ORGANISATION

The Governor General, by Pitt's India Act of 1774, was made responsible for all affairs, civil or military, of the Indian Government. But, as already noticed his position in military matters did not become unquestionably superior until 1833 when the entire superintendence, direction and control of the whole civil and military government was vested in him and the Council. The Governor General and his Council were, however, prohibited from declaring war or commencing hostilities or entering into any treaty for making war against any of the country princes or states in India without an authority of the Court of Directors except when hostilities had been commenced against the British. The Governor General communicated with the Court of Directors on important military matters, and obtained directions to formulate military policy. Orders and notifications relating to military matters in India were communicated through four different channels: the Gazette of India, Governor General's Orders (G.G.O.), the General Orders of the Commander-in-Chief (G.O.C.C.) and the Indian Army Circular (I.A.C.).


2. The East India Company Act 1793, Sec 42 (33 Geo 3, c52) dated 11 June 1793 vide Statutes at large from the thirteenth Year of the Reign of King George III. to thirty-fourth Year of the Reign of King George III, 12th Volume of Mr. Ronnington's Edition and 16th of Mr. Ruff Hend's.

3. Carnduff, C.W.C., Military and Cantonment Law in India, Calcutta 1904, P.XXIV.
The Command of the Army at each Presidency was vested in the Commander-in-Chief, one at each of the Presidencies. The Commander-in-Chief in Bengal was termed the Commander-in-Chief in India; he had control over all the troops of the Crown serving in India; but not over the Company's troops in the other two Presidencies. The Commander-in-Chief at Madras and Bombay held independent commands and were not in any way under the Commander-in-Chief in India; but when the Commander-in-Chief in India personally visited the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, he assumed the command of the Presidency army for the period of his stay and the Presidency Commander-in-Chief automatically became the Second-in-Command in that Presidency.

This special arrangement seems to have been made for administrative convenience for, because of the great distances involved, the Presidency Commanders-in-Chief did not have enough time and means of communicating with the Commander-in-Chief in India stationed at Calcutta. It was desirable that they should exercise their own discretion in the times of emergency. The troops of the Crown were kept an exception owing to their comparatively small number at Bombay and Madras and it would have been very inconvenient to give their control to three authorities. The arrangements thus made, however, did not prevent the Presidency Commanders-in-Chief from employing the

troops of the Crown in operations.

The appointment of the Commander-in-Chief in India as well as that of the Presidency Commander-in-Chief was made by the orders of the Court of Directors. This term of office was originally limited by usage and later by regulations to five years, during which he was precluded from taking leave to Europe. They were required to obey all orders passed by the Court of Directors and the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India or by the Council at each Presidency on their behalf. At each Presidency the Commander-in-Chief was a member of the Council. The appointment could be given to an officer of the Company or to an officer of the Crown and it was required to be approved by the Crown.

The system of separate Presidency Armies, each having its own entity under its own Commander-in-Chief and with its own staff, was the outcome of historical circumstances. Such a pattern was unavoidable in the early days of the Company's rule, owing to the nuclei having been established at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. This system was found so useful that no

1. The East India Company Act 1793 (33 Geo 3, C52) Sec XXV, vide Statutes at Large from the thirteenth year of the Reign of King George III to the thirty-fourth year of King George III, 12th Volume of Mr. Ronnington's Edition and 16th of Mr. Ruff Hand's.
2. Cornduff, C.W.R., Military and Cantonment Law in India, Calcutta 1904, P.XXIII.
3. Evidence of Major General Sir Pritzler, Minutes of Evidence 5,12,2-1234. It appears that whereas the other members of the Presidency Council exercised their authority outside the limits of their Presidency, the Commander-in-Chief's authority as the member of the Council was confined to the Presidency limits.
effort was made at uniting the three armies in the organisation of 1791: and when the army was re-organised in 1824 the Court of Directors considered it useless to amalgamate the three armies.¹ Even in 1857, when the armies were transferred to the Crown, the old system of separate armies was allowed to continue in preference to having one army for the whole of India. The three armies were not united until 1925,² when the advantages of the system ceased to be operative because of the improved communications.³ The Home authorities had been reluctant to give sanction to this measure only because of the great advantage of the old system of separate armies. As an army officer put it, there was 'a political safety' in the division of the Indian Army.⁴ The armies if united would have become too strong and they would have been, paradoxically, a constant source of danger to the British Empire in India.

The events of 1857 appeared to justify this assumption. During the Mutiny, the troops to be mutinous belonged to the Bengal army and there was no mutiny in the Bombay and Madras armies.

It could be argued that had the army of the East India Company been a single whole, the mutinous spirit would have prevailed in the entire army and jeopardised the Company's position in India.

1. Military letter from Court, dated 25 November 1823, Para 213.
troops: the Crown's troops and the East India Company's troops. The Crown's troops were subject to recall from India to meet emergencies in other parts of the British Empire.\(^1\) It was for this reason that a sufficiently strong European force was maintained exclusively for the Company's service, in addition to the Crown's troops. It did not mean, however, that the European troops of the Company could not be withdrawn under any circumstance. During the Crimean war, for instance, the European troops of the East India Company were withdrawn from India in spite of the Governor General's opinion that 'the consequence of weakening the European force at his disposal, even by a single soldier, would be fatal'.\(^2\)

The Company's army was literally the army of the Company and it had all the ingredients of a good army of those days. The Crown's regiments were sent to India only for certain periods of service, and they were kept strictly as auxiliaries to the troops of the Company. But in spite of an equal status of the two armies, the Crown's troops in India enjoyed more facilities by virtue of the customs and traditions having established for centuries earlier. For sometime after 1788, when the King's Commissions were first granted to the Company's Officers, they did not hold the high ranks which the Crown's officers held. The 'Order of Bath' was extended to Company's Officers only in 1826.

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2. Ibid, Q.3901.
Brevets for service were granted in 1832, and the rank of General was first given to the Company's service in 1837.

In Europe, the rank of Commander-in-Chief was first acknowledged in 1855.

The first Commander-in-Chief was appointed from the Company's Officers in India was appointed in 1856.

The Company's troops were also of two types: Native troops raised from the inhabitants of India and European troops raised in Great Britain for the Company's service. The majority of the native troops consisted of "regulars", but there were some irregular troops also.

The Artillery was never irregular, the Infantry had only a minority of irregulars; the Cavalry was mostly irregular.

Besides the three Presidency Armies, there were the Hydrabad Contingent and the Panjab Force. The Hydrabad Contingent had come into existence in 1798, when the Nizam came under British protection. The Hydrabad contingent consisted of over six thousand troops in 1798 and was armed with firelocks with

some artillery manned by Europeans.¹ A treaty was signed in 1800 between His Highness the Nawab Asafjah and the English; he agreed to add two battalions of Sepoys and one Regiment of Cavalry, with their due proportion of guns and Artillery men, to the previously existing force of six battalions of Sepoys, of one thousand each, and one Regiment of Cavalry, 500 strong (with their proportion of guns and Artillery men). The whole subsidiary force henceforth consisted of eight battalions of Sepoys and two Regiments of Cavalry of 1,000 strong, with some artillerymen.² By another treaty, in 1853, the Company agreed to augment the force, when it was named the Hydrabad Contingent, and the force was to consist of not less than five thousand Cavalry, with four Field Batteries of Artillery.³ It was from 1853 onwards commanded by the British Officers fully equipped and disciplined, and controlled by the British Government through its representative, the resident of Hydrabad.⁴

The Panjab Force was raised on the 13th of May, 1849, under the supervision of the Board of Administration, and was, in the following year, placed on the footing of a military corps under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal, almost like His Majesty's Troops, and not

¹. Letter of Lt. Colonel Cuthbert, Resident of Hydrabad to Lt. Colonel Durand on special duty with Governor General, Inquiries on the subject of Reorganisation of the Armies of India, with Reference to the Fifth Paragraph of the Letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors of the Government of India, No.235, dated 25 November 1857 (Subsequently abbreviated as 'Inquiry').

