Recruitment of officers was the Company's major problem. In the early years of the nineteenth century, due to Napoleonic Wars in Europe, no number of officers and men met the actual demands. The problem of recruitment of men was not so acute, however, because of the availability of the natives; but a minimum indispensable number of European Officers in each unit did create problems.

In the opening decade of the nineteenth century, the East India Company opened its own Military College at Addiscombe. Before 1786, direct Commissions were given to young Englishmen in India, and that had been the only method of recruiting officers. In that year, however, the Court of Directors succeeded in getting some cadets trained at the Woolwich Academy. But even in 1799, the Company could not have more than forty cadets at Woolwich trained at its own expense. Meanwhile the demand for officers had been increasing and the Addiscombe establishment had become a necessity.¹

At first training at Addiscombe was imparted to the cadets of Artillery and Engineers alone, but in 1816 the cadets of Infantry were added. The college trained, from 1809 to 1861, in all about 2,600 military officers, many of whom played a great part in the history of the British Indian Empire.²

2. Loc. Cit.
Before 1816, the cadets of Infantry and Cavalry had no specific training and they learnt either on their own, or in their regiments after they became officers. Before the Military College at Addiscombe came into being, some cadets were procured from private academies in England, where some military training was imparted.¹ The cadets trained by private academies were examined by 'proper officers' at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, who after examining them reported if they were 'Qualified for Commissions in the Company's service'. One of such academies was the Royal Military College at Marlow, where training for Infantry and Cavalry was given and this academy had supplied the bulk of cadets for these two services before 1816.²

Cadets for the Company's force at Addiscombe were taken between the age of 15 and 25.³ The age of admission ranged between 15 and 17 at the Royal Military Academy, at Woolwich.⁴ The procedure at Addiscombe for establishing the initial seniority of cadets for the Company's service was the same as at Woolwich, that is, the cadets took their rank when they attained the age of fifteen and a half years, except in the event of their not being reported duly qualified after continuing at the College for two years and a half, in which case they lost one year.⁵

¹ Military Letter from Court, 16 January 1805, No.4.
² Military Letter from Court, dated 3 July 1805, No.12.
⁴ Ibid, P.148.
⁵ Military Letter from Court, dated 10 April 1805, No.6.
At Addiscombe the duration of course was two years. An entrance examination was held and candidates came to compete in large numbers. On passing the entrance examination a cadet's name was registered in the books; a number was given to him; he was allotted to a certain squad, to a certain mess; and a certain barrack was assigned to him. The cadets underwent four equal terms of six months each. At Woolwich too, entrance was by a competitive examination. Sons of civilians could be admitted into that academy who had to pay large amount of fees, whereas the sons of army officers paid restricted fees, ranging according to their rank.

Purchase of Commission was never legalised or regulated in the armies of the Company as it was the case in the Crown's service. The men who purchased their commission on large payment in the Crown's service, when ordered for service in India were generally allowed, with exceptions, to remain in England. Commissions could be purchased in as high a rank as Lieutenant Colonelcy, which posed difficulties of command in India. By an order, officers of His Majesty's service were always considered senior to the officers of the Company's service. So, a Lieutenant Colonel who had purchased his commission in that rank, no matter how long his previous service might have been, and no matter how obtained, at the time of promotion got a promotion to the rank of brevet Colonel, thus superseding

2. Ibid, P.148.
3. Evidence of Major General Mansfield; vide Inquiry.
numerous others who had served for a number of years in junior ranks. This was the greatest evil posed by the system of purchased Commissions.

The ranks of Junior Commissioned Officers were peculiar to the Indian Service and were attainable only by the natives who, consequently, were termed the 'native officers'. There was no direct recruitment for those ranks, and men rose to them only after serving in junior ranks. There had been times when natives had been given 'lucrative commands' under the designation of Commandants, but in 1785 that rank had been abolished. Subsequently, Subedar was the highest rank obtainable in the army, at least till 1824 when the rank of Subedar Major was introduced. Thus, the army of the East India Company did not have a single Commissioned Officer during the entire period of our study.

