CHAPTER V

The Śaṭṭhala-nyāyāsāstra is presented against the background of Nyāyaśāstra and a brief survey whereof is given below:

I. A philosophical study of any system is incomplete if śāntiśikiki branch of philosophy escapes our notice. The science of pramāṇas is called Nyāyaśāstra i.e. Vivāda or Vādaśāstra. This is a very ancient branch of philosophy. The scholars find a good number of logical terms in ancient Indian Vedic literature. Gautama’s Nyāyaśūtra is the oldest treatise available on the science. The historians date him as early as the sixth century B.C. It gives a fully grown up system. So the Nyāyaśūtra as found in the Gautama

1 "Logic in Sanskrit is designated by various names, such as Nyāya, Hetuvidyā, Hatusāstra, śāntiśikiki, Pramāṇasūtra, Tarkavidyā, Vādārtha and Pakkīśāstra. Some of these names are found in works of 4th and 5th centuries B.C." - Tarkasāgraha, fn. 1. p.xiii. Ed. (Tr.) A.D. Pusalker, Bombay Sanskrit Series, N.L.V. 1965.
sūtra is not the beginning of the science. But the history of Nyāyasastra begins with the advent of Gautama.

Every school, belonging either to the heterodox or to the orthodox systems, produced a number of writers on Nyāya. Each school has its own viewpoint to put forth each against the other in its treatment of metaphysics. There are different viewpoints even in a single school in the later periods of its history.

The growth of Nyāyasastra therefore, begins with Nyāya-sūtra and it continues till today. The long

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(i) The public controversy of the Upaniṣads may, however, be noted as a feature which favoured the growth of logic and sophistry, and, apart from the great weight allowed to the Veda in general and the Upaniṣads in particular in the arguments of the two schools. It may be pointed out that the doctrine of the place taken in perception by mind is foreshadowed in the Upaniṣads, whence also is derived in a revised form the Nyāya doctrine of sleep. A.B.Keith, the Indian Logic and Atomism, (Oxford Press, 1921) p.10.

(ii) "Not that they were the first of their kind; perhaps they were preceded by cruder attempts of the same sort that have perished; perhaps the present works are improved editions of older ones." A.D.Pusalkar, op.cit., p.xx.
history is divided into three periods by the historians of literature. The first period begins from the 4th century B.C. up to the 5th century A.D. The second period begins from the 6th century A.D. to the 13th century A.D. The third period begins from the 14th century A.D. up to the end of the 19th century A.D.

The second period of the history of Nyayaśāstra is of great value as it gave a new turn to the course of development. The eleventh, the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries are decisive as the ferment prepared by them gave birth to the Nāvyānāyka i.e. modern logic.

The Indian life was pulsating with logical activities. Karnatāk during this period gave birth to the eminent mystic thinkers who "gave a prophetic turn and popular appeal" to the religion of Karnatāk and contributed their mite to the great movement of logical fervour by bringing about a change in the cultural life of the people. It is religion that
caused change in the history of Indian logic. A Study
of Satsthala literature, which begins to come into
existence with the advent of Kondaguli Kesiraja,
Devara Desimorya, Medare Cennayya and others, throws
light on the history of Nyāyaśāstra in general and
that of Satsthala school viewpoint in particular.
There are no independent works on Nyāya or pramāṇa
śāstra of its own, whereas we have them in other
schools. It is for this reason it seems that the

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3 (1) S.C. Vidyabhusana in the Journal of the
Asiatic Society of Bengal (May 1905) writes:
The circumstances which led the Buddhists
forsake the ancient Nyāya and to lay the founda-
tion of a new system called modern Nyāya was due
to the peculiarity of the religion which they
professed.

(2) The transformation of Aristotelian into
scholastic logic began a decidedly spiritual-
istic culture.

"The new logic as contrasted with Greek, prag-
matic system building was impelled by a different
motivation... Logic was now completely divorced
from natural science, a process which began in
Alexandrian Hellenistic times. Its aim and goal
became the attainment of personal salvation
through the ecstatic speculative union with the
One which lies beyond reason and beyond earthly
existence." Kantor, Psychology and Logic,
pp.47-49.
The Saṭṭhala school is not recognised as a school of thought. A deep study of the Vacana literature in its different forms such as Saṭṭhakasattu, Śunyasaṃpādane, Prabhuliṅgale, Śrīkara bhāya, Vādaśāga etc. is necessary to have an idea of Pramāṇasūtra of Saṭṭhala school from the point of view of logic.

II. The vacamakers of the twelfth century were well-versed in the Pramanasūtra and Vādasūtra i.e. epistemology and sophistry both. They made use of the epistemological terms such as pratyakṣa, anumāna and Sabda. They, sometimes, use cṛtta, drṣṭa and anumāna

4 There is no system that does not approve the pramanās as the knowledge depends on the pramanā, though the number of pramanās varies from system to system.

The Tārkiṇa rakṣa observes:

pratyakṣaṁ eko oṣṭvākṣaḥ kaṇeṣaṁ - sugataupunah | anumāṇoḥ ca taṁ ca api saṁkhyaḥ sabdaḥ ca te api || nyayaikadesino appyevā upamānaḥ ca kecana ||


5 P.G. Halakettī (Ed.) Śunyasaṃpādane, Bijepu (1939), Ch.XV. v.49.
or praśāṇa which is a genus under which these are
species. drṣṭa and srūta are synonyms of pratyakṣa and
śabda respectively in vacana literature. The Śiva-
sarāṇes make use of terms such as mahījñāna, srutajñāna,
svadhiṣṭāna, etc. which are found in Jainaism and
Buddhism. They give an account of the genesis of
mahījñāna, srūta, jñāna, mancariṇa-rajñāna, svadhiṣṭāna
and kevāla-jñāna, which is not found in Jainaism.
The work of tracing the genesis of pramāṇa in Śiva-
sarāṇes is an original one though the technical terms
are found in the old stock of Indian Nyāya. But there
are a few new terms coined by them. They are 'indriya-
likhita', 'lingalikhita', 'tīnu' and 'idiru', etc. which
are found in Vacana literature. They use the term
'samaya', a logical term or epistemological term, which
reappears in the history of Nyāya after a long time.
It attained a special, significant place in the episte-
молоogy of the Śāsthravāla school in particular and
Indian in general. The syllogism, they make use of now
and then to trace the existence of the reality that

lies beyond the bounds of senses is samśnyato drṣte or analogical syllogism. This syllogism is used in this sense by almost all the schools of Indian thought as in the Western logic. They quote the ancient texts in support of their views and they do not hesitate to criticise the texts sometimes which are against the ethical and religious ideals and thereby the metaphysical stand. They refer to the 'samayapramāṇa' to investigate or scrutinise the truth of personal intuition. They criticise Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Yoga, Sāṅkhya and Buddhism pointing out the weak points in each system. They, sometimes, make use of these sister systems to support their views such as existence and Monotheistic stand. They are well-versed in sophistry as they are well-versed in the epistemology. For

7 "The Nature and Spirit are transcendent, beyond sense perception and are established by reasoning from analogy..." - Ganganath Jha (Tr.) Tettva Kaumudi, Oriental Series No.10 (1985), p.19.

8 P.C.Halekatti (Ed.), op.cit., Ch.X.42.

they are well aware of the suitable occasions where they could make use of the vacsana effectively in their discussions. They know what are the right places where they could conduct discussion and with whom to reach the valid conclusions and so on. Thus they had full knowledge of both epistemology and sophistry. They were experts in the kind of pramāṇa that could be made use of in accordance with the metaphysical stand of their school so that they could distinguish their pramāṇa from the other pramāṇas of other schools. Our work is limited to the Vēcāna literature which is supposed to be more precious than the most. The Nyāyasastra of Vēcāna can be dealt with in two sections called A. and B. which have their own parts to play.

(A) There are common features of Nyāya (i.e. Vēda-sastra), as it was known in those days, accepted by almost all the schools both of the orthodox and heterodox traditions. So we have common topics of Nyāya-sastra where Nyāyasastra does not mean a particular school founded by Gautama. The common factors may be pointed out in the Satsthala school also by the study
of Vedic literature. The most important fact about the Nyāya is to investigate the traditional beliefs accepted by the people regarding the nature of reality. This is mimāṃsākarāga. Another important feature is to examine the data of experience by means of pramāṇa. Some of the schools of thought deal with both the types of work of Nyāya, whereas others with one only. The Śaśṭhala school of thought, as its metaphysics demands the investigation into the nature of reality and also the scrutiny of the data of the experience, shares the two views of the meaning and function of 'pramāṇa'. This is the most primary characteristic of the 'pramāṇa' which is to be known first in order to know the nature of 'pramāṇa' according to the Śaśṭhala school. It can be determined only by knowing the metaphysical stand. The stand of the school is similar to what Vatsāyana states when he comments on the first aphorism of Gautama: "pramāṇaḥ arthaperīkṣeṇaṁ." The term 'artha' has two meanings. The term 'artha' in its formal sense is one that does not refer to the outside thing; whereas in the other sense 'artha' refers to the reality independent of the
perceiver. This is the connotation of the term 'artha' which is subjected to investigation or scrutiny. The āṇvikṣiki, thus, has a twofold function as the perīkṣapa is about the twofoldness of 'artha'. The 'artha' is obtained by two sources as the 'artha' means two things. They are 'pratyakṣa' and 'āgama'. This is literally followed by the Satsthala school of thought though it admits 'anumāna' as the third 'pramāṇa' which comes under 'pratyakṣa'. The vacanakāras refer to 'indriyalikhita' and 'liṅgalikhita' showing their preference to these two as primary. The dialectical development in this direction can be recognised by thorough study of the vacanās of the mystics of the twelfth century who had the full knowledge of the past and the present age and also imbibed the spirit of dialectical activity.

The two terms (i.e., 'pratyakṣa' and 'āgama') play a great role in having correct knowledge. This is accepted by the distinguished modern Western metaphysicians like Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein, Strawson and others and by ancient, medieaval and modern Indian
Neiyāyikas. The Sastra school of thought is another Indian system to be introduced to the family of the Indian Neiyāyikas by showing their views about 'pratyakṣa' and 'āgama' which is not yet done. 'Indriya-likhita' is a 'sense-word' to put in the Western and Indian logical terminology; whereas 'śiṅga-likhita' is a 'tradition' or 'sabda' in Indian terminology. We may, in a sense, put it as a 'name-word' in Western logical terminology. I like to restrict my comparative study of meaning and use of these two only i.e. 'Indriyalikhita' and 'śiṅgalikhita' as found in the Indian Nyāya-sūtras accepted by different schools of thought.

