CHAPTER -- V

"THE DISCIPLINE"
ALL systems of Indian philosophy accept that the *Summum Bonum* of Indian life is attained when all the impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissolved. But they widely differ in the matter of details of the way to it. The absolute Advaitins, like Suresvara, firmly deny any type of action, physical or mental, as an essential means to make the self to dissociate from all impurities and realise its own nature which is self-emancipation. The other systems, and some of them also go
the name of Advaita, accept the need for an action or a modified form of it at some stage or other in the process of realisation of self.

SUCH a difference in the opinion about the place of religious activity in the attainment of the Absolute is perhaps handed down from even the earlier Upa­nigads, the first systematised books on thought in Indian Philosophy. The Chāndogya Upanisad speaks of two ways for the people after death. Those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as digging of wells etc., follow, after death, the way of fathers (Pitrāna) in which the soul, enters into ēṅkāra, than into night, the dark half in the month and at last reaches the moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke, night, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed and through the assimilation of food by ma. he enters the womb of the mother and is born again. Thus the soul has not only a recompense in the world of moon but he is born again in this world.
THE other way is the way of God (Devayāna) and it is for those who cultivate faith and asceticism (tapas). "These souls at death enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright half of the year, sun, moon, lightening and finally into Brahman never to return." The meaning of the whole is that the soul on the way to the God, reaches regions of ever increasing light in which is concentrated all that is bright and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman, the light of lights (Jyotisām Jyotih).

THERE is yet a third way and it reflects the absolutic way of staunch Advaitin like Suresvara. "The man is full of desires. As he desires so he wills; as he wills so he works, as the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse: being attached to what he wants to gain by Karma that to which he was attached. Having gone to the end of the Karma that he does here i.e., reaped the full fruit of it he returns back to this world for doing Karma. So it is the case with those who have desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, has freed himself from all desires is satisfied.
in his desires and in himself, his senses do not go out. He becoming Brahman attains Brahmanhood. Thus the verses say:

"When all the desires that are in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and attains Brahman here." 

Here we have a clear reference to the doctrine that freedom from desire and the consequent cessation of all actions is the only way for final emancipation.

The above three, rather two, schools of thought dealing with the way to emancipation are based on the assumption that the soul transmigrates from birth to birth and it is essentially eternal. An individual leaves behind some sort of potency which has the power to ordain for him some joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good or bad. When the fruits of actions cannot be enjoyed in the present span of life the individual has to take another birth suitable for the purpose. Thus here is a postulation of the doctrine of Karma. In latter systems of philosophy, with the exception of Carvaka materialists, all agree on this theory which is not a mere mental specu-
lation but is based on a deep religious purpose of life and its philosophy. It is also interesting to note that the semantic change in the conception of the word "karma" from its grammatical significance of an action to that of its result, some unseen potency capable of producing a perceivable effect at a latter date, had taken place even in this Pre-Paniniya period.5

THE Apūrva or Adṛṣṭā of Pūrva-mimamsa system is based on the conception of such a potency only and so the Karma doctrine can be taken as its fore-runner.

"The Vedic belief that the "Mantra" uttered in the correct assent at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic details, exactly according to the directions, without the slightest error even in the smallest rīfle, had something like a magical virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of Karma doctrine. "It postulates a semiconscious belief that certain mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects without the ordinary process of instrumentality of visible
agents of ordinary course and effect. Perhaps, the idea of Rta, the divine order, as conceived in Vedic Samhitas, may be associated with such a belief. The conception of Karma, or Agnivesa, or Adhara is intended to fill in the gap between the cause, the deed and its effect, the enjoyment.

BUDDHA takes granted the existence of a future birth and transmigration of soul. The theory that a Karma-action produces its effect even in the latter births is highly discussed in Buddhistic literature. In the Milinda Pañca, Māgasena says "this through a difference in their Karma that men or not alike but some long lived, some short lived, some healthy, some sickly some handsome, and some ugly, some powerful, some weak, some rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree and some wise and some foolish." But the media through which the Karma of a previous birth is translated into suffering or enjoyment in a latter birth is not clear. It may however be taken that the "Asava" or lattent
potencies of \textit{karma} fill in the gap and through them the ignorance or \textit{"Avijja"} is considered to come into operation. The \textit{karma} could produce its effect in this life or any other life when there were covetousness, antipathy or infatuation. \textit{Karma} by itself without craving (\textit{Tanha} or \textit{Trsna}) is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Even this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and self indulgence, seeking satisfaction, now then, to wit, the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and craving for not becoming (for no new birth)." Thus the four \textit{\textasciitilde{s}avas} viz., the \textit{Kam\textasciitilde{s}ava}, \textit{Bhav\textasciitilde{s}ava}, \textit{Ditt\textasciitilde{s}ava}, and \textit{Avij\textasciitilde{s}ava} are nothing but the preceding factors of \textit{Tanha} which operates the translation of \textit{karma} of previous birth. When this \textit{Tanha} or \textit{\textasciitilde{s}ava} is destroyed, the \textit{karma} becomes in-effective and all the methods of \textit{Sila} or \textit{Sam\textasciitilde{\ddot{a}}dhi} is intended towards this.

In this background of \textit{\textasciitilde{\textashape{\nu}\textashape{\ddot{a}}}s\textashape{\textashape{\textashape{s}}}d\textashape{\textashape{\textashape{c}}}d\textashape{\textashape{c}}} and \textit{Buddhist\textashape{c}}} conception of the media through which the \textit{karma} operates into its fruit, the eternal nature of \textit{\textashape{\nu}\textashape{\textashape{\textashape{s}}}r\textashape{\textashape{\textashape{c}}}va}
of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Vedāntin’s arguments about futility of Karma as a way to final liberation are to be considered. This Āpurva is the end of all Vedic rites. In its casual stage it is Dharmas which is nothing but the sacrificial rite, which again is caused by the Vedic injunction. In its effectual stage it is the final result like the heaven or salvation. The stages of evolution of this Āpurva can be summed up as follows: Injunction (Vidbi) — Obligation (Niyoga) — Performance (Kīrya or Yāga or Dharma) potency (Āpurva) — the results (Ista). Thus this Āpurva is the centre of the whole discipline of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā for attainment of liberation. It is considered eternal either in its preliminary form of injunction or other forms of evolution up to the stage of emancipation. This potency is a sort of faculty in the sentient which abides in him until the desires result follows.  

However, there is a vast and practical difference in the importance attached to Āpurva by the two schools of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā viz., Prabhākaras and Bhāttas. The Prabhākaras to not have any view of differentiation between
the end and the means. Dharma according to them is goal as well as means. The original import of this word, of course, is the end itself.\textsuperscript{12} In the latter dialectical Sastras it is identified as sacrifice or some such thing that is conducive to take to the desired goal.\textsuperscript{13} The Dharma comprises both the optional (Kamya) and obligatory (Nitya) deeds. prabhakaras hold that in both these types of deeds the question of end does not arise or bear any significance. The commands that ordain the obligatory deeds have to be carried out for their own sake. In such cases there is neither a scriptural warrant nor a logical need to associate an end to an injunction. The imperative or potential suffix of the injunction is the all important as it signifies the mandate of obligation or Niyoga. This Niyoga is also called Dharma, comprising its intrinsic value. It is accomplished by the person commanded under a sense of obligation and not with any motivation and at this stage of accomplishment it is called Kārya. The person commanded (Niyojya) is defined as he who learns the mandate as the one to be carried by him-
For carrying out the command only the person commanded and the content of the command (Visaya) are sufficient. In the oft quoted example the potential in the injunction indicates the person that worships and the content of the worshipping is learnt by the root. This is adequate to carry out the injunction.

