Chapter V

THE ADVAITA SCHOOL AND VIDEYA
The Dvaita school has argued that even the chief Advaitic tenets like Aikya and attributelessness (nirnyutvatva) of Brahman could not be established without the help of Viśeṣa. It is necessary to see the Dvaita arguments in this connection in order to understand the role of Viśeṣa. (1) Aikya is claimed to be identical with Brahman. And Brahman with which Aikya is identical is, by hypothesis, self-luminous. Consequently Aikya should always remain intuited in so far as it is identical with the self-luminous Brahman. But it is not. (2) Aikya would not have to be taught by 'Tattvamāsi' and other so-called Mahāvākyas, for, it is identical with self-luminous Brahman and as such should remain always known or self-established. A self-established thing cannot be the object of śāstraic teaching as it would be an exercise in futility.

Moreover, the self-luminosity is defined as unknowability and also the capacity of becoming an object of judgment based on perception. It would thus be self-contradictory.

1. न तत्त्वज्ञान विद्वेदिने ज्ञातां ज्ञते अर्थात् अनावर्त्तो तत्त्वस्वरूपं नलस्य तत्त्वावस्तुते। धर्मसाधनो ज्ञातं न अभायं। कुं तद्। सकलं विद्वेदिने ज्ञातां ज्ञते न निर्जनमेव शास्त्रं। तत्सत्त्वभवन्त ज्ञातम्। न इति श्रद्धाप्रभावलोक्तः। सुविदा ज्ञते न अभायं। नैव अस्तित्ववर्ग ज्ञातम्। - Nyāyasudhā, p.103.

2. न तत्त्वज्ञानानि ज्ञातां हि सत्त्वानि। अद्वितीय लोक्यं ज्ञातं न धीरो नार्थानि। धीरो ज्ञातं ज्ञातं न धीरो ज्ञातं। Citsukha. Tattvapradīpikā, p.9.
to hold that Aikya is identical with self-luminous Brahman and is still to be made the object of śastraic teaching.

The Advaita school has no solution of its own to this problem. In order to overcome this difficulty it will have to accept Viśeṣa whether it likes or not. On account of Viśeṣa, Aikya remains unknown even though it is essentially identical with the self-luminous Brahman. It is the very nature of Viśeṣa to make this subtle distinction in things that are identical where exigencies of thought and practical necessities require it. It is only the acceptance of Viśeṣa or some concept equivalent to it that can account for Aikya being the object of śastraic teaching while svarūpa of Brahman or Ātman is not so.

The Upaniṣadic sentences like "Satyam jñānam anantam Brahman", speak of reality (satyatvā) etc. attributes of Brahman. They are also identical with Brahman. Here also we find all the difficulties pointed out above besides the difficulty of those attributes of Brahman becoming synonymous in effect. Only Viśeṣa which is capable of introducing subtle distinction within the thing itself can save the situation. Therefore

3. "सत्य ज्ञान अनान्त भ्राम्ण" - उपनिषदः, c.105.
even the Advaitins will have to accept this Viśaṣa.

The Dvaita argument that the pursuit of Śāstra would be fruitless as Aiśkya cannot be the object of Śāstraic teaching is attempted to be met by the Advaitins in the following way. Aiśkya is, of course, identical with the self-luminous Brahman. Śāstra, therefore, does not teach Aiśkya. Still it is not useless as it is meant to dispel the illusion of difference. This is what is meant by the statement "siddham tu niyartakatvāt" (the usefulness of Śāstra consists in dispelling the illusion of difference).
Jayatīrtha dismisses this contention saying that when Aikya is already known or stands revealing itself always, there is no possibility of illusion of difference occurring at any time. Importance of the exact nature of a thing (tattva) is the cause of an illusion. Here there is no such ignorance of Aikya at any point of time. If the Advaitin should urge that Aikya does not reveal itself and therefore ignorance is possible, Jayatīrtha asks how Aikya, in that case, can be identical with the self-luminous Brahma. If Aikya does not reveal itself on account of Avidyā Brahman's caitanya aspect also should likewise remain unrevealed. And when caitanya aspect is unrevealed superimposition of Avidyā too would be impossible. This renders the plea that Aikya does not reveal itself on account of Avidyā fallacious.

Caitanya is revealed always as it is not veiled by Avidyā. But Aikya is veiled by it. Therefore Aikya is not revealed sometimes though it is identical with Brahma. Such an argument too is fallacious as caitanya is a single partless entity and therefore there cannot be a partial veil of Avidyā over Aikya alone. If it is said that Avidyā has a power to accomplish the impossible and that it can bring about partial veiling in a partless Brahman, Jayatīrtha asks, why in that case Avidyā is not accepted in respect of inanimate objects. The impossibility of Avidyā in inanimate things due to non-revelation of adhikāraṇa can be easily removed by the said

6. न्यायसूत्रं सूक्तं न कार्यत् । नीन्दा-व्यवहारं न न्यायसूत्रं ।

- Nyāyasūtra, p.103.
extraordinary power of Avidyā. Thus the Advaita view that “there is no Avidyā in inanimate objects”\(^7\) would become indefensible.

Even if Aikya is the object of nāstika teaching, it is taught by the word ‘tat’ only and the remaining words \(\text{tvam} \) and \(\text{asi} \) would be unnecessary. It cannot be argued that these two words are meant to remove the illusion of difference. For, the word \text{tat} itself has taught Aikya and by the knowledge of Aikya the illusion of difference is removed. The other two words have no role to play in the removal of Avidyā. If illusion is not removed by the knowledge of Aikya which has been produced by the word \text{tat} it cannot be removed at all. If it is held that Aikya is not taught by the word \text{tat}, Aikya cannot be absolutely identical with caitanya\(^8\).

The Advaitin argues that in the sentence “Tattvamasi” the word \text{tat} itself teaches both Brahman and Aikya and the

\(^7\) तपृ अविलेखः ज्ञा कुलोधाकारोऽक्रमः। अनुरुप-तेस्तत-(\text{tattvamasi}) तत्।
तथा जसः ज्ञा ज्ञातासनुपु देशु। तत्तत्। \text{Ibid.}, p.103.

\(^8\) तत्सनेश्वरोऽनिवसनेतुर्मधुरवत्तुपुरुषोऽविज्ञानविवेकहितः। अनुरुप-तेतरुपणातरुपणातरुपणातरुपणातरुपणातरुपणात।
अनुरुप-तेतरुपणातरुपणातरुपणातरुपणातरुपणात।
\text{Padmapāda}. \text{Pancapādikā}, \text{V.S.S.}, \text{Vol.II, Part I, 1891, p.4.}

- \text{Nyāyasudhā}, p.103.
remaining words are superfluous as in the sentence "Soyam Devadattah" where the word sati itself indicates both Devadatta and Aikya which is identical with him while the remaining words are superfluous. Jayatirtha rejoins by saying that even in the judgment "Soyam Devadattah" the identity of Aikya and Devadatta is not absolute but tinged with Vaisesa. If Vaisesa is not accepted the said difficulty cannot be overcome 9.