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10 Haraprasāda shastri writes, "The pramāṇas are defined in four previous sūtras, and all of a sudden, comes a sūtra subdividing sabda; subdivisions of sabda are unknown in other systems of philosophy. It is generally translated by the word, "dogma". The distinctions between the Revealed word and the Ordinary Word is peculiar to the Nyāya Sūtras ... All this seems to be the work of a Hindu sect which we take to be the Śivas at the instance of Haribhadra. These are a compromise between the Hindus and the Buddhists." quoted by V.S.Kambi in Dignāga, Kumaregha Granthamale, Dharwar (1972) p.16.
The Saṣṭhala school of thought like all other Indian schools accepts the common factors which are essential to the Nyāyasaṅgraha to be constructed. The knowledge is possible only when the word is used. No word then no knowledge which is clearly accepted by both the Western and the Indian thinkers. Following is the classification in connection with 'vācana' (i.e. vēk-speech) based on the vācana of the Śiva-serpes.

Vācana:

(1) The place where the vācana is uttered
(2) The basis or the support of the vācana
(3) Adornment of the vācana
(4) The defeat of the vācana
(5) That which derives or comes forth from a vācana
(6) The characteristics which are the causes of a vācana being appreciated by the hearers.

This classification was necessary as 'vēdevivēda' was going on in the world of scholars. 'vēdevivēda' is nothing but proving the point either by reasoning or by occult powers or by referring to texts. The
Indian religious history abounds with intellectual wars which went on among opposite groups of scholars. The scholars argued their viewpoint even at the stake of life. So the people had intense training not only in logic but also in yogic practice for occult powers so as to win the opponents. This was prevalent during the classical age of Indian philosophy. The discussions were going on amidst the scholars belonging to the same circle as between the rival camps. The participants were people who had occult powers. The history of Nyāya-sāstra in India throws light on the fact that the yoga was one of the sources of knowledge.

The following classification in Śabda or words could be arranged following the old Nyāya method which was prevalent then. It influenced the Śivasāstras of the twelfth century. Their classification and the

11 (1) There is an event in the life of Dignāra who fought with a number of scholars and defeated them in the war of intellectual discussions, and converted them to Buddhism. So he did with Isvākrishna.

(2) Saṅkara, Basavaraja and Devara Drāimeyya, converted their opponents to Hinduism.
technical terms such as 'Indriyalikhita' and 'Lingalikhita' are sufficient evidence to this.

(a) The excellent words:

'nuḍidere muttina hāradantirebēku.
nuḍidere maṇikyada diptiyantirebēku.
nuḍidere sphaṭikada saḥkeyantirebēku.
nuḍidere lingamocci shudahudenabēku...''

(Words should be like a wreath of pearls if spoken.
Words should be like the lustre of a rubi, if spoken.
Words should be like a stick of crystals, if spoken.
God must say yes, yes in appreciation, if spoken...)

All the similies used here have not only literary value, as it is easy to learn, but also, if one goes deep, logical value. We are interested not in the literary beauty but in what throws light on its deep knowledge got by the mystics of the twelfth century. The first simile refers to the pleasing form and

pricelessness of it. The second simile brings out the self-evident nature of the word as the lustre of the word reveals 'itself' and the 'other'. The third simile makes clear that the word should not contain the blemish in any of its part. Thus there are three characteristics of the 'excellent word' as stated by Basava in this verses. They are very important features. The word with such features cannot but please the listener. The true listener is 'viveka' (i.e. power of discrimination) in the heart.

(b) Disputation-words:

These are the words expressed by persons about a topic of discussion that reveals opposite stands of the participants. The topics for discussion may be socio-ethical, religious, metaphysical or mystical.

Mystic experience:

(1) अवरेतु मर्शुश्चतु, तन्नमिति मस्निष्टेवेदां
न्द्येवेदयोन्दु शिवुष्ठेँदु हेलुष्ठ वशु भरतु

(Tell me, should you mourn for the self gone back to
Self where neither consciousness nor yet oblivion is ?
Tell me, should you grieve? Look, that saying is false
that says destruction waits the destruction of the
disembodied soul !)

(2) ... Zrudhiye kutaial m nenemu sekiyakane...
S.S.II. 23.

(No witness do I know of it !)

.. anubhavellavu jamanaata sabdaneeda
( .. all mystic experience is word without the ego -
sense..)

Ethical:

(1) ... evarakayavillade arivinge eareavilla.
arivu evaradali saavedhisida liagaikyame kriya-
buddhanendu mudidare panchamahapatka...

14 P.C.Halaketti (Ed.), op.cit. Ch.II. 36
15 P.G.Halaketti (Ed.), op.cit. Ch.III. 71
(... For practice is the frame of inward faith, which needs a chastened body for its housing. But if you speak of him who has attained union with God, with spirit and the act in perfect interpenetration, as slave of works, you sin the five great sins.)

Metaphysical:

(1) Ādi basavanna, anādi liṅga vendeḥbaru; hasi, hasi. I nudiya keśalāgadu. 
Ādi liṅga anādi besavannau...

(It is a lie, a lie, to say Basavanna is manifested, Liṅga unmanifested; such talk is hearsay! It is liṅga the manifested and Basavanna the unmanifested...)

(2) besavanna omārādindattette, nṛśabindu kalēsālādindattette...IV. 20.

(Basavanna is before the World was and farther back beyond and before the birth of sound, Light and form.)

16 P.G. Halakatti (Ed.) op. cit., Ch.III.16.
(3) ... अस्त्रस्वला निरालो निर्मीताग्रेले...  
(... disintegrated those which are born of water)

(4) ... नित्ये निराकृदे ग्हणवु सक्ति इल्लादे इत्याव्रे
ङ्गले बयालदहुदुदु, निमु ग्हणा साइत्यादे कैया
धरिसिदे, ए बयाला ब्रह्मसेभा नामवेयिदित्तु...

Yogic:

(1) ... धारते मेलाङा अग्नि मुगला मुत्तादे इप्पा
योगा...

(The yoga is that in which the fire in the earth centre
does not reach the sahasrāra).

(2) योगदा होलाबे नेनेत्ते बल्लेस्याया? योग सिवे
सक्ति सामुभवैऽप्पुदल्लादे, सिवा सक्ति
वीयोगवोप्पे योगा विल्लेव्ये। नालिकृर्जुनः ।

18 P.G.Halakatti (Ed.), op.cit., Ch.VII. 34.
19 P.G.Halakatti (Ed.), op.cit., Ch.XV. 33.
20 P.G.Halakatti (Ed.), op.cit., Ch.III. 65.
(How can I know the kernel of yoga? Yoga is not the separation of Siva and Sekti but the union... Nelli-karjuna!)

Religious vows:

(1) ṇāgade melaṇa liṅge hiṅgittendātmagāṅtakave
mājābekāmba ajñānigalu ançevāvuda, liṅgēvēvu-
dendavaretta ballaru?

(How do the fools know what āṅga is and what Liṅga, who say that he who left the Liṅga on his body, must commit self slaughter? ...)

(2) servōgamā śruti śrūti purāṇa pāṭhakṣenādāgenu?
... nitya sīvarṣeone trikēlavilla; nityaśādodaka
prasāda sevēyillā idētēra vīrēsaivēyṛa,
idētēra jayamāṇaphalāya, amugēsvēra liṅgēve?

(What if one study all the āgamas, śrutis, śrūtis, purāṇas... unless one is devoted to worship Siva

21 P.G.Halekatti (Ed.) op.cit., Ch.XV. 51.
daily three times and does not take padôdaka and prasâda? Can it be the Virasaiva vow? O Amugeśvare one cannot make one's life fruitful)

(3) arthe pranâbhimânavanoppisidalli bhaktenappene?

(One cannot become a devotee by dedicating wealth, life and ego-sense.)

(4) pûjeyalli leksitavappaveru punyeda Ñâingevodalu.

(Those who concentrate on worship embody merit.)

(5) mâtina mâtiâge ninna kondârendu elchote ałukandeyā.

(0 lamb weep for those who kill you in order to fulfil the words they learnt...)

(c) Rebuke-words:

This kind of vacema is that which consists of unpleasantness or teaching the false theories.

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23 P.G.Halekatti (Ed.) op.cit., Ch.XIII. 15.
24 P.G.Halekatti (Ed.) op.cit., Ch.XIII. 41.
(i) kāyave pithike, prāṇave liṅgaṅaṅgiralu, bēre matte kuruhekeyya?

(When the body is the base, and the breath the Linga, why have symbol still?)

(ii) iṣṭaveṃbudu guruvinahānu

ō guruviṅguyu iṣṭekeyu jaṅgama ve prāṇavenderide balika, ō guruvu, iṣṭeju jaṅgamaṅdaliye aḍakanoḍē...

(The Iṣṭa is Guru's dependency... after you know that Jaṅgama is for these both the breath of life, you will find both Guru and Iṣṭa contained in Jaṅgama...)

(iii) kāyave sakala, prāṇave sakala niṅkala, bhāve niṅkalaṅgaṅaṅgirda matte, bēre eyate avyata samnehitaveṃbudillanoḍē.

sivasekti sanbendhave dēha dēṅgaḷūgirda balika, gohevaṛdaṅgaṅdelli bēroṇdu kuruheviṅgida 26 ariyalekayā cennabasevaṇṇa.

(Body is form; and breath is formless form; and will

25 P.G. Halakatti (Ed.) op.cit., Ch.XIV. 15.
26 P.G. Halakatti (Ed.) op.cit., Ch.X. 14.
being formless Linga, look, look, there is nought besides either what comes, or is possessed, or lodges within you! When the union of Siva and Sakti has generated body and soul, what needs, O Gommateshvara, in Guhesvaralnga, a separate symbol that we know?)

(d) accordant vacaneat

It is a vacane in accordance with the metaphysical stand and producing the right knowledge of the reality in the hearer.

