CHAPTER I

THE JAINA THEORY OF THE SOUL.

The problem of the soul has been a perennial problem in religion and speculative philosophy. The primitive man had made a distinction between body and soul. The burial of the dead with their belongings and even the mummification of the Egyptians are based on such a distinction between body and the spirit. The philosophical concept of the soul has developed from such primitive distinctions.

In modern psychology, the idea of the soul is no longer important. In its place has come the notion of self or 'the centre of interest'. The word 'soul' is ambiguous. Sometimes it stands for mind and sometimes for self and sometimes for both. The English word points to an entity as the cause or vehicle of physical or psychical activities of the individual person. The soul is a spiritual substance. In Indian thought the word 'Atman' has undergone various changes. It is little used in the Vedas. It primarily meant breath. In the Upanisads another word 'prāṇa' is used for breath, and 'Atman' stood for the innermost of man. Man was 'Atmavat'. For the Upanisadic seers, the soul was a presupposition for all experiences. Indian philosophers, with the exception of 'Mayāvāda' of 'Śamkara' and 'Kṣanikavāda' of Buddhism, fundamentally agree about the nature of the soul as a permanent
eternal, and imperishable substance. But the primitive Aryans believed that the life of man is continued after death in a shadowy existence in some subtle bodily form. This is not the soul of the later philosophers. Jacobi calls it the psyche. This is the developed form of the primitive notion of life after death lingering in some form. It is found even today in the practice of 'sraddhā'. The psyche is frequently spoken of as 'puruṣa' and of the size of the thumb, 'angūṣṭha-mātra'. At the time of death it departs from the body. In the oldest Ṛgveda-saṃhitās the psyche is described as constituted by the 'prānās' psycho-physical factor. Still, these factors were not regarded as principles of personality.

The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in Jaina philosophy. Jainism aims at the practice of the liberation of the soul from the cycle of birth and death. The saving of the soul is the Christian ideal. In the Apology, Plato makes Socrates say that his mission was to get men to care for the soul and to make them as good as they can.

Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous division of categories. All things are divided into living and non-living, souls and non-souls. In the first verse of the Dvaya-samgraha, we read, 'The ancient among the great Jainas

*1 Studies in Jainism. (Part one).
- The place of Jainism in Indian thought by Dr. Hermann Jacobi.
has described the 'dravyas' as 'Jīva' and 'Ajīva'. 'Jīva' is a category and 'Jīva' personalised becomes 'Atman'. Jainism believes in the plurality of the souls. Souls are substances distinct from matter. Souls influence one another. But they are quite distinct from one another and not connected in any higher unity. They may be called spiritual monads. Jainism emphasises the diversity of souls. Amongst the Muslim theologians Hazam and his school maintained that the soul is a spiritual substance.

Jainism considers the soul from two points of view, the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view, the 'niscaya naya' and the 'vyavahāra naya'. Dravyānuyogatarkaṇa of Bhoja describes the distinction as mentioned in the Viṣeṣāvyāya-khaṇḍa by saying that the 'niscaya' narrates the real thing and the 'vyavahāra' narrates the things in the popular way. In the jana-yaśas, Kund undacarya points out that the practical standpoint is essential for the exposition of the inner reality of things, as a on-Aryan is never capable of understanding without the non-Aryan tongue.*2

The existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any proofs, we can say that all the 'pramanās' can establish the existence of the soul. 'Oh Gautama, the soul is 'pratyokṣa' said

*2 'S asa'. Edited by J.L. Jaini.
Mahāvīra, 'for that in which your knowledge consists is itself soul. What is 'pratyakṣa' need not be proved like the pleasure and pain of the body. It is 'pratyakṣa' owing to the 'ahām-pratyakṣa', the realization of the 'I' which is associated with the functions pertaining to all the three tenses.³ William James and James Ward present self-consciousness in this form. Ward talks of the 'internal perception' or self-consciousness. The last order of knowledge of the duality of subject and object is an indispensable condition of all actual experience however simple. It is, therefore, first in order of existence. It is the subject of experience that we call the pure ego or self.⁴ William James says, 'For, this central part of the self is felt — it is something with which we also have direct sensible consciousness in which it is present, as in the whole life time of such moments.'⁵ Thus one who ignores the self-evidence of the soul is like one who says that sound is inaudible and the moon is devoid of the moon. The existence of the soul can be inferred from the behaviour of the others. Similarly the soul exists because, 'it is my word, Oh! Gautama'.⁶

