CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN ROLE IN THE CRIPPS MISSION: INDIANS DISENCHANTED.

Being of strategic importance India assumed an increasingly important place in U.S.-British relations. The Cripps proposals offered to India gained the attention of the United States Government and public alike.

In March 1942 Prime Minister Churchill announced in the House of Commons, the purpose of Cripps visit to India as being, to seek assent to the proposals which the British Government had agreed, upon to meet the Indian situation.\(^1\)

Cripps in his broadcast to the Indian leaders reiterated the British good intentions. In a press statement he said, "I have come to India to discuss with the leaders of Indian opinion conclusions which the War Cabinet have unitedly reached in regard to India. Their chief object is to set out finally and with precision the practical steps which His Majesty's Government proposed as the method of fulfilling their past promises of self Government to the Indian peoples.\(^2\)

\(^1\) The Tribune, March 12, 1942, p.1.

The draft of the Cripps proposals read as follows:

(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian states in the constitution making body ...

(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to (i) the right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent secession if it so decided.

(d) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution making body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands, it will make provision in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government for the protection of racial and religious minority, but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other member states of the British Commonwealth.

(e) The composition of the constitution-making body shall depend on the outcome of provincial elections after the cessation of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower House of the provincial legislatures shall as a single electoral college proceed to the election of the constitution-making body, on the basis of proportional representation. Numerically such a body shall be one-tenth of the number of the electoral
college. Like the British Indian provinces, the Indian states shall have their representatives in proportion to their population.

(f) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new constitution can be framed His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and Britain control and direction of the Defence of India as part of their World War effort. But the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India, must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the people of India.

(g) The principal sections of the Indian people shall be invited in the Councils of their country, of the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

Indian reaction to Cripps Mission was varied. The Statesman in its editorial "Now or Never" described Cripps proposal as "Definite and precise proposals for the fulfillment of Britain's past promises" Jawaharlal Nehru declined to make any comments while Maulana Azad said he would welcome him as a friend. Rajagopalachari expressed pleasure that the British Government had at last realised the gravity of the situation. Tej Bahadur Sapru


welcomed it and did not wish to say a word which might prejudice his great mission in which "I hope he will achieve as much success as he has in Russia". The Hindu Mahasabha did not attach much importance to endless discussions and conferences even, if conducted by a member of British War Cabinet like Cripps.  

"New Hope for India" was the heading of the Times editorial on the announcement of S.S. Cripps Mission to India. "Its boldness strikes the imagination, it imparts a breadth of fresh life and hope to an issue which had began to seem desperate".  

Seeing the effect, the scheme was likely to have on United States, Viceroy Linlithgow wrote to Secretary of State, Leopold Amery, "We are by no means out of the woods but I now have considerable hopes that whether the scheme succeeds or fails there may be looking to the propaganda value involved, in face of American opinion a balance of credit to our side."

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United States welcomed Cripps proposed mission. New York Times editorial analysing the Indian situation remarked "It is difficult to say which fact is most startling - that the Japanese are at the Gates of India, that an apparently unconditional proposal for Indian self rule emanates from Conservative Leadership, that S.S. Cripps is the chosen emissary at this great turning point of imperial policy, or that a problem that has baffled British Statesmanship in normal conditions, is to be settled in the shadow of war. But a new and perhaps decisive element had entered into the dispute, now it was vital for the British Government to harmonise the diverse elements in India. For the first time it had become a matter of urgent interest for Britain to reach a satisfactory settlement. In his statement, Churchill spoke of the responsibility of his Government, "to shield the people of India from the perils which beset them" and the desire to "rally all forces of Indian life" to support the World's struggle for freedom". In hour of crisis India and Great Britain, were mutually dependent, and therefore, it was to be expected that the full weight of the British Government would be thrown into the task of re-conciling Indian differences. S.S.Cripps was the
logical envoy for the mission. He had been a consistent advocate of self government for India and his friendship with the Indian leaders and with Chiang Kai Shek helped to cement a fighting alliance between India and China and convince the Indian people, that in massing whole heartedly against the Japanese invader they were ensuring their own independence.  

