CHAPTER IV
DALAVOYS’ RELATIONS WITH TAMIL NADU (1704 – 1761)

In the previous two chapters we discussed political relations of Mysore with Tamil Nadu mostly in the 17th century. In the 18th century the political relations of Mysore with Tamil Nadu took not only an interesting turn, but also got more complex than in the previous century. It was a century of general political disintegration and the regrouping of political powers in the contest for supremacy in India. In the history of Mysore the 18th century was a landmark, our study is up to 1761. But the pattern of politics in Mysore that was developed up to 1761 became a model for political leaders from 1761 to 1799. The natural extension of Mysore towards Tamil Nadu in the 18th century resulted in internal turmoil, external aggression and political disappointment to the policy makers of Mysore.

The reign of Krishnaraja Wodeyar II witnessed the rise of Dalavoy and Sarvadikari in the politics of Mysore. It was because of the weak rule of Monarch, Kalale Nanjarajiah and Devarajaiah occupied supreme positions in Mysore politics, relegating Krishnaraja Wodeyar to the background. Kalale Nanjarajaiah in particular mustered all his time, energy, money and talent for taking possession of Madura and Tirichinapally. In that adventure we see the emergence of Hyder Ali, a humble foot-soldier in the beginning, rose to the power of king makers in Mysore by 1761. Without Nanjarajaiah’s Trichinapally adventure, it was doubtful whether Hyder Ali would succeed Nanjarajaiah as Sarvadikari in Mysore politics. The battle of Devanahalli was
the beginning of the rising star of Hyder Ali. This historic battle was a by-product of Mysore’s expansion towards Tamil Nadu. It was in that battle he came to the notice of his future political mentor namely Nanjarajaiah. It was again he participated in Tirichinapally adventure with Nanjarajiah and got the appointment as Fauzadar of Dindigal. In 1755, he amassed wealth and recruited his own private army. It became the stepping stone for his further progress and fall of Nanjarajiah. Besides 18th century was significant for disintegration of Mughal empire. The rise of the Nizam in the State of Hyderabad, the emergence of the Nawab State of Arcot, and above all the rising power of the Marathas, and the entry of commercialized companies of English and French entering into politics of Tamil Nadu. Mysore had to realize its ambition on Tamil Nadu in that complex struggle for power. In this chapter, we may describe this situation in the context of Mysore.

The political fortunes of Mysore during the early eighteenth century was very much linked with the events in Tamil Nadu. During that period Carnatic became the warring ground for the major powers in Tamil Nadu. Like the Marathas, the Nizam of Hyderabad and others, the kingdom of Madura was the focal point. The weak rule of Minakshi and the internal dissensions prevailing in that kingdom offered much temptation to the contending parties to enter and try their luck for territorial acquisition in Tamil Nadu. A civil war broke out in Madura. Minakshi was unable to control this situation. She therefore appealed to Dost Khan and Nawab of Arcot for help. The Nawab soon sent his army under Chanda Sahib for the restoration of law and order in Madura. He also had the aim to annex that province to
Arcot. On the plea of restoring order in the land Chanda Sahib captured Minakshi and usurped all her powers. Unable to bear this disgrace Minakshi took poison and died. Her death signalized the extinction of the Nayak rule in Madura. Dost khan appointed Chanda Sahib in charge of Tirichinapally and returned to Arcot. In that war, Mysore assisted Minakshi against the Nawab of Arcot in order to obviate the designs of Dost khan on Tirichinapally.¹

The part played by Mysore in the war enraged Ali Dost khan the Nawab of Arcot. The Nawab therefore determined to punish the Raja of Mysore for his interference in the affairs of the kingdom of Madura. He was also attracted by the riches of Mysore. Ali Dost khan planned an invasion of Mysore.² In August 1736, he sent his army against Mysore under his generals Khasim khan and Murad khan. The army passed through Kolar, Chikkaballapur, Hosakote and Bangalore. It encamped at the village near Channapatna. A severe conflict ensued between the two armies. In that war Dalavoy Devarajaiya of Mysore defeated the army in 1737. He forced the Nawab to go back.³ This defeat was a great blow to the prestige of Dost Khan.

Shortly after he took charge of the administration of Tirichinapally, Chanda Sahib planned an invasion of Tanjore.⁴ When Pratapsingh, the Nayak of Tanjore heard about Chanda Sahib’s design on Tanjore he appealed to his master Sahu for help. As soon as the appeal reached Sahu, he sent an army under Raghunji Bhonsle and Fateh Singh to the Carnatic for
the relief of Tanjore. The Maratha army started early in 1740. On his way, Raghoji entered Mysore and invaded the fort of Srirangapattana. The main object of Raghuji in undertaking the expedition to Mysore was to plunder. In the meanwhile, Sarvadhikari Nanjarajaiya died in 1739 and in his place Devarajaiya appointed his brother Karachuri Nanjarajaiya. The authority of the kingdom was in the hands of Dalavoy Devarajaiya never wanted to risk a war with the Marathas. He therefore made peace with Raghuji. Raghuji was at that time on his way to Tirichinapally to reduce Chanda Sahib. Devarajaiya wanted to use the opportunity for his own advantage. He also wanted to put an end to the authority of Chanda Sahib at Tirichinapally. Devaraja made peace with Raghuji by agreeing to help him in his war with Chanda Sahib. He offered Raghuji fifty lakh rupees and urged him to re-establish the ancient family of the Nayaks at Madura by removing Chanda Sahib. The Raja of Mysore was anxious to get Chanda Sahib removed at Tirichinapally because Devarajaiya was also worried that Chanda Sahib would at any time move on Mysore and disturb peace in the region. It was also the desire of the Wodeyars of Mysore from the time of Chikkadevaraja Wodeyar to annex Tirichinapally to Mysore. Tirichinapally acted as the key to the Carnatic region "Under the pretext of restoring the Nayak rule in Tirichinapally the Mysore Raja had in view the incorporation of Tirichinapally in the kingdom of Mysore. On concluding the treaty with Mysore the Maratha's army marched on Tirichinapally and besieged the fort. A bloody battle was fought at that place. In the battle the Marathas defeated Chanda Sahib and captured him alive and took him to Satara as a prisoner.
Tiruchinapally fell into the Marathas who hoisted their banner in that place in March 1741.

The fall of Tiruchinapally complicated the matters in the Carnatic. It was because the Marathas could not satisfy Devarajaiya. They avoided his request to transfer Tiruchinapally to Mysore, because there were several aspirants for Tiruchinapally at that time. Like the Nayaks of Madura and Tanjore besides Devarajaiya. It was not easy for the Marathas to give Tiruchinapally to any one of those claimants. And such a move would satisfy only one party and disappoint the other claimants. This would lead to much discontentment and unrest in the area. Raghuji therefore avoided all the claimants and temporarily appointed Murari Rao Ghorpade as the Governor of Tiruchinapally "till the Souraj should give further orders.\(^9\)

The Nizam who was busy in the affairs at Delhi and had just come to the Deccan. He was engaged to see the Maratha occupation of Tiruchinapally. He planned an invasion of Carnatic to reestablish his authority in that region. Devarajaiya who had failed to take Tiruchinapally with the help of Raghuji now joined the Nizam to wrest the province from the Marathas. According to a letter of 27 January 1743 Devarajaiya was prepared to offer to the Nizam one crore rupees if the latter would place the Raja of Mysore in charge of Tiruchinapally.\(^10\)

The Nizam was already contemplating an invasion of the Carnatic to curb the power of the Marathas in the region. Devarajaiya’s treaty with him hastened his march. The Nizam proceeded towards Tiruchinapally with his
army in February 1743. Murari Rao was forced to submit. The Nizam wrested Tirichinapally from the Marathas in August 1743. Dalavoy Devarajaiya had to pay one crore rupees to the Nizam according to the agreement of Tirichinapally had to be ceded to Mysore. But the Dalavoy could not pay the sum as the Mysore treasury was empty because of the heavy Compensation of fifty Lakh rupees paid by Mysore to Raghuji in 1740. The Nizam therefore placed Tirichinapally in charge of Nawab Anwar-ud-din of Arcot in October 1743. Devarajaiya was again disappointed because his desire to take Tirichinapally was not fulfilled. Mysore only proved its incapability of taking Tirichinapally either by force or through tact and diplomacy. Dalavoy Devarajaiya had to waste enormous amount on that issue, without accomplishing anything. If Chikkadevaraja Wodeyar formerly tried to take Tirichinapally to Mysore by his valor, Devarajaiya attempted to acquire the province by paying heavy sum as contribution to the Marathas and the Nizam. But he was unsuccessful in acquiring Tirichinapally.