In the case of optional deeds also where specific end is mentioned in the injunction either directly or by implication, Prabhakaras hold this very same view. Thus the word Svarga Kama actually speaks the person that is commanded. The word Svarga does not indicate the goal but is included in the descriptive description of the person that is commanded and so it is corollary to the injunction as such. The mandate in the injunction of the imperative or potential mood (Niyoga) is not the direct cause of this Svarga. The mandate is a means to the function (Yaga) which is also termed Karya and there it need comes to an end. Thus Niyoga is a means as well as an end. The Yaga serving as a means to Svarga, of course through the media of Apurva, is not included in the injun-
ction (aŚabda) but is in the nature of a corollary (Anupädañika) to it. The instrumental case of the Yāga (for eg. Jyotiṣtoma) does not signify that it is merely a means to some result, say heaven, but it only denotes the nature of the Yāga to be performed. Thus even in optional deeds the mandate is the foremost thing and its effect, the Yāga, is the end. Prābhākaras do not even go as far as Apūrva in the evolution process of the goal or even if they go, consider it as a subsidiary to the injunction.

THAT being so, the word Svarga Kūma is still more subordinate to the injunction as it presents only the person eligible to perform the particular sacrifice. All Vedic passages that mean some modification in the performer or doer are further subordinate; so are all Vedānta passages. So the main or only thing that leads to final emancipation is work and work alone and one has to die doing the duty. The duty is for its own sake and production of a result, including the assumed Apūrva, by doing so is immaterial.
BUT Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and his followers hold that activities are accentuated by a desire and it is the end that determines the activity. For example, in the direction that a man who wants health shall take the medicine even though the word "Arogyakāma" presents the fit person, it is exactly the end i.e., Arogya that determines the action of taking the medicine. Likewise even in vedic injunction like the performance of the Jyotistoma, it is the end that determines the action of sacrifice. This principle is extended in the case of obligatory deeds also. Here the activity is determined by a negative result i.e., avoidance of an undesired effect (pratyavāya). Such an interpretation is given on the analogy of a youngster carrying out the order of an elderly person like "Bring the cow" or "Fetch the book". In such cases, even though the youngster has no direct desire for the end of the activity i.e., reading the book or milking the cow, yet he is motivated by the desire of getting the favour or avoiding the anger of the elderly person. As such, all activities have a result and orthodox Mīmāmsakās believes
that the result brought about by Apūrva (Say heaven) is the Permanent Bliss and nothing short of final Emancipation. The latter thinkers however believe that the Emancipation is nothing that is acquired freshly but consist in the soul resting in peace.

To attain this the following way is advocated generally. Any action or knowledge adds or substracts to the nature of the self. The performance of a sacrifice or acquisition of a knowledge adds virtue, Dharma, to the self and this results in its qualitative development. Likewise, an evil act adds vice, Adharma. So if both are avoided self stands where it is. In gradual course the virtue and vice already accrued wear out through enjoyment or suffering their consequences and Moksa is attained automatically; subject to that the obligatory deeds are performed scrupulously as they are ordained as such, so that only sin that arises by their non-performance is avoided.

There is also another reason for pustulating
THIS way to emancipation by the Māmamsakas. Self is potency of knowledge\textsuperscript{25} (Jñāna Sakti). This potency of self supplies energy to mind and other senses which act and produce cognition etc., of the outer world as well as the self. At the time of salvation, there being none of the senses, nor the mind, the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge without any expression or manifestation. There is no question of bliss in this stage because the cognitions etc., which are continuous processes, are again generated by the operation of the mind and senses. So to attain the state of emancipation mind shall not have the possibility of operation and accruing pain and pleasure; avoid the prohibited deed since they produce pain; but shall perform the obligatory deeds assiduously because not doing so produces unwelcome result.

The stand of Prabhakaras is however different with regards to the performance of Karmas as a means to the emancipation. In Nitya Karmas they do not admit any purpose, not even the avoidance of Pratyavāya
and they have to be performed for their own sake. Even in optional deeds, since the purpose of the injunction is served by the generation of Kūryāpurva and no result is specifically aimed at, there can be a possibility of their performance with complete detachment. The arising results, like heaven etc., do not have any effect on a soul. The Vedic injunction gets carried out and the self does not get entangled in the bondage. Finally the emancipation arises inspite of the performance. Such an attitude implies a sort of self-knowledge underlying the performance of Vedic and moral rites and in fact the "Jnana-Karmanam-Samuccaya" as a means of salvation is accepted by Prabhakaras.

THIS opens scope to the schools which consider both self-knowledge and Vedic rites are ways for emancipation. Broadly speaking both self-knowledge and Vedic actions can be continued simultaneously in three ways:

1. Karma predominant and Jñāna subordinate,
2. Both having equal importance and
3. Jñāna predominant and Karma as its auxiliary.

In all the methods, utility of Karma lies,
according to Kandana,\(^{30}\) in procuring a peculiar kind of Adhyāta helpful to the manifestation of final emancipation and according to some\(^{2}\) others it is to avoid any undesirable effect (pratyavāya).\(^{31}\) The predominance of Karma over Jñāna helping it so that it may produce Aparva leading to the manifestation of emancipation is perhaps based on the Bhatta school. The second alternative in this scheme of combination, namely equal predominance to Jñāna and Karma is attributed to Bhaṭṭrprapāṇa who maintained the theory of Bhadabheda according to which the ultimate reality is identify in difference or 'concrete' Universal.\(^{32}\) According to this theory "diversity being real and never to be disregarded, Karma remains indispensable throughout the process of Brahma-realisation." Though Karma is a common feature of Mukta and Mumukiṣu, the motive inspiring in the two cases is totally different. It also recognises constant meditation as the means to realisation of the unity in diversity by destroying the popular immediate belief in the truth of mere diversity being independent of unity.
THE activity need not be only physical and limited to the Vedic injunctions of the Karma Kanda alone; it can as well be mental and in Upaniṣadic portions also we have injunctions leading to Sravaṇa, Manana and Mīdhārṣaṇa. The third alternative in the above scheme, namely Jnana being predominant and Karma aiding it refers more to this type of theory. Mandana when he speaks of an activity as a way to salvation intends this type of mental activity also. Even orthodox Advaitic thinkers like Vācaspatimisra, Vidyarāṇya etc., admit some injunction at the stage of Sravaṇa and Manana and also Mīdhārṣaṇa. This Mīdhārṣaṇa is termed as Praśamkhyāna by Mandana and Abhyāsa by Brahmadatta. There is however a slight but considerable difference of opinion in their utility in the attainment of salvation: Mandana holds that Praśamkhyāna itself does not lead to emancipation directly but it generates the realisation, as it were, which leads to emancipation. Brahmadatta’s theory appears to be nearer to the line of thought of Bhaṭṭa school viz., that all actions produce a result with an Adṛśta intervening in between.
of Íapánana is, however likely motivated more by Prabhakara theory that there need not be any motivation by any concrete result to all activities, and the Aúrva, here the desired Jñana, may itself be the final goal. That is why his Prasánkhyana is more intended for removal of evil (Pratyavaya) than being a direct cause for self-realisation.

