Chapter III

DEFENCE OF DIFFERENCE
There are two views in Indian philosophy about the nature of "difference". The first view is that it is the attribute of its substratum (dharmā). The second is that it is the essential nature of the substratum. The first view is represented chiefly by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and among the Vedānta schools by the Nāmaṇja school. Madhva rejects the first view discovering many more fallacies in it, in addition to the fallacies shown by Śriharṣa, Čittākha and others. Madhva accepts the second view that difference is the essential nature of things. No doubt Čittākha and others have criticised this view also. But Madhva has tried to meet these objections and establish the category of difference firmly.

1. यदि अकृत्व स्वः तदा परिष्कृते धर्मः स्वार्मो वेदाचार्यो तदां

If the ekaśūla is not itself the difference, the general difference of an entity from all others would not be grasped when it is grasped. If such general difference is not apprehended, it must be possible to doubt whether one's self is not a jar. No one entertains such an absurd doubt. Having apprehended such general difference from all else, one comes to doubt whether it is not the same as some particular entity which is like it.

- S.S. Rāghavādār (Tr.), Śrimad Viṣṇuṣutpatti-vanapravāya,
  Ramakrishna Ashrama, Māṇgalore, 1971, pp.29-30.
Videsa is the main factor on the basis of which Madhva answers all objections against the view that difference is the essential nature of its dharmi. It is proposed to show in the following few pages how Videsa disarms the objections against the said view and successfully establishes it on firm foundations and thus justifies the stand of pluralism and realism.

Criticising dharmisvarūnapabhedavāda in his tattvapradīpikā, Citsukha says the knowledge of difference presupposes the knowledge of its counter-entity. The knowledge of any dharmi like pot, cloth, etc., does not require any other knowledge. If difference is the essential nature of its dharmi, it should also not require the knowledge of pratiyogī for its cognition. But it does. Therefore, difference is not the essential nature of its dharmi. If difference is the nature of dharmi, it cannot be marked or determined by anything outside of it because the dharmi is not determined by any other thing. But difference is determined by pratiyogī. Hence, difference cannot be the nature of its dharmi.

2. अस्पष्टवालं साम्येन न वर्णं ब्रह्मणं भिषे।
   Citsukha, Tattvapradīpikā, Tukāram Javāji, Mīrān Sagar, Bombay, 1915, p.166.

3. सच्चान्त्वतंौदस्खेत्रं वासूलं नस्तुौलं मां वेदात्मविद्ययमहायुगं।
   Ibid., p.167.
These objections would certainly hold good if the Dvaita school also accepted absolute identity between difference and its substratum. But it does not do so. It pro-
pounds saṁśeṣaṁbheda or what may be called 'qualified identity'. This concept is intended to explain the internal distinction in things where the aspect of difference has to be compro-
hended in relation to a pratiyogī.  

Discussing this point, the Nyāyaśudha says: The same cognition does not assume two roles, i.e. of being sapeksam and nirapekṣa. The cognition of an object as 'difference' requires the knowledge of the counter-entity while the cogni-
tion of the same object as cloth does not require it. This diversity of cognition in regard to the same object is due to Viśeṣa.

The second objection that if difference is the nature of its dharma it cannot be marked or determined by anything outside of it also stands refuted in the same way as the first, for, the aspect of difference can be determined (nirūpya) by the pratiyogī in spite of the former being the nature of dharma itself, by the operation of Viśeṣa.

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4. अधिकार्यात्रा महावेदाओट्टोकारण परिहारेऽत्वित्तिः।

VNT, p.462.