There was no training worth the name given to Cavalry Officers in their profession. From the beginning of the century to the Mutiny, all commissioned appointments in the regular Cavalry were conferred by the Court of Directors on their relatives and friends without reference to training and qualification, although the service was one that more than any other required special aptitude. Before 1727, officers of Infantry were asked to volunteer for Cavalry units without any

1. Evidence of Sir Robert Soot, Minutes of Evidence, Q.1454.
training. In 1797 Cavalry was made a distinct Corps and no officer of Infantry was subsequently allowed to join, except as Junior Cornet. But even these cornets had no training. So, a Cavalry Officer was appointed without selection, and in the regiment he underwent a very light test in drill and riding. He then passed an easy examination in a native language and that completed his training. With those qualifications and training these officers commanded a troop or a regiment and finally took command of a brigade or a division. When in the winters the units went on exercise for combined training, the officers picked up some knowledge of regimental movements, but they rarely had the opportunity of seeing several regiments brigaded together except on active service. After this meagre training the cadets of Cavalry were reported qualified to perform the duty of an officer, and they were given the rank of ensign.

At Woolwich cadets were imparted instruction in the use of drawing instruments, construction of scales, and geometrical drawing, as indispensable preliminaries to the representation of works of defence, then the remarks on the arms in use were read, and explanations were given as to the effects of different missiles, each of which was shown and made familiar to the students. Instruction was then given in the theory and practice

1. This was a rank in Cavalry, equivalent to that of a Second Lieutenant.
3. Military Letter from Court, dated 20 November 1804, No. 75.
of Field Fortification, with the assistance of a standard book and models, so that a thorough knowledge of the modes of executing all kinds of temporary defences was acquired; notes were taken and drawings were made to serve as guides in the field. Descriptive Geometry was also taught at the same time to facilitate the operations of 'defilade' and the application of works to irregularities. After this the cadets read the papers on Permanent Fortification, its principles were explained to them by means of short lectures, diagrams and models, and sets of lithographed plates were supplied to each cadet. They also drew a number of plates, to impress upon their mind the construction of works both of attack and defence, including the layout of mines, and wrote notes on details of execution etc. under a constant supervision of the instructor; the object in view was to teach the student to reason out in each subject, and to apply the principles of fortification practically, rather than merely to learn the theoretical details of a proposed system.

As at Woolwich, so at Addiscombe in the beginning instruction to cadets was imparted only for Artillery and Engineers. There were generally about 150 cadets under instruction at that seminary, and about sixty annually were despatched to India. The education was imparted in a very effective manner and, on their arrival in India, it was followed up.

The subjects taught at Addiscombe were mathematics, fortifications, the military drawing, surveying, and Civil (or

1. Evidence vide 1,640, Minutes of Evidence.
landscape) drawing. All these different studies had a special value attached to them and the rank of a cadet in the class was determined by his proficiency which was judged by the respective value of each study added up to form the total. There were at Addiscombe, as at Woolwich, four terms but five classes. So, there was one extra class, to which honorary promotion was made, which took place according to the proficiency of the cadet in four terms. The final position of a cadet in a class was ascertained from the instructor's report every month. By the merit list thus made was decided a cadet's seniority. The best cadets went to Engineers, the second best to Artillery and the other average to Infantry (i.e., when Infantry training was imparted). The greatest drawback of the system of education of the Military Academy (Addiscombe) was that the future of military officers was judged on academics rather than on performance of military duties. The system of instruction was improved in 1839 by imparting instruction by sand modelling. Sand models were made on which tactics were discussed. In all Presidencies, Depots of instruction were established at the Artillery Headquarters, where training of young officers was undertaken, before they joined the units.

Like the cadets of Cavalry, the Infantry cadets too did not have any training worth the name. No particular education had been prescribed for them in England, but the officers sent

2. Loc. Cit.
4. Evidence of Colonel Limond; there was a depot each at Madras and Bombay, Minutes of Evidence.
for this service were very well qualified to enter upon the general duties of military service, both in education and habits of life. In early stages Infantry Officers were sometimes attached to European Corps and, consequently they got some Infantry training. Later on a cadet company was opened which all Infantry cadets were detained for a considerable time. These company imparted instruction in military duties and native languages before their appointment to their units. The plan of cadet company did not prove very successful, and this system was replaced by posting cadets temporarily to such corps as were thought likely to prove the best schools for teaching them their duties.

There is very little material available with respect to the training of troops of the East India Company. Perhaps there was much stress on practical training for the lower ranks and theoretical part was considered unimportant. That might account for the lack of materials on training in the ranks.

