Advent of 1941 saw the establishment of direct political ties with the United States. A quasi diplomatic American Mission was established in New Delhi and an Indian Agency General in Washington. The exchange of representatives was of historical importance. Till then India had merely commercial relations. Now for the first time political ties were to be formed. The functions of the Agent General were to advice the Embassy on Indian affairs and to deal with non-political questions in Indo-American relations. The United States Secretary of State perceived in this proposal a recognition by His Majesty's Government of the need for an effective representation, of the interest of the Government of India in the United States and the Government of United States of America in India. The need for closer official ties were felt, as India was assuming a position of increasing importance as a source essential to the implementation of co-ordinated


programmes, for United States National Defence. Sir Girja S. Bajpai was appointed as the First Agent General to the United States, with the status of a minister Plenipotentiary. While Thomas Wilson was appointed as the head of the U.S. Mission at Delhi. He was provided with an informal letter of introduction addressed by the President to the Viceroy.

United States official interest and involvement was completely felt, when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter in August 1941. The Atlantic Charter was modelled on Wilson's fourteen points and Roosevelt's Four Freedom's. United States stood for freedom of the suppressed nations, was amply borne by article 3 of the Charter which read "They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live, and they wish to see Sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

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For full Text of Atlantic Charter, See Appendix I.
The principles enunciated in the eight point declaration would hearten, enslaved nations wrote L.S. Rowe, Director General of the Pan-American Union to the President. "The Roosevelt Churchill pronouncement is a new Bill of Rights for small nations and for mankind", said a cable to the White House from a Federal Judge in Dallas. Democratic Congressman, David T. Terry of Arkansas voiced his conviction that thanks to Roosevelt's initiative, the United States would assume its rightful role in world affairs and contribute "to the establishment of peace and some measure of good life not only in our nation, but in all the world. Such sentiments were shared by millions of other Americans, who believed that the defeat of Nazism was of crucial importance, for the security of the United States and welfare of mankind." 6

Although the intellectual and political significance of the Atlantic Charter, as well as of its propaganda value was incalculable, Roosevelt and Churchill neither signed the joint declaration, nor made any specific plans to implement it. This failure was not accidental. 7 Churchill, 

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7 Loewenheim, Francis L. and others (edited), Roosevelt and Churchill: Secret Wartime Correspondence, New Delhi, 1975, p.54.
in an address to the House of Commons on September 9, 1941 specifically excluded India and Burma from the application of the Atlantic Charter. He said that Article 3 applied only to European Nations, under Nazi occupation and had no effect on British Policy as previously enunciated, relative to the development of constitutional Government in India, Burma and other parts of the Empire.  

Even a year later, Churchill remained wary of applying the charter to specific situations. "He wrote to President Roosevelt in August 1942, "We considered the wording of that famous document line by line together and I should not be able without mature consideration, to give it a wider interpretation. Its proposed application to Asia and Africa, require much thought."

The people of United States as well as the Government strongly disapproved of Churchill's September 9, 1941

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9 Loewenheim, Francis L & others (eds.), Roosevelt and Churchill: Secret Wartime Correspondence, p. 54.

Venkataramani, M.S. & Shrivastava, B.K., Quit India : The American Response to the 1942 Struggle, pp. 328-32 make it abundantly clear that Roosevelt had perhaps agreed with Churchill's view that India and other British colonial possessions in Asia and Africa had been excluded from the perview of the Charter.
statement. The New York Times stated that unless the statement was repudiated by President Roosevelt, it will be interpreted by the People of East as another instance of hypocrisy of the British Government of which the United States has become a party. The New York Times suggested to the Americans admiring Churchill to read a comment of a British Newspaper - The News Chronicle "In India the statement of Mr. Churchill is interpreted as a warning that the charter in its interpretation to India, is little more than a piece of rhetoric, and that what the British Government gladly concede to Yugoslavia, it will withhold from the jewel of the British Empire. Britain will have to revise her practice of racial imperialism in India now, by agreeing to grant the people of India their right of self determination. In another article criticizing Churchill's statement the New York Times, reiterated "Except to the Professional Britain among us India may seem far away, yet she is keyed into the war effort of which we are a part... No American isolationist can make it a matter of indifference. It is undoubtedly a part of the indivisible freedom for which Britain is fighting and to which the United States is committed".

