CHAPTER II

MIND IN JAINISM.

Morris in his 'Six theories of mind', has stated that there have been three stages in the history of the speculation concerning mind: (i) a period in which mind and nature are vaguely conceived and differentiated; (ii) a period in which they are regarded as different and sharply opposed; and (iii) a period in which the effort is to restore, at a more complex level, the relation between mind and nature which was vaguely conceived in the beginning. Early men made no distinction between mind and nature, between his personal experience and the world outside. Lispings of the early philosophers in the west faced the same problem, and they could not free themselves from the difficulties of the primitive man. There was no opposition between mind and the world. It was not regarded as a private isolated substance but as a principle of motion and the order of the world. It lacked psychological orientation.

Anaximenes held that air was the life of the world just as breath was the life of the body. Heraclitus suggested that reason guides all things. Empedocles spoke of God as only mind, sacred and ineffable mind. Anaxagoras said that mind is infinite and self-rulled and is mixed with nothing. "Over all mind is the ruler", he said, "and over the whole revolving universe mind held away so that it caused it to revolve in the beginning".*1

*1 'Six theories of mind'. Morris. P. 4
These were the gropings of the early philosophers regarding the principle of the universe, and there was a marked absence of the clear distinction between mind and the world of sense. Aristotle writes that on the one hand atomists and the sophists identified sense and reason, on the other hand Parmenides and Democrites made a distinction between thought and sense.\footnote{2}\footnote{Aristotle's \textit{De Anima}. Ch. 2.}

The early Greek philosophers struggled with the problem of mind and its relation to the physical world.

The problem of mind eludes the grasp of the philosophers and the psychologists because it can be analysed into both metaphysical and psychological problems. Metaphysically it refers to mind as the principle of the universe standing in relation to the phenomenal world. This is the cosmic principle which is emphasised by the idealists as the primary principle. Psychologically, it is the individual mind, the individual's system of psychic states in relation to the world of sense. We are, here, more concerned with the psychological significance of the mind, although the metaphysical shades do influence the psychological analyses. The early philosophers could not make a distinction between the two aspects of the problem. This is evident in the different stages of the speculation concerning mind.
The Indian thinkers were also groping to grasp the intangible, the ineffable, and the immaterial. But they could not free themselves easily from the material. The distinction between mind and matter, the mental and the physical was vague and unclear. In the pre-Upanisadic thought, the principle of 'Ṛta' became the principle of order in the universe. It is the underlying dynamic force at the basis of the universe. It compels every animate and inanimate beings to follow the law of its existence. 'Even the gods cannot transgress it. We see in the conception of 'Ṛta' the development from the physical to the divine.' It is by the force of 'Ṛta' that human brains function. 'Man knows' by the driving force of the same immanent power which makes fire to burn and rivers to flow.' The interpretation of the famous Ṛgvedic hymn of creation 'na āsad āsin no sad āsit tadānim' and again 'Kamas tadagresamevartetādhi manaso retah pratiṣya kavayo manisā. Sato bandhum asati niravindahṛi pratiṣya kavayo manisā.' It gives a description that for the first time there arose 'kama' which had the primeval germ of 'manas' within it. Similarly the word 'kratu' is shown to be the antecedent of the word 'manas' or 'prajñā'. In Sat. Brā. 4.1.4.1 there is a description that when a man wishes, 'may I do that, may I have that', that is

*3 'Indian Philosophy' S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. I, p. 79.
*4 'Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy' S. K. Saxena, p. 16.
'Kratu', when he attains that, that is 'Dakṣa'. This same
terms later changed its meaning to 'manas' and 'prajñā'.*6

In the Upaniṣads the importance of the mind and its
function was gradually realized, although it was still in the
pre-analytic stage. In the Upaniṣads man was spoken of as
'pranamaya' and 'manomaya'. We also hear the utterance of the
sages, 'I was elsewhere in my mind --- I could not see ---
I could not hear.'*7 In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.3.1. It is
said that when a man directs his 'manas' to the study of the
sacred hymns, then he studies them or to the accomplishing of
work, he accomplishes them. Again in the Brhadāranyaka
Upaniṣad 4.1.6. we read that by the 'manas' is the man
compelled towards his wife and begets with her a son who is
like him. Thus the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic philosophers were
trying to find the cosmic principle which is the root of the
universe. But their thought was still in the pre-analytic
stage, or as Renan calls it the syncretic stage.*8 This is
perhaps because of the synthetic approach of the Indian thinkers.
Mrs. Rhys Davids mentions that Bergson had asked what would have
happened if the development of thought had started with psycho-
ology. Mrs. Davids says that in India to some extent it did
happen.*9

*6 'Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy' by O.K. Saxena.
P.17.
*7 'Brhad' III. 1.4.
*8 'Birth of Indian Psychology' Budh (1936) by Mrs. Davids. P.4.
The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind shows there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and the psychological approaches to the problem. It is predominantly a realistic approach. The mind and its states are analysed on the empirical level. Still, the Jaina ideal is the 'mokṣa', freedom of the soul from the impurities of 'karma'. The purity and the divinity of the soul are the basic concepts of the Jaina philosophy, and mind has to be linked with the soul and interpreted in metaphysical terms. The Jaina approach was also synthetic. The evidence of the conflict can be found in the description of the various aspects of the mind.

