Chapter VIII

THE ROLE OF VIŚṢA IN THE BUILD UP OF THE DVAITA SYSTEM
One of the chief tenets of the Dvaita school of philosophy is that Brahman and its attributes are identical. Accordingly, kriyā, jhāna and other attributes of Brahman must be identical with it. Here we face a difficulty. It is well-known that kriyā, jhāna, etc., are not eternal. There are also śruti-predicates like srakṣaṇāt (created) srjati (creates) srakṣyātī (will create) vyajñāsit (knew), jñātī (knows), jñāsyātī (will know) which testify to the fact of kriyā and other attributes of Brahman being non-eternal. How can such non-eternal attributes of Brahman be identical with the eternal Brahman?¹ Madhva solves this problem by admitting their eternality².

This solution advanced by Madhva gives rise to many objections:

1. If there is destructive action even at the time of creation the śruti and other pramāṇas would have referred to them³.  
2. The production and the destruction would take place simultaneously⁴.

¹ Nyāyasudhā, p.159.  
³ Ibid., p.160.  
⁴ Ibid., p.160.
3. That the 'action' of Brahma is eternal means it is the involuntary cause for the effects – 'contact' and 'separation'. Therefore, there must be contact and separation always\(^5\) (without cessation).

4. Does the action of the God produce contact and separation or not? If not it would cease to be a kriyā as the very definition of kriyā is the asamavāyikāraṇa of contact and separation\(^6\). If it produces it would do so even in the previous moment as kriyā has been there even then\(^7\).

Madhva defines kriyā before answering these objections. Kriyā is a power to produce effects\(^8\). This power eternally resides in Iśvara. When it manifests itself it becomes a subject of vyavahāra and produces different effects\(^9\).

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5. अतः इश्वरकृत्तमिः प्रकृतिरायतं विभागं सत्कारिकक्षणं प्राप्तं अवस्थानकीर्तिताः तदुपेक्षा कृतिकर्मन्।\(^{160}\)

6. संयोगकृताजनां नमकाननिन्नर्वणं कर्तव्यं संन्यासः।\(^{160}\)

7. सबराजसागरं इदं प्रभोग्नाणां ब्रजं संयोगासारितवं किलिकीलिकलक्षणं कर्तव्यं।\(^{160}\)

8. अतिकरणीयं ज्ञातिकोणं रोक्तर्वतो।\(^{160}\)

9. इन्सकिरणं विकृति यदा व्यवहारं तदार्थितार्थविलपितो तत्त्वाकरणीयं कार्यविधिद्वारा।\(^{160}\)
Manifestation is nothing but a particular state of power (śakti). Any kriyā is subject to vyavahāra only in its manifest form. Destructive aspect of the action is not manifest at the time of creation. Therefore, the first objection is not in order. As the power produces effects only in the manifest form, the second objection also is untenable. The third objection also is rejected for the same reason. Regarding the fourth objection Jayatīrthā says that God’s action does produce contact and separation. But it does so when it is manifest. Otherwise even the motion in the part would effect contact with next place immediately after its coming into being. At this stage another important question arises. The kriyā of ōvāra is said to be two-fold, potential and manifest. Are the two forms of kriyā identical or different? If they are different, then it obviously means that potential form only is eternal and manifest form is non-eternal. In this case the original question stands unresolved. If they are identical manifestation is always present and consequently effect also should take place at all times. The original question stands unresolved.

10. अद्वैत विद्वानानां तुद्कल्पनर्गुणिः किं द्विभाववर्त्तमाणः
तथा हेतुः पश्चस्यसास्वं पुनर्हेतु स सास्वं पर्यथा. ।

Ibid., p.160.

॥ अद्वैत विद्वानानां तुद्कल्पनर्गुणिः किं द्विभाववर्त्तमाणः
तथा हेतुः पश्चस्यसास्वं पुनर्हेतु स सास्वं पर्यथा। ।

Ibid., p.160.
even in this case. Here Madhva says: the potentiality and the manifestations are identical. But identity is not absolute, but is tinged with Vīśeṣa. This Vīśeṣa is responsible for the non-occurrence of destruction at the time of creation and vice versa. Vīśeṣa is basically conceived as a power which can account for certain facts which appear to pre-suppose difference in their causes which does not exist actually. Two Vīśeṣas are recognised in God's action. They are Saktitā and Vyaktitā. If these two are different, Sakti and Vyakti also should be different in accordance with the demands of logic. If they are identical, the creation and other facts should take place always as Vyakti is there always.

