PART - II

THE TWO PERSPECTIVES
CHAPTER II

The Goal-orientation of Indian Philosophy

(a) Introduction

This chapter attempts a first formulation of the basic perspective of Indian thought which shall be progressively clarified and modified in a few subsequent chapters. This preliminary formulation is on the basis of an analysis of the goal-orientation of Indian philosophy.

We ask mainly two questions about the goal-orientation of Indian philosophical systems: (i) what is the nature of man's ultimate goal? and (ii) what is the manner in which this goal is sought to be justified? Mutual illumination of the answers to these two questions may naturally be expected.

With regard to the second question which we take up first, viz., the question about the manner of justifying the ultimate goal, it is argued herein that the goal is justified in a very complex manner. It is argued that the theoretical system by itself does not provide a sufficient
justification of the goal, that, at the same time, the aspects of intuitive experience and concrete life are also incapable of providing this justification, that is, when each is considered in isolation. It is further argued that all the three factors together, in a certain interrelationship among them, provide a more or less adequate justification of the ultimate goal of life.

The basic argument is thus in terms of the factors of Experience, Thought and Life understood in a certain interrelationship. This is sought to be presented, first, by illustrating how these factors exist, in this relationship, in the Vedānta and Sāmkhya systems of Indian philosophy, and then by discussing a number of objections to taking either Experience, or Thought, or Life as the complete justification of the goal. The nature of the relationship between these factors is clarified in the process and this in its turn suggests the nature of Thought or theory in the Indian context.

Thus, our attempt to delineate the basic perspective of Indian thought by means of an analysis of its goal-orientation, involves looking at the Indian philosophical systems in a new way. This approach is, however, new only in a certain sense of the term: it is new inasmuch as it
is different from the usual approach; but it is not new in the sense of involving a departure from the traditional understanding of these systems.

This analysis brings out certain features of theoretical philosophy as it is understood in the Indian context. It is found that theoretical philosophy is here viewed in its relationship with the other aspects in at least two dimensions. On the horizontal plane, it is viewed as intimately related to the aspects of Experience and Life; on the vertical plane, this philosophy is viewed in its relationship to the goal of life which it supports in a particular way, and which provides this philosophy with its basic orientation. As theory is understood in terms of these complex relationships in the Indian context, a proper understanding of the nature of the ultimate goal and the manner of its justification becomes crucial to an understanding of Indian philosophy as a whole.

As regards the nature of this goal, it is also very complex; it may best be understood with reference to the doctrine of the Four Human Goals (purusarthas) the four goals being dharma, artha, kama and moksa. It is suggested here that the ultimate goal is essentially the same for the
various systems, and that apparent exceptions such as the system of Carvaka are not necessarily a threat to our interpretation of the goal-orientation of Indian philosophy.

Discussion of these issues brings out how this complex character of the ultimate goal points, as does the complexity of the manner of its justification, to the need for extreme caution in our analysis of the characterization of Indian philosophy as moksa-oriented. If it is true that the systems of Indian philosophy can be understood aright only by taking this orientation seriously, it is equally true that some hard thinking is indispensable to avoid gross oversimplifications about this orientation.

If our analysis of goal-orientation indicates anything for an understanding of the Indian perspective, it is possibly this: in this perspective, the relationship, between the whole and its parts is always taken into account and therefore, to understand the philosophies of this perspective, one ought to see the parts always as parts of the whole; one ought to see the parts both in their interrelationship among themselves and in their
relationship to the whole. We may characterize the Indian perspective as holistic in the sense of an insistence on this principle.

The understanding of theoretical philosophy suggested here as applicable to the systems of Indian philosophy seems, however, to suffer in an important respect. It seems that, in so far as it is oriented towards an understanding of the ultimate goal which it cannot by itself justify, this philosophy will, under this interpretation, be not rational enough to be called philosophy in the modern Western sense of the term. In fact, in this perspective, theoretical philosophy cannot fully justify the goal even when the factors of Experience and Life are brought in; for, the factor represented by Authority (śabda) is necessary to complete this justification.

Obviously there are difficulties in this interpretation; and these are to be taken up in the next chapter which deals specifically with the nature and role of theory in the Indian framework. As has already been noted, the present chapter attempts only a first formulation of the Indian perspective by means of an analysis of the nature of the ultimate goal and the manner of its justification.
The following brief interpretation of the Advaita of Sankara is meant to illustrate the manner of justifying the ultimate goal. It serves to indicate at once the meaning of mokṣa-orientation of Indian philosophy and the very nature of the Indian perspective. To the extent that this interpretation is a plausible one, it is also an argument in support of the plausibility of our delineation of this perspective.\(^1\)

(b) Mokṣaśāstra : Some Illustrative Models

Most of the Indian philosophical systems have a conspicuous goal-orientation, and this cannot but be a matter of significance. Notwithstanding the Buddhist denial of the self, the Sāmkhya denial of God and the Cārvāka denial of transcendence itself, it is still possible to argue that systems of philosophy in India have accepted what is usually termed as mokṣa or spiritual liberation as the ultimate goal of human life, and that, therefore, this acceptance of an ultimate goal has something to do with the very nature of the framework of philosophical endeavour in India. A proper understanding of any of these systems could them be obtained by viewing it as a part of a complex analysis and explanation of the ultimate goal of human life.
What, then, might be a proper understanding of a system of philosophy like the Advaita of Sankara? What is the sense in which intuitions about man's ultimate goals provide the framework for this philosophy? And, with what implications?

(i) Three factors in the justification of the goal:

Attempting to answer these questions, we find an important clue in the very concept of prasthānatraya (the three canonical texts) of the Vedānta, and in their inter-relationship. The three canonical texts are: the Upaniṣads, said to be anubhava-pradhāna, the Bhagavadgita, said to be vicārapradhāna and the Brahmaṣūtras, said to be vicārapradhāna. As is evident from the addition of the suffix 'pradhāna' which means 'chiefly', none of the three deals exclusively with only one; they all involve all the three - anubhava, vicāra, and acāra - but one or the other is central to a particular text. Thus, the anubhava (Experience) aspect is central to the Upaniṣads, the vicāra (Thought) aspect to the Brahmaṣūtras, and the acāra (Life) aspect to the Gita.

Therefore, approaching a vedantic system, the Advaita for instance, one will do well to remember that, though the
Thought aspect is what is predominant in it, this system itself is not properly understood unless it is viewed in the wider context, i.e., in its relationship with the aspect of direct intuitive knowledge (anubhava) and the aspect of concrete life and conduct (acāra). In other words, the Advaita metaphysics or theory is only a part of the comprehensive philosophy of the Advaita which includes a certain kind of experience and a corresponding life, so much so that this metaphysics itself is properly understood only when viewed as such.

Let us consider this in some detail.

The Advaitic goal is stated in terms of the realization of the identity of Ātman and Brahman (Brahmātmaikya). It is possible to say that the realization of this goal has three aspects — in terms of Experience, of Thought and of Life. But it is also possible to say, and this is what is significant for us immediately, that there are correspondingly three aspects to our understanding and justification of the goal. That is, the question is not merely what the goal is and how it is to be realized, which question is of course to be considered in terms of Experience, Thought and Life, but also why and how it is the goal, which also has to be answered in terms of the same three elements and
their interrelationship. Our interest here is primarily in the latter issue, namely, in the manner of justification of the goal.

To elaborate: the justification of a particular goal, such as the advaitic one, can be in terms of a person's direct intuitive experience of it as such-and-such. Thus, for instance, a mystic may claim that his experience is one of realizing his oneness with the ultimate reality, this experience having been stated as 'I am Brahman'.

Similarly, a sophisticated metaphysical system, such as the system of Śaṅkara, can be given as another ground supporting this goal. This is the theoretical support of the goal, the support through thought and argumentation.

Again, the life of the liberated, as described and interpreted in the advaitic texts, can be taken as supporting the advaitic goal. This, one might say, is the concrete or practical support for the goal.

Now, there can be various objections to these three—Experience, Thought and Life — as grounds for the justification of the advaitic goal. The objections in each case will
be different in character from those in the other two cases. Thus the objection against the acceptance of mystic experience will not be the same as the objection against the acceptance of practical life as a support for the goal; and the objection against the theoretical system as a support will be still different from these two kinds of objections. Yet, these objections are interrelated among themselves, as much as the three grounds are interrelated. Hence the importance of first examining the nature, limits and interrelationship of these three as grounds for the justification of the goal, before we consider the objections themselves and their interrelationship.

