CHAPTER-II

AGRARIAN STRUCTURE IN PRINCELY MYSORE

A. INTRODUCTION

B. TENURIAL PATTERN

   a. Types of tenures
   b. Garden assessment and bolstering up of commercial agriculture

C. STATE AND AGRICULTURE

   a. Factors necessitating the introduction of survey settlement
   b. State objectives of revision survey
   c. Defective revision settlement and the peasantry
   d. Misuse of remission rules

D. LAND DISTRIBUTION

E. TREND OF AGRICULTURAL PRICES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEPRESSION YEARS

F. STATE POLICY, PEASANT AND LAND MARKET

G. SUMMING UP
A. INTRODUCTION

Princely Mysore in the 19th or early 20th century was not a 'State' in the conventional or legalistic sense. It was a part of the vast colonial state enjoying limited internal autonomy. It was a region which was in the process of a struggle for 'state formation' from 1881 onwards. She had to struggle persistently to keep her economic independence and to preserve her political autonomy. Mysore had witnessed certain trends in its mode of land control and consequent social changes during 1831-81. The traditional mode of land control underwent certain changes during this period, which had a direct bearing upon the land structure. Traditionally speaking, 'big landlordism' was not a notable feature of the agrarian system of princely Mysore.

A comprehensive study of the land tenurial structure in Mysore revealed clearly that it had a cumulative influence on its social structure. The land tenure institutions embodied all those legal and customary arrangements whereby different classes of people gained access to land and its ownership. It constituted the rules and procedures governing the rights, duties and liberties of individuals on the use and control of the basic resource, 'land'.

The vital question of agrarian relation centered around the factor 'land', how it was used and who owned it. The answer to such a question included a discussion of -

a. Ownership of land
b. Types of tenurial systems
c. Assessment and collection of revenue
d. Alienation of landed rights.
The British land policy always aimed at developing agricultural produce in India to feed the industrial requirements in Britain. Thus, the land policy became a part of the total imperial policy (1). As a consequence, the policy-makers brought about a radical simplification of the old tenure system where the pattern of land, once been complex, diffuse and customary was now made simple, clear-cut and uniform. It was stated that property accumulated and agriculture expanded, only under such tenures which allowed permanency of holding, protection from arbitrary enhancement of rent and security for improvement. However, the British classical economic ideas had a great influence on the policy making within India. Adam Smith and the classical school emphasised on "Laissez-faire" or free trade policy against monopoly tendencies. This school believed in the individual initiative and proprietorship. In the sphere of agriculture, it argued for the making of a propertied class for the creation of national wealth and property (2). However, with the advent of the Ricardian theory of rent, emphasising the permanent cleavage of interests between the landlords and other classes of society, belief in the theory of agricultural development by landed aristocracy was seriously undermined. On the contrary, the peasant proprietors and the small owners of land came to be regarded as the best instruments of agricultural progress. It was argued that a settlement directly with the landed cultivator was more remunerative and would lead to the accumulation of capital in agriculture in the shortest possible time (3).

Thus, with the spread of "Laissez-faire" (4) economic ideas in England, it was argued that as most land laws were a relic of the feudal ages, it was thought that the land question was more difficult to tackle. But then, the time
had come for abolishing privileges and getting rid of the laws for protecting landed interests (5). The main plan behind abolishing privileges of landlords was to remove the individuals distinctions between land the other property to give the land owners a purely commercial ownership in the land. A change in the perceptions led to a shift in the emphasis from the zamindari proprietorship to the ryotwari system in accordance with the Ricardian theory (6).

Ryotwari system was also found most relevant to South Indian conditions. Mysore, which was under direct British domination between 1831-81, suffered from lop-sided resources mobilization, owing to British Imperialist policies. Between 1881-1911, the colonial domination of this kind, still loomed large over the economy of Mysore. The economic policy which primarily aimed at making economic resources available for foreign exploitation, led to a growth of economy which was inelastic, static and lop-sided.

