CHAPTER II

"THE SELF"
THE Supreme contribution of Suresvara to Advaita doctrine is his own interpretation of the illu­sory nature of the world and utmost possible approxima­tion of personal soul to the impersonal one. He consid­ered both the world and personal soul as pseudo-appea­rances - Ābhāsas of the Supreme - but not delimitations or transformations. The essence of such a doctrine is that not even a transitory reality and utility is accep­table to this appearance. This perhaps reflects the view of an extremist school. Suresvara's dissatisfac­tion with the other schools of Advaita in this respect is worth consideration.
The School propounded by Padmapāda, one of the direct disciples of Śrī Śaṅkara, and his follower Prakāśatman, known as Vivarṇa School holds that both the subjective psychological experience and world of objects come into being on account of the transformation of negation, Ajñāna, which is a kind of indefinable stuff. This Ajñāna is not the Ajñāna of Buddhists i.e., wrong notion of misconception, or contradiction (Viparyaya); it is a positive power or stuff. All appearances, which are effects shall have material cause and this Ajñāna lying in the transcendent self as a separate power is this material cause of the universe. This Avidyā-potency which is but a substance having a power of transforming itself into cosmic appearances, is considered to be 'Sakti' or potency inherent in the transcendental self because of its dependance on the latter. The self holds the Avidyā within it as a dependant function and as a consequence of it, gets reacted by the very same Avidyā with many fold powers so that it veils its substratum and makes it as the underlying basis of all the appearances caused by it.
Thus in the creation of the world, Brahman and Maya together are material causes. Hence there are two distinct characteristics in the world appearance; the "existence" from the Brahman and materiality (Jādyā) from Maya. Brahman is the cause as the unchanging basis of Maya and Avidyā which is the cause, is the stuff that actually undergoes transformation. This view is a development on the Vivarana school which holds the Brahman as 'Nimitta' and Avidyā as the material cause. At the same time here Brahman, even as a material cause, does not undergo any transformation, as the mud into a pot.

The defect in this process of causation appears to be that Brahman, however basic it may be, gets entangled in the world appearance. The world gets its substances of existence from this basic and as such is not easily deniable. Among the two aspects of the mundane world, the Saṅkṣa and Jādyā, the latter can be negated by the cessation of the transformation of Maya but the former continues to be there; nor is it intended
for negation too because it implies the negation of the
Brahman, the final goal.

Moreover there is no possibility of negating even the Jādyā aspect, when the material cause the
Māyā or Avidyā is considered as the potency or power
resting on Brahman. This potency shall either be a part
and parcel of Brahman in which case it is beyond the
scope of cessation; or it is apart from the latter when
there is no possibility of the Brahman playing a part in
the causation of the world. There shall be a plausible
explanation for the world-appearance and possible way of
realisation of the basic Brahman. Both these are not
possible in the view of Vivarana School or its latter
amendment.

Vācaspati Mīśra also expounds the theory
of Brahman, jointly with Avidyā to be the material cause
of the world. The transformation of gold into an ornament
or mud into pot etc., are the examples usually cited in
this connection. The ornament is only a transformation apparent of the gold. In fact it is only the gold in another form and likewise the world appearance is another way of presentation of the Brahman, the material cause. The value of the ornament is intrinsic in the value of its material cause, the gold, and the reality of the world lies in its material cause the Brahman. The transformation as an ornament will conceal the gold, as it were, and the Maya and its effects veil the Brahman. This Maya is based on the personal self and when Brahman is subjected to this Maya it gets transformed into the world appearance. Thus Maya helps the process of causation.

An extended form of this theory is attributed by Appayyadiksita to the author of Padārdhataśvanirṇaya. It makes the Avidyā or Maya subordinate in the matter of causation and Brahman the be all and end all of such cause of the world. The world as such gets a stable existence and its negation is not at all an easy process. An obstinate impediment requires a still more obstinate
means and in this context and the Sravana, Manana and Nidhih{ya}sana, as they are ordained through a sense of injunction (Niyoga) come to play their part. But by these processes it may be possible to get at the cessation of the world-apparent but how can the Brahmān be realised by this? Surely it cannot be a residue of world negation.

The Vivarta school, on the other hand attributes the power of causation to Māyā. Taking the basis of Brahmān, Māyā apparently changes itself into the universe. In this theory, Māyā, at least in the illusory stage assumes a reality as, otherwise, the possibility of transformation does not arise. The reality, if it is to be possible at the stage of effect, must be existing at the stage of cause also. As such in this theory there is a need of assuming reality to Māyā even before the apparent transformation. It means that at the stage of realisation the negation of Māyā is not possible or it continues as a separate entity which means
that is no realisation at all. Sarvajñātana-muni

hence considers Brahman as the real material cause of the
world through the instrumentality of Maya. Brahman, being
absolutely changeless, cannot be itself be considered a
cause, so that, when Brahman is spoken of as cause this
can only be in a remote and modified sense through the
instrumentality of Maya.