Madhava and Jayatirtha have examined the possibility of Aikya being different from or different-cum-identical with Brahman. The examination is necessary, for, in case Aikya is different from or different-cum-identical with Brahman, the argument that Advaitins too must perforce accept Vaisesa would lose its ground. The examination is as follows:

If Aikya is different from Brahman it would mean that it is unreal, for, everything other than Brahman is unreal in the Advaita school. If Aikya is unreal, the difference between the finite reals and Brahman would become real as a logical...

9. (Pariroala, p.103.

- Ibid., p.103.

1. तत्त्वा ज्ञानिन! तस्मात् काहीं प्रकृति नवं श्रेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ-श्रेष्ठत्वं न तु छोटे श्रेष्ठाद्वयवस्था-प्रज्ञाम् गौत्तम-पर येति श्रेष्ठपुरुषैः मरणसन्तप्तिः आदिः

2. उज्ज्वलित। परं विकृति तस्मात् विशेषणं एवं विभवं न ते कारणं प्रणयेन-स्वतंत्रता-सत्ता-वर्णमाणं सर्वत्र लोकः

- Parimala, p.103.
consequence. This would undermine the thesis of the Advaita school.10.

Jayatīrtha adds some more fallacies to the one pointed out by Madhva. The Advaitins hold that the sentence "Tattvamāsi" teaches one differenceless or partless principle. If Āikya should be different from Brahman the sentence would be referring to the existence of another principle that is different from Brahman which is against the accepted doctrine of the Advaita school. This breach of faith with reference to the original doctrine would involve the fallacy of apāsiddhānta.11.

As Āikya is unreal, as shown by Madhva, it cannot be the object of sāstraic teaching. If the Advaitins, however, contend that even unreal things are taught by āruti it would amount to saying that sāstra teaches unreal things. That would vitiate the validity of sāstra.12.

10. यद्यपि गितलिङ्गोऽनुवेशनं तत्त्वमृत्य न नादृश्य।

- Anuvyākhyāna, p.5.

11. तत्त्वात्मार्थिका कषयानो नृपतिष्ठतानि निचर्चितायां यामां तत्त्वमृत्य निरुपितात्

- Nyāyasudhā, p.103.

12. तत्त्वात्मार्थिका कषयानो नृपतिष्ठतानि निचर्चितायां यामां तत्त्वमृत्य निरुपितात्

Ibid., p.103.
It may be asked that what is the ground for holding that if Aikya is unreal difference would become real? The answer is that it is concomitance. If Aikya is unreal difference would be real and vice versa. Such is the concomitance. The Advaitin may object that no instance of such concomitance can be shown as no real difference is accepted by him. Jayatīrthā meets this objection with the answer that the form of concomitance is not as the Advaitin would have it. But it is a broad general concomitance that whatever attribute of an existent thing is considered unreal the opposite of it would be real. This is acceptable to the Advaitins also. For they admit that as unreality of Brahman is unreal the reality is real. Similarly if Aikya is unreal difference must be real. Similar.

13. जयातीर्थ यह अवस्था क्षण में निन्दित करते हैं तथा उसके आशय नहीं है। तत्काल में उन्होंने अपनी अभिप्रेरणा रूप में निन्दित किया। वहों द्वारा से विवेकात्मक सारणियों में इसका सारधर्म सुझाव दिया। अपना फल स्वीकार करते हैं और उन्होंने अपना तत्काल स्वीकार किया। इसी रूप में, जयातीर्थ ने पूर्वस्कार दिया है और उन्होंने अपनी अभिप्रेरणा तत्कालिक स्वीकार किया। समाप्ति है, पूर्वांग लेने के लिए न हो जाय। इbid., p.103.
Madhava and Jayatīrtha next examine the possibility of identity-cum-difference between Āikya and Brahman. If Āikya and Brahman are different-cum-identical, what is the relationship between difference-cum-identity and its relate, viz., Brahman and Āikya. It could be identity, difference or difference-cum-identity. In case of identity, each of the relate (Brahman and Āikya) would become 'two' as it is identical with a dual relation or the relation (difference-cum-identity) itself should become one, being identical with a single relate. If the relation is one of difference, the question as to whether difference is different from its relate, identical or different-cum-identical would naturally arise. In the first alternative, the same question may be repeated ad infinitum. In the second alternative the words difference, difference-cum-identity, Brahman and Āikya would all have to become synonymous as they are one and the same. This is against the fact. In the third alternative the same question may be repeated again and again resulting in the fallacy of infinite regress.14.

Here Jayatīrtha takes up another important issue:

14. ॥ त्रेषु तद्देशी भूते न तयाऽपि त्राविद्येन त्राविज्ञनानाम॥
    - Anuvyākhyāna, p.9.

अति स्पष्टः किं द्विगृहो द्विगृह अन्तःकरणात्। ज्ञानमेव त्त्ति स्वगुणस्य तुक्तस्य
    त्राविद्येन त्राविज्ञनात्।

तत्रत्र तत्त्वमात्र द्विगृहन्तुष्टते।
    - Nyāyasudhā, p.103.
When a relation of difference or difference-cum-identity between two relata is accepted it leads to an endless series of such relations as seen above. Why should it be considered a fallacy (if there is endless series)? It may be asked. In what way does it stultify the production of effects or knowledge of things? For a regress can be considered a fallacy only in these two cases.

Jayatīrtha answers this question saying that the present regress of difference or difference-cum-identity obstructs the knowledge of a qualified object. If Āikya is different from Brahman the cognition would be in the form of "Āikya and Brahman are different" (Brahmaikya bhinne). Here difference is a predicate. Without the knowledge of predicate a cognition of the substantive as qualified by the same attribute or what is called a visiṣṭa pratīti cannot arise. When there is knowledge of qualification, i.e., difference, the question of its relation to the relata arises. (The knowledge of that relation which is one of difference, being a visiṣṭa pratīti presupposes the knowledge of its relation, i.e., difference. Thus infinite regress obstructs the rise of a visiṣṭa-cognition).

Such a question is unavoidable because a relation cannot be understood independently without reference to its relata. Understanding a relation as different from its relata is a knowledge of qualified object (visiṣṭajñāna). Again the
question whether that relation, (which in this case is difference), is different from relate and so on arises ad infinitum. Without the knowledge of the exact position of the third difference the knowledge of second difference is impossible and so also the knowledge of difference between Brahman and Aikya.

In this way the regress of difference obstructs the knowledge of difference between Brahman and Aikya. The same argument holds good in the case of difference-cum-identity. Therefore, the view of Aikya being different from or different-cum-identical with Brahman is fallacious and cannot be accepted.

