Chapter II
TERMINOLOGY

Values; Values and the Present Investigation
Attributability
Compatibility
Other Terms
The present study utilizes an established scale and other concepts on values, and therefore, no attempt is deemed necessary here to define the term 'value' de novo. However, it may be necessary to make a reference to the broad conceptual coverage of the term 'value' so that the framework utilized in the present investigation may be made clear. Therefore, after a brief statement pointing out the varied causes in which the term 'value' is used, the present discussion will be primarily concerned with bringing out the perspective from which the present study could be considered as a study of values.
Clyde Kluckhohn (1951, p. 390) aptly expresses the complex of meanings associated with the term 'value':

Reading the voluminous, and often vague and diffuse, literature on the subject in the various fields of learning, one finds values considered as attitudes, motivations, objects, measureable quantities, substantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs or traditions, and relationships such as those between individuals, groups, objects, events.

According to Pepper (1953, p. 7), again, values may refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, needs, aversions and attractions, and many other modalities of selective orientation.

Therefore, though the term 'value' is an accepted concept in various disciplines such as Philosophy, Economics, Sociology, Psychology and a few others, there has not been uniform interpretation of the term.

Running parallel with the varied meanings of the term 'value' is the controversy regarding the source of value. A basic issue in the context of assigning the source to the value experiences is the problem of understanding the relation between the value and the
mind or perceiver who does the evaluating. The subjectivist standpoint in this connection holds that the values pertain to the imagination, the thinking, the interests, and the desires of the persons who experience the value. On the other hand, the objectivists hold that the values are outside the mind in the sense that they belong to things as temperature, size do. A third viewpoint in Philosophy, called variously, 'interactionism', 'contextualism', 'objective relativism' holds that value is a function of interaction between the perceiver and the object perceived.

The complexity seen above with respect to meaning and interpretation of the term 'value' is also reflected in its definitions. Apart from such very general formulations as 'any object of any interest' (Perry, 1954, pp. 2-3), and 'anything good or bad is a value' (Peperz, 1958, p. 7), one finds innumerable definitions formulated for specific studies. Saier (1969) gives

* See, Value: A Cooperative Inquiry, edited by Ray Lepley (1949), for some of the recent and important (and generally philosophical) formulations of the value phenomenon.
a very good survey of various definitions on values, but himself considers values as 'appraisals'.

In social science literature, however, a generally accepted definition is given by Clyde Kluckhohn (1951, p. 395): "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action." Perhaps basic in this definition is treating the 'value' as 'conception of the desirable' which should influence behaviour.

Kluckhohn's definition, however, forms a part of a wider conceptualization of values by Charles Morris, a pioneer in treating the axiological problems from the standpoint of enabling empirical research in the area. Discussing predominantly in an empirically and methodologically oriented perspective, Morris defines the study of values as the study of preferential behaviour (Morris, 1949, and 1964, p. 17).

Preferential behaviour, as conceptualized by Morris (1949, 1956b, p. 10, and 1964, pp. 16-20), may be formulated broadly as follows: an act or acts of
selection-rejection or favouring-disfavouring. Further, he assumes that in the expression of preferential behaviour there need not necessarily be a deliberate comparison of two or more objects in the sense of placing one above the other (Morris, 1966b, p. 187).

According to Morris, any situation in which preferential behaviour occurs is a "value situation." Further, to quote Morris (1964, p. 18):

Such behavior [i.e., preferential behaviour] may be directed to any object or complex of objects, or to any properties or an object or complex of objects—hence to parts, joys, persons, actions, physical objects, signs, and complex structures of various sorts. A value situation, so conceived, is inherently relational, involving an action of (positive or negative) preferential behavior by some agent to something or other.

Thus, Morris' conceptualization avoids the subjectivist and objectivist formulations and considers values as "objectively relative": "that is, they are properties of objects (in a wide sense of this term) relative to preferential behavior" (Morris, 1964, p. 15). Therefore, values involve both subjects (agents) and objects.
Further, a value situation might be reported upon by others (i.e., "from without") and by the agent who is himself in the situation. In the latter case the language of the agent may be: "I like (or dislike) X", "I find X satisfying (or dissatisfying)", "X is good (or bad)" (Morris, 1964, p. 13).

Morris distinguishes three classes of preferential behaviour: 'operative', 'conceived', and 'object' (Morris, 1956b, pp. 10-12 and 1964, pp. 19-20). The 'operative' value refers to the "actual direction of preferential behavior" (Morris, 1956b, p. 10). The 'conceived' value refers to instances of positive or negative preferential behaviour accorded to a signified object or situation; or, in 'conceived' value "some object or situation is signified and liked or disliked as signified" (Morris, 1964, p. 19). The 'object' value refers to "what is preferable or ('desirable') regardless of whether it is in fact preferred or conceived as preferable" (Morris, 1956b, p. 11).

In Morris' formulation, therefore, the terms 'operative' value, 'conceived' value, and 'object' value refer to different aspects of value situations or situations involving preferential behaviour (Morris, 1964, p. 20). In other words, the 'preferred' behaviour
observed in a given individual would be 'operative',
the symbolic evaluation of a given situation or object
would be 'conceived', and the situation or object
"desirable" irrespective of being 'operative' or
'conceived' would be 'object' value.

