Chapter IX

Migration.

The partition of the Punjab did not solve the minority problem. More than four million Muslims were left in the East Punjab, and about four million Hindus and the Sikhs in the West Punjab. On account of continuous communal riots since March 1947 the Sikhs and the Hindus had been migrating to the districts subsequently included in the East Punjab and Muslims had been migrating after the August riots to the Muslim majority districts included in the West Punjab. The stream of the displaced Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims was converted into a big torrent just after the transfer of power and announcement of the Punjab Boundary Award because the minorities of the Central districts of the British Punjab lost every hope of being included in the

1. Muslim in Ambala Division according to Census of 1941
   - do - Jullundur Division ... 1318136
   - do - Gurdaspur (minus Tehsil Shakargarh) ... 1877742
   - do - Amritsar District ... 440323
   Total ... 3236201

2. According to Census of 1941, Hindu, Sikh, Adharmis, Scheduled Caste and Jainis etc. in Rawalpindi Division. ... 661762
   Multan Division ... 1472594
   Lahore Division (minus Amritsar District Tehsil of Batala, Gurdaspur and Pathankot of Gurdaspur District) ... 1567240
   Total ... 3701596

It is generally believed that in 1947 about six million Hindus and Sikhs migrated to India from West Pakistan including the West Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind and Bahawalpur State etc. and about six million Muslims migrated from India including the East Punjab, the East Punjab States, Delhi etc. to West Pakistan.
newly created province of their choice. Both the East Punjab and the West Punjab Governments therefore decided "to give maximum assistance for the evacuation of refugees from one province to the other." Since large scale exodus of minorities was not expected no specific machinery was set up to implement this decision. On the 25th August the newly appointed Governor of the East Punjab wrote to the Commander of the Punjab Boundary Force to effect the evacuation of the refugees. He wrote, "My Ministry and general public in East Punjab are greatly concerned over reports of large number of non-Muslims stranded in places like Chichawatni, Montgomery, Okara, Arifwala and Pakpattan (in Montgomery district), Pattoki, Chunia, Raiwind (in Lahore district), Sialkot, Narowal and Pasrur in Sialkot district and Sheikhupura and Gujranwala. I shall be grateful if effective military protection could be ensured for these refugees. I realise, however, that this may not be possible and many refugees would like to evacuate. In that case I would earnestly request you to arrange for evacuation by the road, of the refugees from Montgomery and Lahore districts to Ferozepur and from Sialkot district to Amritsar to Derababa Nanak and from Sheikhupura and Gujranwala to Amritsar. If it is not possible for you to evacuate refugees from Sialkot to Amritsar or to Deraba Baba Nanak by road, we would endeavour to arrange for a special train."


4. In Europe the term "refugee" is commonly used for aliens seeking refuge whilst a "displaced person" means one who has been driven out owing to the changes of frontier.

This communication itself is a specimen of indecision prevalent in the administration in those days. To entrust the task of evacuation to the Punjab Boundary Force which was already facing a grave situation to perform its own specified task of maintaining the law and order and to suggest that a special train would solve the problem were indications which constitute a definite proof that the East Punjab Government never expected the transfer of the minorities from the West Punjab.

Establishment of Military Evacuee organisation -

On account of the communal riots spreading in chain reaction there were a large number of the Non-Muslim and the Muslim displaced persons to be evacuated in the West Punjab and the East Punjab respectively. To begin with a hundred trucks were placed at the disposal of the Deputy High Commissioner of India, in Lahore. The East Punjab Government supplemented this arrangement with the appointment of a Liaison Officer at Lahore and a Transport Controller at Amritsar who was provided with one hundred trucks. The latter was to plan out convoys in consultation with the former. But soon it was found that this arrangement was inadequate because there was no machinery to prevent attacks of hostile mobs on the convoys in the West Punjab. Even otherwise, as subsequent events proved, a hundred trucks could not cope with this huge problem of evacuation. It was, therefore, decided to entrust this work of evacuation of refugees to the military. The East Punjab Area Headquarter at Lahore was converted into the Advance Military Evacuee Organisa-