The Jaina theory of the mind as developed by the Jaina  śrokaryas is a theory in which mind and nature are regarded as different in kind and as sharply separated and opposed. If the classification of the stages in the speculation of the concept as presented by Morris can be used, it can be said to be in the second stage of development, although elements of the first and the third stages are not altogether absent. The traces of the primitive speculation were still found. The primitive conceptions of the mind were lingering in the minds of the philosophers. Yet, they also tried to overcome the conflict between mind and nature and establish the intimate relation between them. An analysis of the Jaina conception of mind will bear testimony to the view presented here.

The function of mind, which is an inner organ, is knowing and thinking. Sthānānātha describes it as 'samkalpa vyaparavati'. Anuvamsyākā gives the 'citta vijñāna' as equivalents
of the 'manas'. Citta manovijnānam iti pavyākāh! Viśeṣāvas- 
yaka-Bhāṣya defines 'manas' in terms of the mental processes. It is taken in the substantive sense. Nyāyakośa defines 'manas' in the sense of the inner organ which controls the mental functions.

It is difficult to define mind. If at all it is to be defined, it is always in terms of its own processes. Even the psychologists of the present day find it difficult to give definition of mind without reference to the mental processes. Older psychologists meant by mind something that expresses its nature, powers and functions in the modes of individual experiences and the modes of bodily activity. McDougall also says that we are bound to postulate that 'something'; and, "I do not think," he writes, "that we can find a better word to denote something than the old fashioned word mind." McDougall defined mind as an organised system of mental and purposive forces. Wundt says that mind is a pre-scientific concept. It covers the whole field of internal experience.

The old metaphysical problem whether mind and soul are distinct or identical faced the early philosophers. Aristotle, in his De Anima, says that Democritus regarded mind as identical with the soul for the fineness of its particles. Anaxagoras

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* 10 Viśeṣāvasyaka bhyāsa. 3525. "Mananam va mannaye vā. nena mano."

Also Abhidhāneśaśendra. Vol. VI. Mana. P. 75.


* 12 Physiological Psychology. Wundt. Introd. 3.

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is less exact. He speaks of mind as the cause of goodness or order, and therefore, different from the soul. Mind alone of things is simple, unmixed and pure. Elsewhere, he identifies it with soul where he attributes it to all animals great and small, high or low.  

Titus Lucretius Carus says that mind and soul are kept together in close union and make up a single nature. It is the head so to speak, and it reigns paramount in the whole body.

The Jaina thinkers asserted the distinction between the soul and mind. Mahavira was asked by Gautama whether mind was different from the soul. "Oh Gautama", said Mahavira, "mind is not the soul, as speech, like mind, is different from the soul, although non-living substances have no mind".

The Jaina thinkers did not merely postulate the existence of mind without any evidence. They find the evidence in the experiences of the world. They also give the empirical proof for the operation of the mind. The contact of the sense organ with the soul alone does not give cognition in the relevant experiences, because there is the absence of 'manas'. Something else is necessary for the cognition, and that is the mind. Again, the mind has the functional connotation which speaks for its

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13 'Six theories of mind' by Morris. P. 10.
14 'Classical psychologies' by Rend. P. 98.
15 'Abhidhāna Rājendra' Vol. VI. P. 82.

'idamuktam bhavati-sūnvarthakriyāvācakasabdābhidheyā hi manahprabhubhayāh tadyatā manaṃte manate vā manah, pradipyatīti pradipah, sahasati bhūṣata iti sādāh, dahanatī dahanah, tapatīti tapanah.'
nature: just as the speech signifies the function of speaking, fire expresses the function of burning and the light shows the light.*16

Orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy postulate the existence of mind as an internal sense organ. On the evidence of cognition the contact of the soul with the sense organ is not sufficient. We must posit the existence of a 'manas' some additional condition which brings them together. For instance, a man may not hear a sound or see an object when the mind was pre-occupied, when the mind 'was elsewhere', as we read in the Upanisads. There is also the positive evidence in the facts of memory and experiences like pleasure and pain.*17 As mind is not tangible, the proof of mind has always to be indirect, and not direct. Dr. McDougall infers the structure of the mind from its functions. He writes that we have to build up our description of the mind by gathering all possible facts of human experience and behaviour, and by inferring from these the nature and structure of the mind. He thus makes a distinction between the facts of mental activities and the facts.