(ii) Experience, Thought and Life: Their Interrelationship:

The Upanisads which exemplify the Experience aspect, is closely related to the Thought and Life aspects. Though the Upanisads do not emphasize and Thought and Life aspects, these aspects are very much there in them, in a way subordinated to the experience aspect. This could be argued out with reference to any one of the Upanisads in particular.³

Regarded as Smritiprasthāna, the Bhagavadgita expounds the Upanisadic teachings which are remembered as exemplified in a concrete situation. The teaching expounded is mainly a sādhanā for the attainment of liberation, and
therefore, in the Gita, the aspects of Experience and Thought are subordinated to that of Life. Yet all the three aspects are unmistakably present. To take just one of the many descriptions of the liberated person we find the following:

"Those who have their intellect absorbed in That... (which part represents the Thought aspect), whose steadfastness is That (which represents the Life aspect), whose consummation is That (representing the Experience aspect), their impurities cleansed by knowledge they attain mokṣa."⁴ There is also here the suggestion that the knowledge or understanding of the liberated is constituted of all the three experience, thought and life. And according to Śaṅkara, only this kind of knowledge destroys all sins and brings about liberation.⁵

The BrahmaSutra, the third of the prastāna-traya known as the Nyāya prasthāna, sets forth the teaching of Vedanta in a logical manner. Significant indeed, is the very structure of the BrahmaSutra which is divided into four chapters, viz., Samanvaya (harmony), Avirodha (non-contradiction), Śādhanā (the means to realization) and Phala (the fruit). As Samanvaya corresponds to Experience, Avirodha to Thought, and Śādhanā (and phala) to Life (and the
attainment of its perfection), the whole text can be viewed as a study in the relationship between Experience, Thought and Life.

Experience, which is what the Upanisads largely exemplify, Thought which the Brahmāsūtras embody in a predominant way, and Life (of the liberated) which the Gita presents, all together thus constitute the justification of the Advaitic goal; each is a part of the justification, but neither is that except in the over-all context which includes the other two as well. And, each - Experience, or Thought, or Life - is there in a particular text, of course in a predominant way; but only in so far as it is related to the other two, also to be found in the same text.

Thus, the Experience aspect exemplified in the Upaniṣads will be a part of the justification of the goal, only in so far as it is related to the other two aspects in the same text. And, the Thought aspect of the Brahmāsūtras will have to be seen in its relationship with the aspects of Experience and Life. So also with the Life aspect in the Gita.

If this is so, then the proper study of the Brahmāsūtra, or of the Advaitic interpretation of it, will
have to relate the theory of it to the Experience and Life aspects in it. Thought or theoretical arguments by themselves will not adequately justify the goal, and this is what one should bear in mind while interpreting and evaluating the Advaita.

To take, for instance, the Life aspect in the Brahma-sūtra which is predominantly Thought or theory, and in Śankara's interpretation of it: The realization of the identity of Brahman and Ātman is not a matter either of Experience alone, or of Thought alone; it is also a matter of Sādhana or discipline. As we need both strength and purity of mind (cittāsuddhi) for this realization, the external and internal aids (bahiranga and antaranga sādhana) are prescribed for the purpose. The external aids are the fourfold discipline (Sādhanacatuṣṭaya), viz., viveka (discrimination), vairāgya (detachment), saṃspat (six virtues such as control of the mind, the senses, etc.) and mumukṣutvam (intense desire for liberation.) The internal aids are śravana (hearing from the preceptor about scriptural teaching) manana (reflection or reasoning) and nididhyāsa (meditation of the Real.) While Thought gives a proper direction to one's discipline and makes life purposeful or meaningful by bringing a unity to the various activities, Thought itself would be inadequate and hollow without this relationship with such a life.
Thought, thus, is a necessary condition for the knowledge and realization of Brahman, at least at the level of the society, if not also at the level of the individual. That is why Śankara brings in the Sādhanā or life aspect even while commenting on the "atha" of the first sūtra. He takes "atha" to mean "thereafter" (ānantarya), meaning the prerequisite of the four spiritual practices, without which deliberation on Brahman cannot be fruitful. The Thought aspect and Life aspect are worked out in detail in the chapters avirodha, sādhanā and phala of the Brahmāsūtra; but even in this first chapter (samanvaya), which deals primarily with the Experience aspect, we find the Life aspect incorporated and stressed appropriately.

Thus, the Brahmāsūtra, as also Śankara's commentary on it, is predominantly theoretical in nature, and yet its theory takes properly into account the Experimental and Life aspects without which theory itself loses its content. Even the chapter, for instance, on the Experience aspect incorporates the Thought and Life aspects into it. And the same can be said about the other chapters as well.

The important lesson for us from all this is that there is an intimate relationship between Experience, Thought and Life as factors in the justification of the goal, and that this relationship is never lost sight of
in the Upanisads or in the Gita or in the Brahmasutra. If we ignore this relationship as it is presupposed in all these contexts, we have only ourselves to blame when we land in lopsided interpretations of the thought embodied in these.

What, then, are the implications of this for our understanding of the Advaita? To put it very briefly, for the present, they are: (a) the theoretical system of Advaita (as expounded by Śankara, for instance) is a justification of the Advaitic goal of identity of Brahman and Ātman, (b) but it is a justification only in so far as there are other kinds of justifications, and (c) in so far as the theoretical justification is internally related to these other justifications. This would mean that objections to the system of Advaita would be proper and meaningful only if they take into account the interrelationship between Experience, Thought and Life, which is presupposed here. This can be done either by consciously accepting this interrelationship or, possibly, by questioning it.

(iii) The Typical Indian Pattern:

Now, it is important to note that the possibility of this interpretation is not a special feature of the
Advaita or even of the Vedantic systems. In fact, it is a general feature of a large part of Indian metaphysical thought; so that, it is not a mere logical possibility, but something which actually provides a clue to the proper understanding of these systems in general. Thus one might note here that the Sāmkhya system, and even the thought of Bhartrhari are easily amenable to this kind of an interpretation.

In the case of the Sāmkhya, what is often emphasized is the element of Thought which argues out the discrimination between purusa and prakriti as the ultimate goal of life. The other two elements, viz., Experience and Life, are ignored. "I do not exist, naught is mine, I am not", thus states the Experimental aspect. The eight dispositions, their consequences and the resulting aggregates which are of fifty types in all, take us directly to the Life aspect. The three attainments pramoda, mudita and modamāna, especially the last one, refers to the suppression of three kinds of misery. It is important to note that the highest attainment is also an aggregate in which the consequences of the dispositions like virtue and vice, non-attachment and attachment, attainment of powers and their absence are all transcended.
Thus, the goal of discrimination between puruṣa and prakriti is, first a matter of understanding the elements of the Sāmkhya system in terms of their interrelationship; second, it is a matter of Experience; and third, it is a matter of the aggregate of dispositions, which means the concrete life of the person concerned. For a proper understanding of the theoretical system itself, therefore, the intellectual, the experimental and the concrete elements must be viewed together and in their interrelationship.

Similar is the case with the thought of Bhartṛhari. The very structure of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapādiya is indicative of this three-fold understanding of philosophical systems. I 1 to I 43 is devoted to showing how the Brahma is the source of everything. I 44 to I 86 and I 118 to I 145 argues that grammar is one of the best ways of knowing the ultimate and if it is correctly practised, it would enable us to realise the Brahma. Thus we have, as it were, three sections of the Vākyapādiya, the first giving us knowledge by way of direct Experience, the second giving us Thought or theory, and the third giving us the practice or Life aspect. This would indicate that philosophy of language in India is no exception to the pattern which is argued here to be the typical Indian pattern of philosophical systems.
A theoretical system can thus be viewed as a part of a certain understanding of the goal of life. Being an attempt to theoretically explain reality, i.e., man, God and Nature, with reference to life's ultimate goal, such a system is only a part of our endeavour to comprehend this reality, the other aspects of this endeavour being (i) the intuitive experience or direct knowledge of the truth about reality and (ii) the conduct or actual life of the realized person which is indeed the concretization of that truth.

It is in this sense, then, that Indian philosophy is goal-oriented: a particular view of the goal of life is what is unique to a theoretical system of Indian philosophy; but the system itself, in its turn, constitutes part of a three-fold understanding of the goal. Neither Experience, nor Thought, nor Life, explains the goal in isolation from the other two. And, therefore, theoretical knowledge in isolation from the other two, and, therefore, theoretical knowledge in isolation from Experience and Life, amounts to little or nothing. However, understood in its relationship with these two aspects, such knowledge goes a long way in explaining reality.

This approach to the study of philosophical systems can be of immense help, not only in bringing out their
significance anew, but also in clarifying their interrelationship. Also, this can be of help in the consideration of a number of important questions regarding a meaningful relationship with our past as well as with the West.

