We have presented in the various chapters a multisided political analysis of the Kashmir problem. The Kashmir problem has been constituted by the aggression of the tribesmen into the Kashmir region and India's taking the problem to the United Nations. This has been the essence of the problem. Given the communal and religious composition of the population of Kashmir, in a way this problem was inevitable. Earlier the whole subcontinent of India, both the British territory and the princely states territory, was divided on the basis of communal and religious principles. Pakistan was carved out on the basis of Muslim majority in the various areas of the British territory and the princely states territory. The principle of contiguity was also applied. This had only a limited application. According to this principle areas which were bordering on Pakistan were to go to Pakistan and those bordering on India were to go to India. The principle was also applied to the Kashmir state. The Muslim population of the Kashmir state has acted as a tremendous attraction for the ruling elite of
Pakistan. Historically the whole thinking of Pakistan has arisen from the premise that the Hindu majority of the subcontinent has been in the forefront in the various walks of life and the Muslims would always remain second class citizens unless they also have a separate homeland of their own. This was the basis of Pakistan and a part of this basis was conceded in a vital sense as early as in 1909, in the form of the Morley-Minto reforms. It was no wonder therefore that Kashmir was a tremendous attraction to the ruling elite of Pakistan. The ruling elite were not reconciled to Kashmir remaining independent or going to India. As we have described in the various chapters Pakistani political leaders and Jinnha in particular tried very hard to secure the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. When that was not possible and when there was a great danger from their viewpoint of the maharaja acceding to India they arranged the action of the tribesmen.

In this situation we should also give sufficient weight to the position and influence of the maharaja, Hari Singh. His vacillation and delay in taking a definite decision about the status of Kashmir gave rise to so much avoidable speculation and controversies both in India and
Pakistan. His lack of firmness and decision kept political leaders of both countries guessing. The intervening period of the British rulers departing from the state and the state not joining either of the dominions or remaining independent was dangerous. The vacuum began to be filled by the invasion of the tribesmen. These events forced the decision as it were on maharaja and he took the last minute action of accession to the dominion of India. The Indian leaders in New Delhi now had a problem of rescuing the maharaja and his state from the invasion of the tribesmen. On the signing of the accession by the maharaja and the state becoming the Indian territory, the territory had to be defended from the invasion of the tribesmen and this train of events was so rapid that the Indians did not have enough time to do all that was necessary in securing the safety of Kashmir and clearing the territory of the invading tribesmen. By the time the Indian action was under way to secure control in Kashmir the tribesmen had already consolidated their position in the area which has been subsequently known as Azad Kashmir. This has been the problem.

Several people in India have argued that this problem need not have remained in this fashion and that
it could have been solved then and there, that is, in 1948 when the invasion took place. They have argued that the government of India should have gone ahead with a full-fledged military action to clear the territory of all the invaders and secure their control in Kashmir which was after all their territory. The Indian hesitation to drive tribesmen further out of the areas occupied by them gave rise to Azad Kashmir and other related problems. The advocates of this view believe that there did not need to have been any Kashmir problem but for the government of India's hesitation to drive away the tribesmen from the entire territory.

There is another section of public opinion which has held that the Kashmir problem was a completely internal problem but the Indian leaders by their own action unnecessarily made it an international problem. Without any need they took this problem to the United Nations and it has remained there ever since without any qualitative improvement in the solution of the problem. Internationalisation of the problem has also meant that a number of countries, big and small, have taken interest in this problem when it has been discussed in the forums of the United Nations and also outside. The United States
and United Kingdom have taken interest in the problem in such a way that it has on the whole strengthened the Pakistani side as against the Indian side. Pakistan involved the United States and United Kingdom on its side in this Kashmir dispute by means of joining the military pacts, SEATO and CENTO. It is said that when the proposal for joining military pacts was made by America to India, India rejected the proposal and refused to join the military pacts. A few people therefore believed that India committed a serious mistake in not joining the pacts and leaving the field free for Pakistani activities which proved greatly prejudicial and problematic from India's point of view. Next to the interests of the western nations China's interest in the problem have made the problem more problematic. China and Pakistan settled their so called boundary disputes at the expense of India, involving the Indian territory in the Kashmir region. China has been given some strategic portion of this territory and has also built a strategic border road and more than half of which passes through disputed territory. While China's attitude was largely favourable to India during the 1950-1960 period and specially up to 1958 in later years, China threw her weight and influence on the side of Pakistan and this complicated the Kashmir
problem all the more from the Indian viewpoint. In this context of the internationalisation of the problem only the stands of the Soviet Union have been of crucial help to India. But for the statements made and stands taken by the Soviet Union delegates in the United Nations from time to time and the veto used by them, the voting in the United Nations on the problem of Kashmir would have gone against India.

