CHAPTER III

The Partition Plan.

After the termination of the World War 1945, the circumstances took favourable turn for the independence of India. The Labour Party in England, having independence of India as one item in its election manifesto entitled "Let us face the future" won the elections. Thus the question of granting independence to India came to the forefront. Moreover Mr. C.R. Attlee, (who subsequently became Lord Attlee), the leader of the Labour Party was himself interested in the constitutional development of India. He had toured India as one of the members of the Simon Commission and subsequently had been one of the architects of the Government of India Act, 1935. As a British Prime Minister he took personal interest in the various plans for transfer of power to India.

Failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan -

The proposals of the Cabinet Mission constituted a serious attempt to meet the Muslim League point of view and thus preserve the unity of India. It provided limited powers for the Centre. The Constituent Assembly to be set up was to have following compulsory grouping of the provinces for making the constitution of free India:

Section A:- Consisting of Madras, Bombay, U.P., Bihar, Central Provinces and Orissa.

Section B:- Consisting of Punjab, North Western Frontier Province, Sindh and British Baluchistan.

Section C:- Consisting of Bengal and Assam.

In the Section B the Muslim representatives were 22, Hindus 9 and the Sikhs 4. The Sikhs protested against the compulsory grouping and in a letter dated May 25, 1946 to the Secretary of State Master Tara Singh, the Akali leader wrote that "a wave of dejection, resentment and indignation has run throughout the Sikh community. The Sikhs have been thrown at the mercy of the Muslims." S. Baldev Singh, the Defence Member of the Interim Government, wrote to the Prime Minister of Britain seeking his intervention to remedy the wrong done to the Sikh community. In a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet Mission the Shromani Akali Dal stated, "In the alternative of existing province of the Punjab, a new province may be carved out as an additional provincial unit in the united India of future in a such a way that all the important Sikh shrines (Gurdwaras) be included in it as also a substantial majority of the Sikh population of the existing province of the Punjab."

The Indian National Congress was opposed to the compulsory grouping of provinces and suggested splitting of the Punjab as is clear from their resolution which ran: "there must be no compulsion of any province or a part of province by another province. The Congress cannot be a party to any such compulsion or imposition against the will of the people concerned .... the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab should not be jeopardised. In the event of any compulsion a province or a part of a province has the right to take such action as may be

5. V.P. Menon, Transfer of Power in India, page 291.
deemed necessary." This greatly irritated the Muslim League who soon after condemned this resolution in vigorous terms viz "these qualifying clauses confer the right of veto within a section on a province and what is more absurd on a part of province and on the Sikhs in the Punjab."

There were vital differences between the Congress and the Muslim League regarding the Constituent Assembly. When after the elections of the Constituent Assembly, the Congress insisted on its functioning, Mr. Jinnah described it as "a blunder of very grave and serious character." The Constituent Assembly started its working on December 9, 1946. The Muslim League bycotted it and stated that "the elections to and thereafter summoning of the Constituent Assembly inspite of strong protests and most emphatic objections on the part of the League, were ab initio void, invalid and illegal."

Conflict in the Interim Government:

Apart from fundamental differences regarding the long term arrangement there had never been smooth working of the Interim Government. The object of the Congress members in the Interim Government was to bring into existence healthy convention of non-interference by the Viceroy and Interim Government working as a team so that it may be replaced by the National Government in the long run. The Muslim League members had entered the Government with an avowed object of holding Congress in check lest anything should be done which might prejudice the settlement of long term issues. In this campaign their chief weapon was

10. Ibid, page 666.
the emphasis on legality "preventing the Government from functioning as a cabinet and to increase the power and influence of Viceroy in order to save themselves from being over ridden (11) by Congress majority." Mr. Jinnah held that the "Interim Government has been formed under the present Constitution, the Act of 1919 which is in operation .... It is sheer flight of imagination to call it a Cabinet, a National Government or even a Coalition.... It can, therefore, only function in the terms of the Government of India Act of 1919, so far as day to day administration is concerned." To the Congress members such an attitude was reactionary as it did not allow them to proceed to their goal of independence. The chain of communal riots starting from August 16, 1946, when the Muslim League observed its Direct Action Day in Calcutta, with their effect at Neokhali and Tripura, their retaliation in Bihar and the Bihar riots retaliation in Hazara district of N.W.F.P. caused strain and exasperation which materially contributed to the friction between the League and the Congress blocs in the Interim Government. Liaqat Ali Khan, who was a Finance Member of the Interim Government, seldom agreed with the proposals coming from the Congress members. Lord Clydesmuir who officiated as a Governor General during the absence of Lord Mountbatten in May 1947, observed "at that time relations between the Hindus and the Muslims had almost reached the breaking point. At Centre there was a joint Cabinet in name only." 