². Loc Cit.

³. Loc Cit.

⁴. For fuller details of the Hydrabad Contingent, refer to the book entitled 'The Hydrabad Contingent.'
under any Presidency. It was ordered to consist of five regiments each of Cavalry and Infantry, and was raised for general service in the Trans-Indus Provinces under the British rule; and also beyond these limits, if emergency required it. The Sikhs formed the majority of the Panjab force, and at the time of the Mutiny there were 70,000 Sikhs on the pay roster.1

The military administration was vested in the Military Board which in each Presidency had been formed by the orders of the Court of Directors in 1786. The Commander-in-Chief was its president, and the senior military officers at each Presidency, the senior officer of Artillery, the Chief Engineer, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General and the Commissary General at each one of the Presidencies were members of their respective Military Boards. The Board was assisted by a subordinate department called the military department to help carrying out its functions.2 The department was brought into existence with a view to enforcing matters of policy and administration, but important matters continued to be decided by the Governor General's Council and the department performed only what may be called clerical duties. The Military Board as an administrative unit in Bengal issued all general orders to the army; all returns from the army were forwarded to it; so were the plans for the Company's territorial defence and for the distribution of troops. The records pertaining to the regulation of expense,

2. For details refer to Bannerji, P.D. History of Military Department, (Printed by Order of F. Collin in Military Department Press) Calcutta 1901.
promotion of officers and several other important matters were kept by the Board; it also undertook to perform the duties of Supply system till 1809, when the Commissariat came into existence. Even after Commissariat came into existence its administration remained under the Board till 1853, when three separate departments were formed, the Commissariat, the Military Public Works and the Ordnance. Some of the departments under the Military Board in 1827 were the Ordnance Department, the Gun Powder Agency Department, the Foundry Department, the Gun Carriage Agency Department. Some of the important functions of the Military Board were the supply of stores from England and their distribution among the Provincial Magazines and Depots, the supply to regiments and Corps of equipment and stores, and the checking up of their expenditure, the conduct of Public Works, civil and military.¹

The Military Board with its numerous military duties could not keep pace with overgrown work at each of the three Presidencies. The difficulties experienced were common in all the Presidencies. The Board in Bengal as early as 1823 had admitted that they were unable to accomplish the duties assigned to them.² In the infancy of the Company's rule when army was small, the assemblage of the heads of the civil and military departments under the immediate direction of the Commander-in-Chief served very well for running the Military Board; but as the immediate duties of those members required more time as a

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¹ Military Consultation, dated 7 December 1827, No.157, P.3 (Sub Page 4)
² Military Consultation, dated 29 October 1830, No.1, Para 3.
result of growth of their respective departments, the Military Board came to be neglected. \(^1\) The Secretary of the Military Board was burdened with its work, for the other members, who were holding higher ranks and important departments of their own, could not pay much attention to the Board. \(^2\) It came to be felt that though the Secretary's duties required him to see all the working of the establishments under the Board, he was not responsible for the resolutions that might be founded on his observations. Similar difficulties were reported by Sir John Malcolm from the Bombay Board. \(^3\)

Reforms were undertaken by orders of the government by dividing the business of the Board into two departments, Military and Civil, the first comprising all subjects relating to the army and Military Finance, and the second comprehending all civil works and establishments. \(^4\) The duties of the Board so divided were entrusted to the civil and military members, who were specially employed for the purpose. Subsequent to 1830, small reforms were undertaken in this department, and it continued to function until the Mutiny.

There was some staff allotted for the functioning of the Army machinery. The Governor General's military staff consisted of a private secretary, a Military Secretary and aides-de-camp. The personal staff of the Command-in-Chief

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1. Ibid, Para 4.
consisted of the Military Secretary, an aide-de-camp and an interpreter. Sometimes the functions of the aides-de-camp and the Military Secretary were combined and given to one person. These officials assisted the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief in their offices.

Throughout the period under discussion, there existed the departments of the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General. Owing to the presence of the troops of the Crown, the staff was duplicated; besides a full staff for the Indian armies, there was staff for the troops of the Crown, an Adjutant General and a Quartermaster General, with their deputies. The staff officers of the Crown's army, however, did not possess independent powers, but communicated with the Commander-in-Chief in India through the Staff Officers of the Presidency Army. The duties of Adjutant General, when his office was first formed in 1730, included all arrangements and general detail, conformable to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of all the armies in India, the formation of all general returns of these armies, lists, reports etc. for the Court of Directors, the conduct of military correspondence with higher authorities, with the Military Board and with the other Presidencies. To these duties, subsequently, the native promotions

1. Army lists of contemporary period published by order of government in the military department.
and superintendence of inferior court martial were added.\textsuperscript{1}

The duties of Quarter Master General's department included arrangement and direction of all that related to marches and movements of troops, including also their distribution of troops and periodical reliefs.\textsuperscript{2} The duties remained so, except that small additional functions were given to these departments subsequently.

There were other important functionaries besides the Adjutant General and the Quarter Master General. The Military Paymaster General looked after the arrangement of disbursements of pay to Military Paymasters, and the Military Auditor General exercised a check on all payments.\textsuperscript{3} The Judge Advocate General, with his deputies in each Presidency and a deputy for His Excellency's troops, watched over the proceedings of Court Martials, and brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief any irregularities in those proceedings, especially in cases of district and Regimental Courts Martial. The Surveyor General's department, commanded by a surveyor general, conducted surveys for the army. Till 1814, each Presidency had a Surveyor General but in that year the office of Surveyor General of India was constituted at Calcutta, with his deputies at Bombay and Madras.\textsuperscript{4} In 1829 the survey departments at Bombay and

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Military Letter to Court, dated 20 February 1827, Para 430.
\item 2. Regulations for the Quarter Master's Department, dated 28 February 1817, vide General Order, Commander-in-Chief 1817.
\item 3. Military Letter from Court, dated 18 November 1829, Para 51 and 52.
\item 4. Military Letter from Court, dated 16 January 1833, Para 5.
\end{itemize}
Madras were closed when the superintendence and control of the whole Survey Department was vested in the Surveyor General and a project of an atlas of India was undertaken.¹

Each presidency had its own specified military area which was further divided into military commands. For instance, after the annexation of the Panjab, the military area of Bengal command, which stretched across the whole of northern India from Calcutta to the Afghan frontier, was organised into seven divisional Commands.² The system of military Commands provided, at the headquarters of the armies, unity and harmony of action, and it prevented division and separation within the armies themselves.³

The Bengal Presidency, though vast, was effectively controlled by the system of military commands. In fact it may be safely suggested that the Presidency was kept as a single unit because of the effectiveness of the military commands.