Methodologically, Morris' classification implies:
"What is preferred (operative value) can be found
through a study of preferential behavior. What is
conceived to be preferable (conceived value) can be
studied through the symbols employed in preferential
behavior and the preferential behavior directed toward
the symbols" (Morris, 1956b, p. 18). And, what is
preferable (object value) can be studied through an
inquiry into what is to be preferred if the envisaged
consequences are to follow.

Thus, Morris' approach to the study of values
has not only the merit of demonstrating that the three
different employments of the term 'value' are
interpretable in terms of the 'preferred-preferable',
but also the merit of suggesting the procedures to be
employed in studying different aspects of the value
situations.
Values and the Present Investigation

Values in the sense of 'conceived value' of Morris' classification are studied in the present investigation. The conceived-value-data in the present study, as in Morris' studies, are provided by subjects' ratings expressed in terms of 'liking-disliking', 'desirable-undesirable' to what is signified. What is signified might be a Way-of-Life or the 'desirability' of a value in a social interactional situation.

Firstly, values are studied here with respect to some cultural ideologies or "Ways to Live" formulated by Morris. The Ways themselves are constituted of evaluative propositions or symbolic expressions of preferential behaviour. In the instructional set to the "Ways to Live" document is included the following: "Remember that it is not a question of what kind of life you now lead, or the kind of life you think it prudent to live in our society, or the kind of life you think good for other persons, but simply the kind of life you personally would like to live" (Morris, 1956b, p. 10). Interpreted, this statement asks of the respondents to inhibit any set to giving responses in terms of 'operative' value ("... not a question of what kind
of life you now lead") or 'object' value ("... not a question of ... the kind of life you think it prudent to live in our society, or the kind of life you think good for other persons"); on the other hand, it creates a set to giving responses within the framework of 'conceived' value (Morris, 1936b, p. 13).

In the Morris' original "Ways to Live" document, the value is studied on a seven-point rating scale ranging from extreme 'like' to extreme 'dislike'. In the present investigation, a five-point scale of 'like-dislike' is used.

Secondly, the values are studied in the present investigation with respect to three basic value categories—Receptivity, Dominance, and Detachment—in specific social interactional contexts through the evaluative or appraisive responses spread on a five-point scale of 'desirability-undesirability'. This part of the data is obtained from the responses on what is called the 'Desirability Scale'.

Each of the value categories stated above is itself a statement of evaluative propositions. Each value category is presented as the description of a
person. The instructional set includes: "... how much you yourself consider it desirable or undesirable to accept the described person to each of the social relationships." Thus the emphasis is on considering the desirability of each value category from the standpoint of the individual himself. This, following Morris' conceptualization, might be thought of as creating a framework in which the 'conceived' value is given expression to. Therefore, what is studied here is a form of 'conceived' value: conceptions of the desirable towards each of the three sets of value propositions in each of the five interactional contexts.

Attributability

'Attributability' is another key term used in the present investigation in the context of obtaining the descriptions of groups within the framework of three basic value categories—Receptivity, Dominance, and Detachment. This part of the data is obtained through what is called the 'Attributability Scale'.

The basic terms used in the Attributability Scale are 'Attributable' and 'Not Attributable': 'Attributable' refers to the respondents finding the value category to be present in a given group, and 'Not attributable'
refers to the value category to be absent in a given group. Thus the responses in a way constitute 'judgements' of attributability or non-attributability of the value categories to the groups. But the term 'judgement' in this context must be qualified; it cannot be interpreted as a judgement in any analytical sense, but a statement expressing the respondents' view which may be influenced by his own value system, his intra- and intercultural experiences, prejudices, stereotypes, attitudes etc.

Compatibility

The Compatibility scores are generated through a methodological framework called the 'Compatibility Model' on the basis of an individual's ratings on the Desirability and Attributability Scales. As will be shown in the 'Materials and Methods', the range of data generated by the Model contains a positive side and a negative side. While the Compatibility scores in general (i.e., irrespective of what side they belong to) are interpreted to indicate preference-potential, the positive side is interpreted to indicate the tendency to accord selective favour to a group under consideration (positive preference-potential), and the negative side
is interpreted to indicate the tendency to accord selective disfavour to the group under consideration (negative preference-potential). The tendency to accord selective favour is termed as 'compatibility' and the tendency to accord selective disfavour is termed as 'incompatibility'.

Other Terms

The terms 'preferential behaviour', 'evaluation', and 'appraisal' are used interchangeably in the text.

The term 'value orientation' is used here basically to refer to how a given group evaluates the Ways-of-Life, and Receptivity, Dominance, and Detachment in social interactional contexts. It is also used to refer to the concepts of Receptivity, Dominance, and Detachment. The latter usage of the term seems justified as these concepts embody evaluative expressions and thus may be thought of as indicating the preferential behaviour of some hypothetical person or group.

It may be noted that the term 'Compatibility' (with the initial capital letter) is used to indicate any score, positive or negative, while the term 'compatibility' is used to denote only those scores which fall on the positive side in the range of Compatibility scores.