The New Approach -

Since the Cabinet Mission plan had practically failed,

12. Mr. Jinnah's statement dated Nov. 26, 1946, 
14. Lord Clydesmuir, Transference of Power in India, Asiatic 
the Viceroy suggested another scheme about which Lord Attlee writes, "Wavel and his chief Service Advisers were despondent and could only suggest progressive retirement from India province by province which was in my view a counsel of despair —
--- Well I thought that was what Winston could certainly quite properly describe as ignoble and sordid scuffle and I would not look at it." By this plan the Viceroy was judged "pretty defeatist" and the change of Viceroy was considered necessary. The British Prime Minister writes, "I had great admiration for Lord Wavel both as a soldier and as a man; but I did not think he was likely to find a solution. I did think that he and Indians could really understand each other. New men were needed for new policy.

With the appointment of Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy of India the British Prime Minister made a very significant speech in the Parliament. He said, "His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that it is their definite intention to take the necessary steps to effect the transference of power into responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948 ....... His Majesty's Government will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over, on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India or some areas to the existing Provincial Governments or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people." This statement, according to Andrew Mellor, "altered

15. Lord Attlee, As it Happened, page 183.
16. Ibid.
the course of history. The echoes of this momentous announce-
(18) ment reverbrated throughout the sub-dontinent." For the first
time Indians felt that the British irrevocably intended to leave.
According to Brecher Attlee's statement "paved the way for
partition and even represented an indirect concession to the
League demand for Pakistan." Gandhi Ji rightly perceived its
meaning when he wrote to Nehru "This may lead to Pakistan for
those provinces or portions which may want them." This
statement together with Muslim League's policy of obstruction
prepared the Congress leaders to accept partition as they were
fed up with the Muslim League's tactics. Pandit Nehru
subsequently said, "There was an overwhelming sense of conflict
during the Interim Government days by pulls in different
directions by Muslim League. It was felt that even if some
arrangement could be arrived at to prevent partition, these
conflicts and disruptions would continue and might come in a
way of any marked progress in the economic and other planning
later. It would have left the Federal Government weak."

The Congress Demand - Partition of the Punjab.

The appointment of new Viceroy and fixation of date
for transfer of power to Indian hands had significant impact
in the Punjab politics. Soon after Attlee's statement Sir
Khizar yielded to the pressure tactics of Muslim League and
resigned. Justifying his resignation he said, "If I were now

to continue to lead a Coalition in which Muslim League is not represented this might put in serious jeopardy such chances as might otherwise exist of a settlement being arrived at between the communities in the province." But instead of any communal settlement there broke out communal riots in the districts of Rawalpindi, Attock and Multan, which vitiated the political atmosphere. Pandit Nehru said in a Press conference at Lahore after visiting the riot affected areas, "obviously all that has happened is intimately connected with political affairs. I propose to say nothing about that aspect except this that if politics are to be conducted in this way then they cease to be politics and become some kind of jungle warfare which reduces human habitation to the state of desert." These terrible communal riots which resulted in extermination of population of the Sikhs and the Hindus in several villages convinced the Congress members in the Interim Government that partition of the Punjab was the only remedy. The Congress, therefore, passed the following resolution on the 8th April 1947 stressing the partition of the Punjab:— "....... these tragic events (the communal riots in the Punjab) have demonstrated that there can be no settlement of the problem of the Punjab by violence and coercion and no arrangement based on coercion can last. Therefore it is necessary to find a way out which involves least amount of compulsion. This would necessitate division of the Punjab in two provinces so that predominantly Muslim parts may be separated from predominantly non-Muslim parts."