SURESVı́A is highly allergic for counting any sort of activity as a way to emancipation. He pounces upon any such suggestion with all the vehemence of a fanatic and does not hesitate even to whirl brick-bats of vocal censures against the advocates of Karma. But his arguments based on logic, experience and authority are so minute and explanatory that not a single stone in the field of his opponents is left unturned and rooted out. Prior to him and Sánkara there is a vast and variegated compendium of Indian thought right from the Vedic age up to the predecessors of Advaitic concept like Íapánana, Bhartṛprapancá etc. In meeting all these schools he takes his nourishment from his preceptor but shows a developed and delightful intelligence with clear analysis at all
problems. In this respect there is remarkable improvement not only in the content of thought and conviction but in the matter of presentation also, in his own self, if the theory of Madana Suresvara equation is accepted, and the works, fully accepted as his, of philosophical discussion, Naishkarma Siddhi and the two Vartikas.

The arguments of Suresvara against the Mimamsakas can be broadly classified under two heads dealing with refutation of the two theories that (1) the action is the be-all and end-all with all other things being subordinate and contributing to it and (2) action serving as an instrument, main or subsidiary, to salvation. The two schools of Mimamsakas represent these two theories broadly. A brief summary of his arguments against the opposing views is attempted below.

Refutation of the theory of Karma alone leading to salvation:

(1) It is uncharitable to consider that the knowledge of self is subsidiary to any Vedic injunction or its resultant action only, because self is the
agent of mundane activities as well. Even persons who do not possess this self knowledge, do carry out Vedic injunctions and perform sacrifices which are mainly mechanical. From the view of result (Phala) the self can be considered as agent in the sacrifice only when it possess the desire for its result and thus the self in its real nature of freedom from duality cannot be an agent at all to carry out the Vedic injunction. The cognition of real self results in freedom of all desires and then agency of all actions. The self-knowledge cannot be subordinate to injunction in the sense that it is a means to carry out the latter into action just as the knowledge of Udgita, is helpful through its rendering and successful performance of Somayaga. Mere existence of a self and not its realisation is adequate to carry out their injunction.

(2) IF Upanisads dealing with self knowledge are considered secondary to the injunctions and thus become non-authoritative, then the whole Veda also has to be considered so, on the principle that by a part becoming useless the whole is purposeless. The Sutras of Jaimini have to be interpreted as referring to the Karma Kanda.
portion only in this context and it is suicidal to extend their application to Upanishada also.47

(3) THERE is the argument that when there is a possibility of joining two sentences or ideas together as complex sentences it is cumbersome to treat them as complete by themselves and give them separate standing.48 But this is not a unique and unexceptionable principle. The Māmśakas themselves accept another counter principle49 that when there are many injunctions existing in the same yajus with a group of words, each group shall be considered separate and complete and joined with the respective injunction. Thus when logic and common sense demand, it is not wrong to give a separate authority to Upanishad portions.50

(4) THE self-knowledge cannot be considered a result (Phala) and hence subordinate even in Upanisadic injunctions aiming at the purification of mind51 inspite of the fact that the attainment of this aim leads to self realisation because the purpose of those injunctions stops with the purification of the mind etc., It may be noted
that the elevation of mind may not produce self-realisation necessarily and on the other hand may also serve certain mundane purposes. It is the very principle of \textit{Him\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde}} that a distant purpose served by the achievement of an aim cannot be subordinate to the injunction dealing with this aim, and the self-realisation got through the purification of mind cannot be subordinate to the very injunction dealing with this mental purification.

5. \textit{It is not possible to fix any such subordination of self-knowledge to karmak\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde} through any one of the six "\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde}" accepted by \textsc{\textasciitilde} \textsc{\textasciitilde} \textsc{\textasciitilde} \textsc{\textasciitilde} which Mantra is considered so to an injunction.}\textsc{\textasciitilde}

6. \textit{The contents of Vedanta passage have a definite utility in that they being in the self-realisation into our immediate experience. They cannot be considered as Arthav\textsc{\textasciitilde}\textsc{\textasciitilde} which do not have any significance except when they are joined with injunction the result of which is mediate. There is not any sort of operation intervening between the Vedanta passage and self-realisation.
just as between the sentence "A son is born to you is considered subordinate to the activities of the Nats.
and the realisation of the pleasure of birth of a son.

It is illogical to postulate an injunction "become happy" in between these two because the need for a secondary or tertiary function (Iksama or Tatparya) arises when there is incompatibility in the primary function. The need for an injunction or any other such means arises when the statement of facts is inadequate to produce the required goal; but it is not so in this case as well as the Vedanta passages. The illusion of snake is negatived by the appraisal of real position and without the interventions and interpretations of sentences like "Do not be afraid" etc., Even in the instances of statements where prohibition or instigation is suggested (Eg: There are robbers in the path; there is a treasure here) it is the fear or desire that brings about the result of action (Fleeing away or taking possession of) and not any interpreted injunction (Eg: Run away; take it).
In all these cases the statements are authoritative and are correct means of knowledge by themselves. Moreover, even assuming that such an injunction is intended by the speaker of the statement, there can be no such possibility in the case of Vedic statements which are revelations and not speeches.56

7. THERE is the argument that words in a sentence have no validity unless they supply to the aim of an injunction or verb.57 If they are given a separate standing it amounts to the fault of Vakyabheda. Even in muncaene actions the meaning of a word is inferred though action.58 The position of Vedānta as well as grammarians is wrong, because they justify the existence of the verb in a sentence through other words, the meaning of which is known otherwise some times and thus the injunction looses its Apūrva nature. The motivation for an action need not be through a desire which is supplied by other words.59 Even in sacrificial addresses (Prāṣa)60 it is the injunction that first operates and then brings the meaning of the verb and the person addressed into the field. In the cases of verbs in tenses and moods61 the imperative sense is to
be understood and then the meaning of the verb; otherwise the desire for accomplishment of the result in such sentences will not arise and the facts stand unaccomplished.

The Vedāntin however feels, that whatever may be the position of interpretation in Karmakānda, in Vedānta Vākyas it is the sense other than the verb or its tense or mood that brings authority to the sentence and the predicate which is only an arrangement of syntax may some times be absent too. It is the self that illuminates injunction the operation of which forms part of non-self. The existence of self is not unreal because it is not realised due to ignorance nor it is brought into existence just because it is realised. Hence, such an ever existing and illuminating self and its knowledge cannot be subordinate to the injunction operated later on. This point is more evident in the case of mental activities. The result of all cognitions is knowledge which is nothing but an interpretation of self. The activity of cognition which starts in the self adds nothing fresh to it. Even in the instances of operation of an injunction the self fulfills
its nature of being an enjoyor and so it cannot be sub-
ordinate to an injunction.

8. Basing on the predominance of action,
even the doer of sacrifice is subordinate to injunction
according to the Mimamsakas. The doer of sacrifice is in-
dicated by the mood suffix in 'Yajata' which again is based
on the sense of obligation in the injunction. So words
like Svargakama are only Arthavadas to the doer. The need
for such a position is all the more evident in the injunc-
tion of 'Citra Yaga' where the word denoting the doer
of sacrifice becomes non-Vedic and devoid of 'Apurva' un-
less it is prestned through the injunction in 'Yajeta'. On
the same analogy the self, if it is a fact, has to be con-
sidered subordinate to some injunction and then only the
self-knowledge is to be a 'novel' experience.

BUT what is wrong in Veda presenting an
idea already perceived by other means of knowledge? So
sake Vedantin. A sentence can make even a thing capable
of being known by other means, now known and by this it
does not lose its reliability just as the word of a re-
liable person is authoritative and in this sense Vedánta Vákyas are authoritative and in the human authorities. Their contents do not lose validity even if they are verified through other means of knowledge; on the contrary, any amount of logic or such other proof cannot create authority in the words of an unreliable person. The Vedánta Vákyas present as it were self which does exist but not realised on account of the illusion. There is, however, a feeling of novelty in this realisation, even though there is nothing attained afresh when only the need for an injunction or an activity arises. This realisation dawns due its own self or, so to say, the mental modification takes the form of self because it is its very own nature. The Vedánta Vákyas which make this immediate cognition arise cannot be unauthoritative (Aramāna) because the very experience brought about by these passages proves their authority and this experience gives authority to all means of knowledge.

