Chapter VI

VIGÉSA AND THE RĀMĀNUJA SCHOOL
The Rāmānuja school holds the view that substance and attributes\(^1\) are different\(^2\) as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. But unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who accept the relation of samavāya between them, it does not accept a separate relation between substance and attributes. It is explained that substance and attributes are mutually related by virtue of their own nature\(^3\). All the judgments which apparently presuppose some relation between substance and attributes occur by the very nature of substance and attributes\(^4\). Attributes are always inseparable from their substrate. This inseparability itself is called a relation between substance and attributes\(^5\).

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1. Vāca-Śrāvaṇaṁ वचाः-श्रवणम्. तदृश नितिका सुमहतिः।

2. न्याय-वैशे عبدالله न्याय-वैशे Abdullah न्याय-वैशे Abdullah न्याय-वैशे Abdullah न्याय-वैशे Abdullah
   Ibid., p.590.

3. वा शरणान्यकामुक्तायमिन्तः सर्वनामार्थ विरिभिः
   Ibid., p.713.

4. प्रत्येक शृवाभावविराजुन निर्विकल्पगुणनः
   Ibid., p.590.

5. अतिक द्वयोऽपि। द्वयोऽपि। द्वयोऽपि। द्वयोऽपि। द्वयोऽपि। द्वयोऽपि। द्वयोऽपि।
   Ibid., p.590.
By this proposition this school successfully overcomes the infinite regress of relations as in the case of samaväya and thus easily defends the view of difference between substance and attributes.

This school also holds that ‘difference’ is not a separate entity. ‘Difference’, in this school, is defined as that which opposes the superimposition. For instance, pothood of pot opposes the superimposition of anything on pot. Therefore, pothood is ‘difference’ between pot and other things. The same pothood opposes any superimposition on itself and therefore pothood is the ‘difference’ between itself and other things.

The difference which is the svarūpa of pothood accounts for the difference between itself and pot and other things and also between pot and cloth. This power of ‘difference’ is called self-sufficiency. By this power of self-sufficiency the regress of ‘difference’ is also avoided.

If ‘difference’ is svarūpa of pothood how are the two

6. यें धात्व अवैद्यायात्त्विको सत्तार्थ मेल । तथा ज्ञात्व मन्त्रातो विलाभ
अध्यात्म निःप्रेक्षणाभी धर्मौ व स्वपी स्वत्त्वैः कपालात्त्विकर्षातीलोकः
स्वस्यवर्तु स्वमन्त्रातो
Ibid., p.604.

7. अशोकस्य वच तद्भवस्य तदनेत्री स्वशम्पन्निलििबें स्वस्य लघुमने
Ibid., p.604.
words bheda and ghatatva non-synonyms? How is the use of genitive case on the word ghatatva in the sentence ghatatvasya bheda which is indicative of 'difference' between ghatatva and bheda justified?

The tradition of Ramanuja school answers these questions in the following way: The word bheda is a general term whereas the word ghatatva is specific. Therefore they are non-synonymous. The use of genitive case is only by courtesy or auxacarika. Thus there is no difficulty in accepting the view of 'difference' explained above.

Thus the view of difference between substance and attributes appears to be sound in the Ramanuja school and in this case the Dvaita concept of Viṣṇesa would have no place.

But on a closer examination it appears that the questions that how bheda and ghatatva are non-synonyms and how the genitive is affixed to the word ghatatva, do not receive satisfactory explanation. Vyāsatīrtha has given a clue to such an examination in his Mandāramañji on Jayatīrtha's commentary on Upaniṣadhaṇḍaṇa of Madhva.

Vyāsatīrtha's clue: Vyāsatīrtha first presents the view to be examined: In the usage ghatasya svārupaḥ, svārupa is general and ghatā is particular. By this capacity of being general and particular, they are non-synonyms and therefore they are not identical and thus cannot prove Viṣṇesa. Examining this point Vyāsatīrtha asks whether the word svārupa in the
usage ghaṭasya svarūpaṃ stands for the svarūpa of pot or for the svarūpa of some other thing or for the svarūpa in general. If it is the svarūpa of pot, then, that being specific, the view that it is general is wrong. The second alternative is untenable as the svarūpa of some other thing cannot be related to 'this' ghaṭa, the relation with which is denoted by the genitive in the word ghaṭa. The third alternative that svarūpa is general is also untenable as there is no one svarūpa common to all entities as the acceptance of such a common svarūpa leads to the absurdity of all things being one.²

Following this clue, the present argument of the Ramanuja school may be examined in the following way: In the usage, ghatatvasya bhedāḥ, does the word bhedā stand for the bhedā of ghatatva or for the bhedā of some other thing or for the bhedā in general. If it is bhedā of ghatatva, then, that being specific, the view that it is general is wrong. The second alternative is untenable as bhedā of some other thing cannot be related to this ghatatva the relation with which is denoted by the genitive case in the word ghatatva. The third alternative that ghatatva is general is also untenable as there is no one bhedā common to all entities as the acceptance of such a common factor is fallacious. Madhva, in his Anuvākyāhyāna, proves that no dharma is general and there are as many dharmas as there are the substrata. He says dharmas like naratva are known to be different from substratum. Jayatīrtha puts this in a syllogistic form.