Foot drill and handling of small arms appear to have been the two main aspects of the soldier's training in the Infantry. Foot drill was the same as with British Regiments, and has undergone very little basic change even till today, and requires little elaboration. In Madras the small arms training, or ball firing as it was then called, was a simple

2. Military Letter from Court, dated 20 June 1804, Par 75.
affair: neither men nor officers were bothered with theoretical instructions or about trajectories or position drill; the recruit was taught to hold his musket straight, to aim at a sand bag tripod, and then to learn priming a blank cartridge and firing with ball from fifty to a hundred and fifty yards. The main aim of all Infantry practice was to teach the men when in line to fire straight to their front, so that their shots might take full effect upon the enemy's ranks at a 100 paces.

For Artillery training there were schools at the Artillery Headquarters at each Presidency where instruction was imparted to the recruits. According to Major General Sir Archdate Wilson, who had been 39 years with the Bengal Artillery, all Artillery recruits went through their Infantry drill first of all, they then learnt the gun drill, the aim of which was to work the guns with greatest accuracy in the smallest time, and they then went through a laboratory course.

The recruits became efficient after a year of regimental experience. To achieve the best efficiency on a standard field gun a detachment of five individuals was needed. Two men were taught to ride with the gun and three were disposed with the limber. The gun drill, as ordered in 1801, has been described for a standard field gun, in a letter from the

2. Ibid., P.286.
Like the Infantry and Artillery, the Cavalry went on exercise in cold season every year for combined training. From the point of view of a Cavalry man the combined training appears to have been of immense use.

In the Company's early days, there was no standard method employed for the recruitment of soldiers. A man, or a group of men, came forward with the necessary capital for raising, training, arming, and equipping a body of soldiers. From 1781 to 1799 the Honourable Company enlisted its own

1. Military Letter from Court, dated 11 February 1701, No.7; "Memorandum respecting method of working guns. "Those with the gun may be called 1st and 2nd Gunner, as soon as the gun halts to prepare for action, all dismount except one who is to take care of horses. The 1st and 2nd unlimber the 3rd unlocks the ammunition and the 4th assists the 1st and 2nd to draw the gun to the place of action. The tumbrill will draw to a convenient distance in the rear. The first and second place themselves to the right and left in the rear: the left in line and then load as follows:

The 4th having received a round of 3rd opening the mouth of the cartridge places it in the muzzle of the gun takes away his hand and turns up the gun on its trunnions as perpendicular as it will go, when the gun is up, he takes out the cartridge drops in a shot or cannon a defected /by Ist/ turns down the gun and steps on one side. The first gunner opens pan inserts a fuse primer with a little loose powder, elevates or depresses the gun direct the 2nd to shoot right or left as the case may require. Then the gun is layed right for the object the 1st locks, directs all to stand clear, steps on one side and by means of a string to the lock discharges the piece, as soon as fired the 4th having received a fresh round of ammunition inserts his cartridge while the 1st half- cocks then as before."

2. Military Letter from Court, dated 20 November 1804, No.75.
European troops and were authorised to keep in depot in England 2000 men in war time and half that number in peace. Before 1781, the Company had enlisted its men anywhere it could. The European element of the army was composed of Europeans of almost every nationality. After 1799, the system of recruitment of Europeans for Indian Service was better organised. A request was made by the Court of Directors to His Majesty for permission to recruit the Company's European army in the same manner and with the same privileges as was done for the British army. The request was granted and the system of recruiting stations and depots came into being in 1798. The recruitment was undertaken at four recruiting stations: London, Liverpool, Dublin and Cork, from each of which the recruiting officer was allowed to send ten men per month to the Company's Depot. The Company's Depot was located at Chatham; and the Company's European regiments were kept complete by receiving a certain number of recruits from them annually. Sometimes volunteers from His Majesty's regiments on retirement list were received for the Company's service.

Before 1793, the Company had the power of raising only 12,200 European troops to be kept in India, and 2000 at home.

2. PP Vol. 40, p. 283, Commons 80 of 1863.
4. Evidence of Major General T. Pritzen, Minutes of Evidence, 2.1830.
in depot. In the year 1853, it was determined to add to the establishment three regiments of Infantry of the aggregate strength of 2,2772 and as this addition was in excess to the stipulated number standard, it became necessary for a revision of the law. It was proposed to raise the maximum to 20,000 in India, and 4,000 at the Depot, thus allowing a margin in the future for additions when required. The Parliament gave it approval and the strength was increased to 20,000 in India, and 4,000 at home.

European recruits were sent between the age of 20 and 30. They were engaged to serve for ten years after their arrival in India, and at the expiration of that period, they were at liberty to return to England at the Company's expense, unless they chose to re-enlist in the Company's service for a further term of five years.