The colonial economic policy before 1881, was confined to safeguarding the revenue by keeping avenues of income like irrigation, transport etc., open. After 1881, there was a cautious decrease in the proportion to land revenue in the total revenue. In 1881-82, land revenue consisted 65% of the total revenue, in 1910-11 the figure had gone down to 43% (7). This was a clear indication of commercialization and monetization of the economy initiated by the colonial rule. The most striking feature of the changes during this period was the slow expansion of agricultural output. The instrument of transfer of 1881, laid down that Maharaja of Mysore "should conform to advice of the Governor-General in Council, with regard to the management of finances, imposition of taxes, extension of commerce, etc" (8).
Thus, Mysore was forced to lose important sources of revenue and open up other avenues of income. As it was a land locked country, it was often deprived of a legitimate source of revenue and the citizens of Mysore were taxed heavily (9). Every possible source of income was tapped. An important source of taxation was railways. Mysore Darbar was compelled to provide land, timber etc., free of cost to the railways, which were as a rule, owned and manned by the British companies. Railways were laid down without consideration to economic development of the state and the state suffered from great dislocation of transit, as state was persuaded to abandon the transit duties. British imperialist influence was, thus, felt in every field in Mysore (10).

In Mysore, revenue and rent law was in a state of utter confusion (11), since the time of British take over in 1831. A small proportion of it was contained in isolated acts of the different legislations, extended to the province from time to time, but a greater part of it consisted of numerous executive orders issued by some officers of the British government, as the highest court of revenue appeal (12). The revenue procedure of 1864 was practically ignored and it had given a wide jurisdiction to revenue courts over suits relating to sales and mortgages, which had led to lot of embarrassment and inconvenience (13). A variety of reasons necessitated the introduction of revenue survey into all types of lands in Mysore.
B. TENURIAL PATTERN

a. Systems of land tenures in Mysore

The land tenures in the province were broadly of two types, (i) The sircar lands or Government lands and (ii) Inam lands. The sircar lands were held on ryotwari tenure either on kandayam, i.e., fixed money assessment system or on "batayi", i.e., share produce system. In the taluks where survey settlement was introduced, the assessment was fixed for 30 years. In Kandayam lands, assessment was not altered or raised but was held on annual leases, called "pattahs". This system was widely prevalent in Mysore and was deemed as the most popular system of tenure under "batayi" system. The land was held direct from government, but the share of Government was paid in grain. But, survey officers argued that this form of tenure gave room to frauds and misappropriation and demanded its abolition by making survey introduction compulsory. Finally, government gave the option to ryots to convert their lands into Kandayam tenure at their will and attended all possible encouragement.

Besides, Mysore had a large variety of private estates called "inam". These villages were owned on the basis of sanads or grants given from time to time. They were held on following tenures:

Warum: Under this system equal division of produce was made between landlord and tenant and the landlord paid the assessment of the land to the government. The occupation of such fields was given annually and the tenants were tenants at will and they had no occupancy right whatsoever.
Mukor: Under this system, two-third of the produce was taken by the actual cultivator and the landlord who paid assessment to the government received one-third of the share. This was also called "Mukuppe tenure" in Manjurabad area literally cleaning 3 heapfuls.

Chaturbhaga: Under this system, landlord received one-fourth of the produce and paid half of the total land revenue assessment, while the actual cultivator received three-fourth of the produce and paid remaining half of the land revenue assessment. But, here the tenant was not a permanent cultivator. His lease could be renewed at the will of the owner. This was widely existent in all the 'kayamgutta' or permanently alienated villages. No cultivator could claim a hereditary right of occupation.

Besides these major types of "sircar" and "inam" tenures, there were the "warg" lands, where a single proprietor-owned lands in more than one village, paid half assessment and enjoyed the source of pasture lands called "hankalu and hadya" lands for which he paid no assessment. There were the kanlands preserved for the sake of pepper vines attached to wargs. Here, the tenant had no rights over the produce whatsoever except grass and government reserved all rights over timber and produce. "Kumri" lands which were specially leased to forest tribes for felling timber, gave no occupancy rights to inhabitants. Lastly, there were the "shraya" lands, usually waste lands, enjoyed by holders free of rent in the first two years, but they had to pay one-fourth of assessment rate progressively. This tenure, in due course of time, led to heavy occupation of "banjar" and uncultivated lands as many recipients of land started availing of the opportunity.
But soon after, the Government came to realise the peculiarities of tenure system in Mysore and took steps to simplify them (14). A general topographical survey of the province was undertaken soon after it was handed over to British in 1799. When Poornaiah assumed charge as the Dewan, a revenue survey was made which was imperfect and lacked any analytical base. During the insurrection of 1831, most of the survey papers were found burnt and the autocratic rule of the prince had given rise to complex land tenurial forms as lands were given away as grants or "inams" even to the minor village officials (15). When British commission took over the reins of administration, the value of a thorough scientific survey was deemed an urgent necessity. In July 1862, glaring defects apparent in the existing revenue system, were brought to the notice of Government of India. The Imperial government fully recognised the necessity of introducing a revenue survey settlement into Mysore on the lines of survey rules in Madras and Bombay (16).