(1) dayavillade dharma-devudyya?
dayavebeka sakala prapigalellorelliyu;
dayave dhamma mulevayy;
kuja saengayyenantellallanayy... 27

(What can do the religion which is devoid of compassion? All the animate beings are in need of compassion. Compassion is the root of religion. God Kujala saengayya does not like if that is not there)

This is said to be an example of an accordant vacana. It is in accordance with the metaphysical stand, namely, the non-dualistic. This monism creates a right sense of understanding and leads to right action that leads to the realisation of the self in all to be the same. This is, therefore, accordant vacana.

The above vacana gives, thus, the characteristic features of the accordant vacana.

(e) Teaching:

(1) gurūpadesa mantravidya;
   jaṅgamopadesa sastravidya, nodā;
   bhavaroṣves kneva periya nodā...

(The initiation by guru is a treatment by spell. The initiation by Jaṅgama is a treatment by surgery, 0 you see. It is the way for removing the disease of births...)

28 S.S. Basawanal (Ed.) op.cit. p.175, v.655.
(2) nimna sāraṇa suñdiyaṇondaṛaṅgalīyaṇitaḥ
dinnannte kānā remanaṇtha.

(The soothing truth-words of your sāraṇa if you make available for me for a while it is as good as you yourself are made available...)

(3) kere halla ṭāvīgala maidegedare
gulle gorse cispugalu kāṇabahudu
vārīdhi maidegedare ratnāṅgalo kāṇabahudu
kūḍalaṣaṇa sāraṇaru manaderedu mātenūḍiḍāgo
liṅgeva kāṇabahudu.

(If the pond, the brook and well dry up, one may see swollen earth(pearls) and the mother of pearls. If the ocean lays bare its heart, one may see the pearls and jewels. If the sāraṇas speak whole-heartedly, one may see Liṅga).

This is the classification of the vacana in

29 P.G.Halakatti (Ed.) Devaradēsimayyena Vēcanaṇgalu, Samaja Pustakalaya, Dharwar (1946) p.17 v.1
30 S.S.Basaveshwar (Ed.) op.cit., p.231 v.861.
accordance with the ancient Indian Nyāya. This is not found in any Ṣṛṣeśaiva text. So one may not find the classification with that available in old texts - both orthodox and heterodox.

(2) The place where the veena is uttered.

The Viśeśaiva saints have a code of selecting a place for discussion. The selection of a place for discussion is based on the nature of the topic to be discussed, namely, secular or spiritual. This type of observance is a very ancient practice which may be traced to the age of the Brāhmaṇas. Cennabasavanna states:

"kendekendelli gaṣṭhi, ninda nindelli banda bendelli suvihva mūduva pūtakaranenagome toradivyvi kūdele cennaseṇañcaṭe.

These words of Cennabasavanna give an idea of their mind regarding selecting a place or where they

31 R.C.Hiremath (Ed.) Pedmaḍajapuruṣa, Surughamath, Dharwar (1955), III. 37."
should not conduct their discussions. The term ṛgāṇi is discussion regarding topics such as religion, morality, mysticism, metaphysics in which experts take part. Ṣaṁsthala vacanagaḷu, Śūnyasambādanagaḷu, the Purāṇagaḷu mention the places where the vacanas were uttered.

They are:

1. Before a king:

   The discussions of problems concerning the religion and the castes were introduced by Basavaṇṇa in the court of the king and the people belonging to the other orthodox sections of the society took part. This was very important as the opposite orthodox groups were feared to strike discordant notes and create troubles in the state. Not only the problems of this type but also other problems were discussed in the courts of kings even in the Upāṇīṣadīc days where

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(1) Kondaguli Keshiraja, Basavaṇṇa conducted discussion in the court of kings.

Kings participated actively e.g. the King Jayakarna's court. Thus the courts of the kings were the fit place for the discussion where the court pundits could take part in the discussions.

(2) in the presence of Dappāyaka (prime minister)

Another important place where the discussions took place according to the ancient Nyaya, which is accepted by both the orthodox and the heterodox schools, is the office of the Dappāyaka or Governor.

(i) Kavasthaladenuvānu suhaśevarana sarāṇa
samgana basavannya bāle besagebha bherē
siddharāmayī.

(ii) Kapilesiddha māllinētha, nimā sarāṇa
saṃganabasavannya sahaśanega nāma nāma endu
bedukidenu.

(... O Kapilesiddhamāllinētha, when I said hail,
O hail unto the House of your sarāṇa Saṃganabasavannya,
I was saved !)

33 P.C. Helaketti (Ed.), op.cit., Ch.III. 139.
34 P.C. Helaketti (Ed.), op.cit., Ch.IV. 43.
(3) In a great assembly:

Even in the days of the Upanigads there were discussions on the religious subjects. We know that great religious councils met in case of Buddhism. An assembly may be great not only in number but also in quality.

An assembly of Yajnavalkya and the king Janaka, who met in privacy leaving out the assembly in which they participated, was great though it was an assembly of only two sitting. So an assembly may be great either because a big number participated in it or because a few of the greatest thinkers took part in it. We have assemblies of both types where discussions took place e.g. Allama Prabhu and Suktavakaka were the only two who participated in a discussion on a unique topic held on a unique occasion. So also Allama Prabhu and Siddhermaya two together alone discussed on vital topics.

There are assemblies where a good number of people took part e.g. Allama Prabhu, Basavanna, Sewdeva and a host of Sankers met Marula Sankera devaru on the way to the place of Basavanna where discussions took place.
(4) Before sages who were well versed in the dharma:

(a) "...sivasaṅgara gaḍhitīyaḻippāt maṅgallāmaka
bhavaṇāriya kūṭalacchānaḥsāmakāva.

(... those who engage themselves in discussions with
the sages are blessed in self, O Lord Bhavapriya
Kūṭalacchānaḥsāmakāva.)

(b) "uligas mātu uligas toṭi etta?
liṅgaṁubhavaṁ mahāṅuṁbhavaṁ sadbhavta,
viśmaheśvarācārā svēyāśriārvalade,
horavegadalli nāma rūpa kri vipiddī...
viśmaheśvarācārā nisuvā vēṇikālliyado?
kūṭalacchānaḥsāmakāva."
From the survey of the veda-s of Cennabasavagga and Hadapadeppagga, it is clear that one should open discussion on the topics of religion, ethics, mysticism, metaphysics before Sarsas and none else. Such discussion yields good results. This reminds me of the event depicted in Satapathabrhamapadagga according to which Jnana and Yjñavalkya discussed important topics only amidst the people who dedicated themselves deeply in search of truth.

(5) Before those who like to hear the dharma:

i. "ittabā sannādeva hette haddalubāda...
   rāmanathā."

(0 Rāmanathā... do not go near those who do not invite you.)

ii. "nudiyalāgadu nudiyalāgadu svaṁajaṁno villed-
    varoḍane givānubhavo... khandēvavē."

(0 Akhandesvara... do not have discourse with those
   who have no knowledge of siva-experience.)
iii. "...vavekśrthavēdeśvarē...śrītāṇḍa-
lāśasu...

(Do not hold discussion with those who do not under­
stand the mind.)

iv. "...trahanacet Serious tannamadhippayādīre
lingavantarē..."

(... O you the possessors of God, see, here is the
one who practised the divine and lived in it forgett-
ing herself...)

The above verses are the instances which advise to have
discussions only with those who are sympathetic and
well versed in and desirous of knowing the reality;
otherwise it will be futile. So this is another code
to be observed.

(3) Adornment of speech:

(a) This means that one should have sound knowl-
dge of one's own as well as of another's system. If
one does not know both, one cannot argue successfully
or drive home the point.
(1) vedasvayasa-hu vēmba vādi ninukṓ̃lēvavo

(0 you who advocate that the Veda is unborn or unwritten by any, listen)

(2) gottiddero heliro tiliyaddarō kekiro

(If you know tell me, otherwise listen me.)

(3) ... vedavmodidavarunande alukaneyē kote...

(0 you ran weep before those who read Veda.)

(4) ganyeveluka sez̄erudara

(Innumerable Sudra)

(5) samtakoti madādgalēlleru cṛpañiliṅga

samābandhada holabonariyade amindā cāturviṁśa

phalāprāptakko ṅaṅgādara...

(Innumerable creeds of Sudra were enchaìned by desire for fruit and status only because they did not know the way of the relation of Ćṛpañiliṅga.)

(6) ekorudra naśvitiyāya taśṭha...

(There are none else but Rudra who is matchless says}
Veda...

(7) "Iśvara sādhīva kiśa pramāṇoṁ" eṁba māṁśकa- 
na mūrei honyenu... "ekāḥ" eṁba saragīśildi, 
vaśeṣika eṁba itīgśīlortai, kuḍālaṁ aṁ-
neśamānīṣrodiyavoruva.

(“What is proof for the existence of Iśvara” says  
Śimśākā. I pierce the nose with the arrow of advaita  
and rub the nose with the brick of Veśeṣike and show  
the kuḍālaṁasam the mirror.

The above quoted instances are good evidences to  
show that unless one has sound knowledge of the points  
of view of different systems, one cannot be in a posi-
tion to argue. The Jānapas knowing fully well were  
quite well equipped. This adorns the speech.

(b) Perfection of the speech:

This is another character of the adornment speech  
or vēcama. The perfection consists in avoiding mistakes  
by being well-versed in vēcama (sābdas)ṭāstra and  
nirvēcama-ṭāstra i.e. etymology.
(e) Fearlessness:

This consists in being sure oneself of the knowledge in one's own and that of others' schools and devoid of any sort of sense of fear even though one is in the midst of hostile or numerous people. The success goes to those who dare and act. This is the underlying doctrine that is at the basis of this—a psychological principle. The same is embodied in the following saying of Basavappa:

"... loka virodbhi samaja mānūṣīṁ añjunaṁallā..."

(samaja is afraid of none though he opposes the ways of the world.)

(d) Firmness:

All these qualities make the speech attractive and esteemed. Thus the speech becomes an adored one.

(7) Nigrahasthaneśa:

These are of three kinds (1) vacanaṃ sānyāga
(2) vacanaṃbhībhaṇa
(3) vacanaṃdōga
1. \texttt{vasana-asny\textgreek{a}}:

This consists in confessing one's own defeat and in acknowledging that the thesis of the adversary is right e.g. Sūryasaṃpādāne, chapter XVI, 30-40.