*16 Abhidhana Rajendra Vol. VI. P. 82.
*17 B.C. Law Volume IV. P. 38.

N.V. Concept of mind by Dr. Bahaduri.
of mental structure. It is comparable to the structure and the function of the mechanical toy; and one who wishes to ascertain the nature of the machinery within it, can only watch its movements under various conditions." There is nothing scientifically wrong in such a procedure. Even the psychologists in the modern age have adopted a similar procedure. The structure of the molecules, for instance, was inferred on the basis of the observation of the behaviour. *19 Recent comparative psychologists have also tried to find the evidence of mind in the animal behaviour. Miss Washburn says that there is no objective proof for the presence of mind. *20 Evidence from the behaviour has been suggested. Variability of behaviour is said to be a criterion. But this criterion was not found to be satisfactory, because from our own experience we see that very often variability is due to the physiological condition. There is nothing in the mental process to account for the variability. Romanes and other psychologists have suggested that the criterion is based on the variation of behaviour as a result of previous individual experience. Miss Washburn writes, 'the fact is that the proof for the existence of mind can be derived from animal learning by experience only if learning is rapid. But this evidence is not very satisfactory.

Yerkes and Lukas try to find structural evidence for the presence of mind. The similarity of the structure can be taken as evidence for the presence of mind. Lukas suggested the morphological, physiological and teleological criteria for the presence of mind. Yerkes mentions six criteria like, the general form of the organs, the nervous system, the neural organisation and specialisation in the nervous system.*21 Mind functions in various ways. Descartes had said that mind is a substance which thinks. Although it is called a thing which thinks, it is an attribute of the soul. It is a thing 'which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels'.*22 *Nyuṇa Bhāṣya* in Indian thought, describes the activities of the mind as 'remembrance, inference, verbal cognition, doubt, intuition 'pratyākṣa', dream, imagination 'ūhā', as also perception of pleasure and pain and the rest'. They are indicative of the existence of the 'manas'.*23 The operation of the mind is necessary in every act of perception. This is shown by the fact that even when there is the contact of the sense organs with the respective object, there is no simultaneity of perception of all these objects. This is due to the fact that there is no such contact of the 'manas' with other


*22 As quoted in 'Six Theories of Mind' Morris. P. 26

*23 'Nyuṇa Bhāṣya'. I.I. 16.
objects. Mind is characterised by the mental processes like doubting, imagining, dreaming and expecting. It is also characterised by pleasure and pain and desires. These are the distinguishing marks of mind. \(\textit{Nandi-sūtra}\) describes mind as that which grasps everything 'sarvāvha grahanai manan'.

In \textit{Tattvartha-dhigama-sūtra} we are told that scriptural cognition is the object of mind, 'srutamaninṣūriyasya'.

In \textit{Maitri Upanisad}, mind is described in its reflective aspect as source of all mental modifications. He sees by mind, by mind alone he hears, and all that we call desire will be belief, resolution, irresolution. All this is but mind itself.

In modern psychology also, Wundt says that mind will be the subject 'to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal experience.' Mind, in the popular thought is not simply a subject in the logical sense, but a substance in real being, and the various activities of the mind are its expressions or 'notions'. But, this involves, he says, some metaphysical presuppositions. For him, mind is a logical concept of internal experience.

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\*24 \textit{Nyāya Bhāṣya.} I.1.4 as quoted by Rachakrishnam. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. II. P. 50.


\*27 \textit{Tattvartha-sūtra} Ch. II. Sūtra 21.

\*28 \textit{Maitri Upanisad.} Ch. VI. P. 30 as quoted in the constructive survey of Upanisadic Philosophy by R.D. Bhamade. (1926) p. 118.

\*29 \textit{Physiological Psychology} by Wundt. Translated by Titchne. Introduction. 3.
Abhijñana Rājendra mentions that the word 'manas' has a functional significance, because it describes the functions of the mind like thinking, imagining and expecting. And from this functional significance of the mind, the structure of the mind is inferred. The Jaina thinkers make a distinction in the mind, as having two phases of the mind: 'dravya manas' and 'bhāva manas'. 'Mansāh dvividhaa dravya manasbhāva manas ca'. In the Vīsesāvasyaka, we get the description of the two phases of the 'manas'. The material mind, which may be called the mental structure, is composed of infinite, fine and befitting particles of matter meant for the function of mind. 'dravyatah dravya manas'. It is further described as a collection of fine particles which are meant for exciting thought processes due to the 'yoga' arising out of the contact the 'Jīva' with the body. In Gommataśāra Jīva-kānda also there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the coming together of mind molecules like a full blown lotus with eight petals.