The loss of Tirichinapally was a great blow to the Maratha power in the Carnatic. Balaji Baji Rao, the Peshwa wanted the Maratha power in the Carnatic. Balaji Baji Rao the Peshwa wanted to retrieve the loss. He therefore sent an army under Babu Nayak a Maratha Sardar to the Carnatic in order to wrest Tirichinapally back from the Nizam. Tirichinapally became a bone of contention between the Marathas and the Nizam. When the Nizam, came to know that Babu Nayak had started on his Carnatic expedition, he sent his army under Anwar-ud-din of Arcot to check the Maratha advance.
Morasunadu was a strategic place connecting Kolar, Chittur and Carnatic region in Tamil Nadu. It became a source of conflict between Mysore and Marathas. Why did the Marathas march on Morasunadu? The Marathas possibly were trying to reestablish their authority round about Bangalore so as to secure a base for their military operations in the Carnatic region, where they had to fight against the Nizam. The Marathas had lost to Chikkadevaraja Wodeyar many of their strongholds in the Morasunadu areas like Bangalore, Doddaballapur, Hosakote and so on. Those places acted as links between Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. The links were cut off after those places fell to Mysore. It was only in the Morasunadu region round about Kolar that the Marathas still exercised some influence. The local Morasu chieftains who were hostile to Mysore became strong allies of the Marathas. The Marathas possibly wanted to restore their authority in the region with the help of Morasu Palegars. Hence Babu Nayak advanced on Morasunadu. He captured the forts of Begur and Yeliyur. Babu Nayak instigated the Morasu chief Range Gowda of Doddaballapur to revolt against Mysore. Doddaballapur had been added to Mysore by Kantirava Narasaraja Wodeyar II in 1711. Since then, it was a dependency of Mysore. Range Gowda was a feudatory of Mysore and he now threw off his allegiance to Mysore and joined the Marathas. With the help of the Marathas, he occupied Devanahalli after putting to rout Narayana Gowda, the Palegar of that principality. Having set up Range Gowda against Mysore and creating a great confusion in Morasunadu, Babu Nayak planned an attack on Srirangapattana.
Nanjarajaiah succeeded his brother Devarajaiah as Dalavoy of the Mysore army in 1746. He soon appealed to Nawab Anwar-ud-din of Arcot for help. The Nawab soon sent an army which consisted of the forces of his vassals in the Carnatic like Murari Rao Ghorpade of Gooti, Dilawar Khan of Sira and offered to help Nanjaraja of Mysore. The Mysore army led by Dalavoy Nanjarajaiah left Srirangapattana early in 1746. At Bangalore the army was reinforced by a detachment under Shabas Sahib and his brother Hyder Ali Khan, who was serving under Katti Gopal Raj Urs at Bangalore.

The Mysore army siezed the fort of Devanahalli in August 1746. Range Gowda had the Maratha army, and it was led by Babu Nayak. The Mysore army was supported by Nawab Anwaruddin of Arcot and his feudatories. A battle was fought at Devanahalli. Nanjaraja won a brilliant victory in April 1744. Range Gowda was captured alive on the battlefield. Devanahalli fell to Mysore. Nanjarajaiah returned in triumph to Srirangapattana. Devanahalli proved to be the first step in Hyder Ali's rise to power. The campaign first brought Hyder to the light of history. Hyder participated in this campaign as an ordinary soldier under his brother Shabas. His performance in the battlefield attracted the attention of Nanjaraja. He made him the head of a small body of troops in recognition of his service in the battles. Soon Hyder won the esteem of Nanjaraja and rose to greater heights in Mysore. And by his own valor he became more and more powerful in the politics of the kingdom. Nanjarajaiah left Srirangapattana early in 1746. At Bangalore the army was reinforced by a detachment under Shabas Sahib and his brother Hyder Ali Khan. The Mysore army seized the fort of Devanahalli in August.
1746. Range Gowda had the support of the Maratha army. He was led by Babu Nayak. The Mysore army was supported by Nawab Anwar-ud-din of Arcot and his feudatories. A battle was fought at Devanahalli. Nanjaraja won a brilliant victory in April 1747. Range Gowda was captured alive on the battlefield. Devanahalli fell to Mysore and Nanjarajaih returned in triumph to Srirangapattana.

Aurangzib died in 1707. The Nizam claimed overlordship over the south as the Mughals' agent in or about 1713. Kumr-ud-din Chin-Killich-Khan was nominated Nizam-ud-mulk with a nominal control over the Mughal possessions in Southern India. His deputies at Arcot claimed through his alleged right while the Mughals direct representative claimed through his alleged right overlordship. But the fact was that the South was never conquered either by the Mughals or the Nizams. In 1748, a disputed succession to the Nawabship of Arcot in Tamil Nadu arose. The fight was between the rival claimants. Their objective was the establishment of the right to possession over Tamil Nadu. They could not claim by virtue of any conquest or effectively occupy in a military sense and collect its revenue. The English and the French had till then been but traders and had not put forth any pretensions to territory and had no military forces worth the name. They began to interfere in the affairs of the local powers.

Mysore had her own interests in the struggle centering round the restoration of Hindu rule in Madura and Tirichinapally. Tirichinapally became the main point of Southern expansion. Mysore as early as 1642 became the
pivotal point of Mysore in political relations throughout the greater part of the latter half of the seventeenth century, a position which was keenly contested from time to time. And Tirchinapally, after its siege by the Nizam and its evacuation by Murari Rao in 1743, was included within the immediate Jurisdiction of Nawab Anwar-ud-din of Arcot in 1744.

Tirchinapally as the Southern-most limit of expansion of the kingdom of Mysore tended in an increasing measure to engage the attention of Dalavoy Devarajaiya and his brother Karachuri Nanjarajaiya especially after the final disappearance of Bangaru Tirumala (of the Nayak family of Madura) from the arena of South Indian politics (1744). Meanwhile the Marathas were alarmed by Murari Rao's evacuation of Tirchinapally (August 1743) towards the close of 1744. Accordingly, the Nizam desired Nawab Anwar-ud-din of the Arcot to put up a stout opposition to the Marathas with the help of all the Karnataka chiefs and allies. In December 1744, Anwar-ud-din marched, against Babu Nayak at the head of 65,000 horses being joined also by his 3rd son Muhammad Ali from Hyderabad. Before commencing hostilities, Anwar-ud-din attempted to pacify the Marathas by offering them a sum of money but they were found to demand Tirchinapally.

The position had worsened during the period of 60 years that had elapsed since the death of Chikkadeva. Muslim control of the South had been tightened by the creation of two Nawabships-Sira and Arcot in place of one. The Marathas had established themselves as a power at Tanjore. The Nizam had become independent and claimed control over the South.
Foreign nations like the English and French had shown no inclination to take sides between the contending parties. All things pointed to the continuance of the prevailing conflict. Nanjaraja saw that there was no hope for the South so long as those conditions lasted. His conviction was that a final attempt at the capture of Tirichinapally would be the key to the Southern supremacy, which was a dire necessity. He saw that there was no other way to avoid the subjection of the South to the foreigner. The early terrors inspired by the Muslim name had died ages ago. The Muslim had been fought repeatedly and defeated. Those who remembered the things came to believe not only in the justice of their cause but also in the possibility of the success of a well-organized campaign against those who were to wrest the power from its rightful owners. It seemed out of the question that South India could be subjected to foreign supremacy while there was yet a chance to secure its independence.