23. D.R. Bose, New India Speaks, page 133.
For the first time this resolution adopted a new stand which was quite akin to the line of argument pursued by the Muslim League. It implied that the solution of the communal disorders and the constitutional deadlock in the Punjab was the partition of the Punjab into Muslim dominated Punjab and non-Muslim dominated Punjab. If we substitute India in place of the Punjab it appears as if the resolution had been passed by the Muslim League. This resolution paved the way for the Partition Plan. Following the lead given by the Congress, the Hindu and the Sikh members of the Central Legislature belonging to the Punjab addressed a letter to Shri Jawahar Lal Nehru with the request that their submission be endorsed by him and communicated both to the Viceroy and His Majesty's Government. The letter ran:- "The Muslims and non-Muslims are equally balanced and no Government can carry on without the support of these communities. Fortunately the population of the Province is so divided that there are districts and contiguous areas where Muslims and non-Muslims predominate. We have given anxious and deep thought to this problem. After considering all its pros and cons, we have come to the conclusion that the only way out of the present deadlock is to partition the Punjab into two provinces." The Sikh leaders jointly with the Hindus as well as separately insisted upon the division of the Punjab and the Shiromani Akali Dal asserted that partition of the Punjab was "the only remedy to end communal strife." Master Tara Singh, Sardar Baldev Singh and Giani Kartar Singh expressed similar views during their interviews with the

Viceroy on the 18th of April, 1947.

The communal riots of the Punjab got much publicity in England. "The Times" London described the Punjab situation as "most critical." On the 11th March in an article "Lesson from the Punjab" it stated that "the Sikhs' complain with justice that the Muslim League seeks to deny to them in the Punjab the position which it claims in the rest of India."

It reverted again to the Punjab communal riots on the 18th March and observed editorially "Prolonged agitation directed by the Muslim League against the Unionist Coalition Government of the Province paved the way for the present outbreak of communal violence." When Lord Mountbatten took over from Lord Wavell in the last week of March 1947 he faced with the most urgent and critical problem in the Punjab as Alan Campbell Johnson wrote, "We have inherited 'inter alia' communal rioting and the key province of the Punjab with three-fold Hindu, Moslem and Sikh communal problem governed by emergency degree."

The Partition Plan -

After discussing the Indian Constitutional problem with different leaders Lord Mountbatten came to the following conclusions:-

1. "On the assumption that Mr. Jinnah's power and purpose were sustained partition would have to be provided for."

2. "Partitioning of Centre involved similar treatment for those provinces where two communities were evenly balanced."

The next problem, as Lord Mountbatten himself stated "was to see if the Congress party who had always stood for united

27. Ibid.
India, would be prepared to consider partition as a price for quick transfer of power and the restoration of peace. The Congress have always stood for non-coercion, and they said that provided no non-Muslim majority community went into partitioned areas against their will, they would raise no objection. It was pointed out that in case of provinces like the Punjab and Bengal partition would undoubtedly be involved. When this was put to Mr. Jinnah he was against the performance of surgical operation on the provinces which had ancient histories of unity." Lord Mountbatten argued, "that the feeling invoked in his heart (Mr. Jinnah's heart) by prospects of partition of these provinces was the feeling invoked in my heart and heart of the Congress against the partition of India itself. And we went, as one might say around the mulberry bush, always coming back to the same point." At last Mr. Jinnah came forward with an enquiry whether the same principle of partition of provinces would be extended beyond the Punjab and Bengal which meant partition of Assam. Lord Mountbatten readily agreed to that also.

Punjab Governor's Dissent -

The following points which formed the basis of the partition plan were circulated to the Governors of various provinces:

1. The provinces generally speaking to have the right of self-determination.
2. The Punjab and Bengal to be notionally divided for voting purposes.

31. Time only to Look Forward, (Speeches of Lord Mountbatten), page 20-21.
The predominantly Muslim Sylhet district in Assam to be given the option of joining Muslim province created by partitioned Bengal through referendum.

Referendum to be held in the North West Frontier Province on the issue whether it was to join one group of province or another.

The Governor of the Punjab at that time was Sir Evan M. Jenkins who had spent most of his career in the Punjab and Delhi and could understand the people and problems of the Punjab. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the Plan and argued that it would satisfy none Mr. Jinnah or the Sikhs because it would leave for Jinnah a truncated Pakistan and it would cut the Sikhs in almost two equal parts. Mountbatten was, however, very optimistic on these two points. He said that "in the last analysis Jinnah would acquiesce and the only way the Sikhs could improve their position was through negotiation."