When the Indian army was re-organised in 1796, the Bengal Presidency was to consist of six general officer's commands, four on the Company's establishment and two on the King's establishment.⁴ In 1813, in the Bengal Presidency there

1. Extract from Military Letter to Fort St. George dated 15 April 1829, General Letter from Court July-December 1829, P.479. The Commissariat Department under the Commissariat General came into existence in 1809, which conducted the business of army supplies (Look up separate Chapter on Commissariat).
3. Evidence of Sir George Clarke, Governor of Bombay, Report of Commissioners, 7.1297-1307.
were the following military commands: Banaras, Cownpore, Dinapore, Meerut, Saugar and Sirhind; in Madras they were Malabar, Canara, Center and ceded districts, Mysore, Northern and Southern Divisions; and in Bombay they were Poona, Surat and Southern Mahratta country. The number of the divisional Commands was fixed at each Presidency, and they were held by officers of His Majesty's service, as well as by the Company's service in the following proportion.

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There were some military commands lower in status than the divisional commands. For example, in 1833, Meerut, Calcutta and Sirhind divisions were commanded by a Major General, whereas Eastern Frontiers, Newar Field Force, Rajpoorana Field Force, Agra and Mathura, Malwal, Oude, Dum Dum, Barrackpore, Rohilcund and Delhi, were Brigadier's Commands, and there were one or two Colonel's Commands also. In establishing the number and priority of commands, there were considerations other than numerical strength. For instance Mysore division in the Madras Presidency in 1835 was termed as key division, and Bangalore was given a similar position because of its favourable climate. It was not as important as Mysore.

1. Military Map of India, Minutes of Evidence.
from the military point of view, but its climate favoured
establishment of practical military schools of the Madras army
there. In 1853, the Gwalior Divisional Command was reduced
from that of a Major General to a Brigadier's and at the
same time Cawnpore and Oude divisions were amalgamated. The
guiding principles in deciding the changes were not numerical
strength of line or local troops in India, but economy and
minor military considerations.

The appointment of officers to the Command of Brigades
and Divisions was done on the principle of selection and
length of service. This was established by an order of the
Court of Directors dated 23rd June, 1835: "We have no hesitation
in expressing our opinion that officers have no strict right
to succeed to the appointment of Brigadier or Brigadier-General
on the ground of mere seniority, these being staff appointments,
involving both confidence and responsibility, but we must
express our firm reliance on the discretion and good feelings
of our several governments that the claims of officers to
those or any other appointments arising out of length of
service, will never be set aside except on public grounds".

In practice the rule of competency was set aside and seniority
became the basis of staff appointments. The rule was slightly
changed in its application by Lord Ellenbrough, who with every
disposition to give the utmost attention to the claims of

1. Minutes of Governor General and Commander-in-Chief, dated
   28 February 1835.
2. PP Vol.50, p.211, Commons 467 of 1860.
   ioners, p.5536.
senior officers, made it a rule that the claims of public service were paramount over everything else, and that the aim was to secure the services of competent officers, the officers who were the fittest for the Command. Thus Lord Ellenborough made selection, rather than seniority, a rule for appointments to the commands.

In 1796 the armies of the East India Company were completely re-organised in all the three Presidencies. The real purpose of the re-organisation was to meet the grievances of officers of the army. Many officers of the Company's army, as senior as in the King's service, had been superceded by the latter. The supercession was owing to the grant of brevet ranks in the Royal Army, a system which did not exist in the Company's army. Among other things, the biggest grievance was that the officers returning to Europe, even those on sick certificate, were obliged to resign, and when permitted to return on duty, they received only a portion of their pay and allowances until occurrence of vacancies admitted them. Those who were too sick to return to India, were given subsistence from Lord Clive's fund which was very small. No pensions were granted whatever might have been the length of service. But

1. The Cambridge History of India Vol.6, Cambridge 1932, P.159.
3. Brevet rank was a rank higher than what was entitled. In the year 1788, by an act of Parliament the officers in India were granted Royal Commissions which removed the inequality in ranks for that time, but no measures were adopted to remove inequality in the prospects of promotion between the Company's and the King's troops.
for the overgrown dissatisfaction of the Company's Officers, the re-organisation might have waited a considerable time.¹

When the officers petitioned to the Court of Directors explaining the disadvantages under which their service was placed, Lord Dundas, His Majesty's Minister for India, requested Lord Cornwallis on 1st September, 1794, to furnish a plan in detail for re-modelling the army in India.² He requested Cornwallis to suggest a plan to prevent the continuance of those discontents and jealousies, which so often manifested themselves between the King's and the Company's troops, and between the Company's troops belonging to the different Presidencies.³

Cornwallis was of the opinion that the Company's military arrangement had not kept pace with the gradual increase in their territories and occasional augmentation of their establishments; the defects in the constitution of the army were of such a nature that unless remedied, they would soon render the officers in general no less discontent with their situations, than until for the discharge of the duties which may be necessary for the protection of the British interest in India.⁴ Cornwallis examined the existing condition of the

1. Neither the Board of Control nor the Council in Calcutta was interested as to how well the army was administered for the authorities considered finances more important than good administration and it was only when the discontentment of the army officers became a source of danger that steps were taken to re-organise the army. Barat Amiya, The Bengal Native Infantry Its Organisation and Discipline 1790-1852 (A.P.H.D. Thesis approved by London University), p.53.
2. Dundas to Cornwallis dated 1 September 1794 vide PP(microfilm) Vol.54, P.549 Lords 63 of 1812.
3. Loc Cit.
4. Cornwallis to Dundas dated 7 November 1794 vide PP(microfilm) Vol.54, P.549, Lords 63 of 1812.
Indian army and was of the opinion that Native Infantry was in good condition, but not the European Infantry. This he attributed to the difficulty of obtaining proper type of men for the service from England. He described the condition of artillery as one deserving his approbation because of its able-bodied men, and engineers on a comparatively bad state owing to a lack of experienced officers. He observed that there was no European Cavalry in Bengal and even native Cavalry was very small. He described the lascars of the Company's army of two descriptions, one attached to the Artillery, and the other employed in the Arsenal, in attending and pitching camp equipage. The Artillery lascars were under the immediate direction of artillery officers, to whose battalions or Companies they belonged, it had not been found necessary to have any additional European officers to command them, and although they behaved well in action, and were principally employed on military duties, they were considered more of labourers.1

Cornwallis recommended that the whole army should be transferred to the Crown, which meant that no army should belong to the Company as such, though all troops were to remain subordinate to the Government of the East India Company. He also suggested that the officers of the infantry should have the option for either the European or the Native branch of the service, but no exchanges were to be permitted afterwards. The rates of pay and allowances in the three presidencies were to be made uniform, and retiring pensions to be granted. If that could not be done, officers should be at liberty to

sell their commissions at certain regulated prices. The Court accepted most of the recommendations of Lord Cornwallis in principle except that they did not approve of transferring the Company's army to the Crown. The Court took into consideration the state of the Company's military establishments in all the Presidencies before determining the new establishment.