(c) Some Objections Considered

The understanding, presented here, of the relationship between Experience, Thought and Life, as factors in the justification of a particular goal, need not be defended as such. Its significance in interpreting the individual philosophical systems in an altogether new way, and the enormous applications of this in the field of comparisons between Indian philosophical systems themselves and between Indian and modern Western philosophies to be considered towards the end of this study, will form a sufficient defence of it.

What may be usefully undertaken here is, therefore, a little elaboration of the nature of this relationship with reference to the objections against each factor taken separately and against all the three factors taken together. Unless this is done, this understanding of the relationship between experience, Thought and Life will remain vague to be of assistance in our attempt to delineate the perspectives of India and the modern West.
(i) Experience as Justification of the Goal:

To take, first, the Experience aspect, the question which immediately arises is about its validity. The genuineness of the experience, say, of the mystic, cannot be taken for granted; for, not only others can doubt this, the mystic himself cannot always be sure that he is not under an illusion.

A. J. Ayer is one of the many modern critics to have questioned the very possibility of religious knowledge. Russell who thinks that mysticism implies a way of knowledge, viz., intuition, which is opposed to the scientific way of knowledge, argues that intuition might be useful in practical affairs but it cannot be of much value in matters of theoretical interest. Again, Wittgenstein's denial of the possibility of private language has its implications for the validity of the mystic's experience which he cannot often communicate adequately.

Of course, one cannot accept the view that all mystics are genuine; nor can one, for that matter, regard all mystics as fake or as being under an illusion. One must therefore, have a method of distinguishing between mystic intuition and mystic illusion.

In the case of a total absence of communication
between the mystic and the society, there is no reason to think that the mystic or his experience is genuine. This would be the implication of Wittgenstein's view that private language is not possible. The mystic, however, is not forced to this situation. He can certainly try and teach us a 'new' language, by and large 'technical', which we gradually pick up. Initially the mystic will not make much sense to the listeners because they lack his 'vision', but slowly communication is established. This situation is analogous to the employment of a technical language in teaching a particular branch of science; by explaining the words and symbols of this 'new' language, it is gradually made part of the ordinary language. This possibility is thus real; of course it contradicts Wittgenstein's idea of different unrelated languages and their different logics.

The 'ineffability' of the mystic's experience is not, therefore, inconsistent with his intelligibility or the possibility of communication. Some genuine mystics may not take pains to explain his experience to others; they may not be inclined to do it. But, since the fake mystic also may not want to argue and explain himself, the refusal to discuss cannot be a pointer to the genuineness of the experience. Hence, it is important that, in general, the
mystic be able to explain this experience to others. This explanation may well include considered arguments and even answers to possible objections. But, very often, it will be metaphorical and analogical, and the Thought involved will not be sophisticated.

It happens, however, that in spite of the Thought element now seen to exist hand in hand with the mystic's experience, the situation has not improved much; this Experience-Thought complex is also susceptible to doubt. And this possibility demands that, for mystic experience to be genuine and to be known as such, by oneself as well as by others, it should be borne out in a life of commitment. Just as one might decide whether one's attitude to another person is love or mere infatuation, on the basis of the actual commitment involved, i.e., on the basis of how much stress this 'love' is able to bear, so also, the mystic's experience can truly be known to be genuine only in terms of the commitment involved.

Comprehensive commitment goes with a more or less thorough understanding of man, his nature and his goal. To the extent that the mystic's understanding of man, his nature and his goal is thorough, to that extent his commitment to lead an ideal life is also total and comprehensive.
This understanding (the Thought aspect) and commitment (the Life aspect) of the mystic rescue his otherwise ineffable experience from sinking into mere solipsism; these two concomitant factors of genuine mystic intuition, guarantee against the possibility of all intuition being reduced to mere illusion.

(ii) Thought as a Justification:

Next we take up the question whether Thought, i.e. a theoretical system, can support a goal adequately. We shall here confine our attention to the general line of criticism against metaphysical theories brought to a head by the philosophy of linguistic analysis.

The adherents of this school based their criticism of metaphysics on a sharp distinction between metaphysics and natural science. Being very general and fundamental, metaphysical questions cannot be equated with questions of science proper. Moreover, "science cannot deal with the questions of metaphysics; nor can it really show how they are unimportant."¹²

There is also this problem that metaphysical questions, which generally employ such phrases as "the totality of things", are often misleading; we tend to use
such concepts as 'cause' and 'substance' outside its proper empirical context, paving way to what Kant calls 'transcendental illusions'. Sankara's use of the concepts 'Brahman', 'the world', 'Absolute Truth', etc. might be objected to in this way.

Granting that there is some value to the use of these terms inasmuch as they assist speculation, there still is the problem of the attempted reduction of a number of categories into one supposedly basic category. For instance, the rationalists hold that all genuine knowledge should be capable of mathematical demonstration; similarly the empiricists try to reduce everything to sensation or sense-data. In Sankara also we find such a reduction of everything into a single model: all the individual selves and world itself is reduced to Brahman.

The systems which do not so reduce everything into a single model, face a different kind of problem. They have to relate the different reals, and this raises the question about the possibility of relationship between reals which are qualitatively different.

Even if all these difficulties are overlooked, there is the problem of choosing between the different metaphysical systems which employ more or less the same procedure.
How, for instance, can one choose between the Sāmkhya and the Advaita? Neither of these systems is less objectionable than the other. For, the Advaitin might feel a grave difficulty with regard to the Sāmkhya explanation of the relationship between the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti, and the Sāmkhyaite might feel a similar difficulty about the way the plurality of the world is related to the non-dual Brahman. In either case, the supporters of the system do not feel the difficulty in their own system as serious, because each of these difficulties can be explained as being the result of our present ignorance.

This would suggest that a metaphysical system may be fully defended only from its own point of view and not from without. That is, it is possible to obtain internal consistency within a system, but it will be open to objections about its presuppositions, etc.

At the same time one must also consider what exactly is gained by such consistency, because it is possible to attain a fair degree of logical consistency and yet lose all purpose, Hume's scepticism being a fairly good example of such pointless consistency.

Having taken note of the possibility of such
pointless consistency, one might go ahead and say, from the point of view presented here, that the different metaphysical systems are more or less of the same value. For, neither is logically fool-proof, and yet each is trying in its own way to describe reality as a whole, reaching, in the process, the utmost limits of thought.

It may now be suggested that the ultimate test for the systems could only be in terms of a new logic, the logic of human personality, one which relates a metaphysical system to human life and its goals.

Thought or theory can thus be regarded as intimately related to intuitions about man's goals and also to practically working out a way of life in the process of attaining these goals. A rational comprehension of the ultimate truth through a structure of concepts, arguments and doctrines, is of course the predominant aspect of metaphysics; but this very aspect has a meaning and purpose only in so far as it underlines, and assists in the promotion of, a particular way of life through the underlying structure of values. Thought, considered by itself, can only suggest the probable nature of truth and the corresponding way of life; there is thus every reason not to isolate it from the Life aspect while examining its validity and reasonableness.
Similarly, Thought is related to the Experience aspect: it is Thought which gives a rational content to the mystic's experience, and probably the intuitions of seers provide a direction to Thought itself.

Thus, Thought or theory plays its role, vis-a-vis the goals and values of human life, in relation to Life and Experience. The role of each - Experience, Thought and Life - is complementary to the roles played by the other two, so that together they may justify the ultimate goal.

(iii) Life as a Justification:

Finally, we come to the life aspect as a justification of the ultimate human goal.

By Life is meant here the life of the liberated or the near-liberated, and not the ordinary life which lacks unity and focus. It is to be noted that the life of the liberated is more or less the same as understood in the different systems of philosophy. Thus, for instance, the Advaita and the Samkhya which are almost opposite to each other in their theoretical positions, advocate more or less the same kind of life as the model. The Gita is the common heritage of all irrespective of their theoretical affiliation.
Unity and focus with regard to the life of a person implies the integrated character of his personality. And this integration, in its turn, implies the presence of a certain kind of Experience and the corresponding Thought in him. Thus, in Advaitic terms, the liberated man is one who has realized the identity of Ātman and Brahman. In such an individual, the Thought aspect, for instance, may be at the minimum, as in the case of Sabari of Ramayana, or it may be of the intermediary level, as in the case of Paramahamsa who taught in parables and metaphors, or it may be at its height as in the case of Śankara where the unity of life is also expressed in an elaborate metaphysical system aided by subtle logical reasoning.

It is not, thus, Life by itself which supports a goal, it is Life in relation to Thought and Experience.