Here Madhva says that these two Vīśeṣas are identical. But there is no room for intermixture of facts because Vīśeṣa is powerful enough to avoid such a contingency. This power is called, as has already been explained, svanirvānakatva.

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12. अप्रियोद्यम त्रिविकल्पानि द। द्रोहदेशः। विस्वात्मानो विशेषितास्तिचा। सम्मयं विद्।निर्बल्क्यं तु। 

Ibid., p.161.

13. स न विशेषः परस्यं तिर्थेनिज्ञानं न अविशेषः च न दृष्टिज्ञानं तत्साधारणं निकृष्टो च नस्तिः। अस्तित्वं पुनः अविशेषः 

Ibid., p.161.

14. अभिकत्सुकः तिर्थेनिज्ञानं न ज्ञातं न ज्ञातेः। अभिकत्सुकः सुप्रज्ञानं निकृष्टो च नस्तिः। स्तन्तिर्विनिज्ञानं स्तुतं । 

Ibid., p.161.
Here one may argue that why not admit 'eternity' to all kriyas in the world? The two-fold nature of sakti and vyakti can be attributed to all of them. There is no defect whatsoever in this course. Answering this question Jayatirtha restricts the scope of this device of sakti and vyakti by fixing a criterion for the use of this device. The criterion is the epistemological ground of the 'eternity' of kriya. The 'eternity' of kriya must be accepted if it has any epistemological ground and the device of sakti and vyakti has to be used to get over the difficulties which may arise thereof. There is no irrefutable ground to accept kriya in pot and such other things, as eternal. But there is such a ground to accept kriya of Isvara to be eternal. 15.

Proof in respect of the eternity of the 'kriya' of God.

Ibid., p.161.

Anuvyakhyana, p.27.

Anuvyakhyana, p.27.
A summary of the above discussed points:

One of the tenets of Madhva's philosophy is the identity of Brahman and all its attributes. This has a good epistemological ground. The Ārutos support it. The Ārutos say that Brahman's attributes are eternal. The only point to be explained is that how these identical attributes can be expressed by words of different connotation and how the kriyā of God which is eternal does not produce contradictory effects at the same time. In order to solve these difficulties Madhva has accepted the principle of Viśesā which has a firm epistemological ground. This Viśesā by its very nature accounts for the judgments of difference and such other facts with reference to identical things. But for Viśegas, all such difficulties would remain unexplained and inexplicable in the Dvaita school. The different elements of its epistemological and ontological tenets would be wanting in central cohesion. Viśesā thus unifies the loose ends of the tenets of the Dvaita school into a co-ordinated whole and is, therefore, its most pivotal doctrine.

The role of Viśesā in explaining the function of cetanas

A very important question that whether the jīva is the agent of action (karta) or not, is inquired into in the Brahma-sūtras. And the sūtras have concluded that the jīva is the agent of action.\(^\text{16}\).

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\(^{16}\) कत्वी ज्ञात्वाविधिभाग्नायां Vedāntasūtra 2.3.32.
Here is a problem. In performing different acts the Jīva expands different measures of energy. This is possible only if he has different parts (aṇḍas). But if he has no such parts and if he is one indivisible whole this regulation of self-energy is not possible. Here the question is whether the Jīva has parts or not. If he has no parts, then, he must use all his self-energy to do even a very small act of lifting a piece of grass. But he does not do so. The fact of his using a part of his energy is actually seen (experienced). But as he has no parts, according to the śrutis, it is not possible even to say that he uses his energy partially.

An attempt may be made to resolve the problem and reconcile the pramanas in question. The Jīva, in reality, has no parts. But parts are introduced by a contact with some external factor (Upādhi) in which case the partial use of energy is possible.

But such an explanation is defective, for, the question will be asked whether the external factor gets into contact

17. Madhva. B.S.B., p.68.
18. Ibid., p.68.
with the entire Jīva or his parts. In the first case, there cannot be any part after the contact as the contact is with the entire Jīva. As there are no parts before contact, external factors cannot come into contact with any parts. Therefore, it is not possible to resolve the problem by bringing this Upādhi into picture. If this problem is not solved then agency of the Jīva cannot be properly explained and the result would be that the Jīva cannot function as an agent of the action.