Evacuation by Motor Transport

In order to facilitate the speedy clearance of refugees on both sides, the East Punjab Government and the West Punjab Government entered into an agreement by which no train or motor vehicle was to cross the border without refugees. It implied that no Indian motor vehicle or train could enter Pakistan without Muslim refugees, nor could any Pakistan motor vehicle or train enter Indian territory without the Hindu and Sikh refugees. In theory it was an ideal arrangement but in practice it proved a great source of hindrance. The Indian motor convoy commandant complained that "the convoys from the East Punjab with Muslim refugees first go to the Walton Training School. There they are made to wait for a considerable time and are asked to carry other Muslim refugees to the districts where they might be going. In this way about six hours were spent at Walton Training School. Again at the Bridge of river Ravi they were not allowed to cross unless every truck was full to the

7. According to the author of Economic Consequences of Divided India (page 79) Military Evacuee Organisation was established in addition to the Punjab Boundary Force which does not appear to be correct. The Punjab Boundary Force was abolished from 1st Sept. 1947 and M.E.O. started working on the 4th Sept. 1947

brim and if any vehicle was found to carry smaller number of refugees than expected the passengers of those vehicles were transhipped to the other vehicles and empty vehicles sent back. This procedure was repeated at many places on the way." 

The Military Evacuee Organisation on the Indian side also adopted similar measures and it was decided "that Civil authorities should establish two Police Posts on the G.T. Road at a distance of about five or seven miles towards east of Amritsar and other at a similar distance to the west of Amritsar. These Police Posts should not allow any vehicle of Pakistan Government to proceed unless it was full to the brim with non-Muslim refugees or it had a certificate from the Chief Liaison Officer that vehicle could go empty." In this way the decision which had been made to facilitate the speedy evacuation of refugees resulted in creating hindrances and counter hindrances. 

Some times the drivers of the other community conspired against their passengers as the D.L.O., Sialkot wrote:- "On 25th August a convoy of 25 trucks the drivers of which were all Muslims was sent from the refugee camp, Sialkot Cantt. to Amritsar. When the convoy reached the bridge of the Ravi near Shahdara it halted on the plea that the drivers wanted to take tea and they went into the town wherefrom a mob of Muslims attacked the convoy." 

Evacuation by Train -

The agreement that no train should be allowed to go 

Meeting of M.E.O. held on 23rd Sept. 1947. 

10. Ibid. 

11. L.A.R. File No. LVII/2/3-B.
empty for taking refugees did not work well in the case of refugee trains where the crew of the train and the passengers belonged to different communities. The Muslims and non-Muslim crew sometimes frightened or sometimes in spirit of retaliation used to stop the trains on the appearance of mobs belonging to their community and thus brought death and destruction for the refugees travelling by their trains. This arrangement brought havoc to the refugees as the Deputy High Commissioner of India in Lahore wrote:— "Some 3000 to 4000 Muslims had collected there and surrounded a non-Muslim train which had arrived from Pind Dadan Khan. This wretched train was attacked soon after it left Pind Dadan Khan on the 19th, then again at Mughalpura this morning where there were 30 casualties of which 3 were killed and more than 12 seriously injured." The train could not proceed to Amritsar as the Muslim engine driver had run away. Similarly the Commanding Officer of the 2/1 Gurkhas wrote:— "The Battalion arrived at Ambala Cantonment Station at 12.30 P.M. the 1st September 1947. The Adjutant reported to the C.O. that a train containing dead bodies was lying on the next line to ours. Holes caused by Bren-gun bursts were visible on all coaches. The driver of the engine evidently intended to let massacre continue by driving his train into the open country and only disconnected his engine at the pistol point."

Another serious defect in the planning of evacuation by the railway trains was that the West Punjab Railway Committee which arranged special trains for refugees did not include any

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13. While Memory Serves, pages 436-37.
representative of the East Punjab. This resulted in great confusion. It was pointed out to the East Punjab Government that trains had been sent to Karnal which was already flooded with refugees when the trains could have been easily received at Ludhiana where accommodation had been kept spare for the purpose. This lack of co-operation also resulted in untold miseries for the refugees who were denied even ordinary facilities like drinking water. Many deaths occurred on account of starvation or shortage of water. Andrew Miller has rightly stated, "In a spate of religious fury trains were held up and their passengers killed, houses burned down over their owners' heads, women raped and abducted, forcible conversions made from one religion to another and every kind of physical atrocity practised."