**Dalavoy Nanjarajiah in Tirichinapally Affairs (1751-55)**

The course of events in South India during 1748-1751 sketched above appears to have enabled the Dalavoy brothers as early as May 1751 to concentrate their attention on the south of Mysore and to station a detachment of 5,000 horse and 10,000 foot at Dindigal (an earlier acquisition of the kingdom) with a view to safeguarding her southern frontier and if possible to advance on Tirichinapally as circumstances might require the acquisition of Tirichinapally as the aim of Mysore. It dominated as much the military as diplomatic policy of Nanjarajaiya and his brother.
Nanjarajaiya tried to promise aid to both in turn and all the while his eye was on Tirichinapally and how to get hold of it for Mysore. Tirichinapally was the key to the Tamil Nadu and he had a view that it should be gained, whatever may happen on its possession depended in his view the supremacy of Mysore over the South of India. Almost simultaneously it became the keynote of Dupleix's policy to enlist the support of the rulers of Mysore and Tanjore and the seventy-two palegars of the Tirichinapally country on the side of Chanda Sahib. About July 1751, Mysore responded to Dupleix's invitation by sending Vakil Gopal Das and Narasinga Das to the Governor of Pondicherry. Those activities attracted the attention of the English at Madras whose Governor Thomas Saunders on August 23 wrote to the king of Mysore persuading him to join the side of Muhammad Ali against Chanda Sahib and cautioning him against the motives of the French in regard to Mysore. Meanwhile Muhammad Ali hard pressed by Chanda Sahib at Tirichinapally had sent his Vakil Seshagiripant to the court of Srirangapattana and entered into an agreement (Kararu) with the authorities there to cede the fort and country of Tirichinapally to Mysore as the price of her assistance to him in raising the siege of the place (Tirichinapally). In part execution of that agreement, a detachment of Mysore horse and foot was to proceed to Muhammad Ali's immediate relief early in September 1751. While the English continued to press Mysore to support the claims of Mohammad Ali to the Nawabship of Arcot. By September 1751, the expected detachment under the command of Virrannaraj and Barakki Venkata Rao marching from Dindigal, arrived within 30 kms. of
Tirichinapally. Finally he reached Karur on the 14th. By the 24th, Mysore had further provided Muhammad Ali with financial help to the extent of Rs. 80,000, and on the 29th Karachuri Nanjarajaiya set out with the main army from Srirangapattana after subsiding, and settling matters with Murari Rao of Gooty who was to join him with 5,000 horse at Tirichinapally. About the middle of October 1751, Nanjarajaiya reached Srirangam, where for nearly two months, he awaited the arrival of Murari Rao. From where he exchanged friendly letters with the Governor of Madras, assuring him of his support to Muhammad Ali. Meanwhile, Muhammad Ali was eagerly expecting further supplies in men and money from Mysore. And Chanda Sahib, having crossed the Cauvery and the Coleroon, had encamped round the fort of Tirichinapally and was on bad terms with Mysore, menacing her safety. At the same time, Dupleix had been alarmed by recent developments. In September 1751 letters of Englishmen from Tirichinapally to Fort St. David about the non-arrival of the Mysore army had been intercepted at Pondicherry. Dupleix criticized the action of Mysore in joining Muhammad Ali, threatening to invade her and seize her fortresses if she assumed the offensive against the French or helped Muhammad Ali. But the Mysorean Vakil Narasingadas at Pondicherry had been directed to declare that no help would be sent from Mysore to Muhammad Ali and that the troops (of Mysore) had marched only as a measure of precaution. Further in November 1751, Muhammad Ali and the English were becoming impatient at the delay in the arrival of the allied troops (of Tanjore, Mysore and Murari Rao) to the relief of Tirichinapally. Nanjarajaiya, obviously to
gain time and be on the safe side, offered Chanda Sahib and the French promises of his assistance. He proposed through his Vakil an agreement with Chanda Sahib. The terms of the agreement were 1) both the parties were to remain mutual friends 2) that part of the Tirichinapally country which had remained long in the possession of Mysore was not to be interfered with 3) the Palegars who had joined Mysore were not to be molested 4) for the maintenance of 2,000 horse and 5,000 foot (of Mysore) who were to remain constantly with Chanda Sahib. The latter was to assign lands adjoining the Mysore territory yielding rupees three lakhs annually. Chanda Sahib saw that Nanjarajaiya was a stronger party. He consented to those terms. He promised not to molest any Palegar except of Toreyur (Turaiyar). He assigned Sondikoppam and certain countries seized by Tondaman in satisfaction of the last clause. Dupleix not only approved of that negotiation but also as desired by Chanda Sahib, directed a letter to be written to Nanjarajaiya to the effect that he would fulfill Chanda Sahib's agreement.

During the Mysorean struggle for Tirichinapally (1752-1755) Hyder made a name for himself as a loyal servant of Nanjarajaiya against Muhammad Ali's treachery. In July 1752, he even suggested to him the capture of the Nawab. In January 1753, he with Hari Singh his military rival led the Mysore horse and charged the enemy at Srirangam terminating the skirmish by the seizure of some firelocks. Again in April 1755, he tactfully put down a rising of the Mysore troops at Srirangam promising to satisfy them with half their dues within three days. So powerful indeed was the influence of his personality over the military that they soon recognized him
as their leader went over to him and prepared to march back to Srirangapattana as if nothing had happened.

In June 1755, Nanjarajaiya on his way to Mysore dismissed some of his forces and placed the rest under Hyder (now Hyder Ali Khan Bahadur) appointing him Faujdar of Dindigal and assigning to him places below the ghats. (viz., Satyamangalam, Erode and Sankhagiri) yielding 300,000 Gopali varahas. During 1755-1757 Hyder was active in Dindigal subduing Ammi Nayaka, Appi Nayaka and other Palegars of Palani (palni) Virupakshi and Millemirangi winning the goodwill of the local populace by presents and benevolences(nazarana) accumulating funds to the extent of rupees two lakh. Securing orders for his measures from vakil Khande Rao at Srirangapattana and equipping himself with resources in men and materials.

During the last phase of Chanda Sahib’s contest for the possession of Tirichinapally (February-June 1752) the Mysoreans and Murari Rao distinguished themselves as allies of Muhammad Ali and the English. In particular they actively assisted in captain Clive’s blockade of law in Srirangam (April-June). There was Clive’s Attack on Autevil at Valikondapuram (June). They were on the whole of considerable service to their allies in the course of events leading to the surrender of Law and Chanda Sahib at Srirangam(June) 1752 A.D.

After the disaster at Tiruchinapalli Nanjarajiah returned to Srirangapattana. Hyder Ali who was powerful asked the Dalavoy to retire. He offered one the five places to go and settle namely Katte-malalavadi,
Piryapatna, Konanur, Bettadapura and Arkalgud yielding only a lakh of Varahas. Nanjarajaiya was sent to Konanur and Hyderali returned to Srirangapattana after placing guards over the Mysore fort.

That was an end of the Dalavoy regime in Mysore. Nanjarajaiya accompanied by Barakki Srinivasa Rao (who had remained with him in Mysore since June 1759) quietly proceeded to Konanur where he settled himself with his family and spent the rest of his life.

**Estimate of Nanjarajiah’s Role in Tirichinapally**

After the disaster of Tirichinapally, there was no more political liberty in South India. The issue between Nanjaraja and Muhammad Ali was really a conflict between free Southern India and fettered Southern India with its own culture and civilization and a Southern India under the control of foreigners.

Nanjaraja in his efforts to save the South exhausted himself and Mysore of its resources. It would be an ideal to speculate on what might have been, had he succeeded in his attempt, how long would such success have been kept up by him or by those who followed him? How far would it have changed the current of history? Who can venture to answer questions of this nature? But it is impossible despite all his faults and deficiencies to withhold from Nanjaraja our admiration for striking a final blow for the political independence of the South, while the attempt lasted he was the hero of the South. All eyes had turned to him for driving the foreigner out of the land.
There can be no question that popular goodwill was on his side in the attempt. He had not only persuaded himself of the need for such a venture but had also persuaded Murari Rao for the movement to join him though the latter proved a traitor. Later and all the forces from Mysore to Tirichinapally had joined him. That is an achievement that despite the failure that overtook him stands to his credit and to the credit of the people of South India. Nanjarajaiya's defeat at Tirichinapally had to be deplored because it opened the way to the South passing under the sway of the foreigner who eventually had himself to make way for another stronger than himself. What the success of Muhammad Ali meant was not seen in 1755 when Nanjarajaiya turned his back from Tirichinapally. But in 1756, when the English won at Plassey and laid the foundation for their rule not only in Bengal but all over India. From every point of view, from that of the victor and vanquished the success of Muhammad Ali at Tirichinapally had to be characterized as a dishonest victory.

There is enough in contemporary records to prove that if it was not obtained exactly by open fraud and violence to truth. It was made possible by recourse to prevarication and rank dissimulation, which deceived nobody except those who indulged in it. So far as Nanjarajaiya was concerned it must be frankly confessed that even if the ultimate issue of his fight for Tirichinapally was known to him beforehand if all the South had known what it must be, even then it had to be admitted that Mysore could not have turned from the course she followed. She was to take account of her then position South of her name and fame of what Chikkadeva had done of what
Vijayanagara her predecessor had done for ages and of what the future had in store for her and others in the South. It is not possible to adjudge that Nanjaraja was wrong in choosing to risk country’s wealth, his name, his fame, his all for the freedom and safety of all in the south of India. That should be the final verdict of history on him. There can be no doubt whatever enough has been said to show what the struggle for Tirichinapally really meant.

It was in fact the last effort put forward by the Hindu Kingdom of Mysore as the true representative of imperial Vijayanagara for the political independence of the South. With the defeat of Nanjaraja and his departure to Mysore that attempt may be taken to have received its practical death-blows. Though Hyder Ali as we have seen adopted the policy of expansion in the South initiated by Nanjaraja and his predecessors and though he prosecuted their aims and objectives, he might perhaps be taken to have been moved by other impulses as well. He might even have prosecuted the old aims and objectives purely from the point of view of an adventurer or even for the sole purpose of maintaining his own personnel supremacy undisputed. Whatever the motive might be he did prosecute the aims and objectives of Nanjaraja, we have shown the credit of, Nanjaraj. There were reasons to believe that the objectives of Nanjarajaiah and those of Hyder in their initial stages at least had been misunderstood by writers on the history of the period we are examining. It is therefore necessary to pause a little and clear that tangled web they have woven around themselves. Mysore had an inviolable claim to Tirichinapally, a claim which could not be set aside. Up
to 1736, when the rule over the South was undisputably Hindu in Character.\textsuperscript{36} Tirichinapally formed part of the Nayaka kingdom of Madura. It was the chief stronghold of that kingdom in Tirumala Nayak’s time (1623-1659) and it was in its hands until the death of queen Minakshi in whose reign it was first occupied on her behalf by Chanda Sahib in 1734 and finally on his own in 1736.

