Chapter VII

THE BHĀTĀ SCHOOL AND VĪṢEṢA
In the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, the relation between substance and attributes is one of difference-cum-identity. This fact is stated very clearly in the Āśtrādīpikā and in the commentary Prakāsa upon it.

The statement such as 'fruit is sweet' implies difference between fruit and its quality of sweetness. This difference is implied by difference between colour and taste. When two attributes are mutually different, they should be different from their substratum also. If they are identical with their substratum, they cannot remain mutually different according to the well-known logical rule that if any two things, say X and Y, are identical with any other thing, say Z, the two things, i.e., X and Y are also identical. If colour is identical with its substratum and that substratum is identical with taste, colour and taste also should be identical. That these two qualities are different is evident from the fact that we do not say the fruit is 'white' while describing its taste nor do we state that 'it is 'sweet' while describing its colour. Were they identical, the statement in both the ways should have been correct.

In the statement "this thing is good" (abhyārrnāmadak drayāṁ), the thing is described as a mere thing without stating any quality of it. Such statements imply identity of substance.

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1. See Supra, Ch. I, p. 20, p. 31.
and its attributes. The above argument for identity is not convincing, for the statement by itself does not clearly suggest such an identity nor is it explained to show that it contains such a suggestion. Therefore, the argument for difference-cum-identity has no legs to stand.

As difference and identity are mutually contradictory, the question of how substance can be different-cum-identical with its attributes is to be answered by this school.

The author of the *Sastradipika* has answered this question in the following manner. Tallness and shortness are mutually

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contradictory. But the same person can be described as tall and short from different standpoints. 'A' may be short when compared to 'B' and tall when compared to 'C'. In the same way, substance and these attributes can be both different and identical from different standpoints.

According to the Mānameyodaya, difference-cum-identity in respect of same objects, though contradictory, is acceptable; for, they are seen in such a manner. Contradiction also is a truth if it is actually within the range of valid experience. This answer too is not acceptable because, an instrument of true knowledge cannot give rise to a contradictory piece of knowledge. Therefore, if contradiction is perceived by perception, the enquiry does not stop there, but continues and the question of how there can be such a perception persists till the contradiction is resolved satisfactorily. It is the firm belief of the Dvaita school that contradiction cannot be

3. नारायण भट्टा र नारायण पंडित. मानभेद योदया, टीएसएस XIX, 1912, p.97.

true. The Bhatta school has no answer to this question. Moreover, the question as to what is the relation between difference-cum-identity and its relate arises and if the relation is held to be one of difference-cum-identity, the question continues endlessly. Therefore, the Bhatta view of relation between substance and its attributes is not satisfactory.

To answer the question as to how perception can visualise contradictory elements in the same substratum, a resort will have to be made to some peculiarity in the nature of things which is but another name for Visesa of the Dvaita school. But accepting this Visesa after accepting difference-cum-identity is the fallacy of excessive assumption. The Dvaita view of identity with Visesa between substance and its attributes has the merit of adequate assumption. A reference, in this regard,

5. While considering the feasibility of accepting difference-cum-identity between substance and its attributes Jayatirtha has said in his Nyayaadhana that Visesa would be essential to remove the contradiction between them. (See Ch. I, F.N. 12, p.11). This gives enough clue to say that the Dvaita school does not believe contradiction to be true.

One more point may be noted to support the above mentioned belief of the Dvaita school. Jayatirtha, in his commentary on Mayavada-khandana of Madhva, has stated that the negation of one of the two mutually contradictory principles is concomitant with the assertion of another. (Paraspara-rudhodaya- taranisadhasyanytaravidyada vyaptadvrt, H.V.K.n.t., p.397. Vidvyamanyatirtha, Poornaprajna Vidyapeeta, Bangalore-28, 1969). As 'identity' and 'difference' are the negation of each other, both of them cannot be true in respect of one and the same thing.
may be made to the Nyāyasudhā of Jayatīrtha:

"As untenability can be removed by accepting difference-cum-identity what is the use of Viśeṣa? This is not correct. Viśeṣa has to be accepted, at least, to account for the co-existence of mutually contradictory factors. As it (co-existence of mutually contradictory factors) is perceived, where is the contradiction? True. But, when it is thought over as to how even such a perception is logical a resort to the excellence in the nature of things should be made. The necessity of accepting Viśeṣa to overcome the fallacy of infinite regress of difference-cum-identity is also already said"

The Prābhākara school and Viśeṣa:

The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā is of the view that substance and attributes are different. This school refutes