"Infection" of Railway Officials -

Like Police, Military and other Government personnel, the railway staff in both the Punjabs was infected with the spirit of retaliation. They could not act impartially in discharge of their duties and did their best to the detrimental interests of refugees belonging to the other communities. Almost all major train accidents were the result of their vindictive policy. The Court Martial Enquiry undertaken by one Indian Military Officer and one Pakistan Military Officer and presided over by a British Officer regarding Jassar (District Sialkot)

14. L.A.R. File No. LVII/22/8-B.
16. *India Since Partition*, page 44.
train accident established the fact how inefficiency of railway staff in the West Punjab led to so many deaths and abduction of women. According to enquiries of the Court Martial the Indian M.E.O. represented to Pakistan M.E.O. that the train was to go via Wazirabad - Lahore on the evening of 22nd October. Orders were issued to this effect. But these orders failed to reach Sialkot. Consequently there was a huge massacre of non-Muslims at Jassar where the railway track was broken on account of floods.

Some times routes of non-Muslim refugee trains were changed to their detrimental effect. The station staff acted under the spirit of vendetta. The train which started from Bannu was scheduled to reach Amritsar via Mari Indus, Lyallpur, and Lahore. From Khushah, contrary to its previous scheduled route, it was diverted to Gujrat where Pathans attacked it on Jan. 12, 1948. The engine driver fled away. There was regular fight between the Hindu escort and the Pathans who had surrounded the platform. The Sikhs in the refugee train were particularly singled out and killed. A large number of women were abducted. Similarly a non-Muslim refugee train which had started from Wah (District Attock) was detained for two days, 24th and 25th September 1947 at Wazirabad (Distt. Gujranwala) where the train was thrice attacked inflicting a heavy number of casualties.

17. L.A.R. File No. LVII/13/2-E The Report of D.L.O. Sialkot stated that 1300 persons have been killed and almost two hundred women abducted. According to Court Martial enquiry the number of killed or injured and missing is 53 and 479 respectively. But at the same time it concluded that "no accurate figure can be produced as by the majority of attackers casualties were taken away and buried or treated by their relatives.
20. Ibid. File No. LVII/13/2-E(Part II)
The attack on the non-Muslim refugee train at Kamoke (Distt. Gujranwala) on the 23rd September 1947 was, according to Brigadier Stevens (M.E.O. Pakistan), the result of unauthorised move of the train to that station. This attack resulted in a heavy number of casualties and abduction of a very large number of non-Muslim women. The same spirit was at work among the railway employees in the East Punjab. A Muslim refugee train which left Ambala on the 25th Nov. 1947 was diverted to the dead line instead of main line at Shambu railway station. Consequently the train was derailed resulting in heavy casualties.

The railway trains carried the largest number of refugees. It is estimated that more than two million people crossed border by trains within two months or\(^{23}\). About five or six trains crossed the border every day and every train was full to the capacity, their roof, foot boards, buffer spaces and even undersides of the carriages were fully utilized. The evacuation operation by trains would have proved more useful, had there been co-operation between the East Punjab and the West Punjab Railways and had the railway staff on both sides not been infected with the communal venom.

**Foot Convoy**

Of all the modes of evacuation, the organisation of the refugee foot convoys proved to be the most effective for the peasants of the Punjab who were tough and hardy by nature. A

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21. Ibid.
23. Millions on Move, page 5. About 673 refugee trains were run from August 27th to November 6, 47.
foot convoy enabled ten thousand of refugees to be collected, moved out in either direction along with their bullocks, cart, household goods and cattle. A strong foot convoy could defend itself with the help of military against any hostile mob. It is estimated that about one million human souls crossed into Indian territory on foot, within a month up till 3rd week of Sept. 1947. Even after that the biggest refugee caravan consisting of three lakhs of human souls marched to India from the districts of Lyallpur and Montgomery.

Establishment of Liaison Agency

On account of suddenness of the forced migration of the members of the minority communities, there were left different categories of people to be evacuated. A large number of persons had been forcibly converted. Owing to continuous disturbed conditions and communal riots a very large number of women and children had been abducted on both sides of the border. The refugees in the East Punjab and the West Punjab who had recently migrated wanted to recover their relations, movable properties, bank lockers, etc. It was, therefore, felt necessary that there must be some organisation which should be entrusted with such work. The East Punjab Government and the West Punjab Government, therefore, established Liaison Agencies for their respective provinces. Under one Chief Liaison Officer in each State, there were appointed District Liaison Officers and each District Liaison Officer was to work in one district placed under him. The East Punjab Liaison Agency had its headquarters at Lahore and it worked for more than a year.