From the year 1742 to 1845, the Company raised recruits at five stations, Edinburgh having been added to the previous four. London district supplied the largest portion of recruits, that is 52%. In 1846, two new stations, Bristol and Nowry, were established. During the years 1842 to 1857 the men enlisted were subject to the provisions of the Mutiny Acts for the Crown's Forces whilst they remained in India.

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2. Evidence of Colonel Hay, Minutes of Evidence, Q.1656.
4. PP Vol.42, P.101; Commons 201 of 1858.
5. Ibid. cit.
Court appointed their own officers and Sergeants to enlist the men. To enable officers of the Company to conduct recruitment in England, they held commissions from the Queen, and the Sergeants were enlisted to assist those officers. The whole recruitment was carried on under the provisions of Annual Mutiny Act, and Articles of War, and under the orders of the authorities of the Horse Guards. The rules were laid down for the guidance of recruiting parties, being applicable to Her Majesty's and the Company's Officers. Unless the Company's service was specially excepted.

For the recruitment of natives, parties were sent out to recruit in districts with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. Native Officers and men had instructions when proceeding on furlough to bring with them recruits for enlistment in the Company's service. The recruiting parties for enlistment consisted of European or Native Officers, chiefly the latter, detached from the Headquarters of a Regiment or from Recruiting Depots in India. The Officer-in-Charge of a recruiting party, on arrival at a particular district, generally broke his detachment into smaller parties, or sent out intelligent men singly into different villages. Candidates were presented before the recruiting party, and were examined by a Medical Officer; and if they passed the tests he entered their names in a roll showing the recruit's age, height, chest measurement, caste, colour,

1. The procedure for Recruitment has been summarised from Replies.
particular appearance, marks, scars etc., native country and village. Men pronounced fit were considered enlisted from the dates of examination, and these rolls were forwarded monthly to the Regiment by the recruiting officer. At times when medical officer was not available at a station, the candidates were examined at the nearest station where a medical officer was found.

If the recruiting party was under a European Officer, his selection of recruits was final, but if the party was not under a European Officer, the recruits were taken to the nearest Commanding or Staff Officer for approval, and were considered as enlisted from the date they were provisionally entertained.

In Bengal, Native officers were required by the regulations to take each recruit after enlistment to the tehsildar in whose jurisdiction the village of the recruit was situated, so that the tehsildar could inquire and verify that his name, caste, parentage and residence had been accurately stated. Lists with the tehsildar's signature were shown to the district officer and handed to the recruiting officer for delivery to the Commanding Officer of his regiment. In Bombay, recruits registry was filled up from his own description. He was then taken before the patel of his village, who verified the registry. The patels of village were bound to keep a register of all men who enlisted from their village. Sometimes when men were brought by native officers after they returned from a regimental Headquarters for enlistment, no particular precautions were taken to verify, beyond ascertaining their physical fitness for service.
During the wars of 1803 and 1804, and subsequently during operations till 1806, a depot was maintained for the purpose of keeping the regiments in the field always complete, with well trained and efficient soldiers. In regard to the number the object was effected, but as regards class composition the system, as we shall see later, was an utter failure and was abandoned after the war.

An important feature of early recruitment was the emergency recruitment of Irregular forces. They served temporary purposes, were cheaper, and were easy to disband after an operation was over. Lord Lake had raised certain Irregular units for service in the First Maratha War, which were disbanded by Lord Cornwallis. During the same period immediate measures were adopted for obtaining troops for the performance of the general duties of Bengal Presidency. This object could be attained at less expense by increasing the Corps of Calcutta Native Militia rather than the Regular Corps; orders were therefore given for increasing the corps of Calcutta Militia from twelve to sixteen Companies. Similarly Skinner's Horse was re-raised, after having been disbanded for sometime, and served very well at the siege of Bharatpur. The Robilla Corps and Scinde Horse of Colonel Jacob are some other examples of the same type. In fact, Irregular Corps was an accepted part of the army system, and for a long time, the British had no regular cavalry at all.

1. Foreign Secret Consultations No.24 of 14 August 1839.
As a rule Bengal always recruited men from within Bengal whereas in Madras and Bombay, recruitment outside the Presidency limits was not uncommon. From early times a considerable difficulty had been experienced in procuring recruits in Madras, and desertions were frequent, which induced the Madras government, with the sanction of the Court, to increase the pay of the native troops in Madras. No amount of inducements and concessions could easily solve the recruitment problem in Madras. It therefore became a normal method of recruitment by a small party of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers to accompany a recruiting officer, for recruitment outside the Presidency. Great encouragement was given to the natives of Bengal provinces to enlist in the army of the Presidency of the Fort St. George. In Bombay, the recruitment problem was similar to Madras, though not as acute. In that Presidency, during the war of 1817-18, there was a difficulty experienced in obtaining sufficient number of recruits from within the Presidency, and many were enlisted from Bengal.