The material composition of the mind was not uncommon in the philosophies of the East and the West alike. In the

*30 Abhidhāna Rājendra' Vol. VI. P. 74.
*31 Vīsesāvasyaka-Bhāṣya' 3525 A. Ma. and Abhidhāna Rājendra
Commentary: Tadyogyaīrmānanayo aṣeymanovargapābhya
ghūtairanantaiḥ pujāśairnirvṛttam tad dravyamana bhāyate.'
The Brhad-āraṇyaka Upanisad, mind was looked upon as material. Upanisadic philosophers supposed that mind for its formation depends on "alimentation". It is supposed to be manufactured out of the food that we take. "Anna mayam manah hi somya manah". Food takes three different forms; the heaviest becomes excretion, the medium quality becomes flesh, and the subtlest part becomes mind, just as the churning of curds gives the subtlest which is butter. Later in the days of the Bhagavadgītā, the three temperaments 'rajas' 'tamas' and 'sātva' were recognised and they were due to the different kinds of food. This may be compared to the modern theory of temperament as depending on the secretion of glands. Therefore, pure food was desirable. The quality of food influenced the quality of mind. In Chandogya Upanisad, it is said that when food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure, memory becomes firm. According to the Nyāya theory it is contended that mind, being an additional sense organ, need not be structurally different from the other sense organs. An atom of earth, water or air can, without any logical inconsistency, be credited with the function of mind. Similarly, it cannot be distinguished from 'ākāśa'. There has been a controversy between the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsikas.

\* 33 Chandogya Upanisad, Vol. V. i. and VI. 6. 1-2-.
\* 35 F.C.Law Volume, 'N.V. Conception of Mind', Dr. Bahaduri.
about the material magnitude of the mind. The Naiyāyikas believed that mind is atomic in magnitude. Otherwise there would be simultaneous cognition of different things. The impossibility of cognition was referred to in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad*, 'my mind was elsewhere I could not see — ' as quoted earlier. But the Mimamsakas hold that mind is unlimited in magnitude. The Vedāntists believe that mind is a created substance devoid of any parts and it must be of medium size, 'madhyama parinama'. According to Śākhya Yoga, in the process of evolution due to the disturbance in the balance of the gunas, 'buddhi', ahāskara' and 'manas' are gradually evolved. They are 'jāda' in nature. Hiriyanna says that according to this view, the function that we describe as mental are really mechanical processes of the physical organism, which assume a psychical character only when illuminated by the spirit.*36 In the Vedānta also the 'antahkarana' is looked upon as 'bhūtika' composed of five elements wherein 'tejas' predominate.

Such a description of the nonsentient 'jāda' aspect of mind is endorsed by the modern theories of mind based on the study of the evolution of behaviour from the primordial amoeba. The fundamental features of behaviour is irritability and conductivity, with the specialisation of structures sensitive to the different forms of energy in nature'. There arises the nervous system which not only conducts the impulses but also integrates

*36 'Outline of Indian Philosophy'. Hiriyanna. P. 265
them. Thus behaviour arises on the basis of 'structural modifications which are based on the various types of energy transformation'.

In Western thought also, there were philosophers who conceived of mind as material. Lucretius Carus had said that the nature of mind and also of soul is bodily. 'We perceive that our mind in our body suffers together with body and feels in unison with it. Mind is exceedingly fine and is formed of exceedingly minute bodies -- and also exceedingly round, because after death, life and mind vanish and weight does not change, just as the flavour of wine vanishes without affecting the quality of wine.'

The Jaina philosophers maintained that the 'bhāva manas' is the result of the activities of the 'dravya manas'. It is expressed in the mental processes like thinking, and the 'bhāva manas' is also described as 'jīva' it is the thinking self.

Such a description of mind as 'dravya manas' and the 'bhāva manas', the structural and the psychical aspect can be

*37 ‘Hiriyanna commemoration volume.’
*38 'Nature of Mind in Indian Psychology' by Kuppuswamy.
*39 'Classical Psychologists' by Rand, 1912, P. 99.
*39 'Visēśavasyaka-Bhāṣya' 3525. Num.
compared to the description of mind given by some modern philosophers. C.D. Broad in his *Mind and its place in nature*, presents a similar view. It is a modification of the instrumental theory according to which mind is a substance that is existentially independent of the body. For Dr. Broad, mind is composed of two factors neither of which is and for itself has the property of mind, but which when combined exhibit mental properties. The factors are bodily and the psychic factors. It is comparable to the chemical compound like NaCl and H₂O in which the individual components lose their individual identity when combined. Therefore, 'mentality is likewise an emergent property composed of living body possessed of (i) the nervous system and something else and (ii) the psychic factor which possesses some feeling like mental.' The bodily factor is described as 'the living brain and the nervous system'.