The 'Jīva' is described from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, the

*3 'Ganadharavāda' 6
*4 'Psychological Principles' by James Ward (1918) p. 370.
*5 'The Principles of Psychology' by William James, Vol. I, Ch. 1, P. 298.
*6 'Ganadharavāda'. 34.
soul is described in the pure form. The phenomenal point describes the empirical qualities of the soul. From the pure point of view, it is not associated with body or any physical or mental qualities. Mahāvīra points out to the third 'Ganadhara' that the soul is different from the body and its senses; just as Devadatta recollects an object perceived through the five windows of the palace, which is different from one palace and the five windows, so also a person recollecting an object perceived through the five senses of the body is different from the senses and the body.*7

The Buddhist impermanence of the soul is also refuted. Buddhists had said that there was no self except the 'khandas' Kundakundācārya points out that from noumenal point of view the soul and body are not one, although in worldly practice the soul having a beautiful body is called beautiful and fair like the beautiful body of the living 'arhat'.*8 In the Chandogya Upanisad, in the dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Janaka, the idea of the self is progressively brought out by showing that it is not bodily nor the dream-states.

From the noumenal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. From the real point of view, the soul is unbound, untouched and not other than itself.

*7 Gandhadara veda. 109 and Sūtra Kṛṣṭāṅga. 33.
*8 Samaya sarā. 39. 42.
The soul is one and not composite. In the Sthānānga we get the description of the soul as one, 'ege ātā'. The commentator describes it as 'ekavidhah ātmanah'. In Śamayasaṅra, Kundakundaśāraya describes the absolute oneness of the soul 'on the strength of my self realization'. This does not mean that the Self is one in the Vedāntic sense, in the sense of cosmic self. It does not contradict the plurality of the souls in Jainism. It only emphasises the essential identity of the souls. 'Jīvas' in all their individual characteristics are essentially the same. If the soul were one, then, 'Oh! Gautama' there will not be 'sukha, duhkha, bandha, mokṣa' etc. The individual souls are different like the 'kumbhas'.

The nature of 'Jīva' has been well described by Nemiścandra in his Dravyasamgraha. He describes the soul both from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. He says that 'Jīva' is characterised by 'upayoga', is formless and is an agent. It has the same extent as its body. It is the enjoyer of the fruits of 'karmas'. It exists in 'samsāra'. It is 'siddha' and it has a characteristic of upward motion. We get a similar description in the Pancaśikavasāra of Kundakundācārya. 'Jīva' is formless. It is characterised by 'upayoga'. It is attached to 'karma'. It is the lord, the agent and the enjoyer.

*9 As quoted in Abhidhāna-Hejendra Vol. II 'Atte'
*10 Śamayasaṅra 5.
*11 Ganadnaravada 34.
*12 Dravyasamgraha 2.
of fruits of 'karma'. It pervades the bodies large or small. It has a tendency to go upward to the end of 'loka', being freed from the impurities of 'karma'. Tattvārthasūtra describes the nature of the soul as possessing 'upayoga' as an essential characteristic.

Every 'Jīva' possesses infinite number of qualities. Glassenapp in his "Doctrine of karma in Jaina philosophy" mentions eight important characteristics as:

1. The faculty of omniscience, 'kevala jñāna'.
2. The faculty of undifferentiated cognition, 'kevala darsana'.
3. Superiority over joy and grief.
4. Possession of belief in complete religious truth, 'samyaktva' and irreproachable moral conduct, 'caritra'.
5. Possession of eternal life, 'aksayasthitī'.
6. Complete formlessness, 'amūrtatva'.
7. Unrestricted energy, 'vīryatva'.
8. Complete equality in rank with other 'Jīvas'.

The first characteristic of the soul is 'upayoga'. The word 'upayoga' is difficult to define. It is the source of experience. Cognitive, conative, and affective aspects spring from it. It is a differentia of the living organism. Umasvati says that essential 'upayoga' is the characteristic of the soul. 'Upayoga' has conative

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*13 'Pancastikāyasaśāra' 27-28.
*14 'Tattvārthādīgamasūtra' Ch. II, 8.
prominence. It may be called 'horme' in the sense that McDougall has used the term. It is a vital impulse or urge to action. P.T. Munn had stated that horme is the basis of activity that differentiates the living animal from the dead matter. It is like Schopenhauer's 'will to live', Bergson's 'élan vital'. 'Jñāna' and 'darsana' are the manifestations of 'upayoga'.