Extra inducements given in Madras and Bombay created problems for Bengal. The Bengal government was obliged to represent that the additional inducement lured men to the armies of the other two Presidencies and this created problems of recruitment in Bengal itself. It was on this representation

1. Evidence of Colonel Munro, Minutes of Evidence, Q.1034.
4. Evidence of Colonel Aitchison, Minutes of Evidence, Q.1705-12.
that in 1821 the Court of Directors appreciated that the
troops of the three Presidencies should be kept
as distinct as possible, and that recruitment for each Presi­
dency should be, as far as practicable, confined to the res­
pective territory of each Presidency. The Court of Directors
also remarked that the system of recruitment which brought
different Presidencies in contact with one another was un­
necessary and inexpedient. The Court of Directors in 1823
ordered that the cantonments of several Presidencies should be
kept as distinct as possible, and the system of recruiting the
Madras army in Bengal provinces was to be altogether disconti­
ued. The order applied to Bombay also.

In spite of the Court's very strict orders of 1821 and
1823, the Bombay Presidency, and to some extent Madras, had to
depend for their recruitment on Bengal. Lord William Bentinck
in 1835 appointed a Committee to enquire how the orders of
1821 and 1823 restricting the recruitment of each of the three
armies to the limits of its own Presidency, had operated. The
Bombay Government reported that the Court's orders had been
totally inoperative, because, though no recruiting parties had
been sent to Bengal, the Bengal men voluntarily presented them­selves for enlistment and they had been engaged for ever. Based
on the report, recruitment outside the respective Presidency was
officially stopped, but as an emergency measure, permission was

1. PP Vol.62, P.272, Commons C1698 of 1877.
2. loc Cit.
4. PP Vol.43, P.123, Commons 129 of 1858.
given to Bombay and Madras to recruit outside its Presidency limits.

All recruits in Madras on enlistment were required to take an oath, swear or affirm in the name of Almighty God, to serve the government with truth and loyalty, to obey orders of all officers and never to abandon the colours but to defend them with their life. In Bombay, in addition to the terms of Madras, they swore that in case they failed in any part of their duty as such, they would submit to the penalties described in the Articles of War. In Bengal a similar oath was taken. In the Punjab and Hyderabad contingents, the oath contained an additional clause which did not occur in any other Presidency; the soldiers swore to march to wheresoever ordered.

By the regulations of 1796, no sepoy in Bengal was to be entertained who was not 5 feet 6 inches, who was under 16 or above 30 years of age unless, in the latter case, he had served before. In Madras the standard was lower, that is 5 feet 4 inches; it was raised to 5 feet 6 inches in 1829 for Horse Artillery and Cavalry, and to 5 feet 6 inches for Infantry. Before 1829, the standard of all branches was 5 feet 4 inches. In Bombay, the lowest standard for Cavalry was 5 feet 6 inches, age 24 years; for Infantry 5 feet 3 inches, and age not exceeding 22 years.

1. Reply of Lord Harris, Governor of Bombay, Replies.
2. Reply of Lord Elphinstone, Replies.
3. PP Vol.52, p.459, Commons 500 of 1867.
It is quite evident that Bengal troops were more robust and more powerful than a native soldier from Madras or Bombay. A Hindustani (as a soldier from Bengal was styled) sought service in the armies of Madras and Bombay and in the contingent forces, and was very soldier-like. That a Hindustani soldier was physically better than any other Presidency soldier will be clear from the following table which gives the average heights and weights:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Height (feet) (inch)</th>
<th>Average Weight (stones)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bengal Infantry</td>
<td>5 7.62</td>
<td>8.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Madras Infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrassees Recruited</td>
<td>5 6.34</td>
<td>8.1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoostanees Recruited</td>
<td>5 6.59</td>
<td>8.5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bombay Infantry</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konkanees</td>
<td>5 5.5</td>
<td>7.9.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deccanees Recruited</td>
<td>5 6.5</td>
<td>8.3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoostanees Recruited</td>
<td>5 6.5</td>
<td>9.0.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The physical standards of recruits laid down for the European Regiments in the Company's service, were higher than those laid down for the natives; but they were lower than those laid down for the troops of the Crown. In England, no one, in any corps, below the height of 5 feet 3 inches was recruited, whereas that standard was maintained in the Company's Artillery alone; the Infantry standard was fixed at 5 feet 6 inches. During emergencies, the fixed standards were not followed very

2. PP Vol.42, Page 101, Commons 201 of 1858.
rigidly. For instance, the standard age for the Company's European service was from 20 to 25 years; on any demand in case of emergencies caused due to war, the standard height was reduced, and men were accepted up to 30 years of age.