Minor term - The dharmas, Haratva, etc.
Major term - are not general
Middle term - because they are cognised even when an individual nara etc. is cognised.

9. अर्थात् एवं अन्यां द्वारा प्राप्तसिद्धं स्रोतं अनुवादितां न अनुवादितां। Anuvāhyāna, p.78.

10. र्यो अनुवादितेन भवति: क्योः आत्मनि प्रतिविषयविनिर्भरः प्रसन्नसती तथा प्रतिविषयः र्यो अनुवादितेन भवति। आनेन आनुवादितां अर्थेन अप्रवृत्तिं। Nyāyasudhā, p.370.
Concomitance - that dharma which is general is not cognised when an individual entity is cognised like doubleness. Doubleness, being a dharma of two entities, does not appear when one thing alone is cognised.

According to this concomitance if nara is a common dharma it should not be cognised when one nara is seen. But it is cognised. Therefore, it is not a common dharma. Madhva quotes a śrutī also which unambiguously says that dharmas are different from substratum to substratum.11

The dharmas are not general for yet another reason, according to Jayatīrtha. As the form etc. (rūpādi) dharmas which are found differently from person to person nara is also found differently from person to person. Therefore, nara is not common like form (rūpādi) etc.12 Therefore, it must be specific difference belonging to ghaṭatva. That difference being identical with ghaṭatva the question of non-synonymousness

11. तत्त्वात् उपेन्द्रोऽयं जाग गुरुः स्वस्तिकाः सुधारणवाणीः।

"तत्त्वात् उपेन्द्रोऽयं गुरुः स्वस्तिकाः सुधारणवाणीः।
स्वस्तिकमिव गुरुः स्वस्तिकमिव सुधारणवाणीः।"

Anuvyākhyāna, p.78.

12. यत्ते ते संबंधव उपलब्धिकारणान तदयाः तत्त्वात् उपेन्द्रोऽयं गुरुः।

"यत्ते ते संबंधव उपलब्धिकारणान तदयाः तत्त्वात् उपेन्द्रोऽयं गुरुः।
स्वस्तिकमिव गुरुः स्वस्तिकमिव गुरुः।"

Nyāyasudhā, p.370.
and the use of genitive case are not properly accounted for in the Ramanuja school. Hence Visesa is the only plausible solution for such difficulties.

Ramanuja's view of difference between substance and attributes is untenable:

That substance and attributes are not obtainable separately is the chief argument in favour of identity of substance and attributes. When once this identity stands established Visesa becomes necessary to sustain their non-synonymoueness, etc. Venkatanatha in his Tattvamuktakalapa has refuted the view of identity between substance and attributes proved on the ground of their non-obtainability separately. He says that such non-difference is opposed to perception. Our perception perceives 'difference' only between substance and attributes13. But this refutation does not hold good because dharma and asravm are not established separately by perception. Even the Ramanuja school admits this when it says that substance and non-substance are aprthaksiddha14. Thus when the perception does not perceive difference how can identity be contradicted by perception?

13. तत्त्वमुक्तकलाप, p.598.
14. तत्त्वमुक्तकलाप, p.590.
Therefore, this argument cannot be refuted by the Rāmānuja school.

Viveśa will have to be accepted by the Rāmānuja school:

Even if 'difference' between substance and attributes is conceded in the instances like pot and its mass, 'identity' is inescapable in certain other instances. The instance of a pot and its svarūpa is one such. The svarūpa of pot can in no way be different from pot for in that case pot would become inconceivable. Therefore, the identity of pot and its svarūpa must be accepted even by the Rāmānuja school. Consequently, Viveśa would be the only way to explain non-synonymity and the use of genitive case.

The Rāmānuja school holds the view that Brahman is endowed with infinite number of attributes. But it holds that those attributes are different but inseparable from Brahman. As the difference, in the words of Dr. Nagaraja Sarma\(^\text{15}\), "would degrade Brahman to the level of the finite"\(^\text{16}\) it cannot be

\(^{15}\) R. Nagaraja Sarma, Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy, The National Press, Madras, 1937, p.508.

\(^{16}\) If Brahman's attributes are different from Brahman the question whether they are insentients (jāda) or sentients (Cetana) arises. In case of first alternative it would amount to saying that Brahman is associated with prākṛta guṇas which would consequently make Brahman imperfect. Therefore the attributes must be held to be sentients and the perfect Cetana being one, attributes must be identical with Brahman. Though attributes are identical with Brahman their innumerability is explained by Viveśa. Innumerability and bheda are not invariable concomitants.
accepted. When thus, identity is to be accepted perforce by the Ramanuja school, the school is obliged to accept Visesa also. Otherwise the question as to how it is possible to maintain this identity along with the conceptual and verbal description of difference of attributes found in the sacred text and tradition as well as experience, cannot be answered.