In a public opinion survey conducted in the United States on March 31, 1942, with the question have you heard or read about the plan to give India Dominion Status? 70% of the people who were familiar with the subject were asked, should England give India Dominion's status now or after the war, the poll revealed the following:

- Dominion status now: 37%
- After the war: 19%
- Never: 2%
- Did not say when: 12%
- Unfamiliar with the subject: 30%

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While the American press and public opinion took interest in the proposals, Maulana Azad and Nehru handed on 2nd April, 1942 to Cripps a resolution of the Congress Working Committee virtually rejecting the proposals. The resolution could be summarised as follows:

Government proposal had been made at the very last hour because of the compulsion of events and had to be considered, not only in relation to India's demand for independence but more specially in present crisis with the views meeting effectively, perils and dangers that confronted India and the world. Congress had repeatedly stated that people of India would line themselves with progressive forces in the war, if essential conditions of freedom of India were realised. War Cabinet proposals related principally to the future after cessation of hostility. The prior acceptance of principles of accession for provinces is a severe blow to the conception of Indian Unity and likely to generate growing trouble in the provinces which may well lead to difficulties, in the way of Indian states joining Indian Union. Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break in that unity would be injurious and painful to contemplate. Any proposal concerning the future of India, demanded attention and scrutiny, but in today's grave crisis it was the present that counted and even proposals for the future were important in so far as they effected the present. For the present
the British War Cabinet proposals were vague and altogether incomplete and would appear, that no vital changes in the present structure were contemplated. It had been made clear that the Defence of India would in any event remain under British control. At any time defence was a vital subject. During the war time, it was all the more important and covered almost every sphere of life and administration. To take away defence from this sphere of responsibility at this stage, was to reduce that responsibility to a farce. And to make it perfectly clear that India was not going to function as a free and independent government, during the period of the war. What is most wanted is the enthusiastic response of the people, which could not be got without the fullest trust in them and the devolution of responsibility in the matter of defence.  

The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League, while expressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan was recognised by implication by providing for the establishment of two or more independent

Unions in India, regretted that the proposals of His Majesty's Government embodying the fundamentals were not open to any modification and therefore, no alternative proposals were invited. In view of the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification, the committee had no alternative but to say that the proposals in their present form were unacceptable.11

A resolution of the Hindu Mahasabha declared, that there were several points in the Declaration which were more or less satisfactory, but according to the statement made by Sir Stafford Cripps, the Scheme of His Majesty's Government was to be accepted or rejected in toto. As some essential features were wholly or partially unacceptable, the Hindu Mahasabha had no alternative but to reject the scheme. One of the cardinal points was the right which the Scheme conferred on the provinces of British India, to keep out of the Indian Union or Federation. The basic principle of Hindu Mahasabha was that India was one and indivisible. The

declaration promised full national sovereignty in the future but the constitutional position and status of India during the interim period had not been made clear, particularly in regard to defence, the scheme of His Majesty's Government was therefore, unacceptable.\footnote{Mansergh, N. and Lumby, E.W.R., \textit{The Transfer of Power}, Vol. I., April 3, 1942, pp.627-628.}

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, leader of the depressed classes regretted the proposals, with the view that the proposals were calculated to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule.\footnote{Ibid., April 1, 1942, p. 603.}

In a letter to Stafford Cripps, the Sikh Committee rejected the Draft Declaration on the ground, that instead of maintaining and strengthening the integrity of India specific provision had been made for separation of provinces and constitution for Pakistan. Secondly the cause of the Sikh community had been betrayed.\footnote{Ibid., March 31, 1942, p. 582.}

In a memorandum rejecting the Draft Declaration T.B. Sapru and M.R. Jayakar pointed out, that while they
appreciated the necessity of unity of policy and control in matters of Defence they thought in common with their countrymen, that the appointment of an Indian member in charge of Defence, working in close association and cooperation with the war cabinet and willing to accept expert advice, would be taken at this stage as a symbol of the confidence of His Majesty's Government in the people of the country. The second point was the provision which made it possible for another Federal Union being established. Such a Federal Union could in certain conceivable circumstances be a rival or hostile union.\[15