With all ambition and love of power, it is indeed to the credit of the Dalavoy brothers that they were able to divert their attention from the immediate preoccupations of the hour and devote themselves whole heartedly to the solution of broader questions of policy. During the early years of their reign (1734-1751) they not only kept a steady eye on the Westward and Southward expansion of Mysore (up to Malabar and Tirichinapally) but also took a keen interest. There were also serious defects in the character of Nanjarajaiya over-confidence in the justice of his cause, unjustified reliance on French support and vacillation, indecision and intrigue in the prosecution of his scheme. And these contributed directly to the collapse of what was otherwise a well-conceived project of political expansion.\textsuperscript{37}

The disaster that overtook the foreign policy of the Dalavoys accompanied by the exactions of the Nizam and the Marathas from the kingdom of Mysore had the immediate effect of draining the resources of the State and reacting adversely on the court of Srirangapattana in 1755. It was too late when Krishnaraja Wodeyar realizing the gravity of the situation
sought to assert himself (1755-1757) and adjust his relations with the Dalavoys on a new footing (1758). The attempt though purely a temporary palliative proved eventually a failure. It led to the end of the Dalavoy regime and paved the way for the rise to prominence of a more powerful usurper in the person of Hyder Ali from the lower ranks of the military (1759). Indeed it was an irony of fate that almost at a time when Krishnaraja Wodeyar was about to inaugurate his independent rule, Hyder had become a power in Mysore (1759-1760). In vain did Krishnaraja Wodeyar with Royalists exert himself to the utmost to hold his own against Hyder during 1760-1761. Hyder’s usurpation was complete in July 1761.

Krishnaraja Wodeyar was a pious and promising ruler. Under other circumstances he should have fared differently. The Dalavoys too were noted for their piety and for their patronage of learning and promotion of literary activity. Karachuri Nanjarajiah was an accomplished scholar of the age. Had they but behaved loyally towards their sovereign, allowed him a legitimate share in the management of State affairs, planned carefully, worked vigorously, exacted what was due from their allies and acted generally, with greater discretion during 1746-1755, the course of the history of Mysore and of South India would have run along different lines.

Dalavoy Nanjarajaiah and Muhammad Ali in Mysore-Tamil Nadu Relations

We may analyse the attitude of Muhammad Ali towards Mysore during the period of our study in relation with Tamil Nadu politics.
Muhammad Ali's attitude was directly responsible for the death of Chanda Sahib. On the retirement of Chanda Sahib to Srirangam (Feb. 1752) Muhammad Ali paid a visit to Nanjarajaiya. According to the contemporary chronicle Hyder Namah, he affected to hand over the keys of Tirinchinapally fort to the latter and to permit him to garrison the place, professing at the same time his desire to be allowed an assignment of lands in Karur to live in peace Nanjarajaiya, however confines the chronicle believing in Muhammad Ali, soothed him by stating that he would secure him Haradanahalli in the Mysore territory as a Jahgir after putting to fight Chanda's troops, and handed back the keys to him. He not only allowed Muhammad Ali to return to the fort with a select retinue but also lent him a further sum of 10,000 varahas for the expenses of his troops. Then Muhammad Ali bribed and won over to his side Murari Rao and the Tanjorean general Majaji. While continuing his friendship with Nanjarajaiya he began systematically to obstruct the passage of the latter's men to and from the fort of Tirinchinapally.

Meanwhile Chanda Sahib who was on the point of surrendering to the English at Srirangam, during May-June (1752), having caught scent of the shifting policy of his rival sent his vakil to Nanjarajaiya. Imploring him not to confide in Muhammad Ali and assuring him of his support in obtaining possession of the fort. If he only took up his (Chandas) cause, at first, Nanjarajaiya was not inclined to listen to Chanda's words. About this time however Muhammad Ali had gone to the extent of cutting off supplies of provisions to the Mysore troops encamped at Tirinchinapally. At this point Nanjarajaiya understood fully the bent of mind of his ally. He entered into an
agreement (Kararu) with Chanda Sahib through Manaji. He undertook to station Chanda's troops on the banks of the Chintamani river, in readiness for an attack on Muhammad Ali. Alarmed at this news Muhammad Ali spread the rumour that he had lost his control over the fort of Tirichinapally in consequence of a mutiny of the English troops for their arrears of pay, and that however the Mysoreans might take possession of the fort provided they captured Chanda Sahib. He also blocked up the Mysoreans who had previously entered the fort. He again bribed Manaji and plotted against Chanda's life. At length one night (June 1752) Manaji having induced Chanda Sahib and his Dewan Seshagiri Rao (prisoners at Srirangam) to leave the camp on the pretext of an alleged them as pre-arranged, Muhammad Ali quietly retired to the fort, the heads were however sent to Nanjarajaiya who later dispatched them to Srirangapatam where they were suspended on the Mysore gate.  

Landless, friendless and destitute of men and money Muhammad Ali looked to Nanjaraja in Mysore and the English at Madras for effective help. Nanjaraja's help was sought because he was the man who had both men and money. He was at the head of the best organized State of the time in South India, Mysore had the prestige of an old hereditary monarchy. He was well-known for his ambitions expansionist aims in South India, the key to which was Tirichinapally, and he had fought for it. Huge money and many lives had been already sacrificed for it since the days of Chikkadevaraja Wodeyar. Muhammad Ali, knew the inordinate desire for power on the part of Nanjaraja and his brother Devaraja.
He was in a desperate state. He had no more territory in Tirichinapally town. He made up his mind to offer Nanjaraja his own terms. When he did so, he was determined to cheat Nanjaraja of his dues when it came to fulfillment. He knew the English at Madras would not agree to his doing it. He desired to take no risks with them. He kept the clause in the treaty relating to the surrender of Tirichinapally and its dependencies Nanjaraja took care to guard his position. He won over Murari Rao, and attached him to himself at great cost. Murari Rao was thus detached from the main Maratha power and prevented from making common cause with Pratap Singh of Tanjore, who in this matter was inimical to Nanjaraja's aims in the South. But he too proved treacherous in the end. True to his word, Nanjaraja kept the clause a profound secret. Even Murari Rao knew nothing of it. He found it impossible to conceal it from the sagacity of his subsidiary, especially in the later stages of the war. When Murari Rao came to know of it, he made up his mind to turn it to his own advantage at the proper time.\(^{39}\)

The English at Madras realized the enormity of the offence committed by Muhammad Ali only after the fall of Tirichinapally. The capture and death of Chanda Sahib was the signal for Nanjaraja's demand for a fulfillment of Muhammad Ali's treaty with Mysore. The English at Madras knew nothing of the secret clause in the treaty, until the time came for its fulfillment.

On the death of Chanda Sahib, Major Lawrence sent 400 of the French prisoners of war to Fort St. David and brought up the rest with the military stores and artillery at Tambukesvaram into Tirichinapally and completed all his other dispositions and proposed to Muhammad Ali that he
should move forth with at the head of the confederate army into the Carnatic. And the news of his successes at Tirichinapally would help to reduce the other fortresses under the control of Chanda Sahib facilitate the establishment of his government over the province and help to raise the revenue due from it. Muhammad Ali pretended to acquiesce in this advice, but showed what Orme calls an "unaccountable backwardness" to put it into execution, the inconsistency in his conduct perplexed all but the select few who were acquainted with the clause. The English had no idea of the difficulties which held Muhammad Ali back. When to their great astonishment Nanjaraja explained the mystery by refusing to march until the city of Tirichinapally with all its dependencies was delivered up to him. For that he said, was the price that he had stipulated with Muhammad Ali for his assistance and Muhammad Ali confessed the truth when Major Lawrence demanded an explanation of it. He protested that his extreme distress alone had extorted a promise from him that Tirichinapally belonged to the Mughals. He himself was only a viceroy, appointed to govern it during the pleasure of that Prince. Firmly resolved on not parting with the place, he in a word proposed to amuse Nanjaraja with a further promise of delivering it up within two months. By this time he hoped, by collecting the so-called arrears of revenue due from the province of Arcot to repay the expenses which Nanjaraja had incurred by assisting him. As immediate reparation "a palliative" in the words of Orme⁴⁰, he proposed to give up the fort of Madura with its dependencies which included a very large district. These terms, he suggested to major Lawrence, were sufficient reward for all that Nanjaraj had
done for him. More especially, he said that the reduction of Chanda Sahib’s power had proved an essential advantage to the interests of Mysore as well as to his own. Major Lawrence was so surprised at this statement as anybody else in Tirichinapally. His powers were confined to the operations in war field. He reported matters to the governor and council at Madras and waited for instructions. Meanwhile the Governor and council at Madras had received simultaneously, applications from both the parties, each setting forth as might be expected the subject in his own way.

The ulterior motives of Muhammad Ali in regard to Tirichinapally was exposed as the contemporary diarist records. The Mysore Raja’s people, including even the vakil were not allowed even to enter the fort. Muhammad Ali Khan told them that the English had occupied it and refused either to give it up or allow any to enter. His brother Abdul Wahab Khan remonstrated with him to surrender the fort and continue with Mysore.