This problem is resolved with the help of Vīdegās. The Jīva has no parts. Still the Almighty Brahman has made it possible to the Jīva to use or exercise partial energy. Madhva cites a śrutī to support his view. "Obeisance to that Svayaambu who makes the Jīva, though he is partless, use only a little energy in his actions" 20.

This explains both experience and the position described in the Bhāllaveya śrutī quoted earlier (F.No.19, p. 22'). Thus the agency of the Jīva becomes explicable.

But yet another objection may be raised. The position that the Jīva is essentially without parts is incorrect, for, the Vedantasūtra "Vyatireko gandhavattathā ca darśayati" 21.

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20. यो शरीरं तत्बद्धम्। जीवं तत्वात् सर्वकालं कर्ममिदं तत्
     सर्वेष शरीरं परं पावतं तत् सत्मं सत्मं जनयति

   - Agnvaśkyāsana, 3.87.

establishes multiple forms for the \textit{jiva}. Another sutra, \textit{Uttarāntigatva gatīnām} represents the \textit{jivas} as ānu. If the \textit{jivas} are ānu and partless, they cannot have multiple forms simultaneously. Multiplicity of forms will hold good only if the atomic \textit{jiva} has parts.

Madhva concedes the above arguments and explains that the \textit{jiva} is described as partless in a sense quite different from the ordinary one of common experience. This may be explained in the following way: "Cloth and such other things have parts. Each of these parts is different from the other and each part is different-cum-identical from cloth. But parts in the \textit{jivas} are not mutually different and also not different-cum-identical from the \textit{jiva}, that is ānī. Thus there is difference between the nature of parts in the \textit{jivas} and that in the parts of cloth. To highlight this difference

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Bidarāyana. Vedāntasūtra}, 2.3.19, p.97.
\item \textit{Madhva. BSB}, p.99.
\item \textit{Nyāyasudhā}, p.304.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.304.
\end{itemize}
the *jīva* is said to be partless. That the parts of the *jīva*
are not mutually different nor different-cum-identical from the
*jīva*, is the meaning of the *sūtra* that describes the *jīva* to be
partless.\(^{26}\)

If the parts are not mutually different and also not
different from the *jīva* how can there be multiplicity of forms?
Multiplicity is con-comitant with difference. If there is no
difference there cannot be multiplicity. The meaning of the
word *aṃśī* is one who has *aṃśas*. Having *aṃśas* is possible only
if there is difference between the *aṃśa* and the *aṃśī*. Thus the
*jīva* cannot be the *aṃśī* if there is no difference from the *aṃśas*.

This objection is also answered with the help of *vidgatas*.
As there is *vidgata* in the *jīva* it accounts for the multiplicity
of forms. *Aṃśītva* of the *jīva* also is explained by it.\(^{27}\) It

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\(^{26}\) [Nyāyasūdra, p. 304.]

\(^{27}\) [Anuvyākhyāna, p. 63.]

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24. *Aṃśīkāśvastropuḥ*  

*[vidgata]* *dvedaṃ* *kavǎtyuḥ* !  

*bhūtāstropastānāṃ*  

*tadvatśaḥ*  

*hy*  

*[vidgata]* *dvedaṃ* *kavǎtyuḥ* !  

[Anuvyākhyāna, p. 63.]
should be noted that the multiplicity is not necessarily con-
comitant with difference according to the Dvaita school\textsuperscript{28}.

Thus Viśesa plays a vital role in reconciling two pramāṇas,
namely, anubhava and śruti with reference to the question whether
the Jīva is sāṁśa or not. As the Dvaita school cannot dismiss
any one of these two pramāṇas as atattvavedaka it has to do
justice to both. This is achieved by recognising the principle
of Viśesa.