'Citta' or 'cetana' as a characteristic of the soul is important in Indian philosophy. In Brāhmaṇgraha the 'Jīva' is described as possessing 'cetana' from the noumenal point of view. 'Cetana' is a sort of inclination which arises from 'upayoga'. This inclination branches in two directions - 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. 'Darsana' may be said to be undifferentiated knowledge. 'Jñāna' is the cognition in detail. 'Jīva' has infinite 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. But certain classes of 'karma' like 'jñānavaraniya' and 'darsanavaraniya karma' tend to obscure and confuse the essential nature of 'Jīva'. From the phenomenal point of view 'darsana' and 'jñāna' tend to manifest themselves in eight kinds of 'jñāna', and four kinds of 'darsana'.

The possession of 'upayoga' raises the question whether 'Jīva' possesses 'upayoga' and is yet different from it or whether it is identical with it. The Nyāya theory does not recognise the identity of quality and its possessor. Jainism asserts that only from the phenomenal point of view they are separable. In Pancastikāvyasāra we read, 'Only in common parlance we separate
'darśana' and 'jñāna'. But in reality there is no separation!*15

The soul is inseparable from 'upayoga'. Horæ is the essential characteristic of the living organism. It is manifested in the fundamental property experienced in the incesant adjustments and adventures that make up the tissue of life and which may be called 'drive' or the felt tendency towards an end.*16

The animal life is not merely permeated by physical and chemical processes; it is more than that. Even the simplest animal is autonomous.

The soul is simple and without parts. It is formless. As the soul is immaterial it has no form. This quality has been mentioned in other systems also. The Jaina thinkers were against the Buddhist idea of the soul as the cluster of 'khandas'. Buddhists do not refer to the permanent soul. It is a composite of mental states called the 'khandas'. In the modern western thought, Hume said, 'When I enter most intimately into what I call 'myself', I always stumble upon some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch 'myself' any time without perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.'17

Hoffding stated that the ego has been looked for in vain as

*15 Pañcaстiкāya sāra. 41.
*16 Outline of psychology by William McDougall. Ch. 3
something absolutely simple. The nature of the ego is manifested in the combination of sensation, ideas and feelings. But Herbert maintained that the soul is a simple being not only without parts but also without qualitative multiplicity. Modern psychology has emphasised the substantiality, simplicity, persistence and consciousness as the attributes of the soul. Descartes had said 'I am the thing that thinks, that is to say who doubts who affirms — who loves who hates and who feels'; and he designates the thing as 'substance'.

Hamilton advocated the four characteristics with the most explicitness. Other prominent names are those of Porter, Calkins, Angell and Aveling.

From the phenomenal point of view, 'Jiva' is also described as possessing four 'prāṇas'. They are sense, 'indriya', energy 'bala', life 'āyu' and respiration 'āna'. Pancaśīkāyāsāra gives the same description. The idea of 'prāṇa' is found in Indian and Western thought. In the Old Testament (Genesis Book I) we read, 'The lord God breathed into the nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul'. In the primitive minds we find the conception that the wind gave men life. When it ceases to blow, men die. In the Navaho legend there is a description of the life force according to which we see the trace of the wind in the skin.

*18 'Meditations. II
at the tips of fingers. 'Prānas' refer to psycho-physical factors of the organism. The 'Jīva' assumes the bodily powers when it takes new forms in each new birth. Whatever thing manifests in the four 'prānas' lives and is 'Jīva'. The four 'prānas' are manifest in ten forms. The 'jindriya' expresses itself in five senses. 'Bala' consists of mental, bodily and speech. 'Āyu' and 'āna' are one each. These 'prānas' in all the details need not be present in all organisms, because there are organisms with less than five sense organs. But there must be the four main characteristics. The most perfectly developed souls have all the ten 'prānas' and the lowest have only four. This has a great biological and psychological significance. Comparative psychology points out that in the psycho-physical development of the various levels of animal species in the lower organisms, chemical sense which is affected by chemical reaction is the only sense function; and it later becomes the separate sense of taste and smell. Experimental investigations carried by Riley and Forel point out that chemical sense is used in the insects like moths even for mating. Forel has given a topo-chemical theory for explaining the behaviour of bees. As we go higher in the scale of life, chemical sense plays little part. In birds, sight and smell are well-developed. In mammals, we find a higher degree of qualitative discrimination of smell. As we go higher still, we get the variability of adaptation which may be called intelligence.