Nanjaraja was determined to get the fort and so he encamped with his entire army before the walls of Tirichinapally. He enlisted the services of Murari Rao’s and his troops, (at Rupees 5,000 a day) as well as some matchlock people and horse man (who had lately deserted the French) he prepared to attack Muhammad Ali, the combined forces refused to march on with later’s army (Major Lawrence) towards Gingee, till he had complied with his promise of giving up Tirichinapally to the king of Mysore. By the end of June 1752, Muhammad Ali sought to negotiate through his vakil, proposing to make over to the Mysoreans the fort and the country
of Tirichinapally as soon as he was settled in Arcot and offering them the English guarantee to that effect Nanjarajaiya, however, in keeping with Muhammad Ali’s original agreement, insisted on the prompt delivery of the fort and its dependencies as a condition precedent to his escorting the Nawab to Arcot. Meanwhile, the Mysore troops had begun the blockade of Tirichinapally, intercepting the passage of provisions thither early in July 1752. Muhammad Ali secretly managed to win over Murari Rao to his side. He paid him Rupees two lakh as the price for affording assistance to him against the French. He also through Murari’s mediation entered into a fresh agreement with Nanjaraja, and undertook to arrange by means of a Sanad from the Governor of Madras to deliver up the fort to Mysore within two months from June 9. While the Mysoreans, in the meantime, were to be allowed to station a Killedar with 200 men in the fort and to maintain uninterrupted provisions thereto.

But this was not materialized. Nanjarajaiya joined with Dupleix and Murari Rao and opposed Muhammad Ali in attacking Tirichinapally from the end of 1752 to 1755. His French and Maratha alliance also did not help to secure Tirichinapally, as the French were defeated. Dupleix was recalled to France in 1754 and the peace treaty was signed with the English by the French Governor Godeheu in Jan. 1755 which ended French supremacy in Tamil Nadu, and Nanjarajaiya had to return to Srirangapattana and shortly afterwards he had to quit politics.
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As Robert Orme the historian has justly remarked⁴⁷ Murari Rao was in reality the most improper person that could have been chosen to adjust the difference that had arisen between Muhammad Ali and Nanjaraja. With regard to Tirichinapally politics his objects were (1) by interacting himself with Muhammad Ali (2) to persuade him to admit a large body of his own troops into Tirichinapally city as the best means of deceiving Nanjaraja into the belief that he really intended to give it up according to his promise. Once this was agreed to by Muhammad Ali, he would have instructed his men to seize any opportunity that might offer of seducing or overpowering the rest of the garrison. If this scheme succeeded he intended to keep possession of the city which as we know he had formerly governed for a time himself; if there should be no chance for the realization of his plan. He determined to protract the dispute as long as possible by negotiations. During that period, he was a sure of paying by Nanjaraja. At the same time, he should get considerable presents from Muhammad Ali. If this double-dealing should fail he proposed to make Nanjaraja to declare war. To create an opinion of the Marathas to carry it on without continuing them in his service. Muhammad Ali understood the game of Murari Rao. He would rather place his trust in Nanjaraja than in Murari. Muhammad Ali realized that he could not even move out of the city to join his English allies. Nanjarajaiah had threatened to attack him, if he showed any inclination to do so before settling the dispute that had arisen between them. He therefore gave Nanjaraja the revenues of the island of Srirangam and several other adjoining districts empowering him
to collect them himself. He also promised to deliver up Tirichinapally at the end of two months. In the meantime, he agreed to receive 700 men (200 according to one source) into the city provided that they were his own men and not Marathas. This shows the inner convictions of Muhammad Ali. He placed no reliance in Murari Rao. He tried to escape from the attack. It is clear from the terms he finally agreed to be with Nanjaraja. But he was as much false to Nanjarajaiah as Murari Rao had promised himself to be. Nanjaraja was not deceived by the promises of Muhammad Ali. He wanted to gain time as much as Muhammad Ali. Muhammad Ali thought that an immediate declaration of war would come in the way of the progress of war in the Carnatic from which he expected some signal advantage, whilst Nanjaraja delayed to commence hostilities against him. Nanjarajaiya, on the other hand, wished for nothing so much as the departure of Muhammad Ali and the English battalion that he might carry on his schemes to surprise Tirichinapally which he realized their presence would render impossible. The excuses Nanjaraja offered, when he was asked to move were understood as showing his intentions. To frustrate them 2000 Europeans with 1500 Sepoys were placed in garrison in the city under the command of captain Daltam, who was instructed to oppose any surprise against it.

Perhaps a greater concern to Nanjarajiah during the period was the attitude of his ally Murari Rao. It was not consistent. Murari's mediation in the dispute over the cession of Tirichinapally to Mysore (July 1752) resulted in a ruinous and most exorbitant charge to Nanjarajaiah. He was made to pay heavily both him and the Nawab. On the morrow of the latter's departure
from Tirichinapally, differences on the subject between Murari and Nanjarajaiah naturally arose and were apparently made up in August by a solemn treaty known to have been ratified by them at the Srirangam temple. Murari while he continued openly to profess his alliance with Mysore was amusing Khair-ud-din (at Tirichinapally) with the offer of a treaty and towards the close of August, he dispatched 2000 Marathas under his paymaster Yoonas Khan and Chettappa (Settappa) to assist Muhammad Ali against the French in the Arcot province. On that occasion Murari appeared to view with disfavor the Mysorean claims to Tirichinapally, a behavior perhaps best reflected in a message he sent to captain Dalton “expressing his great satisfaction that Tirichinapally is not delivered up. Saying that he would never be easy to see it in the king of Mysore’s possession”. During September-October 1752, Murari was in the employment of both Mysore and Muhammad Ali and was known to be receiving from the latter a salary of Rupees 7,000 a day. At the same time as he continued his profession of attachment to them and he was suspected (in August) of negotiating a treaty for an alliance with Dupleix at Pondicherry. In September, however shortly after Lawrence had defeated the French at Bahur (September 6) Dupleix sought Murari’s assistance against Muhammad Ali and wrote to him offering a larger sum of money than he received from Mysore and to spare as many firelocks as he needed for his use. Murari at first was unwilling to enlist himself in the cause of the French replaying that his present engagement with the Mysore Dalavoy puts its out of his power to enter into any other service. Early in October,
however, Dupleix sent Mirza Abdul Nabi Beig to treat with him offering him Rupees two lakh, if he marched with his army and attacked and slew Muhammad Ali and another two lakhs after the latter had been disposed of. Towards the close of October, Murari was reported to have accepted the offer (striking the bargain at six lakh rupees 3 to be paid directly into the hands of Yanus khan the other 3 sometime later) to undertake to engage his troops in the French service on a monthly subsistence of rupees one and a half lakh. It was not however till about the end of December 1752 that Murari Rao marched towards Pondicherry to join the French.

Murari Rao tried to make as much as possible for himself at the expense of Nanjaraja. His stipulations with Muhammad Ali showed clearly that he desired to get possession of Tirichinapally for himself. He tried to cheat Nanjaraja who had employed him. The fact that Muhammad Ali evaded him testifies to his intelligence and sagacity. But that could not excuse Murari Rao from the blame attaching to him in Tirichinapally affair. His plan was plain. He was to have stood by Nanjarajaiah and asked for carrying out of the treaty. If Muhammad Ali failed to agree he should have been made to know something of the consequences that would follow. But Murari Rao's love for money and desire for a continuance of hostilities which brought him funds was so great that he had a little regard for his own ward as for the just interests of others. Nanjaraja's bargain for his help proved a bad one. Nor was Murari Rao's conduct towards the close of the war any better. Again he was found bargaining with both Nanjaraja and Muhammad Ali and making the most of the situation for himself. During the course of the
war, Muhammad Ali had repeatedly induced Murari Rao to return to his own country. The exorbitant demands on the side and the scarcity for money on the other had rendered it impossible for him to carry through the idea. In 1754, the position of Nanjaraja in regard to money was perhaps no better. Murari Rao began to fire if a war which brought him no money and tried to seek a plausible pretext to break with Nanjaraja. He demanded the payment of his arrears which amounted to rupees ten lakh. Nanjaraja having never refused to advance him money whenever he wanted it, suggested he had already overpaid him, sharp altercations followed and Murari Rao pretended to withdraw his troops and retired to the north bank of the Coleroon declaring not to return until his claims were met. Muhammmad Ali having heard of this tried to get rid of Murari Rao without any expenses to himself. In this state of affairs the march of Gaude Rao to Tirukkattupalli occurred. It instantly suggested to Murari Rao that if he could administer a severe blow to Gaude Rao's troops it would surely induce the king of Tanjore, already terrified by the incursions of the Mysoreans and the French to furnish money necessary to purchase his retreat. If disappointed in this expectation, Murari Rao thought that he at least would have the satisfaction of taking venegence for the severe blow he had sustained from the Manakji (Manaji) earlier in the early part of 1754. The double motive of interest and revenge induced him to cross in the rivers of Coleroon and Cauvery in the night with 3,000 of his best troops. At daybreak he fell upon Gunde Rao's party so furiously that only 300 with their general escaped. The rest were either killed or taken prisoners. He wrote to Muhammad Ali who had arrived at Tanjore that if he
would return to his own country and never more be an enemy either to him, the English or the king of Tanjore. Muhammad Ali having as usual no funds applied as Murari Rao had foreseen to the king of Tanjore. After many meetings the king of Tanjore consented to meet the demand. The articles of a treaty were drawn up signed, according to which Rs 50,000 were to be paid to Murari Rao as he reached Valikondapuram. To which place he had previously retired from Tirichinapally a lakh more immediately he reached the pass of the Western mountains and the balance of Rs 1.5 lakhs when he reached his own country. While he was pushing through the faithless transaction with the enemies of Nanjaraja, whom he was pledged to support did not care to do so. He wanted to behave as a truthful employee but because he desired to get as much as he could from Nanjaraja before he finally left the scene. He suggested that if Nanjaraja would pay him his so-called arrears, he would return to his assistance only to be duped once again. Nanjarajaiya sent him Rs 50,000, which was what he could spare at the moment. He marched away with all his troops to Valikondapuram and from there shortly thereafter to his own country.