About the psychic factor, Dr. Broad seems to be vague. Neither mental characteristics nor mental events seem to belong to it. It is likely to be 'sentience' only. However, the psychic factor must be capable of persisting for a period at least after the death of the body; and it must be capable, when separated from the body, of carrying 'traces' of experience which happen to the mind of which it was formerly a constituent. In other words, it must comprise the 'mnemic mass'. Dr. Broad's

*40* 'Mind its place in nature' C.D. Broad, 3rd. impression Ch XIII and XIV section B.

view comes nearer to the Buddhist 'vinnāna' rather to the
Jaina view of 'bhāva manas'. Of all the psychic factors in
the Buddhist view, 'vinnāna' has a more permanent nature. In
the Dīgha Nikāya it is mentioned that after death the body is
dissolved, mind ceases, but 'vinnāna', the coefficient of the
desire to enjoy clings to produce their effects in some other
embryo waking elsewhere.*42 With this difference of Broad's
view of the psychic factor, the Jaina view of the distinction
between the 'dravya manas' and the 'bhāva manas' corresponds
with Broad's theory of the composition of mind. In speaking
of the mental structure, McDougall had likened it to the
structure of a machine. However, McDougall also warns us
that it should not be taken in the sense of a material struc­
ture or arrangement of parts. He likens it more to the
composition of a poem or of music. 'The structure of the
mind is a conceptual system that we have to build up by infe­
erence from the data of the two orders, facts of behaviour and
the facts of introspection.'*43 The same can be said of the
composition of the 'manas'.

The Jaina philosophers, however, were aware of both
the elements in the mental life of the animals, although they
were groping to find the relation between the two aspects of

*42 'Buddhist Psychology' Mrs. Rhys Davids. Chapter. 'Mind'
P. 21.
*43 'Outline of Psychology' McDougall. 12th Ed. P. 42.
the mind. The analysis of the psychic factor and the idea of 'prāna' as 'bodily power' has led some philosophers like Zimmer to believe that the Jaina categories represent a comparatively primitive archaic analysis and description of human nature; many of the details of which underlie and remain incorporated in the later classic Indian view.*44 Dr. Zimmer is suggesting that the analysis of the psyche that prevailed in the classic period in the syntheses of the six systems was originally not a Brahmin contribution, but non-Aryan, having come through Śāmkhya Yoga. Its categories are prefigured in the Jaina view.*45 Although the roots of the Jaina view may be primitive, the conception as developed by the Jainas presents a view of the composition of the mind which is comparable to some modern theories as already referred to. However, the 'dravya manas' and the 'bhāva manas' are not two distinct parts, but two aspects only distinguishable by analysis. They treated 'manas' as one activity with the different aspects. The Jainas have refuted the Buddhist theory of mind as a collection of 'khandas'. The Buddhist conception of mind is well described in the 'Samyuktas Nikāya' Vol.II P. 194, as 'that which is called intelligence arises as a thing and ceases as another.' It is a series of flash points, cinema films, thaumatrope figures welded into an apparent phenomenal units.*46 The Jainas say

*45 'Philosophies of India'. P. 228. Footnote by the editor.
that the Buddhist theory goes against the belief in the other world and inactivity, 'akṛtabhyagamāt'. Mind for the Jainas is a whole and not a collection, nor even a compound of 'dravya and bhāvamanas'. Stout has said that the unity of the individual mind is the unity of the complex whole which is indivisible in as much as its partial ingredients have not an independent existence of their own. The unity of such a mind is beyond comparison.*47

Each 'Jīva' has its own mind, although the general nature of mind is one; 'manana laksanatvena sayvamanasametavat' because the essential nature of mind is the expression of the mental states. In the Sthānāṅga we read, 'ege jīvānām mane'.*48 In this way and according to the situation, the gods, men, and 'asuras' have their own minds. In the Tattvārtha-sūtra, the classification of the souls, five sensed organisms, with minds is mentioned. 'Sañjñinah samanaskah!*49 In the five sensed organisms only some possess minds. Comparative psychologists like Kohler and Alverdes have shown that mind in the developed form is possible in the case of higher animals having insight. Naiyāyikas also believed that each organism possesses a mind and sensitive organs in order that it may be in a position to