While Ramanuja school has emphasised the points which indicate difference between substance and attributes, it has not taken a purposeful cognisance of facts which favour their identity also. No doubt it has tried to explain them by saying that they are together by their very nature. But this resort to nature does not solve all the difficulties. The problem of infinite regress in respect of abhidheyan, pramayatan and other cases remains unsolved as in samavaya. There is no escape from recognising identity and Visesa in these instances, which has the advantage of ladhava in logical assumptions.

Parakalayati’s refutation of Visesa examined:

The identity of substance and attributes is established by the Dvaita school on the basis of samanadhikaragyga cognition and of the separate non-obtainability of substance and its attributes (e.g., the cloth and its whiteness). This view of identity together with Visesa has the support of all the three proofs (pramanas).

Vijayindra17, one of the great exponents of the Dvaita

school, has refuted the Rāmānuja classification of the categories as substance and non-substance in the light of the Dvaita view of identity between substance and attributes.

Parakālayati, an exponent of the Rāmānuja school has refuted Vijayindra's refutation of the classification of the categories as substance and non-substance. An examination of that refutation is necessary here, as it involves the refutation of Viśeṣa also. The following is the summary of his arguments in this respect:

The sāmanadnikaranya cognition such as nīlo gñatān apprehends adjectiveness and substantiveness of blueness and pot respectively. Adjectiveness and substantiveness are possible only in case of difference between the two. Thus sāmanadnikaranya cognition cannot stand as a proof for identity between substance and attributes.

Parakālayati goes further and says that there is a clear proof of the gruti and the perception regarding the difference between substance and attributes. The gruti is "Vadgiga rāhitām"

18. A.D.1676-1737. He is known as Periya Parakālaswāmī I in the tradition of Parakāla Mutt.

rupaṁ rupamastu dṛṣṭaṁ, yacchuklaṁ tadapam, yatkrpaṁ tadannasaṁ.

There is a perception that blue colour is produced by heat in the white pot. If attributes are identical, colours cannot be changed without changing or destroying the substance. Therefore, this perception establishes the difference between substance and its attributes.

A modern scholar Jāhndī śrīnivāsācārya of Phalnad has refuted the above arguments and defended the Dvaita view. He says, "the apprehension of substantiveness and adjectiveness is only due to a relation between the substantive and the adjective. What is that relation? It cannot be 'contact' as it can obtain only between two things which appear separately like two fingers. It is not samavāya as it is not acceptable to the Rāmānuja school. It cannot be viṣayaviṣayabhāva as it does not obtain between pot and its colour. Therefore, the relation must be one of identity. Thus the Rāmānuja school must accept that the sāmānādhikāranya cognition apprehends identity between substance and attributes.

20. Chandogyopanisad, 6-4-1.

2-1, mad br vrat vrśāne samyagdhan vṛkṣāyāṁ yathā hi jñanāmsaṁ tathā prakṛte
vijayīndra parājaya, p.12.

2-2, viṣayāṁ viṣayāṁ tathā gacchati sāvakaṁ sāvakaṁ dvakṛte
tathābhāvāt samyakādhyāmaṁ utvā dyāya
(Continued on p.171)
The possessive case of the word Agn in the śrutī sentence quoted by Parakālayati as a proof regarding difference between substance and attributes can be explained as in the instance of ghaṭasya svarūpaṃ with the help of Viśeṣa. Here the svarūpa is not different from ghaṭa. Still possessive case, the indicative of difference in ghaṭa, has been used. This cannot but be explained with the help of Viśeṣa. The śrutī in question may also be interpreted in the same manner. Therefore that does not stand as a proof to prove difference between substance and attributes.

Moreover, the śrutī in question cannot be taken in isolation from other śrutī sentences. There are śrutī texts²⁴ (quoted supra, pp.36-39) which unmistakably support identity.
and Viśeṣa between substance and attributes. In order to maintain consistency of thought in the śrutis, the present śrutī should be interpreted in a manner which does not contradict others. That interpretation certainly does not go in favour of difference between substance and attributes.

The evidence of perception advanced by Parakālayati is also untenable. For, the very usage "ḥukla ghāte" is a sāmanādikaranya usage and it, therefore, means identity between ḥukla and ghāte. As blue colour is produced in place of white, difference also should be accepted between the two. Therefore, in such places both identity and difference must be accepted and Viśeṣa should be recognised to facilitate the co-existence of two contradictory factors. The evidence of perception is not, therefore, against the acceptance of identity.

Parakālayati has advanced an inference to prove the difference between substance and attributes. The inference is:

25. सुकृत यात्र इत्यदृष्टम् आदे विवधैः। संशोधने शास्त्रगद्धेऽनि निन्दे यत् दृश्य सामानाककरणानां संबंधनिरोधिता उवाच वक्तः अलाधः।
   तथापि प्रत्यत्त्वकान्तौ अति चिन्तात्।
   Vijayindravijayavaijayanti, pp.2-3.

