CONCLUSION

The purpose of this treatise has been to present some problems of Jaina psychology. But no attempt has been made to build up Jaina psychology therein; for, a positive science of psychology, in the sense in which the term is used today, was not possible at that early stage of knowledge. Psychological analyses were merely shades of the epistemological problem, and both, in turn, were parts of metaphysical investigations. However, the psychological problems have been woven together here to present a coherent picture as far as possible.

The Idea of the Soul.

The idea of the soul has been a fundamental principle in the rational psychology of the Jainas. The existence of the soul is a presupposition in Jaina philosophy. It is a 'pratyaśā'. The soul is described from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, it is pure consciousness. 'Upayoga' is the fundamental characteristic of the soul. 'Upayoga' is interpreted, in this treatise, as horse in the sense in which McDougall used the term. It is the purposive force which is a source of all experience. All the three aspects of experience - cognitive, conative and affective, spring from it.

'Cetana' is a fundamental quality of the soul. It is pure consciousness, a kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the
Thus, 'upayoga' is a driving force which is purposive and which is responsible for experience. It expresses itself into 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. This expression is possible in the light of 'cetana'. 'Cetana' is the background of light of cognitions of 'jñāna' and 'darsana'.

The Jainas recognise three species of conscious experience - cognitive, conative and affective. They make a distinction in consciousness as knowing, feeling and experiencing the fruits of 'karma'. As a rule we have first feeling, then conation and then knowledge.\footnote{\textit{Pancastikāyasaṃ}} McDougall's view of the primacy of affective element in experience and especially in instinctive behaviour may be mentioned in this connection.

The Jaina thinkers were not unaware of the unconscious. \footnote{\textit{Mandī dūtra}} gives the picture of the unconscious in the 'mallaka dṛṣṭanta'. The doctrine of 'karma' as analysed by the Jainas comes nearer to Jung's Collective Unconscious. He says that it is possible to find the karmic factor in the arche-types of the unconscious.\footnote{\textit{Two Essays in Analytical Psychology} (1953), P. 76. foot note.}
Prajñāpana Sūtra recognises the peculiar mental force called 'Pāsanayā' which is rendered as 'pasyāta'. It connotes prolonged vision. It is interpreted, in this treatise, as mneme, a psychic force which holds our experience and which later becomes the basis for new experiences.

The Jaina Theory of Mind:

The Jainas have developed a systematic theory of mind. The approach to the problem has been a fusion of the synthetic and the analytic points of view. The Jainas say that mind is a quasi-sense organ, a 'no-indriya'. Mind has two phases: material phase, 'dravya manas' and the psychic phase — 'the bhāva manas'. The material phase is a mental structure and it is composed of infinite, fine, befitting particles of matter meant for the mental function, 'manovarganās'.

'Bhava manas' is expressed in the mental processes like thinking. C.D. Broad in his *Mind and its place in nature* presents a similar view in the distinction of the bodily and psychic factors of the mind. McDougall also makes a distinction between the facts of mental activity and the facts of mental structure. He infers the structure of the mind from its functions.

Regarding the problem of the relation between body and mind, the Jainas presented a sort of psycho-physical parallelism concerning the individual minds and bodies. Yet, they were aware of the interaction between the mental and bodily. The empirical approach showed them that there is mutual influence.

*3 *Prajñāpana-sūtra* 29-30
between them. The Jaina theory was an attempt at the integration of the metaphysical dualism of 'Jīva' and 'ajīva' and the fact of interaction of individual minds and bodies.

The sense organs and sense qualities:

The Jain philosophers recognised two varieties of experience: sensory and extra-sensory. Sensory experience is indirect, it is conditioned by the sense organs and the mind, while extra-sensory experience is directly apprehended by the self without the help of the sense organs and the mind. For the sensory experience, the sense organs are the windows through which the self cognises the external world. The mind does the function of organising the impressions received through the sense organs in order to get a coherent experience.

The Jainas have accepted five sense organs. Motor organs are not recognised as instruments of experience. The Jaina analysis of the physical structure 'dravendriya' and the psychic function 'bhāvendriya' has a great psychological significance. The physical part is the organ itself. It has its sub-divisions. It can be compared to the modern physiological analysis of the sense organs. The 'bhāvendriya' is divided into two parts: 'labdhī' and 'upayoga'. 'Labdhī' is the manifestation of specific sense experience, and 'upayoga' is the psychic force, the norme, which determines the specific experience.

The problem of the contact of the sense organs with the external object is psychologically important, although it has a
great epistemological bearing. The Jainas maintain that the
visual organ, like the mind, is 'aprapyakāri', because it does
not come in direct physical contact with the object. The other
four sense organs have direct physical contact with the object.
Therefore they are 'prāpyakāri'. But modern scientific analysis
of the sense organ of sight shows that we should suppose that
there is some form of contact of the eye with the object through
the medium of light.

The Jaina analysis of the sense qualities of sense
experience coming from the various sense organs has also a great
psychological importance. According to the Jainas, the visual
sense quality is classed into five types of colour. Touch is
of eight types, and smell is of two types. There are five types
of taste. There are seven fundamental sounds. Comparison with
the modern analysis of the sense qualities shows that the Jaina
analysis has psychological basis, although it is not based on
experimental investigations.