Churchill's stiff attitude to the Congress reaction was evident in his telegram to Cripps. "Cabinet showed itself disinclined to depart from the public text of the declaration or to go beyond it in any way. It has made our position plain to the world and has won general approval. We had reached an agreement on it before you started and it represents our "final position."\[16

\[16\text{Draft Telegram from the Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal. War Cabinet Papers, Vol. II, April 2, 1942, Nehru Memorial Museum Library, Delhi, p. 263.}
tried to persuade Churchill to give up this rigid attitude and sent a telegram asking for his final decision. Commenting on the situation Cripps stated, "The time has now arrived when a final decision must be arrived as to how far we are prepared to go on the chance of getting a settlement. My estimate of this situation is that the Muslim League are satisfied and prepared to accept the scheme as it stands. The only point for negotiation was clause E which as Cripps pointed out "You know was purposely left vague apart from general principle of retention of defence". Cripps pointed out, that if the Congress did not accept the scheme, no other party would accept it either. Cripps declared that "if they do not accept, the situation will in my view become difficult, as we shall be attempting to carry on the war in at best a neutral atmosphere and at the worst a hostile one. The British Government stuck to the original draft despite Cripps pleas.\textsuperscript{18}

The Cripps proposals had the desired effect in the United States. The Indian nationalists were vehemently criticised by the United States papers. The

\textsuperscript{17}War Cabinet Papers, Vol. II, April 6, 1942, N.M.M.L. Delhi, pp.265-268.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.
New York Times declared "the fact that Indian leaders are stressing the issue over the defence question, rather than over Dominion status, has resulted in the focus of press attention turning from a discussion of British imperial policy to the subject of India's place in the world struggle against the Axis. There are many warnings to Indian leaders of the folly of wasting precious time debating, when India's freedom is so obviously bound up with the United Nations victory. Washington Post pointed out "India's quibbling when the British offer to India was so fair and decent and the alternative so suicidal, that the conclusion is forced on the American people that suspicion of Britain is almost ineradicable. The Christian Science Monitor said "to ask Indian's to trust Britain may be more than they are prepared to do. But today they should trust friends". Herald Tribune speaking in favour of the British proposals declared "the British plan seemed the dawn of the new future. Instead it has been rejected by Indian leaders with a offer of counter proposals. If this means that Indians prefer invasion and enslavement and perhaps civil war, American disappointment will be bitter and deep." The New York Post pointed out "England's promise of India's freedom has been spoken of as a post dated check. Alright call it that, all the twenty six United Nations including America will endorse. it. If that is not security there is
no security in the world". Chicago Sun declared "Sir Stafford Cripps offers India the choice between delayed independence from Britain or perpetual slavery to Japan."

In reply to the United States press criticism, Rajagopalachari said "America as we have the news here is surprised that the Cripps proposal has not met with enthusiastic response in India. The answer is that devolution plus reservation of defence cannot save India, and the people of India see this". The belated and far too belated declaration that India may determine her own constitution on the cessation of hostilities, had failed to evoke enthusiasm, because of Britain's understandable refusal even at this late hour to install a truly national government, inviting it to take up the responsibility of the defence of the country.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru asked American to reserve opinion on the Congress refusal to accept the British proposal in their present form. Nehru made this statement with the approval and direction of M.K. Gandhi.

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19 Reported in The Times of India, Bombay, April 6, 1942, p.9.
20 The Times of India, Bombay, April 6, 1942, p.9.
Speaking on American press comments Nehru said, "these comments obviously are influenced by the urgency of the events." He said "we appreciate that urgency ourself, indeed for us it is an even more urgent matter than for the United States. "But behind these comments there is not enough appreciation of the Indian situation and public relation to events. It is difficult for me to deal with this matter fully at this stage as the working committee has decided not to release the resolution yet". Pandit Nehru hoped that India's friends abroad would wait until publication of the decisions was possible. He reiterated "the future is undoubtedly so important that we may not accept anything for that future which is opposed to our vital principles." He said "but ultimately it is the present with all its urgency and possibilities for far reaching consequences that counts." Nevertheless Nehru assured President Roosevelt that India's millions would battle Japan to the last, if permitted to direct their own war effort. He gave this assurance through Col. Louis Johnson President Roosevelt's personal envoy to India, who arrived in the midst of S.S. Cripps negotiations with the Indian leaders.  

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While the negotiation were on the brink of failure, United States Envoy Louis Johnson tried to make a last attempt to make the Mission a success. Col. Louis Johnson had been sent to India as the Personal Representative of the President of the United States. He furnished only an informal letter of introduction to the Viceroy, as the constitutional position made it impossible for direct diplomatic relations.