26. सृष्टेऽवशिष्ठिकरणं शिलां। स्थानसे शुरुरास्त्रयायेऽपि तथाम्।
   Vijayindraperājaya, p.2.
Minor term - Colour and other attributes
Major term - are different from their substratum (adhikarana)
Middle term - For, they are produced and destroyed, while their substratum remains as it is.

The inference may appear to be right at first sight. But on a close examination it is found to be ridden with fallacies. Certain attributes remain in or with substance as long as the latter exists. The middle term does not apply to such cases and thus the middle term suffers from the fallacy of partial non-existence in the minor term. In the case of attributes which do not last as long as their substratum lasts, difference is accepted. Therefore the inference suffers from the fallacy of partial Siddhanātā. When the Dvaitin says that difference between substance and attributes is accepted in the above said instance it should not be mistaken that he accepts only difference. He accepts both difference and identity. Videśa stands there to prevent the contradiction of difference and identity.

Another main objection of Parakāśayati is: A blind person who has the perception of smell has a doubt about the substratum of smell. In the same way, he has doubt about the

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27. यान प्रकाशनिर्वत्तिकु देवरागिन्यु आयामिनित ।

Vijayandravijayalajyanti, p.3.

Ibid., p.3.
colour of the substratum though he knows the substratum by touch. This doubt and certainty at the same time would be contradictory in the case of identity of substance and its attributes. Therefore, the difference between them must be accepted.

This argument is untenable because the untenability of absolute difference (resulting in separate appearances like two fingers) is not removed by this argument. Only the untenability of absolute identity is shown. In the light of the untenability of both absolute identity and absolute difference the qualified identity is the only reasonable solution. Therefore, the argument criticising identity between substance and its attributes does not hold water. Another sweeping criticism against identity advanced by Parasakṣayati is: Vīseṣa of the Dvaita school is equal to avidvā of the Advaita school. To explain: The judgment

29. अवस्थावेदनात्तेजस्तु तत्सृष्णांशुल्यं परमवेतास्तृष्णाः। तदेव
स्वप्नविनिर्वास्यस्याः सामान्याः सत्त्वस्य तत्त्वात्तुपासुवन
अत्युक्तिः। कल्पने परस्परस्वेष्यं सामान्यविनिर्वास्याः
सत्त्वस्य तत्त्वात्तुपासुवन त्वग्नुभावां त्वदेवसुवन

Vijayindraparājaya, p.4.

30. अवस्थावेदनात्तेजस्तु तत्सृष्णांशुल्यं परमवेतास्तृष्णाः। तदेव
स्वप्नविनिर्वास्यस्याः सामान्याः सत्त्वस्य तत्त्वात्तुपासुवन
अत्युक्तिः। कल्पने परस्परस्वेष्यं सामान्यविनिर्वास्याः
सत्त्वस्य तत्त्वात्तुपासुवन त्वग्नुभावां त्वदेवसुवन

- Vijayindravijayavaijayanti, p.5.
of difference regarding substance and its attributes which are identical in reality, is possible by the knowledge of difference between them. This knowledge of difference is an illusion as difference is not real. Therefore, all souls from Brahman down to one's preceptor would have to be illusion-ridden, as they arrive at such judgments. If Viṣṇa is held responsible for such usages, it amounts to saying that Viṣṇa is responsible for giving rise to the false knowledge. Therefore, Viṣṇa is like avidya of the Advaita school.

This sweeping charge suffers from want of correct appraisal of Viṣṇa. Viṣṇa is based on the firm ground of all the three pramāṇas (See II Chapter). Besides an examination of certain popular usages made by both Loukikes and Vaidikas would show how this charge is groundless. There are usages such as 'Devdatta is lion' (Simha Devadatta) and 'a fistful of kusagrass is the sacrificer' (yajamānah prastaraḥ). The usage indicates identity between lion and Devadatta in the first and yajamāna and prastara in the second. But there is no identity between them as a matter of fact. Therefore, all loukikes (Continued on p.176)
and vaidikas would have to be branded as illusion-ridden. This is quite impossible. Therefore, the reason for such a usage has to be found out. Naturally, the reason should be similarity between the lion and Devadatta and a relation between prastara and yajamana. Such usages are explained through similarity or other relations on account of untenability of identity and validity of difference. In the same manner in usages showing difference between substance and attributes where difference is invalid and identity is valid, a certain other fact which is responsible for the reference of difference is to be found and that fact is called Viṣṇa by the Dvaita school. Recourse to Viṣṇa is quite in keeping with the practice of interpreting well-known usages. When identity

Vijayindravarajaya, p.6.