5. एनेकायेत वस्तुम: प्रतिभोगियाप्रतिसम प्रेक्षानवपेयं अ प्रतिविद्य: किं गतो? न तद्वर्त्त्वमिति प्रतीति-रागी। किंतु प्रतीति हृदयमेव। न तदृष्ट्वर्त्त्वं वस्तुम विद्ये जनरज्जनः समंस्य स विश्वस्तति इति। शेषं परस्परोगृहते अल्पोपिष्ट।

- Nyāyaśudha, pp.381-382.
Another important objection against difference has also been shown to be invalid by Jayatirtha in his commentary on Vijñatattvavinirnaya. The objection is: If difference is the essential nature of the dharma, for example, if difference from pot which exists in cloth is the essential form of cloth, it means there are no two entities as cloth and difference but there is only one entity denoted by two words. As a result of this, the terms 'cloth' and 'difference' will have to be considered as synonymous.

Jayatirtha anticipates this objection and replies that this objection stands disproved in the light of Viśeṣa. Viśeṣa is such an intrinsic power of things by virtue of which both the cloth and its difference have a meaningful coexistence, in spite of their being identical and therefore, the words remain non-synonymous.

6. मनु गेदम्ब परस्वपन्नः पट एवाक्षे न केद कृत्य नागेद एवाक्षे न पट कृत्य नी पटोऽहो परस्मानविनिन्यनां आपदेयत ।

VTNT, p.499.

7. विज्ञानायेव परस्वोऽर्थं सतिर्याण्य श्यामधिर श्रवणार्यमं क्षमात्यागं परिवर्ते आर्योऽम्बस्तर सा द्विवेद्यत । विज्ञानेन तत्त्वं मन्नामानोपायं किम न अधिकारिकै । विशेषयम सेद प्रौद्योगिकिल्लान ।

Ibid., p.499.
It may be reminded here again that only absolute identity could logically mean the existence of one of the two things in question. But cloth and difference are identical together with viṣeṣa. This viṣeṣa, as it is the pratiniṇḍha of difference, performs a few functions of difference without endangering the unity of cloth and difference. As difference between 'difference' and its substratum is impossible on account of fallacies of infinite regress, etc., identity of the two must be accepted. But at the same time, usage of dual number such as ghaṭābhedau, of genitive such as pataśya bhедāḥ, etc., are also valid. Therefore, viṣeṣa must be there to account for such usages where identity is an indispensable fact. By this viṣeṣa, both cloth and difference retain their existence and consequently their non-synonymousness also remains. As the existence of such a power in things and its recognition has been shown to be indispensable, there should be no difficulty in appreciating the view of the Dvaita school so far as the dharmisvarūpabheda-vāda is concerned. Dr. R. N. K. Sharma has pointed out that "if the solution of difference as savideṣābhinna (colourfully identical) with the substratum, does not commend itself to the Advaitins who came after Madhva it is not because of any further difficulty in the conception of difference viewed in the light of viṣeṣas, but because of

8. Usage of non-synonymous words, usage of genitive case, etc.
a deep-rooted metaphysical bias of the unreality of difference and in the nirvesagatva of reality⁹.

Some unknown author has raised many objections against the conception of difference as the essential nature of its substratum. Many of them had been put up by his predecessors and some of them are new. Kādi Tiramalacārya, a follower of the Dvaita school has taken notice of them in his gloss called Kādi on Bhedojīvāna of Vyasatīrtha and has answered all of them. An account of both the criticism and the reply will show how Viśeṣa plays its role in the defence of difference.

If difference is the essential nature of its substratum the predication (prakāratva) of difference in the knowledge, say, 'cloth is different' (bhinnah patih) would be untenable.¹⁰

There would be no difference between two knowledges where pot is the object in one and difference in another, for pot and difference, the objects of the two knowledges in question are one and the same.¹¹ The distinction in the nature of causal complements that give rise to the knowledge of difference and the knowledge of substratum would be un-