Madhva and Jayatirtha have also shown how Aikya cannot be absolutely identical with svarūpa of Brahman. Nor can it be different or different-cum-identical. The Advaitins tried to remove those defects by proposing to bestow an intrinsic power called 'self-sufficiency' (svanirvānakatva) to Aikya. By virtue of this power of self-sufficiency Aikya, though identical with self-luminous Brahman, can remain unknown. Given this, the usefulness of Śāstra will also remain unhampered.

In the case of difference-cum-identity between Aikya and Brahman it has the power of self-sufficiency and another

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15. इसी प्रकार अर्थात् आदिन्त, अर्थात् एक ज्ञान के पार में हेतु यहाँ उपन्यास तथा प्रतिभावश्च ज्ञातिः स्वप्रतीक्षात् विशेषतः न आतिशयनतः | केवल यहाँ-प्रतीक्षात् कर्ण न लोकस्त्रिकोणम् उपयुक्तप्रतिक्षात्कर्तार् ।

Ibid., p. 103.
relation is not necessary to explain the relation between
difference-cum-identity and its relata. The first differ-
ence-cum-identity itself is the relation between itself and
its relata. Thus the relation of Aikya to Brahman can be
explained satisfactorily without Viṣṇeva.¹⁶

Mādhava refutes the above contention showing that even
svānirvāhakatva would be impossible if Viṣṇeva is not accepted.
As Jayatīrtha points out this can be proved by a close analysis
of the word svānirvāhakatva. Svānirvāhakatva means the
capacity of a given thing to operate as both the agent and the
object of the same action. This meaning is in accordance with
the Pāṇinian grammar.¹⁷

When we say "Aikya is svānirvāhaka" four things are in-
volved. They are, (1) dharma (Aikya), (2) agency of Aikya

16. नतैनवप्रत्ययार्थात्मिकिः प्रकृतिः स्वानिर्वाहकतात्मकः स्थायिकतात्माने
प्रकृतिकेतनीताने निरूपिते। यदृ सक्षेपय शैलयन अता शैली
स्वानिर्वाहकतात्माने। यदृ अता शैलयन अता शैली स्वानिर्वाहकतात्माने।
अन्वेषितो पुष्पकिरिते। Ibid., p.104.

17. स्वास्य निरूपिते नौ द्विद्विजोक्तम। नस्य आवो द्विद्विजोक्तमा।
नस्येतितिन कर्मणि पुष्पा। कर्त्तकर्मणि कृतीति कर्त्तात।
त्स्वास्य द्विद्विजो एवं च िर्मायणि कर्मकर्तेन नस्ये निरूपिते
निरूपितभक्तिकर्ता भवति। Ibid., p.104.
(nirvāhakatva), (3) objectness of Aikya (nirvāhyatva) and (4) the actual act (nirvahana).

Hence the questions - (1) whether both "agency" and objectness of Aikya are identical with Aikya and the act and (2) whether both of them are mutually identical, or (3) are they different from Aikya and also mutually - arise. If they are identical, it amounts to saying that all these words are synonymous. If different, it ends in the fallacy of infinite regress. In order to overcome this difficulty Viśeṣa has to be accepted. Now we can say that 'objectness' (nirvāhyatva) etc. are identical with Aikya and the 'act' and also mutually, but that identity is not absolute, but qualified by Viśeṣa. Viśeṣa being the pratinidhi of difference avoids synonymousness of these words.

Thus the Advaita school too will be obliged to accept Viśeṣa in order to explain satisfactorily the position of Aikya of Jīva and Brahman.

Refutation of Viśeṣa by the Advaita school:

The Dvaita school argues that Brahman is endowed with innumerable attributes and these attributes are identical with

18. स्त्रिया नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां नाट्यां
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- Anuvāñādyāṇa, p.9.
Brahman through the agency of Videsas. The Advaita school does not subscribe to this view and refutes it. Its refutation is as follows:

There are no attributes whatever in Brahman. Brahman is attributeless (nirguna). But besides this attributeless Brahman there is another Brahman (Saguña Brahman) which possesses attributes. Those druti sentences which speak of attributes in Brahman refer to this Brahman and not to the Infinite, Absolute Brahman. This saguña Brahman is the outcome of the projection of nescience. Therefore, the contradiction in respect of attributes being both different from and identical with It and so on are not a defect and therefore no new principle need be accepted to overcome them. Even if some statements like "Anandam Brahmanah" (The bliss of Brahman) should have reference to Absolute Brahman they do not bear a primary significance but only a secondary one as in the case of the expression 'Rehu's head'. Hence there are no real attributes in Brahman.

Therefore questions such as whether attributes are different from or identical with Brahman have no meaning. And

19. अर्थवर्णमेव ब्रह्माः। न दूः तत्र कामाःश्चायैत। न दृष्ट अति शुष्कायेत। न दृष्ट अति शुष्कायेत।
ब्रह्माः न दृष्ट अति शुष्कायेत। न दृष्ट अति शुष्कायेत। न दृष्ट अति शुष्कायेत।
ब्रह्माः न दृष्ट अति शुष्कायेत। न दृष्ट अति शुष्कायेत।

- Nyāyasudhā, p.515.
bringing in Visesa to answer them is irrelevant.

Madhva and Jayatirtha have examined these arguments and shown the untenability of them. The Advaitins can say that those Sruti texts which refer to the actions etc. attributes of Brahman refer to only Saguna Brahman and also can say that it is the figment of nescience and no effort need be made to remove any contradiction in it. But they admit that the Sruti texts "Satya-jnanamayanam Brahman" refer to the Infinite Absolute Brahman only. This Brahman has no attributes whatever. An examination of this position reveals many defects.

According to the Advaita belief, all the three words, satya, jhana and ananta speak of Brahman bereft of any attribute. This amounts to saying that the meaning of all these words is one and the same or in other words these words are synonymous. If they are accepted to be synonymous their use in the same sentence would become untenable as it serves no purpose. It cannot be said that each word speaks of a different Brahman. Such a view is against the Sruti "Ekam Advitiyam Brahma", which asserts Brahman to be one only.

If the Advaita school accepts Visesa in Brahman it would account for the non-synonymousness of the words in question and the simultaneous use of all the three terms to describe Brahman would be meaningful.

(Continued on p.130)
When it is said that a fat person does not eat in the day then if he does not eat in the night also, his fatness becomes unaccountable. Therefore, the fact of his fatness is a proof for his eating in the night. In the same way, the use of non-synonymous terms with reference to an object in which there is no difference is untenable. Therefore, there must be some principle which accounts for such usage. This principle is Viṣṇu.