6. न तू शुद्धे कार्यविद्यानिकृतिग्राहकानि सुभाष्यन संस्कृतिरूपिनि यौ। वृद्धपालिन्योर्धदेव तराजयविद्धिः हृद्यसंतुलिन्य रक्षितस्त्रृं 

प्रतीचक्तिहीरसी शृङ्खलेन। सत्यम्। तेऽत्सदां प्रवृत्तिसिद्धां भूतपोषेन निसर्गान्तः असुरत्तत्त्वानितिष्ठितान् 

संयोगजस्तत्रनादपिरंतरसाधिष्ठितानि प्रथिष्टाविद्याकारायनस्तकलस्ति बलाः।

- Nyāyasudhā, p.106.
the arguments advanced by the adherents of the view of identity. The main argument in favour of identity is, as we have seen, the simultaneous perception or knowledge of substance and attributes together or their not being perceived separately.

Śālikanātha, in his Prakaranapancikā shows some instances where the argument fails.

Sometimes attributes like the form, etc., are perceived even when the substance is not perceived. In darkness, substance is known without its form being known. When the wind is blowing, smell is perceived from a distance though the substance in which the smell resides is not perceived. A born-blind perceives a substance only by touch and not its form or colour. In these instances, substance and its attributes are not perceived together and therefore, they are not identical. This school accepts samavāya. Samavāya is a relation between two different entities existing inseparably.

7. केवलिने असते, सर्वांगतोरुपम आदर्शाणि वर्णीती।
śālikanātha. Prakaranapancikā, BHU Darśana Series, No.4,

Jaipuri Narayana Bhatta. Nyāyasiddhi, BHU Darśana Series,
No.4, 1961, p.160.

8. अति रामानुजम्बर्ये: तांत्रराहस्यम. GOS, 1923, p.23.
This fact is a sufficient proof to say that this school subscribes to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of difference between substance and its attributes.

As samavāya has been refuted by the Dvaita school and as there is no other plausible relation between substance and its attributes, they must be admitted to be identical.

Prabhākara does not appear to have taken a full account of the facts that lead to the acceptance of identity of substance and its attributes. As pointed out earlier in the second chapter of this thesis (pp.26-31), difference between two cognitions 'flowers in basket' and 'cloth in threads' cannot be explained unless cloth and threads are held to be identical. The arguments set forth in the first chapter (pp.5-6) are also weighty enough in favour of identity. Since bare identity alone will not solve the difficulty, identity along with Viṣeṣa becomes unavoidable. The examples cited by Prabhākara can be explained in the light of Viṣeṣa. Viṣeṣa is conceived as the pratinidhi of difference and vested with the power to do some functions of difference. The instances of the perception of substance alone without the perception of its attribute or vice versa are the functions of difference. This function can be attributed to Viṣeṣa.

Viṣeṣa and the Sāṅkhya school:

The Sāṅkhya school holds the view of identity of substance and its attributes. Their contention in support of this view
The nature of things is to be determined by cognitions. Therefore, none of it can be denied. Attributes are identical with substratum because (i) they are attributes; (ii) they are effects (kārya) and (iii) they can never be severed from substratum. They are identical with substratum for yet another reason that they are neither known separately, nor do their production or coming into being appear separately.

Here, the question arises as to how then one of them is treated as āśraya and the other as āśrayī. How do valid judgments arise showing difference between the two? How are the words denoting them non-synonymous? The Sāṁkhya school answers these questions by saying that all these are due to a way of speaking (vivakṣa) as in the usage "Here are 'tilaka' trees in this forest". The Tilaka trees are not different from the forest, but form an inseparable part of it. Still there is a valid usage which is based on āśrayāśrayībhāva between them. This is only due to the desire to speak in terms of difference. The same is the case with judgments of āśrayāśrayībhāva with regard to substance and its attributes.

(Continued on p.202)
If vivakṣa or personal preference is held to be made the cause of judgments of difference, the cause would only be subjective and not objective. Such a view can be held by an idealist. To a realist, anything that is caused must have some objective cause. The Sāṅkhya, being a realist, cannot hold such a view at all.

The Sāṅkhya view of relation between substance and attribute is not, therefore, acceptable.

The Buddhist view of substance and attributes and Vīśeṣa:

There are four prominent schools of the Buddhism. They are known as Vaibhāṣīka, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra.

The Vaibhāṣīkas do not accept the existence of substance apart from rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa and śabda. Only rūpa and others exist and we have “substance” when all the five are in a collective state. When rūpa is detached from the group, the group of four (minus rūpa) is called water.