9. To say that statement of fact get their
validity through injunction is not feasible from the point of view of syntax also. In their relation to the injunctive mood, the words in such sentences have three alternatives in their function viz., (a) they have to maintain their own meaning and establish relationship with the verb; (b) loose their independent meaning and become a subsidising part to the injunction or (c) establish a relationship among themselves through their own meanings and make the whole sentence meaningful. In the first alternative there cannot be comprehension of the meaning of the sentence as such and the very sentence is useless; in the second the usage of words other than the one denoting injunction becomes meaningless and only the third alternative makes the whole sentence meaningful. Unless the mutual dependence (Apeksa or Akasha) among the words cognised, the very application of a sentence becomes futile and this result in the whole Veda becoming invalidated. It is not possible to say that the injunction first dawns and then establishes its connection with the sacrifice and then Soma Yaga etc., through its own operation, because even for the
establishment of such a relationship, the content and meaning of the words like the sacrifice (denoted by the word Yaṇa) and soma etc., should have been existing even earlier. Then the injunction serves the purpose of only illuminating the existing objects.\(^7\)

10. THE conception that the injunction is independent by itself and hence other contents of the sentence are subordinate is wrong. In the absence of contents governed by the injunction not getting into operation, there is no cause for the very injunction itself to operate; and such causeless operation is not agreeable to either parties. No second injunction is acceptable to operation of the first one because this will land in AD\(\)INFINITUM. So a cause for the operation of injunction has to be accepted and this means its dependence on the cause.\(^7\)

11. THE very conception of injunction is propounded by Ṣaṁśākṣas is not feasible. The instigation (Niyoga) is not injunction as it is the object of the
latter. The process of comprehending the content of injunction is a means of knowledge (verbal testimony) and not the injunction. The action is the result of the injunction and cannot be considered as the very injunction. The goal is not the injunction because the need for it is not accepted by Prabhakaras. The mutual relationship of the words in a sentence cannot be injunction as it exists inspite of the latter. To say that it is beyond times is also incorrect because it delimits a fact to a particular time. It is not also beyond senses because in such cases it is not understandable by the "mood" etc., of the root and cannot be accomplished at all as it will be out of reach of any human being. The equation of injunction, instigation, sacrifice, agurva and goal does require a human effort for its accomplishment which is real and not illusory. It means that it is the human effort that works it up and not merely the injunction. The injunction itself becomes the object of human effort in the process of accomplishment and there is no speciality attached to it.
12. IT is also wrong to say that the injunction indicates *Apūrva* only because in the matter of interpretation, there is no difference between Vedic and mundane injunctions. In both cases it is the meaning of the individual words that establish the meaning of sentence structure through mutual dependence (*Akaṅkṣa*) in which case the injunction follows the meanings of individual words and so loses its "Apūrva" or prashna. Moreover this *Apūrva* means that the thing intended by the injunction starts at the point of non-existence and produces something existing. This is illogical especially for a Sākāryavadin like Mīṃsaka and so he has to accept the sense to be produced by the injunction does exist even earlier, may be in different form. This means that the injunction is no more *Apūrva*.77

13. To stage that it is the Miyoja or the sense of duty imbibed in the injunction that is "Apūrva", is equally not feasible. This Mīyoja is an after-effect or a product, so to say, of the injunction which again is dependent upon the meaning of its components as stated above.78
14. APURVA, the pivot on which Mimamsaka theory revolves, is not caused at all by the injunction. It is the product of the action of Yaga. The veda speaks of the result of Yaga, heaven etc., and Apurva is the assumed factor intervening between the Yaga and the result. Without accepting such an assumption veda itself has to be considered unauthoritative. To say that injunction alone produces apurva without any reference to the Yaga amounts to that the Yaga's effect is false. So it has to be accepted that the injunction operates through the Yaga in order to produce apurva; so it is the fact of Yaga that is all the more important and not the injunction. To say that is is the sense of Yaga that is caused by the injunction and this is Apurva and performance of Yaga follows it, leads to the fault of mutual dependence because unless the idea of the Yaga is already existing the sense of its performance cannot arise.

15. AN injunction means only a statement of fact and not instigation. In fact the words denoting
such an instigation are nothing but statement through 
which a thing unknown is made known. The moods and ten-
erse that mean the instigation cannot be the same as the 
facts on which they are based (i.e., roots like yaj etc.) 
and the moods by themselves cannot indicate instigation 
as there is no such word-ability (Mākti) to them. The 
activity of instigation requires and instigator to ope-
rate but Veda being superhuman, there is no such possibility 
of instigation. So it is only the fact that brings life 
to the mood etc., and so to say the instigation is nothing 
but this statement in as much as it makes an unknown thing 
known. The contention that a mere statement of 
fact is mere repetition (Anuvādaana) and so had no vali-
dity does not hold ground because Vedic statement is ac-
cepted as authoritative by itself and even if it is sub-
ject to other means of knowledge, its authority does in 
no way diminish as it serves the purpose.  
It is the 
predicate and not the injunction necessarily that brings 
a sense of completeness and validity to the sentence and 
so sentences like "Tat Tvam Asi" are valid by themselves.
16. EVERY action has a product and every product is destructible, the generation of the product is dependant on the desire of the doer; it is an automatic corollary to action. So, the Moksa which is considered eternal by all schools of thought cannot be a product of action. There is the authority of Vedas also to this extent.82

17. EVERY action shall have an object as its aim and the effect it produces in the object is its result. This effect is fourfold i.e., generation (Utpatti), attainment (Apti), purification (Saṁskāra) or modification (Vikāra). The nature of Brahman is such that its realisation does not fall into any of these categories. It is not generated because it shines by its own self from eternal times. Since it is one's own self and so already stands attained, is not attainable. It is beyond purification because it is free from any impurity and ignorance and there is nothing that can be added to it. All the means of knowledge are caused by it only; hence is not a result of modification.83 The argument that by warding of Dharma and Adharma and their effects, the self
cognises its own self and so this cognition is a modification, so to say, is not acceptable because the self is beyond change. 84

18. To say that self realisation means a perception, visual or mental, and as such the process involves modification or purification (Sanskāra) of the self is wrong. It is accepted by all that self does exist even prior to realisation and its appearance or disappearance is not due to any intrinsic fault that lies with it. These two functions are only attributed to self in a secondary sense. As such the realisation means the very knowledge and this exists in the self always. 85 There exists no relationship of knower, known and knowledge and hence the idea or parts at the time of realisation, because the self is the seer (Saksin) for all and itself and there can not be any activity (Vyāpāra) in this process of knowledge. The process of visual perception is limited and it cannot comprehend this all pervasive knowledge just as a fiery particle cannot burn the fire. 86 The mind can
perceive only the so-called attributes of self like desire, hatred, Dharma, Adharma etc. Since these attributes are not a part of the self, in which case the self cannot be free from them even in the stage of salvation, the mind is incapable of perceiving the self and so is not a means of realisation. Hence the question of self being subject to changes and thus being realised does not arise at all and so there is no need for any action or injunction for such a realisation. "I am engaged in action by such and such injunction and I am Brahman". these two conceptions are mutually opposing.