States newspaper Chicago Sun pointed out that thought ought to be given to China's suggestion, that President Roosevelt be invited to mediate in India. This could be done only if Prime Minister Churchill desired mediation. Since India was to have full dominion status after the war, why should not the symbols of that change be furnished now.  

American writers spoke out against British imperialism. Walter Lippman declared, "The Western Nations must now do what hitherto they lacked the will and imagination to do, they must identify their cause with the freedom and the security of the peoples of the East putting away the 'Whiteman's burden' and purging themselves of the taint of an obsolete and obviously unworkable Whiteman's imperialism." Pearl Buck declared that she did not consider the declaration of Atlantic Charter as a statement of War aims, as Churchill had limited its application to Europe, while this was a global war. Nehru's book "The Unity of India" at this time was widely read by Americans. Mrs. John Gunther sent a telegram to the White House

12 Roosevelt Papers, File No. 10, April 4, 1942, Nehru Memorial Museum Library, Delhi, p. 57.
requesting the President to take cognizance of Nehru's words which read "We want independence and not dominion or any other status. Every thinking person knows, that the whole conception of dominion status belongs to past history. It has no future ... We want proof that this war is for freedom and democracy and to put an end to imperialism. No bargaining. No talk about unessentials and subsidiary matters. India wants to be considered and declared an independent nation, only on that basis can she discuss or talk." Gunther requested President Roosevelt to give an assurance of American support for Indian Independence. This would win the confidence of the vast peoples of India and Asia and swing them to support the war.\textsuperscript{14}

Five United States Congressmen, touring Britain declared, "A frank and unconditional declaration by Mr. Churchill assuring India definite dominion status after the war, will not only appease India but convince us in America that Britain is fighting for maintaining and spreading ideals of democracy. Congressman Moas declared, "Personally I regard that the Atlantic Charter is a mass of contradiction. It contains generous sentiments, but

\textsuperscript{14}Roosevelt Papers, File No. 9, February 21, 1942, pp.34-36.
what made me suspicious about it is the Charter's tone to maintain the existing order."^15

The United States Government's reaction to Churchill's interpretation of the Atlantic Charter was one of disapproval. United States did not wish to have an altercation with the British. Nevertheless on appropriate occasions, they stated to the public and to the British Government that the "Atlantic Charter applied to all peoples alike seeking independence in every part of the world."^16 United States Ambassador to United Kingdom Winant had spoken to Churchill just prior to his declaration of September 9, 1941. In his conversation, he had emphasized to Churchill that the proposed declaration, ran counter to the general public interpretation. He reiterated that it would simply intensify charges of imperialism and leave Great Britain in the position of "A do Nothing Policy" so far as India and Burma were concerned. Churchill, however, took the position that it was a matter of internal British politics.^17 President Roosevelt sent Ambassador Winnat in

^15The Bombay Chronicle, December 3, 1941, p.7.


London a telegram on February 25th, 1942 saying that the situation in India gave him some concern, particularly in view of the possible necessity of retiring slowly from Burma to India.  

However, the Under Secretary of State advised the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull against any intervention in the Indian problem. He pointed out, that status of India was an issue, that had been used against the British Government by the left wing organization in the country. He had not found the issue meaning much to the public opinion in the United States. He declared, "I also have the strong feeling in view of Mr. Churchill's wellknown and frequently published attitude, concerning the status of India, that he would inevitably feel, should this government intervene even in an informal manner suggested, that United States was taking advantage of Great Britain's present situation and her dependence upon this country, in order to try to force Great Britain to take an immediate step, which he personally has consistently opposed and to which the overwhelmingly majority of the British and Civil and Military authorities are likewise opposed."  