The Advaita school may try to solve this problem of the use of non-synonymous terms with reference to one and the same object in a different way. The words, satya, jhāna and ananta speak of Real Brahman. It is Attributeless (Nirguna). There is however no fear of their becoming non-synonymous, as those words do not affirm the presence of attributes in Brahman. They negate the presence of certain defects in Brahman. This negation is necessary because there are misapprehensions about Brahman such as 'it does not exist', 'it is limited' and 'it has nescience'. The word, satya removes the misapprehension that Brahman is non-existent, the term jhāna removes the misapprehension that Brahman has nescience and the word ananta removes the misapprehension that Brahman is limited. As such...

20 (continued).
word here has different meaning (asatyatvādyapohavācitvāt) and purpose it is not synonymous with another.

The sentence, "Satyam jñānamanantam Brahma", may be explained satisfactorily without resort to Videsa in a different manner. Those words are expressive of different meanings. Therefore, they are not synonymous. But those words are not syntactically related to the other term 'Brahman' in their primary sense and therefore they do not subscribe to the presence of any attribute in Brahman. They are related to the word Brahman in their secondary sense (lakṣaṇāvṛtti). Thus words do not oppose the attributelessness of Brahman though they are syntactically related to the term Brahman. In the well-known example Gaṅgāyānghoṣaḥ, the primary meaning of the word gaṅgā is the current of the river. It yields the meaning of "bank of the river" by lakṣaṇāvṛtti. That does not mean that the bank is the current. Likewise, if satya and other words refer to Brahman by lakṣaṇāvṛtti, it does not mean that Brahman has existence and other attributes. These words are not purposeless as all of these are required to dispel corresponding misapprehensions.

Here a question arises. If these words teach Brahman by lakṣaṇāvṛtti what is their primary meaning? There cannot be any word without having a primary meaning. Lakṣaṇā is resorted to when the primary meaning is not relevant to a particular context. (Mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūṣitotha prayojanāt).
This question is answered in the following manner. In the Advaita school a saguna Brahman clouded by nescience is accepted apart from Nirguna Brahman. The former is known as Sabala Brahman. Satya and other words speak of this Sabala Brahman by their primary meaning. They speak of the Absolute Brahman only in their secondary sense as their primary sense is not applicable to It because of its attributelessness. In this explanation there is no fear of satya etc. words becoming synonymous. Thus the Advaita school has no need to accept viséga.

But these arguments do not stand the test of reason. To say that satya and other words are intended to remove the misapprehension of unreality, etc., of Brahman means that Brahman is not unreal or in other words there is absence of unreality in Brahman. This "absence of unreality" itself is an attribute. The acceptance of this attribute in Brahman goes against the basic tenet of attributelessness of Brahman. Thus the effort to avoid the acceptance of Viséga opens the door to aparásiddhánta.

The Advaitins may say that this attribute too does not exist in Brahman and therefore there is no aparásiddhánta. But this is not correct. Because on such a view the sentence in question (Satya'bhánamamantam Brahma) will have no definite meaning at all. It would neither affirm the existence of reality and other attributes nor mean 'absence of unreality'.

Ibid., p.510.
etc. in Brahman. A sentence must either denote the relation of some attributes to relata or absence of some attributes in some relata. There is no alternative at least in the present case. As the sentence in question is unable to denote either of these meanings it would be a meaningless proposition.

In the foregoing, a few defects in the Advaita view that "Satyamjñānamamanantam Brahman" speaks of attributeless Brahman, have been shown. There is one more defect to overcome which Viśeṣa is necessary. That is: words are meant to denote or speak of things. They do so having some quality or action or some other attribute in the thing as criterion. Therefore,

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22. यह सत्यम ज्ञानम अनानांतम ब्राह्मणः अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः। अनुमति न पार्थ ज्ञानम वा ब्राह्मणः।

- Nyāyavedānta, p.517.
anything that is denoted by a word must have some attribute or the other. As Jayatīrtha declares, words cannot simply speak of things which have no attributes. If Brahman is attributeless no word can connote it. Thus either it must be accepted that Brahman has attributes or it must be conceded that the sentence "Satyaḥ jñānānāmāntam Brahman" does not speak of Brahman. As the second alternative would undermine the authority of the Vedas it cannot be endorsed. So only the first alternative remains to be accepted. Then the necessity of accepting Viśeṣa would arise in the end.

Madhva has, in his Viṣṇutatvavirāga, cited another significant instance to show how the Advaita school is forced to admit Viśeṣa. It has reference to the Advaita interpretation of the Śrutī, "Sa eka neti netyātmā" of Bhadārānyaka Upaniṣad. This sentence establishes that Brahman is different from all other entities according to the Advaita interpretation. It means Brahman is neither a corporeal entity nor a non-

23. Ibid., p.517.
corporeal.  

Here it may be asked: Do the Advaitins accept difference between Brahman denoted by the word Atma and the two differences expressed by the phrases neti and neti or difference-identity? Acceptance of either would go against their basic tenet and lead to aparastha for it is their stand that every sentence establishes Brahman as bereft of differences. Hence they must accept identity between two differences and Brahman. That means both the sentences mean one and the samthing. This again leads to the defect of repetition or tautology. Therefore

25. तत्स्वतं लाभं परंसन्वयं करते जरायणे सर्वपूर्वः उपूर्वः नैर्त्यकार्यमीपुरोषतिः पेघ्या अपेक्षा तत्त्वमयिः। — VN, p.499.

26. न च भक्तवर्गः 'नैर्त्यकार्यमीपुरोषति' अर्थं उपलब्ध्यां नैर्नैर्नैपुरोषतिः नैर्त्यकार्यमीपुरोषतिः नैर्नैर्नैपुरोषतिः


नैर्त्यकार्यमीपुरोषतिः परंसन्वयं परं प्राप्तं उपूर्वः।

Ibid., p.134.

26. तत्स्वतं लाभं परंसन्वयं करते जरायणे सर्वपूर्वः उपूर्वः नैर्त्यकार्यमीपुरोषतिः पेघ्या अपेक्षा तत्त्वमयिः।


नैर्नैर्नैपुरोषतिः परंसन्वयं परं प्राप्तं उपूर्वः।

Ibid., p.134.
absolute identity between Brahman and difference must be abandoned and identity together with Visësa must be accepted. As Visësa deputises for difference in its physical absence it would help avoid tautology. But the difference from cloth itself is not the difference from cloth. Nobody has that experience. Though differences that appear in the book are non-different from the book, the non-difference is tinged with Visësa. This means difference is a feature of the book. The same is the case with Brahman also.