On assessing the situation Johnson asked the President to intercede with Churchill. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Johnson stated "unless the President feels that he can intercede with Churchill it would seem that Cripps efforts are doomed to failure. Cripps so believes to. Such failure will adversely effect the war effort. I respectfully urge therefore, that the President without disclosing he is advised by Cripps consider further effort with Churchill."

At the same time Johnson held talks with Indian leaders. His meeting with Nehru revived India's hope. The

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Indian newspaper *Statesman* declared "The Johnson Nehru meeting is considered a very significant development in political quarters here owing to the fact that it associated America directly with the British effort at assuring India's freedom and conveys a personal message from President Roosevelt to the Indian people".  

However, Johnson at the same time clarified United States stand to Nehru when he pointed out, "If America was convinced that Congress was solidly supporting the war effort, the sympathy she had previously had for Congress would continue: if on the other hand it appeared that Congress was saving face, or hedging or taking action to slow down the conclusion of the war, it was not too much to say that America would hate Congress". Johnson added, in response to an interjection of Nehru's that America would have the leading place at the peace table, that her attitude towards India at that table would be determined by the whole heartedness or otherwise of Indian war effort.

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Johnson met Nehru and Azad on one hand and Cripps on the other. After conference with Cripps and with his approval if not quite at his suggestion Johnson met Field Marshal Viscount Wavell who along with the Viceroy had blocked Churchill's approval of clause 'B'. Wavell at first arbitrarily refused to consider any change in Cripps amended proposals. But with tact Johnson explained that the set up of United States on defence establishments and convinced him that His Majesty's Government had nothing to loose by reversing the form of approach. On Wavell's recommendation Viceroy approved.

Col. Louis Johnson submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru personally not officially his formula for defence:

(a) The defence department shall be placed incharge of a representative Indian member with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War member of the executive council.

(b) A war department will be constituted, which will take over such functions of the defence department as are not retained by the defence members. A list of all the detailed functions has been agreed to, on to which will be added further important responsibilities including matters now dealt with by the defence co-ordination department and other vital matters related to the defence of India.

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28 The Times of India, Bombay, April 13, 1942, p.7.
Johnson's substitute defence amendment was informally agreed to at a conference between Cripps, Nehru and the Congress President, but His Majesty's Government refused to agree. Cripps declared that Col. Louis Johnson's formula meant the same thing as his original amendment, which was untrue. Johnson wrote to the Secretary of State, "Cripps is sincere, knows this matter should be solved. He and Nehru could solve it in five minutes if Cripps had any freedom of authority. To my amazement when satisfactory solution seemed certain Cripps with embarrassment told me he could not change the original Draft Declaration without Churchill's approval. "I never lost confidence until then, London wanted a Congress refusal why? Cripps original offer contained little more than the unkept promise of the First World War."\(^{29}\)

President Roosevelt on hearing Johnson's version wrote to Harry Hopkins hoping that Cripps would try once more to prevent the breakdown of the negotiations. President Roosevelt stated, "I regret to say that I am unable to agree with the point of view contained in your message to

me, that public opinion in the United States believes that negotiations have broken down on general broad issues. Here the general impression is quite the contrary. The feeling is held almost universally, that the deadlock has been due to the British Government's unwillingness to concede the right of self government to the Indians, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust to the British authorities technical, military and naval defence control. It is impossible for American public opinion to understand why if there is willingness on the part of the British Government to permit the component parts of India to secede after the war from the British Empire, it is unwilling to permit them to enjoy during the war what is tantamount to self government. Should the current negotiation be allowed to collapse because of the issues as presented to the people of America and should India subsequently be invaded successfully by Japan, it would be hard to over estimate the prejudicial reactions on American public opinion.  

Linlithgow in a letter to L.S. Amery expressed these sentiments, "However, helpful he may be I do not altogether like the principle of any-body in his position concerning himself to close with the detailed negotiations between His Majesty's Government and Indian politicians. I shall be relieved if we get through this business, without some misunderstanding or confusion, on account of Johnson's activities and perhaps on the part of the President himself."  