31 (Continued) अभावान्त्यं द्रव्यिको तत्समनं निरूपणं द्वस्तारं निरूपणं-क्षणं लया (लक्षणं-ष्टव सम्प्राणं) इत्यं अभावान्त्यं। इत्यं अभावान्त्यं। विरूपणमितुष्णां ते तद्भविष्यं वाहि विधिनः कालवती।

Vijayindravarajaya, p.6.
of substance and attributes is established beyond doubt and arguments in favour of their absolute difference are refused and proper authority for Vīśeṣa is shown, there is no reason to reject it or equate it with avidyā. This has been conclusively done in the first chapter particularly (pp. 5-9) and in subsequent chapters occasionally (pp. 87-90, 166-167).

An examination of the refutation of the perceptive authority proving Vīśeṣa:

Vīśeṣa is based on the perceptive authority according to the Dvaita school. It proves this in the following manner:

There is a judgment 'threads are cloth'. This is sāmānādhikaranya judgment. If two words denote an absolutely identical thing, sāmānādhikaranya judgment does not obtain there. For example, there is no judgment as 'pot is pot'. Here two words denote an absolutely identical thing, that is, pot.

For the sāmānādhikaranya judgment arises with reference to absolutely different things as we have no usage as 'pot is cloth'. Therefore, we have to understand that sāmānādhikaranya usage denotes identity with some additional factor in the things. That additional factor is Vīśeṣa. Thus the perceptive judgment 'threads are cloth' stands as a proof in respect of Vīśeṣa.

33. तत्काल्यः धर्म: 34. धर्मः कल्पित: 35. धर्मः परः
Parakālayati refutes this, giving a different reason for the above said sāmānādikaraṇa usage. He says that there are two prakāra-s tatttvā and pātatvā. The substratum of these two prakāra-s is one and the same. Sāmānādikaraṇa usage is due to this oneness of the substratum of two prakāra-s. As ghaṭatva and kalaśatva are not two different prakāra-s, there is no sāmānādikaraṇa usage as 'pot is pot' (ghaṭaḥ kalaśaḥ).

This objection is answered as follows:

If the substratum of threadness and clothness is identical which means threads and cloth are identical, why do threads not perform the functions of cloth? That they do not do so is known by experience. Therefore, absolute or unqualified identity between the substratum and threadness and clothness is not possible. Hence, some factor which accounts for such non-functioning, in spite of identity of the substratum has to be taken to be operating in threads. That factor is Viṣṇu. Thus the perceptual judgment 'threads are cloth' is a sufficient proof of the

36. भ कर्त्तम तत्त्वस्वरूपम् कर्त्तवतिष्ठितिविशिष्टमालहि उपयोगिता: सामानिधिकरणः प्रणीतः: विशेषपरमाणे प्रामाण्यार्थिनार्। ततः: परस्तरवर्तिं तदविन्द्रवर्तिं परमाद्वितीयते प्रामाण्यम्।

VijayIndraparājaya, p.107.
existence of *Viśeṣa*.

Parakālayati has not noticed the points made by the Dvaita school about the perceptibility of *Viśeṣa*, especially in Jayatīrtha's *Nyāyasūtra* (See supra, Chapter II, pp. 26-32). Perceptibility of *Viśeṣa* stands proved by these arguments. Parakālayati's explanation of समान-सहितारणायामात्मरा, in respect of identity of substratum having different prakāraṇas does not in any way disprove the necessity of recognising *Viśeṣa*. For, when substrata are identical for whatever reason the non-synonymousness of terms like *pata* and *sukla* has to be explained. This could be only due to operation of some power in the things itself. That is *Viśeṣa*.

On Parakālayati's observation that threadness and clothness are two different prakāraṇas whereas *gaṭaṭa*va and *kalaṭa*va are not, it may be asked: Threads and cloth are absolutely identical as *gaṭa* and *kala* are. There is no difference in their identity. Then, why is it that there are no two prakāraṇas as *gaṭaṭa*va and *kalaṭa*va while there are two prakāraṇas as *tattva*va and *patatva*. There must be some basis for this difference in the two instances. That is *Viśeṣa*.

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37. गण्यम् तस्मातिन्त्यव विकल्प्यितोऽपि ततोऽपि वाच्यायाः सत्ववन्दनेषु तत्रिति सञ्जीयते विषयः। ततः त्रिभवतांत्वं अतिरेकताः। इत्यावश्च तद्

**VijayaIndravijayaVijayanti**, p. 76.
Parakālayati accepts identity of substratum of ghatatva and śukṣatva. If the identity of substratum in respect of ‘threadness’ and ‘clothness’ is similar to the one of ghatata and kalaśa, sāmāṇḍnākāranya cognition in regard to them would be untenable as there is no such cognition in the other case of ghatata and kalaśa. Therefore, it must be conceded that there is some peculiarity in the identity of ghatata and kalaśa as distinguished from the one of ghatata and kalaśa. The peculiarity is videga\[38\].

As only the operation of Viśesa gives rise to sāmāṇḍnākāranya cognition, it can be taken to be proved by perception in so far as its effect is open to perception.