It is difficult to understand Murari Rao's conduct in deserting Nanjarajiya. He behaved throughout treacherously. He foiled the attempt of Nanjaraja to get Tirichinapally. He actively interfered and induced Muhammad Ali to break the treaty between them. He betrayed Nanjaraja's cause, while all the time he was adding to his coffers through the liberty of Nanjarajaiah. Murari Rao was at variance with truth. Hyder Ali's servant and apt pupil of Nanjaraja who took part in the war for Tirichinapally including its
last stages remembered the part played by Murari Rao in it and meted out punishment to him which finally ended both his career and life.

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English appreciated Nanjaraja's claim, they were both to lose either their hold on Muhammad Ali in whose immediate vicinity if not country, they not only lived but also traded on the large sum of money they had lent him. Though such thoughts came to them now and again, and though they even put them down in their debates and resolutions, still they always preferred to play awaiting game. They went so far as to answer effectively, Major Lawrence's objections to their view. But they would not make up their mind for a definitive treaty with the king of Mysore. An accommodation with Dalavoy they realized even if it did not end the war would put it in their power to wage it with advantage. But the change of policy that followed Godeheu's arrival and the advantages it seemed to offer, made them change their views. The truce was advantageous to Muhammad Ali also. Muhammad Ali's debts accumulated and the English were sure with the truce to recover them and unless Muhammad Ali was supported in the changed circumstances they could not hope to realize the huge amount involved. He could be treated as the defacto and the titular Nawab of Arcot and used as a puppet to wage war in their own interests if war was renewed. The company could not in any case lose its money. That was the fundamental point with the English. Moral considerations weigh but lightly in matters where money is the prime factor in arriving at a decision. The English as a nation of traders desired to protect themselves first before trying
to protect others however just as equitable their cause and what Nanjaraja lost the English gained. Tirichinapally if it proved the grave of the French and final extinguishment of Mysore’s legitimate ambitions in the South, became the first milestone in the ultimate success of the English as a nation in India. Tirichinapally even before Plassey thus paved the way for the establishment of British power in India. Nanjarajaiah showed the way to the English at Madras to recognize the fact that the capture of Tirichinapally would prove the ultimate victor of the South. Nanjarajaiah led the way in the struggle and bore the brunt of it in men and money and the English reaped the benefit.

When English came to know that Tirichinapally was the price for Mysore’s assistance about the middle of 1752, they did not know what to say of it. They prudently determined not to interfere in the dispute unless violence should be used against Muhammad Ali professing great friendship for Nanjarajaiah they strenuously recommended to both parties an amicable adjustment of their differences. The suggestion failed to carry conviction to Nanjarajaiah’s mind. He with justice on his side demanded fulfillment of the treaty. He did not agree that Muhammad Ali was the agent of the Mughal and as such had no right to dispose of the Mughal’s territory. The English his allies were really aghast at his conduct. They characterized it in their solemn proceedings as a knavish and weak action of the former because he (Muhammad Ali) knew he had no right to do it. It plainly appears to make a powerful enemy instead of a friend. The English tried their utmost to reconcile the differences between Muhammad Ali and Nanjarajaiah in this matter. But they knew what a bad case they had to defend and what an
impossible compromise to effect when they pleaded that Nanjarajiah would be committing a breach of faith, if he deserted Muhammad Ali. Nanjaraja's taunt was effective to a degree. The bad scent of the Nawab's behavior said he is spread over the world to such a degree that one could not discern the odor of one's faith. Nanjaraja's attitude is understandable in the light of the bad faith of Muhammad Ali. The injustice committed by the English in supporting their untruthful ally could not be forgiven.

Almost simultaneously the English Government at Fort St. George, Madras had been obliged to decide upon hostilities with Mysore. The attitude of Thomas Saunders governor at Madras and the members of his council in regard to the Tirichinapally question since June 1752 was in general that of allies of the Mughal Government (Sarakar) of the time and in particular that of mediators between Mysore and Muhammad Ali. Though they were gradually led to support the latter to counteract the ambitious designs of Dupleix and safeguard the commercial interests of the English in Tamil Nadu. At a consultation held on June 29, 1752 when news of Muhammad Ali's difference with Mysore first reached Madras. The president observed that the present dispute between the king of Mysore and the Nawab was an affair of the utmost consequence in which we ought not to precipitate ourselves as the effects might be dangerous for should we receive a Jageer (Jahgir) for our alliance with the circar be anyway instrumental to the separating so large a district (as Tirichinapally) from the subaship. "Accordingly Saunders wrote to Nanjarajaiah to send his vakil to Madras assuring him of his friendship and that no endeavors shall be wanting to
settle everything to the satisfaction of both the parties. According to a
dispatch dated July 5 the dilemma was thus depicted. The Nawab admitted
he had no right to give away such large countries and the English were allied
with the circar to protect it and could not appear in such a transaction.
Moreover, Mysore was the Nawab's sole support and should that State and
the Marathas join the French, the Nawab would be in a dangerous situation.
Dupleix was doing his best to forement those dissensions. At another
consultation (July 27) the president recorded that was debated measures
were proper to be adopted at that critical juncture. On the one hand the
Mysore king and the Marathas (under Murari Rao) were disgusted at the
Nawabs refusing to deliver up Tirichinapally according to agreement.

The position of the English at fort St. George on Tirichinapally between
November 1752 to May 1753 perhaps best summed up in a dispatch to the
court of directors, London, dated November 3, 1752. The dispute between
the Nawab and the king of Mysore continues; the latter had sent a vakil to
Madras with offers to support the Nawab, if the English would guarantee the
cession of Tirichinapally but the Nawab declared that he had no power to
execute his promise which was made only out of dire necessity. Received a
letter purporting to come from Salabat Jang desiring the English to support
Muhammad Ali and denying the latter's right to cede Tirichinapally. There is
no doubt the Nawab having made the promise but both he and the king must
have known that it could not be fulfilled. The king immensely rich and the
acquisition of Tirichinapally would lead to his conquering Tanjore (where the
English and no less than the French had commercial settlements) and
becoming most powerful. In the South, Dupleix was negotiating with the Mysoreans and the Marathas. Another source dated May 6 1753 states that the intentions of the English were not to take possession of the country for themselves. Their opinion was that the country was made under the Mughal power, their trade might be carried on in safety for which reason they had assisted Muhammad Ali Khan in several respects and supported him. They have never attempted to take possession of the whole country like the French.

Saunders strove to make up a matter between Muhammad Ali and Mysore. During January-May 1753 he successively wrote to Nanjarajaiya commenting on his hostile attitude towards the Nawab and advising him to be reconciled to him. In February-March, he even tried to bring external pressure to bear upon both Nanjarajaiya and Murari Rao by writing to peshwa Balaji Rao and Saiyad Lashakar khan (Dewan of salabat Jang) to advise them to desist from their scheme and retire to their countries in the interests of the welfare of the Mughal's dominions. These attempts having proved ineffective, in May, he empowered Major Lawrence and Robert Palk to reconcile the difference between the Nawab and the Mysore king through the mediation of Pratap Singh of Tanjore offering as the basis of settlement the mortgage of Tirichinapally country to Mysore in satisfaction of the Nawab's dues. Nanjarajiah having however declined the offer and insisted on his demand for either the fort or the money lent in ready specie. Saunders at last on June 15 treated him as the Nawab's enemy and wrote warning him against the consequences of his alliance with the French.
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He determined in 1752 to conquer Tirichinapally by means, fair or foul. The steps he took with this end in view were such that Lawrence, the English General, was compelled to place on English garrison in Tirichinapally for its protection. At the same time, the troops from Tanjore and Pudukotai left for their homes. With the result the English position at Tirichinapally was still further weakened. Dupleix saw the opportunity in all the happenings, won over Nanjaraja and Murari Rao, the Maratha chief, to his own side and he played a waiting game, for he had no military commander whom he could put forth against the veteran Lawrence. In any case, he thought he could starve out the garrison in the Tirichinapally fortress by preventing supplies of provisions and military stores to it, Lawrence as we know depended for the existence of his army entirely upon the safe arrival of his convoys and Dupleix planned with the aid of Nanjaraja and Murari Rao, to prevent in no uncertain manner. In this attempt however, his arrangement miscarried, though Nanjaraja and his army did not lack in their endeavours.

