Chapter I

THE BEGINNING OF THE INDIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN U.K.

A. Shyamji Krishna Varma and the Home Rule Society

Though seemingly paradoxical, the first organised echo of the Indian revolutionary activity abroad made its sound in the metropolis of the British Empire itself. Its explanation is not far to seek. Britain had, of course, been a place of refuge for revolutionaries from all over the world. Its democratic traditions and free atmosphere were quite conducive to the growth of such movements.

From the last decade of the 19th century there had existed in England a British Committee of the Indian National Congress to which a number of British themselves have lent their support. But this was a tame organisation. Despite two decades of sustained, though vain patriotic toil, it could not make its presence felt. For its leaders and followers adhered to its fundamental principles of loyalty to the Empire and constitutional methods. Voices had, doubtless, been raised against what was recognised as the spineless propaganda of the Congress. But these remained for the most part ineffective until a British radical leader like Hyndman came forward and denounced the methods used by the Congress leaders to make an appeal to the British public opinion. Men like Dadabhai Naoroji had taken objection to it. But Hyndman in no uncertain terms reminded Indian leaders that unless and until the Congress adopted more forceful methods, it could achieve nothing. Hyndman's example in fact served as an immediate incentive to the formation of revolutionary activity in England.
Shyamaji Krishna Varma, who had earlier watched the activities of the Congress, took the cue from Hyndman and embarked upon the course from which he never deviated. It was on Hyndman's suggestion that the Indian Home Rule Society was established in England and through its organ, The Indian Socialist, it started denouncing what it considered to be idle and foolish demand of self-government under British empire. Not satisfied with what the leaders of the Congress had been doing, Shyamaji soon emerged as an advocate of a national form of Government which should have nothing to do with the Empire. This difference between the view points of the two streams of Indian political organisations in England brought about a fundamental change in the thinking of the people in India and abroad, its reaction being equally expressed in the concern among British official circles. It must, however, be recognised that it was British tradition of liberty that provided ground and freedom for revolutionary operations at the very imperial headquarters.

The credit for its propagation abroad goes largely to Shyamaji Krishna Varma (1857-1930). Born in a poor family in Mandavi in Cutch State, he became one of the foremost leaders of the Indian revolutionary movement. During the critical years of 1905-14, he carried on a vigorous propaganda for India's freedom from London, Paris and Geneva. A great Sanskrit scholar, Shyamaji was a man of sterling character. He was invited by Monier Williams, the then Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford, to work as his assistant. In India, Shyamaji had actively associated with Swami Dayanand, the founder of the Arya Samaj, and Colonel Olcott of the Theosophical movement. After graduation from Oxford he was called to the Bar at the Inner Temple.
Shyamaji came back to India in 1884. From 1886 to 1897 he served in a number of Indian princely states. While as Diwan in Junagarh he came in clash with the British Resident and was dismissed from the state service. Officially, the Resident mentioned that Shyamaji's dismissal was on account of 'gross misconduct', but privately, he informed the Foreign Department of the Government of India that Shyamaji was a dangerous person, and he submitted that 'all States and all Residents should be warned against him'. The real reason for the expulsion of Shyamaji appears to have been that in his capacity as Diwan he ignored the Political Agent and conducted the affairs of the State in an independent way. The defiant attitude of the Diwan of an Indian could hardly be tolerated by the Supreme Government of India, who had always regarded not only the princes but all their functionaries as subservient to the Resident or the Political Agent. Shyamaji after having imbibed the ideas of freedom and democracy during his stay in England could not patiently watch the interference of the Political Agent in the affairs of the State. After his dismissal from Junagarh, Shyamaji served for a brief period in Udaipur State as a member of the State Council. In 1897 he left for England having no taste 'to live a life of constant pinpricks or servility to foreign masters'.

Perhaps he had an inkling; the Government of India had not reacted favourably to his participation in the activities of the

1. A.F. Attenopedia to Basanquet; 26 September 1895; F.D., Internal A, Confidential B, 1895, Nos. 86-90.
Arya Samaj and the Theosophical Society. The break came when the authorities in India began the ruthless prosecution of Natu brothers, connected with the murder of Rand, the Plague Commissioner of Patna, and he decided to settle in England. J.C. Ker, personal assistant to the Director of Criminal Intelligence, suspected that Shyamaji's departure was not unconnected with the arrest, particularly the deportation, under Regulation III of 1818, of the 3 Natu brothers. Shyamaji according to government authorities also believed that 'no one was safe from oppression of the governing classes in India'.

From the time Shyamaji left India, the political situation underwent a considerable change. Under the bold leadership of Tilak, Pal and Lajpat Rai, the educated Indians now came out with the slogans of Swadeshi and Swaraj. The agitation was not confined mainly to writings and speeches, but an era of bombs and violence against the British officials emerged a little later on the Indian political scene.

It was about this time that Shyamaji, who had been closely watching the developments in India after his departure, decided to throw in his lot with the mainstream of Indian nationalism. In December 1904, in a letter to Sir William Wedderburn, he suggested the scheme of Herbert Spencer Indian Fellowship and requested him to present it at the forthcoming annual session of the Indian National Congress at Bombay. The letter of Shyamaji contained

severe denunciation of the Indian Government. Wedderburn politely refused to read it publicly in the Congress session, taking into consideration the basic aim of the Congress to maintain its character for loyalty and moderation in the eyes of the Government. 'With this letter', writes his biographer, 'Shyamaji made his debut on the stage of Indian politics and his political views came to the notice of the authorities in India.

Finding no response from the Congress to give publicity to his political views, Shyamaji launched in January 1905 the publication of his own paper, the Indian Sociologist. The apparent reason given by Shyamaji for starting the paper was that a genuine Indian interpreter of the political relations between India and England was needed in the United Kingdom and that it could show on behalf of India 'how Indians really fared and felt under British rule'. Since there was no other organ through which the Indians could ventilate their feelings, Shyamaji wanted to plead the cause of India and her unrepresented millions before the bar of public opinion in England and Ireland through the medium of the Indian Sociologist.

The very first issue of the journal published the scheme of the Herbert Spencer Travelling Fellowship which had mentioned previously in his letter to Wedderburn. The fellowships scheme was quite new.

5. Shyamaji to Wedderburn, 4 December 1904 and Wedderburn to Shyamaji, 19 February 1905. The Indian Sociologist, April 1905.


7. The Indian Sociologist, January 1905. It appeared regularly from January 1905 to July 1914. At the outbreak of the War, when Shyamaji sought shelter in Switzerland, the publication was stopped on the suggestion of the Swiss Government. It was republished from 1920-22.
and bold in its conception. It aimed at encouraging Indian graduates to complete their education in England with a view to adopting independent professions. The scheme, however, envisaged the training of those young men for the nationalist cause. A graduate holding one of these fellowships was not expected to 'accept any post, office, emoluments or service under the British Government after his return to India', instead he was honour-bound to devote his life to the cause of India's independence. With the object of creating a class of patriotic youngmen who could take an active part in the nationalist movement, Shyamaji sponsored another scheme of six lectureships of Rs. 1,000 each for enabling authors, journalists and other qualified Indians to visit Europe, America and other countries so as to equip themselves efficiently for spreading among the people of India a knowledge of freedom and national unity.