Viśesa explains a Prabhakara objection on the
Dvaita view of error:

The Prabhakara school of Mīmāṁsā holds the view that no
knowledge is illusion and all knowledge is valid. The knowledge
'this is silver' which occurs when our eyes are in contact with
the conch-shell is proved to be valid. They split this knowledge
into two parts. The knowledge of 'thisness' is experience and
knowledge of 'silverness' is memory. But how does one stretch
out his hand towards an object which does not exist there in
front of him? - is the question. The Prabhakaras reply that
the difference between the two knowledges and their objects is
not known. This non-perception of their difference is the cause
for stretching out at the object\textsuperscript{29}. Here the Dwaitins' question

\textsuperscript{28} See Chapter I, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{29} तता वाचर्रम: निरूपणि: स्वरूपानां विधानाश्च अन्तर्गतं गुणः।
देहं दत्तं संपर्यति शुचिः प्रेमः। | Nyāyasudhā, p. 49.
is: What do the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas mean by difference?
Examining four possible meanings of difference the non-perception of such difference is refuted.

The four possible meanings of difference are: (1) Difference is the essential form of its substratum; (2) Prthaktānam — separateness which is defined as a unique reason by which the cognition 'this is different from this' arises; (3) Mutual negation; (4) Opposite attributes.

If difference is taken to be the essential nature of its substratum, then the difference between the two knowledges and their objects cannot be unknown, for the knowledges and their objects are known. They are known because knowledge is held to be self-luminous by the Prabhākaraś and while the knowledge is known its object also is known. Thus the first meaning of difference cannot uphold the Prabhākara view that the difference between the two knowledges and their objects is unknown.

39. ज्ञानमेव विकर्त्ताय अविभक्तिः प्रभाकरानुरंगितम्

40. वसवधानपञ्चानानां, मुक्तेवली, प. 711.

39. ज्ञानमेव विकर्त्ताय अविभक्तिः प्रभाकरानुरंगितम्

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40. वसवधानपञ्चानानां, मुक्तेवली, प. 711.
The second meaning of 'difference' cannot be taken because as prthaktva is a quality it cannot subsist in knowledge because, the latter also is a quality. When there is no prthaktva in knowledge the question of non-apprehension of it does not arise at all.\footnote{32}

The third meaning also is ridden with fallacies. When they say that the mutual negation of the objects of knowledge is not known, is it the mutual negation of 'this' and silverness or of 'this' and silver that is not known? It cannot be of 'this' and silverness because one is a substance (thing) and another is a generality. It is a fact that they produce the remembrance of non-synonymous terms. Production of such remembrance is not possible if mutual negation is not known. Therefore, it is not possible to say that mutual negation between 'this' and silverness is unknown. Moreover, mutual negation is the essential form of its substratum. Now the substratum 'this' and silverness and 'this' and silver are known. Therefore the mutual negation cannot be unknown.\footnote{33} The fourth meaning of 'difference' does not arise at all.

\footnote{32}{\textit{Nyāyasudhā}, p.49.}

\footnote{33}{\textit{Nyāyasudhā}, p.49.}
also is untenable. Thisness and silverness, the opposite attributes of 'this' and silver are known as present in 'this' and silver respectively. Thus the difference is not unknown.  

Here the Prabhakaras may say that even the Dvaitins have to accept the view of non-perception of difference and consequently all the defects shown by them hold good in their view also. Here the Dvaitins say though difference is identical with dharma or vastu it is not mere identity, but identity together with víśeṣa. 

This víśeṣa accounts for non-perception of difference though vastu is perceived. But the Prabhakaras cannot offer such an explanation as they do not accept víśeṣa. Thus víśeṣa plays an important role in supporting the Dvaita view of error by overcoming the difficulty which the Prabhakaras have to face.

Víśeṣa and Anvītābhichārānavaśa: 

The question how the anyavya, i.e., the relation between the meanings of words is known or in other words which part

* They are opposite in the sense that 'thisness' does not reside in silver and silverness does not reside in 'this'.

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35, 4) निवर्यांशुपपपणनामविशेषाः प्रातः स्वप्नमेव एनांधिति भविष्यति। सत्यविशेषेण तत्त्वस्य न भविष्यति। सत्यविशेषाणां भवन्ति।  

Yadupati. Gloss on Nyāyasudhā, p.50.
of the sentence produces the knowledge of *anvaya* between the meanings of the words is examined by different schools of Indian philosophy in different ways. As a result many theories on this subject have come into being. The Dvaita school holds the view that the words express their meanings through the relation to the meaning of other appropriate words in the sentence (*Yogastarasvärthābhidhānavada*)\(^\text{36}\).