Thus, the first survey operation was introduced into Chitradurga district in 1863. A separate department was constituted controlled by the District Commissioner, headed by a Superintendent and 14 Assistants. Likewise, an Inam Commission was instituted in 1866 under the Inam Commission. It was only in 1872 that control of these departments was handed over to survey commissioner. Its operations were brought to a close in 1881. Over 50,000 "inams" were confirmed and over 10,000 inams were resumed for invalidity of their tenure.
b. Garden assessment and the bolstering up of commercial agriculture

Garden lands which grew superior qualities of crops received 'much too preferential treatment', during reassessment and great leniency was shown in assessing gardens. According to government, "the most careful and difficult operation in a revision settlement was that of assessing gardens". All the garden revision rates were reduced considerably as shown in Table-1. It was argued that in view of the amelioration of the Malnad, generally government had defined the limits which could not be transgressed by the settlement officer. Though such a liberal policy entailed a heavy sacrifice of revenue, government decided upon limiting the rates well below government minimum of 33 percent, with a longterm project of procuring assured profits in an immediate future. For, gardens were a guaranteed source of profits. In Malnad dry cultivation was comparatively of little importance and was more or less negligible and government wanted to protect the garden produce by special care and legislation. Here too a dubious policy of increasing the assessment on wet lands was followed. Rice fields had a maximum assessment, as it was the only possible avenue of bringing more income.

But due to almost stationary conditions of population, the scarcity of labour, the consequent increased cost of cultivation and inclement climate combined with the concession allowed to garden lands, the government claimed that there were no marked profits from soil-rich Malnad. Government was always of the opinion that a large financial loss was incurred due to gardens. To even the financial loss, Malnad wet lands were assessed heavily (17). But,
government by lowering the rates of assessment on gardens, wanted to attract more and more cultivators to garden cultivation. The low assessment only acted as an inducement to further the extension of garden cultivation. For example, due to decrease of garden assessment rates, by 22 percent Tarikere saw a remarkable increase in the garden acreage which was 2,591 acres at the time of original settlement, shot up to 4,951 acres at revision settlement.

The Bombay rules of 1874, which dealt with garden rates were also applied to Mysore, and it had the following working effect.

a. well-irrigated "bagayets" (garden) recorded as existing at the time of the last settlement were assessed at the highest dry crop rate.

b. well-irrigated "bagayets" brought under irrigation since the last settlement were assessed at ordinary dry rate.

c. lands under wells sunk under tanks so as to draw their water by percolation were assessed at rates not exceeding double the dry crop rate.

Ruling of the government dated January 24th, 1902 made no distinction between ordinary wells and good wells. But, government did not think that rates under 3rd head above might work out lower than under the 1st head, although exactly the opposite was the intention. Double the ordinary dry rate was a very expedient rate and it was based on no principles whatsoever and its very limit and uniformity would make its incidence all the more startling. Mysore government
did not take into consideration the increased value of any land due to improvement effect by or at the cost of the owner, during the currency of the previous settlement and it reserved the power to assess "pro tanto" the value imparted to such land by the government's own improvements or by water which is government's own property.

As a solution to the difficult problem of garden assessment in the Malnad the 'shraya' (referring to garden lands) rules were issued on a careful examination of revenue derived from gardens and bearing in mind the importance of garden produce (18). By adding a clause to section 115 of the draft Revenue Regulations, necessary steps were taken to popularize this system. These rules offered liberal encouragement for the making of new gardens. Firstly, in the case of Malnad gardens, a nominal assessment of 4 annas (25 paisa) per acre per annum for twelve consecutive years and a progressive assessment during next three years and secondly, in the case of inferior areca and coconut gardens, an assessment of 4 annas per acre for 9 years and a progressive assessment for the next three years was adopted.