*20 'Pancastikaśvasara' 30
In the *Brāhmaṇa* and the oldest *Upaniṣada* there is the description of the psyche as consisting of five 'prāṇas'. They are regarded as factors of physico-psychological life. Occasionally more than five 'prāṇas' are mentioned. But still the idea of a permanent self had not shaped itself. In the third adhyāya of the *Brhadāranyaka* sage Yājñavalkya was asked to explain what happens to the person after the body has been dissolved, the parts of the psyche had been remitted to the fire and wind. He avoids the discussion and suggests that 'karma' remains after death.*21* This was a step in advance to the formation of the permanent self. *Brhadāranyaka* also contains a discussion about the constituent parts of the soul. Eight instead of five have been suggested. 'Vijñāna' and 'jñāta' are mentioned. This 'vijñānamayaḥ puruṣaḥ' comes nearer to the conception of the soul, although personal immortality is not emphasised. In Jainism also, the idea of a permanent soul possessing 'prāṇas' must have developed on the same lines.

From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is the lord 'prabhu', the doer 'karta', enjoyer 'bhoktā' limited to his body 'dehamatra', still incorporeal, and it is ordinarily found with 'karma'. As a potter considers himself as a doer and enjoyer of the clay pot, so from the practical point of

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view, the mundane soul is said to be the doer of things like constructing houses and the enjoyer of sense objects. As the soul produces the impure thought activities and hence as a consequence the material 'karmas', it also enjoys the thoughts with the help of the material 'karmas'. Thus 'Jīva' enjoys its thought-created activity. However, from the noumenal point of view, 'Jīva' is the doer of 'suddha bhāvas' or pure thought 'karmas'; and from the phenomenal point of view, it is the doer of 'pudgal karmas' or 'karmic' matter. The distinction between the formal cause, 'nimitta' or material cause, 'upādāna' has been introduced for the description of the soul. The Jains say that the soul is the efficient cause of the material 'karmas'. The 'Jīva' possesses consciousness, and consciousness manifests itself in the form of various mental states. These mental states are responsible for activities which produce material 'karmas'. It is, therefore, asserted that 'Jīva' is the agent of thought — 'karmas' indirectly of the 'karmic' matter. The Pancastikāyāsāra describes the 'Ātman' as the agent of its own 'bhāvas'. But it is not the agent of 'pudgala karmas'. Jainism emphasises the activity of the 'Jīva' as against the Sāmkhya view of the passive 'udāsina puruṣa'. As a consequence of activity. The 'Jīva' experiences happiness and misery. But Nemicandra says that it is only from the phenomenal point

*22 'Pancastikāyāsāra' 27 and 'Samayasāra' 124.
*23 'Dravyasamgraha' 8, 9.
*24 'Pancastikāyāsāra' 6, 28.
of view. From the noumenal point of view, 'Jīva' has consciousness and it enjoys eternal bliss. In Dravyasaṃgraha 9 we read, 'Niccayanyado cedana bhāvan khu adassa'. The joys and sorrows that 'Jīva' experiences are the fruits of 'dravya karma'. But Buddhism believes that the agent never enjoys the fruits of 'karma'. James Ward gives the general characterisation of the 'varied content of the empirical self', and says that the self has first of all (a) a unique interest and (b) a certain inwardness, further it is (c) an individual that (d) persists (e) is active, and finally it knows itself. *25

But the process of entanglement in the activity and enjoyment is beginingless. It gets entangled in the 'samsāra' and gets embodied through the operation of 'karmas'. The soul gets various forms due to the 'upādhi' conditions, and it is involved in the cycle of birth and death. It is subjected to the forces of 'karmas' which express themselves first through the feelings and emotions and secondly in the chains of very subtle kinds of matter, invisible to the eye and the ordinary instruments of science. When the soul is embodied, it is affected by the conditions of the environment, physical, social and spiritual in different ways. Thus, we get the various types of the soul existence. The soul embodies itself and identifies itself with the various functions of the bodily and social environment.