Since the outbreak of Muhammad Ali dispute over the cession of Tirichinapally to Mysore (June-July 1752), there prevailed in Pondicherry expectations of an alliance of Mysore with the French, to capture the fort and country of Tirichinapally. Such an alliance seemed eminently to further Dupleix overweening intention, namely, the establishment of French sway over the whole of India including "Mysore, Tanjore and Tirichinapally, etc, countries" South of the Krishna. In August 1752, Nanjarajaiya was known
to be in treaty with Dupleix "whose offers" were held not satisfactory early in October, however, Dupleix himself took the initiative, for while negotiating for the services of Murari Rao in his war against Muhammad Ali, he offered to secure Tirichinapally for Mysore, in return for which the Raja of Mysore, was to pay 30 lakh of rupees. At the end of October an alliance of Dupleix with the Mysore King, Maratha and the Vellore Fouzdar (Ghulam Murtaza Khan) seemed to be on the point of conclusion. It was not till about the end of December (1752) that Nanjaraja became really earnest about the alliance, Muhammad Ali having systematically foiled to comply with his agreements. Accordingly, Murari Rao marched on to Pondicherry. Nanjaraja sent his vakil Venataranarayanappa, to strike with Dupleix, an advantageous term for Mysore. At Pondicherry, Murari Rao we are told, remained indifferent, caring for his own interests.

Since January 1753, Venkatanarayanappa was left to rely on his own resources in conducting the negotiations. In February, Dupleix obviously to coerce Nanjarajaiya to accede to his own terms, wrote to him about his design to co-operate with peshwa Balaji Rao in an invasion of Mysore for the realisation of the latter's alleged dues (chauth), Dupleix's threat, however remained unanswered. Meantime, Venkatanarayanappa continued his diplomatic activities at Pondicherry. On April 21, he received a letter from Nanjarajaiya, "agreeing to all but one or two of the (French) proposals". At the end of April, on the arrival of the English troops (under Major Lawrence) towards Mayavarm and Kumbakonam, Nanjarajaiyah as he tells us "entered into an agreement with the French who did the same with me on their part."
In May, the march of the English army to the relief of Tirichinapally, he wrote repeatedly to Dupleix, asking for the services of one Hasan-ud-din Khan. Dupleix seemed reluctant to comply with the request, at the end of May. Nanjarajaya’s alliances with the French Governor did not, in fact, appear to have become a reality till June 8. When he sent him a bill of exchange for rupees 3 lakh (towards 4-5 lakh promised in the first instance) drawn on Aetharam Tarwadi (Gumasta of Kosi das Bukkanji) payable at a month and a Golfs sight. And it was not till about the middle of the month of (June) that Dupleix in satisfaction of the bill dispatched a crops of 300 French soldiers, infantry, guns etc. to help Nandi Raja, the Dalavoy of Mysore, who was commanding the Srirangam camp, in order to take Tirichinapally.

As to the conduct of the French the less said the better, even before the date on which the terms of the truce were published-11 Jan. 1755. It was clear to Nanjaraja that the French were not ready to carry out their obligations. He naturally treated them just as he had treated Muhammad Ali, if they desired to retire, they could be said do so and go back to Pondicherry, they could not bind him to the terms of their treaty, they had no right, he openly declared to make any treaty with the English on his behalf, as a matter of fact, Nanjaraj had discovered even before the truce was concluded between the French and the English, that the French were determined to keep Tirichinapally for themselves if they should succeed in taking it. Nanjaraja said that the French were as much for deceiving him of the fruits of his victory as the English had been. The statement applied as much to the conduct of Dupleix as to that of Bussy who continued to fight the battles of
Salabat Jang against the country powers, the truce while it stipulated the cessation of hostilities in the Carnatic did not interfere with his status or the authority of his position in the Northern Circars. He continued to wield the full power of the Nizam against everyone, against his own position or to secure the pecuniary contribution. It alone would help him.

In the whole history of the career of the able French diplomat and general, there was no greater blot than the active aid he rendered in the spoilation of the truce of 1755. But for the invasion of Mysore by Salabat Jang aided by Bussy to exact the so called arrears of tribute attribute that was immoral in its levy, illegal in its exaction and inequitable in its incidence. Nanjaraja would not have been called off to Mysore, what he would have done at Tirichinapally by continuing thereafter the truce would not detain them for any length of time. For as it was, he had to leave the island of Srirangam, the revenues of which had been formally given up to him by Muhammad Ali, to the French, though they had unjustly included him in the truce they had concluded with the English without notice to him and as it seemed against his will, and undoubtedly in open violation of the terms of the treaty concluded with him and certainly against his country's interests, he had repudiated openly their right to do so and had declared he would carry on the war and Bussy's act was openly disruptive of the treaty the French had concluded with Mysore. They were indeed in strict alliance with Mysore while they were also bound by treaty with Salabat Jang as well. But it was not clear that Bussy was bound to break the treaty with Mysore to fulfill the treaty with Salabat Jang treating Mysore as his country's enemy for the
purpose. Bussy, indeed, felt considerably embarrassed in the matter and
tried in the first instance to get the money from Mysore without declaring
war. But when he found Devaraja, the brother of Nanjaraja, unyielding, he
declared war and exacted the vast sum of Rs 55 lakh from him, ruining the
country and those who stood security for Devaraja as well. If the conduct of
the English was immoral to a degree, the conduct of the French was worse.

None was perhaps, more adversely affected by the truce between the
English and the French than Nanjarajaiya, who continued to maintain friendly
relations with M. Godeheu despite his first disagreement with M. Maissin
(September). Early in October 1753, M. Maissin in compliance with
Godeheu's orders were sent for a small detachment of French troops across
the Coleroon on route to Pondicherry. Nanjarajaiya was helpless against an
attack by the enemy- Murari Rao having left him- implored him (M.Maissin)
to stay a month or fifteen days at least until he could fetch dhoties, palquins,
carts, etc. from the city (Tirichinapally) to remove his family but we are told
he refused and persisted in deporting where upon Nanjarajaiya resolved to
assemble his wife and children in a house and blow it up with gun powder.
The calamity, however was averted in Maissin having in the meanwhile
received Godeheu's permission to remain with the Dalavoy. Nanjarajaiya
was overjoyed at this, his hopes of Tirichinapally seemed to revive and he
provided M. Maissin with money for his expenses, promising a lakh more in
eight days and wrote to Godeheu assuring him of the payment of his arrears
to the French Government. It was not however till about October 20 that
Nanjarajaiya received intimation of Godeheu's truce with the latter's
instructions that he must not attack Muhammad Ali khan or their countries. Nanjarajaiya was deeply shocked that the truce had been concluded by Godeheu without his knowledge. Indeed he wrote to him pleading how he had hoped to settle his affairs with Muhammad Ali and the English for rupees 60 lakh by which he expected to find means to pay his debt to the French and return to his country and how the truce upset his calculations by enabling them (Muhammad Ali and the English) to strengthen themselves with forces and provisions and to devise other plans to beat him with on the expiry of the truce. About the end of October the position of Nanjarajaiya at Srirangam seemed insecure, he had only a small force at his disposal, Godeheu had recalled all the French troops except 300 military and 1000 foot with Maissin while Muhammad Ali and the English as Nanjarajaiya complained were gathering troops at the fort of Tircinapally. Not long after on August 2, 1754-Dupleix super session by M. Godeheu came off and negotiations for a treaty of peace between the English and the French companies followed. A suspension of arms was proclaimed on the 11th Oct. 1754 and a conditional treaty was agreed to in January 1755.

The departure of Saunders and Dupleix finally put an end to the war while the arrival of M. Duval De Leyrit in succession of the hopes that Nanjaraja had built on French aid.

The advance of the Nizam and the Marathas on Mysore added to the troubles of Nanjaraja and he had to go back to his own country, his ambitions unrealized and his money and men wasted.
The French could not be excused. They did not keep to their promise. They in fact were both to take any action advantageous to their own aims and aspirations. They made their so called help the cause for extortionate demands on Nanjaraja. The demands were both unjust and immoral, especially in the light of the utter lack of sympathy they showed to Nanjaraja in the active prosecution of his claims.

If Tirichinapally sealed the fate of Nanjaraja and it also sealed the fate of Dupleix and the French nation in India.

From the above study we may draw a few conclusions. First, Madura and Tirichinapally were the focal points in the relationship between Mysore and Tamil Nadu in the 18th century. Madura had always been the object of conquest by the rulers of Mysore. It was nothing but the Southern political expansion of Mysore towards Tamil Nadu. Madura was the capital of the Nayaks during the Vijayanagara period. In the beginning of the 18th century, the Nayaka rule at Madras was declining and a power vacuum was created. To fill the political vacuum, powers of Tamil Nadu, the Deccan and Mysore became rivals. As a result of the conflicts, alliances emerged.