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⁹. Philosophy of Madhvācārya, p.64.
¹⁰. निवृत्तिति प्रतीति प्रकारत्वानुपलब्धेः।
¹¹. द्वारा तेक्षा प्रतीति प्रतिविरोध प्रकारत्वात्। विषयमें श्लोकमं विद्यया।
Ibid., p.48.
It is within common experience that when there is knowledge of a pot there arises a doubt, sometimes, about its being different from some other thing. That would be inexplicable if bheda and its dharma were identical, for then, there would be no aspect which is not known when the pot has been known. Difference pre-supposes a pratiyogī. But if it is identical with the substratum this pre-supposition of pratiyogī would be untenable as the dharma does not pre-suppose anything. Colour and other attributes should also be the essential nature of the substratum if difference is so. As identity also, like difference, is the essential nature of the substratum, both difference and identity would have to become identical (tadabhinnābhinnasya tadabhinnatva-niyamāt). Consequently, there can be no difference between the knowledge of 'difference' and 'identity' and as a result

12. गृह-कर्माणि जी विचराणाश्रयते। Ibid., p.48.
13. घटप्रदोषो अदेवे वेद्यगुप्तावेशय। अन्तगतशाय आवापह। Ibid., p.48.
14. पदमा स्वर्णिमोभिज्ञानोपनितन्त्र। धर्मों घटितः। प्रकृतिनिमित्तोपनितन्त्र। Ibid., p.48.
15. सूपदेशस्त्रृधिश्वरस्वपनवेशय। Ibid., p.48.
of this, the two words, 'difference' and 'identity', will have to become synonymous.\textsuperscript{16}

Answers to the above objections:

Kādi Ziramālācārya says that these and similar objections are fully met with the help of Viśeṣa accepted as the pratinidhi of difference in such cases\textsuperscript{17}. The Kādikā gloss says: "Difference is both the essential form of substratum and an attribute of it. Though difference is identical with substratum, it can still be an attribute of it, thanks to the principle of Viśeṣa which is in the substratum\textsuperscript{18}. That Viśeṣa is such a wonderful power that it can disclose the essential form of an entity as its attribute need no more be emphasised.

As difference can act as an attribute of substratum on account of Viśeṣa, it can figure as a predicate (prakāra) in the knowledge 'cloth is different'. Difference between two knowledges of pot and 'difference', in which one of them

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} \textsuperscript{Ibid.}, p.48.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} \textsuperscript{Ibid.}, p.49.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} \textsuperscript{Ibid.}, p.49.
\end{itemize}
is sāpekṣa while the other is niraṇeṣa, is also maintainable through Viśeṣa.  

Here, a very important and pertinent question arises. Viśeṣa, it is said, is the cause for the difference in two perceptions of ghatā and bheda. While accounting for the difference in two cognitions, does it do so cognised or un-cognised? To put this in other words, is Viśeṣa an object in the perception of ghatā and bheda or not? If it is not an object in the perception and still causes the difference in the experiences it means that objects are not the cause or do not play any part in bringing about the distinctive experience and this would lead for an idealism which would be disastrous to a realistic thought. The other alternative is against the experience for the fact of Viśeṣa being an object in the perception is not experienced by anybody.

The Kāśika gloss answers this question in the following manner. Viśeṣa is not an object in both the cognitions. Nor does it bring about difference in two cognitions without being

19. अतएव विचित्रिति द्विगत भक्तरलापि।
    घटो वृद्ध प्रतिगत्तेऽपैन न रणमयियं लिङ्गीपदेन।
    ibid., p.49

20 न विचित्रिते न विचित्रिते द्विगतिष्ठितां
    विषय नेत्राक्ष्यं न विषयानादृढः प्रमुखः। विषयवाच्य मण्डलः लगाने
    अनुभवस्वरुप अनुभवी विद्या सुभाषितः।
    ibid., p.49.
an object. In the knowledge of ghata, ghatatva is prākāra and in the knowledge of bheda, bhedatva is prakāra. The two knowledges in question are different on account of different prakāras. Though ghata and bheda are identical, the difference in the prakāras of two knowledges is caused by viśeṣa while itself remains in the background²¹.