*25 'Psychological Principles' by James Ward (1918), Ch. XV. P. 368.
William James distinguishes between the self as known or the 'me', the empirical ego as it is sometimes called and the self as knower or the 'I', pure ego. The constituents of the 'me' may be divided into three classes; as the material 'me', the social 'me', and the spiritual 'me'. The body is the innermost part of the material 'me'. Then come the clothes, our home, and the property. They become parts of our empirical ego with different degrees of intimacy. A man's social 'me' is the recognition that he gets from his fellowmen. A man has many selves as there are individuals and groups who recognise him. The spiritual 'me' also belongs to the empirical 'me'. It consists of the 'entire collection of consciousness, my psychic faculties and dispositions taken concretely.' But the pure self, the self as the knower is very different from the empirical self. It is the thinker, that which is conscious of. This is permanent, what the philosophers call the soul or the transcendental ego.*26 James Ward also makes a distinction between the self known or the empirical ego and the pure self. For him, the empirical ego is extremely complex. It is the presented self. The earliest element is the presented self, is the bodily or the somatic consciousness. But they never have the same inwardness as the 'the sense of embodiment'. We also find a certain measure of individual permanence and inwardness, that belongs to the self. We may call this 'the sensitive end the

appetitive self.' With the development of the ideation there arises what we call the inner zone having still more unity and permanence. This is the imaging and desiring self. At the level of intellection, we come to the concept that every intelligent person is a person having character, history and his aim in life through social interaction. This gives conscience, a social product as Adam Smith had said. At this stage a contrast between the thinker and the object of thought is clearly formed. This is the thinking and willing self. At this stage even the inner ideation and desire become outer, no longer strictly self. The duality of subject and object is the last order of knowledge and is the indispensable condition of all actual experience. It is the subject of experience that we call pure ego or self.*27

The Jaina thinkers made a distinction between the soul states as 'bahiratman', 'antaratman' and 'paramatman'. 'Bahiratman' consists in the identification of the self with body and external belongings. It is the bodily self. In this, we say, 'I am the body, I am fat, I am lean etc.' This identification is due to ignorance. The same soul is in the 'karma-vasthā' and is characterised by 'suddha-caitanya' and bliss. It is free from all senses of otherness. It has discriminative knowledge. This conscious self is 'antaratman' in the 'saṃyogṛṣṭi guṇasthāna'. The pure and perfect self which is

*27 'Psychological Principles' by James Ward. Ch. II.
free from the impurities of 'karma' is the 'paramātman'. It is characterised by perfect cognition and knowledge. It is freed and is a 'siddha'. This 'paramātman' is 'jñānamaya' and it is pure consciousness. It cannot be known by the senses. It has no 'indriyas' and no 'manas'. From the noumenal point of view, these are the attributes of the soul.*18 The Jaina approach to the problem is metaphysical. It contains the elements of psychological investigation. But that is in the language of metaphysics. The modern psychologists, especially the rational psychologists, stopped at the psychological analyses and explained the process of realizing the pure nature of the self from the empirical stage to the stage of pure ego. But the transcendental self is not the subject of psychology. William James had said that the states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with. 'Metaphysics or theology may prove the existence of the soul; but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous'.*29

Jainism refers to the size of the soul. Although the souls are not of any definite size, they contract and expend according to the size of the body in which they are incorporated for the time being. The soul is capable of adjusting its size to the physical body, as the lamp placed

*28 'Pramātmaprakāśa'. 31
*29 'Briefer Course' by William James. P. 203.
in a large or small room illuminates the whole space of the
room. Hemacandra describes it as the phenomenal characteris-
tic of the soul. From the noumenal point of view it is said
to exist in innumerable 'pradesas'. In respect of the elasti-
city of the soul, Jainism differs from the other schools of
Indian thought. As Jacobi said, the Jainas have a tenet of the
size of the soul which is not shared by other philosophers.

Some philosophers like the Vaisesikas, Democritus
and the atomists thought of the soul as atomic. Some others
talked of the omnipresence of the soul. Dr. Jacobi says that
the original Vaisesika was not clear on this point. Some
Sāṃkhyā writers preferred the soul to be infinitely small, while
Īśvara Kṛṣṇa and later writers characterised it as all
pervading. The spatial view of the habitation of the soul
had occupied the minds of the Upanisadic philosophers. Upa-
nisadic psychology agrees with the Aristotelian in localising
the soul in the heart. It was later thought that it was in
the brain. Yogic and tantric books recognised the cerebro-
chemical processes and consciousness was traced in the brain.
In the Śaṅkārya Upanisad (1.6.1.2) we get the description
that the soul in the heart moves by a passage through the bones
of the palate right up to the skull where the hairs are made to
part. The soul in the heart is called 'Manomaya'. In the

*30 'Dravyasamgraha' 10.