Thus, the soul is the experiencing agent. It gets two
types of experiences, as the sensory experience and the extra-
sensory experience. The sensory experience is the empirical
experience gained through the sense organs and the mind. It is
indirect. The extra-sensory experience is the supernormal
experience. The soul gets it directly without the help of the
sense organs and the mind.
Sense Perception:

The Jaina analysis of sense perception is very complex and is very significant. The contact of the sense organs with the object, except in the case of visual sense, is just a remote condition as time and space. The sense perception of a particular object does, in fact, involve psychic factors. The removal of psychic impediments in the destruction and subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring 'karmas' is a necessary factor in the sense perception of an object. It is a negative condition. Selective attention is a positive psychic factor: it may be compared to the mental set of the psychologists.

The Jaina description of the stages of sense perception is a significant contribution to the psychology of perception, although it gives a predominantly epistemological picture. According to the Jainas sense perception can be analysed into four stages: (i) 'avagraha', the stage of sensation (ii) 'Ihā' the stage of associative integration (iii) 'avāya' perceptual judgement and (iv) 'dhāranā' retention. 'Avagraha' is a sensational stage. It is further divided into 'vyājanavagraha' which may be referred as the 'stimulus condition of the sense awareness' or the 'threshold of awareness,' and 'arthāvagraga' awareness or the sensation itself. 'Ihā' involves the mental factor. It integrates the sense expressions. 'Avāya' is the clear cognition of the object involving perceptual judgement. 'Dhāraṇā' is retention of what has been experienced. However, sense
perception is a concrete psychosis involving these processes which are combined and fused to give a coherent experience. The Jaina description of the sense perception gives a scientific and coherent picture of the psychological element in perception. This can be compared, to some extent, to the structuralist view of sense perception.

Other sources of sense experience:

There are other sources of getting sense experience. They are (i) 'dhāraṇā' retention which is also a condition of recollection (ii) 'smṛti' recollection (iii) 'pratyakṣa' recognition which gives determinateness to sense experience, and (iv) 'anumāna' inference which is an indirect course of sense experience. 'Dhāraṇā' can be described as a mental trace or mental disposition 'samskāra' by which experiences cognize into a different form by 'avaya' are retained. Such retention forms a condition of the recall of the experience on a future occasion. 'Smṛti' is a form in which memory expresses itself. It is ideal revival of a past experience, so far as it is merely reproductive. It arises due to the stimulation of mental disposition 'vasanā' which may be considered as equivalent to 'samskāra' of the Jaina. Mental dispositions are the latest conditions of memory. The emergence of mental dispositions to the level of consciousness is due to (i) the external conditions consisting of the environmental factors and (ii) internal conditions refer to the conative urge. The Jaina description
of the conditions of memory may be compared to the laws of association in psychology. Regarding the internal conditions, the Jaina description comes nearer to McDougall's view of memory. McDougall says that explicit volition, purpose or intention to remember greatly favours remembering and recollecting. In order to get clear recollection, it is necessary to remove psychic impediments like aversion to the object, fear and painful experiences associated with it. Such a removal of psychic impediments was, in a sense, mentioned by the Jainas in terms of the removal of the veil of 'karma'. But recollection does not give us a complete picture of memory unless recognition 'pratyabhijña' as a factor operates. The Jainas give prominence to 'pratyabhijña' as an important factor in experience. It is a synthetic judgment born of perception and recollection. The Jainas make a 'upamāna' a form of recognition. Psychological analysis of recognition shows that recognition is a fusion of a percept and an image.

'Anumāna', inference, is another source of knowledge. Inference has been recognised by all the systems of Indian thought, except the 'cārvaka', as a source of knowledge. The Jaina analysis of inference has a great psychological value, although it is mainly epistemological. The distinction between inference for one-self 'svārtha' and inference for others 'parārtha' is very important. Inference for others needs a syllogistic structure for expression. On this basis, mañḍrabāṇa
contends that the extent of the constituent propositions depend on the ability of the person to whom it is addressed.

Inference is a mental process. Validity of inference depends on the psychological and logical grounds. It is based on the perception of the relation of the minor term to the middle term, and the recollection of the universal relation between the major term and the middle term. McDougall showed that all deductive reasoning involves 'aperceptive' synthesis. Similarly, the desire to know is an important condition of inference. Miss Stebbing said that inference involves both the constitutive and the epistemic conditions. The epistemic condition relates to what the thinker, who is inferring, knows.

Supernormal Perception:

The Jainas thought that knowledge due to the sense organs and the mind is not sufficient to comprehend the nature of reality. They accepted the possibility of immediate and direct experience without the use of the sense organs and the mind. This is really 'pratyakṣa'. This is supernormal experience. All the schools of Indian Philosophy, except the Carvākas, accept the possibility of supernatural experience.