The Advaitin may attempt to explain the sentence without invoking Visësa. The sentence would suffer from tautology if all these groups of words mean Brahman in their primary

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27. तथा विशेषः विभूति विशेषः विशेषं वस्तुः परमेश्वरः पुनः अविशेषः प्रदेशः। अविशेषे विशेषं प्रदेशं। अविशेषे विभूति विशेषः। अविशेषे विशेषः परमेश्वरः। अविशेषे विशेषः प्रदेशः। अविशेषे विशेषः परमेश्वरः। अविशेषे विशेषः प्रदेशः। अविशेषे विशेषः परमेश्वरः। अविशेषे विशेषः प्रदेशः। किती विशेषः प्रदेशः?

28. न देव विपर्ययेन परदेश वेदां अनुप्रयोगां निवेदयात।

29. अनुप्रयोग न हिंकार विपर्ययेन प्राप्तः। अनुप्रयोगां निवेदयात। अनुप्रयोग निवेदयात।
meaning. But Brahman is not their primary meaning. These words teach Brahman only by secondary power (laksanāvṛtti).

The primary meanings of the words in the sentence are different. Therefore, there is no tautology. As all these words teach just Brahman and nothing else by laksanāvṛtti there is no contradiction to the basic tenet of akhandārtha. Thus the sentence can be satisfactorily explained without Viśeṣa and hence the Advaita school has no need to accept Viśeṣa. Jayādīrtha dismisses this argument saying that if all words mean Brahman only, by laksanāvṛtti the use of several words to teach one Attributeless Brahman would be uncalled for.

Another possible Advaitic explanation of the sentence may be this: "There are misconceptions such as Brahman is not different from corporeal and non-corporeal entities. In other words, there is superimposition of non-difference from corporeal and non-corporeal entities on Brahman. The phrases neti and neti are meant to dispel such misconceptions or negate such superimpositions by affirming the difference from corporeal and non-corporeal entities. Thus these words are not useless."

30. न चेमानिर्वातः त चतवन्नकीयो आभाव स्वतांत्रताति। किल्लु निक्षेपणम्। तत्रत्व प्रकृतिपार्यम् वर्जन्ति वो वैभव-सदा वाति जैत्यस्वकम्।

31. न वीर्याः विकृतज्ञानं पुनः विद्या परिवर्तनाति।

Ibid., p.499.
Even this argument is not tenable. The superimposition can be removed if only the words posit the existence of difference in Brahman. (But the existence of difference in Brahman is not acceptable to the Advaita school, as such acceptance will go against the basic tenet of ahamārtha). Since difference cannot exist in Brahman there is no way of removing the superimposition. Thus there is no other way but to accept two differences in Brahman. Absolute identity of differences and Brahman would lead to tautology. Therefore, even the Advaita school will have to accept qualified identity. That is nothing but accepting Viśeṣa.

Examination of Madhusudana Sarasvati’s refutation of Viśeṣa:

The necessity of accepting Viśeṣa and its role in defending dharma have been shown in previous chapters. Madhusudana Sarasvati, a great champion of the Advaita school has criticised the concept of Viśeṣa at some length in his Advaitasiddhi. It is necessary to examine this criticism for a better understanding of the concept.

1. Madhusūdana Sarasvati’s first point of criticism against Viśeṣa is that it has no authority (pramāṇa) to support it.

32. "तत्तत्त्वविविषयः न तत्त्त्वविविषयाय नु गतिनिः।"
   - Ibid., p.499.

33. "तत्त्त्वविविषयः न तत्त्त्वविविषयाय नु गतिनिः।"
But Vyāsātīrtha in his Nyāyāntara has advanced an Arthāpatti as an authority to prove Videśa. According to Vyāsātīrtha even the Advaitins are obliged to accept this inference. The inference is as follows. The Upaniṣadic sentence "Vijnānamānandān Brahman" describes Brahman as Vijnāna and Ānanda. Vijnāna and Ānanda cannot be mutually different or different-cum-identical from Brahman as there are no attributes in Brahman which are different from It according to the Advaita standpoint of view (Khaṇḍārthakaṇḍa vidyante khaṇḍāṁ aṁśaṁ arthāḥ yaśmin tat).

These two attributes cannot be treated as different for yet another reason that it is opposed to Upaniṣad "Eka-dhaivānudraṣṭavyam". Therefore, these two attributes are one and the same (identical). When the attributes are identical the words Vijnāna and Ānanda cannot but be synonymous. But they are not. To explain this fact a principle which distinguishes these attributes to that extent has to be accepted. That principle will be Videśa. Thus even the Advaitins are obliged to accept Videśa to solve their own problem. This

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34. वर्गकालुण्डुष्टु अनात्त्वाद्रभं िूिाति।
तिन्द्रेषु पदं आकानायुद्य आचरण साधन पर्यथे। Br.Up., 4.4.20.

35. प्राप्तमेव तोमा परफति। हिंदौने ब्रह्मकोणिकाको शिक्षामेव नोकर्मो नोकर्मात्नाती पुराणको न सावध भृध्वी अभ्यासेह न। अति कृप्यां संसारमेव। एको गई 
तु इत्यादिष्ठ्यको विद्विद्विद्विद्य को न है तत्र उत्तमतिः प्रकृतिः अभ्यासे हि 
- Nyāyāntara, p.563.
Arthāpatītī itself is a valid source of authority regarding Viṣeṣa. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī argues that even the acceptance of Viṣeṣa is opposed to Upaniṣad "Ekadhvañānudrastavyā" as it brooks no distinction in Brahman. Viṣeṣa is meant to retain a distinction at least to some extent in Brahman.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says that the non-synonymousness of the words viññāna and ānanda can be explained without Viṣeṣa. Though the secondary meaning of the words in the said sentence is identical, primary meanings are different and the words viññāna and ānanda can be non-synonymous because of these different primary meanings.

Any one of the words is not unnecessary as there is difference in the things precluded (vyāvartya).

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī asks: "Why should even the Ādvaitins press for Viṣeṣa to explain the given sentence, for, in spite of viññāna and ānanda being identical, the words may be non-synonymous on account of difference in pravṛttinimittas of two words. Pravṛttinimittas are jñanatva and ānandatva."

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36. Advaitasidhā, p.806.
37. Advaitasidhā, p.806.
38. Advaitasidhā, p.806.
Therefore, there is no need to accept Viṣṇeva.

2. The Dvaitins argue that if there is no Viṣṇeva there cannot be the revelation of both jñāna and ānanda in liberation, but of only one of them because they are identical. If Viṣṇeva is there it can keep both of them in existence and revelation of both will be possible. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī refutes this by saying that jñāna and ānanda are not different and therefore there is no question of only one of the two remaining. The talk of "one of the two" itself is invalid.