*31 'Studies in Jainism' by Dr. Hermann Jacobi. Edited by
Jina Vijaya Muni. P. 83.

*32 Ibid. P. 8a.
Kausitaki Upanisad: The soul is described as the master of all bodily functions. The senses depend on the soul as the relatives on the rich. The self is immanent in the whole body, and is hidden in it. This passage leads to the view, like the Jaina view, that the soul fills the body. Different other descriptions were given in the Upanisads. In the Brhadaranyaka the self is described as small as the grain of rice or carley. In the Katha Upanisad we find that the soul is of the size of the thumb.*33 It dwells in the centre of the individual's heart. In the Chandogya, it is said to be of the measure of the span between the head and the chin. William James traces the feeling of self in the cephahic movements. He says that the self of selves when carefully examined is found to consist mainly in the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and the heart.*34 Descartes maintained that the seat of the soul was the pineal gland. Fichte held that the soul was a space filling principle. Lotze said that the soul must be located somewhere in the matrix of the arterial brain events. These descriptions tend to make us believe that the soul is something material which occupies space. It is sometimes pointed out that the idea of the spatial attributes of the soul constitutes a contradiction. If the soul has no form it cannot occupy space, even the infinite 'pradesas'; and if it is

immaterial, it cannot have form. However, this contradiction is due to the difficulties or expressing the immaterial in terms of the material. This has been the perennial problem of philosophy, because the immaterial has no vocabulary of its own. The Greeks had the same difficulty. Plato had to resort to the allegories and myths for expressing the immaterial. In Jainism, although the description of the soul is not metaphorical, it is just an attempt to come nearer to immaterialism. It may be that the difficulty is due to the complexity of substance in Jainism. Jainism gives the cross division of substances as spiritual and non-spiritual and again as corporeal and non-corporeal. Non-spiritual is 'Ajīva'. In the non-spiritual we get the non-corporeal substance like 'dharma' and 'adharma'; and there is the corporeal which is called 'pudgala'. From the phenomenal point of view, 'Jīva' comes under the spiritual but corporeal. The corporeal need not necessarily be material. The classification is as follows:

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If this division is accepted, there need be no contradiction. Again, when the size is attributed to the soul, it is possible that it refers to the sphere or extent of the influence that is intended. In the Paññastikāyasaṅga, we get the description that just as a lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk imparts its lustre to the milk, the soul imparts its lustre to the whole body.*35

"Jīva" is characterised by upward motion. Nemicandra describes the pure soul as possessing "ūrdhva gati". In the Paññastikāyasaṅga, it is said, that when the soul is freed from all impurities it moves upward to the end of 'loka'.*36 For Plato, the soul was above all the source of motion. It is only the self that moves. In the Phaedrus Socrates says in his second speech, "The soul is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal". The self never ceases to move and it is the fountain and the beginning of motion to all that moves.

The movements of the soul in 'samsāra' is due to its association with 'karma'; but by nature it has the upward motion which it adopts when it is free from 'karma'. But it has to stop at the top of the universe beyond which no movement is possible in pure space which is devoid of the medium for motion. The Jaina conception of the soul as possessing 'ūrdhva gati' is mere an ethical expediency than a metaphysical principle or a psychological fact.

*35 'Paññastikāyasaṅga'. 33.
*36 Ibid. 79.
All these attributes belong to the nature of every soul and they are clearly seen in the 'Jīvas' are pure and free. However, most of the 'Jīvas' are not pure and free. They are contaminated by some foreign elements which veil the purity and perfection. The foreign element is 'karma', very fine matter imperceptible to the senses and which enters into the soul and causes great changes. The souls are then involved in the wheel of 'samsāra'. They become 'samsārin'.

The 'samsāri Jīvas' are classified on the bases of various principles, like the status and the number of sense organs possessed by them. They are the 'sthūvara Jīvas', immovable souls. This is the vegetable kingdom. Sir J. C. Bose has pointed out that the vegetable world has the capacity of getting experience. They are one sensed organisms. Earth, water, fire and the plants are such 'Jīvas'. They possess the sense of touch. This view is peculiar to Jainism. 'Trasa' 'Jīvas', moving souls have two to five senses. Worms, oysters, conches etc. possess taste and touch. Ants, bugs and lice have three senses - taste, touch and smell. Mosquitoes, bees and flies possess four senses - taste, touch, smell and sight. And birds, beasts and men have all the five senses. Again, five sensed organisms may possess mind. They are called 'samanasaka'. They may be bereft of mind 'amanaska'.