*4 'Outlines of Psychology' by McDougall. P. 102.
*5 'Modern Introduction to Logic' Miss Stebbing. P. 215
The Jainas give three levels of supernormal perception:
(i) 'avadhi' (ii) 'manahparyāya' and (iii) 'kevala'. 'Avasī' may be compared to clairvoyance. It differs with the different individuals according to their capacities. Human beings acquire this form of experience. But in the case of beings living in heaven and hell, it is natural with them. The Jainas have described different varieties of 'avadhi'.

Researches in the extra-sensory perception show that clairvoyant cognition may differ with different individuals regarding the intensity and durability of experience. The society for Psychical Research has found many instances of these types. The psychic phenomena called 'French Sensitiveness', which is sometimes called 'psycho-metry', may be included as a form of 'avadhi', although in psycho-metry the sense organs and the mind do play their part.

'Manahparyāya' is cognition of mental states of others. A certain physical and mental discipline is necessary for acquiring this experience. It is only possible for human beings of character, especially for homeless ascetics. The conditions for the possession of 'manahparyāya' are that (i) the human beings must have fully developed sense-organs and fully developed personality (ii) they must possess right attitude and (ii) they must be self-controlled and must possess extra-ordinary powers.

Siddhasena Divākara is inclined to extend the scope of
'manahparyāya' to lower animals possessing two or more sense organs. In this connection we may mention Dr. Rhine's view that it is possible to find instances of the possibility of such perception in the case of lower animals, especially the vertebrates. But the traditional Jaina view does not accept such a possibility. Two varieties of 'manahparyāya': 'rjumati' and 'vipulamati' have been recognised. 'Manahparyāya' may be compared to telepathy.

The Jaina analysis of 'avadhi' and 'manahparyāya' shows that 'avadhi' may be called paranormal while 'manahparyāya' supernormal cognition. 'Avadhi' is possible even for lower animals and beings residing in hell. In the case of man, he has to acquire it. But only the gifted human beings possess 'manahparyāya'. Even the gods residing in heaven may not possess it.

In the West interest in extra-sensory perception is increasing. It is being investigated on the experimental basis since the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research. The Duke University is foremost in this respect. Psychologists like McDougall have said that extra-sensory perception, like clairvoyance and telepathy, seems also in a fair way established. Dr. Rhine has done good work in extra-sensory perception. Prof. Myers cites many instances of telepathic intuition.
'Kevala' is the highest form of experience. It is omniscience. It is pure consciousness. It intuites all substances and modes. Nothing remains to be known in omniscience. The Jaina view of omniscience may be compared to the Nyāya view of divine knowledge and the 'Yoga' theory of divine perception, although the Jaina emphasis is on the individual soul.

It is difficult to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of empirical methods of investigations which psychology and empirical sciences follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied.

The Sojourn of the Soul:

The Jainas believe that the soul has the inherent capacity for self-realization. The realization of the self is a realization of the transcendental self and not of the empirical self. The soul has the tendency to free itself from the wheel of 'sāṃsāra', but this tendency is obscured by the veil of 'karma'. The attainment of 'samyaktva' right attitude, is a condition of finding the way to self-realization.

In its wanderings in the wheel of 'sāṃsāra', the soul sometimes gets the vision of the goal of liberation and the way to reach this goal. It feels an impulse to make efforts to reach this goal. This energy for effort is the 'yathāpravṛtti
karana', it is then set on the way to liberation. The struggle consists in the two-fold processes known as 'apūrva karana' and 'anivṛtti karana'. The process of 'apūrva karana' enables the souls to cross the obstacles of 'karma granthi' and 'anivṛtti karana' leads it to the dawn of enlightenment.

The way to self-realization is long and arduous. It takes many difficult stages before perfection is reached. The Jainas have mentioned fourteen stages in the struggle for perfection. They are called 'gūnasthānas'. The first four stages lead to the right vision, 'samyakhva' by removing the obscuration created by the perversity of attitude. It is purely an intellectual process. It does not involve moral effort for self-realization. These four stages may be compared to the progressive development of the attitude of the prisoner in the cave as given in 'the parable of the cave' in the Republic of Plato.

In the struggle for the attainment of perfection, the soul undergoes the vicissitudes of moral life, sometimes going up the stage of moral development and sometimes coming down. This moral struggle starts with the fifth stage. The fourteenth stage of 'gūnasthānas' is the final stage of self-development. It is called the state of 'ayoga kevali'. This is the stage of 'kaivalya' or 'nirāñjana'.

Dr. Handimath compares the 'gūnasthānas' with the 'sayasthalas' of Vīrasāivism. Prof. Mundanagar in his introduction to 'Ādipurāṇa' gives a similar view. The struggle for perfection
in the fourteen stages of self-development has a great psychological importance, although psychology as a positive science will not be able to explain the significance of these stages.

The study of the problems of psychology as presented by the Jainas is useful for a better understanding of the Jain philosophy. These problems have been interpreted in terms of the concepts in modern psychology, especially the rational psychology. The analysis of these problems in the light of the ancient Indian thought and the Western psychological thought gives a synoptic view of the nature and the value of the problems that the Jainas presented.