By negotiation Lord Mountbatten perhaps meant that the Sikh should come to an understanding with the Muslim League. For that purpose he arranged meetings between Mr. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan and Maharaja Patiala and Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Member of the Interim Government. Since the Sikhs had already put forth the demand of a Sikh State, the talks naturally centred around that issue. Mr. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan agreed to the formation of the Sikhs State with its

33. Sir Evan Meredith Jenkins was born on Feb. 2, 1896. Joined Indian Civil Service in 1920 and served in the Punjab. He was Chief Commissioner of Delhi in 1937, Secretary to the Department of Supply 1940-43, Private Secretary to the Viceroy and Secretary to the Governor General (Personal) 1943-46. He has been Governor of the Punjab since 1946.
34. Mission with Mountbatten, page 85.
70

separate military within Pakistan, provided the Sikhs did not insist on the partition of the Punjab and agreed to join Pakistan. The Sikhs leaders demanded for the proposed Sikh State the right of opting out of Pakistan to which the Muslim League leaders did not agree. Master Tara Singh told the writer that if Mr. Jinnah had agreed, they would have negotiated with the Congress for better terms, which indicated that the Sikh leaders ultimately wanted to join India. Besides this there were several reasons for this break down. There had never been any understanding between the Akalies and Muslim League before. None of the Muslim Leaguers in the Punjab was of the calibre of Sir Fazle Hussain or Sir Sikander who with foresight and political sagacity, could make necessary adjustments with the Sikhs on the Pakistan issue. An influential Akali leader Giani Kartar Singh attended Muslim League M.L.As' conference in Delhi in April 1947, and he tried to probe into Muslim League's attitude towards the Sikhs in case of establishment of Pakistan. He was told nothing except giving assurance of good treatment. The basic cause for this attitude towards the Sikhs was that the top most Muslim League leaders were not fully conversant with the Punjab communal problems or Sikh problem. It has been rightly stated that Mr. Jinnah "himself knew no more of the Punjab than Neville Chamberlain did of Czchoslovakia."

From the Sikh point of view the Sikh - Muslim accord would have saved them from the miseries of migration, death

---

35. 'Mr. Jinnah's offer of Sikh State", Maharaja Patiala's article, Tribune Ambala, July 19, 1959.
37. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, page 140.
38. P. Moon, Divide and Quit, page 37.
and destruction caused on account of communal riots. In
Pakistan they might have secured some better political status
than they could get in the Republic of India. But this could
only be possible if the Sikhs could obliterate their past
bitter memories of 18th century Muslim domination. No doubt
the Sikhs were mono-theistic, and did not believe in the caste
system and had faith in equality of man like the Muslims. But
to join Pakistan required great boldness on the part of Sikh
leaders and sufficient justification for joining Pakistan which
was not forthcoming from the Muslim League. One of the major
causes of the Sikh-Muslim estrangement was the communal riots
of March 1947 in which Sikhs had been killed in large number
by the fanatical Muslim mobs. But not a word of regret had been
expressed by any of the Muslim League leaders. The passions
were so high and tension was so tense that understanding
between the Sikhs and the Muslims appeared impossible.

The Sikh leaders, however, made the right choice
in the long run. Keeping in view their culture, history and
past traditions which were more akin to the Hindus than to the
Muslims they permanently linked their destinies with India.
Joining Pakistan by the Sikhs was just like joining hands by
the Sikhs with Ahmed Shah Abdali to build an Afghan Kingdom in
the Punjab which according to Rattan Singh Bhango, the immortal
author of the 'Panth Parkash,' was "mingling fire with water."

Provisions for the Partition of the Punjab —

Lord Mountbatten publically announced the Plan on the
3rd June, 1947. It is, therefore, known as 3rd June Plan. The
following provisions were made for the partition of the Punjab
in the 3rd June Plan:

1. "The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the
Punjab excluding European members will be asked to meet in two parts - one representing the Muslim majority districts and other rest of the province. For purpose of determining the population of the districts, the 1941 census figures will be taken as authoritative." The Muslim majority districts of the Punjab as given in the appendix were:-

Lahore Division:- Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Sheikhupura, Sialkot, Rawalpindi, Lahore.