2. \texttt{vāsamatbhibhasa}:

This consists in avoiding discussion or introducing wrong arguments even when one realises one's own insufficiency. The person loses temper and wants to find faults in the adversary. He looks abashed and trembling. He shows all the (both bodily and mental) signs of defeat e.g. when Ācalakrikāsana met Dīghaṅgā.

"kūśūṣukha kaṅgota, pāsūṇata pathavaṇariya."

3. \texttt{vasana-adacya}:

It is speaking at random; violent expressions; obscurity of expression (which makes the audience and the adversary); lack of proportion (as̥hikṣyaṃvanyatā); meaninglessness, disorderliness of the arguments, obscurity etc.
Thus the first part of the Nyāya is sophistry some features of which are delineated here. This should not be considered exhaustive and detailed. This is an indicator or introduction for the deeper study of sophistry which could be found in the various literature of the twelfth century. This is not as important as the pramāṇas which form the second part of the chapter. It is termed 'B'.

(B.I) This is a more important part of the Nyāya than the portion dealt so far. The earlier part of the exposition gives a kind of practice that was prevalent in those days. The material for the study of Nyāya of the Sāñcchala school is gathered from the various of the Śivāharājas. So also the exposition concerning the origin of cognition, which according to the Śivāharājas, is 'indriyalikhita' and 'lingalikhita', is based on the various. It is similar to the Nyāya view as stated somewhere in a Nyāya text: prātyakṣa-gamish... These two sources of cognition i.e. indriyalikhita and lingalikhita of the Sāñcchala school cover both the empirical and the transcendental origin of
cognition. These are common to most of the Indian schools except Čārvaka. It is 'indriyalikhita' on which Ānumāṇe depends. Indriyalikhita is source for syllogistic and analogical inferences both as there are two types of inferences. Both of them presuppose two orders of reality. The former presupposes the realm of cause and effect, whereas the latter presupposes the realm of identity i.e. tadvaptti and

35 "Ānumāṇe, as its etymological sense indicates is after-proof. It is after-proof in the sense that it uses the knowledge derived from perception (pratyakṣa) or verbal testimony (Āgama) and helps the mind to march on further and adds to its knowledge." - S. Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic, Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Mysore, Madras (1961), p. 189.

36 "There are two types of reasoning generally recognized in Indian philosophy. The first of them is what is familiarly known as syllogistic inference, and is illustrated by the example of inferring the presence of fire from observing smoke. We shall have an instance of the second type of reasoning if, from the observed fact that an effect like a jar requires for its production a competent agent like the potter, it is concluded that the world, as an effect, should also have been brought into existence by a competent Being, God. It is called Śāntyeto drśyemānaṇaḥ, and corresponds to what in modern logic is known as analogical reasoning." - M. Hiriyar, Indian Philosophical Studies, I, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore (1937), p. 45.
tādātmya respectively. The former is a sphere of common experience. The inference that presupposes this is dependent on 'laukika pratyakṣa' as observation is involved in this act of inference. The inference that presupposes the sphere of identity is dependent on 'laukika pratyakṣa'. This is a realm that lies beyond common experience. Aristotle also supports this view of inference when he defines the logical terms in Organon.

The two types of inference (anumāna) are not two independent sciences as in the Western world of thought. They presuppose a synthetic turn of thinking or logic in Indian systems. The classification of this is made clear. The anumāna is in one sense 'āvērthānuṣṭhāna' and in another sense the 'parāvērthānuṣṭhāna'. 'Āvērthānuṣṭhāna' turns into 'parāvērthānuṣṭhāna' to serve the purpose of the person. This distinction is not merely one of a formal kind. It is rooted firmly on the fundamental

37 M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin (1938), p.200.
doctrine of Indian logic that syllogistic reasoning should be viewed, not apart from the inductive process of thinking, but merely as a continuous and methodological application of it. In Indian logic, deduction and induction do not represent two mutually exclusive types of inference but they should always be looked upon as inseparably connected parts of a complete process of thinking called inference (anumāna), and the chief function of 'anumāna', as a means of valid cognition, is to enable one to realise how certain facts are inseparably and necessarily connected with each other in accordance with a general principle. The process of thinking or cognition and the reality about which the cognitive process takes place are not two independent of each other. Anumiti is that which is of reality. There is no cognition apart from reality in Indian systems. This is true of Śāsthrala school of thought which is the metaphysical foundation of the Nyāya in Śāsthrala school of thought. This is the

synthesis of formal and the material forms of logic. It is 'antiverbalist'. "Indian logic studies the naturalistic syllogism in itself, as internal thought, distinguishing it from the syllogism for others, that is to say, from the more or less usual, but always extrinsic and accidental forms of communication and dispute. It has not even a suspicion of the extravagant idea (which still vitiates our treatises) of a truth which is merely syllogistic and formalist, and which may be false in fact. It takes no account of the judgement, or rather it considers what is called judgement, and what is really the proposition, as a verbal clothing of knowledge; it does not make the verbal distinction of subject, copula and predicate, it does not admit classes of categorical and hypothetical, of affirmative and negative judgements. All these are extraneous to logic, whose object is the content, "knowledge considered itself." This is so because the object of thought is realizing the reality which

in the ultimate analysis leads to liberation. The content and object of thought is reality i.e. existence in every school of Indian thought. So also it is the same with the Sāsthraka school. The problem of reality may be either subjective or objective or correspondence or parallelism is not important. But the logic in Indian schools is not verbalist is important point to be noted.

What does the word 'indriyalikita' (writing of indriyas) i.e. sense-word presuppose is a very important point to be raised from the point of view of 'pramāṇa' where pramāṇa means instruments of knowledge and the investigation or scrutiny of the knowledge obtained by instruments. The word 'indriya' means 'organ'. So 'indriya' here, though used in a singular sense, stands for a genus as there are different indriyas that come under the genus 'indriya'. So 'indriyas' are species. They are external instruments, i.e. 'bahirindriya' and the internal instruments i.e. 'antranindriya'. The external instrument again has sub-species like sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell
i.e. netra, srotra, tvaca, jivha, ghraṇa respectively.
The internal instrument i.e. 'antarindriya' consists
of mana, buddhi, cit and shankāra and jñāna. So
those are the sub-species of the species called 'antar-
indriya'. Thus indriya is a genus under which come
two types of indriyas. They have sub-species. Their
activity is called 'indriyalikhita' or perception.
The word perception again is not a simple term as it
seems to be. For it is a genus as there are different
perceptions depending on the internal and the external
instrumentality. This is the view of the Āśāsthāls
school.

The second question concerning the 'indriyas' or
instrumentality is about the formation of the indriyas.
There are two views in Indian philosophy regarding the
constituents of the indriyas broadly speaking. They
are of psychological and physical origin. The critical
examination regarding the formation or the constituents
that go to form the sense-organs makes it clear that
both the views i.e. a psychological and physical origin
are in the ultimate analysis of the same stuff. This
is an important consideration as the correctness or exactness of perception depends on the nature of the senses as the modern Western psychologists also consider.

The organs of sense and the organs of knowledge and means come under the genus 'sense' in Śāṅkhyā philosophy. They are derived from 'śāṅkāra'. "The senses are not eternal, since their rise and lapse are seen. Each sense grasps one quality. The senses are not the organs of sight, etc., as the functions of means. They are the means of observing the fine and the gross elements. The organs of action are the functions of the tongue, feet, hands, and the organs of evacuation and reproduction."  

The Śāṅkhyikas state that the senses are generated out of the gross elements. The sense of hearing i.e. 'ear' is a product of ēkākāra. The sense of touch i.e. 'tsuk' generates from air. The sense of sight

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i.e. 'eye' generates from fire. The sense of taste
i.e. 'tongue' generates from water. The sense of smell
i.e. 'nose' generates from earth. But Lokādhyāya holds
that the senses are not generated by gross matter or
elements but are rather sustained and strengthened by
them.

The Viṣṇupurīya's and Lokādhyāya's have their
own view. They state that the Sattvika ई to and the
sound potential together form a sense of hearing i.e.
ear (srotā). The Sattvika ई to and the touch potential
(tanātre) together form the sense of touch (i.e. tvak).
The Sattvika ई to and the sight potential (i.e. tanātre)
form the sense of vision i.e. 'eye' (netra). The
Sattvika ई to and the taste potential (i.e. tanātre)
in union ई to the sense of taste i.e. 'tongue' (rasa).
The Sattvika ई to and smell potential together create
the sense of smell i.e. 'nose' (mūla). This is a
process of union or mixing of ई to and the potentials
of the elements that is the cause for the birth of the
organs of knowledge called 'bahirindriya'. They again
give a process of another set of bahirindriya called
'Karmendriyas' i.e., action-organs. They are also five. According to these two sources the constructive sense of speech is developed in accompaniment of the sense of hearing, the hand in accompaniment of the sense of touch; so also the constructive sense of food in accompaniment of the sense of vision, that of upsthā in accompaniment of the sense of taste; that of vāyu in accompaniment of the sense of smell.

The mind is developed from the ego without any cooperating or accompanying cause. This is a unique process in the scheme of the development of eleven indriyas out of which five organs of senses and five organs of actions are external organs and one is the internal organ.

There are other systems who held that the ego is the instrumental cause and the gross elements the material cause in the production of the senses.

42 S.N. Das Gupta, A Study of Patanjali, pp.59-60.

In Advaitavedanta internal organs are physical as in Nyayasulaska system. The Nyayasulaska do not accept karmendriyas. They substitute vital air for the organs of action i.e. karmendriyas. But the vedanticas accept both karmendriyas and bhinnendriyas.

Now we have the scheme of evolution of indriyas as found in the works of the mystics of the twelfth century which give the Saivathala school view of the indriya. It is stated that Ganesabhasavande did this on the basis of ancient Sanskrit text called Siva-bhairavi. He calls the work by the name kramamargay – i.e. analysis of the categories.

Ganesabhasavande divides indriyas into the internal and the external. The internal indriyas is a species consisting of as many as five sub-species. They are jnana, manas, shankara, buddhi and citru. The process

44 E. Hiriyappa, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, (1953), p.541.
of formation of these constituents of the internal organ is: jāmam is evolved by the union of Ātma with the great element called Akāra. Mana is evolved by the union of Ātma with the great element called Vāyu. Shankhara is evolved by the union of Ātma with the great element called Āgni. Buddhi is evolved by the union of Ātma with the great element called Āppu. Citta is evolved by the union of Ātma with the great element called Prthvi. These abide in Ātma and learn the objects. Therefore, they are called 'internal organs'.