As regards the arrangement of European Artillery, they ordered each battalion to consist of five companies, each battalion of 1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant Colonel and 1 Major, 5 Captains (one for each Company), 5 Captain Lieutenants, 10 Lieutenants, 5 Lieutenant Fireworkers; 20 Serangs, 20 Corporals 40 gunners, 10 drummers and fifers, 280 Matrosses and 10 Fuckallies for Bengal; 20 Sergeants, 20 Corporals, 40 gunners 10 drummers and fifers, 280 matrosses and 10 Fuckallies for Madras; and 25 Sergeants, 25 Corporals, 50 gunners, 10 drummers and fifes and 310 matrosses for Madras and Bombay. In addition, some staff was ordered, which was to consist of 1 Adjutant, 1 Quartermaster, 1 Paymaster, 1 Surgeon, 1 Mate, 1 Sergeant-Major, 1 Quartermaster Sergeant, 1 Drill Sergeant, 1 Drill Corporal, 1 Drum Major and 1 Fife Major; the staff being the same for all the three Presidencies.

Each Company of lascars for the service of Artillery, which was employed for dragging and cleaning of guns, was

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1. Jaa Cit.

2. The details of organisation of 1796 as given in this paragraph and subsequent paragraphs have been obtained from Parliamentary Paper Vol.40, P.283 Commons 80 of 1863.
ordered to consist of 1 Serang, 2 First Tindals, 2 Second Tindals, 50 lescars and 1 Packaly.

As regards European Infantry each battalion was ordered to be formed into regiments of 10 Companies, each consisting of one Colonel, (Junior Lieutenant Colonel and Junior Major were without Companies), 7 Companies of 1 Captain Lieutenant, 21 Lieutenants, 2 Ensigns, 40 Serens, 50 Corporals, 22 drums and fifers, 850 privates and 20 Puckallies. The staff for the European Infantry was ordered to consist of 1 Adjutant, 1 Quartermaster, 1 Paymaster, 1 Surgeon, 2 Notes 1 Serjeant Major, 1 Quartermaster Sergeants, 1 Drill Sergeant, 1 Drill Corporal, 1 Drum Major and 1 Fife Major.

Native Infantry was ordered to be formed into regiments of two battalions each, with ten Companies in each battalion; the regiments were to consist of 1 Colonel, 2 Lieutenant Colonels and 2 Majors (Junior Lieutenant Colonel and Junior Major were without Companies), 7 Captains, 1 Captain Lieutenant, 22 Lieutenants, 10 Ensigns, 2 Sergeants, 20 Subedars 20 Jemadars, 100 Havildars, 100 Naicks, 40 Drums and Fifes, 1000 privates for Bengal, 1500 for Madras and Bombay. The staff for Native Infantry was to consist of 2 Adjutants (one for each battalion), 1 Paymaster, 1 Surgeon, 2 Notes, 1 Serjeant Major, 1 Quartermaster Sergeant, 2 Native Doctors, 1 Drum Major, 1 Fife Major, 2 Drill Havildars and 2 Drill Naicks.

The Native Cavalry regiments were ordered to consist of Six troops each, with 2 Captains, 1 Captain Lieutenant, 6 Lieutenants, 3 Cornets, 2 Sergeants, 6 Subedars, 6 Jemadars, 18 Havildars, 18 Naicks and 6 Trumpeters, 450 troopers and 6 Puckallies; and the staff was ordered to consist of one
Adjutant, 1 Quartermaster, 1 Paymaster, 1 Surgeon Mate, 1 Sergeant Major, 1 Quartermaster Sergeant, 1 Drill Master, 1 Drill Sergeant, 1 Trumpet Major, 6 Pay Masters, 6 Fifers and 1 Native Doctor.

A Corps of Engineers consisting of 1 Colonel as Chief Engineer, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Major, 4 Captains, 4 Captain Lieutenants, 8 Lieutenants, 8 Ensigns and 1 Adjutant.

The powers of the Colonel were defined in the following words: "The Commanding Officer of the regiment may parade it for exercise, or any other duty whenever he thinks proper, or may order a parade or exercise of either of the Battalions under its Command; but as the Commanding Officers of the Battalions are answerable for the discipline of their Corps, they are to be allowed to have such parades, and to prescribe such duties, or exercise, consistent with established regulations as may conduce to this end whenever the battalion is not required for general or regimental duty".

After the reorganisation, the army of the East India Company was placed on a footing of respectability which it had not held before. The Command of Bengal Artillery was vested in a Senior Colonel, with a Brigade Major as his staff officer. In the native infantry the proportion of officers was increased and made equal to what was then prevalent in the Crown's troops. This increased the efficiency of the native corps. With the new promotion system in which rise to the rank of Major within the regiment was provided for, experienced officers could be attached to the native corps and it strengthened the reciprocal confidence and connexion between
the European Officers and sepoys, which was always deemed the most essential principle of the constitution of native army.\textsuperscript{1}

The re-organisation, however, failed to satisfy all the aspirations of the Company's officers. Many promotions occurred in the Army after the re-organisation but it did not please some officers. The Calcutta Gazette recorded: "to learn that some of our officers, instead of receiving the material benefits and advantage held out to them by the army regulations, with gratitude and respect, had presumed to cursed those regulations in a style disrespectful and intemperance highly unbecoming the situation which they stand in those who prescribed them: that some had even dared to insinuate that we had been actuated by unworthy motives in forming some parts of regulations."\textsuperscript{2}

King's officers too were not happy to be placed under the Company's Commander-in-Chief. The difficulties of status and of jurisdiction over the royal as well as the Company's troops were so great that Cornwallis insisted on the grant to himself of the Commander-in-Chief, when he became the Governor General, and Lord Wellington and Lord Hardinge held the same positions.\textsuperscript{3} The Governor General as the Commander-in-Chief was acceptable to the King's officers.

\textsuperscript{1} Malcolm, "Political History of India 1764-1823", Vol. II, London 1882, P. 231.


\textsuperscript{3} Malcolm, The India Office, London 1896, P. 189.
Something new to emerge from the organisation of 1796 was the Horse Artillery and the Stud Department. On 19 June, 1797, the Governor General, on the authority of the Court, ordered that an experimental Horse Artillery should be organised with a view to ascertain how far such an establishment would be useful for the service with the army in India. 1 Guns, stores and Horse harness for the use of Horse Artillery were sent from England for the experiment. Some of the Experimental Horse Artillery was ordered to accompany the expedition to Egypt, and it embarked almost as soon as it was raised. 2 A portion was attached to the Governor General’s Body Guard. Horse Artillery was made a strong element by allotment of two guns of Light Artillery to each unit of Horse Artillery, and in due course each regiment of Cavalry also received the same number of guns, by an order of the Court of Directors. 3

General Lake was the first to combine the movements of Horse Artillery and Cavalry, by way of exercises, and made Cavalry a real effective arm by using the two in close co-operation. 4

The Government found it difficult to obtain horses for the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, and those available, were not of required size and strength. A Stud Department was therefore opened by the government at a very heavy expense, with a

2. Buckle’s, F. Memoir of the Services of the Bengal Artillery, London 1852, P.231.
4. A little more detail will be found in the chapter on Tactics and Strategy.
view to getting the finest type of horses for the service, both for Horse Artillery and Cavalry. The Stud Department improved the breed of cattle for the army beyond expectations. The department was expected not only to produce good breed horses for the army, but to become a source of income for it. By 1802, the Stud Department had made a considerable progress. The Court wrote: "With respect to the Company's stud, we have the further satisfaction to notice the considerable progress that has been made; that of establishing and extending an improved breed of horses in the Company's territories for supplying the Company's Cavalry. Every effort was made to improve the Stud Department. From time to time well-bred horses had been imported from England to be added to the locally purchased. The horses of Stud attracted the native dealers for the purpose of exportation. The quality of horses can be judged from the fact that, to prevent exportation, a duty equal to twenty per cent. of the cost of the horse was levied on all horses proceeding beyond the limit of provinces.