The main feature of this proposition is

that even though Brahman is the actual material cause it
does not undergo any change or transformation with or
without the aid of Maya. Nor is there any transformation
of Maya, as such taking its nourishment through the Brahm-
man its substratum. There is the appearance of Universe
in the Maya and since Maya, rests as it were, on the
Brahman this appearance is misinterpreted as it were that
of Brahman itself. The projection of appearances of
Universe in the Brahman is due to the wrong and illusory
cognitions of the individual. At the time of realisation
the pseudo-appearances in the Maya cease and Maya itself is
discarded through the Vedanta Vākyās. The Brahman that stays behind presents itself and the realisation dawns. In this theory there is no causation attributed to Maya and never to Brahman. It is neither, Vivarta nor Parināma but only an Ābhāsa.

This view is an annulment of what is known as Ābhāsa theory of Suresvara. According to him the whole universe is only an appearance of Brahman disguised as it were. The disguising factor is Avidyā, which serves as a flimsy curtain. The Brahman who apprehended through this curtain, is cognised as the world with its multiple facets and activities. The curtain, as it were, gives its own form and name to the Brahman and without the basis or illumintion of the latter, the curtain, not to mention its own various permutations and combinations, has no existence at all. Hence the partition between dissolution and creation of the maintained universe is very thin.
BUT Suresvara does not stop at this stage, in his explanation of the Universe. There is a primary appearance and all the secondary appearances depend upon and are drawn from this primary one alone. In the process of creation Brahman takes a form, an appearance, through Avidya; rather it is correct to say that a form is attributed to the Brahman as it appears through the Avidya. It is again to be noted that Avidya itself has no form or existence without this background of Brahman. There is a form, created in the Avidya, on account of this basic principle viz., Brahman and Brahman in its turn gets the attribute of an appearance of form by such an Avidya. Thus in this primary stage there is a movement in Avidya and this is attributed as the movement of Brahman which is actually motionless. This stage is called Isvara, the sentient and omnipotent. It is here the curtain if Avidya is so flimsy that can be pierced through by a mere will as it vero. It is Cidabhasa.

THIS appearance or Cidabhasa continues in the
secondary stage of evolution. But these secondary appearances draw their essence from the primary one. This primary appearance, cidābhāsa, is the perennial source or inexhaustible medium of the subsequent manifold appearances of the world. Here too avidyā has its own place. The Brahman that has taken the form of primary appearance, gets involved further; its secondary and subsequent appearances are projected through the very same avidyā. The factor that is so projected is the primary appearance of Brahman but not the Brahman in its original stage. This primary appearance, itself being a projection of Brahman through avidyā, is said to be the creator of the world; and its avidyā curtain being flimsy, it is said to have a control over it. The avidyā through which these subsequent appearances are projected is termed as māya; it is avidyā drawing its life from śiva, the primary appearance.

The next stage of the projection of the primary appearance through this māya is the universal
soul or Hiranyagarbha. One phase of projection of this Universal soul, again through Avidyā, now got further thickened, and assumed the term of Buddhi or intelligence, is the personal soul or Jīva. The other phases of projection constitute the multifarious world which is nothing but latter and latter appearances of the above Abhāsa through the Avidyā getting thicker and thicker and assuming the term Ajñāna finally resulting in the projection Jñānen-driyas, Karmendriyas, Tanmatras etc.

The last stage in this process of downward gradation is the illusionary appearances in this world. Here too the earlier stages i.e., the multiple world, which is Cidābhāsa in its own turn, gets projected again through Avidyā, now termed as prahman or illusion. Thus according to Suresvara, the illusion is one of the variations of appearances, may be at its lowest level, of the supreme reality and as such has an atomic basis of truth behind it. The illusionary appearance is only the final degradation of Supreme truth and the medium of this process, Avidyā plays
its worst and final part at this stage. In the process of evolution of the universe, the Brahman stands at one end and the illusion (Brahman) at the other end and the crooked line that connects both is avidya.

THUS according to Suresvara, the whole universe is a series of appearances of the supreme being clabhasas, and their permutations and combinations. Isvara is the Abhasa of the Supreme Reality through Avidya, the virâ of Isvara through Mâyâ, Jiva of the Isvara through Buddhi, and so on. Thus every particle in this universe is an Abhasa of the Supreme Reality which is in one stage of evolution or other.

WHAT is the status of Avidya then? Is this also an Abhasa or appearance of cit? Suresvara does not contribute to this idea and in this respect he is in the footsteps of his Guru. It is not possible to postulate any clear conception of this Avidya. It cannot be given the same status as the supreme reality because it then becomes indestructible. Nor it can be considered to have
any separate entity as distinguished from the supreme Reality, for fear of accepting a duality. Hence it is only indescribable, \textit{anivarcanīya}. But Suresvara does not use this phrase. Its conception can be neither of indistinguishable nature from the reality nor separate from it. Hence its very existence is due to lack of discrimination. "Avicārita-siddhi" is the phrase coined by Suresvara for explaining how, then, this Avidyā results.