*47 'Monist'. Vol. XXXVI, 1936, I, 51.
*48 'Abhidhāna Rajendra' Vol. VI. P.82. and 'Sthānāṅga' I, 6.
*49 'Tattvārtha-sūtra'. Ch. II, Sūtra 11.
cognise the objects and to experience pleasure and pain in accordance with past 'karma'. Each self has one mind because a single mind of atomic magnitude cannot be shared by all. This mind in each self can function only inside the organism with which the self is connected. If there were one common mind for all, there would be simultaneity of cognition. A similar argument was presented by the Jain-thinkers from the side of the 'Jiva' as 'bhāva manarūpa'. If the 'Jiva' were 'sarvagata', there would be cognition of everything by every one. Their arguments were more metaphysical and epistemological than psychological. But modern psychology has tried to analyse the same problem from the psychological point of view. Dr. McDougall writes, 'It seems probable that mind has the same nature wherever and whenever it exists or manifests itself, whether in animals, men or superhuman beings, whether in the newborn infant, the fool, or the wise man. On the other hand, the structure of the mind seems to be peculiar to each individual; not only is it very various in the various species of animals (if they have minds) and in man; but the structure of the mind of one man is different from that of every other man; and, in any one man at each stage of his career or life-history, it is not quite the same as at any other stage.

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*50 'B.C.Law.' Volume II. P. 18. 'A.V. Concept of Mind'.

*51 'Abhidhāna Sāndhra.' Vol. VI. P. 75: "sarvagrohanaprasangatapi tat asangatam."

*52 'Outline of Psychology.' 12th Ed. P. 35-36.
The ancient Indian philosophers were faced with the problems concerning the instrumental nature of the mind. It was generally believed that, like other sense organs, mind was also a sense organ, and it is the instrument of the soul. In the Upanisads we find references to the mind as one of the organs along with the other sense and motor organs, 'jnānendriyas and karmendriyas'. Prasna Upanisad mentions 'manas' as a central organ. Reference to the 'manas' as the driver of the ten organs in the Maitri Upanisad may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philosophy accepts mind as the internal organ. There were some philosophers who made 'buddhi', 'ahāmakāra', and 'manas' together as the internal organ 'antahkāra'. But Jayanta believed that mind is the only internal organ. Similarly, Vidyānandi maintained that 'buddhi' and 'ahāmakāra' cannot be regarded as a sense organ. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers regarded the mind as the internal organ. But Jautama did not include it in the list of the sense organs - Kṣesāda was also silent. Vātsyāyana includes 'manas' under the senses. He calls it the inner sense by which we apprehend the inner states of feelings, desires and cognitions. The self perceives the inner states by the instrument of the 'manas'. Vātsyāyana believes that mind is as good a sense organ as the eye and the like, though there are certain differences. But the Jainas believed...

53 Philosophy of the Upanisad. Deussen. 58.
that the mind is a 'no-indriya' in the sense that it is different from the five sense organs. Its sense contents and functions are not entirely identical with those of indriyas. 'No' does not mean 'not', but at times it is rendered by 'iśad'.

Still they accept the instrumental function of the mind. In the Gommatasāra: Jīva-kanda, we get the description of mind as the 'no-indriya'. It is through the mind that mental knowledge and mental activity arise. But in the case of the mind there is no external manifestation as in the case of the other sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative. Pramāna-Mīmāṃsa describes mind as the thing which grasps everything. In the Vyrtti of the same it is said, 'manonindriyamiti no indriyamiti ca ucyate'. In the Tatvārtha-sūtra, the function of mind, which is 'anindriya', is described as the 'sruta' cognition. The second function is the 'mati' and its modifications. It is called the organ of apprehension of all objects because all senses - and not specifically determined, such as touch of the tactile sense, are apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the instrumental nature, 'karaṇatva' of the mind. But it is said that the 'karaṇa' is of two types - 'bāhya karaṇa' and 'antahkaraṇa' and even the 'dravya-maṇas' is

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54 Gommatasāra. 444. 'No indiyatti sappṣa tassa have sasa-
- indiyamva vattattābhāvādo ---'.
55 Pramāna-Mīmāṃsa. 24. and Vyrtti.
56 Tatvārtha-sūtra. II. 21. and Pramāna-Mīmāṃsa Vyrtti.
'Srutaṃtihivissayina vissyasas nirdesah'.

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described as the 'antahkarana', the internal organ. Being the internal organ, it is different from the other sense organs.*57

However, such a description of mind need not be interpreted in the sense that, according to the Jaina view, mind is not a sense organ. That it is a 'no-indriya' does not mean that it is not a sense organ. In fact it is more than a sense organ. Its function is not specific like that of the other sense organs. It is 'sarvārthāgrahaṇa', as it is stated in the *Pramāṇapadāmadhavāntara.