24. Millions Live Again, page 3-4

25. L.A.R. East Punjab Liaison Agency was finally withdrawn on 50th Nov. 48.
Forcible Conversions -

The most urgent and immediate task before the East Punjab Liaison Agency was to evacuate the persons who had been forcibly converted in the West Punjab. The D.L.O., Montgomery wrote that "it was discovered later on that more than two lakhs of people had become converts in order to save their skins, their property and their girls from abduction." According to D.L.O., Gujranwala "the non-Muslims had embraced Islam as a matter of expediency in the hope that some day the Hindus would come back to Pakistan and old order would be re-established." The D.L.O., Multan wrote, "thousands of non-Muslims became converts to Islam in order to save their lives and honour of their females. The assessed estimate of converts was 5000." In the district of Mianwali about 6000 persons were forcibly converted. About forcible conversion D.L.O. Dera Ghazi Khan wrote "All the converted men had very sad tales to tell. Even the old men of forty had to undergo the pain of conversion ceremony resulting in profuse bleeding" by circumcision.

Recovery of Abducted women -

The Governments of India and Pakistan in their meeting held on the 6th December 1947 took following decisions regarding recovery of abducted women and children:-

1. Conversion by persons abducted after 1st March 1947 was not to be recognised and all such persons were evacuation made by the East Punjab Liaison Agency is said to be about 8,000,000. According to D.L.O., Multan, "thousands of non-Muslims became converts to Islam in order to save their lives and honour of their females. The assessed estimate of converts was 5000." In the district of Mianwali about 6000 persons were forcibly converted. About forcible conversion D.L.O. Dera Ghazi Khan wrote "All the converted men had very sad tales to tell. Even the old men of forty had to undergo the pain of conversion ceremony resulting in profuse bleeding" by circumcision.

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1. Conversion by persons abducted after 1st March 1947 was not to be recognised and all such persons were
to be restored to their respective Dominions even against the wishes of the persons concerned.

2. The primary responsibility for the recovery of abducted persons was to rest with local police.

3. Social workers were to be associated actively with the scheme. The D.L.Os were to supply information regarding abducted persons to be recovered.

The decisions to alleviate the sufferings of womenfolk who had suffered most during the partition of the Punjab were, however, partially acted upon. A very large volume of the correspondence between the high officials of the East Punjab and the West Punjab indicates that the police officers in both of the Punjab acted partially in favour of their own community while recovering the abducted women. Deputy High Commissioner for Pakistan wrote to Chief Secretary, East Punjab: "One .... has written to say that his daughter ...... aged 13 years has been kept by one..... son of ...... Jat of village Bjoma district Amritsar. In reply to his request for recovery of the girl he was informed by the Indian military authorities (copy attached) that his daughter did not wish to leave her husband." "The D.L.O., Campbellpur reported that the Deputy Commissioners of Campbellpur and Rawalpindi districts were not handing over the recovered abducted women and girls because they had been handed over to the Azad Kashmir Government." In some cases the Police

officers in various districts had openly declared that it was their duty to see that proper regard was paid to the public opinion. In spite of inter-Dominion decisions, the statements of recovered women and girls were recorded by Magistrates and in many cases the recovered women were returned to their abductors by the district authorities.

Hurdles in the way of Recovery

On account of fear of disturbance the local authorities purposely avoided to take any action against the Pathans who had abducted the girls. Five non-Muslim girls were recovered by the Sub Inspector, Phulerwan, District Shahpur. The girls were brought from Phulerwan to Sargodha and handed over to the District Liaison Officer. During the night a large number of Pathans surrounded the house of the Inspector and on the following day they surrounded the offices of Superintendent of Police and created lot of commotion in the city. The Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent Police prevailed upon the District Liaison Officer to hand over the girls to Deputy Superintendent Police. The Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division and Deputy Inspector General Police reached Sargodha and with great difficulties these five girls were removed to India at dead of night.

The police officers who were appointed to protect the women, themselves committed the worst crimes. Two Assistant Sub Inspectors of Police went to recover a non-Muslim woman from a village in the West Punjab and the unfortunate woman was raped

34. Ibid.
and ravished by those very police officers during the nights on the way. In the meeting of the officers of the East Punjab Liaison Agency it was brought to the notice that one Sub Inspector of Police at Kamoke (District Gujranwala) had collected all the non-Muslim girls at the time of Kamoke train attack and distributed them to his accomplices. That Sub Inspector's brother who was in Pakistan Army was also in possession of abducted girls. When the latter was contacted by D.L.O. he said that he had sent about 22 non-Muslim abducted girls to his brother.