There is one more aspect of the internationalisation of the problem. This is the various degree of tensions characterising the Indo-Pakistani relations. As a result of this Kashmir problem the Indo-Pakistani relations have been more or less complicated and embittered for the last 20 years and more. As India did not settle this problem completely and conclusively in 1948 Pakistan came to acquire, not in technical terms but in actual situation, a kind of locus standi with regard to Kashmir. As a result although Kashmir belongs to India and it was the territory of India, like any other state, India felt obliged in actual practice to watch the developments in Pakistan and come to terms with attitudes and policies of the Pakistani leaders on this problem both in the United Nations and outside. In fact the series of
commissions or observer groups which visited the subcontinent on behalf of the United Nations involved not only India but also Pakistan. And what is more, some of these arbitrators or mediators went to the extent of equating India and Pakistan or putting India and Pakistan on the same level. In doing so the arbitrators or mediators completely forgot that India was the aggressed party and Pakistan was the aggressor party. From this major premise they managed to come to a strange conclusion that the aggressed and aggressor were on the same level. The Indo-Pakistani relations have been characterised by several crises, particularly the four wars. In every one of these wars Kashmir frontier and territory has proved a sensitive ground for the military and political manoeuvres involving the two countries. Whenever the Indian and Pakistani leaders draw up a list of outstanding problems which call for settlement, they inevitably put Kashmir as an important item in the list. Nations friendly to these nations who have been interested in improving the relations between these two nations have recommended and have offered to help in the settlement of various problems and particularly the Kashmir. On one side the United States was keen on emphasising to India the necessity of settling the Kashmir problem satisfactorily as a necessary step to improving
Indo-Pakistani relations; on the other side the Soviet Union had wanted to do the same thing. She went a step ahead and held the Tashkent conference at which the leaders of India and Pakistan — prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan — were invited to participate and to settle their outstanding differences. Nations like China have also issued from time to time declarations that they want the two countries to settle their problems amicably. This was China's position generally from 1950 to 1960.

A crucial question which has figured importantly in the context of the Kashmir problem is that of a plebiscite. Pakistan and her supporters, specially the United States, Britain and even China, in the post-1960 years have spoken of the necessity of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. They tried to tell Nehru and Krishna Menon that it was a contradiction on their part not to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir and that agreement to plebiscite had been their earlier position. The spokesmen of Pakistan and their supporters have not felt persuaded by the view that the offer of plebiscite was conditional, limited and was in a context. It was conditional on the vacation of the occupied territory by tribesmen. Plebiscite was not exactly a plebiscite; it was a step like a plebiscite which would
amount to the ascertaining of the wishes of the Kashmir people. This was properly and abundantly done by the expression of the will by the constituent assembly of Kashmir. The constituent assembly confirmed the accession and expressed itself in favour of the state being with India. Pakistani spokesmen and their supporters either did not pay attention to the three conditions and stipulations etc. of this plebiscite or dodged the conditional nature of plebiscite. They did nothing to fulfil the condition of clearing the territory of the invaders. And yet they were insisting on India to fulfil the condition of plebiscite. This was evidently a strange logic but the glaring contradiction in it was not obviously seen by the advocates of the Pakistani view. This often became an issue of deadlock in the United Nations. The advocates of Pakistani view would say that India should hold a plebiscite and the advocates of the Indian view would say that the three conditions of plebiscite were not fulfilled and the context of plebiscite had substantially changed and therefore the plebiscite argument had lost its bottom.

One dimension of the Kashmir problem can be said to be the relative futility of taking some of the
international problems to the United Nations. Looking at the history of the Kashmir problem in the United Nations one may feel that United Nations is a body more for delaying the problems or throwing them in the cold storage than for solving them. Further the solution of the international problems in the United Nations depends, it may appear, not so much on the merits of the case, rightness or wrongness of the problem, on right side or wrong side of the nations involved in a dispute. It rather depends upon who is able to muster whose support, which nation is able to swing on its side which particular nations which can vote in the General Assembly or the Security Council. Even the composition of the arbitration commissions, observer groups etc. can be loaded in the sense that members of particular nations could be in preponderant number vitiating thus from the start the principle of impartiality and objectivity. As we have pointed out earlier, at one stage a majority of the members in a commission visiting the subcontinent were Americans and the Indian side had no reason to believe that they were warm supporters of the Indian stand on plebiscite and indeed on the whole Kashmir problem. It may be added here that nations which have been keen on solving their problems sometimes choose to take their
problems outside the purview of United Nations as apparently they believe that the United Nations would only arrange continual long debates on the problems and there would be no solutions to the problems. One example is the problem of disarmament and control of nuclear weapons. The talks in Europe specially the SALT talks have been conducted outside the forum of the United Nations.