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Nevertheless, in a radio address of July 23rd, 1942, Cordell Hull, United States Secretary of State had India in mind, among other people when he said, "We have always believed-and we believe today, that all people without distinction of race, colour or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty are entitled to its enjoyment. We have always sought—and we seek today—to encourage and aid all who aspire to freedom, to establish their right to it by preparing themselves to assume its obligations. We have striven to meet squarely our own responsibility in this respect—in Cuba, in the Phillipines and wherever else it has developed upon us. It has been our purpose in the past and will remain our purpose in the future—to use measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all people, who by their acts show themselves worthy of it and ready for it."20

The British Government was quite perturbed by these statements. British Minister Sir Ronald Campbell wrote to Cordell Hull conveying from Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that any messages dealing with the interpretation of the Charter, should be carefully concerted and

20Ibid., p. 1484.
any reference to India or Burma in the message or any public statements by United States Government should be consistent with the Prime Minister's Statement of September 9, 1941. Cordell Hull nevertheless told the British Ambassador Lord Halifax, "According to my idea of the Charter's proper construction and practical application, it should be universally applied to all nations and peoples - whatsoever their condition and whatsoever shade of independence and freedom they might aspire ... British Empire would probably run into constant difficulties, if it should seek to have the Atlantic Charter applied in separate compartments." United States Vice-President Henry A. Wallace in a pamphlet entitled, "Our Job in the Pacific" asserted that Asia cannot permanently remain half free and subject. He added, "It is not to our advantage to perpetuate this division, but to see that an orderly process of transition takes place so that the areas of free Asia will grow and that of subject Asia continually diminish."

The Indians were not satisfied with the United States official stand. They wanted the United States to support India more openly. An article in the Modern Review remarked on Roosevelt's silence, "He either agrees with Churchill, or not agreeing with him shrinks from displeasing him. That shows that though he is the highest placed

21 Ibid., p. 1485.
functionary of the most wealthy state in the world, he lacks that real love of liberty for all mankind, that nobelity of mind, that spiritual greatness and that courage which have led the leader of China to give his message both to the people of India and to Great Britain". D.F. Karaka in an article in the Bombay Chronicle wrote, "Although Mr. Churchill has gone out of his way to tell us so soon after his Atlantic declaration, that the principles of the new world order are not to apply to us, it is significant that President Roosevelt had not given his version of what was intended in the declaration. After all, the declaration was made by two men on behalf of the people. And the "Americans have not yet told us whether they intended that the Charter should apply to us as well or not. We must bear this in mind and without wanting to hamper Britain in the present war in any way, we in India must not budge an inch, on the question of our independence which is distinct from the question of defence. Even those who may feel it expedient and necessary to help in a war against Nazism, must not give in on the question of our national independence. That is why every effort must be made to see, that America also hears our point of view."  


23 The Bombay Chronicle, October 4, 1941, p. 6.
Sir R.K. Shanmukhan Chetty, Head of the Indian Purchasing Mission to America, when asked about the attitude of America towards Indian aspirations remarked, "America is definitely in sympathy with India". I have no doubt that America would be on the side of India in implementing the Atlantic Charter, after the conclusion of the war. The Americans were the last people to entertain any idea of exploiting India for their own purpose."

While Sir Mohammed Zafrully Khan remarked, "American public opinion sought to make no distinction in the application of principles of the Atlantic Charter. Americans thought that the principles were and ought to be of universal application. He recalled his conservation with President Roosevelt and said that there had been no specific talk about the future of India though the President had expressed sympathy with Indian aspirations, namely the desire of India to be complete mistress of her house. Sir Zafrulla added, he had no doubt that the President had any reservations about the applicability of the Atlantic Charter to India.