The external organs are two-fold. They are organs of action and the organs of knowledge. So the species called external organ has its sub-species. They are sub-species as they come under it. The process of formation of the organs of knowledge stated by Sena-besavanna is as follows:

The fire (āgni) in the earth (prthvi) is ghrīṇeṇḍriya i.e. nose. The fire (āgni) in the water (appu) is jīvāṅgā i.e. tongue. The fire (āgni) in the fire (āgni) is netra i.e. eye. The fire (āgni) in the vāyu
The earth (i.e. prthvi) in the earth is sāyuvinārya i.e. anus. The jala (i.e. water) in the water (i.e. jala) is suhhyendriya i.e. sex. The earth (prthvi) in the fire is foot i.e. pādendriya. The prthvi (i.e. earth) in the air (vāyu) is pāṇindriya (i.e. hands). The earth (i.e. prthvi) in the ākāsa (i.e. ether) is vāgindriya (i.e. organ of speech). These are the five organs of action. They form half of the bahyindriya.

The objects of the organs of knowledge, which are supposed to be bahyendriya i.e. external organs of sense, are also stated by Cennabasavagga. They are five in number as the organs of knowledge. They are:

(1) 'gandha' (smell) is the object of 'ghrūpa' (smell).
   It is water (appu) in 'prthvi' (i.e. earth)

(2) 'rasa' (taste) is the object of tongue (jiva).
   It is water (appu) in the water (jala).
(3) 'rupu' (form) is the object of eye (netra). It is 'appu' (water) in the fire (gni).

(4) 'aprasa' (touch is the object of skin (tvrd). It is 'appu' (water) in the Vāyu (air).

(5) 'sałda' (word or sound) is the object of ear (srtra). It is 'appu' (water) in the 'ākāśa' (ether).

These are the objects of the organs of knowledge which are called 'tanmātras' or the potentials of the four elements. These expositions need investigation to have a full picture of the contribution made by the Saisthala school of thought. This is to be done in comparison with the expositions of the other schools and religious texts given above.

First of all we must know what is the relation between the objects of knowledge and the organs of knowledge. The above exposition makes clear that either the objects of knowledge or the organs of knowledge are the effects of the combination or coming together of two great elements. The outstanding feature
of the system of knowledge is that there is a common great element in the organs of sense. It is fire (agni). The term agni since the dawn of civilization is symbolically used for knowledge. The 'agni' in each of the element is called indriya corresponding to the element in which it is. One may quote for example 'agni' in earth is shrōṇendriya. In other words agni in each element beginning with prthvi and ending with 'ākāśa' stands for the instrument of knowledge of the predominating nature or potential. The same viewcriptically expressed in the sayings of the Sivāsuras, without the knowledge of 'Karṇaprabhauge' is impossible to understand. Without the knowledge of Karṇaprabhauge, one may conclude that the idea of the cognitive sense in the vacsena is similar to the one in the Vyāya-Vaiśeṣika but it is based on quite different metaphysical stand. So the practice in the Saññ̄sthala school, namely, giving 'Karṇaprabhauge' along with the vacsena-gala kāṭṭu (i.e. a book of mystic sayings) is meaningful only in the light of the study of the sort we are doing here. The Vṛsanstra is not a literature but a philosophy.
Similarly 'epou' (water) in each of the elements is the object of knowledge to the corresponding organ of cognition. The term 'epou' in the vacana literature, as in other literatures, stands for the thirst which needs satisfaction. It is both symbolically and metaphorically or factually true when it is stated that the 'epou' in each element is the object of knowledge.

This is the ontological part of the exposition of the organs of knowledge and the organs of action as well as the objects of knowledge. These have thus a common source, namely, mahabhutas i.e. great elements. From the ontological standpoint, broadly they are really not identical in their views. This is in accordance with the monistic metaphysical stand taken by the Sāṃkhya school as the doctrine of their union and the analysis ultimately leads to the monism or non-dualism. They are the evolutions of a single reality.

'Indriyalikhita' and 'līghalikhita' are the pramāṇas, accepted by the Śivāntas as already stated and need examination to know what they stand for in
Indian epistemology.

The stand taken by the Śāṣṭhala school of thought regarding perception and inference is not peculiar to the Śāṣṭhala school. Most of the Indian schools share this view. Because "perception is superior to the other means of cognition and precedes them. It is superior, because inference and the rest, are depending on it. The order given here is significant as 'anumāṇa' depends on 'pratyakṣa', and 'śabda' depends on both 'pratyakṣa' and 'anumāṇa' states Viśesapati Mīra. There are others who hold this opinion in Indian epistemology. People like Aristotle state that inference is abstracting general concepts from sensations. Therefore 'anumāṇa' is accepted as already present in Indriyalikhita. That the other pramāṇa, namely, śabda is also dependent upon perception is the logical conclusion. It is a stand of the several Indian schools. Anyhow these are three different pramāṇas, namely, pratyakṣa, śabda and anumāṇa. The last two are the different forms resulting by use of the first pramāṇa according to the needs of the person. These are also necessary as the circumstances of life demand.
Clear thinking is the way for the realization of reality which ends in success. These three means of knowing are each in a sense scrutinizing the other. They are necessary for the test of the validity of knowledge. If this is so, why should there be 'liṅgalikhiṭa' or what is the characteristic of the premāṇa that makes this an independent premāṇa is the foremost problem to be dealt with.

Hence the need for the explanation of 'liṅgalikhiṭa'. The term 'liṅgalikhiṭa' may be interpreted differently as the word admits of different interpretation. The word 'liṅga' means 'mark' in the original sense as found in the Nyāya literature. It also means subtle form or the sūkṣma sārīra. It is mental existence. This is commonly used by the orthodox systems. So it is a state of life. There is one more meaning which is very important. It is 'divinity' or 'intuition'. There is no need to prove this as the religious literature of the orthodox people is familiar with this. The peculiar use to which the Sarvāṇī put the term 'liṅga' is unique. The uniqueness is the uniqueness of the metaphysical stand. They state that
the Śraṇas see, hear, touch and smell not by the indriyas i.e. the senses but by the 'lingas'. Thus there are two types of words concerning indriya and linga or pratyakṣa concerning indriya and linga. Therefore 'liṅgelikhita' is a word or a pratyakṣa (i.e. perception) which is quite different from the indriya likhita i.e. sense word or pratyakṣa. The Śabda, as most of the Nyāya or Āṇvikāśikīs are of the view, is dependent on a pratyakṣa called liṅga-pratyakṣa which we find in the sayings of the Śraṇas.

According to the Nyāya-Śaivaśākta it is a word of reliable person (Āptavākyā) in the earlier sense developed in its history and then Āpta was interpreted differently. Āpta is not only the human being but also the divine being or God. This is not the Śabda view of the Śivaśastraṇas. They make a distinction in pratyakṣa they accept. According to the Nyāya-Śaivaśāktas and those who followed them, there is a distinction in a secular Āpta and non-secular Āpta i.e. God. A detailed examination of this may be taken up later. There are words or pratyakṣa quite different in accordance with
the metaphysics of the Śaṅkhāra school of thought. Both are essential according to the Śaṅkhāra school. Thus the school accepts these two pramāṇas out of necessity and uses the other pramāṇas as their species which is quite evident from the use of those pramāṇas in the vacasas of the Śivāsena. We may show that there is a similar view of pratysaśa in the Nyāya-Vaisesa. Nyāya-sūtra states:

"sa dvividho dṛṣṭa-dṛṣṭṭthisatvāt // 1.1.8"

("It is of two kinds, viz., that which refers to matter which is seen and that which refers to matter which is not seen." The first kind involves matter which can be actually verified. Though we are incapable of verifying the matter involved in the second kind, we can somehow ascertain it by means of inference.) Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana states: The 'word' of which the thing spoken of is perceived in this world is called 'Dṛṣṭṭthis'; while that of which the thing spoken of is only believed to exist in the other world is 'Adṛṣṭṭthis'. These are the two divisions under which are included all the assertions of sages and ordinary
The 'adṛśa-surtha' in the Nyāya view is the 'surtha' that lies beyond the bounds of 'indriyas' which does not necessarily mean the yogajāpratyaśkṣa but the 'surtha' knowable by inference. The interpretation of the 'surtha' that is seen by sages is not the 'śrāvikā pratyāśkṣa' as stated earlier but later it is included in the Nyāya text. Haraprapāda Chasri writing about the peculiar use of yoga in the Asiatic Society Journal says that though yoga is not one of the means of knowing, the school is forced to adopt it as a means to perceive things which are not perceivable by the ordinary senses. It is this perception which is similar to liṅgalīkhita in Saṅkhya school. We have similar classification in the Śaṅkha epistemology. According to this there are indirect perception (i.e. indriya-pratyāśkṣa) and direct perception (i.e. yogajāpratyaśkṣa). The yogajāpratyaśkṣa is accentuated by orthodox and heterodox schools in one or the other stage of the epistemological development except Īśvāka and Purvaśūnyāsā.

The similarity between 'liṅgalīkhita' and 'yogająpratyaśkṣa' does not mean that they are identical. The 'liṅgalīkhita' or 'liṅgapratyaśkṣa' is not the 'yogają
pratyakṣa in the sense that the 'yogajāpratyakṣa' involves the sense of ego, whereas in case of 'linga-pratyakṣa' there is no trace of ego behind the activity. It is being without human composition. This is the metaphysical difference that lies between the 'linga-pratyakṣa' and 'yogajāpratyakṣa'. "Indian epistemology had a direct relationship to metaphysical issues," as N. Smart states on p.170 in the work "Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy". 'Linga-pratyakṣa' and 'yogajāpratyakṣa' as have metaphysical differences have much difference. The difference in them is the difference of tattvāsvabhāva (i.e. the relation between similar substances) and the subject predicate relation. So linga-pratyakṣa of Saṃsthala school and yogajā-pratyakṣa of orthodox systems are quite different. Yogajāpratyakṣa is a stage in the development of linga-pratyakṣa in the Saṃsthala school of thought. Thus indriyāpratyakṣa, yogajāpratyakṣa and linga-pratyakṣa are in accordance with the metaphysical categories. The objects of indriyāpratyakṣa are gross objects, those of yogajāpratyakṣa are subtle objects, those of linga-pratyakṣa or likhita are the causal states of
reality. This does not involve the fineness of the mind that is attained by the yogic practice but the self itself. The yoga-japṭṛtyakṣa is still a psychological activity. But the linga-japṭṛtyakṣa is the activity of the self. Therefore the yoga-japṭṛtyakṣa, as accepted by some of the schools of orthodox systems is not the same as linga-japṭṛtyakṣa or linga-līṅguḥtī. This is the subtle difference in them.