At Madras there was no Stud Department and all horses were brought down from the Persian Gulf by sea, and were purchased by the Commissary for the army. In that Presidency

2. Loc. Cit.
3. Military Letter from Court dated 12 March 1802, Para 32.
5. Evidence of Sir T. Pritzler, Minutes of Evidence, 1154 - 1155 and 1158.
all horses for the artillery were purchased by contract, a certain sum being allowed by the government for each horse; the horses, however, were approved by a confidential officer appointed for that duty; or sometimes a committee of officers was appointed for the same purpose. The horses then selected were sent to the depot in Mysore. The Artillery was allowed to make the first selection, and afterwards the Cavalry.¹

The Stud establishment in Bombay was started in the eighteen-thirties.²

In the early days when there were no studs, horses were supplied by an agency, held by a Captain.³ On the introduction of Studs, the agency system was suspended, but as the demand of Horse Artillery and Cavalry increased, the Stud could not keep pace with the demands. The unmet demands were fulfilled by purchase from native dealers and an appointed agent. As time passed, horse artillery, Cavalry and stud department became prominent parts of the army and the former two came to be extensively employed in Indian warfare.

The wars after the reorganisation of 1796 brought about a number of changes in the army establishment. The

1. Evidence of Colonel J. Limond, Minutes of Evidence, Q.1294, 1296 and 1297.


battle of Seringapatam brought about a great increase in the army. The Bengal army, the artillery in particular, was increased for the protection and tranquility of Cude. Since there was no prospect of obtaining Europeans to complete the required needs of artillery or men to supply the common casualties, Colundauze (the Colundauze or Indian artillery) was the only substitute for preserving this branch. A large number of Colundauze Companies were once again raised. Fifteen Companies were raised in Bengal. As soon as the wars came to an end, due to short-sightedness the Colundauze were disbanded, excepting the detachments which were on foreign service. But as soon as the British came to arms with the Marathas, the Colundauze were re-established. They were formed into five companies, increased to 6 companies in 1808, and a Captain was allowed to command in 1811. Then fully organised, in Bengal they were formed into two battalions of eight companies each. Each battalion had a Subedar-Major, 7 Subedars, 16 Jamadars, 64 Havildars, 64 Seaks, 16 Drummers and 332 privates; and a company had a Subedar, 2 Jamadars, 8 Havildars, 8 Seaks, 2 Drummers and 104 privates. The staff consisted of 1 Adjutant,

6. loc. cit.
In Bombay there was one brigade of four troops of Europeans as in Bengal. There was no horse artillery in Bombay and each troop had four six-pounders.¹

The foot artillery of the three Presidencies consisted of battalions, each of 4 Companies. There was 1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Major, 5 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 4 Second Lieutenants, 1 Adjutant, 1 Quartermaster, 1 Surgeon; Sergeants 24, Corporals 20, Bombardiers 40, Drummers 8, and gunners 320.² In addition, gun lascars were attached to Companies of foot artillery, each company consisted of Subedars 2, Jamadars 2, Havildars 8, Naicks 8, privates 120 to 160; and the native staff consisting of Subedar-Major, Pay Havildar, Bheestis, Washermen, Native Doctors, Artificers and Sweepers.³

The Golundauez Battalions of Bengal and Bombay were of 8 Companies and in Madras of 6 Companies, but the element of personnel was almost the same in spite of this major difference in basic organisation. Each battalion had 1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Major, 5 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 4 Second Lieutenants, 1 Adjutant, 1 Interpreter and Quartermaster, 1 Surgeon, 1 Assistant Surgeon; Native Officer, Subedars 8, Jamadars 12 to 16; Native Non-Commissioned Officers and rank and file; total 552 in Madras, 560 in Bombay and 832 in Bengal.⁴

¹ Loc Cit.
² Parliamentary Paper Vol. 13, Page 1, Commons 735 of 1832 (The Appendix on organization page 248 to 256).
³ Loc Cit.
⁴ Loc Cit.
At all the Presidencies each regiment of Native Cavalry comprised of six troops. Each regiment had officers; Colonel 1, Lieutenant Colonel 1, Major 1, Captains 5, Lieutenants 8 and Cornets 4; European Staff, Adjutant 1, Quartermaster 1, Surgeon 1, Assistant Surgeon 1 and Veterinary Surgeon 1, Sergeant Major 1, and Quartermaster Sergeant 1; Native Officers, Subedar Major 1, Subedars 5, Jemadars 6 in Bengal, 12 in Madras and Bombay; Native Non-Commissioned rank and file, Staff Havildars 3, Havildars 24, Staff Naick 1, Naicks 24, and Troopers 420.

In 1834 the Governor General, Lord W.C. Bentinck, submitted to the Council a plan for re-organising the army in India. The plan was calculated to improve the efficiency of the army, particularly in its Infantry and Cavalry branches, and was expected to reduce military expenditure. The plan did not propose any change in the constitution of the regiments of Infantry or Cavalry or decrease in the numerical strength. It was simply intended to raise the complement of each regiment from 420 privates to 600, which had been the average peace establishment of all the Presidencies many years ago and in the Cavalry from 420 to 600 troopers. It was also suggested to reduce two guns in each troop of artillery.

The following tables indicate the advantages expected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prospective Saving</th>
<th>Immediate Saving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22,89,451</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,63,337</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,45,952</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lord William Bentinck suggested the total abolition of the Bombay army. In his view the Indian army was the most expensive and the least efficient in the world. The Bombay army at any rate was serving no good purpose. He suggested that the Hindoostanee half of it should be transferred to the Bengal army, and the Bombay half should be a Major General's command under the Madras army. He argued that the Bombay army was very small and yet it required all the staff of large armies to conduct its affairs; and this resulted in great loss of revenues. To effect economy, he thought, the measure was necessary.¹

Bentinck's view was not shared by Sir C.T. Metcalfe. Howsoever pressing the financial condition might be, the reduction in the number of regiments (even when not in total strength) was not acceptable to Metcalfe. Reductions had already been effected previous to this plan and any further reduction would have made the system inefficient.² Sir C.T. Metcalfe wrote:³

We have repeatedly been in a state of similar confidence, which has been suddenly disturbed by unexpected war. In 1802, a large reduction of the army took place, under the expectation of continued peace. This was followed by a war in 1803, which lasted to 1806, requiring all our energies, and exhausting our resources. Before the Goorkha war we despised our enemies, and


² Bengal army was reduced from 1,70,000 men to about 90,000 by Bentinck after the Burmese war vide Evidence of Colonel Selmond Minutes of Evidence, 4.575.