These rules were revised in 1904, so as to make terms more liberal to make them flexible. The Deputy Commissioner was now empowered to grant lands applied for, he could reserve the right of assessment for such garden lands and he was also empowered to include under these rules, lands unoccupied for more than 3 years. He was also empowered to grant more concessions if necessary.
C. STATE AND AGRICULTURE

a. Factors which led to the introduction of the survey settlements

1. Among various reasons, the existence of a great variety of rates on dry land was considered to be a vital factor which necessitated the introduction of survey and settlement in Princely Mysore (19). Each village had a rate of its own and it greatly varied from other village. The village accountant was the prime agent in pillaging the ryot and defrauding the government. There were nearly 596 rates on dry land per kudu which was 2/3 of an acre (20). The existence of innumerable rates contributed to a situation in which lower level officials like the Shanboq could exploit the ryots for their personal advantages who simultaneously played a fraud against the government (21). There were multiple cases of a man holding more lands than was nominally entered against his name. Peasants were often found appealing against defrauds caused by the Shanboq and other village officials (22), since there was never a proper revenue survey in Mysore.

2. Though, British administrators, argued that assessment was based on Poornaiah's Survey, but in practice, there was barely any trace of this and nobody knew the basic principles of land assessment as laid down by Poornaiah perfectly (23). The fact is that Poornaiah himself was not in a position in the early 19th century to undertake an elaborate survey, and hence, his system could not have been considered to be a perfect one. It was like people paying the assessment on the lines what their forefathers did and no revenue official had ever ventured to disturb the time
honoured abuse on numerous instances. It was stated that returns showed a notable deviation from the rates which previously existed. Village accountants like the Shanbogs were the first to benefit out of this faulty system, and later adjusted the rates in the manner most conducive to serve their own interests.

3. The unsatisfactory state of "Inam" holdings was another factor which led the government to rethink of settling the land assessments (24). There was no check on unauthorized occupancy and holders of many of the rent free ("inam") lands had encroached largely government lands. Government had to move very cautiously in dealing with such tenures. The government's argument was "in a native state, the scrutiny into illegal rent-free tenures should not be hardly pressed" (25), and "patience and liberality are requisites in investigations of this nature, so as to avoid causing unnecessary irritation" (26). This shows clearly the colonial attitude towards the privileged sections and the care they had taken not to disturb the economically and socially powerful groups in the localities.

4. The peasant's position was in jeopardy. The theory then existing was to acknowledge no proprietary right. But to treat the cultivators of government lands as mere tenants-at-will who were engaged year by year to pay the sircar assessment without any right to permanent occupancy. As a consequence of this, there was no room for all well-to-do class of farmers to emerge and agricultural community was absolutely left without a proper base.

5. Another argument which was strongly put forward in favour of a survey settlement was the increasing importance
of the coffee cultivation in Malnad (27). Government had, by then, recognized the importance of commercial agriculture in Mysore. Government observed, "It is the time to encourage the produce of articles for which a foreign market is to be found" (28). Initially, while granting lands for coffee cultivation, boundaries were very roughly marked giving room to frequent boundary disputes between estates (29), as estate owners began to infringe upon other's lands and also started encroaching adjoining lands. To avoid this, the demarcation of boundaries, was to be accurately laid down, through a survey settlement. The government officers defended their urge in augmenting the survey operations both on financial and political grounds (30). Hence, orders were also issued to quicken the pace of settlement of "Inam" tenures. The government argued thus, "sooner the Inams are investigated, sooner will the revenue be increased" (31).