We may say that, to the extent the Kashmir problem is solved, it has been solved not because of the United Nations or the debates held by it or the commissions sent by it but regardless of these or even in spite of these. The real solution of Kashmir problem, to the extent it has been a solution, has come in the form of political or military action. The legal bodies of arbitration and mediation or for other efforts have not helped the nations concerned to arrive at the solution. The Gordian knot of the Kashmir problem came to be cut with the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war over East Bengal (East Pakistan) which is now Bangladesh. The 1971 war divided Pakistan inseparably and resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh leaving Pakistan in the shape of the remainder of the territory, the present Pakistan in the northwest of India.
The whole context of the territorial, logistic and strategic factors and forces of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent and relations has changed since this 1971 war. The people in Kashmir specially the Muslims realised again that commonness of religion is no guarantee of peace, stability, success or welfare. In other words Kashmir's joining Pakistan, in an extremely desperate contingency, would not be a wise step at all. So the only wise course left was to seek the fortune and welfare of Kashmir in the context of Indian dominion or union which they (the people of Kashmir) had joined. Besides truncation of erstwhile Pakistan into two and reduction of Pakistan to the relatively small size on the northwestern side of India showed the Kashmir leaders that Pakistan could not be a contender or challenger to India in the new post-1971 situation in the subcontinent. The political observers and military strategists have observed after the 1971 war that India has emerged as a major power east of the Suez canal. This impression was further confirmed with the explosion of the nuclear device by India. We may say that this view of India's status as a big power or major power is grossly exaggerated. But nonetheless as regards the Kashmir problem there is no doubt that the Indian side emerged
remarkably strong and the Pakistani side emerged remarkably weak. With nearly 93,000 Pakistani troops in the Indian custody as prisoners of war Pakistan emerged a weak bargainer in the subcontinent including on the much vexed problem of Kashmir. It was no wonder therefore that the leaders of the Kashmir people and particularly Sheikh Abdullah came round to the view that a strong and obvious alternative was to make Kashmir a strong prosperous state of the Indian union. In the post-1971 years Sheikh Abdullah rapidly reconciled to the realities of the situations and to the understanding that India was in no mood to continue indefinitely the internationalisation of the Kashmir problem. As between Sheikh Abdullah and New Delhi, New Delhi had already shown that it could conduct the affairs of Kashmir even without Sheikh Abdullah, although not so well as under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. To Sheikh Abdullah, now around 70, it made sense when it was proposed that the situation in the subcontinent had now changed and he should take over the leadership of Kashmir, formally, as chief minister. As we have seen earlier protracted negotiations took place and Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader of Kashmir, was inducted as the state’s chief minister after nearly 22 years of political wilderness.
The wilderness had brought him the realisation that it was not doing service to him nor to his dear people of Kashmir and so he very wisely assumed the chief ministership of his troubled state.

Now as we have shown above the limited solution of the Kashmir problem has come about on account of the military and political factors. True the Kashmir problem continues to be in the United Nations but in view of the past history of the United Nations' handling of that problem it does not appear likely that that body will handle (even) the remaining part of the Kashmir problem. It is possible that the present line of control dividing Kashmir into Indian Kashmir and Azad Kashmir will remain the boundary between the two Kashmiris for quite some time to come. This problem of two Kashmiris or, better, the vacation of Azad Kashmir territory may figure in time to come in the Indo-Pakistani talks on outstanding problems. As it is leaders of India and Pakistan have their hands full of several other pressing problems and it appears now that it will be quite some time before the problem of Kashmir is broached in the Indo-Pakistani talks. At present the division of Kashmir looks like the division of Berlin. For their part the Kashmiri people have not
given up the hope of unification of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah has said this in so many words. But he has also shown preparedness to wait till the problem is solved satisfactorily taking into account the adjustment to the Pakistani interests. As regards the controversy or propaganda about the people of Indian Kashmir being in revolt or rebellion or in any case in a state of dissatisfaction with their authorities, it will radically change. The same thing however cannot be said about Azad Kashmir. The people here have been said to be dissatisfied with the Pakistani rule conducted by Islamabad. This appears to be particularly true of the Bhutto regime. For Bhutto and his party men are said to have strengthened their position in the Azad Kashmir by setting aside the local leaders and substituting their own supporters in their places. However there appears to have been a change of mood of the Azad Kashmir people in the intervening years in which the martial law administrator, General Zia, has come on the scene and in which Bhutto himself has been sent to the gallows. Therefore it was not surprising that crowds in the Azad Kashmir, when Bhutto was hanged in 1979, raised pro-Bhutto slogans and, surprisingly, also pro-India slogans, perhaps for the first time in the last 30 years. In this
sense the Azad Kashmir area continues to be a disturbed sector as the other constituents of Pakistan like Sind, Baluchistan and North Western Frontier Province which now and then are reported to be in a state of dissatisfaction, if not rebellion. Hence the propaganda about the Azad Kashmir being discontented or restive is apt to be entertained in the interested quarters. Whether such propaganda is entertained or not, the Azad Kashmir problem continues to be one of the outstanding problems and it looks likely that people of Kashmir and India may have to address themselves to this problem sooner or later when the relations between India and Pakistan are more helpful and the times are more propitious.