Karamāṇaṇaṭugo written by Ānandaśvarangī gives the evolution of the internal organ and the external organ as already stated earlier. This gives a clue to the idea of perception they had. The process of perception as most of the Indian schools think, consists of the organ of sense, its contact with its object and thereby its apprehension by the mind. This is the volitional

45 Perception is one instrument of knowledge admitted by all schools alike. The obvious conception of contact between sense-organ and object (indriya-rthā samāvikarana) was the starting point for the development of the doctrine, and appears in the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā sūtras.

46 kasaṅkṣaṇaḥ, . . . . . . . . . . P.C. Halakatti, Śāmasāstādene, Bijapur (1920) XIV, 45.
side of perception. This is necessary. This motor
action is absent in other forms of pratyakṣa. It is
one of the distinguishing features of sense perception.

The other very important aspect of perception is
pointed out by the Śivāsaṅgaśas. They state that it is
impossible to know what the one indriya can know un-
less we know what the five indriyas are. The doctrine
as expounded by the Vaiśeṣika literature is peculiar to
its metaphysical stand. The perception is fivefold.
Each can be understood only when the rest of them could
be known. This statement means that each 'indriya' i.e.
sense-organ, is to be known. This means that one should
know what it is made up of and what is the relation
between the object and the sense concerned. Unless
these are known we cannot understand the attribute or
quality that comes in contact with a particular sense-
organ. This constitutes the three-foldness in the
process of experience. The triad is constituted of

47 cidindriyavat-riddhāde ondindriyakke senda-
gunavemāryaburada... P.G. Helmskatt, op.cit.,
XIV. 29.
the substantive (visesya), the adjunct (prakara) and
their relation (samsarga). The word 'anubhava' i.e.
experience is used in this school in order to exclude
recollection which is not a valid cognition. The
Sivagaranas state that it is connected to the experience
i.e. anubhava through the relation of 'arupa'. The
arupa consists of padartha i.e. object, hastra i.e.
instrument and mukha i.e. the way in the experience.
This gives first-hand experience.

The experience earned through the instrumentality
of nose is gandhatra. Gandhatra is what the sense has.
Gandhavaya is what the object has. Thus there is a
change in the process of experience. The former is, in
the epistemological language of Western thinker,
sensation and the latter is the quality. The change
of terminology does not signify any difference.

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49 The term 'arupa' is a technical one as samyoga
is a technical term referred to in Manikarn -
Gandhāra refers to the sense or subject and gandhāra refers to the object or the thing. They correspond to each other. It is better to put in the sāṇḍhī dialectical terminology. So it is the identification. It is this that makes the knowledge valid. Therefore knowledge is perception as Theophrastus says. This is similar to the saying of an śramaṇa:

sāṇḍayādīvinirvaktā cicchatārāṇamasaucyate!

(pratyākṣa i.e. sense knowledge is that devoid of doubt, etc.)

The definition given in the introductory part of the commentary to Pitālāṅkama is based on the sayings of Pārvatavesvara tantra and Pañcarājaṅkama.

The term 'māṇḍhā' is based on the Sāvīrtigama and it is the characteristic of pratyākṣa in the school.

50 "perception is a source of knowledge for it exactly corresponds to the object perceived." S.J. Vidyabhusan, History of Indian Logic, p.310. Manikṣeś - A Nātyanātya Manual.

under study as the commentator presupposes. This demands reflection as it is based on the Śaivāgamas such as Pārameśvara and Prasākara. Because Īgamas are the common source literature for all the Śaiva schools. Gubbiya Mallenārya did not take this very important point into consideration. So rational student can accept it as a premāṭa unless it is shown that it is of the school for the good reasons, which is not taken note of by Gubbiya Mallenārya. So what Mallenārya did is nothing but assertion. Therefore the two terms, namely 'saṃsaya-vinirmuktā' and 'mānā' need interpretation to show that the definition is in accordance with the Śaṅkhāla school and also that it helps to know in what way it is different from the famous definitions of the orthodox and heterodox schools. The text runs:

\[
\text{caturāṁ tāṁ mānāṁ pratyakṣgādini he dvijaḥ /} \\
\text{pratyakṣaṁ manuṣṭhānāṁ ca sabdarthepti tīrīcychi /} \\
\text{saṃsaya-vinirmuktā cichaktirānāmuccyete /}
\]

The term 'mānā' is a logical term which is used twice in the above quoted text. It is a technical term used by the orthodox and heterodox logicians (Natyaśikṣas). "mānā" means both knowledge, means of knowledge and scrutiny or investigation. It is sometimes used with prefix "prā" and is popular among the Natyaśikṣas. They use "mānā" and "premāṇa" synonymously. The term
"pramāṇa" is in more use than the "māna".

Gubbiya Mallārya uses 'māna' in the first of the three lines quoted above and states that there are four pramāṇas and enumerates them in the second line. The term 'māna' in the third line demands reflection.

(i) Mallārya states that 'māna' is cīcchākti which is devoid of doubt and other defects. This is, therefore, valid knowledge. But the term 'māna' is a genus under which come species such as pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, anumāṇa-pramāṇa, sabda-pramāṇa, etc. Some of which have sub-species. All these are 'māna' arising out of each of the above said instruments of knowledge. One 'māna' becomes manifold according to the Śaṅkhāya school. So the term 'māna' in the sense of 'cīcchākti' does not mean pratyakṣa-pramāṇa i.e. knowledge only arising out of five sense of knowledge. Therefore, the connotation of the word 'cīcchākti' does not permit the kind of interpretation.

(ii) One may compare this interpretation with the one that is found in the Jaina school of thought. According to the school 'pramāṇa' i.e. 'māna' is 'asya-saṃsāpā'. The definition is:

"asya-saṃsāpā pramāṇa/"

This means that the senses, mark and word are not
pramāṇa but, the knowledge that originates from them. So what the Tarkikas and others say is not pramāṇa. It is twofold, namely, direct and indirect. The direct is pure, distinct and unlimited; whereas indirect is limited knowledge. So 'pramāṇa' in this sense has wider connotation which is 'āmayagūnaḥ' as 'māna' in the Śāntahala school is 'cicchakti' which consists of all kinds of valid knowledge. Therefore, as the term 'āmayagūnaḥ' does not allow it to be used in the sense of one of its species so also 'cicchakti' does not. In both the schools the terms 'pramāṇa' and 'māna' are put to similar use.

But Gubbiya Mālāgārya emphatically states that it is 'māna' and places it first in the serial order of (i.e. pratyakṣa, anumāna, sābda and arthāpatti) the four pramāṇas; and thereby it is implied that it is pratyakṣopapramāṇa.

Does this not suffer one of the errors of relation i.e. either narrowing down the connotation or widening the connotation? This is a very important point to be noted here.

The term 'pratyakṣa' implies not only indriya
pratyaksa but also pratyaksa or anubhava. It is for this reason the term 'pratyaksa' has wider connotation.

But 'pratyaksa' as used by Kalaranya means 'indriya pratyaksa' only.

There is another kind of error of relation implied in the use of the term 'manah' as 'pratyaksa'. Because the term 'indriya' (i.e., sense of knowledge) has much scope for interpretation. This is not peculiar to the Śaṅkhāra school as it is the common feature of almost all the orthodox and heterodox schools. The term 'pratyaksa' not only means 'bahirindriya' i.e., external senses of knowledge but also 'antarindriya' i.e., internal sense of knowledge. Because the example quoted in the interpretation of the term 'pratyaksa' is that of 'rajjasarpanaśya'. It is an example of an error quoted often in case of perception received by eyes i.e., visual perception. Therefore 'pratyaksa' in perception by senses i.e., external senses. Such an interpretation of the term 'manah' leads to the error of relation i.e., narrowing down the connotation of the term.
Therefore, the term 'mānā' does not mean perceptual knowledge of the kind to which use it is put here though we accept 'mānā' in the sense of 'pratyakṣa prāmāṇya'.

The term 'mānā', if at all it is to be accepted in the sense of 'pratyakṣa prāmāṇya' it could be done without committing either of the errors mentioned earlier.

The term 'pratyakṣa' has species, namely, antarindriya pratyakṣa and 'bhūririndriya pratyakṣa' on the one hand and 'ātmapratyakṣa' on the other. One may, according to Saṅkṣetra school, include 'yogajñapratyakṣa' in the 'antarindriya pratyakṣa', because it is 'nāmāpratyakṣa' in its purified state. I think this is the meaning of 'yogajñapratyakṣa' in some of the Indian schools of thought as the mind in that state (i.e. yogic state) requires limitless power which is lost to the mind that does not undergo the yogic practice. 'Ātmapratyakṣa' is a special kind of 'pratyakṣa' which is termed 'darsana' by the Upadiṣadic texts. This is the highest type of perception in the
ending order of clarity. This is the pure state of 'cicchākta' or knowledge. Thus pratyakṣa has wider connotation which does not suffer either the error of narrowing down the connotation or the widening of the connotation. So 'व्यन्ति' interpreted in this sense is 'pratyakṣapratyanāṇa'. This is 'cicchākta' which becomes the subject and object as also the means. This is identical relation which is contrary to the causal relation. The causal relation is criticised by the Buddhists.

From the survey of the above exposition and the force of the serial order of mentioning them it is consistent to conclude that 'व्यन्ति' means 'pratyakṣa'.