³ A Minute by Vice President and Governor General in Council, C.T. Metcalfe dated 19 April 1835.
thought them utterly powerless. Nevertheless, they proved to be best soldiers. The Marquis of Hardinge, whom that war unexpectedly greeted on his arrival in India, left this country in a state of peace, little supposing he had bequeathed to his successor another war, the most expensive that we have ever had. There cannot I conceive, be a greater mistake than to imagine that our situation in India is without danger.

Metcalfe did not accept the sweeping statement of Bentinck that the Indian army was most expensive and least efficient in the world and that any appreciable financial gain would result from abolishing Bombay army. In a famous minute he said: "Is it not proof of efficiency that it has conquered all India? Is it no proof of efficiency that India is more universally tranquil owing to our Indian army than it even was under any Native Government or Governments that we send of? If our Indian army be so expensive, why do we not employ European troops alone to maintain India? Why but because Europeans are so much more expensive that we could not pay a sufficient number? If our Indian army be so inefficient, why do we incur the expense of making soldiers of the natives? Why do we not entertain the same number of undisciplined people who would cost much less? Why but because then we should lose the country from the inefficiency of our native force?" The plans of re-organisation were not carried into effect and the army organisation as ordered in 1824 continued as such till the year 1858. In fact the army as a whole made speedier progress and in years to come it proved to be about the best army in India.

Between 1796 and 1858, attempts were made to introduce a measure of uniformity into the organisation of the armies of the East India Company. For the organisation of 1796, the Court of Directors had ordered the same organisation for all the Presidencies. However, the old institutions could not be changed all at once. They therefore had allowed slight changes from Presidency to Presidency in the application of their orders, to suit the convenience of each Presidency. Once put on correct lines, the armies swelled in numbers, though there were occasional reductions after wars. In 1796, European soldiers including the white soldiers of the Company were about 13,000 strong, the Native troops about 57,000, the Madras and Bengal armies had 24,000 each, and Bombay 9,000. In 1805, the strength of the army rose to 154,000 out of which 24,000 were British and 1,30,000 Natives. The Indian army was 2,00,000 approximately in 1813; its strength became 2,76,000 in 1826, and this was the highest figure between 1813 and 1830. In 1830 it was 2,23,000 approximately. In 1849 the strength of the army was 3,00,000 fighting men, while there were 400 field pieces besides those mounted on forts. Out of the total strength, 1,58,659 were in Bengal; and this force was considered enough for guarding the Indian Empire. In 1856 the army was

1. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Oxford 1907, Vol.IV, P.333.
2. Ibid, P.335.
3. Appendix A(I) to Minutes of Evidence P.135 relating to 'The Amount force maintained in India at each Presidency and the dependent settlements and in each year from 1813 to 1830.
4. PP. Vol.29, P.1, Commons 219 of 1857.
estimated at 3,23,823 which consisted of 1,400 Drogoons (British Cavalry), 24,000 Royal Infantry, 2,660 Horse Artillery, 4,044 Foot Artillery, 6,215 officers of the Company army, 9,000 Company's Infantry, 700 veterans and 300 ordinance, warrant and non-combatant staff, making a total of 43,519 European Officers and soldiers; 275,304 Native troops including 2,569 sappers (Engineers), 4,480 Foot and 440 Horse Artillery, 9,450 regular and 2,37,80 irregular Cavalry, also 1,70,000 regular and 51,150 quasi-local or irregular infantry; and 516 guns were on service, 138 being horse artillery. At the time of Mutiny, the Bengal army formed by itself more than half of the Indian army and on 1st January 1857, the number of Native soldiers in the army of Bengal including irregulars of all descriptions, amounted to 1,70,000 men, and the European force consisted of 15,750 men; and the queen's forces were, Royal Artillery 2,686; Royal Engineers 230; Cavalry 2,962, Royal Infantry 44 battalions or 37,888. Thus we see that between 1796 and 1857, the army had become four times its size, that is, from 7,300 in 1796 to 3,00,000 in 1857.

We also observe that irregular force had increased during these years with equal steadiness. Irregular Infantry was never the elite of the Native army, but irregular Cavalry was certainly so. In point of organisation and pay some of the

irregular corps were on the same footing as the Native Corps, or even the corps of the line. The Ferozepore and the Goorkha Regiment, for instance, were as well organised as the Native Corps. It was not uncommon for irregulars to proceed on foreign service. For example, the 4th Sikh Local Regiment went to Burma during Burmese War. But in spite of all their capabilities, the irregulars had a lower status than the regular Native troops, both in times of war and peace. In war the Irregulars proved less disciplined and less efficient as compared to the regulars. In time of peace, civilian officers considered Native Irregulars at a very different standard than Native Regulars. There was never Irregular Artillery, but the Native Artillery was treated no better than Irregulars. Among the British rulers of India there remained a lingering fear that teaching the use of artillery to the natives was dangerous. This sentiment was explicitly stated after the Mutiny.

1. Reply of Major General Birah, Inquiry.
2. Evidence of Major General Harington, Report of Commissioners, O.1385. At the time of mutiny there were the following Infantry Corps viz:

1 Khelat-i-Ghitzil 3 Goorkha Corps 4 Sikh Local
2 Sikh Corps (Ioodianah & Ferozenore) Infantry
6 Corps Panjab Irregular Infantry or North West Frontier
1 Guide 5 Oude Locals 6 Gwalior 1 Harrianah Light
Infantry 1 Bhagalpur Hill Rangers 1 Ramgurh Light Infantry

Governor General wrote:

'in no way in future should the natives of the country be entrusted with British Artillery, nor should any native in India be instructed in the use of such dangerous weapons. The native drivers are good horsemen, and the gunners most excellent; and in proportion as they are most valuable to the government they serve, so are they more formidable when they choose to be rebellious.'

A Commander-in-Chief, believing that there was in the heart of every blackman, an inherent dislike of the white-man, advocated that the natives should not be taught the use of artillery. It was felt indeed that artillery should be the one arm in which an unquestionable superiority should lie with the British so that the subject peoples did not count upon success in revolt. Nevertheless, the British rulers of India raised Goludauze battalions for two reasons. Firstly, European Artillery was very expensive and Native Artillery could be raised at a much less expense; secondly there were not enough artillerymen available in England for service in India. Goludauze battalions were often raised only to serve in a war and disbanded or reduced immediately after its termination.

Artillery could never be completely dispensed with and the

1. PP. Vol.90, P.73, Commons 216 of 1859.
3. Reply of Major General Birch, Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Inquiry.
and the employment of natives in the artillery could not be avoided. They quite often tried to recruit in England officers and men for this branch, but the deficiency could not be met.\(^1\) Added to this was the difficulty of obtaining recruits and officers when in time of emergency augmentation became necessary. They were, however, employed on unimportant stations, in stations where European artillery could not be provided and on forts, with the result the European artillery were made available for more important employments.\(^2\)

The Engineers department of the army was very small.\(^3\) Wars brought out the dangers of neglecting this important Corps, but they were forgotten with the return of peace.\(^4\) In 1805, at the siege of Bharatpur, the weakest link was the Engineers and the Commander-in-Chief wrote to the Court of Directors;\(^5\) "Howsoever zealous my engineer officers were, neither their abilities, knowledge nor experience were adequate on the occasion, and this course had doubtless considerable influence in preventing that success which had hitherto attended every operation of my army."