A possible objection here is to our taking the life of the liberated as against the life of the ordinary man. But, as already noted, by ordinary life we do not mean here the life of the ordinary man, but a life which lacks unity and focus. What provides unity to one's life is the presence of Experience, Thought and Life, all the three of them in varying degrees, but in their organic relationship Thought, for instance, brings unity to one's life which will otherwise be lacking this unity. According to Kautilya, ānvikṣikī brings unity to one's thought, speech and action.
Another objection in this regard, and indeed a very important objection, is whether a unity is not to be found in the wicked man's life also. Perhaps the best example of such a life is that of Ravana, whose life is focused on evil. Rama resolves the conflict, between dharma and moksha on the one hand and artha and kama on the other, in one way, and Ravana in another. Hence the question about the rationale for preferring the Rama model to the Ravana model.

It is not enough, here, to point out that there is a spiritual force working in us, a force which inclines us towards the Rama model rather than towards the Ravana model. Kant's principle of universality, if accepted, will also not solve the issue; for, it will only tell us what is good and what is bad, not why we should choose the good rather than the bad.

Ultimately, it seems the choice has to be based on 'faith' or acceptance of Authority (śabda). For instance, one accepts Rama's life as the ideal because it is the teaching of the Rāmāyaṇa, because it is in accordance with the texts of Revelation and Tradition (Śruti and Smriti). Thus the choice is based on Śabda. One might as well note here that the different scriptures of the world, though
differing among themselves in varying degrees with regard to the elements of experience and thought contained in them, agree in their advocacy of the life of the liberated as distinct from the ordinary dissipated life as well as from the demoniac life which is focussed on evil.

To sum up: Experience alone cannot justify the goal, because genuine experience cannot be distinguished from illusion without reference to Thought and Life. Thought alone cannot do this, because no theoretical system is free from all objections. And Life, though it is concrete and observable, cannot by itself justify the goal, because it can be purely mechanical without the other two factors. Any and every combination of the three elements cannot also justify the goal; to justify it adequately the Experience-Thought-Life combine should take into account the natural human proclivities as is generally indicated by the kind of ideals traditionally accepted in all human societies.

This last condition regarding consonance with traditional acceptance of a particular combination of Experience, Thought and Life, brings in an altogether new dimension to our discussion, viz., the dimension of Authority, especially the authority of persons who are regarded in the tradition to have attained a certain level
of perfection. This criterion cannot be reduced to perception or inference; it has to be in terms of śabda. It is possibly in this sense that śabda is the ultimate source of knowledge, the antyapramāṇa.

This way of looking at śabda, as it opens up the possibility of viewing it from a new angle, might throw some light on the importance of the Vedas, of the āpta, and of the guru in the Indian tradition.

It may also be mentioned here that, as the above interpretation places Indian philosophical theories in a significant relation both with Experience and Life and with the acceptance of Authority, it does also raise some important questions about the implications of this understanding for the nature and scope of reason in the Indian perspective. This issue is raised and discussed in the next chapter; the remaining part of the present chapter discusses some issues related to the nature of the ultimate goal so as to bring out its complex character.

(d) **Nature of the Ultimate Goal and Related Issues**

In this section we ask: (i) what is the nature of man's ultimate goal, mokṣa, and what is its relationship
with the other goals recognized in the Indian tradition?

(ii) What is the relationship between the different understandings of this goal in the different systems of Indian thought? (iii) How is one to reconcile the acceptance of one ultimate goal in the systems with the different goals of the theory of Puruṣārthas? (iv) What are the implications of the Ācārya rejection of mokṣa and the Buddhist emphasis on renunciation for the attainment of the ultimate goal?

(i) The Nature of Man's Ultimate Goal:

The ultimate goal, variously termed as Mokṣa, Nirvāṇa, Kaivalya, etc., is not necessarily a simple state or condition; it could well be understood as a framework of interrelated goals. In other words, Mokṣa as the ultimate goal need not be understood in isolation from dharma, artha and kāma which are the other goals commonly recognized in the Indian tradition. But this requires an interpretation of the puruṣārthas in such a way that, not only there is no incompatibility among them, but there is indeed a certain interdependence for these different goals.

This 'new' interpretation is not, however, a departure from the traditional understanding of the puruṣārthas and their interrelationship. It is new only
in the sense that it may appear as a strange, even forced, interpretation to the modern ears; for, the modern understanding is, by and large, that they must conflict among themselves, and that any synthesis of them cannot succeed either in theory or in practice. But this is human shortsightedness which Vyasa, for example, has in mind when in concluding the Mahābhārata, he says, 'Here I am, crying out with uplifted arms that Dharma brings with it Artha and Kāma; but no one listens to me'.

When Krishna says, in the Gita, 'I am Kāma, not at strife with Dharma', the same note is struck regarding the relationship between the different goals. Christ's words, 'Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and all else will be added unto you', if they are not to be rejected as insignificant, will have to be taken to suggest, in the same way, that the so-called distinction between the secular and religious goals will have to be approached very cautiously.

It is, then, possible and in an important sense necessary to argue that neither of these will be a human goal without the other goals also being taken care of. That is, it is a very plausible interpretation of the puruṣārthas that each goal, in its proper understanding, accommodates the other goals.
Thus, for instance, moksa will not be a human goal without the other three goals being some way and at some level accommodated in it. There is, of course, the notion of the hierarchy of these goals; but this notion may well be understood in consonance with the understanding of puruṣārthas and their relationship suggested here. This will be taken up for consideration later in the chapter on the autonomy of morality, that is, chapter 5. Suffice it to say here that there is, indeed, much in favour of interpreting moksha in a positive and comprehensive manner, not in opposition to the other goals, but as interacting with them for it to be that very goal.

To understand how the different goals of dharma, artha, kāma and moksha are compatible and even interdependent, one might try distinguishing between incompatibility and tensions. Such a distinguished writer as Zaehner has confused between them and consequently spoken about the incompatibility of dharma and moksha which he thinks is particularly conspicuous in the Mahabharata. His reference is particularly to the verse in the Gita, where Sri Krishna says: Give up the things of dharma, turn to me only as thy refuge.

Tensions will always be there, not only between dharma and moksha, but also between these on the one hand and artha and kāma on the other; also, there will be tension;
between artha and kāma and between one kind of kāma and another, as between one kind of dharma and another. The question therefore is just how to understand these tensions.

It may be suggested here, without further discussion, that these tensions do not necessarily imply an inherent incompatibility in the framework of goals conceived in terms of the purusārthas. Rather, these may be understood, fruitfully indeed, as tensions within the framework of their interrelatedness and interdependence. To use a rather crude analogy, the quarrels and tensions within a family are normally to be understood within the framework of the unity that family connotes; for, when this framework is no more, the family also ceases to exist as a meaningful entity, and the father, for instance, is no more a father in the same sense as before, nor the son a son.

In the same way with the tensions among dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa; of course, it harbours the possibility of their breaking out of the framework of their unity and interdependence, thereby ceasing to be what they are supposed to be within this framework; at the same time, these tensions do not amount to an actual, necessary and irrevocable conflict of the nature suggested by the term incompatibility. In short, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa will each be one thing
in their interrelatedness and entirely a different thing when it is taken in isolation from the others.

The Gita, when it exhorts one to give up things of dharma and turn to God as one's refuge, does not therefore imply any contradiction or incompatibility between dharma and moksa. This implication is suggested mainly because one thinks of theism in the Indian context as being exactly of the same nature as theism in the West. But if the perspectives are different, what forms part of these perspectives will also be significantly different, even though to all appearance they are the same.

Thus, if one thinks of dharma mainly as obedience to the will of God, that is, if ethics is supposed to follow from a metaphysics of God, then it is very difficult to see how one might reject the will of God and yet attain God. But this seems to be just what is suggested by the exhortation to give up dharma. However, if the will of God may be identified with God, that is, if, as Gandhi would put it, the Law and the Lawgiver are the same, then the above suggestion is simply out of question, and the natural and only conclusion would be that the above mentioned exhortation of the Gita does not suggest an exclusive understanding of the religious goal; rather it suggests that the moral goal by itself does not constitute the proper
Zaehner goes to the extent of saying that the bhakti cults in Hinduism were concerned far more with escape from this life into God than with the pursuit of dharma in this world in accordance with the will of God. Whether this be a comment on the Hindu theory or the Hindu practices, this is wide off the mark, and it involves a misapprehension of the relationship between dharma and mokṣa.

To underscore the notion of a framework of interrelated goals, however, is not to deny the significance of the distinction between these various goals for a proper understanding and appreciation of Indian philosophy as a whole. What is suggested however is that just as mokṣa is not mokṣa without rōm being given for the realization of the other goals as well, so also mokṣa-śāstra would not be that without its intimate and internal relationship with the other sastras such as dharmaśāstra and arthaśāstra. Just as it has been the tendency to isolate mokṣa from the other goals, so also it has been the tendency to isolate mokṣa-śāstra from the other śāstras thereby distorting it considerably. Of course, all the śāstras may have been distorted in a similar manner; but as we are concerned
more with what is called mokṣa-śāstra, we shall confine our attention to the distortion that this śāstra suffers on account of its isolation from the rest of the śāstras. The understanding of the relationship between the different goals of human life and the understanding of the relationship between the different śāstras go hand in hand with each other. If the one is inadequate, so will also be the other.