Some of the officials in Pakistan kept the non-Muslim abducted girls with them in spite of the appeal of the East Punjab and the West Punjab Governments to the public to surrender these girls as is clear from the following letter of D.L.O. of Montgomery "Shrimati...... was recovered from the custody of........ Naib Tehsildar, Dipalpur. The Naib Tehsildar had been keeping the girl for the last eight months. Hand bills signed by Deputy Commissioner regarding the recovery of abducted girls were distributed among the masses through Tehsildar, meetings were arranged in the Tehsil for making appeals to the people to return the abducted girls."

Legislation for the Recovery of the Abducted Persons -

The East Punjab Liaison Agency was closed on 30th


37. L.A.R. File No. L-VIII/14/171(Pt.II). Similar statement regarding this Sub Inspector at Kamoke has also been given in the E.B.R.

38. L.A.R. Letter No. LN 229/249 dated 4.6.48 from D.L.O., Montgomery to C.L.O.
November 1948 along with the Women Recovery Organisation which was associated with it. The work of the recovery of abducted women was brought under the Ministry of External Affairs in India and Pakistan. So far there had been no special legislation for the recovery of abducted women who were being recovered on reciprocal basis. Indian Government, however, established an elaborate machinery for the recovery of the abducted persons. An ordinance namely "Abducted Persons Recovery and Restoration" was promulgated on January 31, 1949 and it was subsequently replaced by Abducted Persons Recovery and Restoration Act 1949. One of the principal features of this Act was that it adopted a more comprehensive definition of the term "abducted" as compared to the already provided in the Indian Penal Code. Another important aspect of this legislation was the provision for setting up of an Indo-Pakistan Tribunal to decide the disputed cases of the abducted women. The camps for the stay of the recovered persons were to be established. This Act applied only to the "affected areas" viz. U.P., East Punjab, Delhi, Patiala and East Punjab States Union and United States of Rajasthan. A special provision was made to enable the recovery of the abducted women from the other States in India. The co-ordinative officers and staff were appointed to assist the police in recovery of the abducted persons. Social workers

39. According to Clause No.2 of The Abducted Persons (Recovery & Restoration) Act 1949 "abducted person" means a male child under the age of sixteen years or a female of whatever age who is, or immediately before the 1st day of March 1947, was a Muslim and who on or after that day and before 1st Jan. 1949 has become separated from his or her family and is bound to be living with or under the control of any other individual of family and in the latter case includes a child born to any such female after the said date."
were also associated with this work. There was, however, no corresponding legislation regarding the abducted persons in Pakistan.

The abductors in Pakistan adopted several methods to avoid the Indian recovery officer. They with their abducted women shifted from the West Punjab to those districts adjoining the Jammu & Kashmir territory, which were banned to the Indian officials on account of hostilities in Kashmir.

According to the provisions of Abducted Persons (Recovery & Restoration) Act no option was to be given to any recovered person who had to be sent to the other country. With passage of time it was found that recovered persons were loth to be sent across the border. The forcible restoration of such recovered persons resulted in great hardship to them as also to their children who were deprived of affection and care at least of one parent. It was, therefore, decided in the Indo-Pakistan Conference held in May 1954 that suitable means should be devised with a view to ensure that no abducted person was forced to go to other country against her will. By this decision special homes were instituted in both the countries where unwilling persons could be lodged and given full facilities to meet their relatives and to make up their mind without fear or pressure. It was only after sufficiently prolonged stay in such homes that the final wishes of the recovered persons were ascertained by the Indo-Pakistan Tribunal. In that case if the recovered women refused to go to the other country she was not forced to do so.

41. Diary of Akali Chakkar Kaur Singh (Punjabi), edited by the writer and published by the Khalsa Samachar Amritsar, page 12.
42. Recovery & Restoration of Abducted Persons in India, page 3.
Discontinuance of the Recovery Work -

The Abducted Persons (Recovery & Restoration) Act continued to be renewed every year up till 1957. It was not renewed after 30th November 1957, on account of following reasons:

The abducted women began to show increasing reluctance to go to the other country after leaving their children. By the Indo-Pakistan Government decision of 1954 they could not be forced to go to the other country against their wishes. Secondly, the most serious consideration which prevented the Government of India to renew the Abducted Persons (Recovery & Restoration) Act of 1949 was the problem of the post-abduction children. During the period from January 1, 1954 to September 30, 1957 no less than 860 children were left behind by the Muslim women restored to Pakistan while 410 children were taken by them. These children created problems for the State which had to take care of them.