19. An injunction presumes positive action but the result of an action need not be positive in nature; in case of negative results the action too has to be negative as for example in the case of withdrawal from a serpent to avoid misery. The argument that the injunction as such produces positive action but on force of implication it may sometimes include the result (here avoidance of misery) as well as an action (here withdrawal)
which may be negative or positive in nature but injunction as such is free from any such negativity:— This does not stand further examination. How can this kind of implication be attributed to the injunction when the same is not intrinsic in it? As such the action must be considered as intrinsic in the injunction, and then the necessarily positive operation of the injunction is lost.

20. THE injunction that is understood by hearing the imperative mood etc., will be accomplished by the speaker or doer, only when he hopes for some positive effect (which may of course be a puruṣārtha and not necessarily so). Thus if the doer does not comprehend the human goal, he does not act in the world by mere command and never performs a sacrifice which is cumbersome and painful. The injunction cannot produce an automatic result like hypnotism or chant because in that case, since the doer has no control there will be no scope for repentive action (prāyascittakarma). Thus the goal is a necessary adjunct to the injunction in which case its superhuman nature is lost.
22. To say that absence from prohibitory action means cessation of that action and the sin, its effect is not correct. The cessation is negation whereas prohibition is based on something positive, an activity to avoid a positive thing and as such has a goal i.e., avoidance or misery. Hence it is not possible to say that absence from prohibitory deeds leads to the negation of desire and then to emancipation because there is the desire of negation in this absence.

23. Even if it is accepted that by avoiding the prohibited and optional deeds, obligatory deeds are still to be performed and the intention of this is said to avoid undesirable effect (Pratyāvaya), but to attribute such an aim for positive deeds is illogical because positive action has to produce invariably a positive result and avoidance of undesired effect is only a negative result. Even Veda does not sustain such a position because it mentions some such positive results for obligatory deeds. A definite result for Vedic action is as
the world of manes is also mentioned in some passages.

Nobody wants to avoid good effects and even if the obligatory deeds destroy the sinful effects (which are really meant by the term Pratyavrtya) the good ones do persist. No one can say that even the good ones also are not wanted because it goes against the very Mimmsa tenets. Smrtis as well say that even the obligatory deeds which aim at avoidance of misery produce some desired effects also as a corollary. Moreover effects which are intended to be avoided by obligatory deeds may be caused by non-Vedic deeds as well. Thus for example, the good effects of munificence or the evil effects of supernatural forces, like storms, unconscious vicious deeds etc., cannot be avoided by performance of obligatory deeds; some evil effects are to be suffered for births and births and it is impossible to spend away this store which comes into operation only in future.

It is impossible and impracticable for any man, however efficient he may be, to avoid the pro-
hibitory deeds and optional deeds. There is a doubt about the very existence of the minor term in the syllogism; Narah Maiddhakāmyadhivargajante Saktah Atmatantratvāt; so the postulation is simply impossible. This impracticability leads to the impossibility of salvation, the attainment of which shall be sure and not accidental. Moreover there is no where any injunction to the effect that those deeds are to be avoided, and hence, basing on the Mīmāṃsa tenets of interpretation, the person who operates it is assumed as definite and the question of avoidance does not arise at all.

25. THERE is no need for any injunction, even from the view of Mīmāṃsaka's conception, for salvation which consists in the self-resting in its own place. This stage of self is considered natural to it in which case the need for an injunction which is said to bring forth something new (Aurvva) is not clear. It is also illogical to say that the self which is in the state of salvation operates those injunctions for its own salvation. On the other hand, if this salvation is something
beyond the very nature of self, no amount of force of an injunction can change the course of such a real nature. If the injunction is said to remove the indisposition caused in the self by continuous enjoyment of pleasures (Viṣayābhāsasajāsvasthya) and the Dharma and Adharma are causes for this indisposition, these two cannot force any attachment and indisposition on the self which is unattachable by nature. Even the argument that the innate capacity of the self to be such an agent is dormant at the time of salvation is also illogical because the capacity must be co-existing with the self and since there is no difference between a cause and effect, the agency to operate must be considered existing at the time of salvation and then it is salvation at all.\textsuperscript{100}

26. The instances of some extra-ordinary fortunate persons attaining salvation without the need for any injunction or action, like Vāmadeva, Gārgī, Maitreyī, prove the uselessness of an injunction.\textsuperscript{101}
BUT there is a classical school of Advaitins who try to establish a sort of joint effort of both action and knowledge in the attainment of salvation. The various theories propounded in this connection can be classified into four heads: (1) Karma aiding for gradual attainment of salvation through the achievement of various goals step by step, whereby the last stage, Brahma, will be the fittest so as to present the salvation as the next. (2) Karma aiding for the purification of mind and its attitudes by removing impurity of desire etc., and thus making it eligible to grasp the oneness of soul. (3) Karmas aiding to impress the destructibility of the external world and thus aiding to impress its negation wherewith the oneness of the soul dawns by itself, and (4) Karmas, mental activities to be more specific, helping the conception of oneness of soul presented by Upanisads, and to stabilise it and thus lead to a firm attainment of salvation.

Suresvara, in the footsteps of his Gur, Sri Sankara, denies any iota of Karma helping in the
process of attainment of salvation because the field of operation of Karma and Jnana are quite different. The arguments against any combination of both advanced by him are summed up here.

1. It is possible for two opposing things to exist in succession and not at the same time, as for example, movement and stoppage. Likewise Jnana may succeed action but both cannot exist together. That is why the conception of Mahabakshas that self is both divisible and non-divisible, on which they base this theory of co-existences of Jnana-Karma, is wrong. The existence of a thing has to be cognised through the non-existence of the other thing and the other has to be denied when the first is comprehended. 106

2. Jnana is based on perception of self which is immediate whereas Karma is based on the various accessories and directions mentioned in Veda, its result being mediate. It is established that perception is more powerful than other means of knowledge which are to aid the former. 107 The Upanisadic portions of Veda produce such
immediate perception of the self and the action which causes only a mediate result has no power in this matter.

To ascribe secondary nature to such Upanisadic portions and bringing in action as an aiding main factor is only to divert the issue (Asrutamanabhipretam).^{108}

3. **There is a difference in the conception of "Adhikāri" in both the fields.** For example, Prabhakaras think that the eligible person is presented only through the action; (Svargakāma) comes into the field of operation through the injunction (Yajeta). In such cases to do or not is left to the discretion of the Adhikāri according to Bhattas. But in case of self-realisation, the person who seeks it has no option, because it dawns by itself. Anybody who is after it is Adhikāri in the case of Realisation and for Karma only he that is spoken of by the injunction. There is no scope for an injunction or consequent action involving even as intermediary and there are concrete examples to this effect like Vāmadeva.^{109}

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^{108} THE very beginning of a separate thesis
about Uttara Kāṇḍa (as Athāytobrahmajñānāsa) to expound the Upaniṣads, indicates that the fields of operation in both the Kāṇḍas are quite different. That is why both are considered authoritative in their own fields. Śrī Saṅkara tries to establish a connection, however flimsy, between both these Kāṇḍas in his "Bhāṣya" and there would have been no necessity for such a thesis if both are naturally interdependent. Moreover if any one of them is not authoritative no connection is proper and if both are authoritative no connection is possible.110

5. THE Kārmakāṇḍa speaks of activities, the instruments that aid these activities, so as to bring the import of injunction into practice. These activities may also be more mental as is mentioned in certain portions of Upaniṣads themselves. The necessary precedent of true self-realisation is renunciation of all types of activities and so the "kārmakāṇḍa cannot have any operation in Jñānakāṇḍa.111
6. THE means of salvation in Karmakāṇḍa is to be repeated and also so in mediation and such other mental activities. Further there are different types of Vedic rites that yield different degrees of happiness and the nature of the final goal according to Karma Kāṇḍa is not defined. There are also many varieties of sacrifice that lead to this final happiness or Svarga. Considering from the stand of lesser types of happiness which are enjoyable only through the limitations of external means, like sense organs etc., there is no proof that even this Svarga is enjoyable without such limitations. The whole effort thus ends in confusion of means, goals etc. But the Realisation of self is free from all these defects and Karmakāṇḍa cannot transgress into Nyāsa Kāṇḍa even from this point of view.