The objection that the doubt about the pot being different from other things would be untenable if pot and 'difference' are identical does not hold good in the light of Viśeṣa. Though they are identical, the pot is unknown as 'difference' thanks to the operation of Viśeṣa, and therefore the said doubt about pot is valid²². In other words, the argument of the untenability of such a doubt can be advanced if pot and 'difference' are considered as absolutely identical. But they are considered as savīdeśābhinna.

The fact of the perception of difference presupposing the perception of pratiyogī while the perception of the substratum is able to do without it is also ascribed to Viśeṣa.

²¹ Ibid., p.45.
²² Ibid., p.49.
This is explained at the beginning of this chapter (p.61). An objection has been raised against this. There is a valid judgment that pot does not presuppose a pratiyogī (ghato ma sapratiyogīkaḥ). This will be invalid if pratiyogī-presupposing difference is identical with pot—for, pot also should be pratiyogī-presupposing in that case. The Viṣṇu gloss replies that sapratiyogīka difference is not absolutely identical with pot. But it is identical together with Viṣṇu. As this Viṣṇu can accommodate internal distinction without destroying the unity, pot need not become a sapratiyogīka entity in spite of its being identical with sapratiyogīka difference and the validity of the above mentioned usage remains intact.

Criticism of Madhusudana Sarasvati:

According to the Dvaita school difference is mutual negation and identical with its substratum. This Dvaita view...

23. ग्रेद्यम सप्रतियोगिक अवतम विजेश्यानुगदिते। ग्रेद्यम ग्रेद्यम सप्रतियोगिक अवतम विजेश्यानुगदिते। सप्रतियोगिक ग्रेद्यम सप्रतियोगिक अवतम विजेश्यानुगदिते। ग्रेद्यम ग्रेद्यम सप्रतियोगिक अवतम विजेश्यानुगदिते। ग्रेद्यम ग्रेद्यम सप्रतियोगिक अवतम विजेश्यानुगदिते।

24. ल विवेष्यानुगदिते (ततः ग्रेद्यम सप्रतियोगिक अवतम विजेश्यानुगदिते) किं ताम, अवतम विजेश्यानुगदिते।

of difference obviously means that bhāvatva and abhāvatva reside in the same entity. Madhusūdana criticises this view in his Advaitasiddhi. He says that bhāvatva and abhāvatva cannot co-exist as they are mutually contradictory. Their mutual contradiction may be found in the fact that they subsist in different substrate like a pot and its absence. The pot is never a substratum of abhāvatva while its absence is never a substratum of bhāvatva. How then can the Dvārtta position which makes both bhāvatva and abhāvatva reside in the same substratum be acceptable?

This objection can be answered with the help of viśeṣa by pointing out that the identity of substrate is not absolute or unqualified. It is qualified. Identity is accompanied with viśeṣa. Viśeṣa is conceived as such a factor competent enough to resolve such contradictions. There is, therefore, no difficulty in holding that anyonyabhāva is the essential nature of the dharma.

This may be elaborated further: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's objection will hold good in case of absolute identity of

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25. ऐतिहासिक भावात्त्वप्रचुरते भावोत्त्वान्थवता पृूमविषयः कालस्थिताः पद्माविन्यासः तथा ग्रन्थप्राचार्य भद्दः। किमण्डुला आशोलाभागः। म हि विनिन्यासा श्रीश्री इत्यस्थ धाराधिकार आत्मवासस्य गौराण्डे निरंतराय। गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे गौराण्डे

- Advaitasiddhi, 793-794.
'difference' and its substratum. The Dvaita school is fully aware of such a contingency. They have discovered *Videsa* as a wonderful power which can resolve problems like the one posed by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī here. It is pointed out in the first chapter that *Videsa* precludes the non-existence of one of the two entities. Because of this power of *Videsa*, both difference and its substratum are real. Because of the reality of both of them and their qualified identity, the substratum of *bhāvatva* and *abhāvatva* need not be same.