Estimate of the Recovery Work -

In recovering abducted women the Government of India achieved greater success on their side than the Pakistan Government. The statements exchanged between the two Governments indicated that 25,856 persons and 9366 persons had been recovered in India and Pakistan respectively. It is very significant to note that in both countries a large majority of persons recovered were not those included in the lists of missing persons furnished by the respective Governments. No less than 4415 abducted persons out of 30,335 that is, about 14.5 per cent of the total number

44. Ibid, page 5.
45. Idem.
of abducted persons were declared as "the non abduction cases" by the Pakistan Government. Evidently enough, those cases whose particulars were supplied to the Pakistan Government on the basis of information collected from the relatives of the persons could not possibly be staying with their relatives or in their own homes. About 4191 abducted persons that is to say 13.8 per cent of the list furnished by the Indian Government, were reported to have died in Pakistan. This figure too does not appear to be correct as the corresponding number of the abducted women who died in India was surprising low viz. 3.3 per cent.

The most peculiar phenomenon with regard to the recovery work of the non-Muslim women was that the non-Muslim abducted girls very often refused to be evacuated. They were too afraid of the rigidity of the caste system and were over-conscious of having lost their chastity. In the Hindu society woman has been depicted as idol of chastity, purity and loyalty to her husband. These very notions prevented them from facing their relatives. Though they were completely helpless under the circumstances some of them really believed that their husbands and other relations had failed to protect them and hence they had lost all rights over them. The delay in their recovery was also one of the major factors because it gave their abductors the time and opportunity to din into their ears so many false and baseless rumours like "there is no food in the East Punjab" "near and dear ones had all been murdered", etc. etc. In certain

46. Idem.
47. Idem.
cases arguments of the abducted girls were very correct and genuine. An abducted girl said to the District Liaison Officer "How can I believe that your military strength of two sepoys could safely take me across to India when a hundred sepoys had failed to protect us and our people who were massacred."

Another said, "I have lost my husband and have now gone in for another. You want me to go to India where I have got no body and, of course, you do not expect me to change husbands every day." A third said, "But why are you particular to take me to India, What is left in me now - religion or chastity?"

APPENDIX

Extracts from the Findings of Court Martial
Regarding; Jassar Train Incident.

The Court having considered the evidence before them
give their opinion as stated below:-

Routing of the Train -

(a) Originally orders were given by Brig. Stevens i/c
Refugees transportation for the train to be routed
from Sialkot to Jassar. Orders were issued
accordingly by D.Q. (Rail) M.E.O. Pak to the Railway
Control Office, Lahore on 22nd October who passed
them on at 15.10 hrs to the Station Master, Sialkot,
who in turn passed the information to H.Q. Sialkot
Sub Area.
The Court is satisfied that these were the only
orders received in Sialkot either by the Station
Master or by the Military, and were duly acted upon.

(b) The Indian M.E.O. represented to Pak M.E.O. that the
the train should go via Wazirabad - Lahore on the
evening of 22nd October, orders were issued by D.Q.
(Rail) M.E.O. Pak to Railway Control to halt the train
at Sialkot while the matter was referred to Brig.
Stevens. The latter issued orders for re-routing
of the train via Lahore at about 10.00 hours. On
23rd October both these orders failed to reach
Sialkot as

(i) D.Q. (Rail) M.E.O. Pak gave the orders to
Railway Control Lahore. (It is to be noted
that D.Q.(Rail) had only just taken over the
appointment and did not realise that Sialkot
was not controlled by Lahore Division).

(ii) Railway Control Lahore was unable to get through to Sialkot to pass the message owing to trouble with their ordinary telephone.

The Court consider that the D.Q. (Rail) M.E.O. Pak should have informed Sialkot Sub Area direct and the Railway Control Lahore should have informed D.Q. (Rail) M.E.O. Pak when they were unable to pass his messages to Sialkot.