BUT what is the wrong in assigning the status of an \textit{Abhāsa} to Avidyā also? After all, its resultant conceptions of the universe are explained away as \textit{Abhāsas} of the cit. There are two defects in posulating such a proposition. First, there is the defect of Anavasthā (ad-infinitum) because for Avidyā to become an \textit{Abhāsa} another Avidyā is required. The conception of \textit{Abhāsa} is that when Reality is viewed through Avidyā, there is an appearance of the reality, coloured through this very Avidyā. Hence to consider Avidyā itself as such an \textit{Abhāsa} is illogical.
SECONDLY if Avidya is an Abhāsa, it attains the status of a relative reality. In the conception of Abhāsa like Tāvora, Jīva etc., there is a basis of reality, however borrowed or atomic it may be. Then realisation dawns, the distorting factor of the Abhāsa is removed and the basic principle of reality remains and continues, as it were, expanded to infinite. If Avidya too were to be considered as Abhāsa, it stands on the same footing as the other Abhāsas and even at the time of final dissolution, it cannot be stipulated as completely extinguished. The basic idea of postulating a relative reality to a conception is that it is basically and eternally real and the non-real aspect is only an appearance. It is dangerous and self-destructive for Advaitins to accept such a basic reality to Avidya too.

THEN, why should the Advaitin assume such an Avidya at all, an inexplicable conception. Suresvara answers this question that it is so because it is there in the experience. But, because there is the physical
and psychological experience of Avidyā, it is not possible to assume a reality to this Avidyā as well. This experience of Avidyā is not on account of such a reality of its own, but because its function is due to the base on which it operates, the Supreme Reality. The latter lends, so to say, its reality to the Avidyā. Hence the experience of Avidyā is again due to non-discrimination (Amicārata-Sāmsiddhi) 11

THEN what is the position of Ābhāsas like Īśvara, Jīva etc., with reference to their relationships with this Avidyā. The Avidyā, which is an inexplicable conception, is the cause for these wrong conceptions and hence will certainly have its say and influence in their functions. Even at the stage of final emancipation, the basic "cit" of these Ābhāsas, may not hence get relieved of such an overwhelming influence of Avidyā. The result will be that there is no possibility of dissolution of Avidyā at all in the stage of salvation too.
Suresvara's reply to this objection too is that the very ēkāsas are resultants of non-discrimination, Avicārita-Siddhas. What is this Avicārita-Siddha according to Suresvara? "He uses this epithet at all most all places where he mentions the ignorance of the self i.e., (Pratyāhāra). This relationship between the self and the ignorance has been enunciated clearly by Suresvara that this ignorance "has arisen due to non-discrimination in the matter of self." The real nature of the self is not apprehended either fully or correctly and such a non-apprehension is called ignorance. The ignorance has a two sided function, one towards the self and the other towards the non-self, its resultants. As far as the first one is concerned the nature of this function and consequent relationship is quite inconceivable and beyond and means of postulation.

The fact that there is this ignorance cannot be denied because it is brought out by experience of incorrect and wrong concepts, and the very 'experience' contained in such concepts testifies to the fact that the self discharges its function of base or witness with regards to
this ignorance.

THIS word 'Avicārita Siddha' has three components: Vicārita, a negative particle and Siddha. The word 'Siddha' means that which is 'ready' or available to experience. The Avidya came into being and acquired an existence, even though such a conception for it is not caused either by fact or fancy. The reason for such an Avidya is "Avicārama" i.e., lack of discrimination. The Avidya is not there when there is 'Vicārama i.e., correct reason and discrimination. When there is a complete and correct analysis of the evolution, Avidya disappears even if it is not fully dissolved. Hence in this word Suresvara completely gives a picture of Avidya. He concurred with his Guru as well as colleagues that Avidya is not false; at the same time he insists that it has not only an existence but also is an aspect of experience and this existence. He allotted a level of existence to Avidya all most equal to Brahman, the Supreme self. Both are 'Siddha' and are within the experience of an individual. The difference being that whereas Brahman is undeniable, at any stage,
Avidya cannot stand a ‘Vicāra’.

BUT even for acquiring existence, which is not essentially temporal, and the stage of being experienced by the individual, Avidya requires the background of Brahman. Avidya is immutable (Jaça) and devoid of illumination (Acetana). To acquire an existence which is proved only in experience these two qualities are quite useless. The Jñāya and Acetnata are nullified by the background Brahman. Hence the function of Brahman as far as Avidya is concerned is only this much, but not the very generation of Avidya. There is Avidya and Brahman gets it into working. The epithet ‘Avicārita’ also means this i.e., the working capacity of Avidya or its power of further transformations resulting in concealment (Āvarapa) and incorrect ideation (Viksepa), is actually caused by the background Brahman but wrongly assumed to be of its own.

Saurusvara does not deny an existence ‘Sattva’ to Avidya but only reality ‘Satyata’. He says that since
Avidyā is thus in existence due to lack of proper discrimination, it neither acquires reality of background Brahmān is transferred to it, so as to cause its aspects of existence or mutability, because when this aspect of reality is known Avidyā ceases to exist. Amandagiri however, confuses 'reality' as 'existence' and says in his commentary that Avidyā has no existence at all, there by indicating that it is no entity at all. Vidyaśārya, in his Vīrtika Jāra also, does not, perhaps, correctly understand this distinctive conception of Suresvara and confuses 'Satya' with Satta and says that the existence of avidya is not possible either in consonance with or in separation with Brahman and hence it is Avicārita Siddha. He however assumes the existence of avidya because it is in experience that 'I do not know', a negative cannotation.