The India League in London held the United States guilty with Britain in furthering "An imperialist war" and held that it was only aiding her "in the sacred name of preserving democracy in Europe." 24 In a letter to the

New York Times, Taraknath Das told the Americans the disasterous effect of ignoring India. He stated, "Ignoring India's claims for equality is the best means of promoting Japanese propaganda, that Britain is pursuing her policy of racial imperialism... discrimination against Asiatic's and is determined to keep India and Burma with more than 40,000,000 people out of the war." In a statement to the News Chronicle, London reproduced by the National Herald, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru described British attitude as "The greatest disruptive factor in India, in addition to being completely authoritarian, alien and oppressive. The only possible response to that is non co-operation with that Government, for nationalism is so far the strongest urge of the Indian people."

In an article in the Indian Review, entitled 'India and the Atlantic Charter', it was commented, "Mr. Churchill has atlast broken his studied silence about India. The speech will cause no surprise in this country which is pretty familiar with his strong Tory bias, specially with regard to India. Those who had hoped that the war which has made him so dynamic a chief at this crisis would find him equally great in his handling of the Indian problem, are

26 Reported in the The Tribune, December 21, 1941, p. 12.
disappointed and disillusioned. He is still the old Churchill for India. But to tell the world that the August offer is in tune with the spirit of Atlantic Charter is more than it can really swallow."

Sir Sikander Hyat in an interview to the press on October 1st, 1941 stated, "Churchill's recent statement has evoked considerable criticism and resentment throughout the country." He demanded a fresh statement from Churchill, bereft of all dubiety and fixing a time limit for Dominion Status. The Times of India endorsed Sir Sikander's statement and said, "It cannot be denied that it created a most unfortunate impression in India." V.D. Savarkar, President of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, sent a cable to the American and English Press, "It was well that Mr. Churchill was compelled to tear off the altruistic mask camouflaging Anglo-American War aims with his own hands and forestall President Roosevelt, by declaring that the war aims were to fight all aggression and to emancipate all countries, but India. Will President Roosevelt now dare to contradict Mr. Churchill's inter-

27 The Indian Review, October 1941, p. 620.

pretation or play second fiddle to Mr. Churchill's declaration by word or silence."^29

G.V. Deshmukh declared that it was the instinct of self preservation that induced the British Government to make the Atlantic declaration and said that after having declared that the Charter would not be applicable to Indians, the British Government should be ashamed to call them to give help in the war and send their men into the battle fields. Jamna Dass Mehta while feeling that there was an air of unreality about the whole debate strongly criticized Churchill's statement which he said threw them back to the declaration of August 30, 1940.30 Mohan Lal Saxena, exclaimed, "Mr. Churchill's brutally frank statement has only vindicated the Congress stand and has caused heart searching amongst ardent British supporters like Sir Sikander Hayat Khan".31 Asaf Ali, Member of the Congress Working Committee interviewed by the United Press on Churchill's announcement said, the British Premier pricked the bubble of the so called Atlantic Charter and put it beyond doubt that India had nothing to hope except a position of subordinate interdependence. Hollow phrases of free and equal partnership

^29 The Times of India, September 24, 1941, p.7.
^30 The Times of India, October 30, 1941, p.7.
^31 The Bombay Chronicle, October 11, 1941, p.6.
are contradicted by glaring facts. We have got our answer from Churchill, and naturally the step we took in 1939 remains unaffected. Referring to L.S. Amery, he said the Secretary of State only added insult to injury by his latest broadcast to America. Referring to the Atlantic Charter, Mohammed Ali Jinnah said, "Most of the declarations mean nothing. They have no value at all as for Muslim India, we have forged our own charter and that is Pakistan."

The fourteenth annual general meeting of the Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce held under M.L. Bahanukar, referring to the Atlantic Charter, remarked that at a time when England was involved in a life and death struggle with the Axis powers, it would have been in the fitness of things, if India was told that the Charter was meant for her as well and that the declaration of 1940 stood modified.

The Hindustan Times in an editorial remarked, "India does not matter may well describe Mr. Churchill's reaction to everything concerning this country."