An examination of the refutation of Arthāpatti in favour of Viśesa:

That the difference between substance and its attributes is untenable has been established by the refutation of sāmanāvāya. The difference is refuted on the ground that they are not cognised apart from each other like the two fingers. When identity thus stands established, however, in order to explain

\[38\] Ibid., p. 73.
certain judgments and usages indicative of difference between
them videga has to be pressed into service. This argument is
known as Arthāpatti.

Parakālayati seeks to refute this position as follows:
There cannot be the absence of the knowledge of whiteness when
there is knowledge of cloth, because the knowledge of cloth
itself would be the knowledge of its attributes, in case of
their identity. As regards absence of the knowledge of the
whiteness, Parakālayati says it is due to the absence of contact
of the eyes with the colour which is the cause for the knowledge
of the white colour.

This objection is met in the following manner:

That inseparability is the cause for identity is well-
known. Such inseparability is there between whiteness and
cloth. Therefore, they are identical. As the causal complex
for the cognition of cloth and of the cognition of white colour
is the same it follows that if the cloth is cognised its white
colour also should be cognised. But it is not. Therefore,
the contingency that the white colour should be cognised even
without the contact of eye as the cloth is cognised without
such contact, (but by the touch) is inescapable. To overcome
this contingency some factor which accounts for such non-
cognition has to be recognised in the cloth. That factor is
Videga. 39

The Dvaita school advances the following Arthāpatti argu-
ment to prove Videga. We have, in our experience, certain
judgments like samavāya is related; saṁyoga is related; sattā
has sattā; 'the difference is different', 'time is eternal;
'space is everywhere'. These judgments are uncontradicted.
An analysis of each of these shows the need for Videga to account
for their validity.

1. The judgment samavāya is related means that samavāya
embodies a relation just as a pot embodies in itself the relation
of samavāya between its quality and itself. What is that rela-
tion? It cannot be saṁyoga as it obtains only between two sub-
stances and as samavāya is not a substance either. Failing
saṁyoga it must be taken to be samavāya. But samavāya is
numerically one according to the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore,
we must say samavāya abides in itself. This 'abiding in'
presupposes adhārādheyabhāva which in its turn presupposes
difference between adhāra and adheya. But in the case of

39. जैनोत्तर वेदोज्ज्वलिको पदार्थनिर्दिष्टविद्या परोपकंमकरणगणानां — परो
संप्रदायानिर्दिष्टविद्या परोपकंमकरणवस्तु संस्कृतादिप्त
सन्नियमस्य परावर्तित स्मरन्ति आत्मा ज्ञाताय अपेक्षाकृत
कितीयानं सत्तां सुविशेष न ज्ञात्व वेदोज्ज्वलिको पदार्थनिर्दिष्टतां
काले अति काले तत्त्वात्। इति काले अति काले अति काले अति काले।

Ibid., p. 81.
judgment under consideration one and the same samavāya is being apprehended as ādharma and ādheya. Therefore, the question arises as to how the ādharadheyabhāvā in respect of the same thing is possible. We cannot dismiss the judgment as wrong as there is no contradiction of it later. A solution has therefore to be found for this apparent illogicality of this valid judgment.

That solution is Viṣeṣa. Viṣeṣa is a power to account for judgments showing difference where difference does not exist as a matter of fact. Even granting a plurality of samavāyas the above judgment cannot be logically explained. For, the assumption of a second samavāya in first would necessarily lead to the assumption of a third samavāya in the second and so on regressively. Therefore, we have to stop at some point and accept that samavāya acts both as ādharma and ādheya. In this context the recognition of Viṣeṣa would be unavoidable.

2. The judgment ‘samvāga is related’ has to face the same difficulty. Samvāga can be related to a substance by samavāya. Then the question of the relation between samavāya and samvāga arises. If that relation is samavāya it leads to infinite regress. In addition, those who do not recognise samavāya as a category also have the judgment samvāga is related. They cannot explain the judgment with the help of samavāya. If a second samvāga is accepted it leads to infinite regress. Therefore samvāga and its relation must be said to be one and the same. The question of validity of ādharadheyabhāvā arises in this case. Viṣeṣa is the only solution to it.
3. The judgment 'existence has existence in it' also is open to either infinite regress or the untenability of ādārādheyaabhāva. The acceptance of numerical oneness of 'existence' (sattā) is necessary to ensure the validity of the judgment.

4. The judgment 'difference is different' means an attribute 'difference' exists in a substratum 'difference'. This means there are two 'differences'. Then the question of relationship between substratum 'difference' and attribute 'difference' arises. If the relation is one of third 'difference' it would lead to the assumption of an endless series of 'differences'. Therefore, we must assume that there is no difference between difference and its substratum, but they are identical. To explain the judgment showing ādārādheyaabhāva between 'difference' and its substratum Viśeṣa is to be necessarily resorted to.