Shyamaji gradually expanded the activities in England. On the suggestion and active cooperation of Hyndman and other Irish friends, he founded, in February 1905, the Indian Home Rule Society. The object of the Society was to secure home rule for India by a genuine Indian propaganda in England and to achieve


10. See Appendix I for the constitution of the Indian Home Rule Society.
this objective by all practical means. With the establishment of the Home Rule Society and the publication of the Indian Sociologist started Shyamaji's new career as a full-fledged political propagandist and an organiser of a movement abroad for the attainment of complete independence by the people of India.

Shortly after, Shyamaji opened the India House at 66 Cromwell Avenue, Highgate, London, which provided cheap accommodation for the students holding the fellowships and served as a meeting place for the Indians then living in the city. The opening ceremony of this centre was performed by H.M. Hyndman, and others who participated in the function were Dadabhai Naoroji, Madame Cama, Swinny of the Posivists Review, Harry Quelch (Editor of Justice) and many Irish nationalist leaders. Lajpat Rai also made a speech as one of the first residents at the India House, which in subsequent years became 'the most dangerous organisation outside India' and headquarters in England of the Indian revolutionary movement.

The Home Rule movement of Shyamaji while it received encouragement from Lajpat Rai, Naoroji, Tilak and Pal, was disapproved by Gokhale, Banerjea, Wedderburn and Hume. Gokhale regarded the views of Shyamaji as altogether crude, such 'as of an unpractical man'. On the other hand Tilak sent him a congratulatory telegram applauding his 'self-sacrificing spirit'.

in which the latter had started these institutions and expected that the 'freer atmosphere of England' would give him a wider scope for the propagation of the nationalist ideas amongst the Indian people. F.H.O'Donnel, President of the National Democratic League, also sent a telegram wishing success to the movement.

Shyamaji fully utilised the 'free atmosphere' of England for propagating his views. In the initial stages, the movement was anti-Congress and anti-British. Shyamaji, however, subsequently made an implicit reference to his speeches as to the methods he wanted to pursue for the emancipation of the country from the British rule. In his view the parliamentary representation was a failure and the only effective way to demand justice was by force, if necessary. He even warned the leaders of the Indian National Congress to desist from wasting resources of India for the admission of a few Indians into the British Parliament. He believed that Indians could obtain independence by simply refusing to help their foreign masters and without incurring the evils of violent revolution.

Shyamaji was convinced that the salvation of India depended on Indians themselves. His views became more clear when he started exposing ruthlessly the fruitless activities of the Indian National Congress and the pernicious system of Government then prevailing in India. Gradually in the Indian Sociologist Shyamaji explained

forcefully the possible ways of putting an end to the system of Government prevalent in India. He wrote that either the British should withdraw from India voluntarily or the people should make a successful effort to throw off the foreign yoke or the British rule in India could be brought to an end by the disinterested intervention of some foreign power.

The last alternative was discarded by Shyamaji and since there was no possibility of the voluntary withdrawal of the British from India, as she was keeping the country as 'a preserve or happy hunting ground for the benefit of British civil and military services and British capitalists', he advocated that the only other course left for the Indians was to throw off the foreign yoke by not cooperating with the British Government.

Shyamaji had a clear political thinking and while preaching the boycott of the British Government, he discussed also the form of administration which was required to replace it. He placed before the people three practical propositions which were open to them. First, if they were happy with the present system they should meely go on tolerating the despotic form of Government under which they had no real voice. Secondly, they should faithfully echo the cry of the Indian National Congress and struggle for the attainment of self-government as enjoyed by the British colonies under the paramountcy of Britain. The third alternative available to the people in his view was the establishment of an absolutely free and independent form of National...
Shyamaji completely ruled out the first alternative as obnoxious to all political minded Indians. He proved by arguments that the second choice was also absurd and not possible for the British Government to grant. He therefore openly favoured the third proposition as worthy of achievement by whatever means possible. Shyamaji's views thus stood in sharp contrast to the policy of the Congress and its reactionary British and Indian leadership.

Shyamaji's scheme of fellowships and lecturerships was quite successful and brought within the orbit of the movement a number of persons from India. The first five students sailed from India in 1905, and another batch came in 1906. Among those selected were three Muslims. The India Office became apprehensive of the danger of this move of Shyamaji's and immediately instructed the Government of India to make enquiries regarding the antecedents of the holders of the fellowships. The enquiries revealed that the majority of the candidates selected belonged to the extremist party in India, or were recommended by the extremist leaders.

The Home Rule movement in England under the patriotic leadership of Shyamaji gained in popularity and strength and within a year it had a membership of 112. Besides, Shyamaji's propaganda, the other reasons for the growth of political

20. Indian Sociologist, August 1906.
23. Government of India to India Office, 14 March 1906. The names of the persons selected.
consciousness among the Indian students was the mental atmosphere of England itself. Party politics was in the air in England and it formed a common subject of conversation among the revolutionaries of the various countries who were then having an asylum there especially those from Ireland, Egypt, Persia and Russia. Living in such conditions, it was not expected of the young students to resist the ideas by which they were surrounded, and readily responded to clarion call of Shyamaji. A branch of the society was also established in Paris under the direction of S.R. Rana and B.H. Godrej.

The new voice raised by Shyamaji in London did not go unnoticed in India. While the Anglo-Indian press began to denounce him as a 'mischief-monger', the Congress press assumed an attitude of cold indifference. Surprisingly, among the pro-Government Anglo-Indian papers there was some frank appreciation of his activities and views. The *Pioneer* while supporting Shyamaji commented that he was not 'bound to be loyal to a Government of foreigners if his honest convictions led him in another direction' and commented that Shyamaji was at least reasonably frank about the fact that he was 'employing his energies and purse in attempting to shake the foundation of the British Government'. The main idea propagated by Shyamaji and his followers regarding their political preachings was that the British connection was so great a curse to the country that it should be dissolved by force if the remedy of


force should come within the sphere of practical politics.

The *Times of India* gave the appellation of the 'Third Party' to the followers of Home Rule movement, which though still comparatively small was growing rapidly. According to the same paper this party had a definite plan of what it wants. Whatever its faults, it is logical enough from its own point of view, and states the issue in clear and unmistakable fashion. It laughs at the idea of Self-Government on the colonial basis, which it frankly admits England could never be expected to grant to India. It jeers at the aspiration of the present Congress leaders. It insists that the only remedy which will satisfy its desires is the establishment of an absolutely free and independent form of National Government without the paramountcy of England. 27

In its initial stages, Shyamaji had advocated the efficacy of the passive resistance as a potent force for the attainment of a free and independent form of Government, but when the Government of India embarked on a policy of ruthless suppression of the national movement in India, Shyamaji openly propagated the use of force to achieve the object. 'The possibility of a peaceful revolution' Shyamaji wrote was now: 'We fear, very remote seeing that England is bent upon destroying every vestige of political freedom in India'. Thus, he commented further a struggle was inevitable of which there could be but one result, namely the overthrow of the oppressive alien Government in India by violent means and that the only effective way which could


bring the 'English Government to its senses' was the Russian
29
method.