The Council of State passed by ten votes to six, V.V. Kalikar's resolution expressing their deep discontent

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32 The Bombay Chronicle, October 4, 1941, p.6.
33 The Bombay Chronicle, November 5, 1941, p.8.
34 The Bombay Chronicle, November 22, 1941, p.7.
35 The Hindustan Times, January 3, 1942, p.4.
over the statement made by Churchill about the non-application of the Atlantic Charter to India. Kalikar said that the Congress Party was never under the illusion that the Charter would be applicable to India. But many others were. Churchill who had maintained a studied silence over the question of India ever since he became the Prime Minister, however, promptly corrected the impression that the charter could be applicable to India. In doing so, the Prime Minister had greatly prejudiced the war effort of this country and had weakened the stand taken by the protagonists of the war. M.N.Dalal supported the resolution. Sir Tej Bahadur vehemently condemned Churchill's statement and declared that if Britain was really fighting a battle of freedom for all countries, in which they wanted India's support, they could not deny the same freedom to countries over which they dominated. Sir A.P.Patro opposed the resolution. Sir Mohammed Yakub also opposed the resolution and declared that his own opinion was that democracy was not suitable to any part of the world. Sir Akbar Hydari, leader of the House announced that so far as the resolution was concerned, the government would remain neutral. Sir Akbar continued, "Churchill had not in any way disassociated India from the principles laid down in the Atlantic declaration, on the contrary, he had specially associated India with them."^36

^36 The Bombay Chronicle, November 19, 1941, p.8.
There was criticism of Churchill's policy even in certain British quarters. MacGovern, who championed the cause of India speaking on the Atlantic Charter, remarked, "It is to be applied to Nations that have been overrun by Hitler, while independent governments, which it proposes to give them is denied to territories that have been overrun in the past by Britain herself." Even the British Liberal Press was unhappy about the Indian situation. "The longer the war goes on" said the News Chronicle, "the more it becomes apparent that the situation in India presents not merely great opportunity but great potential dangers. How serious this situation may become is indicated by the attitude of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan."  

The Indians had lost faith in Prime Minister Churchill and were becoming apprehensive of United States support. The signing of the Washington Declaration on behalf of India by G.S. Bajpai was considered a big hoax. The Hindustan Times in an editorial entitled "The Washington Hoax" commented "Churchill has already told us that the Atlantic Charter whatever it might or might not say about the rights of all peoples to choose their own..."  

37 The Bombay Chronicle, November 29, 1941, p.6  
38 The Bombay Chronicle, October 10, 1941, p.6.
forms of government, does not apply to India and other
countries which have good fortune of being under
British domination. But why having categorically repudi­
ated the applicability of the Charter, Churchill should
have caught hold of Sir G.S. Bajpai to sign the Washington
declaration on behalf of India is inexplicable. That
President Roosevelt also should be a party to this hoax
is only another proof, that under the exigency created by
war, victory must take precedence over principles."39

Chiang Kai Shek requested the Indians to give
their unstinted support to the Atlantic Charter, he
declared, "I venture to suggest to my brethren, the people
of India, that at this most critical moment in the history
of civilization our two people should exert themselves to
the utmost in the cause of freedom for all mankind ...
Further should freedom be denied to either China or India,
there could be no real peace in the world."40 Chiang Kai
Shek appealed directly to Britain to give India freedom.
"I hope Britain without waiting for any demand on part of
the Indian people, will as speedily as possible give them
real political power, so that they will be in a position
to develop further, their spiritual and material strength.
The Indian people thus, would realize that their partici­
pation in the war was not merely to aid anti-aggression

39*The Hindustan Times*, January 16, 1942, p.4.
nations to secure victory, but also the turning point in their struggle for their own freedom." Chiang Kai Shek paid a personal visit to India in February 1942 with a view to swing India into the war against Japan, as the common enemy of all continental Asia. He held talks with Indian leaders like Nehru, Gandhi, Jinnah and Sapru. Nehru's response to the Chinese appeal was "We will very gladly help you but our hands are tied... the people of India can only function in any such cause under Indian control and through Indian agency." In an article for the News Chronicle, London, Nehru wrote "It is not enough to say that the war has to be won, we must win the objectives of the war and for this purpose the objectives must be clearly stated and acted upon in the present, in so far as possible. That has been the Congress position throughout and it remains so today... more particularly I should like to express solidarity with the people of China and the Soviet Union who represent many ideals that we value."