7. To neglect an injunction is blasphemy as it means to question the authority of Vedas; so the transgression of Karmakāṇḍa into Vedānta has to be accepted, so to say the opponent. But questioning the passage of
self-realisation and their correct import in Upanisads or giving them a subordinate position is equally a blasphemy says Vedāntin. So evidently if both are to be considered authoritative, there must be a break between them. 113

8. JUST as Kāmya Karmas that yield visible and enjoyable results, the Upasana and such other mental activities prescribed in some chapters of Vedanta, also produce some type of result. So there is never a possibility of these processes leading to self-realisation, just as Kāmya Karmas do, when the non-attachment to result is practised; 114

9. PERFORMANCES of various sacrifices leads to various stages in the gradation of perfection and the final stage i.e., prajāpati leads to emancipation; in this sense too the continuation of Jnana and Karma cannot be accepted because (a) the Karmas aim at the fulfilment of certain desires and more the lust is satisfied the deeper it grows; (b) the Brahman underlying the stage
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of Prajāpati or a human being is the same and it is not necessary to reach this last but one stage for Realisation of this Brahman; (c) there is the danger of the person getting entangled or satisfied with the attainment of the lower and lower goals of happiness and losing sight of the final goal; to say that the intermittent stages are for alluring the men to try for the final goal is to defeat the very purpose of injunctions which specifically and separately mention these stages and the final goal as well; (d) in such a case the Adhikāri for all injunctions has to be the same and this goes against the very rule of Mimamsa interpretation.  

10. To say that the injunction prohibits the desires partly and in this way it serves the purpose of negating the apparent world and thus helps in Realisation is simply false because of the following reasons:

(a) Essence of Karma Kāṇḍa is to perform certain actions i.e., something positive and how can any prohibition be guessed in them?
(b) Even in places where no specific result is mentioned the sacrifice does not end without producing some result and there is *apūrva*, the very produce (*sādhyā*); so there can be no absence of any result by which alone the injunction may be construed as implying prohibition. 117

(c) The mere negation, the result or prohibitions, direct or implied, is not self-realisation because it is something positive. If that is so the negation of the world exists in sound sleep which can as well mean the *mokṣa*. 118

(d) The world, which is a natural attribute to self according to *mīmāṃsakas*, cannot at all be negated; if not is so negated, self also gets destroyed. 119

(e) If the Realisation is got only through negation, the whole world is to be negated; this is an impossibility for an individual or society. 120

(f) Some say that only the sense of difference is negated and not the world; but in such a case the
seed cause for such a sense of difference i.e., Avidya is not destroyed and this can be done only through self-realisation; Karma can is no way help it.\textsuperscript{121}

(g) The future of a man can never be negated by any action. The past is beyond the scope of negation and the present which is the stage of fruition of past Karmas cannot be negated by the present Karmas. So Karma is no way helps the destruction of non-self.\textsuperscript{122}

(h) To attribute the sense of prohibition also to injunction is to end in the blunder splitting a sentence (Vakyabheda)\textsuperscript{123}

(i) There cannot be any difference between Vedic and mundane injunctions in the matter of interpretation; if there is no scope of fulfilment of any desire the very purpose of both types is defeated.\textsuperscript{124}

(j) The purpose of dividing the injunction into three types i.e., Apūrva, Nyaya and Parisahkhyā.
(11) The self realisation is not subordinate to Karma on account of the following reasons.

(a) There is no direct connection between realisation and Vedic action as we have in sprinkling of sacred water and creation of Apūrva.126

(b) There is no indirect connection too as we have in Palaśawood and the laddle of sacrifice.127

(c) It is not an Ārthavaḍa because the very person eligible for self-realisation and Karma are quite different. The self that forms as subject of performance for Vedic rites is the self non-realised.128

(d) The realisation by itself is purposeful and it cannot be a purpose of any injunction, not even the Upanisadic injunctions (E.g: Ātmetyevosasita), and never the injunction of Karma Kānda. Even in the mundane experience, the realisation of happiness itself is a purpose...
and it need not be necessarily through an injunction. 129

To say that the purpose of Vedānta Vākyas is to cause the negation of the superimposed world and the Vedic action to bring forth the Realisation is to mean that the Vedānta Vākyas serve no positive purpose. But this negation of the world can also be established through other means of knowledge viz., inference etc., and then Vedānta Vākyas are simply redundant and futile; this makes the whole world Veda purposeless. This position is not acceptable to any system of Indian Philosophy except perhaps the three atheists. 130

12. The injunction-like passages is Upanisadic portions of Veda also do not lead to the Realisation of self directly as the factual statements like "Tat Tvam Asi" do, because (a) no injunction is required in understanding the meaning of the very injunction. Likewise no injunction is necessary to realise the Self. 134

The interpretation that "Sṛavana, Maṇana,
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Nidhi Bhāṣana or Prasādhikhyāna etc., are the actions ordained by the injunction, the realisation is got when these actions are performed and that these actions are necessary in reaching the final goal is against all logic. When the nature of the final goal is known or experienced through perception caused by the enlightenment presented by the Upaniṣadic Vākyas, the need for any action further is not clear.¹³²

(c) Vedānta Vākyas signifies a mediate experience and the injunction of meditation is to make that experience immediate. Thus both have different purpose. That is why in Veda apart from Mahāvākyas, there is such injunction as "Nidhideśitavah" etc. This is the line of argument of some old schools of Advaitins like Bhātrprapaṇca. This is again wrong says Suresvara because the above argument is that the Mahāvākyas present the Brahman through a process of subject-object relationship in a complex way. But this is not so. If such a position of Vedāntin is not acceptable, the so
called very injunction of meditation etc., becomes futile because the correct nature of the object of meditation would not have been established and it becomes something like a fancied object analogous to assuming a form to a deity. If the position of this school of Vedantin is accepted, there is the fault of interdependence viz., realisation depending on the injunction and vice versa and to avoid this the need for injunction is altogether avoided.  

(d) Meditation means repetition. Even according to Mīmāṃsakas repetition of an action as in Dākṣiṇāyana Yāga, does not produce any variation in the result. So when Realisation is got, the meditation of that experience is meaningless.

(e) The Realisation comes only once and it stays. The worlds like śravana, śravaṇa, etc., have no bearing on this realisation once dawned.

(f) Meditation may also mean giving a proof to the factual experience by logic etc. As such it means that logic, meditation, śāstra, all go up to cause
Realisation jointly. This is wrong. Realisation or factual experience depends upon the very nature of the fact and not external means just as the power of emanating light depends upon the very nature of flame and not oil, wick etc., that cause it.\(^{136}\)

\(g\) The sūtra that presents actual experience does not add to the content of that experience even when repeated. But how can logic, which is less powerful as it causes only mediate experience, increase the content of experience or cognition?\(^{137}\)

\(h\) If logic is required to substantiate or impress the Vedic saying it is as well required in case of Karma, Kṣaṇa, which means that Veda is not self-authoritative.\(^{138}\)

\(i\) If meditation, logic etc., are to prove the something which is already got by experience they are redundant; if they prove something different they are irrelevant for the purpose.\(^{139}\)
(j) Meditation is said to get refinement to the knowledge stage by stage. So it is to be summarised that the knowledge gained by each stage of meditation is quite different from that obtained at the previous stage and as a corollary each stage of meditation is a different means from the other. So we have a series of experiences and not the single Realisation. To say that the means is the same but the result may be different because it is the final result that matters is illogical because even when the same fact is cognised through different sense organs the cognitions are not the same, their purpose being different.\textsuperscript{140}

(k) If the concentration produces Realisation, it is equal to a process of knowing because Realisation is knowledge. But the very knowing is the Realisation of self and how can it be again a process, rather a means on par with concentration?