1. PP Vol.19, P.73, Commons 216 of 1859. Also Military Letter from Court dated 15 July 1857, No.123.
2. Loc Cit.
4. Memorandum regarding the Employment of the Royal Engineer Corps in India, submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General with suggestions for modifying the Organisation of the Public Works Department (no date). This document is available in the Library of National Archives of India, New Delhi.
When we remember that the best officers went to the Engineers, their inability to fight in wars can be attributed to their having been employed, too often, on civil duties, which prohibited them from getting army experience. Barrack Building and repairing were the main jobs on which they were employed. The role of pioneers and sappers and miners, which was given to them suddenly in the time of war, could not be efficiently played.

Until 1856, the Barrack Department was not separate from the Engineer Department; the Executive Engineer of military division was also the Barrack Master, and there was no difference between the two functions. From the earliest days of the Company's army, Barrackmasters were appointed in Bengal for the custody of military buildings. The Corps of Engineers which in the beginning of the 19th century, numbered about 30 officers, was employed either in the field in survey duties, or in the construction of new works. The Chief Engineer, the senior officer of the Corps, was stationed at Fort William and had permanent charge of works there, in addition to his duties as a member of the Military Board. A minute of Council, dated April 27, 1789, defined his duties and that of Barrack Master. Things remained in that state until the year 1818, when a regular

3. The Sketch of Engineer Department has been summarised from Memorandum regarding the Employment of the Royal Engineer Corps in India submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General with suggestions for modifying the organisation of the Public Works Department.
Barrack Department was formed consisting of District Barrack Masters for the general duties of the department. These District Barrack Masters were placed under the orders of two officers, styled Superintendents of Public Buildings in the Field and Lower Provinces, respectively. The general control of the department was vested in the Military Board.

In 1824, when the army was re-organised, the term Barrack Department was replaced by the 'Department of Public Works. It was provided by a general order, dated 12 April, 1824, that the Barrack Masters were to be replaced, as vacancies occurred, by the Executive Engineers who were to be responsible for fortifications, and buildings (both Civil and Military), bridges, canals and surveys. The department at that time was very small. It was intended, that the department should be officered entirely from the Corps of Engineers, and the employment of any other officer was held exceptional. In 1839, the Court of Directors expressed their desire that the Department of Public Works and Survey should be wholly officered by Engineers and for that purpose some augmentation was done in the department in the following years.

The department provided barracks for the residence of European officers and men. No accommodation was provided for the Native troops. When Stationary, the Infantry regiments were quartered in thatched huts. In front of each row there was a

1. Military Letter from Court, dated 20 March 1839.
small place for storing accoutrements of which a Havildar was incharge. Even till 1858, the Department of Engineers was virtually a Barrack's Department.

Before 1764, medical duties were performed by civilian doctors and the department came to be organised into a regular service only in that year.¹ The Army Medical Department was separated from the civil in 1796 but again united in 1798, and it continued to be so till 1824, when it was again organised into a separate department.²

In 1796, the Medical Department was put under a Medical Board, with at least two members appointed by the Commander-in-Chief.³ The Board was responsible for the management of the department and was answerable to the Commander-in-Chief for the conduct of persons employed in the department. The civilian gentlemen of medical profession, on option, were given employment in the army. The rank in the army depended on their status in the civil employment. An Inspector-General of hospitals, or a Deputy Inspector-General of hospitals was appointed in each Presidency.⁴

European Doctors were employed for European troops, but Native doctors were also allowed on the establishment of all

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2. Loc Cit.
3. PP Vol.40, P.293; Commons 80 of 3, 1863.
native battalions. The proportion of medical officers allowed to European and Native Corps was three to one.

The medical officers received certain allowances from the government, which was worked on the establishment strength, and they in their turn were required to provide the necessary treatment. If Regimental Surgeons could not cure the patients, they were transferred to General Hospitals, which were under the charge of Medical Inspectors or Superintending Surgeons.

Hospitals also existed for sick women, and women hospitals were more for prevention than cure, where women suffering from venereal diseases were admitted, and were cured, lest the soldiers came in contact with them and contracted venereal diseases. Insane hospitals and sanitoriums formed a part of the medical department and there were many insane hospitals and sanitoriums in all the Presidencies. Some of the functions of the Medical Department were: maintenance of good sanitary conditions, removal of filth from cantonments, supply of pure water by way of water carts from deep tanks in the vicinity of cantonments, inspection of buildings for their fitness for living, ensuring cross-ventilation in barracks, especially in case of new construction. Introduction of Medical treatment to the troops raised the physical standards and reduced progressively the casualties which occurred for reasons other than war.

1. Military Letter from Court, dated 31 August 1804.
2. Loc Cit.
Sir Alexander Tullock who studied the casualty returns of European troops in India of 39 years, from 1817 to 1855, inferred that mortality of army in India during a series of years, was 70 deaths per thousand every year, and only 10 deaths were owing to war. This shows how important a part the Medical Department was to play in peace, besides its duties on the battle field.

For the conduct of operations accurate survey was most important and the army became the pioneer of Indian Survey. Captain Baniell was the first surveyor of India and all officers appointed under him were army officers. Baniell undertook the work of surveying the province of Bengal and finished the Bengal Atlas in 1781. Armies on their march by order of the Governor General, were required to maintain journal of field book in which bearing of places and objects, with their estimated distances were put down. The objects selected were prominent landmarks like forts, hill forts, towns, villages, rivers, rocky or broken ground, and the distances were computed by the time taken to cover them. These books were, by standing orders of 29 September, 1788, and 19 January, 1804, required to be transmitted to the Quartermaster General, who immediately on receipt sent them to the Surveyor General. The firsthand information obtained from the field books was a remarkable contribution to the Indian Survey.

1. PP Vol.40, P.553, Commons 324 of 1865.
3. Ibid, P.142.
It was in 1817 that topographical staff was added to Quartermaster General's branch, which formed the regular department of survey. The officers of the new department accompanied the armies in their operations and collected valuable topographical information. In peace time the staff was employed on geographical or other surveys—as land and river surveyors. In the beginning the staff allowed for the topographical department consisted of 2 Quartermaster's General, 2 Assistants, 4 Deputy Assistants Class I, 3 Deputy Assistants Class II and three Deputy Assistants Class III.

In 1818, trigonometrical survey of India was undertaken. Triangulation, the new system of survey, gave most accurate results. Colonel John Everest introduced the Gridiron system into the operation of triangulation and earned fame in survey work, and he gave his name to the proud mountain peak.