The latter authors and commentators appear to mistake this conception of Avicāritaśiddha with that of Anirvacanīyata. Suresvara does not consider this pri-
mordial Avidya as Anirvacanîya, because he ascribes an existence to it, relative only to the Supreme. The definition of Anirvacanîyata is difference from existence, non-existence and both. Madhusûdana Sarasvati, while defining Anirvacanîyata on these lines,\(^{18}\) gives an alternative definition also viz., it consists in the nature of not being competent to withstand an analysis as existence or non-existence for possessing the attribute of existent or non-existent.\(^{19}\) That is to say it cannot be described an existence, like Brahman, or non-existence as abhava; nor it can be described as an entity having the attributes of existent or non-existent in such terms like a 'pot exists' or a 'pot does not exists in a cloth.'\(^{20}\) While the first part of this definition is acceptable the second part may not stand an examination. Madhusûdana Sarasvati, in a second alternative definition of Anirvacanîyata says that it consists in being annihilated in an object delimited by it (Avidya).\(^{21}\) When Avidya is assumed as existent before such an annihilation and it does not acquire the attribute as non-
existent after the annihilation, how can it be considered as worthy of annihilation at all? So these two terms must mean real and unreal, as was propounded by Suresvara, or eternal and non-eternal.

MADHUSUDANA Sarasvati himself, to meet such a question squarely expands his idea of 'existent' and 'non-existent' that the former means as not being the object of annihilation and the latter as being unfit of being cognised by the existent. Further expanding these two concepts he concludes them to indicate the eternal and non-eternal as not being subjected to destruction and other wise respectively. His commentator Brahmananda explains these two terms of external and non-eternal more clearly. It hence becomes inevitable to accept that avidya cannot be described as real or non real but not so as existent or non-existent and an existence has to be assumed to it.

WHILE defining avidya itself, Madhusudana Sarasvati says, he accepts it to be as having a positive form without a beginning and liable of annihilation by the
Supreme knowledge, and adds that positive or negative nature of a thing has no relationship to it in the matter of destructability or otherwise. So only the reality and unreality shall have to be considered as necessary adjuncts, for judging the indestructability and destructability respectively.

In Tattvārtha Uchāya, Suresvara clearly says that Avidyā exists out of its own very existence, but, the commentator interprets the expression 'very existence' as the basic supreme consciousness. Even the simile given in this context does not support such an interpretation of this word. During day time there is darkness as far as owls are concerned and such a darkness does exist because of the nature of owls. The real day-light has nothing to do in the matter of existence of such a darkness and the relationship of both is so far as when the former is realised the latter disappears. Similarly there is Avidyā that comes into being and exists on its own accord and the basic supreme self has nothing to do in bringing out such an existence. Such an existence to Avidyā, only
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comparative to the Supreme Self, has been emphatically expressed by Suresvara in Naiskarmasiddhi also.\(^{30}\)

Sri SANKARA also attributes indescribability only to the effects of this primordial Avidya. He calls the name and form as Anirvacaniya and not the Avidya which has created them.\(^{31}\) According to him it is that these two effects of Avidya that he assumed as the very nature of the Isvara and their cause has nothing to do in such assumption. There is Anirvacaniyata in such wrong assumptions, only. It is also interesting to note that Vacaspati Misra,\(^{32}\) explains this aspect of the falsity of the effect of Avidya, is limited in time and space. The effects which appear and disappear are not real but false since they are delimited by time and space. The appearance of these denotes that they are not eternal and disappearance indicates that they have a temporal limit. When on account of Supreme knowledge, these limitations of effects are negated, their cause, Avidya, too gets negated since only the Supreme self remains in the experience. Thus there is negation, once for all, of
Avidyā from the standpoint of the supreme knowledge and this does not prove that Avidyā was not existent at all. "Falsity is not merely the absence of reality at the time of destruction". In this sense perhaps Avidyā can be termed as false because a reality can never be destroyed but not in the sense that it has no existence for all the times.

NOW, what is the connection between Avidyā and its basic ground, the Brahman. It is quite impossible to define this relationship correctly and completely. "The difficulty of giving a satisfactory explanation of this relationship," Radhakrishnan says, "is due to the imperfection of human mind which employs limited categories of space, time and cause and which at least commonly entertain fragmentary aspects of the world that are not genuinely real."

BUT Avidyā, like Vidyā, should have some thing on whom it has to rest (Âsrayā and some object to which it refers (Viśaya), "Just as a knowledge is incomplete
WITHOUT ANY SUBJECT and object, similarly Avidyā too requires some one as its substratum, to whom it belongs or characterises and some content which is governed by it. But in the case of Vidyā or Jñāna these requirements are for enlightenment and in case of Avidyā they serve the purpose of creation. The enlightenment consists in the realisation of the basic supreme self that abides in all the three, the subject, object and the relationship between them. Hence it is logically sound to say that all the three are based in this respect on the Supreme self only. But in the case of Avidyā, since these three factors combine to produce illusion and consequent creation of the Universe, it is difficult to assume all of them to be alone the Supreme self only.