(l) To say that Sāstra is primary and meditation is secondary is wrong. The results that are expected
from each are said to be different i.e., mediate and then immediate through increasing the content of the mediate. Thus how can both serve the same purpose and have any connection at all. The Realisation is self-existent but the result of meditation is a product.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{(m)} For every action presented by an injunction an appropriate time, place etc., are prescribed. But for prasāṅkhyāna no such time is ever-prescribed and so prasāṅkhyāna-injunction is no injunction at all in the strictest sense of the term as no Apurva can be generated.\textsuperscript{142}

\textbf{(n)} To get the required capacity of generating action, the action here meditation, is to be made subordinate to another injunction which can generate Apurva directly (For \textit{e.g.} Joint with the injunctionतस्मात् आचरणं). It means meditation is subsidiary for two i.e., the Realisation as well as to such an injunction. This is absurd and by the consequent confusion the very validity of medita-
tion as means becomes questionable.\textsuperscript{143}

(o) If Realisation is not directly from \textsc{Sastra} and only through action of hearing, meditation etc., \textsc{Sastra} becomes subsidiary to action and becomes mere \textsc{Arthav\~da}. Such an insignificant position to \textsc{Sastra} is not acceptable to both the parties (i.e., old and new School of Advaitins) as it would end in action and action alone and not the goal.\textsuperscript{144}

(p) If \textsc{Sastra} does not present in immediate experience and an action like concentration etc., is to produce the same, it means they bring about a product. Evidently the products must be those that do not exist earlier; they are Sa\textsc{apat} or some supernatural experience like \textsc{Arjuna} etc. In fact these are the results of concentration and not Realisation.\textsuperscript{145}

(q) The \textsc{Karma K\~nda} is full of injunctions; what is the purpose of \textsc{Uttarak\~nda} if it is to consist the injunction again? To maintain a separate status and validity it has to consist a separate way of presentation,
(r) Meditation or other actions are not means by themselves but results of valid means i.e., injunctions. So they cannot be a means to another result i.e., realisation.

(s) Logical exposition, if it is so meant by meditation, is accepted by Veda itself as supporting the statements in it. But it does not mean that logic is a necessary adjunct in comprehending the significance of those Vedic passages. The very Veda mentioned, in some places, some illogical expressions also but we do not take them at their face value but treat them as Artha-Vedas.

(t) Logic has no end and to try to substantiate the Vedic statements through it is to defeat the very purpose. Thus for example, if the permanency of self is to be proposed to be established by a reference
to its existence through the three stages of wakefulness, dream and sleep etc., the "Jāti" also will be of the same description. Thus we reach no purposeful end. 147

(13) From the viewpoint of interpretation of sentences too the Vedānta Vākyas are self dependant. The import of whole sentences as such is quite different from that of its component words or inter-correlation between them. The latter are established by the external means, whereas the former is not dependant upon them. Thus in the statement, "Ayaṁ Atma Brahma", even though the first two words indicate a fact that is already presented by perception, and the last word a conception beyond any means of knowledge, still by the juxtaposition of these words an altogether different sense dawns. This sense is due to the dropping out a part of the conception of individual words and accepting the remaining part of the same. Thus the Vedānta Vākyas get their validity by their own selves. The meaning of individual words and their
interrelationship is only an indicator for such a sense of import. It is incorrect to say that the words and their relationship will be meaningful only when they indicate some action. Each word has its own meaning since time immemorial and sense of action does not create a meaning as in a word per se. To say that the purpose of a word does not dawn till the activity relating to it is brought to the notice is also incorrect because in such cases the reason is the ignorance of the person concerned and not the inefficiency of the word. Thus the authority of Veda rests on the enlightenment it gives and not on the action it speaks of.149

149. The falsity of Vedānta Vākyas due to their negation at Realisation does not in any way affect their authority because the relative reality of pre-realisation stage is accepted. The reality or otherwise of smoke has nothing to do in its utility of inferring the fire just as the reality of fumes has no part to play because of its ineffectiveness in such an inference. That
is why the Vedantins accept the authority of Karma Kanda also in its own sphere. The injunction in Karma-Kanda has its operation in mundane world, being dependant on the conception of difference, whereas the Vedanta has the purpose of the negation of this difference. 150

15. Just because it is said that through the Vedanta Vakyas, like "Neha Narastikicana," etc., and also those of assertion the realisation of the self is got after the negation of the non-reality, it shall not be assumed that negation as such is a fundamental fact and Realisation is got through it only. The School of Bhāvādvaita, ascribed to Maṇḍana Misra, proposed a reality to this negation on par with Realisation and it is this underlying reality of the both that is considered the Advaita. But such a conception of the continuance of sense of negation even at the time of realisation is illogical. 151

(a) The non-existence of an article is
cognised with reference to a base and not to the article
the denial of which is cognised; the very negation gets
its existence by the base.152

(b) There cannot be a co-existence of a
negation and an existence. In the case of negation of
an article there can be cognition only with reference to
the base and not the article negated.

(c) The negation of the world (or article )
cannot be an attribute of and common factor to the reality
or Realisation (of base) because the latter does not need
the former for its existence and so experience too.153

(d) A reality for the negation too can be
accepted for convenience (Vyakarana only); on the other
hand, if both are strictly real there will be two reali-
ties and realisations and if one of them is only compara-
tively real then it is unnecessary to assume any final
reality to it at Realisation.154

(e) Two realities, or as to that matter two
non-realities cannot function together towards the same end.155
(f) The very expression of non-existence of a thing is meaning-less because the expression "thing" means it exists and juxtaposition of it with non-existence does not carry any sense. At best it can be interpreted in a secondary sense viz., the attribute of the thing rather the "thingness" is negated. In this sense there is no negation of reality at all in the stage of Realisation, by the assumption of which only the negation can be considered real.\(^{156}\)

(g) The cognition of existence and non-existence cannot arise simultaneously. If they do so one of them must be illusion or it must be the cognition of an entirely different thing, here the totality of both by which the underlying reality is meant just as the perception of a varigated colour (Citra) arises when a series of multiple colours is seen.\(^{157}\)

(h) It is not possible to postulate any difference in reality because then the reality looses its
intrinsic nature of singularity.\textsuperscript{158}

(i) The conception of mutual non-existence too cannot hold good. Just as the cloth can never be the non-existence of pot, even though it is so postulated by Naiyayikas etc., The self-realisation cannot be equated with the negation of the world. It is something positive just as the cloth is.

(j) The idea of difference is cognisable as a quality according to \textit{vaiśeṣikas}. So if there is a difference between the negation of the world and Realisation, it must be cognisable when both are not in the same foot. If no such cognisable difference can be assumed, then both are one and it is unnecessary and illogical to assume different status to each.\textsuperscript{159}

(k) If a relationship between a negation and realisation is assumed, it must be either a \textit{Samavāya} or contact. Samavāya is assumed as the relationship, it means that both join together to produce a different article, just as the threads produce a cloth; in which
case the existence which is so produced as it were, will be merely a *Jātī* or common attribute. The relationship cannot be a contact also as both cannot function together as stated above.  