Another problem that the Jaina thinkers faced along with other Indian philosophers was the 'prāpyakārita' of the mind. This problem is peculiar to Indian philosophers. It refers to the capacity of the sense organ to come in actual contact with the object of experience. According to the Nyāya philosophers, mind is 'prāpyakāri', because cognition is possible when the mind comes in contact with the object through the sense organs. The speed of the 'manas' in contacting the object is greater than the speed of any other sense organ. But the Jainas believe that the 'manas' is 'aprāpyakāri'. It does not directly come in contact with the objects. They strongly object to those who argue that it is 'prāpyakāri'. If, they say, the mind were 'prāpyakāri', then the mind would go out of its place and meet

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the objects, like the idol of Jina on the mount Meru, both during the waking and the sleeping state. But this is not so; otherwise there would be confusion of experiences. While thinking of fire, we should experience burning. When we think of poison, we should experience poisoning. Similarly, when we think of the sandalwood, we should experience coolness. Even the 'dravya manas', although it is made of the fine particles of the matter, cannot get cognition, because it is unconscious 'acetana'. Moreover, it is an internal organ unlike the other sense organs. Those who believe that the mind is 'prapyaśkāri' may give dream experience as evidence: mind goes out of its place to the 'jīvālaya' on the mountain Meru in the dream. But such experiences are also false because they do not correspond to facts of experience. They are like the illusion of moving circle when a burning stick is moved fast. 'ālayaḥ bhrama. After waking up, we find that our experience in the dream is false. The argument for the 'prapyaśkāritva' of the mind on the basis of undifferentiated unanalysed cognition is also not acceptable. This problem has a great psychological significance, although it is found even in primitive times. It is intimately connected with the problem of the process of perception.

Ancient philosophers could not free themselves from the animistic ideas inspite of the fact that they had advanced in

the direction of conceiving the immaterial as distinct from the material. Jain view expresses the naturalistic approach to the analyses of the mental states. Still the metaphysical approach was not absent. The Jainas were trying to see the problem from a more analytic and empirical point of view. They centred their discussions on the various facts of experience, as in the waking and the dream state in order to find evidence for the 'aprapyakāri' nature of the mind.

One more problem remains, and that is the problem of the relation between body and mind. This has been a perennial problem for the philosophers and psychologists of the east and the west. The problem has a metaphysical and a psychological side. There have been philosophers who have made attempts for solving this problem. Whether it refers to the individual minds and bodies or with the general relation—the finite mind to matter, there are various possible solutions to the problem. Materialists say that only the body is real and the mind or the mental is only the product and is dependent upon it. The idealists lay emphasis on the primacy of the mind. The material is unreal, or it is manifestation of the mental. There are other solutions, like those who say the both are unreal or two aspects of some higher reality. The realists on the other hand emphasize the reality of both matter and mind. Similarly there are many divergences in these views, especially when it refers to the relation between the finite mind and the finite body.
The relation between the finite body and the finite mind may be: 
a) a complete dependence as when mind is regarded as the 'secretion of the brain or a sort of epiphenomenon, a product of processes: and similarly a by-product of the physical processes; b) that of parallelism, the two series mental and bodily corresponding step by step, element for element to each other; or c) that of reciprocity or interaction, the mental processes being the condition of the bodily, and the bodily of the mental. Jaina philosophers discussed the metaphysical aspect of the problem. They were, at the same time, not unaware of the psychological side of the question. Still the distinction between the metaphysical and the psychological was not clearly drawn. Mahāvīra points out to the Ganadhara Yāvasūti that it is not correct to maintain that consciousness is produced by the collection of the 'bhūtas' material elements like earth and water, as intoxication is produced by the mixture of 'ghātaki' flower and the jaggery, although it is not found in the constituents separately. On the contrary, 'cetanā' is the quality of the soul. It is different from the bodily aspect. In this, we find the refutation of the Lokāyata view. Similar arguments are found in Sūtrakṛtāṅga. In Pāñcāstikāya sāra, Kundakundācārya discusses the problem from the side of the effect of 'karma' on the 'jīva'. On account of the rise, annihilation and suppression of 'karma', 'jīva' has five 'bhāvas'.