Thus, one might say that it is, partly at least, on account of a near-total isolation of mokṣa-śāstra from the other śāstras that Indian philosophy has so often been described as negative, other-worldly, religious, etc. This suggests that one way of getting over the present confusion about the nature of Indian philosophy as a whole is to look into the interconnections between the various śāstras. Suffice it to say here that the understanding, suggested here, of the interrelationship between the various goals of human life, and the understanding of the relationship between the various sastras, which is merely hinted at here as a possibility with important implications, should mutually illuminate.

Now that attention has been drawn to the issue of the complex character of mokṣa, let us note that the
acceptance of such an ultimate goal, or a framework of goals, does not necessarily mean acceptance of a particular understanding of the goal. In so far as both these are accepted more or less without question, they may be regarded as presuppositions. But these are indeed two different kinds of presuppositions.

That man's life has a goal which is of a certain kind and which therefore gives meaning and significance to life, is one kind of presupposition, one which is, let us say, common to most of the Indian philosophical systems. But this would not mean anything by itself. There is also the other kind of presupposition that the goal is to be understood in a particular way, which completes and concretizes the first kind of presupposition. In this latter respect the systems differ among themselves.

As for the relationship between the two kinds of presuppositions, it has already been suggested that the specific understanding of the goal, peculiar to a system, is necessary to give content to the otherwise hazy awareness of direction which, in a sense, is embedded in the human heart, and, in another sense, is revealed to, or intuited by, the best minds. The former thus concretizes and completes the latter.
And each is related to reason in different ways: there is little that reason can do with regard to the supposition that there is a certain kind of goal or, which is the same, the supposition that such and such is the direction in which man can find his fulfilment; for, really this awareness of a direction is a precondition for the meaningful operation of human reason; but, in the case of the supposition that the goal is to be understood in a particular way, there is indeed a lot that reason can do in its explanation, although it is also a presupposition and therefore not fully amenable to reason, or rather to reason by itself.

Thus, the supposition that there is an ultimate goal which lies in a certain direction and which ought to govern all our thinking and activities, not excluding philosophical thinking, and the supposition that this goal has to be understood in a particular way, are mutually complementary and neither is fully in the purview of reason. If the former is an ultimate postulate which provides a direction to reason itself, the latter is what gives content to reason.

Two questions arise immediately: (i) With regard to the supposition that there is an ultimate goal of a
particular kind which should determine the direction of reason: does this not affect the character and scope of reason? (ii) With regard to the supposition that the goal is of a particular description: how can reason support or justify at the same time the entirely different understandings of the ultimate goal in the different systems?

As for the first question, viz., whether the prior acceptance of an ultimate goal does not unduely restrict the scope of reason, we shall consider this in some detail in the next chapter. Here it should suffice to say that the answer to this question is in the negative if, as Bhartrhari contends, reason would lack direction and be a source of confusion without a framework of goals to guide its course.

There need not, then, be any contradiction in holding at once (1) that reason in the Indian tradition functions within a framework of goals and (2) that here is a significant and positive role assigned to reason in this tradition, in as much as it explains and justifies a particular understanding of the goal, of course in association with some other kinds of factors. The form and the general direction of inquiry may well be beyond the purview of reason, and yet the matter or content, that is, the
exact nature of the goal, can be subjected to severe rational criticism and analysis. And, what is more, this could very well be the true business of reason.

Now we turn to the question: how can reason be expected to support or justify different understandings of the ultimate goal found in the different systems of Indian philosophy?

(ii) Different Goals or Different Understandings of the Same Goal

Not only the different systems of Indian Philosophy have given different descriptions of moksha, no system holds that its understanding is just arbitrary. That is, each system claims that its description of moksha corresponds to what that ideal situation in fact is. In other words, a particular conception of moksha is a part and parcel of a particular theoretical set up, and it is seen as the conception that accords well with the experience of the sages. However, if this raises the problem of differing conceptions of moksha, it also points to a solution.

And the solution is on these lines: True that the a particular conception of the goal gets some support from the corresponding experience of the sages. But, in
so far as the life of the realized person is also an essential component of the explanation and justification of the ultimate goal, and in so far as the systems with their differing interpretations are in general agreement in their description of the life of the realized person, it is possible to argue that the systems have a common goal in spite of their different descriptions of the same.

Let us explain this. We have already argued that the goal is to be understood not merely in terms of the theoretical description and arguments in a system nor merely in terms of the Experience of the realized persons, but also in terms of their actual life. Therefore it becomes indeed very significant that the description of the realised person does not so much differ from system to system. The significance of this is that it provides a clue to the essential unity of the different goals.

To take an instance: The Advaita understands the goal in terms of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, while the Samkhya understands it in terms of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakriti. One might think that the ultimate dualism of the Sāmkhya and the Absolute monism of Śankara cannot both be equally valid philosophical positions,
that the philosophical method which leads to such a situation must have some serious fault inherent in it.

This feeling, however, is the result of our exclusive emphasis on the theoretical aspect of the explanation for an understanding of the goal. As already indicated, the Indian tradition is decidedly against such an emphasis, as, according to this tradition, the goal is to be understood and justified in a threefold manner, i.e., by means of direct knowledge or intuition, theoretical understanding or Thought, and practical life or conduct.

The life of the liberated, of which the different systems give more or less an identical picture, is complete or perfect in itself. It is perfect in the sense that the different aspects of life such as the individual and the social, the emotional and the intellectual, the moral and the religious, reach their integration and fulfilment. In fact, the ultimate goal is realized in the attainment of the fourfold purusārthas, in their integration; and this integration though variously achieved by different persons in different theoretical and practical situations, is essentially the same: it is the integration of dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa.

Of course, the differences have their relevance
both at the theoretical and practical levels; for, differences exist among people as to what aspect of the goal they find appealing to them. This explains the well-known fact that the systems of Indian philosophy, while holding on to the truth about the ultimate reality as they understood it, admit at the same time the possibility of there being different explanations of the same ultimate goal. That each system tries to subsume all other explanations under its own specific one, should not blind one to the fact that there is a general awareness among the systems regarding this possibility.

If this is so, then the role of philosophy in India is to argue out in a rational and convincing manner what might be a possible theoretical explanation of the ultimate human goal which of course can be variously worked out at the theoretical level. In so far as there might thus be alternative descriptions as well as explanations of the goal, validity of each system consists partly in that it is, indeed, one of the many possible explanations; and partly it consists in its being an explanation only in association with direct experience of the truth of reality on the one hand and the concretization of this reality in actual life on the other.
These two associate factors - direct knowledge and actual life - especially the latter, compel us to view differences in theory from a new angle, such that these theories can, while being different on a certain plane, justify the same goal on a more fundamental plane.

The logical consistency and the overall strength of the arguments are of course important in determining the validity of systems; this is not at all denied when we refer here to some other factors as equally important. But the strength and validity of a theoretical system is not merely its own strength; it is derived also from the strength of the accompanying Experience and Life. And the Life factor being there to unify the systems, the strength of a theoretical system does not necessarily imply a denial of strength to a different system. The strength or validity of a system will have to be considered with reference to the role it plays in justifying the ultimate goal and with reference to the effectiveness with which this role is played.

Thus a corollary to this idea that the different systems have a common goal, is the possibility that these systems though vastly different from one another, play the same role in justifying this goal. An explanation as to
how different paths can lead to the same goal, may be found in this notion that the paths which are different need not necessarily have different roles to play in the wider context of the complex justification and support of the goal.

This line of thinking is supported by the traditional Indian insistence on the possibility of different interpretations of the same reality which can be traced as far back as the Rig Veda which says that reality is one, but the sages describe it differently. It is supported also by the practice of regarding the different systems of Indian philosophy, orthodox and heterodox, as darsanas or different perspectives to the understanding of the same reality. Mādhava's Sarvadarsana Sangraha, for instance, discusses not only the Saddarśanas but also the Baudhāyana, Jaina darśana and the Cārvāka darśana as well.

This line of thinking, in turn, throws light on how a system like the Carvaka was considered as an ānvīkṣikī by no less a person than Kautilya. The traditional acceptance of Cārvāka as a legitimate philosophical system will remain a hard nut to crack until and unless the Thought aspect, or the theoretical element in the justification of the goal, is brought in relation to the
Life aspect as we have done in our analyses so far. This very point will be taken up for a brief consideration shortly; but, before that let us consider briefly the goal of the systems and the puruṣārthas.