5 & 6. The judgments 'time is eternal' and 'space is everywhere' refer to the being of time in time and space respectively. But as time and space are numerically one such statements are, apparently, logically untenable. But they are valid judgments. Hence some factor other than difference which can preserve their validity must be assumed to be existing in time and space. That factor is Viśeṣa.

The need to accept a power, functioning in place of actual 'difference' in things, to rationalise the above
judgments which are apparently untenable leads us to the acceptance of the category of Viśesa.

Parakālayati gives a different interpretation to these judgments and proves their validity without Viśesa. His arguments may be summarised in the following manner: If the "existence" means generality (sattā) the judgment 'existence has existence' would mean that existence is related to time and space. If the word 'sattā' itself means relation to space and time, the judgment would mean that space is related to time and time is related to space. 40

As sattā and time and sattā and space are mutually different, the judgment indicating the difference is valid. So there is no need to recognise Viśesa there. In the same way, space and time are different and the judgment is valid by virtue of this difference only.

The judgment 'time is eternal' means the continuous flow of things that come into being in the natural course of seasons, etc. The judgment 'space is everywhere' (deśah sarvatra) means

40. तत्तथायम् तत्तथायम् तत्तथायम् तत्तथायम्: तत्तथायां तत्तथायां तत्तथायां तत्तथायां तत्तथायां तत्तथायां तत्तथायां

Vijayindraparājaya, p.110.
a particular property seen at a particular place is found in other place also. According to these two interpretations, time does not exist in time and space does not exist in space. Therefore, there is no need to recognise Vīśeṣa to account for ādārśāddhayabhāva.

We may now examine these arguments. The statement "existence has existence" (sattā satā) means the universal 'existence' has a relation with space and time. Here the question as to how or by what relation that relation resides in the universal 'existence' (sattā) has to be answered. The acceptance of another relation for this purpose would result in an infinite regress. Therefore, it must be concluded that the time-space relation is not related to the universal 'existence (sattā) by some other relation. They (the time-space relation and the universal 'existence' sattā) are mutually identical and therefore, there is no need to go in for another relation. This makes it clear that Vīśeṣa is necessary to account for judgments of difference in respect of them (sattā) and the space-time relation.

In the second interpretation too the same difficulty of
of relation and space and the relation and time confronts us. To get over it identity between the relation on the one hand and the time and space on the other should be admitted. Consequently Videga also should be admitted. Regarding the interpretation of the judgment 'time is eternal' the Dvaita school says, the being of time in time is essential, for, time is considered to be the cause of all effects. The definition of cause is that which exists in the immediate preceding moment of the birth of an effect. This implies that the time exists in time. Otherwise, the fact of being the cause could not be sustained.

Even the judgment 'pot is in time' can be interpreted as the existence of pot in upādhis caused by the time and thus the being of pot in time may be denied. But such a denial is against the fact. If pot is proved not to be existing in time it would cease to be an existent as 'existence' means...
Moreover, there are no upādhis caused by the impact of time during the period of world destruction. And then the prediction "time 'is' always" (kālaḥ sadaḥ aṣṭi) will have no meaning.

The interpretation of the expression 'space is everywhere' also is wrong, for the judgment 'pot in space' (dāda ghatāḥ) could also be interpreted similarly as the pot having a particular quality seen at a particular place. Consequently, the pot would become non-existent, for, the existence means 'being in space'.

Thus as the interpretation of the above judgments offered by Parākālayati is defective, the Dvaita interpretation has to be considered and this consideration, obviously leads to the

Moreover, there are no upādhis caused by the impact of time during the period of world destruction. And then the prediction "time 'is' always" (kālaḥ sadaḥ aṣṭi) will have no meaning.

43. तथा सति औषधिकर्मणा | कालस्य कारणातलासुधायुक्तस्य कालुः लिखलय असिक्षितिः कर्मयो बाधास्थ्रयो | अन्यथा कोंक्रोणेत्रिमिर्गविनक | कालान्वये के चाक्षुखेशी नासुदुष्टै लिखलयेव चिन्ह्येकामचिन्त्य | अविनित व प्राप्ये | कालुः लिखलयाने दृष्टिविशालित्व असाक्षासुः रूप है | कालन्वये निर्देश है | रामदि | Ibid., p. 85.

44. काल अविनितितन वसंतविद्याकालविवेकप्रकुणोन्तर्विवेकप्रकाश्य भविष्यनाती तत्त्व नामक नावकारोन्तर्विवेकप्रकाशस्य कथय । काल संसारसंसारिनामातिप्रत्येककालोऽभविष्यते। तत्त्वाति तथेनात्निपान्त्यकालोऽन्तः कालसंसारसंसारिनामः। 

Ibid p 85
acceptance of Viśeṣa.