Shyamaji's efforts were not confined to the training of
Indian youngmen in England and propaganda through the Indian
Sociologist. He enlarged the scope of his activities and set up
an organisation of political missionaries in India. He offered
10,000 rupees for the establishment of this organisation which
was named 'Deshbhakta Samaj or Society of Political Missionaries'.
The move was taken by Shyamaji on the recommendation of Pal and
Tilak. Tilak even suggested that the best way of spending the
money would be to distribute the expenditure over three years and
to arrange for a lecturing tour each year in each province, with
a view to elucidating the principles of 'the new school of
31
political thought in India'. Pal was selected as the first
political missionary under the scheme, but he could not fulfil the
assignment. After the arrest of Pal, the scheme could not be

29. Indian Sociologist, December 1907.
30. According to the British Intelligence report Shyamaji carried
on all his political activities on the advice and assistance
of Pal and Tilak. Foreign Department (General B) Confidential
1906, No. 13. However, it was Har Dayal, then a student of
Oxford, who suggested the constitution and a programme for
the establishment of Political Missionaries in India. See
A Note by Har Dayal on the Political Emancipation of India,
Har Dayal Papers.
31. The Mahratta (Poona), 17 March 1907.
32. Memorandum on Anti-British Agitation in England, Part I.
Foreign Department, General B Confidential, 1906, No. 13.
The reason why Pal could not deliver the lectures was
explained by him in a speech on 4 November 1908: 'events
took a shape in India that sent me to jail just when I was
arranging to organise these lectures; and when I cam out of
jail conditions were not favourable for getting up these
series of lectures'. Ibid.
implemented in India. In England the revolutionary preachings of Shyamaji and his associates came under the scorching analysis of the authorities. In July 1907, J.D. Rees, a Member of Parliament, drew the attention of the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons to the activities of Shyamaji who was endeavouring to 'debauch the loyal subjects of His Majesty'. Rees suggested that the public prosecutor might be ordered to proceed against Shyamaji with a view to 'his ultimate expulsion as an undesirable alien' from England. The Secretary of State for India, however, did not accept the suggestion of Rees, but Shyamaji after having become undesirable and dangerous in the eyes of the British authorities thought it prudent to leave England in August 1907, for settling in Paris. Under the British law no action could be taken against Shyamaji, but the Government of India issued a notification in September 1907 prohibiting the entry of the Indian Sociologist into India. Despite the prohibition, copies continued to reach India in covers which were changed from time to time so as to escape detection in the post office.

It was through this weekly paper, subtitled 'an organ of freedom and political, social and religious reform', that Shyamaji pleaded for full self-government for India which differed from

the Congress aim of securing more seats in the Councils and more posts in the Government service. Similarly, his radical methods of self-help which included the most stringent boycott and 'Passive Resistance' and even force if possible stood in sharp contrast against the Congress tradition of begging and praying for concessions.

In the short span of two years Shyamaji succeeded not only in initiating a powerful anti-British movement abroad, but also established close links with the extremists in India. Shyamaji became a nucleus around which all revolutionary elements abroad revolved. That his propaganda exercised a profound influence on the extremist movement in India was recognised even by the Government of India, who found that Shyamaji's political views were 'avowedly very extreme and anti-British' and his 'influence over those in India who held similar views was very considerable'.

H.H. Risley, the Home Secretary, confirmed that the operations of the professional sedition mongers were far more widespread, far better organised and far more advanced than those of the professional criminals and after the success of the propaganda of Shyamaji the range of the activities of the Indian revolutionaries now 'includes England, America and Paris' and they fully shared his political creed that political killing was no murder.

There is no denying the fact that before Shyamaji left for Paris, the anti-British movement had spread to different

34. Indulal Yajnik, op.cit., p. 165.
parts of the world and was linked with the secret and revolutionary parties in India.

Besides this, Shyamaji during his stay in England obtained without strings the sympathy and close cooperation of the Irish and Egyptian nationalists in his fight against the British. Shyamaji's whole-hearted condemnation of the British rule in India and his demand of full political freedom from foreign rule won him the admiration and respect of the Socialists and other patriotic workers in England. He was the first of the most prominent Indian leaders to publicly demand absolute Independence and declared fearlessly that as nothing short of this ideal could be the political aim of a nation, especially of India, she could never come to her own, never win political freedom without embarking on a relentless war, having recourse to force.

It is true that Shyamaji's political ideas which he widely propagated could not bring any change in the thinking of most like

36. Ibid. Events moved with rapid succession in Bengal after the partition and a number of revolutionary and secret societies were formed. By far the most important was the Anusilan Samiti founded by Barrister P. Mitra which became during 1906-08 the largest revolutionary organisation in northern India. Newspapers like the Sandhya, the Bande Mataram and the Yuvantar of the Indian revolutionaries carried on anti-British propaganda. Propaganda was followed by the assassination of the British officials. The revolutionaries were convicted in a number of cases, e.g. Alipore Bomb Case, Nasik Conspiracy, Gwalior Conspiracy, Dacca Conspiracy, Barisal Conspiracy, and the activities of these societies were declared unlawful. For details see Sedition Committee Report (Calcutta, 1918).


38. Chitra Gupta, Life of Barrister Swarup (New Delhi, 1939), p. 54.
It is true that Shyamaji's political ideas which he widely propagated could not bring any change in the thinking of the men like Gokhale and other moderate leaders, but it gave a new turn to the Indian revolutionary movement. The dedicated band of workers which Shyamaji trained were active both in India and abroad.

B. The assassination of Sir Curzon Wylie

After the departure of Shyamaji for Paris, the party, now mainly composed of young men, rapidly increased in numbers and boldness. Very soon the question of achieving Home Rule by pacific means became a discarded and meaningless cry. The movement came under the guidance and leadership of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. Since his coming to London in June 1906, Savarkar had not taken any prominent part in the movement. He was apparently busy preparing for his examination and writing a biography of Mazzini. Brought up under a new extremist school of politics in India, Savarkar held strong anti-British views and played an active role in the revolutionary movement in India and was the founder of the Abhinava Bharat Society. After having translated the "Autobiography of Joseph Mazzini" into Marathi, Savarkar had lost faith in mendicant methods of politics and was firmly of the opinion that independence and self-government were not to be acquired by pursuing such methods. The motive behind the

translation was perhaps that Savarkar wanted to acquaint the Indian people with the great potentiality of secret societies for wresting freedom. To an indomitable will, Savarkar united outstanding courage, breadth of vision, and strength of intellect — and all the pomp and circumstance of Edwardian Britain could not dazzle, delude or overawe him. According to his biographer, he went to London on the recommendation of Tilak to learn how to organise a revolution and carry on the struggle for independence from abroad. Savarkar had not much faith in the theoretical radicalism of Shyamaji and under his direction the Indian revolutionaries in England began to propagate in public and in private sedition of the most violent kind. Savarkar also undertook purposely the writing of the history of the Indian Mutiny which he called the 'First War of Indian Independence'. The Government of India already apprehensive of the dangers of seditious literature coming to India, approached the Secretary of State for India for cooperation in putting an end to the evil which was assuming grave proportions. They demanded that the opponents of the British rule in India should not be permitted to use the headquarters of the Empire as the centre of a seditious and revolutionary campaign. There was nothing the

41. Dhanajay Keer, Savarkar and His Times (Bombay, 1950), p. 27.
Government of India or the India Office could do to suppress the activities of the Indian revolutionaries in England. The policy of resolute enforcement of the law against the publication of seditious literature and the revolutionaries in India no doubt resulted in its curtailment, but indirectly this led to the departure of many of the extremist leaders for London where they began the publication of revolutionary journals, pamphlets and leaflets without any hindrance.