59 'ganadhara-vāda.' Part 3. Discussion with Ganadhara Yāvasūti.
60 'sūtrakṛtāṅga'. gāthā. 8, with commentary.
61 'Pāñcāstikāya sāra'. 69, 70-77. edited. 4th editor's commentary. P.
physical characteristics of "karma" like 'udaya', 'ksaya' etc.,
determine the corresponding psychic characteristics called
'bhāvas'. The last 'parināmic bhāva' is not causally connected
with 'samsāra' or 'moksa'. It is a 'niskriya bhāva'. Being
affected by the changes in the karmic material, 'jīva' experiences
certain emotional states. But whatever emotional states appear
in the consciousness are due to the causal agency of 'jīva'. The
extrinsic cause is the physical matter and the proximate cause
is the 'jīva'. 'Karma' is of two types, 'dravya karma' and 'bhūva
carma'. Peculiar combination of 'paramāṇu', atoms, form the
material 'karma'. A change in the material 'karma' may bring about
a similar change in the psychic states. This conscious change
has a predominantly affective tone. This is 'bhāva karma'.
Thus, it is really parallelistic. There are two distinct causal
agencies as 'nimitta kārtā' or efficient cause 'upādānakārtā' or
substantial cause. 'Jīva' is the substantial cause of psychic
changes. It is the immediate cause. 'Bhāva' is the psychic
change, and it can be brought by a psychic change only. 'Karmic'
matter is the substantial cause of the physical changes, these
are the two series which correspond to each other. 'Karmic'
matter brings about its own changes. 'Jīva', through its own
impure ways of thought that are conditioned by karmic matter
brings about its own thought changes. These two processes form
independent series. This seems to suggest a psycho-physical
parallelism. But the parallelism is not merely the temporal
 correspondence of the two series. It is transcended by the
doctrine of the 'nimitta karta'. Like the Cartesian view, their thinking and the unthinking are distinct, yet the two are related by the peculiar concept of causal relation. The unthinking may be the 'nimitta karta' of the other, and the converse also may be true. However, the two causal changes are independent. The Sāṁkhya thinkers raised objections against such a view. If the 'karmic' matter affects its own change and if 'Jīva' brings about his own changes, why should he enjoy the fruits of the 'karma' for which he is not responsible; and why should the two independent series affect each other? But Kundakundaśārya answers that the world space is filled with material bodies, some imperceptible and some perceptible. These constitute the 'karma'. These are the 'karma varganās'. They are physical molecules of a particular constitution which give them tendency to be attracted by the 'Jīva'. This is also known as the 'karma prayoga pudgala'. 'Jīvas' and 'karma varganās' coexist. But by the mere fact of contiguity, 'Jīva' and karmic matter are brought together as the casket filled with black collierum powder becomes black by mere contact.

The relation of this 'bhāvamana-rūpa Jīva' to the body is described on the analogy of the mixture of milk and water: 'kṣāra-niravat' similar, just as the Lotus-hued ruby placed

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*62 'Pancastikāyasāra'. 70-77. Editor's note. P. 71-78.
*64 'Abhidhāna Rajendra' Vol. VI. P. 75.
in a cup of milk imparts its lustre to the milk, the 'Jīva' residing in the body imparts its lustre or intelligence to the body.

Radhakrishnan says that the Jainas accept the dualism of body and mind. They accept the view of parallelism with all its limitations. And, to the question why 'Jīva' should suffer the fruits of 'karma' for which it is not responsible, 'a sort of pre-established harmony' is suggested. But the Jainas do not speak merely in terms of the preestablished harmony. Their theory transcends the parallelism and tries to give a more intimate connection between body and mind.

Some modern psychologists like Jodl would limit the extent of parallelism. Mind is correlated with body, but only under certain conditions, where there is a certain complexity or organic structure, a central nervous system. Some others like Spencer, Hoffding and Paulson make the parallelism universal. The Jainas have given a modified parallelism with reference to the psychic activity as determined by the karmic matter.

The analysis of the Jaina concept of mind so far shows that the Jainas were clearly aware of the distinction between

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*65 'Indian Philosophy' Radhakrishnan, Vol. I. P. 310.
*66 'Body and Mind' McDougall. Ed. 1911. Ch. J-III
mind and body. Metaphysically, they had given the dichotomous division as 'Jīva' and 'Ajīva'. They presented a sort of psycho-physical parallelism concerning the individual minds and bodies. Yet, they were not unaware of the interaction between the mental and the bodily. The empirical approach showed them that there is such mutual influence. The idea of the 'nimitta-kārtā' was introduced for the solution of the problem. The idea of the structure of the mind 'dravya-mānas', and the functional aspect of 'bhāva-mānas' mind, shows that they were aware of the significance of interaction. A clear and a consistent formulation would have been possible if the metaphysical and the psychological analyses were clearly distinguished. The Jaina theory was an attempt at the integration of the metaphysical dichotomy of 'Jīva' and 'Ajīva' and the fact of the interaction of the individual minds and the bodies.