Secondly, Mysore under Karachuri Nanjarajaiah and Kalale Devarajiah had become a very significant power in South India. Madura was not only a Hindu power center, but also a holy place for the Hindus. It was the ambition of Nanjarajiah to conquer Madura for Mysore or to keep it under Hindu rule. When Meenakshi of Madura was overthrown, the Nawab of
Arcot became supreme at Madura. The situation resulted in the interference of Mysore in Madura in Tamil Nadu.

Thirdly, in the policy of Mysore towards Madura, we notice three different stages
1) Pro-Madura and anti-Nawab of Arcot policy
2) Pro-Maratha and anti-Nawab of Arcot policy
3) Pro-Nizam and anti-Maratha policy.

These three policies of Mysore continued up to 1743. The attempt of Mysore to keep Madura either under Nayaka rule or under Mysore did not succeed. The attempt of the Marathas to keep Madura under their control also failed. In 1743 Marathas were defeated and the Nizam placed Anwar-ud-din in control of Madura and Tirichinapally.

Fourthly, as fall out of the policy of Mysore towards Madura, Karachuri Nanjarajaiah had to face Maratha danger in Morosunadu which was the border of Mysore kingdom. Morosunadu was a strategic region in Kolar district. It was a corridor or meeting place of Mysore, Tamil Nadu and Andhra. The Maratha wanted to establish a military base in Morosunadu in order to control Tamil Nadu. Mysore formed an alliance with the Nizam of Hyderabad in order to drive the Marathas from Morosunadu. In 1747, the famous battle Devanahalli was fought and Marathas were defeated.

Fifthly, after Madura-Tirichinapally became the focal point in Mysore-Tamil Nadu relations from 1744 onwards. Tirichinapally as the
Southern-most limit of expansion of the kingdom. Mysore had bases in Tamil Nadu like Dharanagar, Dindigal, Salem and Coimbatore. Nanjarajaiah used these bases for the conquest of Tirichinapally from 1751 to 1755. Nanjarajaiah played a deciding role in the foreign politics of the period. Tirichinapally dominated his military and diplomatic policy during the second Carnatic war. Nanjarajiah's dream of annexing Tirichinapally to Mysore was a failure. It is said that "the Spanish ulcer ruined Napolean. In the same way, it may be said that Tirichinapally ulcer ruined Nanjarajiah". Crores of rupees of Mysore treasury disappeared in the adventure of Tirichinapally. The Tirichinapally adventure provided opportunity for the rise of Hyder Ali in Mysore and forced Nanjarajiah to quit politics.

Lastly, Muhammad Ali, Murari Rao, the English and the French cheated Nanjarajiya from keeping Tirichinapally for Mysore. All of them exploited Nanjarajiya. The English did not honour the provision of the secret treaty between Muhammad Ali and Nanjarajiah relating to Tirichinapally, because they argued that Tirichinapally overlordship belonged to the Mughals and the Nizam. Murari Rao exploited Nanjarajiah and in the end abandoned him. Murari Rao himself secretly wanted to keep Tirichinapally for himself. Dupleix also used Nanjarajiah against the English and abandoned him in 1754 when he was called back to France. His successor governor general Godeheu concluded the peace treaty with the English which was disastrous to Nanjarajiya. Thus Madura and Tirichinapally remained a dream for the policy makers of Mysore in the 18th century.
Notes and References


2. Letters from Fort St. George 1736, pp. 51-52; Letter No. 80 dated 6, November 1736.


10. Ibid., (1743-1746) p.3. No. 56.

11. Tuzak, pp. 113- 114.

12. Supra, p. 113.


17. The following is a sufficient summary of the history pertaining to Tirichinapally and the country dependent on it.
1559 Visvanatha Nayaka takes Tirichinapally

1609-1623- Virappa Nayaka I attaches Tirichinapally to Madura, and Tanjore king having exchanged it for Vullam.

1623-1659 Fortress of Tirichinapally becomes the chief stronghold of the Nayak's kingdom during Tiramala Nayak's time.

1734-Minakshi invites intervention of Dost Ali Nawab of Arcot in her dispute with Bangaru- Tirumala father of her adopted son.

1736 Chanda Sahib finally occupies the fort of Tirichinapally.

1741. Chanda Sahib attacked by the Marathas, Chanda Sahib taken prisoner and Murari occupies Tirichinapally till 1744.

1743-44 Nizam Ul Mulk invades Tirichinapally the Marathas vacate and Anwar- Ud- Din becomes Nawab of Arcot.

1748-49 The French ransom Chanda Sahib and with Muzaffar Jan attacked Anwar-Ud-Din and killed him at Ambur. Anwar-Ud-Din's son Muhammad Ali fled and occupied Tirichinapally.

1749-51 Chanda sahib declared Nawab of Arcot by the French.

18. *Di A.P.I.*, VIII. 1 Notes dated May 3, 1751. Wilks(1387) Speaks of the acquisition of Dindigal by Mysore in 1745, though we have so far no independent evidence on the point. The probabilities are in favour of the place that was absorbed into the kingdom of Mysore during the conclusions which followed the extinction of Nayak rule in Madura.

(1736) Dindigal; As a strategical point of great natural strength commanding the passes between Madura and Coimbatore, its possession was always keenly contested between 1623 and 1659,
and it was the scene of many encounters between the Bijapur, Mysore and Madura troops. The Mysorean troops besieged it in 1625 in Tirumala Nayak's reign in 1736 and Chanda Sahib stormed it. Taken by Mysore between 1736-1745, it was in 1755 garrisoned by Hyder and used as a base by him for annexing Madura and Coimbatore. As the gate to Coimbatore faces the South in Hyder's hands, it proved a great obstacle to the operations of the English at Tirichinapally and Madura.


20. *Haid. Nam.* Ff.5. see also and compare Fr. Corres (1752) p. 32 (correspondence dated February 18, 1752).


33. *Ibid.*, in this connection a military advice. It is interesting to note that it refers to Hyder Naique as marching down this way (i.e South of Mysore) with 6000 men and 8 lakh rupees… (*Di. cons BK*(1755) p.117, July 17, 1755 Captain Caillaud to the board) the *Di.A.Pl.*, (XI Notes dated July 6, 1757) speaks of Hyder as having been sent as Sardar (to the south i.e. Dindigal) with 5,000 horses 6,000 or 7,000 Sepoys and 25,000 or 30,000 men, etc.


36. The alleged supremacy of the Mughal since 1693 over the Nayak kingdom of Madura was only nominal. Chanda Sahib's occupation of Tirichinapally in 1736 was a result of the attempt made in 1734 on behalf of the Nawab of Arcot by his son Safdar Ali khan and his
nephew and confidential advisor Chanda Sahib. Queen Minakshi’s quarrel with Bangaru-Tirumala the father of her adopted son gave the letter an opportunity to interfere while Bangaru Tirumala ruled over Madura and Tinnevelly. Chanda Sahib occupied Tirichirapally fort unmolested. But his occupation of the dependent country was so far effective.

37. Attempts had to be made to get possession of it. The revolt of Muhammad Yusuf in 1763 and what preceed is the best proof of the non-conquest of those areas. Till then they belonged to the Nawab of Arcot. In this connection, it is significant to note that Karachuri Nanjarajiah had maintained a regular journal of his transactions ever since he set out from Mysore (see count. Corres. (1753) p.30 ; Letter No. 49 dated February 27, 1753 Dalavoy to Capt. Dalton-unfortunately however this record has not come to light so far.


40. Ibid., p. 244.

41. Di. A. Pl., VIII 129, 133 Notes dated July 7 and 10, 1752 the dispute between Nanjarajaiah and Muhammad Ali over the cession of Tirichinapally is found first refferred to in the Di cons Bk.(1752) p. 22. consultation dated June 29, 1752.

42. Ibid., 166 Notes dated August 13, 1752.

43. Haid. Nam., ff. 7 ; also Di. A. Pl. 133 Supra.
57. See *Ante*, Ch. VIII pp. 171-172.
60. See *Ante*, p.133 fin 2.
61. Fort St. George records mily. cons. (1753) consultation dt. 3rd Jan. 1753.
64. Ibid., also Mad Desp (1744-1755) p. 173, despatch dated July 5, 1752.

65. Di. Cons. BK., p. 27.


68. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 13-14, 36-37 and 51 letter Nos. 5, 18, 62 and 90 dated January 6, 31 March 29 and May 3, 1753- Saunders to Dalavoy.

69. Ibid., pp. 16, 24, and 34 letter Nos. 26, 41 and 58 dated February 12 March 4 and 23, 1753.

70. Ibid., p. 35 letter No. 59 dated March 23, 1753.

71. Count. Corres., p. 57 letter No. 98 dated May 17, 1753- Tanjore to Saunders; p. 72 letter No. 120 dated June 11, 1753- Dalavoy to Saunders.

72. Ibid., p. 78 letter No. 124 dated June 15, 1753- Saunders to Tanjore.

73. Ibid., p. 78 letter No. 125 dated June 15, 1753- Saunders to Dalavoy.


75. Ibid., 136 Notes dated July 11, 1752.


80. Count. corres., p. 96 letter No. 156 received July 24, 1753 Dalavoy to Saunders.