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43 The Hindustan Times, February 16, 1942, p. 1.
44 Private Papers of Jawaharlal Nehru, Serial No. 88, Part III, December 11, 1941, Nehru Memorial Museum Library, Delhi.
Gandhiji's response was similar. In a letter to Chiang Kai Shek, Gandhiji wrote that he favoured effective resistance to Japan and other Axis powers and all possible aid to China, if India received independence.\textsuperscript{45}

In a message to America, Nehru expressed his profound faith that the cause of freedom for the subjugated everywhere would commend itself to the people of United States. In the destruction and desolation that grips the world, he wrote, "The great free republic of the United States of America has a special responsibility to bear, for countless eyes from all over the world look up to it for leadership in the path of peace and freedom. That peace and freedom will come only when fascism and imperialism have ended and no nation or group dominates over another."\textsuperscript{46}

United States was aware that its involvement in the war was imminent. President Roosevelt in a proclamation declaring unlimited national emergency on May 27, 1941, expressed these sentiments when he said, "Whereas the succession of events makes plain that the objectives of the

\textsuperscript{45} The New York Times, June 21, 1942, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{46} Venkataramni, M.S. and Shrivastava, B.K., Quit India: The American Response to 1942 Struggle, p. 6.
Axis belligerents in such a war are not confined to those avowed at its commencement, but include the overthrow throughout the world of the existing democratic order and world-wide domination of peoples and economies through the destruction of all resistance on land, sea and in the air and whereas indifference on the part of United States, to the increasing menace would be perilous, and common prudence required that for the security of the nation and of this hemisphere, we should pass from peace-time authorization of military strength, to such bases as will enable us to cope instantly and decisively. 47

When Japan attacked Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, the United States entered the Second World War. President Roosevelt declared, "We must begin the great task before us by abandoning once and for all the allusion that "We can ever again isolate ourselves" the President continued, "The sudden criminal attack by the Japanese and the Pacific provide the climax to a decade of international immorality... There is no such thing as security for any nation or any individual in a world ruled by principles of gangsterism... The goal we see is far above and beyond the early field of battle. When we resort to force as now we must, we are determined that this force

47 The Indian Review, June 1941, p. 344.
shall be directed towards the ultimate good as well as against the immediate evil, we Americans are not destroyers, we are builders."

United States could no longer keep itself aloof from the Indian problem, India being of immense strategic value. Roosevelt in a personal appeal to Churchill suggested a way to solve the Indian problem. In a letter to Churchill he wrote, "I have given much thought to the problem of India. As you can well realize, I have felt much diffidence in making any suggestions, and it is a subject which, of course, all of you good people know far more about than I do. I have tried to approach the problem from the point of view of history and with a hope that the injection of a new thought to be used in India might be of assistance to you. That is why I go back to the inception of the Government of United States. During the Revolution, from 1775 to 1783, the British Colonies set themselves up as Thirteen States, each one under a different form of Government, although each one assumed individual sovereignty. While the war lasted there was great confusion between these separate sovereignties, and the only two connecting links were the continental Congress (a body of ill-defined powers and large inefficiencies) and second the continental army which was rather badly maintained by the Thirteen States. In 1783, at the end of the war, it was clear that the new responsibilities of the thirteen sovereignties could not be welded into
a Federal Union, because the experiment was still in the making and any effort to arrive at a final framework would have come to naught.