Madhva has formulated this theory after pointing out the inadequacies in the theories of other schools\(^\text{37}\).

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\(^\text{36}\) देवेनु मुलिन्दे। "... " गर्भेण (हि वदानि) उगमित सार्थिक्यं द्वायेन्तरस्ताशिर्विधानसमागमित । *Nyāyasudhā*, p. 87.

\(^\text{37}\) अर्जुनां भूलिताऽत्त्। यथार्थेषु विवेकवाणामुक्ते जागामः जानेन्। द्वायेन्तरस्ताशिर्विधानसमागमित सर्थिक्यं निकर्षते। अतः सागरायनः पुनः पथर्नर्तकः पुनः । अतां उपास्को विषलोऽस्त्रेण सुसिद्धां नागराजः। सत्तार्थशिर्विधानो महायतेन निमित्तविधिसति। अतस्त्रेण समागमित । यथार्थेषु विवेकवाणामुक्ते जागामः जानेन्। असागरायनः पुनः पथर्नर्तकः पुनः। अतां उपास्को विषलोऽस्त्रेण सुसिद्धां नागराजः। सत्तार्थशिर्विधानो महायतेन निमित्तविधिसति। अतस्त्रेण समागमित । यथार्थेषु विवेकवाणामुक्ते जागामः जानेन्। असागरायनः पुनः पथर्नर्तकः पुनः। अतां उपास्को विषलोऽस्त्रेण सुसिद्धां नागराजः। सत्तार्थशिर्विधानो महायतेन निमित्तविधिसति। अतस्त्रेण समागमित । Anuvyākhyāna, p.142.
But even Madhva’s theory is apparently, not free from certain defects. It holds the view that Brahman and its attributes and also substance and its attributes are identical. Therefore, in the sentences “Satyan jñānamanantam Brahmā, Yah sarvajñah sa sarvavit, etc. the word Brahma itself must be denotative (vācaka) of the qualities denoted by other words. Therefore, other words in the sentence would become redundant. Besides, in the case of identity of Brahman and its qualities, there cannot be any anvaya (relation) as anvaya is possible only between two or more different meanings. Therefore, how can words signify anvaya generally and also particularly in the absence of difference between meanings of words? The solution to this problem is found in Madhva’s doctrine of Viśeṣa. By this power of Viśeṣa internal distinctions between Brahman and Its attributes and between attributes themselves is possible. Consequently, the anvaya (relation) between meanings denoted by different words is possible and also non-signification of particular aspects is possible. Thus, there is no difficulty in appreciating the theory of Yogetarasvārthabhābhināvāda. An

Nyāyasudhā, p.52C.
objection may be brought against this solution. The view of identity of substance and its attributes gives rise to a question as to why, when the pot is known by touch, its colour is not known. The answer to such a question would be that Vīśeṣa prevents the perception of colour by touch. On the same ground, a question may be asked as to why the signification of both general and particular anvaya is not prevented by Vīśeṣa. Answering this objection Madhva underlines the function of Vīśeṣa. We have to accept that the signification of particular anvaya alone is held up by Vīśeṣa and not the signification of general anvaya also. Because, every word in a sentence signifies its meaning in a general relation to other meanings denoted by some other word in the sentence. Words have a power to give rise to the knowledge of a meaning related particularly to other meaning. They derive this power by association with other words. This is the experience of one and all. Therefore, the objection that general anvaya also should be held up, is against experience and is thus groundless. The hold up of particular anvaya must be explained suitably as there is no reason for such a hold up in the view of absolute identity of Brahman and Its attributes. As Vīśeṣa is capable of internal distinctions the hold up of particular anvaya can be easily ascribed to it. Thus Vīśeṣa has to be utilised to explain certain incongruities arising out of certain logical necessities and while doing so we cannot afford to ignore experience also. In the light of experience and logical compulsion of identity of
Brahman and Its attributes Viśeṣa steps in to prevent particular anvaya and not general.

The role of Viśeṣa in explaining a judgment pertaining to time:

We have a judgment Purva kāḷaḥ. Here the time denoted by two words is not different. But it is one and the same. The same ‘time’ figures as both the determinant and the determined. That it is determinant is denoted by the word Purvaḥ and that it is determined is denoted by the word Kāḷaḥ. Here the question, as to how the same time can act both ways simultaneously, would naturally arise. The answer that there is a subtle distinction in time which does not harm the unity of time is inevitable. Such a distinction is possible only through Viśeṣa.