(iii) The One Goal of the Systems and the Four Puruṣārthas:

It is pertinent to ask here about the relationship between the one goal accepted in a particular system of philosophy in India and the four goals which together constitute the puruṣārthas. Not only this has implications for the understanding of the systems themselves, this will also serve to reinforce the view that the systems have essentially the same goal.

The systems vary among themselves with regard to the understanding of the ultimate goal to be achieved. This is understandable in so far as the Experience and Thought aspects differ considerably from system to system. Now, while there are some differences in the Life aspect also, this aspect is more a unifying factor than a distinguishing feature of any of these systems. The more important point to be noted here is the acceptance, by these systems, of the account of the goal in terms of the same four human goals viz., dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa.
Hence the question: How are the four goals of the purusārthas and the one goal of the systems reconciled?

It may also be considered here whether the goals are really four according to the tradition or they are less than four. For, this consideration will throw some light on the question raised just now. Without going into the details of it one may just mention here that there are two views to be taken note of in this connection. One is that there are not really four goals, that the goals are only three, that mokṣa is a later addition. On the other hand, there is this view that the three goals are really not goals, they are a means to the ultimate goal of mokṣa understood as freedom from the pursuit of the other goals.

Suffice it to say here that the acceptance of the four goals is not a marginal tradition in so far as the Manusmriti, Kautilya's Arthaśāstra, the Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa, etc. support all the four goals.

However, there are many passages where, for instance, mokṣa is left out. Here is one: "some declare that the chief good consists in dharma and artha; others place it in kāma and artha, others in dharma alone or artha alone; But the decision (of the wise) is that it consists in the
aggregate of all the three." One might wonder why moksa is left out here. But in so far as it is spoken of elsewhere in the text, and is also related to the three mentioned here, it is important that we take the text as a whole and see how the parts or different statements are interrelated among themselves.

One might also ask whether these references to moksa could not be interpolations. Of course, it is possible that this is so; but it is also possible that they are only explications, and this possibility gains credence if we remember that, as already argued, moksa and dharma are very closely related and neither is independent of the other. They are interdependent and they complement each other.

One could say that dharma, the code of conduct, disciplines our relationship with others in the pursuit of artha and kāma; and, at the same time, it disciplines our emotions, it brings about an internal discipline. It is this latter kind of discipline which completes the former; and when this completion or consolidation is attained, then one attains moksa. One is then a sthitaprajna in the terminology of the Gita; one is established in a certain state of attainment. So that
one is not tempted by, say, the actual attractions of money and sexual enjoyment; one is also not swayed by other possible influences such as power and fame.

Indeed, there cannot be a proper discipline in relation to others and with reference to the actual situations in which one is placed, if there is no corresponding discipline with reference to oneself which can take care of various possible situations. But this latter kind of discipline cannot exist without the former. In other words, dharma alone will be mechanical adherence to rules and therefore mere ritualism, and mokṣa alone will be escapism; just as artha alone will be greed, and kāma alone lust.

Also, any direct training of the emotions, etc. through meditation, austerity and the like, not only helps to perfect internal discipline; it helps at the same time to discipline our relationship with others in the pursuit of artha and kāma.

If this is so, then the theory of the four puruṣārthas need not be replaced by any of the two views mentioned earlier: One is not compelled to hold either that mokṣa is not a traditional goal, or that it alone is the goal. Not only that; the four puruṣārthas together
constitute one goal, viz. mokṣa, which perfects and is perfected by dharma which disciplines and renders feasible our pursuit of artha and kāma.

And this shows how the four goals of the traditional scheme of purusartha reconcile with the one goal of the systems: the four goals together give us self-realization which is in fact a single goal, and the goal of the systems is also self-realization, whether it be described as Prakritā-Puruṣa-viveka or Brahmātmaikya.

One might also venture to suggest here that perhaps the puruṣārthas emphasize the unity of the individual in terms of the various goals to be realized in their integration, while the systems attempt to explain reality as a whole and the unity of all reality with a definite place in it assigned to the self. The systems, which are in this sense different theories of the self and its relation to the rest of reality, do it differently as different persons, conditioned as they are by different problems, different doubts etc., can approach the same reality from different angles. Thus the task of the theory of the puruṣārthas and that of the systems are complementary.

Mokṣa is not merely a religious concept. It is,
indeed, the meeting point for knowledge, action and devotion. On the side of the systems, which are concerned with Thought or theory (for, it is here that moksa is explained and justified in theoretical terms), moksa has to be known/understood correctly; on the side of the theory of purusārthas (where it gets linked with dharma, artha and kāma), moksa has to do primarily with proper and virtuous life. If the former has to do with right knowledge, the latter has to do with right action. The 'spiritual' character of moksa cannot be understood properly if we do not take into account these dimensions of knowledge and action in their interrelationship. Add to this the dimension of devotion, and we have the triad of knowledge, action and devotion, of jnāna, karma and bhakti.

Thus, it is possible to understand the entire gamut of Indian thought. Its practical (ethical), 'philosophical' (metaphysical) and religious dimensions can be viewed as centered on moksa, the 'spiritual' ideal. This would be a plausible way of looking at the moksa-orientation of Indian thought, a way that is far from being apologetic.

While we are at the question about the number of purusārthas, it is useful also to consider briefly whether
knowledge itself should not have been given a place in
the scheme of the basic human goals. Acquisition of the
knowledge of reality is often regarded as a sine qua non
for its attainment. Knowledge thus becomes a means and
not an end. This is clear, so far as the Vedanta is
concerned, from the description of the knowledge of ulti-
mate reality as a path in the Upanisads. ²²

That the same is also the view of systems other
than the Vedanta may be seen from the following: In the
Nyāya Sūtra, for example, are told that mokṣa results from
knowing the true nature of reality. ²³ The Sāmkhya Kārikā
speaks of the destruction of the three fold misery as
being a consequence of knowing what the system takes to
be the ultimate nature of reality. ²⁴

It is useful here to look at Kautilya. He
conceives of ānvīkaṣikī as an extension of dharma. Ānvīkaṣikī
is sometimes understood as logic. But the understands it
as that which brings together all our thought, speech and
action. It gives unity and focus to life. This focus is
also what makes for the reality of the sthitaprajña. In
so far as this ānvīkaṣikī is related thus to dharma and
mokṣa, it is quite understandable that knowledge/understand-
ing, which is what ānvīkaṣikī primarily connotes, is not
Knowledge here is the suggested means to the realization of the four goals in their totality and interrelatedness. The very first line of Dharmakirthi's Vākyabindu, for instance says that by proper knowledge all the purusārthas are attained.

Here, then, we have a criterion to distinguish between knowledge proper and knowledge which is not genuine. Here we have also, perhaps, a means of judging the genuineness of scientific knowledge as it exists today. In so far as the methodology of science is compatible with the general method of bringing a focus to life, we have true science; and in so far as these methodologies contradict each other, the knowledge and practice of science will cease to be a worthwhile human enterprise. In other words, spirituality, meaning the attempt to bring a focus to one's life in terms of the pursuit of dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, provides the framework for knowledge: whatever knowledge can be fitted into this framework may be regarded as genuine, and the rest is all spurious, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Judged by this criterion, the magic of modern science could essentially be black magic; and the
much-talked-about marriage of science and spirituality would be just a mirage.

If, thus, spirituality in the sense just mentioned is to provide the framework for science and not vice versa, then the relationship between science and philosophy is to be examined afresh. For, it does not then seem to be alright to say, as Hiriyanna does, that science gratifies curiosity or wonder, but philosophy is meant to meet the deepest desire of man for peace of soul. Gratification of curiosity will not qualify as science in the true sense of the term if it is not within the framework of man's desire for and pursuit of self-realization.

In short, science, in whatever form, is not the framework into which spirituality may be accommodated; rather, spirituality at least in certain forms, can and should accommodate science into its framework.

So much for the notion that the doctrine of puruṣārthas is arbitrary on account of its leaving out knowledge from its scheme. Knowledge or science cannot be constitutive of, the fundamental framework for the art of living life fully and significantly; it has to be within that framework. That is, if we go by the perspective of
Indian thought and what it implies.

(ii) Problems posed by the Cārvāka and Buddhist Philosophies:

It is time we considered the question whether the goal orientation of Indian philosophy can be taken seriously in the face of the Cārvāka denial of moksa, as also the question whether the positive understanding of moksa presented here is not negated by the emphasis on renunciation found throughout the Indian philosophical systems, especially in Buddhism and Jainism.