3. Vyāsatīrtha has urged the necessity of accepting Viṣṇeva by the Advaita school through the following argument: According to the Advaita school in the sentence "Tattvamāsi," Tat means Brahman. Tvaṃsa tens identity of jīva with Brahman. What is the relation between identity and Brahman? If the relation is difference or difference-cum-identity and if that difference or difference-cum-identity is real the fallacy of aparāddhānta will arise. If unreal it wipes out the very basic tenet of the school. Therefore, it must be accepted that the relationship between Brahman and Identity is one of identity (abheda). When once identity is accepted, the following problems would arise:

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40. Advaitasiddhi, p. 807.
(a) According to the Advaita school Brahman is self-luminous. That being so, why is there no revelation of identity though there is revelation of the self-luminous Brahman?

(b) The Advaita school holds that while the revelation of Brahman is not opposed to the illusion of difference, the revelation of identity is opposed to the illusion of difference. The justification for such a distinction is not clear unless Viśeṣa is introduced in the bargain.

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(c) Revelation of Brahman is not dependent on the revelation of any other thing whereas the revelation of identity is necessarily dependent on the revelation of its counter-negative. Why is there this difference?

The Advaitins usually reply that 'identity' is veiled by ignorance and hence there is non-revelation of 'identity'. But Vyāsatīrtha says that the identity is identical with Brahman who is known as Cit. This Cit is unveiled. Now, then, can this identity alone be veiled? If Viśeṣa is accepted, then, by its operation one of them can remain veiled and the other revealed. But no such principle is acceptable to the Advaitins. Therefore, the non-revelation of identity cannot be explained in the Advaita school. 41.

41. निर्णयासह आनार्थ्य चिदभिन्नत्वाह्याः क्षयः कारणः ।
   - Nyāyaśāstra, p. 563.
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī answers these objections as follows: Cit and identity are no doubt one and the same. But there is a beginningless imaginary difference between the two. Owing to this difference 'identity' is not known though Cit is known all along. (This means the knower who is under the influence of ignorance does not understand Cit as 'identity').

The knowledge of identity is what is opposed to illusion. As that knowledge of identity is not yet attained there is illusion. Because of this fancied 'difference', the revelation of Cit is not dependent while the revelation of 'identity' is dependent.\(^{42}\) (sāpaka).

Here Vyāsatīrtha's objection that how can identity remain veiled by ignorance when Cit is not veiled in the absence of Vidya remains unanswered. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī postulates that there is a fancied 'difference' (fancy is a result of ignorance) between Cit and identity. Because of this 'difference', 'identity' remains veiled while Cit is revealed. But Vyāsatīrtha questions the very basis of this postulate. When Cit and 'identity' are one and the same, how can ignorance of

\[^{42}\text{Gouda Arahmanandī, p.607.}\]
difference veil identity alone. Madhusudana Sarasvati does not come to grips with this problem as any serious attempt to solve it would ultimately force him to accept Viśeṣa.

4. The Dvaita school has scriptural support to prove Viśeṣa. The text "Eveṃ dharmāṇ prīthaka paśyam tānevaṁpuḥśivaśvatī" in the Katha Upaniṣad negates 'difference' between Brahman and its attributes. But at the same time, there is reference to manyness of Brahman's attributes (dharmāṇ) and to their dharmadharmabhāva. This is not possible in the absence of mutual difference between attributes and also difference between Brahman and its attributes. Yet difference has been negated. To reconcile the denial of difference and assertion of manyness of attributes and dharmadharmabhāva something which sustains manyness of attributes and dharmadharmabhāva should be recognised. That something is Viśeṣa.

Here the Advaita school says dharmāṇ in the text is just meant to report or repeat (anuvāda) dharms for purposes of their subsequent negation and there is no intention to predicate dharms to Brahman. Here Vyāsatīthra says that these dharms

43. Nyāyāmṛtam, p.564.
44. Advaitasiddhi, p.3C7.
are not earlier known through other sources and therefore, their mention for purposes of negation here is not possible. To this Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says that these dharmas are fancied by nescience (avidyā) and therefore they are previously known by sākṣin.

5. Vyāsātirtha advances another argument in support of Viśēṣa. If guṇa and guṇīn are identical Viśēṣa has to be accepted to explain the fact of guṇa being unknown while guṇīn is known. If guṇa and guṇīn are different-cum-identical it has to be accepted to explain their being together though they are mutually opposed principles. If they are completely different it has to be accepted to explain certain judgments such as "Samaśavāyaḥ sambaddhaḥ", "Sattā satī", etc. There is no other explanation of these facts.

Here Madhusūdana Sarasvatī persistently maintains that there is no need to accept Viśēṣa. According to him these facts

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45. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Nyāyāmrtam, p.564.
46. Advaitasadas, p.807.
47. Gouda Brahmanandī, p.807.
and judgments can be explained with the help of the unique nature of respective entities.

6. Vyāsatīrtha has drawn a line of distinction between 'difference' and Viśeṣa. Where there is no 'difference' for valid reasons and still there are judgments implying 'difference', Viśeṣa must be admitted to operate. But where radical 'difference' itself is there between two things as between a jar and a pot, there is no need for Viśeṣa to differentiate them. Viśeṣa is the pratītiḥ of difference and is pressed into service when difference itself is not established by any pramāṇa. Therefore, wherever 'difference' itself is present, there is no point or purpose in admitting Viśeṣa. Some and pūṭika are two plants. Some is prescribed in some sacrifices. In the absence of Some, Pūṭika is permitted. When Some is available, Pūṭika cannot be used. Likewise, where difference itself is established by pramāṇa, Viśeṣa cannot operate in its place.

Advaitasiddhi, p.807.

Prmnt

48. स्वाभावविशेषोद्धि स्वतंत्रताय: | तत्स्सवालकश्चतस्सतस्सताः
स्त्रेष्ट्रविशेषकर्पितवेष | अदुःस्बाबिशेषानामः। न न्यात्साहनः
प्रमाणायतः। स्वतंत्रिकर्पितवेष्। Advaitasiddhi, p.807.

49 यव शिवद्वारास्व श्रवणकार्य न्यायिको तत्रैव निर्देश: कलागते इति
न प्रमिषिते श्रवणि प्रक्रियायथ: निर्देशान्वयि ओक्तातः। एको रसायनम्
प्रसिद्धिः इति न्यायवाच्य: स। Nyāyāmṛta, p.564.
Madhusudana Sarasvati refutes this point. He says that instance of *Soma* and *pūtika* is not sound. There is reason to decide that in the instance considered above, *soma* is principal and *pūtika* is not so. But, as far as 'difference' and *Viśeṣa* are concerned, there is no criterion to decide which is principal and which is not. Both 'difference' and *Viśeṣa* are on the same footing. Therefore, we cannot say that *Viśeṣa* is the pratinidhi. It may as well be the other way about.