The only effective step they could take was to prohibit the entry of revolutionary literature into India. About Savarkar's book on the Indian Mutiny, the Government of India knew that it was being published in Germany and had promptly issued a notification under Section 26 of the Indian Post Office Act 1898 for the interception of all copies of a book or pamphlet in Marathi on the subject of The Indian Mutiny by V.D. Savarkar. Without having seen the book, the Director of Criminal Intelligence had reason to think that it would be a most objectionable book and Minto was hoping that they could stop it from entering India. Savarkar wrote a spirited letter to protest against this procedure and poured out vials of ridicule on the nervousness of the authorities.

44. Ibid.

The letter by Savarkar was published in Kal in which he pointed out that "it may be legal to suppress a book even before it is published, but certainly it can never be just." Native Newspaper Reports, Bombay, 1909.
V. Chirl of The Times regarded the book as a very remarkable history of the mutiny, containing considerable research with grossest perversion of facts. Savarkar's motive in writing the book was to inspire the people with a burning desire to rise again and wage a second and successful war to liberate their motherland. Whatever the merits or demerits of the book, it became a text-book for young Indian revolutionaries both in India and abroad and in spite of the prohibition, large numbers of copies found their way into India through various ingenious devices. Along with the publication of this book, the Indian revolutionaries also celebrated the 50th anniversary of the First War of Indian Independence in London. A circular was sent to all the students in England inviting them to attend the meeting in which they wished to admire as martyrs the principal leaders of the Indian mutiny who had been condemned as traitors by the British Government. The meeting was attended by a large number of Indian students some of whom travelled from Oxford and Cambridge and even from Edinburgh to be present.

Shortly afterwards from London came a leaflet On Martyrs in commemoration of the memorable year 1857. The authorities in India were perturbed over this growing trend in the revolutionary


Foreign Department, General B, Confidential 1909, No. 13. Savarkar's book was translated into Urdu and was serialised by the Ghadr from its very first issue.
movement and Minto again drew Morley's attention to the
dangerous activities of the London Indian Society where disloyal
Indians were propagating sedition and disaffection against the
British and requested him to devise measures for the suppression
or at least the mitigation of the evil which was of grave
importance.

Lee-Vaxner, the Under-Secretary of State for India,
sounded Morley after having received a secret report from the
Director of Criminal Intelligence that in the meetings of the
London Indian Society there were threats of the assassinating
of British officers and a move to smuggle arms and bombs into
India from Germany. He referred to the utter uselessness of the
Scotland Yard to collect information about the activities of the
Indian revolutionaries, because it failed miserably to distinguish
between Hindus and Muhammedans, harmless or dangerous agitators.

49. Govt. of India to Secretary of State 4 March 1909.

It is interesting to note that Madan Mohan Malaviya
regarded Oh Martyrs as an incendiary leaflet and while
sending it to the Government of U.P. he requested them to
take such steps as it might deem proper to prevent the
circulation of such poisonous matter. Madan Mohan Malaviya
to J.W. Bose 23 Aug. 1908, Home Political Deposit, December
1908, No. 19.

Other revolutionary pamphlets which were issued from
London were "Mero Firingi Ko", "Choose Oh Indian Princes",
"Khalsa", "Bande Mataram" in memory of Natwar Singh, and
"Kunwar Singh". For further details about the revolutionary
pamphlets sent from England see Home Political Deposit,
April 1911, No. 7.

50. Note by Director, Criminal Intelligence 30-9-1907.
He suggested the employment of efficient Indian agents to know what was going on amongst the Indians in London. Morley was surprised to know that no machinery had been organised for ascertaining "the existence and the ramifications of a regular dynamite and dagger confederacy in London, Paris, Berlin and New York". He agreed to the employment of a retired Indian police officer for watching the activities of the Indian revolutionary group in London.

In India, the Government resorted to rigorous measures to combat the revolutionaries, at the same time announcing the reform proposals to regain the support of the moderates. The reforms were welcomed by the moderates, but were criticised by the extremist section of the Congress. The Indian revolutionaries abroad condemned with one voice the policy of reforms and intensified the agitation for absolute freedom. In their view the object of the whole reform scheme and the probable result of associating Indians with the Government was to strengthen and consolidate the empire. The enlarged Councils were likely to take away the men of ability from the side of the people and cause them to range themselves on the side of the Government. Savarkar and his associates became more violent in their speeches and in November 1909, while delivering a lecture on "Are we

really disarmed?"; he referred to the war-like material available in India in spite of the Arms Act. "What was wanted", he declared, was "an active propaganda work in the Indian States and among the troops". He reminded them that it should be the duty of every Indian leaving these shores to work in that direction. The scene of the bombs had so terrified the British public that Savarkar boldly pronounced, "We must teach our people to hate the foreign oppressor and success is sure". At the same time, he formulated an elaborate scheme for the liberation of India. In his view mere production of revolutionary literature and speeches, though quite effective in their own way, were not adequate to shake the foundation of the British empire.

Savarkar combined in himself the qualities of a propagandist and an organiser which were apparent in his scheme. The essential features of his scheme were: First, arms to be despatched to India and men to be sent to Belgium, America, Switzerland and Egypt to receive military training as well as to learn manufacture of bombs. Secondly, he intended to distribute revolutionary literature amongst the soldiers with the object of inculcating in them the feelings of patriotism and hatred against the British. Thirdly, to carry out the programme of direct propaganda among the sepoys by members of the secret societies which were to be established.

every province and every village in India. Savarkar was convinced that by these means, it was possible for India to achieve independence in ten or fifteen years.