Let us take the case of the Cārvāka system first. Kautilya regards it as an ānvikṣikī; he defines ānvikṣikī in terms of concrete living. He says that ānvikṣikī confirms benefit on the people it keeps the mind steady in adversity and prosperity; it illuminates thought, speech and action.26

Kautilya's mentioning Lokāyata, i.e. Cārvāka, as an example of ānvikṣikī, along with Sāmkhya and Yoga, throws up important possibilities. In the first place, Lokāyata need not be treated as an obvious exception to the tenor of Indian thought. If we treat it so, it is because this system is seen as an inconvenience, rather a nuisance, to our viewing Indian thought in a particular way. Perhaps we need to understand the tenor of this thought more closely.
The much talked about denial of mokṣa by this system may itself need reviewing. Perhaps this denial of mokṣa is only a denial of the goal understood in terms of transcendence, and not a denial of the ultimate goal itself. And, what is more, the goal of Chārvāka and the goal of the other systems in terms of transcendence, need not necessarily be antithetical to each other. Rather, it is possible that each is required to properly understand the other. In so far as mokṣa may have always been interpreted negatively as well as positively, this denial of mokṣa could very well have signified a stiff resistance to the negative understanding of the ultimate goal, thereby ensuring indirectly that this goal is understood in positive relation to the other goals and not in opposition to them.

Again, the description of the realized or ideal person is possibly common to all systems, not excluding the Lokāyata. The refined Lokāyata, whom we must take into account, is theoretically at least, as much important as the vulgar version we are so well acquainted with.

According to Lokāyata, whatever is to be achieved by man is to be achieved in this very life. This would mean that man's ultimate goal is not a transcendent state and therefore it cannot be mokṣa understood in transcendental terms. This explains why Kautilya understands
anviksiki, which is darsana and therefore philosophy in the usual parlance, in terms of the three sciences of dharma (the three Vedas), vārthā (the science of the means of livelihood) and dandanīti (the science of politics). Thus, according to him, anvikṣiki is a rational inquiry into good and evil (dharmanātha), power and absence of power (balābalam) the expedient and the inexpedient (nayānāyam) and the relative strength of these.27

Thus, the Chārvāka system does not really pose a serious problem to the characterization of Indian thought as mokṣa-sāstra, that is, if the term is not taken in the purely transcendental sense. It is possible that there are serious disputes about the nature of the ultimate goal, and yet it is also possible that we understand Indian thought itself as having for its basic framework an indisputable goal-orientation.

It is here suggested that we take the Chārvāka system in the context of the general tendency of Indian thought to be preoccupied with man's ultimate goal. It may then be argued that the Chārvāka system, by its denial of transcendence, emphasises a certain aspect or dimension of man and his perfection. Perfection has been understood by other systems as necessarily involving transcendence, that
is, transcendence of artha, kāma and even dharma; by denying transcendence itself the Chārvaka system highlights, indirectly though, the role of what is transcended in the very state of transcendence.

Our interpretation of mokṣa in a positive and comprehensive manner, i.e., moksa as inherently related to the other goals, gets an indirect support from this interpretation of the Chārvaka denial of transcendence. That is, by this kind of denial we are kept on our guard against confusing the more or less transcendent goal of moksa with the complete denial of what is transcended, i.e. the denial of artha, kāma and dharma. In short, the nature and kind of this denial has to be such that it is consistent, not with a denial of any of these goals for its own sake, but with an affirmation of these in the proper sense of the terms. When mokṣa is realized as a puruṣārtha, the other puruṣārthas are all realized at once. One is here reminded of Vyāsa's contention that dharma brings with it arthe and kāma; and of Christ's exhortation: First you seek the Kingdom of God and all else shall be added to you.

Mokṣa, then, may be understood as the final point one reaches in practising the art of living, the stage wherein there is proper integration of every aspect of life.
It is that which imparts meaning and purpose to life on this very earth. In other words, moksa in its true relationship with artha, kāma and dharma, is the a priori condition under which we can be said to be human beings and the liberated can be said to be perfect human beings.

Just as one model of spirituality, say, of Sri Aurobindo, will not be properly understood in the absence of other models, such as that of Gandhi and Ramana Maharsi, so also, the ultimate human goal as propounded by the 'transcendentalist' philosophies will not be properly understood in the absence of such opposition as that of the Cārvāka to this understanding. This is probably the value of the Cārvāka system. The different models act and react on one another. In the process they limit one another but they also reduce the chances of degeneration in each case.

The concept of jīvanmukti is necessary to be taken into account for a proper understanding of the ultimate human goal. This, indeed, has been considered the "acme of Indian though." But in what sense? Probably, the answer is here: the negative interpretation of moksa is supposed to have been strengthened by the system of Advaita with the treatment it received in the hands of Sankara; and this very system, which has come to be regarded, rightly
or wrongly, as representative of the Indian philosophical genius, accords a prominent place to this concept, thereby compelling us to see the goal of Brahmatmaikya aright. Where there seems to be a marked tendency to emphasise the negative side of mokṣa in its opposition to artha, kāma and dharma, exactly there one finds the concept of jīvanmukta, with its emphasis on the relevance of this life, being given a prominent place in the scheme of things. Similar is the significance of the notion of Bodhisattva in Buddhism. These concepts, and their living counter-parts, imply an affirmation of the world, of the values of artha, kāma and dharma, vis a vis the ultimate goal of mokṣa or nirvāṇa.

In so far as perfection, understood in a particular way, may be said to have been aimed at by the refined Čārvāka himself, his denial of mokṣa cannot be taken to mean a lack of concern for the higher human possibilities; it might well be that this denial implied a difference in the understanding of perfection itself. And, in so far as the two notions, mokṣa and transcendence need not be identical, it is not impossible to interpret the Čārvāka position as the denial of the latter rather than the former. In fact the plausibility of this interpretation is what is suggested by Kaut-ilya's citing Čārvāka, along with Sāmkhya and Yoga, as an ānyāksikā: While Yoga represents systems which accept
God and transcendence and Śāmkhya stands for systems which accept transcendence without God, the Cārvaka represents systems and world-views which accept neither God nor transcendence.

Kautilya is clear and emphatic about the nature of the relationship between the various goals. With reference to the king, Kautilya says that he should enjoy only those pleasures which are not against dharma and artha. That is, realization of one goal can never be at the expense of another. If anyone is pursued in excess, it harms itself as well as the other two. 29 Here the king represents the state and the community. Hence at the level of the community there should be a balance of emphasis on the various goals, though at the individual level any one of these may receive more emphasis than the others.

Thus, the refined Cārvaka, taken at least as a possibility if not also as an actuality, throws light on transcendence itself, by emphasizing the role of what is transcended, and by suggesting that what is transcended is not necessarily denied but in fact related to the realm of transcendence and thereby really affirmed.

While the Cārvaka system in a sense excludes moksa
from the framework of goals, Buddhism and Jainism seem to limit the framework to a negative understanding of the ultimate goal. A consideration of this problem would lead us to an examination of the common assumption that the Indian tradition advocates renunciation (sannyāsa) as the means to liberation. And this assumption needs to be touched upon here. For, this point has its bearing both on our interpretation of moksa as inherently related to artha and kāma, and on our understanding of the Cārvāka system as denying transcendence rather than the goal-orientation of life.

Since the ascetic path finds its extreme emphasis in Buddhism and Jainism, the charge of asceticism against Indian philosophy is best discussed with reference to one of these systems. However, the issue is not actually discussed here thus; it is only briefly considered with reference to the distinction between the path of action and the path of renunciation, (nivṛttimārga and pravṛtti mārga). It might, however, be said here that Buddhism and and Jainism, along with the Cārvāka system, provide the necessary foil to understand the other systems and the perspective which we have discerned in the general philosophical scene of India.

The question before us is this: Does sannāyasa
(renunciation) not mean pursuit of mokṣa in a way which negates the other three goals?

For one thing, the life of renunciation is not the only path available to those who pursue mokṣa. They can as well be householders (grihasthas), which means that they can and should lead the life of activity. It is possible to give more or less equal emphasis to all but at the level of the society.

In the framework of a society where the different goals are more or less equally emphasized and integrated among themselves, it is meaningful if some individuals sacrifice the so called lower interests in pursuit of the higher. For, this enriches the well being of these individuals as well as of the society, in so far as it works out new patterns of life within the established framework at the social level. Thus, the distinction between what is necessary at the social level and what is possible or desirable at the level of individuals - this distinction removes much of the sharpness in the contrast between the life of activity and the life of renunciation.