S.S. Cripps however, clarified Johnson's role when he said "Louis Johnson was of the greatest assistance in the negotiations" but emphasised that the United States envoy acted purely as a "personal intermediary" in attempting a solution of the Indian problem. Johnson "never in any sense acted in an official capacity at all. It was purely personal and of great value".

The Indians appreciated Johnson's interest. Nehru remarked, "Col. Louis Johnson has taken a friendly interest in our problem of today, and we are grateful to

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31 Ibid., Vol. I, April 7, 1942, p. 691.
him for it, but it would be unfair to him and to us to imagine that the burden of any decision or intervention is cast on him." In fact Nehru denied any report that the Indians had asked for President Roosevelt intervention. "For my part I admire President Roosevelt and consider he is shouldering a great burden worthily. I think he will inevitably play a great part in the future but reports that we have asked for his intervention in our problems are incorrect for we realise the burden is ours and we must shoulder it".

Nevertheless Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to President Roosevelt the reasons as to why the Congress had refused Cripps proposals. "I am venturing to write to you as I know that you are deeply interested in the Indian situation today and its reactions on the war. The failure of S.S. Cripps Mission to bring about a settlement between the British Government and the Indian people must have distressed you, as it has distressed us. As you know we have struggled for long years for the independence of India. But the peril of today made us desire above everything

34Ibid.
greatly appreciates your letter dated April 12, which he has received through Col. Louis Johnson. He has been deeply gratified by the message which it contains. He feels sure that all the people of India will make every possible effort to resist Japanese aggression in every part of India. To the utmost extent of its ability the Government of United States will contribute towards that common cause.  

That President Roosevelt had taken a keen interest in the Cripps negotiation, also came to light through a note from the Acting Secretary of State S. Welles to Louis Johnson. "I think you should know that prior to Cripps departure and up to the last moment the President made every possible effort with the British Prime Minister, to prevent the breakdown of negotiations and to have delayed for that purpose the departure of Cripps".  

Deep disappointment mingled with incredulity was the first reaction in the United States to the news that the Congress had rejected the British proposals.

37 Ibid.
The New York Times commented, "the mind refuses to believe that this means the end of all efforts to find an honourable solution to the points in dispute. It is unthinkable that Japan should be permitted to find a road to the enslavement of India, paved by the confusion that would follow the breakdown of negotiations. We find some Indian leaders puzzled and resentful at our American comments on India's reception of the plan. We can readily enter into their feelings, with regard to the last point Americans do not know as much about India as we could wish, but we do know that S.S. Cripps plan however overdue, was offered in good faith". Editorial comments on S.S. Cripps failure in the New York Times said, "if the problem of India can still be solved, the solution can rest only on candid recognition of the factors that have lead to the present impasse. The responsibility for the breakdown of negotiation is many sided. Long ago the British people should have recognised the urgency of the Indian problem. The British made the error of waiting, until the enemy was at India's very gates. But now that the officer

38 Reported in The Times of India, Bombay, April 13, 1942, p. 8.
else, that an opportunity should be given to us to organise a real national and popular resistance to the aggressor and invader. We were convinced that the right way to do this would have been to give freedom and independence to our people and ask them to defend it. If that was not to be as we wished it and considered necessary for purpose of war the least what we considered essential, was the formation of a truly national government today with power and responsibility to organise resistance on a popular basis, unfortunately even that was not considered feasible or desirable by the British Government ... ... I only wish to say how anxious and eager we were and still are to do our utmost, for the defence of India and to associate ourselves with the larger causes of freedom and democracy. Our sympathies as we have so often declared, are with the forces fighting against fascism and for democracy and freedom. With freedom in our country, those sympathies could have been translated into dynamic action."35

President Roosevelt could understand Nehru's views. The Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles sent a message from the President to Nehru. "The President

has been made and rejected, the American people and even the people of India themselves have a sharper knowledge of the inherent difficulties and complexities of the problem... only by surmounting their habit of past distrust of the British can the Indian leaders face squarely the present reality of the threat of invasion and conquest by Japan".  