Dunlop Smith, private secretary to the Viceroy, while in London during 1908 informed Lord Minto of the political feelings of the Indians who had been affected by the revolutionary propaganda of Savarkar and his associates. In his view the students had developed a distinct political consciousness and instinctively looked at everything from that standpoint,

they say that every nation struggled through disturbance and blood-shed to manhood, and they must expect the same thing. They are prepared to face everything as an inevitable preliminary to a larger growth. 55

In India, the British bureaucrats adopted direct or indirect methods of suppression in order to silence political agitation. Suppression of newspapers, conviction of editors, gagging of public speakers and prohibition of political meetings became the order of the day. 'Crush the extremist, rally the moderates to the side of the Government' was the advice given to Englishmen for stamping out extremism in India. But this policy failed to stem the rising tide of national movement which was now enlarging its field and was developing in the far-off distant lands. As a result London became a place of refuge for


55. Dunlop-Smith to Lady Minto, 12 July 1908, Martin Gilbert, Servant of India: A Study of Imperial Rule from 1905 to 1910 as told through the Correspondence and Diaries of Sir James Dunlop-Smith (London, 1966), p. 166.
those who could escape from the clutches of the British Government. G.S. Khaparde of Amraoti, Lajpat Rai, Har Dayal, and Ram Bhaj Dutt from the Punjab, and Bipan Chandra Pal from Calcutta all left India in August 1908. Though these leaders with the exception of Har Dayal, did not espouse the policy of violence advocated by the Indian revolutionaries, their presence in England gave a great impetus indirectly to the activities of the London group. Some of the above leaders still believed in the policy of the Congress. The Indian revolutionaries on the other hand advocated that it was no use delivering lectures and holding meetings to give the state an opportunity of watching their activities. They believed in secret and violent methods and demonstrated it by an assault on Lee-Warner on 12 January 1909 by one of its members Vasudev Battacharji, who was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment. The police investigations made it perfectly clear that the assault on Lee-Warner was not accidental or personal; it was committed in pursuance of a deliberate plan by the members of the India House. From India Minto again informed Morley about the effect of their propaganda from abroad. He wrote that it was needless to dilate on the amount of harm which the seditious literature

56. Lajpat Rai held aloof from the revolutionary party and was busy with the task of contacting the members of the Parliament. Foreign Department, General B, Confidential 1909, No. 13.

sent from abroad was doing in India. He mentioned the steps which
the Government of India had taken to prevent its introduction into
the country but pleaded that his cooperation alone could put an
end to the evil which was very harmful for the stability of the
British Government in India.

Under instructions from Morley, the India Office appointed
a few more police detectives to keep a watch on the activities of
the Indian revolutionaries settled in U.K., and an officer was also
especially deputed to London by the Government of India. The main
purpose of this step was to secure the arrest of Savarkar, the
kingpin of the movement, in order to suppress it. However, the
Indian revolutionaries continued with their secret activities
with increased zest and even undertook the preparation of a
Treatise on bombs and explosives and training in revolver-shooting
at a range near the Tottenham Court Road.

Meanwhile, the Government of India after having intercepted
certain letters from Savarkar to his brother Ganesh Savarkar
informed the Secretary of State about the valuable information they
had furnished about the acts of the revolutionaries and the
possibility of incriminating Savarkar and his brother against

58. Govt. of India to Secretary of State 4 March 1909,

59. Note, D.C.I. dated 21.9.1909,
H.P. A, January 1911, Nos. 52-54.

60. Memorandum on anti-British agitation in England, Part II,
whom criminal proceedings had already been instituted by the Government of Bombay.

As a result of prosecution Ganesh Savarkar was duly convicted and sentenced on 9 June 1909 to transportation for life as the author of two books of songs considered to be seditious by the Government. This arbitrary policy of the Government along with the restrictions which were now being imposed on the members of the India House had an adverse effect on the Indian revolutionaries in London. A report was received that at the meeting on 20 June Savarkar was very violent and advocated the wholesale murder of Englishmen in India. He asked everyone present to do his best to serve the country by sacrificing his life at the earliest possible moment.

The above information was sent to the Commissioner of Police, London, with a note of warning that it was quite possible that the next outrage might be committed in London. Minto also sounded Morley privately regarding the existence of a widespread conspiracy to undermine the British authority in India by assassination of its officers and that some such attempt was likely to be made in London.

63. Note, Director, Criminal Intelligence, 5 July 1909. H.P. A, September 1909, Nos. 66-68.
In pursuance of the policy of assassination to terrorize the British officials, who were employing unjust methods to crush the revolutionary activities in India and abroad, the Indian revolutionaries decided to demonstrate what had till then been mere propaganda. They planned to assassinate Lord Curzon, Lord Kitchener and Sir Curzon Wyllie, Political A.D.C. to the Secretary of State for India. The last named person had become quite obnoxious recently on account of the strict measures undertaken by him to check the activities of the Indian revolutionaries in London. In the scheme of these assassinations Sir Curzon Wyllie became the first victim when Madan Lal Dhingra shot him at the Imperial Institute on 1 July 1909. A Parsee doctor, Cowasji Lalchanda, who was standing nearby and had made an effort in the direction of the assassin was also instantly shot.

Morley, after having received warnings from Minto had long felt that the murder club would extend to Europe, was shocked by the terrible news of this attempt on Wyllie's life. Considering the gravity of the crime he seriously wanted to ascertain whether it was the result of an individual action or of a criminal conspiracy and requested Minto to find out whether the assassination was premeditated and perpetrated from political motives. The preliminary investigations revealed that Dhingra had resorted

to the assassination "intentionally and of purpose as a humble protest against the inhuman transportation and hanging of Indian youths".

Regardless of how many press laws were passed, how many agitators were deported or how many concessions the British Government offered, Morley was convinced that "Indian discontent or alienation or whatever we like to call it" would ultimately "be sure to run into the same channels of violence as Italian, Russian and Irish discontent". Minto in India was more hopeful and believed that good was likely to come out of what had happened and anticipated "that people at home" would "at last realise the danger of allowing the hatching of sedition in their midst - not only for themselves but for us in Indi".

In spite of what had happened, Morley was gratified with the prosecution of Dhingra. The Attorney-General went to the Chief Justice and urged upon him to conduct the trial "without a word of political heroics" and to treat Dhingra "as soberly as an


69. Morley to Minto, 8 July 1909. Morley Papers, IOL.

70. Minto to Morley, 7 July 1909. Morley Papers, IOL.
ordinary murder*. Some of the members of the Secretary of State's Council taking a lenient view suggested that Dhingra might be sent to Broadmore for life, but Morley, though worried that the execution might lead to retaliation and bloodshed not only against the people at the India Office but against lonely Europeans in remote places in India, still strongly favoured execution and wrote to Minto, "We hang a murderer when we are likely to contact one and so we shall hang Dhingra."

Dhingra was put to trial on 10 July 1909 at the Westminster Court. It was the shortest trial in the history of British justice lasting only an hour and a half. Dhingra pleaded guilty and boldly refused to put in any defence beyond a dignified justification of his act as one of political warfare and said defiantly:

> Just as the Germans have no right to occupy this country, so the English people have no right to occupy India and it is perfectly justifiable on our part to kill any Englishman who is polluting our sacred land.  72

Dhingra was not afraid of death and it is admitted by the contemporary observer W.S. Blunt that no Christian martyr faced

71. Morley to Minto, 23 July 1909, Morley Papers.

72. Dhingra's statement in the Court - Papers regarding the trial of Mādañ Lal Dhingra acquired from Public Record Office, London by the NAI (Microfilm copy only).