Therefore, the thirteen sovereignties joined in the Articles of Confederation, an obvious stop-gap Government, to remain in effect only until such time as experience and trial and error could bring about a permanent union. The thirteen sovereignties, from 1783 to 1789, proved, through lack of a Federal power, that they would soon fly apart into separate nations. In 1787, a Constitutional Convention was held with only twenty-five or thirty active participants, representing all of the States. They met, not as a Parliament, but as a small group of sincere patriots, with the sole objective of establishing a Federal Government. The discussion was recorded but the meetings were not held before an audience. The present Constitution of the United States resulted and soon received the assent of two-thirds of the States. It is merely a thought of mine to suggest the setting up of what might be called a temporary Government in India, headed by a small representative group, covering different castes, occupations, religions and geographies - this group to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government. It would, of course, represent existing Governments of the British Provinces and would also represent the Council of Princes.
But my principle thought is that it would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent government for the whole country - this consideration to be extended over a period of five or six years or atleast until a year after the end of the war.

I suppose that this Central Temporary Governing Group, speaking for the new Dominion, would have certain Executive and Administrative powers over public services, such as Finance, Railways, Telegraphs and other things which we call public services.

Perhaps the analogy of some such method to the travails and problems of the United States from 1783 to 1789 might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire and to stress the danger of Japanese domination, together with the advantage of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.

Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

I hope, that whatever you do the move will be made from London and that there should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion.
For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, though I do want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business, except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making."

Some of the British statesmen and policy makers felt that a new outlook and policy was essential. In a memorandum to the War Cabinet, the Lord Privy Seal declared that India has been profoundly effected by the changed relationship between Europeans and Asiatics, which began with the defeat of Russia by Japan at the beginning of the century. The hitherto axiomatic acceptance of the innate superiority of the Europeans over the Asiatic sustained a severe blow. The fact that Britain was driven to a recognition of China as an equal, made the Indian ask, "Why he too cannot be master in his own house." Similarly the success against the Axis of a Semi-Oriental power, The Russians lent weight to the hypothesis that the East was not asserting itself against the long dominance of the West. The Secretary of the State pointed out, that the immediate storm could be weathered by doing nothing but what of subsequent storms? Such a hand to mouth policy is

not statesmanlike. He felt that now was the time for an act of statesmanship. "To mark time is to lose India." 49

The Government, however, continued the hard line. Churchill voiced his views in a letter to Clement Attlee. I hope, my colleagues will realise the danger of raising constitutional issues, still more of making constitutional changes in India, at a moment when the enemy is upon the frontier... I do not think you will have any trouble with American opinion. 50 The Duke of Devonshire speaking for the Government as parliamentary under Secretary for Indians threw cold water on appeals made in the House of Lords for India, to be freed before her opposition to the British rule proved helpful to the approaching enemy. He reiterated that the Indians must settle their communal difficulties before they could safely receive self rule. 51

However, with the growing Chinese and United States pressure as well as the advancing Japanese armies towards India, Britain had no alternative but to do something about India. As a preliminary conciliatory measure,


this war is fought for a new democratic order." The British Government informed the United States Government of the basis of negotiation for a solution of the Indian problem. 54

Indians were invited to join the Imperial War Cabinet and Pacific War Council. Sir S. Cripps told parliament, "A debate will be possible very shortly upon the basis of a Government decision in the matter." Many Britains felt that "Shortly" was much to far away for either action or debate on India. Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador told United States "We are anxious and prepared to do our part, but India first must conquer the fundamental difficulty that of unification between the Hindu and Muslim parties." Ultimately the British Government announced its decision of sending Sir S. Cripps to India. His task being to sell a British plan for the future of India. Some of the members were worried whether a form of settlement had not been evolved too late, and the Government had not tarried too long, in sending a negotiator now to urge adoption of a policy that might have been commended to India before the war began. In his statement Churchill spoke of the responsibility of his Government, "to shield the people of India from the perils which beset them." Further more it will strengthen the hands and hearts of those, who believe that

53 Ibid.