Examination of Parakālayatī's refutation of Arthāpatti argument based on the śrutis:

"Nehā nānāsti kiṁcana" "Śevam dharmān prthak paśvanstāne vānuvīdhāvati". These are sentences from the Kāṭha Upaniṣad. According to the Dvaita interpretation the sentences negate any difference between Brahman and its attributes and also among attributes themselves. There are, however, judgments and usages which seem to disclose the presence of some difference between Brahman and its attributes. Such statements, made about a being in which there is no difference in reality, would naturally suggest the presence of Viśeṣa in Brahman. Otherwise the reference to a variety of attributes would make no sense. The Dvaita interpretation of such texts has already been dealt with earlier. Parakālayatī gives his own interpretation of this śrutī and refutes Viśeṣa.

Parakālayatī's interpretation:

1. He who understands and contemplates mere dharmas without contemplating their substratum or guṇa would just experience or feel dharmas alone and would not have the experience of Brahman, or the knowledge of Brahman.45

45 धर्मानु धर्मकृ सुचिक्रिया पर्यन्त न नेव गुणविध्यति।
सो तु द्वाराधिधर्मानुराधिको भावनि व पि किं किं लक्ष्यं॥

Vijayindraparājaya, p.13.
2. The rain water falling on the top of a hill flows down to places other than the mountain. In the same way one who contemplates only a few dharmas while learning a particular branch of vidyā would know and experience all the innumerable dharmas.  

The very word dharma and the plural form of it show that attributes are different from Brahman. If they are not different, they cannot be dharmas, but will be dharmā only. Nor can they be many in number as the dharmā is one. If guṇas are identical with Brahman, they will not be dharmas of Brahman. So much so, the Upāsana of guṇas would be false and one would be driven to admit that a false upāsana would confer liberation.

The first interpretation is far fetched. For, there is

46. यथा दुर्गवहलुकां परित्वर्द्धार्यते विधायिति दुर्गा भागायूं दुर्गाप्रजान।

47. विषेषतः यात्रापराग्या यात्राप्रवर्तनानि दुर्गाप्रजान।
no scope or possibility of *upāsanā* of mere attributes leaving out the possessor of such attributes. A prohibition without a possibility of occurrence of such *upāsanā* is out of order.\(^{48}\)

In the second interpretation the interpretation of the word *Parvateśu* to mean "places other than mountain" is against grammar. The instance in the *Upaniṣad* clearly indicates the downfall and therefore the sentence under our consideration should mean the downfall of one who practises the *upāsanā* of mere gugas. How can the contemplation of a particular gugas in a particular *vidyā* bring the knowledge and experience of all innumerable *dharmas*?\(^{49}\)

As far as the third objection, the plurality of *dharmas* and the usage of the word *dharmā* in spite of its being identical with *dharmā*, can be explained by *Viśeṣa*. *Viśeṣa*, as has already been proved, is capable of accommodating *dharmas* in spite of

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\(^{48}\) आदिनाम् गुणोत्साषयाप्रकारेऽकृतऽन्तरसाधनम् तद्विषेधोऽधारणः
अनुशीष्यति त्व एव पुरुषोऽसारी नामस्य केलकुरुपोपारतः
प्राप्तिः। यदौ तेनिष्ठ्यैः हसनाः।

*Viśeṣvindravijayavaijayanti*, p.12.

\(^{49}\) प्रत्येकु  हल्ल कर्तव्यः  धर्मविवेकाभावगम्याधिकारः  ते धर्मः
प्रत्येकतः  तेन प्राप्तता  गुणोऽवसरः । उदाहरणः

*विज्ञानिकेषु  तदः  गुणात्मकोऽधिकारः  तदः। उदाहरणः*।

being identical with the dharma. Hence there is no fear of false upāsana. We cannot, therefore, accept the interpretation of the sruti “evam dharma...” as given by Parakālayati.

Parakālayati's interpretation of the above discussed Katha sentence is different from that of Rāmānuja. According to Rāmānuja the sentence means: "Those who contemplate the attributes of "controlling by in-dwelling" (antaryāmitya) which legitimately belong to Brahman, as existing in other gods would fall in samsāra. This does not offend against the Dvaita interpretation of the text or touch the concept of Viśeṣa in any manner.

50. अबसाध्यपुरुषस्वस्थिताविराज आधाराक्षोधनेति उन्होंदिके धर्मात्मानायात्। अतिरिक्तस्वस्वस्वस्थितासंवर्गाया। भुस्माद्विष्णु: निर्माणात्मायात्। Ibid., p.14.

51. चर्चितपूर्ववर्तिका वृद्ध प्रतालपरिकीर्तिका रागात्यतंत्रमातृतिकार्यापनियता धाराविति। पुरातप्रवृत्तिकार्यकलाविनायकान्यालाविनायकान्यानोदिताने प्रतालपरिकीर्तिकार्यापनियताकृति तथाप्रभुस्माद्विष्णुविनायकान्यानोदिताने परिकीर्तिकार्यापनियतात्। भुस्माद्विष्णुविनायकान्यानोदिताने प्रतालपरिकीर्तिकार्यापनियतात्।