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39. स्वार्थपुरुषोऽयणा वैशेषिकं दर्शयान | अनुवाक्यवांशायां | Anuvākhyāna, p.142.

30. यथा पुरा कालं: पूर्वं रूपितं विनिर्देशणं: वेदं कथितं विवेकं | Madhva, BSB, p.139

40. झूठे विद्याधर: निर्विग्नित्वा विनिर्देशणं कालं वेदं 'अवधेकोऽवधेको' विनिर्गृहीतं | जगन्नाथायानि, Bhāsyadipikā on BSB of Madhva, BDPS, Bangalore 1965, Vol.III, p.115.

C.7. पूर्वं रूपितं विनिर्देशणं कैलं | इति विनिर्देशणं कैलं | इति विनिर्देशणं कैलं | इति विनिर्देशणं कैलं | इति विनिर्देशणं कैलं | इति विनिर्देशणं कैलं |

अत: संस्कृतत्वादि गृहीतसः | संस्कृतत्वादि गृहीतसः | संस्कृतत्वादि गृहीतसः | संस्कृतत्वादि गृहीतसः | संस्कृतत्वादि गृहीतसः | संस्कृतत्वादि गृहीतसः |

Trivikrama-panditācārya, Tattvapradipikā, ABMM, 1958, p.338
Madhva supports his interpretation with a stanza from the Brahma-purāṇa,

अति विद्याधरी ज्ञातानि विशेषा: वेदमेव विशेषा | विशेष्ट्विनिर्देशणं इति विनिर्देशणं |

इति विनिर्देशणं इति विनिर्देशणं | इति विनिर्देशणं | इति विनिर्देशणं | इति विनिर्देशणं | इति विनिर्देशणं |

Madhva, BSB, p.139.
Vîseša explains avidya in the Jīva:

The Jīva is self-luminous (svaprakāśa). He always knows himself without the aid of any external means. Knowledge, bliss, etc. are his essential qualities (svarūpa). This means knowledge, bliss and other such qualities are identical with the Jīva. Here arises a question, why then Jīva does not experience any bliss or knowledge in his state of bondage? He does not even know about his being the svarūpa of knowledge, bliss, etc. though he knows himself as evidenced in the knowledge 'I'. How is this possible if Jīva is self-luminous? No answer to this question can be given without Vîseša. As Vîseša is capable of internal distinctions in the subject, the ignorance and non-experience of full knowledge and bliss is rendered possible by this Vîseša.41

Vîseša explains the instrumentality of soul in producing knowledge:

The number of sense organs is seven42 in the Dvaita philosophy. Six of them are the same as accepted by all other schools. The seventh is sākṣī. This sākṣī is none but the

41. यहैं चैवहि: ईव मयाज्ञेयांनां जगीविषं! द्वारथिमं विद्यं अभिधर्मितार्थम्। ज्ञाति कारं द्वारनम् कधितोद्योः। Nyāyasudhā, p.64.

42. प्राणविभिन्न विद्यिकां गणितार्थिक्षेत्रविद्या जीतान्। Madhva, Pramāṇalakṣāṇa, p.123.
knower, that is, soul. Like other sense organs (indriyas) the soul also is an instrument of knowledge in directly cognising time, space, etc. Time, space, etc. cannot be and are not known by eye or other sense organs as the farmer do not have colour or other properties which are essential pre-conditions to be an object of sensory knowledge. Nor is time known by mind, for, there is knowledge of time even in the state of dreamless sleep when the mind is at rest. That such a knowledge of time is there in the state of dreamless sleep is proved by the recollection of the happy repose of sleep expressed in the judgment 'I have slept soundly and blissfully all this time'. We have, therefore, to attribute them to the instrumentality of a special sense organ that is active during the dreamless sleep (when the mind itself is at rest) and which co-ordinates with the innermost experience of the self. This sense organ can be nothing other than soul itself.

Here arises a question. How can the soul, being the knower, be an instrument of knowledge? This question can be answered only with the help of Vivega. By this power, there is an internal distinction of jñāatra and jñānakaraparva in the soul and hence it is an instrument of knowledge.