The Court further consider that D.Q. (Rail) cannot be held negligently to blame as he was new to his job and had acted in good faith.

The court also consider that in view of

(a) the orders received by the Station Master, Sialkot.

(b) the fact that many previous evacuee trains had passed through Jassar without undue molestation.

(c) that fact that the India dominion was sending Muslim refugees by that route.

that Sialkot Sub Area were not at fault in not querying the routing of the train.

The movement of the train -

Information regarding the arrival of this particular rake was first received in Sialkot by the Station Master at 15.10 hrs. on 22nd October. The rake actually came in at about 22.00 hrs. Loading commenced at about 0.15 hrs on 23rd. The train left Sialkot at 0.00 hrs and reached at about 11.30 hrs.
The court considers that
(a) the decision not to load train during the night 22/23 Oct was sound.
(b) The despatch of the train early next morning was perfectly reasonable.
(c) No undue delay occurred in moving the train to Jassar except that its speed between Narowal to Jassar may have been less than normal.
(d) adequate escort was provided of mixed troops upto Jassar.

Action at Jassar -

The evacuees and their kits were unloaded just beyond Jassar Station on the right of the railway. This took about an hour. During this time, adequate protection was afforded by the 16 P.R.O train escort and by a platoon from 512 Garrison Coy under Major Khan and a small detachment of about 2 and 6 from 15 P.R.C. under Major Shah.

The Court consider that
(a) Some collections of armed villagers and undoubtedly followed the train from Narowal towards Jassar and must have been in the vicinity. They do not consider that there were any armed Mussalmans under the railway bridge as stated by the 9th witness.

The court noted on the ground that the 9th witness could not have been under the bridge from where he was standing due to an intervening bank. The court also accepts the fact that had they been there they would have been seen by Major Shah and Major Dunn.
(b) Major Shah and Major Khan were unaware at this time that these collections of men were in the vicinity as they had gone ahead by truck and so would not have seen those who followed the train.

(c) Major Shah and Major Khan were in no way in collusion with the villagers

(i) Major Khan had only arrived that morning.

(ii) Major Shah would not have called in Major Khan's platoon if he had been in collusion with the villagers.

(d) Major Khan was justified in not accepting the full command of the escort and that Major Shah must be considered as the Escort Commander.

(e) Although the evacuees had been warned not to take more kit than they could carry most of them had in fact taken more and the surplus had to be discarded at Jassar.

Action after the main attack -

The leading portion of the convoy had run forward during the attack and were escorted to the Ravi Bridge. The rear portion was brought up by Major Khan and Major Shah. No further attack was made on the convoy during this period.

The court considers that during this period one or two of the escorting troops did remove valuable from the refugees.

The court notes that a detachment of 1 N.C.O and 3 men were sent to collect any wounded or any children and that the pl. of 15 P.R.C. returned along the evacuees route. It is considered however that more action might have been taken
that night to collect wounded or stragglers from the crops.

Casualties etc. Evacuees -

(a) the number of men, women and children who left Sialkot was 3569.

(b) The numbers counted by the 18th witness as having reached India were

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>3405</td>
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<td>29 Oct.</td>
<td>23</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(c) The numbers still known to be on the Pakistan side at Narowal hospital:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) The number of dead evacuees reported by the Police was 35

(e) Therefore the total is made up as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Living</td>
<td>3474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Known dead</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Unaccounted</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3569</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Of those living the following have suffered major or minor injuries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) In India</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) In Narowal</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>479</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) Of the injured mentioned in para (f) above, the following had been hit by 303 bullets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) In India</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) In Narowal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(h) Of the dead mentioned in para (e) (ii) above the number killed by bullets was four.
Four others had no injuries but had died from natural causes.

Action by Civil -

No action appears to have been taken by Civil or by Police. The D.C. had been warned that the convoy was due to move on 22nd and 23rd October. This was subsequently cancelled and information was given for 24th and 25th October. No information was however given to the D.C. on the evening of the 22nd October when the firm time of departure was known.

Though there may have been instances of a few of the troops not having done their duty by firing unaimed shots, the Court is satisfied that the conduct of the troops was generally satisfactory.

The Court wishes to record that they are unanimous in the above findings.

President Sd. J.R. Cornor Col.
Member Sd. Teja Singh Capt.
Member Sd. Subah Sadiq Captain.

File No. C.F. 315-ER-47
Partition Branch Records,
East Punjab Government.