**rasa** is detached from the group, the group of three is called fire. *While sparśa and śabda make air, śabda alone is space*\(^{10}\). The reasons for the denial of the substratum are: (1) the substratum is not obtainable separately from *rupa*, etc. - its attributes\(^{11}\). (2) The substratum is not perceived by any of the five sense-organs as they are capable of perceiving only the qualities of *rupa*, etc. There is no separate sixth sense organ which can perceive the substratum\(^{12}\). (3) There can be no relation between substratum and its attribute, as such a relation is exposed to the fallacy of infinite regress. Therefore, there is no substratum as such called 'substance' behind *rupa* and other qualities, but there are only qualities or *dharmas*.

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\(^{10}\) *Śrī Kāśyapītaka: Saṃskārakheśa Vidyākṣetra* (With a Commentary by Ṣeṇānasī, Mysore, 1933, p.24).

\(^{11}\) *Anandadayinī* (A commentary on Ṣaṃsvārthaśāsana, which is a commentary on TMK by Vedāntadeśika) ORI, Mysore, 1933, p.24.

\(^{12}\) *Manameyarahasyaslokavārtika*, p.159.

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Another group of the Vaibhāsikas and a group of the Saunātrāntikas hold that only the substratum exists and not attributes\(^{13}\). According to them what is perceived is 'just a thing'—sannātra. This sannātra is known as rūpa when perceived by eye and rasa when perceived by tongue and so on. Difference in the perceiving senses is the cause of the divergence of knowledge.

The argument in support of this view is: The cognition of rūpa, etc., can be explained without accepting rūpa, etc.
as in the case of abhāva. The subject of the cognition of abhāva is either the place or time and abhāva is not a different entity other than the place or the time. In the same way, dharmī itself when cognised by different senses comes to be known as rūpa etc. and there is no need to accept attributes over and above substance\(^{14}\).

Like the Vaibhāsika, the Saunātrāntika school is also of the opinion that there can be no relation between substratum.

\(^{13}\) Anandadāyinī, p.24.

\(^{14}\) Manameyarahasyālokāvārtikā, p.150.
and its attributes, if they are considered to be different entities.

The difference between the two (the Vaibhāṣīka and the Saunāṭrāṇīka) schools is that one holds that only the attributes exist and not the substratum while the reverse is accepted by the other.

A question may be asked here:

If the substratum, separate from the attribute or the attribute separate from the substratum are not accepted, how these schools can explain the genitive case in the sentence patasaṇya rūpam, and difference in number in the instance indivarasya rūpaddayah?

This question is anticipated by Santarākṣita, a Buddhist logician and answered in the following way: Such usages are due to the desire of the speaker. The contention is that the speaker can resort to such usages if he so desires even without corresponding outside object.¹⁵

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¹⁵ Santarākṣita. Tattvasaṅgraha. GOS, 1926, p.571, St.571.

(Continued on p.206)
Śantarakaśita defends his above view (that even the usage of genitive is right without real difference) by pointing to the same state of affairs in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

To elaborate: There are usages such as the ‘existence’ (astitva) of six categories, (saṅgām padārthānāṁ astitvaṁ) the group of six (teṣām saṅgāmām vargaḥ). Here, astitva and varga are not different from six categories. They cannot be different as such a difference is against the basic tenet of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Even without any real difference between astitva, etc. and six categories, there is usage of the genitive case. In the usage of svāya bhāvāh svatvāḥ, bhava is not different from svā. But there is usage of the genitive. All this support the Buddhist explanation for the usage of the genitive case and other judgments of difference.

15 (Continued).  

Kamalāśīla, Pancīka. GOS. Baroda, 1926, p.192.

16. Tattvasaṅgraha, p.192, St.572.

As both the Vaibhāṣika and the Sauntrāntika schools do not accept both substratum and attribute, they have no problem of resolving the problem of the relation between substance and its attributes. Moreover, this very problem is a favourable argument for them to accept either dharati or dharma only. Therefore, these schools have no need to accept videsa.

Of the other two schools, the Yogacara school does not accept any outside entity and holds that there is nothing other than the mind. To the Mādhyamika school, there is nothing but the void. These schools do not appear to have made any inquiry about the relation between substance and its attributes even though they accept empirical reality (sāmvrta satyatya).

Regarding the Vaibhāṣika and the Sauntrāntika objection, supra p. 206, on satitva, etc. dharmae, the Vaiṣeṣika school has no any convincing answer.

The Dvaita school has such an answer in its concept of videsa. It explains that though there is no real difference between satitva and the dharmas such as bhāva and eva, videsa which is a substitute for difference is there in all things and this is responsible for the usage of the genitive case, etc.