The Company's European troops were physically more robust than the native troops; but the latter had more endurance and stamina than the former. A European was considered fit for service in India for about 12 or 15 years, and a native for 20 to 25 years. In some situations, the native troops were better calculated for employment than European troops; in others, Europeans proved better than the natives. The European Artillery was far superior to the Indian, owing to better energy and intrepidity resulting from better physical standard. On the other hand, in the Cavalry, the native troops were in an excellent state of efficiency and were as good as the Europeans.

The officer class was all European, to the Junior Commissioned Officers were appointed native regiments; they had a status in between that of the British Sergeant Major and of the Commissioned Officer. In the rank structure of Europeans, there were no Junior Commissioned Officers; there was instead

2. Loc. cit.
a larger number of Non-Commissioned Officers who carried out the same duties as the Junior Commissioned Officers.

Opinions differed on the usefulness of the Junior Commissioned rank. In the opinion of Sir P. Grant, it was a great mistake to institute the Native Junior Commissioned Officer. Lieutenant General Sir M. Cubbon, described the grade in itself as a most useful one, both for the discipline and the interior economy of regiments. He was also of the view that the native officer was a great aid to the European Officers of the Company as a channel of communication with his men. Major General Birch was of the opinion that native officers were found to be extremely useful when the European officers started taking interest in their corps. Brigadier General John Jacob was of the opinion that the organisation of Native Commissioned Officers greatly weakened the moral power of the English officers: but he did believe that the Native Officers, under a proper organisation, could be the very nerve of the whole body, of which sepoys formed the bones and muscles, and European gentlemen the brains. Whatever the opinions, the rank structure was allowed to remain even after the Mutiny, and exists even today. This may be a sufficient proof of the usefulness of the native officers in those days.

1. Reply of P. Grant Commander-in-Chief Madras Army vide Replies.
2. Reply of Major General Cubbon, Commissioner of Mysore, Madras Army, Replies.
3. Reply of Major General Birch, Secretary to Government, Military Department Bengal Army, Replies.
4. Statement of Commander, Scinde Irregular Horse, Bombay Army, Replies.
Generally speaking, there were separate regiments of natives and Europeans. Only rarely were the regiments composed partly of natives and partly of Europeans. In 1809-10, the Commander-in-Chief gave the order to assemble eight regiments composed of Europeans and natives under Major Vansell. 1 A mixture of natives and Europeans was, however, very common in the Artillery; they were entirely mixed up even in a single battery. 2 His Majesty's troops employed in India were composed solely of Europeans, and differed in no respect from the British army, of which they were detachments, and they were never mixed with the natives.

European and Native regiments were, on the whole, like water tight compartments; but they were very often employed together on various duties both in war and peace. A mixed force of natives and Europeans combined (in full units) was most efficient. In campaigns, employed in the ratio of one European to three native fighting men made an excellent force. The experience of General Lake in the Maratha war of 1803 suggested that for every single European battalion, four native battalions combined with it would be the most efficient force. 4 Sir Charles Napier was of the opinion that a force mixed in such proportions, and led by European Officers, was superior in

2. Loc. Cit.
Asia to an equal number of any European troops, except the French and the English. He was convinced that any General with that proportion in pitched battle, all other things being equal, could beat an equal number of Austrians, Prussians or Spaniards.

The proportion, however, varied in different arms. In the Artillery, there was a greater inclination toward a larger proportion of Europeans, because there the British wished to maintain their superiority over the native force. During the emergencies, however, the proportion of the natives generally increased. In the Cavalry the advantage of employing Europeans was the minimum, and a very small proportion of Europeans sufficed. Another important reason for a smaller proportion of Europeans in the Cavalry was that the European Dragoons could never dispense with cross-cutters and other followers who were necessarily on foot, and thus Europeans as cavalrymen lost much of their superior celerity and independence. It was deemed advisable to employ the equally efficient but less costly natives in the Cavalry.