Rawalpindi Division: Attock, Gujrat, Jhelum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi, Shahpur.

Multan Division: Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan and Muzaffargarh.

2. "The members of two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the Province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either side decides in favour of partition division of the province will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly.

3. "In the event of partition decided upon, for the purposes of final partition of these Provinces a detailed investigation of boundary questions will be needed, a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-General."

Acceptance of the Plan -

On 3rd June Lord Mountbatten reminded Mr. Jinnah that Nehru, Patel and Kriplani had made an absolute point that they would reject the Plan unless the Muslim League accepted it as a final settlement. The Muslim League, therefore, took the lead in accepting the 3rd June Plan by passing the following resolution on the 9th June: - "The Council resolves to give full authority to the President of All India Muslim League to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise — although it cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab.

or give its consent to such partition, it has to consider H.M.G's plan for the transfer of power as a whole. In the meeting of All India Congress Committee, held on June 15, 1947, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru argued for the acceptance of the Plan and said, "The House will remember Raja Ji's formula on the basis of which Mahatma Gandhi carried on negotiations with Mr. Jinnah.... It must be realised that it is not possible to coerce even with swords unwilling parts to remain under the Indian Dominion." The Congress Committee therefore passed the following resolution on the 15th June 1947:- "In view, however, of the refusal of Muslim League to participate in the Constituent Assembly and further in view of the policy of the Congress that it cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in Indian Union against their declared and established will the All India Congress Committee accepts the proposals embodied in the announcement of June 3, which have laid down a procedure for ascertaining the will of the people concerned."

Estimate of the Plan -

According to Lord Ismay, the Mountbatten Plan was a case of "Hobson's choice". No one in India thought that it was perfect. Lord Mountbatten himself admitted in the radio broadcast on the day of its announcement. He said that "The whole Plan may not be perfect, but like all plans, its success will depend on the spirit of good-will with which it is carried out."

---

42. New India Speaks, page 165.
44. Memoirs of Lord Ismay, page 420.
The Plan was essentially a compromise from every point of view. The Congress which had been struggling for independence, no doubt, achieved it but its conception of Indian unity was shattered. The Muslim League won its Pakistan which it so forcefully demanded but much against its wishes the Punjab and Bengal were partitioned leaving Pakistan "truncated." In a way it was an achievement for the Sikhs who had been struggling to get rid of Muslim domination in the Punjab. But partition of the Punjab ultimately proved disastrous for the Sikhs as more than two million of them found themselves to be the citizens of Pakistan along with many of their holy places. There was no provision for their orderly migration to India. Nor was there any provision for the free pilgrimage to their holy shrines in Pakistan.

While drawing up the plan for transfer of power every possible care was taken to meet the points of view of the two major communities. Winston Churchill, then leader of the opposition, had also emphasised that if there were an effective acceptance of the plan by both the Congress and the Muslim League, they (opposition) would do all in their power (46) to expedite the necessary legislation. Subsequent events proved that to meet the point of view of Sikhs, the third community was equally important for peaceful transfer of power. The Cabinet Mission Plan rightly stated,"--- it is sufficient to recognise only three main communities in India, General, Moslems and Sikhs, the General community including all persons who are not Moslems or Sikhs." The third community was equally

46. Quoted in Memoirs of Lord Ismay, page 422.
important as the Viceroy Lord Irwin stated in written reply to a Sikh deputation on 9th July 1931:—"I have read the annals of Sikh history: and, believe me, I am fully alive to the special position your community has occupied in the North West India in the past and occupies today and of the notable contribution it has made to the past and present development of the Punjab...

...... I note that your comparatively small community supplied no less than 80,000 men to fight with the colours in the great war; and, to return to the example I have taken as typical of Sikhs as a whole, the famous Sikh regiment........ added La Basse, Armentieres, Givenchy, Neuve, Chapelle, Ypres, Festubert, Helles, Krithia, Suvia, Sari Bahr and Gallipoli ----- scenes of gallantry and sacrifice which will outlive the memories of the present generation and the Suez Canal, Palestine and Mesopotamia to their record. These things are not and cannot be forgotten."