BUT according to Suresvara, and also a good majority of Advaitins, the Supreme consciousness itself, is both the subject and object of Avidyā. The locus of Avidyā is this Supreme self and Suresvara is
very emphatic about it. He gives three reasons for such an assumption.

FIRSTLY this Āvidyā or its resulting ignorance is the sole source of all the unwanted creation. The Universe and the individual self that experience its effects are caused by this Āvidyā. "Every part of our experience involves two fold consciousness viz., the consciousness of the real of which our consciousness never fails and that of the unreal of which our consciousness fails." What is fleeting must be unreal and what is constant must be an absolute reality. As a corollary the temporary unreal, even though experienced at present, is only an appearance. "Persistence is the criterion of the real and particularity that of the unreal."  

THIS unreal, which does not persist on a closer and enlightened examination of the problem, wears a mask of reality and permanence because of its association with the real. Without this borrowing or transfer
of reality to the appearance, there is no possibility of appearance at all. Even an illusory idea which has no form of an external object exists as an idea (Avagati) and for this purpose it gets the reality transformed from the basic consciousness or illumination.

NOW, the appearance itself is not real and so is considered to be useless and on the other hand it produces unwanted results. On the one hand it leads to the non-realisation of the Supreme Self (Avaraka) and on the other it leads away from it (Viksepa) and the primordial Avidya only which is the source of all these temporal appearance is the cause for this state of affairs and it gets the temporal reality on account of the underlying Supreme consciousness.

THE second reason advanced by Suresvara is that the Supreme self itself assumes the function of a seer (Saksi) in the manifestations of the primordial Avidya and its function. To assume such a function of even 'Sak-
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Sakti in the Supreme self which is considered to be free from any function, a touch with Avidya may have to be considered necessary. But according to the commentator Anandagiri, the contact with any form of Avidya is not necessary for this assumption of Saksitva. Starting from this standpoint, the conception of Saksi changed stage by stage to Jiva, in the Advaita thought.

Vidyaranya gives three types of Saksi in the chapters of his Vedanta Pancadasa. In Kutastha Dipa, Saksi is defined as Kutastha himself i.e., the unchanging Supreme consciousness without a touch of Avidya. This conception tallies closely with that of Anandagiri referred to above. Jhana Chandapada maintains that Saksitva really belongs to the category of Supreme consciousness but is mistaken through the process of superimposition, as being the function of Jiva.

This view is supported by Citasukhacarya who draws a distinction between the Saksi, the seer, and pramato, the cogniser. The former is not qualified
by Avidya whereas the latter functions through the instruments of knowledge that are mere modifications of the same. To gain Saksitva, mere presence of Avidya as an associate is adequate. The logic behind this, says Citisukha, is that during the sound sleep where there is Avidya there is a knowledge of sound sleep experienced inspite of the absence of the functioning of the instruments of knowledge and yet there is no external or internal cognition. The concept that gains this experience is Saksi. He also strongly denies any complications of the Supreme Self with a Avidya at this stage because in that case the pure consciousness gets involved in the function of cognition, when he cannot be termed as a mere self. He is emphatic that even in this stage of Saksi, the nature of Supremo consciousness is retained by the seer.

ANOTHER conception of Saksi is given by Vidyaranya himself. The omnipresent Supreme consciousness not only acts as seer by itself without any attachment
whoso-ever, but throws its enlightenment on the modifications of Avidya that stands around it. The distinction between this conception and the former one lies in that in this sphere there is an activity on the part of Supreme-consciousness, may be an involuntary one, namely enlightening the Avidya environment, while in the former even an iota of any such activity is absent. This activity is purely voluntary and automatic and does not tend to cause even the simplest blemish of Avidya in the Supreme.

SARADAVAYA clarifies this view and identifies this conception of Śākta with Isvā, because in Vedic passages only the Supreme God is considered to be Śākta in as much as he, being omnipresent, acts as the starter of all activities and yet remains neutral. The conception of Isvā consists in the stage where duality is projected due to the working of Avidya and yet is not experienced in effect. Further modifications of Avidya and the delusion brought by it, start from this point and so this forms the basis for Jīva.
IN this proposition, Isvara is not exactly the personal God. The Supreme consciousness is endowed with the function of creation as well as witnessing due to the proximity of Avidyā but since he is not involved in the effects of Avidyā he maintains the non-attachment. Hence the epithets of single (Kevaṇa) and non-qualified (Nirguna) are employed. Perhaps these two epithets can only have a secondary sense in this context because Isvara has the function of creation too and he cannot be strictly considered as single and free from qualifications.53