7. Madhusudana Sarasvati has raised another important point against *Viśeṣa*. *Viśeṣa* is being recognised as representative of difference. Why should it be so? Let difference operate wherever there is differentiation (*phedakārya*). To explain the practical effect of non-difference (*abheda*) in such places, let a representative of *abheda* be accepted. There is no reason to accept *Viśeṣa* as representative of difference. This objection may apparently mean that *Viśeṣa* is conceded as the representative of *abheda* by the Advaitins. Śouda Brahmānanda.

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50. Advaitasiddhi, p.808.

51. Ibid., p.808.
therefore, interprets it differently. According to Goude Brahmananda, *abheda* must be accepted as the representative of *abheda* where the effects of *abheda* are found.

8. VyasaIrtha has advanced many syllogisms in support of \( \text{Videga} \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minor term (pate)</th>
<th>1. The non-remaining of only one (ekataraparidesapta) of the two attributes, viz., ( \text{Vijfena} ) and ( \text{Ananda} ), which are the <em>avarupa</em> of Brahman.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major term (sadhya)</td>
<td>2. Ekataraparidesapta of ( \text{Aikya} ) and Brahman which are identical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle term (hetu)</td>
<td>3. The being of prameyata in itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of concomitance: (vyaptisvarupa)</td>
<td>If a determined factor is not determined by a particular factor, it must be determined by a factor other than that particular factor as in the instance acceptable to both.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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52. 'Remaining', 'Remainder', 'Residue', etc. are given in Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary as equivalents to the Sanskrit word, paridesa. Therefore, *paridesapta* is translated as 'non-remaining'.

\[ \text{Goude Brahmananda}, \ p. 508. \]
This syllogism has been explained in detail and it has been shown how this syllogism proves Videga, in the second chapter (p.33-35) of this thesis.

2. Minor term - Viṣṇāṇa and Ānanda which are the svarga of Brahman.

Major term - have a determinant factor which determines the non-remaining of only one of the two, i.e., Viṣṇāṇa and Ānanda. That factor is other than 'difference'.

Middle term - because there is no 'difference' between Viṣṇāṇa and Ānanda, but still there is ekataraparīdābhava.

Form of con-comitance: That, which does not have a particular determinant factor but has a determined factor, has a determinant factor other than that particular determinant factor as in the instance acceptable to both.

In a syllogism major term is sought to be proved on the basis of already established minor and middle terms. In this syllogism the minor term is established by āruti and logic.

53. वृक्षेस्वर्गकार्योक्तानांत्येकोन्हिंदुर्धराम पुराणंदेवताः।

54. Myāyāmṛta, p.564.
Supra Chapter II.pp./j« the identity of Vijnana and Ananda logically necessitates the reality of only one of them. But such a contingency is against the spirit of Gruiti which proclaim that Brahman is endowed with infinite number of attributes. When there is no difference, which normally determines the non-remaining of one of the two, between Vijnana and Ananda, there must be some other factor which determines the non-remaining of one of the two. That factor is Visega.

3. Minor term - Prameyaatva (knowability) which subsists in itself.

Major term - has a factor which determines its supporter-supported position. That factor is not 'difference'.

Middle term - Because there is no difference between supporter prameyaatva and supported prameyaatva. But still there is supporter-supported position.

Form of con-comitance - That which does not have a particular determinant factor, but has a determined factor, has a determinant factor other than that particular determinant factor as in the instance acceptable to both.

In this syllogism the minor term can be proved by the

55. नानाप्रवर्तपादरितानि सत्यबायायासशिष्यिनानास्तिर्विविष्यिनिर्जातिकालम्। संवर्तसे सति आयामापायात्सर्वाः प्रामाणिकां यथा गौरवेऽते सति यदाचिन्तयत्वं तत्र तथा प्रामाणिकत्वं यथा सर्वत्र।

Ibid., pp.564-565.
The fact that there is unsublated cognition that knowability is knowable (prameyatvam prameyam) and by the fact that knowability is numerically only one as assumption of more than one knowability leads to the fallacy of infinite regress. The numerical oneness of prameyatva and the supporter-supported position with reference to it points to a factor which can account for such a position and that factor is Viṣeṣa.

The principle that is implied in the major term of the above syllogism is Viṣeṣa and that explains the positions in the minor terms according to Vyāsatīrtha. But Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says avidyā itself can explain all these positions and therefore, the syllogisms suffer from the fallacy of arthanāteratā. Or, all the said positions may be due to 'difference' which is the outcome of avidyā and thus syllogisms suffer from the fallacy of Bādhya.

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56. (वेदोपभिगति विशेषनीतिविदेशस्य सर्वनिर्मित्तं गार्ग्यसंशयते।) Advaitasiddhi, p. 808

Arthanāteratā is a fallacy of syllogism which arises when the minor term of a given syllogism can be explained even without resort to a factor proposed in the major term. According to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the minor terms of all the syllogisms of Vyāsatīrtha can be explained with the help of avidyā and therefore, there is no need for supposing a new factor called Viṣeṣa.

57. (आपि विएषां भवेत् गार्ग्यसंशयते।) — Ibid., p. 808

Bādhya is a fallacy of syllogism which arises when the major term is not to be found in the minor term. According to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, ekataraparīśabāhāva and being of prameyatva in itself can be explained by 'difference' which is the outcome of avidyā. Therefore, there is no need to assume a factor other than 'difference' to explain the minor terms of the syllogism. Hence the fallacy of Bādhya.
9. Vyāsatīrtha has advocated the perceptibility of Viśesa with the arguments put forth by Jayatīrtha. The arguments of Jayatīrtha for the perceptibility of Viśesa have been dealt with in detail in the second chapter of this thesis (p. 26-32).

On the basis of the intuited distinction between two types of cognitions such as 'cloth in threads' and 'fruits in basket', Jayatīrtha examines the causes for distinction and concludes that 'identity' of cloth and threads and 'difference' between fruits and basket are the causes for distinction. Then on the basis of sāmānādhikaranya usage such as 'threads are cloth' he concludes that 'identity' between cloth and threads is not absolute, but qualified. The qualifying factor is Viśesa. As the distinction - the effect of qualified identity in one case and 'difference' in another - is intuited, the intuition in turn means Viśesa is intuited. Hence the perceptibility of Viśesa is intuited.

58. न्यायमर्ता, प. 515.
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī dismisses this argument saying that to explain samānādhikaranya usage in respect of threads and cloth we may rely on difference which is the outcome of āyātim.59

Further examination of this refutation:

1. The contention that the āruci, Ekadhāvānudrādṛṣṭāvyaṃ will not brook even Viṣṇus in Brāhmaṇa is baseless as there is nothing in the āruci text to support such a contention. On the other hand, the text must deny only absolute difference in Brāhmaṇa and not Viṣṇus too so that it can maintain consistency of thought. There are many statements in the āruci a few of which unmistakably suggest the necessity of Viṣṇus and the others of which more expressly speak of Viṣṇus. Therefore, the āruci like Ekadhāvānudrādṛṣṭāvyaṃ cannot be taken to oppose Viṣṇus. Moreover, the absolute denial of any attribute cannot be the meaning of such texts because the position of an attributeless Brāhmaṇa cannot stand the test of reason as has been established already. Therefore, the text in question should be interpreted in a manner in which they do not render the predication of attributes meaningless. Such an interpretation would be consistent with Viṣṇus.