(1) The reality is single by its own self but multiple when cognised to external things; such a proposition presumes the reality to multiplicity also when negation is not at all possible.

(m) The very nature of cognition of the world cannot be clearly defined. It cannot be more absence of other five means of knowledge because it means that the non-existence is no positive means. If any separate positive status is assigned to it, it then follows that it is quite different from the realisation and then the possibility of two realisations arise. Hence such a cognition is not a correct one and merely stands on par with doubt, indecision etc., which are only partial variations of reality.
So the cognition of negation of the world is only a variety of experience; all experiences, except that of self-realisation, are only false. It is perhaps the immediately preceding experience to the dawn of realisation and it gets negated by the latter. The factor of "Not known previously" in the statement "I now cognise a pot not known previously" is only a reference to an experience and not a statement of fact because cognition is determined to the present time and cannot be extended to the past. One can speak of "Unknownness" of a thing even without cognition.\textsuperscript{163}

\textbf{(h)} Mere negation of the world cannot be equated with salvation and that would amount to the view of Bauddhas. Happiness and sorrow are experienced separate and the absence of one cannot be the other; but one may be the means to the other.\textsuperscript{164}

16. The question of meditation and any such mental activity leading to the final emancipation is also not feasible. In the process of reception of mental concep-
tions (Manana) or meditation (Nidhidhyasana) etc., there shall be a cogniser, cognised and the process of cognition. The cogniser is the 'I'. The conception of 'I', cognises the self. So there is the existence of duality and the knowledge arising out of it is based on such a duality. Hence the conception of 'I', the so-called cogniser, is only relatively real and it is only the realisation obtained through Vedanta Vakyas make this relative reality of 'I' conception removed, when only the self in its pure form of knowledge remains. It is also not possible to consider that, since both the conception of 'I' and the self realised are same in essence there is self realisation achieved in this process of meditation because in such a case it is not the meditation, an external process in which the result of action is th acrue to a cogniser standing separate, but the self simply realised. Any amount of meditation etc., only helps in making this conception of 'I' becoming stronger and stronger. Thus when such an internal means cannot comprehend the self-
realisation, there is no possibility of external means (Eg: the six means of knowledge or activity etc) comprehending it.

THUS according to Neo-Advaitins like Sankara and Suresvara any iota of activity is no means for salvation. However action is still considered as helping to the extent that it produces diversion from desire. Just as a prohibitory injunction diverts from its effect as they cause intolerable pain and thus cause freedom from desire, even shall the actions of desire as they produce grievous results will divert the men from their own selves and their effects, including the world of prajūpāti. There will be thus a longing to be freed from the cycle of life. Thus they help Realisation indirectly (Arādeva).

This contention is to be examined from certain philosophical and practical points of view. Any philosophical speculation, which has a deep religious significance too, and it is so in Indian thought, shall give a basis for the thought and life of the individual.
seeker. It must be reasonable and practicable too. In this respect the doctrine of Advaita, especially as enunciated by Suresvara, excels the practical schools of religious philosophy that went earlier, and compare very favourably with western thought of recent times.

For Buddha, the voidness of all phenomena is the final goal and the 'Sīla' and the resultant 'Samādi' prescribed for the ascetics of that school are the same as its final goal. 'Sīla' means those particulars volituous and mental states etc., by which a man who desires from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. By proper adherence to Sīla, which has three aspects namely, Cetana, Ācetasika and Sumavara, all the bodily mental and vocal activities of the ascetic are duly systematised organised and stabilized (Samadhānam, Upadhāranam and Pratiṣṭā). The practice of Sīla accompanied by pure disciplinary codes (Dhūtaṅgas) helps the ascetic to adopt the course of Samādhi; Samādhi means concentration of the mind bent on right path (Kusālacitīśekāgrata Samādhi) on
a single object in the first stage (Bkarambhana). The objects of concentration change from concrete to abstract like Universal friendship, Universal pity etc. The next step is meditation (Dhyānam) again from concrete to abstract. There are four stages in this process of meditation, the ascetic getting rid of the bondages one by one. In the end, fourth and final stage characterised by Supreme and Absolute Indifference (Upeksā) comes the final perfection which is nothing but total extinction of Citta (Cetovīśukti). Here there is absolute cessation of sorrows and suffering, Nirvana. Thus the whole discipline of Buddhism ending in Final Emancipation leads to complete annihilation. It is a withdrawal from the world and is based on pessimism about the world. "Better trust the fear than faith" is the motto of German Philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer and so is the Buddhistic view of philosophy life. The mind and body are instruments of will (Citta) which by itself has no motive, no aim, no purpose and no limit. It is a mind, endless and futile-striving. It
works and ends in its Vayanti-thesis; the will to live driven ultimately to self-destruction. Life is postponed death so Buddha as well. So the best way to avoid both life and death is to destroy the will. But happiness cannot be equated with destruction; it is something positive. The will to destroy the will requires another will to destroy itself and so on we end in nowhere.  

So also says Mimamsaka, avoid all that produces happiness or misery, the optional and prohibitory deeds but do the obligatory ones which produce no result but guard you from fall. prabhakarás, so as to avoid any entanglement do not admit any result, not even the purification of mind (Cittasuddhi) to these obligatory deeds. In this respect they pass over even the Karmayoga enunciated by Bhagavādgītā. It is the ethical obligation of the human being to do his duty and what is right in this respect is ordained by Veda. Veda, which is intution for all orthodox schools of philosophy, is analogous to Immanuel Kant's "Categorical imperative". This intution
is not a matter of 'pure reason' but 'practical reason'.¹⁷¹

But this much is the difference between the Kantian and
Mīmāṃsaka conceptions. According to Kant "our feeling
proves to us the existence of free will. For if we had
no free will we should have no conception of moral obli-
gation. We cannot feel obliged to do what we are not
able to do,"¹⁷² Sankara and his followers too hold that
to do or not to do is according to the will of the person
and not the obligatory aspect (Niyoga) of the injunction
(Vādhi). Even though we act upon the instinctive prin-
ciple that goodness is its own excuse for its being, our
feeling and consequent knowledge that it will be rewarded
in the next world of birth, if not here and now, moti-
vates us to act good. This conclusion of Kant is sup-
ported by Bāttas as well as Advaitains.¹⁷³ There is no
action without motivation and performance of obligatory
deeds is indeed to meet this desire and it is only a pre-
tence that they aim at nothing.
THE Bhāvadvaita school, says that the Karma is to be done to dispel the ignorance through the establishment of the destructibility of world. This Karma may be that ordained in Purva-kānda or in Uttara Kānda. The Final Realisation dawns through the Māhāvākyas. As such the negation of the world and the Realisation of self stand, as it were side by side; and to achieve this, Karma and Jñāna are equally necessary. However there is no sense of obligation in the Karmas to be performed. As per the Hegelian theory, not only has everything an opposite but everything is its own opposite. Hegel's practical reason is to arrive at the former and his pure reason to realise the latter. The Bhāvadvaitin also accepts both the practical Karma and mental reasoning followed by Abhyāsa, the former for negation and the latter for Realisation. The equation of both is the unity of both but this sounds odd and hence says the Advaitin that even the negation and its sources are illusory.

BUT Suresvara in his enthusiastic defence
of Advaita, perhaps lays over emphasis on meeting the arguments of other schools. The view of Advaitin is less explained than meeting the arguments of the opposing schools. Even here he first elaborates the views of the opponent and then meets them crisply. This argument is more negative in outlook. Perhaps this reflects the very method of Realisation of an Advaitin: negate the world and its root cause the nilsence and the Realisation dawns of its own accord. It is a 'Sadhana' of the Suresvara, the "Vividisa Sanyasin."