The British put the blame for the failure of Cripps Mission entirely on the Indians. In a farewell message Cripps said, "We have tried by the offer I brought to help India along her road to victory and freedom. But for the moment, past distrust has proved too strong to allow a present settlement". The British were satisfied that the purpose to change American opinion on British attitude with regard to India was being fulfilled. British official Graham Spry after a survey in the United States submitted a report on Cripps Mission. According to Spry, "Cripps Mission had demonstrated that Indian problem was not simple, and that it was more of a problem within Indian than between Britain and India".

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40 *Time the Weekly News Magazine*, April 20, 1942, p. 28.

The American public generally approved of the Draft proposals and felt that the Indian political leaders should have accepted them. The intransigence of Congress, and particularly of Gandhi adversely influenced their position in the United States. The policy of the various information departments of the American Government was directed towards increasing friendship with Britain and knowledge of her imperial policy including Indian problems. But some suspicion had been there in official circles that a settlement in India could have been made possible in the final stages of the negotiation by new or revised instruction from the War Cabinet. A question on this point was raised in a friendly tone by the President and was emphatically denied by Spry. The denial was accepted.

The role of India in Anglo-American Relations according to Graham Spry though at the moment was not of first significance but at a moment of tension it could so become. It seemed to remain a permanent factor that determined American feeling favourable or unfavourable towards Britain.\(^{42}\)


\(^{43}\) Ibid.
Lord Wedgewood (Labour) said the Cripps Mission had served to enlighten Americans, as to the real position of affairs in India.\(^4^4\)

Even the Chinese leader Chiang Kai Shek appealed to the Indian leaders to reconsider the formula, through which Britain was seeking the subcontinent's full cooperation against the Axis in return for Indian independence after the war.\(^4^5\) Nehru's reply to Chiang Kai Shek's appeal to the Indian's to participate was, "it was my ardent wish that India should have participated in this war". We have every sympathy with Russia and China, but it is beyond my power to help China.\(^4^6\)

Indian Nationalists were slowly and gradually getting rather sceptical of foreign influence, specially of United States. Mahatma Gandhi in his paper *Harijan* attacked the policy that had resulted in the arrival of United States troops in India. Gandhiji declared, "we have the promise of the never ending stream of soldiers from America and possibly from China. I must confess I

\(^4^4\) *The Hindustan Times*, May 1, 1942, p.4.


do not look upon this with equanimity. He reiterated "cannot a limitless number of soldiers be trained out of India's millions. Would not they make a good fighting material as any in the world. Then why foreigners? ...
"it amounts in the end to American influence if not American rule added to the British". In another interview with two American journalists Gandhiji once again spoke out against American troops, "It is not at India's request or with India's consent they are here. It is enough irritation, that we were not consulted before being dragged into this war ... To have brought the American forces is in my opinion to have made the stranglehold on us all the more tighter ... since America has become the predominant partner in the allied cause she is a partner also in Britain's guilt".

Colonel Louis Johnson tried to appease Gandhiji's fears of American designs on India. "America has no territorial designs on India". The sending of the Technical Mission to India was only a phase of the United Nations war effort and not part of any peace time plan. The purpose

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48 The Hindustan Times, June 20, 1942, p. 6.
of the mission was to gather data, furnish experts if so desired and give all other assistance to help India to enhance her war production". He also claimed "there is no goal for us and for you except victory. And in that victory may I say on behalf of the President that we propose to bring to the problem of eventual peace, no less than to the battle grounds our aroused conscience our highest resolve, our loftiest ideals". Johnson clarifying United States attitude declared "I will put this on record. There is no damned thing in all this fine country that we in America covet at all. You can look at our record in the Philippines and see how we handled Cuba. America is the greatest self contained nation in the world". In an All India Broadcast, Louis Johnson stated, "What we are fighting for now in a sense, is a larger Bill of Rights, a Bill of Rights for all peoples everywhere ... President Roosevelt has said, that all men everywhere should enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear. It is

49 The Statesman, April 23, 1942, p. 5.

50 The Times of India, Bombay, April 25, 1942, p.1.

51 Roosevelt Papers, File No.10, April 22, 1942, N.M.M.J., Delhi, p. 80.
in such a cause that the people of United States expect to find, in the people of India, their comrades and allies." He reiterated "the Vanguard of American troops is already in India. They are here both to aid in India's defence, and set up certain bases from which the enemy can be attacked and destroyed... They come here as your friends, your allies, your comrades, your brothers. They will know nothing of your political problems, your difficulties and your occasional differences of opinion". In fact special instructions had been issued to United States troops. The orders being (i) The sole purpose of the American forces in India is to prosecute the war of the United Nations against the Axis powers. In the prosecution of the war in that area, the primary aim of the Government of the United States is to aid China. (ii) American forces are not to indulge to the slightest degree in activities of any nature, unless India should be attacked by the Axis powers, in which event American troops would aid in defending India. (iii) American forces in India will exercise care to avoid the slightest participation in India's internal