> After Lord Chief Justice had passed the sentence of death "Thank you my Lord" Dhingra said "I am proud to have the honour to lay down my humble life for my country."
his judges more fearlessly or with greater dignity. Dhingra was sentenced to death. His last wish was that he should be cremated in conformity with Hindu rites and that no non-Hindu should touch his body. A petition was submitted to the Secretary of State requesting him to hand over the body of Dhingra to V.V.S. Aiyar. The petition was turned down by the India Office and Dhingra was cremated after the execution on 17 August 1909. The refusal was nothing short of the exhibition of heartlessness and meanness indication of a revengenul spirit not worthy of a state.

The assassination of Curzon Wyllie produced two types of reactions. On the one hand there was an unqualified disapproval of Dhingra’s action by some, while others acclaimed him as a patriot and martyr. The British and Indian press as well as the moderate leaders of the Indian National Congress regarded the assassination as a "national calamity". Leaders like Gokhale, Banerjea and the Aga Khan were horrified, even Dhingra’s own brother wired the Government apologising for his son’s misdeed. Dhingra’s brother apologetically wrote to Dunlop-Smith that "it was an irony of fate that in a family like ours, so deeply loyal to the Government, and so gratefully attached to the British


Blunt discussed the case with Khaparde, who was in England at that time and both were full of admiration for Dhingra and both agreed that if India could produce five hundred bhen as absolutely without fear she could achieve her freedom. Ibid.

people, a young man should degenerate into a murderer. While a London newspaper New Age commenting on the execution of Dhingra wrote that

India in the future will regard him as a hero with full responsibility; we say India will be right. Our own opinion must be put on record. It is the beginning of the end of British rule in India. 76

In the opinion of a Swiss writer the assassination amounted to a powerful denunciation directed against the tyrannical and blood-sucking Anglo-Indian Government showing England that a young intelligent and enlightened generation had sprung up, who were intent upon fighting for the political and intellectual transformation of India with every means possible. In this one rightly perceived at that time the desperate attempt of a young Indian patriot to attract the public opinion of all civilized countries to the unbearable position of his fatherland. 77

The crime suggested in the considered opinion of the India Office the paramount need for making a clean sweep of the India House and tightening of control over the students proceeding from India. Some Indian papers held Shyamaji responsible for the assassination and recommended that he along with all his propagandists of India House and the Indian Sociologist must be annihilated once

75. Behari Lal Dhingra to Dunlop-Smith, 7 July 1909.
Martin Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 193. Benerjea, who was in London, lost no time in convening a meeting of Indian residents to express condemnation of the outrage.


77. Quoted in *The Indian Sociologist*, August 1912.
The assassination, however, did not bring the end of the British rule in India, but it opened a new phase between the Indian revolutionaries abroad and the India Office. Henceforth, it was accepted as a matter of policy by the India Office to crush the Indian revolutionary movement outside India as it was not possible for the Government of India to do so. The crime suggested in the considered opinion of the India Office the paramount need for making a clean sweep of the India Office and tightening of control over the students proceeding from India. Some Indian papers held Shyamji responsible for the assassination and recommended that he along with all his propagandists of India House and the Indian Sociologist "must be annihilated once for all". Immediately after the execution of Dhingra, Morley informed Minto that "You will be glad to see that the Home Office are keeping a hunt against the printer of the Indian Sociologist. The Attorney-General came to ask my opinion. I had no hesitation to saying 'strike'."

King Edward VII also instructed Minto to take serious steps for the prevention of the young men coming over to England with no fixed occupations and falling into bad hands which they

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79. Morley to Minto, 26 August 1909, Morley Papers. Subsequently Guy Aldred, the printer of The Indian Sociologist, was convicted.
invariably do. They only learnt sedition and treason which they infused into the minds of their countrymen both in England and India.

Further investigations in the assassination of Wyllie revealed that it was engineered by Savarkar and that it was a political murder deliberately brought about by the anarchist society of the India House, "who were guided in their choice of a victim chiefly by the considerations that Curzon-Wyllie was a prominent official of the India Office", and was taking a leading role in organising measures to prevent Indian students from falling into the Society’s clutches. The police recommended the arrest of Savarkar and other leaders of the India House which in their view was likely to sound the death-knell of the revolutionary movement in England. India Office and the Government of India henceforth directed their attention to the question of arrest and deportation of the Indian revolutionaries.

80. King Edward VII to Minto, 17 August 1909, Martin Gilbert, op. cit., p. 195. Chirol also recommended that; "these organizations deserve to be closely and continuously watched. If we want to do any real good, we must spread our nets as wide as the revolutionaries have spread." V. Chirol, Indian Unrest (London, 1910), p. 181.

C. Arrest of Savarkar

The series of assassinations both in India and abroad brought home to the authorities the evidence regarding close connections between Indian revolutionary societies in India and abroad. After seeing these alarming reports, Minto informed Morley that what they had to face now was a dangerous conspiracy and the consequent panic which was spreading through the Indian and European population. Minto did not think that there was any political party of importance directly advocating the commission of anarchical crimes, but he was convinced of the existence of a dangerous conspiracy aimed at the assassination of the British officers. Minto's fears had been further confirmed by the murder of Jackson at Nasik, which disclosed that the crime was committed...

82. Savarkar before his coming to England was a member of Nitra Mela, a secret society of Nasik. Under the guidance of his two brothers, Ganesh Savarkar and Narayan Savarkar, Nitra Mela became very popular and assumed a new name, Abhinav Bharat (New India). V. D. Savarkar also gave this name to the society in London. The society had branches at Bombay, Poona and connections at Aurangabad, Hyderabad and Gwalior. The Indian revolutionaries abroad were in close contact not only with this society but also with Anusilan Samiti (Improvement Society) of Bengal, which also believed in the overthrow of the British Government by violent means. The society had its headquarters at Dacca and branches at Rmsensingh, Titterpur, Faridpur, Dinajpur and Sylhet.

83. Minto/Morley, 23 December 1909, Morley Papers.

84. Minto to Morley, 27 January 1909, Morley Papers. Jackson, the District Magistrate of Nasik, who had tried the case of Ganesh Savarkar sentencing him to transportation for life was shot on 21 December 1909 at a farewell party at Vijay Theatre by a Brahmin youth Amand Lakshman Kanhale. A Note on Nasik Conspiracy Case. R.P. B, July 1918, Nos. 292-316.
with one of the several Browning-pistols sent by Savarkar from England to further the cause of the revolutionary society through Chatturbhuj Amin, who was returning to India. The Government of India had been trying to implicate Savarkar but had met with no success. As a result of these assassinations in India and England, the Director of Criminal Intelligence categorically recommended that their policy henceforth should be to utilize all the resources at their command for keeping in close touch with movements of the more dangerous revolutionaries in England.