The third conception of Sākṣi, is in the Citvadipa.54 Dividing the consciousness into four fold as Brahman, Rātastha, Isvara and Jīva, Vidyāraṇya says that Isvara, "residing in the intellect, having the intellect as his body, nor perceived by the intellect, directs the intellect from inside,"55 and he gets attribute of omniscient because of this function.56 This Sākṣi is identified with the intellect due to the process of superimposition
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and hence mistook to be moving along with the it, in the process of mundane cognition. Evidently it is the Jīva the consciousness delimited by the intellect which is considered as Sākṣi here and when the delimitation in this stage is removed, automatically he is identical with Īśvara. Appayya Dīksita mentions some school of Advaitins who contribute to this concept. The analogy of daily experience where Sākṣi indicates a person who sees the incident without any attachment whatsoever in it, is given in support of this observation. The attachment and yet the function of witnessing are possible only when the pure consciousness is delimited by the cause, Avidyā, and not its effects like mind and intellect. Thus the internal pervasive consciousness (Antaryāmi) who is really Īśvara, is termed as Jīva when he discharges the function of a witness according to this school of thought.

THERE is yet another school which considers that the Jīva, even when he is delimited by the
effects of Avidyā, like mind and intellect, it is the Sākṣi actually. The basis for such an assumption is that if the universal Īśvara is the Sākṣi, everybody should have the perception of the mind and intellect of every second man, because the enlightenment caused by the function of witnessing is common to the whole universal consciousness, i.e., Īśvara, delimited only by the Universal Avidyā. But such an universal enlightenment is not in our experience. Even in dreamless sleep, this school of thought assumes the retention of mind in its atomic form, so that the Jīva discharges the function of witness through it.

WHAT is the view held by Śrīsvāmīya in this matter? He does not hold that the immutable Kātastha consciousness to be the Sākṣi because to be a witness is to discharge function of the same and this involves mutability. At the same time the Sākṣi shall be the nearest possible entity to the pure consciousness and the Avidyā or its effect that causes this Sākṣitva
should be liable for termination very easily. There shall be no attachment in this function.

To be so, both the stages of Īśvara and Jīva are the appropriate ones where Sāksitva is possible. Suresvara considers both these stages as discharging the functions of Sāksī. In the stage of Īśvara, the pure consciousness being all-pervasive and yet functioning through the veil of Avidyā is the Universal Sāksī. It is not possible without this universal consciousness to discharge the function of creation and control from inside (Antaryāmitva) on the part of Īśvara. For all such functions the awareness is the primary requisite.

The stage of Jīva, which according to Suresvara, is the Supreme consciousness delimited by Avidyā which is in the stage of cause only and not effect like the mind or intellect. The difference between the Avidyā of Īśvara and that of Jīva is in degree only and not in content. In the former there is no delimitation
of supreme consciousness. It is only a veil as all-pervasive as the veiled itself. In the latter only a part of the veiled supreme consciousness functions and hence the supreme consciousness itself appears as though it is delimited by the veil of Avidyā. Hence the Jīva too discharges the function of Sākṣi in his own limited atmosphere. 66

HOWEVER, there exists slight difference in the function of Sāksitva of Isvāra and that of Jīva. In the former the revelation of the object is caused by the process of non-differentiated enlightenment (Abhādā-bhivyakta). The object caused by Avidyā is consumed as it were and made as a part of revealing consciousness. In the case of Jīva there is slight attachment; the underlying consciousness colours the object (ciduparāga) caused by Avidyā through the intellect and mind. The object in return throws its light on the consciousness. 67

THIS view of Suresvara namely that the Sāksitva continues from the highest point of creation
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...till the lowest where there exists the function of cognition, it is perhaps the most convincing proposition that stands both the reason and common sense. "It may well be imagined that consciousness, though prior to matter in the order of knowledge is posterior to matter in the order of existence," both from the Epistemological and Ontological stand points of view, the assumption of Saksitva both for Isvara and Jiva is inevitable because the Supreme consciousness reveals the physical and psychological creations and yet its existence is established and revealed only through the latter, however temporal it may be. The transcendental is the cause of the temporal and yet the latter reveals the former.

How far this view of Suresvara concurs with these of other orthodox Advaitings? The view of Vidyapajapa has already been stated and he perhaps takes up the clue from Suresvara and expounds these two aspects of Saksi in the Citradipa and Natyadipa of his Vedanta pancadasa.

Suresvara himself draws his inspiration of this two fold conception of Saksitva from his Guru Sri Sañkara who while...
commenting on *Bpadraṣṭā* gives these two conceptions of Sākṣi namely a seer, standing nearby and yet not getting into any entanglement and also a seer who lies as the inner most of body and internal organs and who makes them all his objects of witness. The former interpretation signifies the conception of Ṛṣṭvā and the latter Jiva and the commentators too agree on this point.

In western philosophy too we come across Idealist thinkers, who do not deny consciousness but deny an entity to it. Prof. James says "Undeniably thoughts do exist. I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is no aboriginal staff or quality of being contrasted with that of which material objects are made, but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform and for the performance of which this quality of being is involved. That function is knowing." It may be noted here that James, like Advaitins considers that both 'thoughts' and
material objects are derived from a primordial stuff called "Pure Experience." The views of Suresvara come close to this proposition. For the derivation of thoughts, in order to enable them to perform the function of knowing, the quality of being, or the 'primordial stuff' of pure experience is to be involved. The function of knowing when it stops at this stage is parallel to the Saksitva of Isvara. When it continues further so as to grab the object too, which also is a derivation of pure experience, it is equal to Saksitva of Jiva.