The treatment of the 'pratyakṣapratyanāṇa' done so far brought to the light that there are two types in it. They are 'bahirindriya pratyakṣa' and the 'antarindriya pratyakṣa'. They are cognition by senses. Over and above the 'indriyapratyakṣa' i.e., psychological perception there is a metaphysical perception called 'āmnādarsana' i.e., 'auddhava'. The former two types of psychological perception
presuppose the commerce between the gross and the subtle states of reality: whereas the metaphysical perception i.e. 'darsana' or 'anubhava' presupposes the commerce between the self and the causal state of the reality. As there are three forms of reality, so also there are three forms of perception. The 'bhāvinindriya pratyekā' is perceiving the qualities of the external objects. The 'antarindriya pratyekā' is perceiving the qualities of the 'āgraha' i.e. self in the state of 'pasu'. The anubhava is perceiving the self by the self which is in its true form. Except the Śrāvākās the orthodox and the heterodox schools accept these three forms of pratyekā in one form or the other.

The three forms of 'pratyekā', namely, external-sense perception, internal-sense perception and anubhava, may be compared to the Nyāya's sense perception, mind perception and yogic perception or to the 'rupendriya pratyekā', 'ānanda pratyekā' and

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and 'yogi pratyakṣa' of Dīnāṅga which are in Saṅkaṇa's view 'rūpamārga pratyakṣa', 'manasa pratyakṣa', 'lakṣikā pratyakṣa' and 'sūdha pratyakṣa' or 'lokottara pratyakṣa'. These three perceptions are common to all the schools of Indian philosophy except Ājñā. These are based on the ontological category they accept. This is, one may state, based on the metaphysical basis. There is another type of classification of 'pratyakṣa' which is based on logical principles. They are 'sāvikālpa' and 'nirvikālpa' i.e. determinate and indeterminate perceptions.

The term sensation i.e. pratyakṣa, sensation, is different from school to school in the Indian philosophy. We find different views in Western psychology also. So it is not as simple a term as it appears to be. The whole history of Indian epistemology hinges on the interpretation of pratyakṣa.

The interpretation of pratyakṣa by each of the schools depends on the metaphysical stand it takes. The idea of perception as advocated by the Jñānaśāstra school is in accordance with the metaphysical stand of its own. The objects of perception are real.
perception is possible because the senses and their objects are evolutos of the similar substances. According to this school like perceives the like. The people like Empedocles in Greek philosophy are of the same view. So this position of the school is distinct from the position of the causal theory of perception. Because in causal theory of perception "The cause and effect to which it refers should be distinct from each other." Another important result of the causal theory of perception is this: "those who wish to uphold it, is to build into the theory some distinction between objects as they are in themselves and objects as they appear to us." There are schools like Śāṅkhya and Nyāya which hold that the senses and their corresponding objects are evolutos of the same substances in the ultimate analysis. So this type of stand is similar to the one taken by the Śaṅksthala school of thought. But the world views of these schools and that of Śaṅksthala school are not the same. Because Śāṅkhya and

Nyāya world views are dualistic and pluralistic, whereas that of Śaṅkhalé school is monistic. The perception in the monism of Śaṅkhalé school and that of the Śāṅkhalé school is not the same though both of them are monisms. The theory of appearance and of reality that results in avoiding the difficulty of causal theory of perception as is suggested by D.R. Bell in his article on logic and epistemology, is one of the theories of monism in Indian philosophy. This theory offered by the Śaṅkhalé school of thought is not in the illusionistic sense. Therefore the perception of the Śaṅkhalé school is different from that of Śaṅkara_dvaita theory.

Let us see how the theories of perception are constructed by schools which help us to know the nature of perception in the Śaṅkhalé school of thought.

The first of the theories of perception constructed is that of Gautama. The sūtra as stated in the

Nyāya sūtras of Gautama is:

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Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determinate, unnameable and non-erratic (or perception is knowledge and which arises from the contact of a sense with its objects and which is non-erratic being either, indeterminate or determinate.)

Determinate:

The epithet distinguishes perception from indeterminate knowledge; as, for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust.

Unnameable:

Signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears.
Non-erratic:

In the summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly best quiver and appear to the eye in water. The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.

From the analysis of the terms involved in the definition of pratyakṣa it is clear that the sensation and the object correspond to each other. The validity of sensation consists in verification as the valid sensation implies the object that corresponds to it.

Dīnaṅga is the first man to give a new turn to the pramāṇa sūtra by giving a new definition of pratyakṣa. He states:

pratyakṣaḥ kalpanaṇaḥ /

nāmajñātyadhyasaḥyutam /

(Pratyakṣa is that which is shorn of nāma and jñāti

(i.e. determinate and universal and is devoid of construction of mind.) This is similar to the one given by Gautama. But there is a world of difference because the knowledge arising out of senses has corresponding realities outside of oneself. This definition of direct knowledge is quite consistent with the Vijnana-veda metaphysics. "It will appear that this definition of direct knowledge omits the usual condition of the contact of the (five) sense organs with the objects of cognition, which is found in the earlier definitions of direct knowledge." The definition makes it quite clear that one has no need of referring to things outside of oneself. Later on Dharmakirti added the term 'abhranta' which is unwarranted. "This addition is not an innovation introduced by him, but due to his acceptance of the old theory of sastrantas. This fact is not only proved by our texts, but also is clearly pointed out by Mallivadin in his Lippani (p.19, Stororbatasky). ... Jiva knew another definition of direct perception, namely that which we find

in the śāntī: here the pratyahāra is the very thing
rightly perceived and devoid of error. The Chinese...
presupposes an original like this, avyādā satyakta -
pratīta 'vyāhato'rtabhaḥ. This definition of Bherma-
kīrti points out to the realistic nature of the śāstra-
ntika and Vaibhāṣika schools. This is in accordance
with the development and is a shift from viśṣaṅgaśāda
theory to realistic theory of perception in order to
make possible for the logicians to construct a theory
of perception which would be otherwise difficult. The
difficulty of construction of the theory of perception
was thus overcome by Bhermākīrti. This is in the
right spirit of philosophical thinking. The construc-
tion of the theory of perception is easy for the

57 Guiseppe Tucci, Buddhist Logic Before Diṅgana,
in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1929

59 ... in the definition of direct knowledge, the
condition that it should be non-erroneous
(ābhṛttatra), which was absent in Diṅgana's defi-
nition, has been included, and the test of the
reality of a thing (vesta) has been accepted to
be the same as that in the Nyāya school, viz.,
that it could serve some purpose-arthakriya -
realistic systems. To support the stand of each i.e.,
idealistic and the realistic thinkers one should refer
to the idealistic and the realistic way of etymological
explanation of the term 'pratyakṣa'.

Dīṇḍāṇa gives the etymological explanation of
pratyakṣa in Māyāya Mukha as follows:

"akṣaṁ akṣaṁ prati vartata iti pratyakṣaṁ
(pratyakṣa is so named because it occurs in close
connection with each (prati) sense faculty (akṣa);"
cf. Māyāya Mukha, p.38.17.

This etymology is repudiated by Gondrakīrti on
the ground that it could yield the absurd conclusion
that cognition which has a sense-organ (akṣa) for its
object (prati) is pratyakṣa; see Prasannap., 72.1.3:
yam tva akṣaṁ prati vartata iti pratyakṣa - sabdam
vyutpadeyati tasya jñānasyendriyāvighayastvat viśaya-

59 Giuseppe Tucci, Ibid., p.473.
60 Hattori, Dīṇḍāṇa on perception, Harvard
University Publication (165) pp. 78-79.
viṣayastvaḥ ca na yuktē yuttattih (Prasastapādeśa's definition of pratyaksagā slightly differs from the above; sec Prasastapāda bhāgya Pāh., p.552.28: akṣaṁ akṣaṁ pratiyotpadātā iti pratyaksam). Nyāya etymology might meet Śendrakirti's criticism: akṣasyakṣasye prativiṣayē vṛttīḥ pratyaksāṁ (pratyakṣa is the function of each sense-organ (akṣa) toward (prati) its object.)

Actually Dīgnāga bases his etymological explanation upon the Ābhidhārmic doctrine that perception, although caused by sense and object, is named after the sense, which is its specific cause (asādhrāṣṭa-hetu), but not after the object. The above cited etymology in Nyāya Sūkha is preceded by "asādhrāṣṭa-kāraṇatvāt" (ISP, p.373.23); and Dīgnāga expresses the same thought in Pramāṇasamuccaya (V); ... Besides asādhrāṣṭa-kāraṇatvā of the sense, another reason for naming perception after the sense, viz., īṣayastva of the sense, is mentioned by Vasubandu in Ābhidhāraṇa Kocha, I.45.
The idea that the sense is the basis (ārāya) of perception is noticed in Dhammottara’s etymology of pratyakṣa; N.B.T., p.22; pratyakṣaḥ iti pratigatā ākṣaraḥ skṛtaḥ (pratyakṣa means that (cognition) which belongs to or rests on a sense). However, the etymologies given by Diṅgāṅga and Dhammottara cannot include such cases as māṇḍa-pratyakṣa, yoci-pratyakṣa and evamāvedana, which are independent of the sense. Hence Dhammottara distinguishes between the etymological origin and the actual meaning. After offering his etymology of the term “pratyakṣa”, he states that all sorts of direct awareness (nākṣātiśārjita) are actually implied by the word pratyakṣa...

The etymological interpretations of pratyakṣa in its two-fold sense i.e. pratyakṣa through ākṣara and pratyakṣa without the aid of ākṣara (i.e. direct awareness) given by Viśeṣavādins and realists are two ways of interpretations. But the Saṅgahala school in stating indriyalikhta and liṅgalikhita synthesises the
two stands and holds that pratyakṣa is that cognition which is both depending on indriya i.e. sense and mind and also without their aid i.e. direct awareness.

B.(2) Another important pramāṇa in Āśrayamāna, according to Sivacaragasa, is linṣelikhitā which is one of the aspects of its tradition. Its another aspect is sanātana. This demands clarification. The term 'linṣelikhitā' is what is written by the Divine. It is in other words 'tāmillada nuḍī'—a word without ego. It consists of tūnu i.e. ego, illuḍa i.e. absent and nuḍī i.e. word. In one sense it is Āgama. In another sense it is anubhava—intuition. It is both personal intuition and collective or social intuition. First we take up the Debda view of the Āgamsa school which is a form of tradition.

The Āgamsa school puts forth Sivānāmic and the Vācasāuṣṭāmic views of Debda.