On the basis of the evidence collected in Jackson's murder, the Government of India asked the Government of Bombay whether it was possible to obtain action under the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881 for the arrest and deportation to India of all the persons belonging to the London group against whom a prima facie case could be established. It was intended to take drastic action against all the Indian revolutionaries in England, but the evidence against them was incomplete. The only person who could be easily implicated was Savarkar.

The Indian revolutionaries had to restrict their activities on account of the close watch which the detectives from the Scotland Yard were now keeping on their movements. Sjiysmaji now settled in Paris decided to close the India House as the objective for which

it was established, "namely instilling hatred of the English and infusing new spirit of independence into intellectual youths coming over to England, was already accomplished and had produced tangible results".

His idea was to dispose of the India House and with that money to open a new one in Paris, to be developed as an active centre for anti-British movement, as London was no longer a safe place to carry on such activities. While the Indian revolutionaries started reorganising their activities in London and Paris, the Government of India was making every effort to procure false or true evidence by which they could arrest all or at least the chief members of the India House. In the considered opinion of the Director of Criminal Intelligence there was no need for wasting time in a hopeless effort to deal legally with the Indian revolutionaries who were outside the pale of their system and their laws, and was firms in favour of arresting them by whatever means available. Harold Stuart, the Home Member of the Government of India, however, rejected the above proposal and insisted on the collection of legal evidence in case the Indian revolutionaries did "eventually enter any portion of the British dominions".

Savarkar had left for Paris in the beginning of 1910 with a view to collaborating with the group there for finalising the programme

of revolutionary action, but he came back to London on 13 March 1910 to wind up the affairs. The vigilant London police who had already been anxiously waiting for him immediately arrested him at the Victoria station on a warrant under the Fugitive Offenders Act. Savarkar was represented by Powell and J.M. Parik, his solicitor being R. Vaughan, who applied for bail which was refused. Minto believed that the arrest of Savarkar was likely to hasten the process of disintegration of the London group and his belief was confirmed when the police discovered that there was a considerable consternation among the revolutionaries.

The Indian revolutionaries after the arrest of Savarkar were organised under the leadership of Aiyer and Virendranath Chattopadhyaya. They suspended their activities temporarily and concentrated their attention on saving Savarkar from the clutches of the British authorities. They started collections for Savarkar's Defence Fund hoping that he could be tried in England only, where his acquittal was regarded as more probable, while in India under the British legal system he was sure to be given at least transportation for life. The authorities in India had meticulously

89. Minto to Morley, 17 March 1910, Morley Papers.
90. Indian Agitators Abroad (Simla, 1911), p. 176.
prepared the case against Savarkar with hardly any room for his being tried in England under the Fugitive Offenders Act.

After the formal hearing of the case in London Savarkar's return to India was ordered and he was taken on board *P & Q S.S. Morea* on 1 July 1910. His associates had prepared a scheme for Savarkar's escape from the prison, but on account of its premature leakage it was abandoned. But Savarkar successfully escaped on 8 July through the open port-hole of the lavatory, when the ship was standing in the docks at Marseilles. He swam to the shore in the hope of meeting his compatriots, who were waiting with a car there, but before he could cross the docks, he asked the French policeman to take him to a magistrate. The policeman instead brought him back to the ship and handed him over to his British escort.

Once again Savarkar's colleagues failed to secure his freedom, but his arrest on the French soil was a flagrant breach of international law, since legally the British guards were powerless to apprehend him. The Indians with the help of their friends in Paris and England got up a strong agitation against the alleged violation of French sovereignty. The great furore in the French press and the French socialist circles compelled the French Government to demand the return of Savarkar to the free soil of

France or if London was reluctant to hand over Savarkar to the French the case was to be taken to The Hague Tribunal. M.F. de Pressense, President of the League of the Rights of Man issued an appeal urging the French Government to insist on the liberation of Savarkar and to refer the matter to the International Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the event of British refusal.

The socialist Mayor of Marseilles, Jean Jaures, and others also persisted in their criticism that the French Government had violated an important right of asylum, of which England herself was the protagonist. Keir Hardie, the British Labour Party leader raised the question at the International Socialist Congress at Copenhagen on 6 September 1910 and had a resolution passed that every attending country "must regard as valuable the right of asylum and, accordingly, Savarkar must be handed over to the French Government." But no one in India believed that Savarkar would be sent back to France. Once the British had captured him, they were likely to do their best to keep him in spite of the international law, because in the opinion of the Marwatta there never was any chance of any serious unpleasantness accruing between the French and the British governments over the life of an unfortunate Indian.

L'Humanité edited by Marx's grandson Leare Longuet regarded Savarkar's arrest as an abominable violation of the right of asylum, which was effected in absolute secrecy. It further commented that in "giving up a political refugee, the Marseilles authorities have committed an outrage of which account will most assuredly be demanded and in respect of which the sanction of the state itself" was necessary.

The situation was quite embarrassing and Government of India was strongly opposed to the case of Savarkar being taken to the International Court. They sent to Paris Wallinger, their London based Secret Police Agent, with the object of persuading the French Government to drop the matter. During the private discussions Sir Francis Bartie, the British Ambassador, impressed upon Wallinger the necessity of the British authorities giving up Savarkar to the French to ensure *entente cordiale*. But Wallinger took pains to explain to him the importance of Savarkar in the ranks of the Indian revolutionaries and the impetus his return abroad would give to the Indian revolutionaries and their subversive activities. He made it clear to him that the Indian Government would look at his surrender to France as a very serious obstacle in their attempt to stamp out sedition. Further reports from

Wallingar show that though the French Government was quite adamant, the French Police was favourable and very helpful, still they also appealed to him to impress the home authorities to accede to French demand; otherwise it might lead to friction.

As a matter of fact Savarkar's case created problems for both the parties, but especially the French, who were now faced with serious opposition in the National Assembly from the socialist deputies. In order to save their face, the French authorities proposed to the British Government to settle the terms of arbitration in the dispute by the International Court so that an announcement could be made that the two Governments had agreed on arbitration.

The agreement finally signed was the outcome of a prolonged negotiations at London and Paris. During the discussions it was originally contemplated by Grey that the Court should consist of three neutral arbitrators but the French Government evinced so strong a wish that one of their nationals should act as an arbitrator, that Grey instead of snapping the negotiations and thus bringing about an impasse, agreed finally to a compromise by which the tribunal was to have five arbitrators, of whom two were to be the nationals of the respective states and remaining

97. Wallinger to Cleveland, 23 September 1910. H.P. A, April 1911, Nos. 21-69. The reasons for the French police's cordiality were that they themselves were involved in the case and had arrested Savarkar near the docks at the instigation of the British Secret Police. Home Political A, April 1911, Nos. 21-67.

98. Sir Francis Leveson Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, 6 October 1910, Grey Papers, P.R.O.
three neutrals. The court of arbitration was to decide whether Savarkar in conformity with the international law was to be restored by the British Government to the Government of France.