To conclude, the Supreme seer becomes a Saksi at two successive stages and the primordial Avidyā as an associate and as a delimiting factor, is the cause for such an assumption of the function of witness. Hence it is but natural and logical to hold that this Supreme self itself is the base for the Avidyā.

The third reason advanced by Suresvara in support of such a proposition is that the revelation and realisation of supreme soul is obtained by the negation
of Avidyā and this would not be possible if Avidyā is not based upon this very Brahman.76 There is no distinction between this realisation of Brahman and negation of Avidyā. Suresvara definitely denies not only any stage between these two factors, but any separate standing for each of them. He does not consider these two even as two aspects of the same thing. The arguments of Suresvara in support of such a proposition in which the negative entity of negation of Avidyā is equal to the positive entity of Supreme Bliss are many. To mention some of them: (1) If this is not so, the supreme realisation becomes something freshly formed and then it will have to be considered destructible equality.77 (2) Some external action may have to be found necessary, for the realisation, if the function of Vedānta Vākyas stops with negation of Avidyā and in such a case the realisation becomes again a thing created and hence liable for destruction.78 (3) Strictly speaking the Universe and other eternal creation have to standing different from the
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self except through the ignorance. Consequently the negation of ignorance and Avidya has no standing except in the form of the self and its realisation. Even the means of realisation, such as Vedanta Vakyas fall in the scope of this Avidya and they too get negated on attainment of the Supreme realisation, since they have no standing apart from the supreme self. Only the presence of ignorance is considered to be standing in the way of Supreme realisation by all schools of philosophy and the destruction of the same is adequate for the Realisation.

ACCORDING to Suresvara the process of realisation is immediate and not gradual. In the individual soul too, the ignorance and its cause Avidya are negated by the means of Mahavakyas at one stroke and the Emancipation is got without passing through the stages of Isvara, Kutastha etc., for the enlightened. Such a realisation is possible only if Avidya is admitted to rest itself on Brahman directly. His Abhasa theory also upholds such a conclusion because, all the psychical and physical creations are mere appearances of Brahman seen through Avidya.
and the negation of this Avidyā is nothing but the supreme Realisation.

WHAT is the relationship of this Avidyā with Brahman on which it is so based? This is a vexed question in Advaita. In the previous paragraphs it is pointed out that Suresvara considers that primordial Avidyā has a definite existence viewed from the angle of created Universe and hence it cannot be considered as indescribable or Anirvacanīya.

The Vivaraṇa School led by Padmapāda and Prakāśādīka, hold that Avidyā not only rests (āśraya āśrayi Bhāva) on Brahman but has the very same Brahman as its object (Viśaya Viśayībhāva) too. For the purpose of creation of the Universe, Brahman is considered to be not only the Mīmāṁsaka Kāraṇa but Upādānakāraṇa too and in this process of creation the Avidyā starts from the base of Brahman and gets its effectuation by concealing the very nature of latter. All the aspects in the creation are
pseudo-reflections of Brahman in the mirror of Avidya.
The very existence of Avidya is caused by the Brahman and again the very same Avidya produces the false reflections.\textsuperscript{83}

Another school of thinkers, among whom Vācaspati Miśra is the leading exponent, thinks that the relationship of Avidya and Brahman is that of object and predicate (Visaya Visayabhāva) only, but there is Asraya Asrayābhāva between Jīva and Avidya.\textsuperscript{84} Avidya operates first having the Supreme consciousness as its object. Through the permutations and combinations of Avidya and its products, Brahman gets qualified and transformed into the various phases of psychical and physical creations. When the Jīva is formed by one of such transformations, Avidya rests on him so that the Viksaya aspect of its forces operates and leads him further and further into Samsāra.

In these two schools of thought the relationship of primordial Avidya and Brahman is not quite clear.
They only try to describe the evolution of the Universe from Brahman through Avidyā. It is quite difficult to clearly define this relationship because "Progress in knowledge may enable us to describe the phenomena which make up the objective world with greater detail and more accuracy, but the rise of the finite world out of the bosom of the infinite—is quite beyond us" and this is the point, "When elucidation stops and nothing is left for us but to admit a fact not capable of further deduction."^85

BUT Suresvara tries to establish this relationship in definite terms. According to him Avidyā does exists (Siddha) in the Supreme soul as a special feature (Asādhārana) and is cognisable in the presence of the latter only (Pratyagatmaikagoccha)^86 Hence the Supremo consciousness is like the soul^87 and very essence of Avidyā which pervades all its phases. Suresvara attributes to Avidyā all most an equality equal to Brahman, short of permanence. Such an intrinsic and intimate relationship between Brahman and Avidyā extends to the
"In this connection it may be remarked that this apparently conflicting description about the nature of Avidya, which assumes its existence ante but denies its persistence after Brahman realisation, is the logical outcome of the two-fold intellectual position which recognises Brahman (from the view point of Absolute Reality and consciousness) as unrelated and transcendent and at the same time (from the stand point of Avidya or limited reality) as related being the underlying substratum of the said universal power or phenomenon—whether explicit or involved—as infinito potencies in the womb of Avidya. In other words, those two apparently self-contradictory concepts about Brahman are clearly reconcilable in accordance with the two stand points namely Vastu-Vrutta (i.e., view point of Reality) and Tamp-Vrutta (i.e., view point of Avidya), recognised by Suresvara."  