Madhusūdana Sarasvati's view on the non-synonymousness of the words Viṣṇus and Ānanda is also not maintainable for

59. तत्त्वज्ञानेंद्रे का-परिकल्पनेनाद्वायं तत्त्वात्यक्षेतिधिषेष्यति (Advaitasiddhi, p.809.)
the following reason: When he says that the secondary meanings of the words are identical the question, what is that secondary meaning, arises. Obviously it is Brahman. This again obviously means that Brahman is taught by \textit{lakṣaṇāvṛtti} of words. A point may be raised here. Brahman cannot be said to be taught by \textit{lakṣaṇāvṛtti} of words for anything that cannot be denoted by \textit{vacanavṛtti} of any word cannot be denoted by \textit{lakṣaṇāvṛtti} also.  

When Brahman is \textit{vācyā} by one word it can be \textit{vācyā} by another or all other words. Then the questions of identity of its attributes and the non-synonymousness of terms would naturally follow. \textit{Vīśeṣa} would be necessary to answer all these questions.

To the point that all words but one would become unnecessary if all words denote Brahman only by their \textit{lakṣaṇāvṛtti}. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has said that there is difference in the things precluded (\textit{vyāvartya}) and therefore, no word is superfluous. This point stands answered by the immediately preceding observation that Brahman cannot be taught by \textit{lakṣaṇāvṛtti} if he is not taught by \textit{vacanavṛtti}.

3. The following observation may be made on this point. That there is no 'difference' between \textit{Jñāna} and \textit{Ānanda} is acceptable to the Dvaitins, because they are the essential nature of \textit{Ānanda}. Still the experience of \textit{Jñāna} is different from that of \textit{Ānanda}.

\textbf{60.} Madhva. \textit{BS3}, p.13.
How will Madhusudana Sarasvati account for it without video?

3. Madhusudana Sarasvati’s interpretation of “Tattvamasi” has been refuted in the course of narrating his view (See supra, p. 144). No further elaboration of it is necessary.

4. The Advaita school cannot prove the existence of avidya. To exist, avidya must have a locus and an object. Some cetana can be ignorant about something. But in the Advaita school Brahman is the only cetana. Its attributes cannot be the object of avidya as Brahman is attributeless. Brahman itself cannot be the object of avidya as it is self-luminous.

It is not the locus of avidya as it is attributeless. Avidya cannot exist at all without a locus and an object. Thus avidya itself is untenable and consequently it is non-existent within the framework of the Advaita school. 61.

When avidya itself cannot have any place in the Advaita school, the view that attributes of Brahman are the outcome of

61. निषेधीं निषेधीं सूत्राय सुत्राय अनेतृ । Anuvyākhyaṇa, p. 3.

अवृत्ताकृतिन्सौंचेतार्थो न कुच्छ्या । Madhva - Upadhihikhandana p. 317.

अत्यन्तं हि कर्मादिन् कलालोकावशे । तदं तत्र धर्मान्वय निरिक्षणः

तस्य बृहस्पती द्वितीय नस्तस्यावशेषम् वक्तव्यः । तदं तत्रात् कुच्च्या कुच्च्या

तस्यावशेषः । अति ओऽगाधीशशः गोश्वाक्षरः गुप्तप्रगाहः गुप्तप्रगाहः

आद्यस्यापूर्वस्यापूर्वमिव अधिकासेन ।

Jayatirtha, Upadhikhandanatika, p. 317.
avidya also becomes untenable. As they are not the outcome of avidya it is not tenable to say that they are previously known by sakshin. Moreover, the concept of sakshin itself is placed out of court by the refutation of avidya. Thus the view that the druti, "Evaṃ dharmān ..." just repeats (anuvadati) attributes to deny them later, is unfounded. These points have been set forth in the original works of the Dvaita school. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has ignored these points in his defence of attributelessness of Brahman and refutation of Viṣṇu.

5. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says that the unique nature of given things accounts for the facts put forward by the Dvaitins. But what is that unique nature? It is nothing but guṇa, etc. attributes of a substance. Therefore, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's answer means that guṇa etc. attributes account for the facts in question. This is no answer at all to the question as to how guṇa is unknown while guṇin is known when they are identical. The Tarangini62 raises a very crucial point against Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's view. It says even the uniqueness of respective attributes is not possible without Viṣṇu.63

62. The Tarangini is a commentary on Nyāyamṛta of Vyāsatīrtha by a scholar known as Rāmacārya. He has written the Tarangini as a reply to the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

63 Rāmacārya, Tarangini, p.333.
6. Madhusudana Sarasvati says, there is no criterion to decide that 'difference' is principal and Viśeṣa is its pratinidhi.

To this the Taraśānta replies there is no controversy so far as 'difference' is concerned. It is accepted by all. This acceptance by all is a sufficient criterion to decide that difference is principal. But there is controversy about Viśeṣa. The Advaitin himself is contending against it. Therefore, it is not principal.

Another answer to Madhusudana Sarasvati's objection may be noted. Difference and Viśeṣa cannot be on the same footing. Difference is recognised by all as a matter of logical necessity. That logical necessity is to answer the question why things are as they are. After the acceptance of this difference and its application in understanding the ontology of the universe certain other questions like the one pertaining to substance and attributes arise. To solve this, Viśeṣa is needed. And only that power in things which is responsible for certain judgments implying difference is called by the name Viśeṣa. The basic

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64. Ibid., p. 334.

65. Ibid., p. 334.
idea behind the conception of Viśeṣa is to solve certain problems in the absence of difference. The conception of difference is prior and fundamental, while the necessity for the concept of Viśeṣa arises only after the conception of difference. They cannot, therefore, be placed on the same footing. Therefore, difference must be principal and Viśeṣa should be the substitute.

7. As regards the contention that difference can be the pratīti of identity and that there is no need for Viśeṣa, the answer is very simple. Difference cannot be conceived as the representative of identity because difference and identity are mutually opposed to each other. The nature of opposition is one of the killer and the killed.

8 & 9. The eighth and ninth arguments of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī dismissing the syllogisms and perceptual experiences adduced as proof of Viśeṣa, may be easily refuted by the refutation of avidyā which is done by Madhva and his followers in their works. When avidyā is refuted the syllogisms adduced by Vyāsatīrtha will hold good and perception will remain one of the strongest proofs in favour of Viśeṣa. The refutation of avidyā has been given in detail while answering the fourth point of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (Supra, p.155).