The Plan was not comprehensive as it lacked deep penetration into some of the vital problems of the Punjab. No machinery was devised to make proper and proportionate adjustment in the Indus river system of irrigation, which irrigated about 26 million acres of land and which was source of livelihood for about 46 million people in the Indian sub-continent.

48. S.H.R. File No. 1304, vide also the Chapter "Conclusions".
49. Vide Chapter "The After Effects".
APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF MAJOR J.M. SHORT.

(In reply to the writer's following queries, Major J.M. Short gave this statement:-

1. What were the circumstances leading to the 3rd June Plan, how would you account for the bloodshed which followed the transfer of power in 1947?

2. What is your opinion about the 3rd June Plan especially with regard to the Sikhs?

3. When did you arrive in India and what steps were proposed by you to avert the coming crisis?

You ask me to account for the bloodshed in India soon after it was handed over in 1947. As I see it now, it was inevitable.

A people as a whole feel their way. They do so in their own way and in their own time, slowly and surely, incoherently and imperceptibly, but inevitably. They do so the more safely and soundly as they have it in them to spot the good sense to recognise that no two people or persons and their needs are alike, and that it is imperative to be guided above all by sustained first-hand local practical experience of the humans involved. So history seems surely to warn us.

The Anglo-Indian venture began when the crucial and abiding need of the English for trade was increasingly met by Indians; thanks to the English increasingly meeting the crucial and abiding need of Indians, which was for a paramount power, willing and able to furnish them with protection from themselves and others, together with such attention and forbearance as would otherwise let them be their various selves and leave them to their various devices.
But all this is hindsight. At the time I was as muddled and misled as most of us English were; and more so for having been as such a stay-at-home as a man-on-the-spot, and therefore that much the more torn as under by experience and inexperience.

So, to come to your second question, although I was not in India when the plan of the 3rd June 1947 was formulated, I approved it, and chiefly because in my aforesaid fuddled state I felt any agreement by then would be better than none.

In which same fuddled state, to turn to your third question I arrived in India on or about the 20th or 21st of July 1947, at the request of Sardar Baldev Singh, and with the consent of the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy; and soon after my arrival sensed two things; first, that our Hindustani and Pakistani heirs—apparent, and too many of us, were over complacent about Sikh reaction, in the event of the Sikhs disliking the upshot of partition: Second, that the Sikhs generally were all too sure that, somehow or other, we English and in particular the Viceroy, would save them being unduly displaced and displeased by that upshot. But I was too fuddled to sense either of those things with sufficient keenness and clarity to influence events effectually.

But even if any one had sensed the outcome keenly and clearly enough, it would have been of no avail by then. In the light of hindsight, I am now as sure as I can be that only a miracle could have brought the English, and their more—English than—Indian heirs—apparent, to realise that the Indian masses, subconsciously rather than consciously, but none the less firmly, looked upon the agreement of June the 3rd as a promise and proclamation of a renewal in a new form of English paramountcy.
in India, and that the Sikhs as a whole, including most of their leaders, and not excepting Sardar Baldev Singh and Master Tara Singh, consciously and subconsciously, felt sure that, in return for their consenting to that agreement, the English would ratify Anglo-Sikh bonds afresh by securing for them, if not a Sikh State, then as 'Imperium in imperio', agreeable to them.

Seeing things then, in that light, it follows I feel that the responsibility for this sorry episode lies with us English and Indian as a whole. It cannot, as I see it, be shuffled off on to this or that section or sect, group or groupings, party or partisan, personage or person, and least of all on to any of the fashionable 'isms' of the day. These were but the servants and instruments, the signs and insignia, of our having allowed ourselves to be all too misled by our lack of sustained first-hand local practical experience of one another.

But that said, the greater responsibility nevertheless lies with us English. 'To whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required'. We had greater resources for getting such experience. We misused them to escape it, and to indulge increasingly our own escapism, and that of a few more - English - than - the English Indians. We did so despite the warnings of history, and our being better equipped to profit by them. Inevitably the upshot had to be much as it was. Inevitably the responsibility for it lies much more with us.

Sd/- John McLaughlin Short

BIRCHDEN CORNER,
GROOMBRIDGE,
TUNBRIDGE WELLS,
October 30, 1964.