The relationship between various stages of life, (āśramas) can also be brought in line with this view.
spite of the distinctions and contrasts between these stages, it is not necessary to suppose that the relationship is one of independence for any one of these from the others. Just as renunciation is not necessarily cutting oneself off from the society, so also to be a householder is not a matter of indulgence. The stage of brahmacharya is but a preparation for both these. It is possible to conceive of their relationship in such a way that each stage is what it is only because of the other stages. This view accords well with the genius of India which never loses sight of the interrelationship among the parts of the whole.

The best example of the life of renunciation is not only a matter of renouncing the world; there is in it a certain blend of action and renunciation. So also, in the case of the examples of the life of activity, we find there is a subtle blend of these two aspects.

Let us say that corresponding to the life of activity and the life of renunciation advocated by the tradition, we have two kinds of liberated life. To concretize, there is Rama who lived a life of activity, and the Buddha who lived a life of renunciation. Princes by birth both renounce their kingdom for an ideal, and both are regarded as avatāras. Yet one can distinguish between the
life of Rama and the life of the Buddha. Rama renounced his kingdom as a matter of his duty; he had to obey his father which implied his going to the forest. If he is the ideal son, he is also the ideal king, the ideal husband, the ideal father, etc. He could respond to any occasion in a perfect manner; his was an ideal life of activity, which, nonetheless had in it a place for renunciation.

In the case of the Buddha, the life is different. He renounces not only his kingdom but also his wife, his son, his relations, etc. He does this, not so much to fulfil his duty, as to ensure the attainment of the supreme human goal, viz., mokṣa or nirvāṇa. His life represents the ideal life of renunciation. If we examine the life of the Buddha, however, we find that even after his realization, the other goals, viz., dharma, artha and kāma, had their place in it, if only in relation to the society in which he lived and moved. Of course, these other goals were clearly subordinated, even in the case of the society at large, to the goal of nirvana, and thus their scope was restricted.

To conclude, the Indian tradition has provision for both the ways of life. We have the examples of Janaka, Krishna and others who were both kings and householders
like Rāma and who are similarly regarded as liberated. Similarly, we have a host of recluses such as Śankara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Ramaṇa, etc., who, like the Buddha, followed the path of renunciation, and who are regarded as liberated men. The situation, however, is properly understood only when we also note that, in either case, all the goals were realized by and through them, if not at the individual level then at the social level. Śankara, in the introduction to his Bhaḍvadgita Bhāṣya, says that the Gita talks of these two different disciplines so that people can choose any one of them and realize the same supreme reality, viz., Vāsudeva, by attaining all the human goals (Samasta-puruṣārtha).

M.Hiriyanna has observed that the life of activity and the life of renunciation, in their Indian form, present a rather unusual feature in that they have ceased to be mutually exclusive. The strangeress of this feature will no more baffle us if we get to know the essence of the Indian perspective which never allows any of its aspects to be viewed in isolation from the other aspects which are all organically related to it.

(e) Conclusion : The Indian Perspective as it Emerges

If it is possible to thus interpret the Indian Philosophical systems with some plausibility about it, and
if the main objections against such an interpretation can be met more or less adequately, then it seems that in this understanding of the goal orientation of philosophy in terms of the relationship between Experience, Thought and Life, there is the basis for identifying the framework of Indian thought in general.

First, to sum up our findings, it has been possible to understand the goal-orientation of Indian philosophy in such a way that it suggests that this philosophy exists in a certain relationship with both Experience and Life; that together with these factors it justifies the goal more or less adequately; that, therefore, the relationship between theoretical philosophy and the goal of human life, is not simply that the latter determines the former. The goal itself is explained, justified and realized in a complex manner involving the interplay of Experience, Thought and Life. The relationship is pretty complicated and has to be understood properly to avoid oversimplifications.

The above understanding suggests that, in the Indian perspective, when either intuition, or systematic thought, or the practical aspect of life, is taken into account, it is considered necessary to view it in its relation with the
other aspects. The other aspects will, of course, be subordinated then to the main point of consideration; but the relationship among them is never ignored.

In so far as the mokṣa-orientation of Indian philosophy thus refers to the fact of a larger framework in which theory functions here, and in so far as the elements are all closely interrelated and interdependent in this framework, one might say that the Indian perspective is holistic in character. But the elaboration of this description though important, should wait till we are through the consideration of a number of problems arising out of the suggested understanding of goal-orientation, especially the problem that any and every combination of Experience, Thought and Life may not justify the goal.

It was found that, though objections may be raised against each of the three factors, Experience, Thought and Life, taken separately as a justification for the ultimate goal of human life, these objections lose much of their force when the three are seen in their inter-relationship; for though neither is a sufficient justification by itself, together they can go a long way in justifying the goal. But there was a snag: we also found that a serious objection could be raised against this combination of the three factors.
The question was: why at all should the spiritual kind of unity be preferred to the demoniac variety? It seemed, an answer to this is possible only in so far as one is ready to take recourse to Sabda, the authority of the scriptures, and all that it implies. That is, the goal is justified comprehensively and adequately, only when this justification itself is in accordance with a certain kind of authority which may be generally termed Tradition. Tradition, in this sense, would determine the direction that man takes in his endeavour to understand, justify and realize the ultimate human goals.

This implies that, in this perspective, theoretical attempts and reason itself would be subject to control by factors which are often regarded as antithetical to reason. In other words, this implies a denial of the autonomy of reason, a denial which may or may not be consistent with an affirmation of the scope and significance of reason. Hence the need to examine this issue of the nature and scope of reason in the two perspectives of India and the modern West. The following chapter undertakes this task.

To conclude, our first formulation regarding the essential nature of the Indian perspective in terms of its goal-orientation, does not deny either the recognition or the pursuit of the same goals in the modern Western context.
However, there seems to be an important difference between the two in so far as there is in the Indian perspective an acceptance of a larger framework wherein philosophy, as a theoretical enterprise, is organically related to, and therefore conditioned by, the factors of direct knowledge by intuition and concrete life; whereas, in the modern Western perspective, the goals are themselves sought to be established, each more or less independently of the others, and that too on purely rational grounds. It seems that, in the former case, reason is related to intuition and life in such a way that each controls as well as assists the other two factors, while this relationship is largely obscured, if it is not altogether missing, in the latter case.

In the Indian context, the Experience-Thought-Life complex itself functions in a framework where the authority of Tradition is recognized. Tradition, in this case, seems to cast its shadow on reason; while, in the case of the modern West, reason seems to enjoy something like an autonomous status. Hence the temptation to understand the difference between India and the modern West in terms of the contrast between authority (Tradition) and reason, which is looked into in the chapter that follows.
A closer look at the notions of Tradition and Reason and their relationship in the two perspectives is likely to modify the understanding of the perspectives already presented in this chapter in terms of the relationship theoretical philosophy bears to direct intuitive experience on the one hand and to concrete living on the other. It is thus expected that the nature of the two perspectives will be progressively clarified as the discussion proceeds.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

CHAPTER 2

(References are to the editions mentioned in the Bibliography)

1. Dr. B.N. Krishnamoorthy has attempted this interpretation in considerable detail in his Ph.D. thesis "The Advaita of Sankara, In Search of a New Perspective" for which he has been awarded doctorate by the Karnatak University, Dharwad. That work has also been done under the guidance of Prof. K.J. Shah as the present one is. In a sense I take off from where Dr. Krishnamoorthy left it, extending what he said about Advaita to other systems as well, considering what this means for a proper understanding of the Indian perspective vis a vis its modern Western counterpart, and looking into the implications of this for comparative studies between the two.
NOTES AND REFERENCES: CHAPTER 2.

(References are to the editors mentioned in the Bibliography)

1. (See File 2, p.8) (Reference to and Relationship with, B.N.K.'s Thesis)

2. Brihadāranyaka Up. 1.4.10

3. This is actually argued out in considerable detail with reference to the Isa Up. in Dr. B.N.K.

4. The Bhadavadgita, V. 17

5. B.G. Bhāṣya V. 17


7. Ibid. Kārikās 43 - 58

8. Ibid. Kārika 67


10. Mysticism and Logic and other Essays, pp. 1 - 32


12. Hampshire, S., Spinoza, p. 213

13. Ibid. p. 220

14. Ibid. p. 219

15. Cf. Sāmkhyakārīkā No. 67 and B. Gītā II 54


18. Zachner, *Hindusim*, pp. 84 - 87

19. B. Gita, 18.66


22. Śvetāsvatara Up. iii, 8. Quoted by M. Hiriyanna in *The Quest After Perfection*, p. 27.

23. *Nyāya-Sūtra* with Vātsyayana's Commentary, I. 1.1


25. *The Quest After Perfection*, p. 28


27. Ibid.


29. *Arthasastra*, I, vii, 3 - 5

30. *Popular Essays*, p. 35