The Native Infantry too was more useful than European Infantry. This had been discovered in the Mysore War of 1790–92 when two companies of Royal Infantry, were directed from Europe, and joined the army in Mysore, under Lord Cornwallis, but on reaching Coimbatore they were reduced by sickness and death.

to be almost unfit for that war. Henceforth Europeans were
never kept to the required proportion in the Infantry.

Another factor in deciding the composition of troops
in respect of the proportion of Europeans to natives was the
British apprehension from the natives. Sir Thomas Munro in
1828 remarked that 'a large proportion of European troops is
necessary for our security.' Sir William Bentinck recorded
his view in one of his most notable minutes, dated 13 March,
1835: "in the native army alone rests our internal danger
and this danger may involve our complete subversion. But the
fidelity of our native army, though wonderfully great, and
deserving of high confidence, cannot be considered exempt from
the possibility of seduction, and that an adequate European
force is the sole security against this, the greatest evil
that could befall us." It was believed by others that the
British had nothing to fear so long as they felt concerned about
the welfare of Indians, preserved their social and religious
institutions, and did not interfere with their laws of inheri-
tance and adoption, which were part and parcel of their religion.
But this was easier said than done. In the army it is not
always possible to cater to religious needs, especially during
the operations. For example, the Indians were for religious

1. Evidence of Major General Forsley. Minutes of Evidence
Army B, No.18.
2. PP Vol.52, P.459, Commons 500 of 1967.
3. Minutes by Governor General Lord "W.C. Bentinck vide PP Vol.52,
P.455, Commons 500 of 1967.
   There is no doubt that whatever danger threatened India, the
greatest was their own native troops (Calcutta Review, Vol.II
London 1944, P.52).
4. Haush, Political and Military Events in British India, Vol.1,
London 1853, Introductory page.
sentiments reluctant to go overseas, but service required their appearance in overseas expeditions. Such occasions gave rise to dissatisfaction among the native troops. Therefore keeping the European and native soldiers and officers in right proportion was a real problem and not an imaginary one. To obviate the internal danger, Europeans employed with natives in a certain proportion could serve the purpose, and within each of the Presidency armies, the British wished to ensure that the class composition was of such diverse races that conspiracy was not easily possible.

To obtain the fidelity of native troops it was necessary to recruit men from a variety of tribes and nations. The Calcutta Review once remarked about the composition of the Bengal Army: "Our sepoys come too much from the same part of the country, Cudge, the lower Dooch and Upper Behar. There is too much of clanship among them, and the evil should be remedied." The remedy suggested of course was recruitment from various other places, so that the sense of clanship amongst the new diminished. Charles Metcalfe once remarked that the Native Infantry was composed too much of men of one class, actuated by one common feeling, and that it was expedient to have a variety, in order that one description, in case of necessity, may be used to maintain order in another. An examination of the class

composition of various armies of the Presidencies, would show how wide a variety of people were recruited. In Bengal where recruitment was restricted to a particular class or classes of people, the object was not well achieved. The great disaffection in 1857 in the Bengal Army may partly be attributed to this situation.

Before 1796, the Madras Army was composed only of Pampats, Musalmans and the three Telugu castes—the Kammi Naju, the Rezu and the Velama Naju. The weavers and cultivators, who were seldom found to make staunch sepoys, were excluded from the ranks of the Madras Army. Subsequently, it was proposed by the Madras Council that each sepoy battalion should be formed of men of the same caste and religion—either Musalmans, Welabers or Cauturs; but the proposal fell through. If the proposal had been accepted, the army would have become an organisation of several small clans, and a ground for disaffection. Thus the composition of the various Madras Sepoy battalions depended entirely upon the accidental caste of the recruits who presented themselves for enlistment in the various regiments. By a general order of the Commander-in-Chief in 1838, it was laid down that all natives were eligible for enlistment without reference to caste, provided in all other respects they were perfectly fit for service. Later, when recruitment was restricted to family, Teluvas, Musalmans and men of lower castes, they were not sent to a particular regiment but were divided equally in all the regiments.

2. Ibid, p.15-16.
very considerable number of men belonging to a single clan
or caste in any of its regiments. The men composing the Madras
Army were perfectly distinct in their habits and feelings.