In Gommateshvara: Jīvakanḍa we get a detailed classification of 'samsāri Jīvas'. This classification is shown in Table 1.
Comparative psychology points out that there have been various stages in the development of animal life. The first simple animals, the protozoa are possessed of one sense. In fact, till we reach the insect species we find that the chemical sense predominates. Positive, negative and the food reactions are mainly due to the chemical sense. As we go up the animal scale, we find the sensory discrimination in qualitative distinctions. Even the other senses get discriminated and developed as we proceed in the development of animal life.

Similarly, the distinction between the 'jīvas' as 'paryāpta' and 'aparyāpta' has great psychological significance. Gommaṭāsāra illustrates the 'paryāpta', developed, as 'as the things like the room, jars, and clothes are full or empty, so the 'jīvas' should be understood to be complete or incomplete'.*37 'jīva' becomes 'paryāpta' with the possession of food and drink, body, sense, respiration and 'manas'. The one sensed organisms become complete with the possession of food, drink, body, sense and respiration. Similarly, the possession of these attributes make the first four sensed organisms 'paryāpta' or complete. For five-sensed organisms all the six are necessary. In the absence of these the 'jīvas' are incomplete. Comparative psychology has shown that the sensory discrimination has been a gradual process. Miss Washburn points out that the ability to distinguish between the different sensory experiences depends

*37 'Gommaṭasāra' P. 118.
on several factors like the nature of the sense organs and the ability to make varied reaction movements. On the basis of these investigations, three different classes of senses like the chemical sense, hearing and sight have been mentioned. The chemical sense is manifested in the combined senses of taste and touch. As the sensory discrimination becomes more complex, the mental life of the animal becomes more developed and pronounced.

These characteristics of the soul are mentioned from the practical point of view. Defilement of the soul takes place when the 'karma' pours into the soul. This is called 'asrava'. The soul then begins to experience the mundane and emotional experiences like the passions. 'Karma' which comes into contact is retained. The soul is eternally infected with matter. Every moment it is getting new matter. In the normal course of things, it has no end. But the deliverance of the soul from the wheel of 'saṃsāra' is possible by voluntary means. By the process of 'saṃvara' the soul can stop the influx of 'karma'; by 'nirjara' it can eliminate the 'karma' already glued to the soul. Then all obstacles are removed and the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of 'saṃsāra'. Being free, with its upward motion the 'Jīva' attains the liberation or 'moksa'. In the last lines of the Gomāṭasāra: Jīva-kānda, it is said that the liberated soul remains pure and free.

*38 The Animal Mind (1936) by Miss Washburn. Ch. V.
The pure and perfect souls live in eternal bliss. But they do not lose their identity as the Vedantin would emphasise. In the eighth 'khanda' of the Chandogya Upanishad, it is said that when a man departs from hence his speech is merged in mind, his mind in breath, his breath in fire and fire in the highest being is 'sat'. Now, that which is the subtle essence has its self. It is the self, 'and thou, Oh Svetaeketu, art that'.

In the eleventh 'khanda' also, we read that when the body withers and dies and when the living self leaves it, the living self dies not. Dr. Jacobi says that here we come nearer to the concept of the soul. It differs from the Jaina concept in that it does not possess a permanent personality, for in 'mukti' the 'jiva' is merged in the 'Brahman' and its individuality is lost. For the Jaina, McTaggart's analogy of the 'college of selves' would appear to be apter, although what type of spiritual unity there is in the 'moksa' — Jainism cannot say. McTaggart speaks of the unity of the 'absolute' as that of a society.

All the selves are perfect, and, "if an opponent should remind me", he writes, "of the notorious imperfections of the all lives of all of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is considered as eternal". Sub specie eternitatis it is progressing towards perfection as yet unattained. The never ---

*39 'Na Jivo mriyate'.

*40 As quoted in the Idea of God by Beth Pringle-Pattison (2nd edition) Ch. XX, P. 391.
ceasing struggle of the soul is an important tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, then, an amusing pantomime of infallible marionettes, but it is a fight for perfection, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by the success. It is melioristic.