17: वाजिकीर्तिकृता जु बुद्धिकारणेऽक्षण... निरुचि नाति किरति जनान।
सतीत्वविभार्य जु जर्ति त्वांतिकिनः किर्ति जनान।
It deserves to be noted here that the position of the Dvaita school, that we have distinction of reference (bheda-vyavahāra) in cases like svarūpa of pot (ghatasya svarūpam) or svarūpatvam without actual difference, is not analogous to the Buddhist view. For, according to Madhva, in such cases the objective content of bhedavyavahāra are Viśeṣas themselves and not bheda as such. The generally accepted logic that bhedavyavahāra and usage of non-synonymous words and so on are concomitant with difference, is split in this school. It is thus: (1) Bhedavyavahāra and the usage of non-synonymous words with reference to two different substances and with reference to substance and its such attributes which do not remain as long as substance does, is concomitant with difference (2) Bhedavyavahāra and non-synonymous words with reference to substance and its such attributes which remain as long as it remains, are concomitant with Viśeṣa.

The Buddhist explanation that the usages under our consideration have no foundation in fact is not a satisfactory explanation as it deprives them of any specific content.

By and large, Viśeṣa, then appears to be the most acceptable solution so far advanced by any school of thought into the underlying problem of the ontological relation between substance and its attributes.

The Jaina school and Viśeṣa:

In the Jaina school, substance and attributes are
different-cum-identical. This means neither identity of substance and attributes nor difference between them is absolute. They have relative identity and relative difference.

Kundakundaswâmi, a great authority on the Jainism has discussed this problem thoroughly in his Pancâstikâya. Some quotations from his work would suffice to show the Jaina view of the problem.

"Avidhâktamananyatvam dravyagunânâm vibhaktamanyatvam
Nechanti niscayagnañcadviparîtaâ hi têtsâm."
Gâthâ 45
Pancâstikâya

A. Cakravarti Nayanar gives the following introduction and translation to this gâthâ.

"Next the author rejects the following views:

1. That substance and qualities are absolutely identical.
2. That they are absolutely different
3. That they are absolutely identical and different at the same time.

Then he establishes their conditional or relative identity and relative difference".

Translation: Those that know the truth do not recognise any of the following views as to the relation of substance and

quality; that they are absolutely identical and inseparable; that they are distinct and separate in every way; and lastly that they are both distinct and identical at the same time.  

While this gātha merely rejects the above mentioned three views the gātha 51 clearly underlines the Jaina view of relation between substance and attributes.

Varnarasagandhasparśāḥ paramāṇuprarupītaḥ videsaḥ hi  
Dravyaśca anānyāḥ anyatvapraśakaśaḥ bhavanti  

Gātha 51.

A. Cakravarti Nayanar gives the following translation to this gātha:

"Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of the primary atom. They are not said to be really distinct from their material substratum though they are undoubtedly distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc."  

Amrtacandrācārya, the author of Tattvapradīpikā on Pāṇḍitikāya very clearly says that substance and attributes are both identical and different. They are identical from the point of view of the sameness of place they occupy and they are different from the point of view of judgments denoting difference-vyaçadeśabheda.

20. Ibid., p.48.  
21. (Continued on p.211).
In this school, the judgments showing difference in spite of the identity of substance and attributes are not convincingly explained. It is merely stated that such judgments of difference is on account of judgment showing difference. But the question as to how can there be difference when attributes are identical with substance is shrouded in an ambiguous "somehow" without giving it a precise content. 22.

It is very clear from the above shown points that the Jaina school forcefully proves the identity between substance and attributes, but it accepts difference also between them without any powerful argument to support but by simply saying 'somehow'. This affords no material explanation of the valid
judgments of difference when there is identity. The very validity of judgments of difference would oblige us to accept working difference between them. This Jaina view may be acceptable to those who believe that the truth is relative. But to Madhva, a hard-core realist, truth or reality has no shifting standpoints. Two mutually opposed factors cannot be real with reference to the same thing. The Jaina school also appears to subscribe to this view rather feebly when it says that the judgments of difference are 'somehow'. It could not have used a phrase such as _kanthancit_ in describing the judgment if it believed in all seriousness that identity and difference are not mutually opposed.

Had the Jain thinkers thought more realistically and persistently, they could have overcome this dilemma, finding out a plausible reason for the judgments of difference in the heart of identity. Madhva has successfully pursued the problem from where it had been left by the successive schools and thinkers who had grappled with it. And he has announced his solution through the discovery of the concept of _Videsa_ enunciated long ago in the Upanisads, the _Brahma Sutra_ and other authoritative works collected by him.