Right from the early days, the army played a prominent part in civil affairs. Sir John Malcolm once remarked that in the various situations, civil and political, which the military men had been called upon by emergencies to fill during the days of extension and consolidation of the Company's forces in India, they had rendered greatest services. Army was very often employed on two duties, revenue and police. The reason given by high authorities for employing army officers for such duties


2. Letter of Major General Malcolm dated 13 February 1832, Minutes of Evidence. Appendix B.
was the inability to get sufficient men to meet the demands of service. In Madras Presidency, 8 Battalions had been raised before 1790, and six more in that year, for the purpose of revenue collection.¹ The Madras system, however, did not interfere with the army because these battalions were exclusively employed for collection and assessment of revenue and no regular troops were ever called to perform these duties. In Bengal no separate revenue battalions were raised, and whenever necessity arose, army officers were employed for the purpose.

The army was very often employed on police duties. The Sepoy and Native Cavalry regiments performed the duty not only of guarding the country from foreign aggression, but also of putting down riots or local opposition, however petty.² The guarding of fairs and festivals, escorting treasures and many other matters of internal administration were committed to them. Whenever a new territory was conquered by the army, it was given to army officers to rule, who were required to maintain law and order. The army did multifarious duties as police and it was not uncommon to see army personnel employed as police force. In fact in Bengal, there were in the beginning of the nineteenth century certain regiments called 'provincial battalions', attached to the police, which performed the duties of military police.³

3. Minute by I.J. Holliday, vide Report of Select Committee on Indian territories 1853.
On the other hand, there were "police corps" only in name, for this was another name given to a virtually standing army. The largeness of the Bengal Presidency native army was owing to its having been employed not only for legitimate purposes of an army, that is for the maintenance of general peace of the country, but also for carrying on to a great extent the civil administrative functions, which in contemporary Europe were performed by the Civil Police.¹ For instance, guarding of public offices, gaols or jails and treasuries, and furnishing treasure parties were some of the duties performed by the army.²

In 1843, Lord Ellenborough introduced Police Battalions into some of the districts of North West Provinces. The entire police duties were entrusted to this force, guarding of jails, treasuries and Tehsildarees etc.³ Detachments were posted at Thanahs. The men comprising these battalions were regular soldiers, though officers were ex-police officers.

Sir Charles Napier strongly supported the idea that army and police duties should not be intermixed. In one of his famous memoranda,⁴ he remarked that the great principle to follow in India was to have a large, well organised police to do all those duties for the civil branches of the government.

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1. Evidence of Mr. C.F. Trevelyan, Report of Commissioners, Q.3056.
2. Loc. Cit.
3. Thompson's Despatches, vide Inquiries.
that required armed men, such as occasional guards for civil servants, by escorts of treasuries, putting down robbers, arresting men by order of civil power. This he thought would leave the military to do its own duties, and thus the troops could be concentrated in large bodies, ready to move upon the enemy. It was with such idea that he undertook to raise Scinde Police, and it was the first body of its kind organised in India, and it had the support of Lord Ellenborough.

The Scinde Police was organised into two branches, called the Rural Police and Mounted Police. The Rural Police was a body of drilled Infantry, whose functions were purely protective. They guarded prisoners, jails and wherever permanent guards were required. The Mounted Police was a body of Police Horse, some of them armed and equipped like the Irregular Cavalry. Their functions were partly protective and partly detective.

Like the Scinde Police, battalions of police were introduced in the Punjab after the annexation. The idea was to have a smaller body of troops. It was also expected that the presence of a smaller military force would be effective, indirectly, in keeping the people calm. The so-called police battalions of Scinde and the Punjab were in no respect inferior to native battalions of the army. They did the same duty, carried the same arms and had a similar training. In the opinion of Major General Mansfield, it was not possible to

1. Letter of HBR Frare, Commissioner of Scinde, Inquiry.
2. Loc Cit.
separate the police of British India from the constitution of its army. The police force had included in its organisation an element of Cavalry and Artillery in addition to Infantry. At the time of the Mutiny, the strength of Bengal Police contingents was 44,570, and 25 guns.

The status of the Governor General in relation to military matters was exactly what Elphinstone had desired it to be: "If there is one thing which must be laid down as a principle not to be departed from our military arrangements in India, it is the entire subordination of the army both European and Native, to the Government of India." The troops of the Crown's regular army while serving in India were all subject to the authority of the Indian Government. The principle of complete subordination of the army to the civil government was observed even when the army was transferred to the Crown; the Governor General in Council remained the supreme head of the army.

The Commander-in-Chief in India was given vast, but not unlimited, powers. This ensured a better relationship between him and the Governor General on the one hand, and with the Madras and Bombay Commanders-in-Chief on the other. Provision was, however, made for the three armies to form an efficient force

1. Loc. Cit.
2. A return attached to Inquiry.
4. Report of the Special Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor General in Council to enquire into the Organisation and Expenditure of the army in India, Simla 1879, P.37.
in the field. There was no dispute among the Commanders-in-
Chief themselves. The Commanders-in-Chief had an adequate
staff and the various departments, combined together, gave the
Company's army the shape of an efficient modern army. With small
changes, the same status of the Commanders-in-Chief was allowed
even after 1858.

A great requirement of the day was a decentralised
army, and its usefulness had been demonstrated by several
mutinies. The process, though evolutionary, served well for the
British Indian Empire. The armies were distinct and separate
from one another, with a distinct espirit de corps. When the
mutiny of 1857 came, only Bengal was affected; Bombay and
Madras remained quiet. The usefulness of decentralised army
was well proved and Presidency armies were allowed to continue
even after mutiny.

Each Presidency's division into military commands had
two effects: decentralisation and better administration. In
those days, when the means of communication were scarce, the
system of military commands served very well in obtaining
efficient administration. It would have been impossible for
one Commander-in-Chief to look after the whole Presidency army.

In each Presidency the army was composed of Europeans
and Natives, and in deciding their proportion the demands were
conflicting: safety and financial economy. In effect, the
Europeans remained an auxiliary of the sepoy corps.¹

¹. Minute of Major General Mansfield vide Inquiry.
But the natives were well commanded by the Europeans. Sir Thomas Munro remarked: Native Troops are quite orderly and easily managed; the Native Officers are well acquainted with all their duties, and expert in their execution. They conduct almost all the interior details and leave but little for the European officers to do. They are, however, apt to grow insolent and careless when left to themselves and European officers are therefore absolutely necessary to direct them but not many. One to a Company is quite enough for a useful purpose."

In fact for commanding natives one officer per Company became a rule. As regards the rank and file, the consideration in deciding the number was to obtain maximum efficiency and best control.

From this brief analysis of the organisation of the army of the East India Company, it may be evident that, whatever its defects in comparison with the modern armies, in the early nineteenth century it was easily superior to the organisation of any Indian army.

1 Military Letter from Court dated 21 December 1825, para 33.
2 Military Letter from Court dated 25 November 1823, para 69-76. For Commanding natives, before 1781, the allotment of Europeans officers depended on availability, but in 1786, when Battalions of 8 Companies each were formed, 8 Subalterns were provided, at the rate of one per Company. Again in 1796, a regiment of twenty Companies was allowed 30 Captains, so that there was at least one Captain present with each Company, making an allowance for those on leave and sick etc. In 1824 the aim was again to provide each Company with at least one officer at any one time, provision having been made for those on leave or on sick list.