After the agreement the French Government asked the British authorities to stop the prosecution against Savarkar in India. Savarkar had landed at Bombay on 22 July and was being tried in the Nasik Conspiracy Case. But neither the India Office nor the Government of India was prepared to meet the wishes of the French Government regarding the suspension of the judicial proceedings against Savarkar pending the decision of the Hague Tribunal. With a view to maintaining cordial relations, however, the India Office agreed to give an undertaking that in the event of trial resulting in the conviction of Savarkar the execution of any sentence passed upon him would be suspended till the decision of the Hague Tribunal was announced. They also agreed to surrender Savarkar to the French in the event of the case being settled against the British Government. But in a secret telegram the Secretary of State hinted to the Viceroy that in case of surrender if he should appear in British territory "our rights against him as a fugitive offender would revived."

99. Foreign Office to India Office, 2 November 1910. J. and P. Department, F.No. 1032/1910. Earl of Desert was nominated by the British Government. The French Government nominated Monseur Louis Renault and Monsieur Le Jonkheer de Savamin Lohman from Hague and Monsieur Gramm from Belgium Chamber of Commerce acted as the President of the Tribunal. Ibid.

100. Secretary of State to Viceroy, 3 October 1910. J. & P. Department, F. No. 1032/1910.
soon after this the India Office requested the Government of India to consider whether the extradition of Savarkar on account of public safety be demanded from the French under the Treaty, in the event of the decision going against them. The idea of extradition was whole-heartedly supported by the Government of India since they viewed his liberation as a very serious matter. In their opinion Savarkar was an "extremely dangerous man" who "would be regarded as a hero and his influence and power for mischief would be greatly increased" if set free. While agreeing with their assessment of Savarkar, Crew, the Secretary of State for India, impressed upon Hardinge, the new Viceroy, the necessity of firm conviction of Savarkar by the Bombay Government, because in his opinion the decision of the Hague Tribunal was likely to depend to a great extent on the proof which could be produced of abetting murder, so that if that charge was postponed until after the arbitration tribunal had decided, "our strongest card would remain unplayed". The conviction of Savarkar was viewed by the India Office as extremely essential both from the point of view of making the extradition easier as well as to influence the decision of the judges at the Hague.

103. Under the terms of the Treaty of Extradition with France, the British Government could ask for the extradition of a person who had committed a crime in their territory and had been convicted and not of a fugitive, who had not been convicted. See Lee-Warner's Note on Savarkar's Case, 3 February 1911, J. and F. Department F.No. 778/1911, IOL.
Crewe again wrote to Hardinge that though technically the Hague tribunal was "concerned with the escape rather than the crime" of Savarkar, yet the fact that "political conviction had been obtained might weigh with them". He further convinced him about the exigency of linking Savarkar with the particular murder of an individual which might "be necessary for conviction" and if "any leniency" was to be shown to him, it would be in the "sentence but not in verdict". If this was not achieved, he warned, "Savarkar will get off at the Hague".

The whole machinery of the Government of India and the Bombay Government was not directed towards the conviction of Savarkar. He was hurriedly tried by a special tribunal in the Nasik Conspiracy Case under Section 121-A for abetment of murder of Jackson. The Court sentenced him to transportation for life and forfeiture of all his property.

The Hague tribunal also after a cursory consideration gave its verdict on 24 February 1911. The court held that as the gendarmerie was acting under the orders of his superiors, Savarkar was rightly handed back to the British escort on the ship and the British Government, who had Savarkar in its custody, was under no obligation to restore him back to the French Government because of a mistake committed by a foreign agent. The court, however,

conceded that an irregularity had been committed in the arrest of Savarkar and in his being handed over to the British police, but decided that no useful purpose could be served by transferring him to the French soil especially after he had been found guilty of the gravest charges by the highest tribunal in the land of his birth.

Both Crewe and Hardinge were very happy over the "decision of the sages at The Hague" and especially when it was apparent that Savarkar was now to "spend the rest of his days with his brother in the Andaman Island".

The judgement came as a shock to freedom loving people all over the world. "It was clear from the very beginning", commented a German newspaper, "that the French Government was ready to help its ally and to prevent one of its uncomfortable prisoners from escaping while in its waters or on its territory and it could not in consequence afterwards demand his restoration on the ground of a right of asylum...". In view of the same paper, the Tribunal had no time to examine whether arrangements such as were made between the two police commissioners could abrogate the right of asylum. The paper further wrote that throughout this episode the attitude of the French Government

108. Hardinge to Crewe, 2 March 1911, Hardinge Papers.
had been influenced by her feelings of alliance with England and that the wish to please the latter had been stronger than the desire to preserve the right of which, as representative of a Republican people, it ought to be exceptionally proud. Some of the other continental newspapers described the verdict of The Hague tribunal as something that had 'reduced the right of asylum to a farce'. The judgement caused a great disappointment amongst the Indian revolutionaries and as expected by the Government of India, the removal from the scene of action of Savarkar, who was marked by them 'as the ablest of the Indian revolutionaries in Europe', hastened the process of disintegration of the London group. Still Hardinge was not wrong in thinking that though Savarkar's removal had given a "great blow to the extremists" in India and abroad, yet he anticipated "some more political assassinations in retaliation for Savarkar's loss of liberty".

As a result of the prosecution of Savarkar, the other members of the India House now realised that London was no longer a safe place for their operations and they began to search for more congenial places to carry on their anti-British activities. The leading workers, who were considered dangerous by the British police, Chattopadhyaya, Aiyer and Har Dayal, left London and made Paris and other European capitals as their centres.

Home Political, January 1911, Nos. 62-64.
110. Hardinge to Crewe, 2 March 1911, Hardinge Papers.
Revolutionary movement which began on a moderate scale in 1905 reached its apex in 1909 and 1910. There now remained in London leaders like Pal, his son Niranjan Pal and Khaparde. Pal tried to revive the movement and alongwith J.M. Parikh, formed the Hind Bradar®, a society for Indian students. However, his efforts came to nothing. The Indian revolutionaries under the bold leadership of Savarkar had been able to establish close and active contacts with secret and revolutionary societies in India and an elaborate programme for the purchase of weapons and "storing them in the neighbouring countries to be used when opportunities should occur" had been drawn, but the strong hand of the British Government removed him from "the scene of action". "He was caught", writes Lajpat Rai, "because he was reckless; he never cared about his personal safety; he had the dash of an old warrior who always put himself in the post of danger."

Savarkar and his associates advocated complete independence for India to be achieved by means of a violent revolution. The task was difficult but they had confidence and moral courage to achieve it. Despite the arrest of their capable leader, they still advocated the assassination of the British officers as the first stage of revolution. They were convinced that without

111. The name of Hind Bradar® was changed to the Hindustan Society in February 1911. However, it was disbanded on 31 May 1911. See F.D., General, Confidential 1911, No. 62.

112. Lajpat Rai, Young India (Delhi, 1965), p. 176.
absolute political independence the country could never rise to that exalted position amongst the other nations of the world which was her due. Swarajya, they knew, could never be attained except by waging a bloody and relentless war against the British. With this end in view, they expanded the scope of their activities and established their centres in Paris, Berlin, New York and Tokyo.