But actually it is the Avidya that is responsible for this two-fold and self-conflicting stand...
According to Suresvara the effects of Avidyā too have a contact with the Brahman through their material cause only because as already explained the relationship between this cause and its underlying Supreme consciousness is that of soul and "souled" (Atmātmavatva). At the same time Suresvara does not clarify as to whether the Supreme self can be considered as the soul of the effects too but his commentator clearly says that such a relationship of effects to Brahman is not a real one (Kalpanik).

Hence it should be surmised that as far as the effects are concerned, the individual soul or Jīva shall be considered as the essence and there exists the relationship of Atmātmavatva between these two entities. Otherwise, Brahman himself gets directly involved in the multiple creation. The example of spider's web coming out of the spider, for explaining the creation aptly suits only this proposition because the Spider stands in the place of Jīva and the world, in that of
the web.\textsuperscript{92} From the viewpoint of Kūṭastha, the proposition is false but from the viewpoint of Jīva it is partly real.\textsuperscript{93}

The individual soul is capable of consisting those two phases of existence i.e., reality and falsity at the same time only on account of this nature of partial reality.\textsuperscript{94}

Hence it is within the capacity of the Jīva to shed down one aspect of this nature or other; he can be one with the Omnipresent or immerse in the creation of ignorance.\textsuperscript{95}

Even a little inner perception reveals that the personal soul is devoid of duality which arises only when viewed from the angle of the Supreme ignorance.\textsuperscript{96}

To sum up, Suresvara postulates the following points in the evolution of psychical creation.

1. Avidyā exists intrinsically in the Supreme consciousness.

2. The Supreme consciousness evolves itself as an appearance and thus the Kūṭastha is formed. The primordial Avidyā has not clear place in this stage of evolution of the Supreme into Kūṭastha.
3. The first projection through the primordial Avidyā is called Īśvara and the Avidyā that persists at this stage is called Maya.

4. A further creation of appearance is that this Īśvara through his Maya assumes the form of an all pervasive individual soul when the Maya is thickened as it were into ignorance (Ajñāna).

5. This individual soul entangles itself in the multiple world through the ignorance when it gets the title of cogniser the ignorance and the intelligence (Buddhi or Anahākarana).

6. A further projection is in that the Jīva becomes doer and the ignorance the organs of sense and action.

THUS according to Suresvara the process consists in a series of projections of the Supreme consciousness through Avidyā. In this process, the primary Ābhāsa is formed through the primordial Avidyā and it is Īśvara. But before this there is a stage of outward evolution, in the form of all pervasive inward cognitive consciousness. When this consciousness becomes external, then arises the need for the assumption of Avidyā and its
consequent association whence the primary Abhisa termed Isvara arises. Up to this stage, hence, there is no appearance of duality but there arises duality in the stage of Isvara when the Avidya arises and assumes existence, of course impermanent and unreal. The duality gets consolidated further when creation starts at this stage of Isvara; one is psychical and the other is physical.

Two stages in the evolution of Jiva are enunciated above. One is all pervasive individual soul which functions through an Universal ignorance and the other is an individual soul that gets entangled through the intellect. Suresvara clearly recognises these two aspects and consequently he is of opinion that Jiva is Universal as well as multiple. The Universal Jiva is Hiranyagarbha and gives rise to mainly psychical evolutions and the individual Jiva function through intellect and its vṛtti. The Hiranyagarbha is not with in the experience of an ordinary soul but he assumes the function of an individual soul when he functions through
a vātti "Thus a psychosis, like the switch of the electric light is essential for the connection of the Jīva with a particular object through the mind (antahkarana)."  

In the former stage the revelation of the object is thorough manifestation of identity (Abhedabhivyakti) and so it is a philosophical cognition leading to the attainment of the stage of omniscience of Jīva. It is an upward movement. In the latter stage the object is revealed in the process of cognition where there is a personal colouring of the consciousness (Cidparāja) and hence a downward movement.

The former is a metaphysical conception of experience of knowledge and the latter epistemological. In Indian philosophy, and especially in Advaita Vedanta, the metaphysical conceptions give a base and foundation to the epistemological ones and viewed from the conceptions of Western philosophy this may seem strange. "But if we closely examine the modern epistemological thesis of perception, it will not be difficult,
to find that their loud protests against metaphysics, existemologists have tacitly assumed without criticism certain theories of reality on the truth of which alone their epistemological conclusions can stand. If so, is not far better to express the metaphysical grounds, and confess plainly and honestly that the final guarantee of these epistemological theories would come from the truth of metaphysical assumptions?