Indeed, the Madras Army was composed of diverse races: a
few Rajputs families which had settled long ago in the south
of India, a few Benealics or men from Oude and the North West
Provinces, Gentus, or those who used Telugu language and
Maharars, or those who used the Tamil language. The Hindus
altogether formed about two-thirds of the army, the remaining
one-third being Musalmans. The recruits were taken from for
off districts. The Gentus, or those who spoke Telugu, come
from the Northern Circars. The Maharars come from the Southern
districts: Chingleput, North and South Arcot, Trichnopoly,
Salem, Madura, Tanjore and Tinnevelly, comprising those portions
of the country which were at times called the southern Polingars.
The Musalmans were also drawn from all parts. No race, tribe
or caste had been excluded from enlistment by regulation. The
object was to maintain a due proportion so that no one caste
could predominate over another. An order was published sometime
before the mutiny fixing a caste proportion, which included all
castes in the existing constitution of the Madras Army.

The Bombay Army like the Madras Army was also composed of
a variety of races. The Hindustani were 39.76%; Koncanars, 47.6 %;
Daccans, 6.5%; Madrasis, 1.71%; Maharars, 0.28%; Punjabis, 0.48 %;

at Asiatic Studies Library, Townhall, Bombay).
2. Reply of Honourable Lord Harris, Governor of Bombay vide
Replies.
The Irregular Corps also had a variety of races included in them: the Deccani, 27.3%; Hindustani, 21.4%; Madrasis, 5.2%; Coromans, 10%; Gujaratis, 5.5%; Kutchis, 3.3%; and while 0.9%. The Bombay Native Infantry was composed of men with heterogeneous religious beliefs. No particular race or tribe or caste was excluded from enlistment in the Bombay Native Infantry either by regulation or by practice, with the exception of bhenens, sweepers and scavengers. The traditional policy of the authorities of the Bombay Army to avoid having a large majority of men of one particular race or caste in a particular regiment was never lost sight of and inspite of some discretionary powers given to Commanding Officers to recruit for their regiments from the races they wanted, the policy was not completely set aside or even ignored. This was not true of the Cavalry and Artillery, but their number was too small to be dangerous.

The Bengal Army, unlike the Madras and Bombay Armies, was always difficult to handle because of the high caste men, Brahmins and Rajputs. On the Bengal establishment, low caste men were completely excluded from the army, because they were employed only on menial jobs and were not allowed to mix with the high caste Hindus. The sepoys who fought for Clive were

1. Minute by Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, Inquiry into Peace.
chiefly low castes. The Bengal Army did not become Brahmanised by any order of the government, but simply through the recruiting officers, over a series of years, confining their choice to the darkest, bawdiest, and cleanest looking men, who were undoubtedly of high castes. Gradually they came to predominate, and to exercise their influence to keep away all low caste people; and finally, the custom became a rule.

Lord William Bentinck observed this defect in the Bengal Army and ordered that the recruitment was open to all men belonging to respectable classes. But the order did not open recruitment to low classes; it only increased the field of recruitment to respectable or high classes and middle classes. Special care continued to be taken to reject all men of the inferior castes, such as Bongolis, Khete, Naik, Teillis, Thomolis, Currencs, Ladhos, Rajaobs, Vebars, Moorances, Konders, Welis, Koshi and any other employed in menial occupations.

Sir Charles Metiers was the first to strongly object to confining the recruitment to high classes in Bengal. He wrote to the Duke of Wellington on 15 June, 1850, 'the last and most important thing which I reckon injurious to the Indian Army is the immense influence given to caste, instead of being discouraged, it has been encouraged in the Bengal Army. In the Bombay Army it is discouraged, and that army is in better order than the Bengal Army. In this latter (Bengal Army) the Brahmins have been leaders in every mutiny, in the last mutiny about pay, and which

1. Reply of Major General Grant, Oude Force, vide Replies.
2. PP Vol.43, p.123, Commons 129 of 1852.
I may say, was general throughout the Bangui Army, though it appeared in six regiments only, all appeared to be governed by Brahmins. The spirit of exclusiveness in favour of high castes which operated to the full on officers and sepoys alike, created an atmosphere which is always the forerunner of mutinies in all armies. "A subserviency of officers generally to the feeling of high caste, which gave them handsome and intelligent men, was appreciated in all its strength by the sepoys, played with the fears of their Brahminized Colonels, and instead, in many instances, on the observance of certain customs even in the presence of an enemy, to which they were perfectly indifferent under really intelligent and energetic command." Thus was the germ of resistance to authority and discipline fostered, and Commanding Officers openly admitted the presence of a power superior to discipline. It was the germ which finally became the cause of the Mutiny.

2. Minute by Major General Mansfield vide Replies.