52Roosevelt Papers, File No.10, April 24, 1942, N.M.M.L., Delhi, pp.49-55.
political problems or even the appearance of so doing. (iv) American forces will resort to defensive measures, only in the event that their own personal safety or that of other American citizens is endangered, or for the necessary protection of American military supplies and equipment.53

The Indian papers accepted Johnson's declaration. Editorial, comments of the Statesman supported Johnson's version. "His words are no empty flatteries and promises for India's immediate consumption. Behind his mission to India and his contacts with her people he sees another obligation, a self imposed obligation to work on his return to America, for a more perfect understanding between the two countries. The words of such men have great value."54 Even Nehru seemed to differ with M.K.Gandhi when he pointed out, that he did not think American interest in India was based on a desire to gain territory. According to Nehru the real American interest was in winning the war, and since India had become the major location of a potential offensive many Americans had come to the country.55

53 Roosevelt Papers, File No.10, August 12, 1942, N.M.M.L., Delhi, pp.184-186.
54 The Statesman, April 27, 1942, p.4.
N.R. Sarkar pointed out "American democratic traditions and her anxiety for the victory for democracy in this war are well known. Realising that India has also been drawn into the vortex of this struggle against Axis powers for the maintenance of democracy ... I am aware that sending out of the American Technical Mission had in the beginning given rise to misunderstanding among certain section of the public and business communities. Happily however, the explanations furnished by Louis Johnson and Dr. Henry Grady have dispelled such fears." Nehru in fact even appealed to the United Nations "to acknowledge the independence of India as a means of ending the bitterness that had developed after the failure of Cripps Mission. While Dr. Anup Singh belonging to the India League of America urged United States, China and Russia to help Great Britain and India to reopen negotiation and declared that a representative from each country be appointed, to look after military affairs in India "to elevate the suspicion that still exists".

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56 The Hindustan Times, May 27, 1942, p.7.
The Indian papers clamoured for United States support. The National Herald, on April 24, 1942, stated, "The time has come for Mr. Roosevelt to act and we suggest that he should act decisively. He should tell the British people to be done with, Churchill and Amery being the worst enemies of a vigorous common allied effort and as the worst opponents of a common allied victory". The Hindustan Times, April 24, 1942, in a less objectionable language pointed out "we suggested to Col. Johnson that without the hearty and enthusiastic cooperation of the people of the country, it will be impossible to defend the country against the menace which threatens it. If he agrees, then we feel it is his duty to tell the British Government in a language which they can understand that they must first secure the cooperation of the people of India, before thinking of the defence of India".  

However, Gandhi continued to carry on a tirade against the British and the United States. Gandhiji wrote in his journal Harijan, "the presence of the British in India is an invitation to Japan to invade India. Their

withdrawal would remove the bait ... United States and Britain lack the moral basis for waging war, they could gain it only by giving all Asiatic peoples political independence and racial equality". Asked about the possibility of visiting the United States Gandhiji said, "I have no faith that I could do anything good for India by going to America ... It is difficult to wean the golden calf from the worshippers of mammon". In a letter to President Roosevelt through Louis Fisher, Gandhiji clarified, "My personal position is clear. I hate all war if therefore, I could persuade my country men they would make a most effective and decisive contribution in favour of an honourable peace. But I know that all of us have not a living faith in non-violence. Under foreign rule, however, we can make no effective contribution of any kind in this war except as helots. If the allies think it necessary they may keep their troops at their own expense in India, not for keeping internal order but for preventing Japanese aggression and defending China. So far as India is concerned, we must become free even as America and Great Britain are".61

60 *Time, the Weekly News Magazine*, May 25, 1942, p. 32.

61 *Roosevelt Papers*, File No. 12, July 1, 1942, N.M.M.L., Delhi, pp.9-10.