The Āgamas state that there are four pramāṇas among which Debda pramāṇa is superior to the rest of the pramāṇas. Sarvaṣṛtya on the basis of
Pramāṇa states: pramāṇa cestaśeyam āgama pramāṇevasa
śīṣaya pramāṇam iti uddhataḥ

The superiority of Sādāc consists in its revealing the nature of its artha i.e. object which is not accessible to the senses - i.e. organs of knowledge and mind. āpratīkṣapramāṇa is both source of cognition and a means of scrutiny so also sādāpramāṇa is both source of cognition and a means of scrutiny.

The sādāc according to the Āgamic view is a word of a trustworthy person and gives the characteristic features of the trustworthy person. They are:


62 There is a sādāc which is called empirical word. Empirical word presupposes a faculty quite different from the faculty presupposed by the transcendental word.

63 R.C. Hiremath (Ed.), Śatsthaleśānāmārtha, Dharwar, (1964) p.121.
The trustworthy person, who possesses clear senses, knows everything, makes everything known, is impartial and apprehends objects as they are. He does not make use of space and time. He is present everywhere. He does not depend on anything as everything depends upon Him. He destroys threefold taint of Brahma and all other enchained persons and gods. He is the place for liberation. It is the word of Paramasvarā that is pramāṇa i.e. knowledge.

There is difference between the āpta's (trustworthy person) sabda that reveals the object that is beyond the reach of the senses and that of a person that reveals the object that is not present to the listener for the present. So the āpta of the former kind is he:

64 R.C.Hiremath (Ed.) op.cit., p.121.
pratyakṣaṇaṇumāṇena yadetat suṇiscitaḥ

(Who tells the inimitable meaning arrived at by perception and inference. Is not āptams who eradicates illusion of a fellow being by one's own experience? Pārśiva is the noblest of the āptas.)

The two definitions given above add difficulties to the problem of pramāṇa which are not new for the students of Indian philosophy. One of them is: is the theory invented to solve the problem of the eternity of the Sabda as advocated by the Mīmāṃsakas which does not admit the existence of God? So the believers brought in the idea of God as the cause of Sabda and thereby the Sabda becomes eternal as the case is eternal. In this way theistic schools admitted the Sabda-pramāṇa bringing about change in the connotation of the origin of Sabda. The Sabd śiva thus was with God as the Tāṇamas pronounced the theory of Sabda. Ṭaṇḍrāna states:

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In the beginning of the creation of the universe, in order to have values of life made the highest knowledge available in the form of a Gama which was narrated by five faces of Him. This saying of Gama is similar to the one given by the Svetasvatara-paniṣad. It states:

yo brāhmaṇam vidādhīti pūrvam /
yo vai vedāmas prabhincti tasmāi //

(He who created Brahman first before the creation of the universe narrated the Veda to him...)

This view of the Upaniṣads is supported by Bādarāsa who states:

'sastreyonitrāt /

All these are similar views regarding the authority of Sabda.

66 Svetasvatara-paniṣad, vi. 18.
The Agamas accept the natural theory of Sabda i.e. the Sabda is the form of the rupa or substance. They are inseparable from each other.

According to the Agamas 'aphota' is the manifestation of Sabda and is not independent of varga. But the Vaiśeṣika states that it is quite different from 'varga'. According to Vaiśeṣika 'aphota' means varga. Śrī Upavargaśṭrya states: 'varga evam sabdāh'. According to this there is no experience in explaining brahma-sūtra I-3-8-23. The original 'aphota' is 'prajava'. It is the root cause of the universe which took the forms of fifty vargas. These are souls and bodies. The vowels are said to be souls and the consonants bodies. The union of them makes the words. These words give rise to mantras. Thus the Vedic

67 Śāṅkhulīnga Sivavṛtṛya, op.cit., pp. 21-22.

That this pranāma, according to the Upaniṣad, is not to be taught to one and all is a restriction laid down. This is inherited from the hoary past,
The meaning of Sabda is different from system to system and is acquired differently.

The sense of Sabda is either primary or secondary. The primary sense may bear various relations to the etymology of the term. It may be either root meaning or it may have a customary sense (i.e. yagika and rūḍhi). Or there may be both customary and root-meaning i.e. yogarūḍha. Śābhūṭa Śivācārya states that the Āśamic meaning is acquired by the mode of 'yoga-rūḍhi'.

Among the srutis and sārtis sruti is the powerful pramāṇa and sārti is the weak pramāṇa. Because it is as if a second hand information as it is based on the srutis. The latter is an aid to understand the former as it is rahasya or gūḍha i.e. veiled or deep. This is about the Sabda view of Śaivāgamas as understood by the Vīrāvasī writers. Now we may make a survey of the vacane literature that throws light on the nature of Sabdepramāṇa.
The pre-BSava period i.e. earlier to the twelfth century, the history of Indian logic is one of the most valuable periods. This is the scholastic period.

"The classical philosophers of India have placed tremendous weight on authoritative scriptures." The logical conclusion of this led to the development of a new way of logical thinking. This is true of the development of logical change in the history in all ages of all countries in the world. The Bhavamadya age gave way for the change of logical thinking and we come across the Buddhist logic. Again in the scholastic age we see change because of a new atmosphere prevailing soon after Bihangag that continued till the end of the eleventh century under which a current of change was running. It is true not only in the case of Indian Philosophy but also in the case of Western philosophy. Change in the religious thinking of the Western world led to the development of scholastic

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logic during the middle ages. The object of life in
the history of philosophical thinking after Ṛgveda,
that reigned supreme during the scholastic age, gave
rise to the other type of thinking with the advent of
Ṛṣabha, Uddhabva and others. The logical end is reached
with the movement of Śivascrāṇas who stressed the
realistic, idealistic monism. This led to the change
in the transcendental perception and transcendental
Sādān view which is termed vacana, anubhava, sūnugdi,
etc.

The term 'vacana' means sabdepasmāna; anubhāva
which is both personal institution i.e. individual and
social intuition and lastly sūnugdi, a tradition in-
herited. Thus these words mean differently in different
contexts. They are also used synonymously in vacana
literature now and then. Both the first and the last
terms, namely, vacana and sūnugdi are based on anubhava
which is a transcendental perception as the leukika-
sādā is based on leukikapratyakṣa i.e. empirical
perception.

69 Cantor, Psychology and Logic, pp. 47-49.
S'rabbstegra like Jaimini accepted it in the sense of tradition. Kumārila differs from both Jaimini and Prabhākara as he states that Sabda in both human and divine. In this distinction there is a sign of change in the concept of Sabda. The change brought about in this branch of prema is of great value. The causes are yet to be discovered. In this sense both Kumārila and Nyāya have a common view about sabdiprāmāya. Sankara is another great thinker who has a similar view and states that Sabda is both Veda and outside Veda.

So far we have considered the authority of 'Sabda', and it is one of the forms of tradition. The other part of tradition is 'sameyya' to be considered 'sameyprāmāya' and reigns supreme in the Vāsena literature.

The Indian people honoured the authority of tradition since the days of the Veda. "Respect for tradition can be traced in the Brāhmaṇas also, which now and then, by way of supporting their views, cite an earlier text or mention an older teacher. But it is only implicit there, and is not formally recognised as
here. The tradition itself is two-fold; it is either that of the Veda or of samaya, as it is termed, which means the habitual observances of the cultured Aryans (Sistas). 'Samaya' as a pramāṇa lost its importance in due course, which means habitual observances of cultured Aryans (Sistas). 'Samaya pramāṇa' came into existence only when there was no quotable text to support current practice. This is a substitute for 'sruti' in a sense. But it is a practice revolutionary in the history of 'pramāṇaśāstra'. It is still more so in the case of Agamic schools. It disappeared long back before the advent of the mystic thinkers of Karnataka.

Orthodox systems gave the highest place for 'Śabda-pramāṇa' as it reveals 'adṛṣṭārtha'. But the Vāc, na-kāras reduced the 'Śabda', i.e., 'nirvākārya' or 'Śruti' to the status of 'sārūti' and gave the highest place for intuition i.e., 'anubhava' as shown in the

70 E.Miriyan, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, (1959), p.91.

71 The term anubhava means both Reality and direct awareness without reference to the ego. In this sense it is a new meaning.
The mystic thinkers again introduced change by subordinating personal intuition (i.e. 'yaktiyākubhava') to the collective or social intuition (i.e. samaye). Thus it introduced a radical change in the history of 'pramāṇasthātra' which is a unique contribution made by the Śaṅkhaṇa school of thought.

The Mimamsa school rejected 'samayapramāṇa' because the 'siṣṭa' is after all a human being and his practice or word is not eternal like the non-human and the eternal 'Veda'. It is the Veda alone that reveals the eternal 'arthā' and none else which are written by no human being. The eternal 'arthā' is knowable only with the aid of the Vedas and not with the aid of the word of a human being. Thus in such a scheme of 'pramāṇa' the 'siṣṭa' or 'samaye' lost its place.

The other orthodox systems brought the idea of God as the highest of the ēptas into the realm of knowledge to which, the 'arthā' of all non-empirical kind that yields happiness or 'mokṣa' i.e. freedom from misery, belongs. This 'Ēpta' is the highest authority in matters both mundane and divine. They
subordinated the human 'Śrī' and he had place only in matters of empirical universe. Thus all the six orthodox systems enthroned the 'śruti' who once was equated with the authority of the 'āruti' and enjoyed the highest status in the realm of 'pramāṇa'.

The change took place with the dawn of the mystic thought in Hastinapura, and 'samṛya' reigned supreme. The mystics began to think without human element as the centre and acted accordingly. Such a person is called Sarāṇa. Sarāṇa is a living-divine who never loses the unique awareness that Flavinus experienced in the flight of the alone to the alone once or twice in his life time. This is 'anubhave'. They wiped out the distinction and ridiculed the use of words such as 'achieving' or 'reaching' by asking: why should one stand up on the tip of the toe on the misty mountain top to reach sarāṇa i.e. sky as he is the sky and living in the sky? The distinction of 'ātātāt' the lost meaning to them. This is how life changed the logic. This sort of change happened (i.e. change in the logical approach) earlier when the idea of personal God was introduced. The new idea of 'samṛya' was
replaced by the old idea of 'Ṛpta' in matters divine i.e. rituals and the notion of 'puruṣārtha'. This is in a sense an advance over the stand of the Nyaya-nyāya which restricted the authority of Nigamārgas to the realm of adhyātma. Thus 'samyaya' was given the highest place. This is a new contribution to the Indian logic made by the mystics which is more radical than the Nyaya-nyāya.