6. In addition to the discrepancies in the rates of assessment, another fertile source of embarrassment was the prevalence of the "batayi" system. The system was no doubt popular with a section of cultivators, because on the one hand they were secure against paying more according to change in rates of levy, while on the other hand, there was ample opportunity for defrauding the government. Some of the revenue officers of Mysore division also favoured it because they were under an impression that a larger revenue could be raised by it than by "Kandayam" system. But, government was of the opinion that it was incurring losses by this system with the innumerable frauds practised by the cultivators and village officials, besides pickings and stealing by petty government officials of the produce the real "sircar" share came to only 1/3, though it was entitled to half the produce.
Thus, glaring defects were apparent in the revenue system of Mysore, which was very complicated and required much cautious move by the government. It had to make a move in such a way as not to annihilate the peasantry or in any way diminish the revenue sources. For this, they had to force their colonial prodigy, the Dewan and the puppet Maharaja to accept imperial legislations and execute them and quieten any agitative elements thereby. An increase in the surplus of a princely state was essential to the colonial logic, because even under an indirect rule, Mysore was supposed to pay a huge subsidy which they thought would be ensured only through a better management of its revenues.

b. State objectives of revision survey

After 1881, the state was handed over to the Maharaja, who with the help of a bureaucratic apparatus under a Dewan began to run the administration. A resurvey was ordered with the following main objectives.

a. A remeasurement of all lands had to be carried out whenever roads, canals, railways etc., have been newly added and were not dealt within the limits of original settlement.

b. Old survey numbers had to be sub-divided into new survey numbers considering the area bordering the occupancy.

For this purpose, new sub-divisions were considered as occupancies giving them a new recognition under rule XXVII of the Land Revenue Rules of 1891. Subject to minimum rules under section 109 of L.R.C. separation of the various classes of land comprised in the same old survey number was effected by making new survey numbers. Where the supply of water had
to be reconsidered, the old survey numbers were completely measured and sub-divided. Each survey number was inspected and if neither correction nor sub-division was required, the boundary marks were standardized. The maps of all survey numbers were brought up-to-date.

Regarding the reclassification, water classification of all the rice and garden lands were revised. However, soil classification was not altered. The water reclassification was necessary in the interests of government, as well as cultivators because the changes in the water supply, since last 30 years was so great and colossal. This was due to, (a) silting up of tanks (b) deterioration of some tanks and (c) changes and improvements in water storage tanks (d) improvements in irrigation facilities.

Similarly, great changes had occurred in the well irrigated lands. New wells had been sunk, old wells had been abandoned and new water supplies had been created. In short, without a reclassification of the supply of water sources, it was impossible to give effect to the policy adopted by the government, for the revision assessment of well-watered garden occupancies. The rates adopted earlier for well-irrigation land had become rates of mere expediency without the slightest claim to merit as rates. Highest dry crop rate was considered suitable to well-watered gardens.

c. Peasantry and the defective revision settlement

1. While reassessing the lands, the grouping of villages was a major problem to be tackled. In an effort to quieten any agitative elements in response to the announcement of new assessment policy, most of the Survey and
Settlement Commissioners stuck to old grouping which had been carried out decades earlier. A thorough alteration was thought undesirable in this connection, because such a step would lead to abnormal increase or decrease in the total assessment. Only slight modifications were made in such cases, with due regard to increased advantages or disadvantages. But here, the interests of the government were best safeguarded rather than the ryot’s. The village survey maps and the incongruities appearing on it were taken for granted, despite the loopholes, which might have been avoided. In cases, where the disadvantages were found, it was shrouded in mystery.

2. Rice or wheat rate was always the chief underlying basis of original grouping. The dry maximum rate varied according to local peculiarities. For instance, unduly heavy rainfall was favourable to rice, while it was unfavourable to dry crops. Thus, the climatic peculiarity necessitated 2-3 groupings in a single tract. The whole of the garden and wet lands were reclassified with regard to water supply sources, but soil was not reclassified. Government was not in favour of such a reclassification, as such a measure would have resulted in the remarkable decrease of revenue. But, ryots demanded a soil reclassification because soil changed its nature according to fertility in due course of time.

3. In some taluks, survey officers took the previous revenue collections into account, while reassessing them, and they were only particular that it did not fall short of the stipulated amount that they were made to bring to the state coffers. In such cases, cultivators suffered, because a proper survey was not at all done. In certain cases, the survey officers took to consideration, assessment rates
prevailing in the taluks of Madras, and Bombay Presidencies blindly without considering the existing local assessment rates. This often led to over-assessment as it happened in the case of Davangere and Kolar taluks. In their anxiety to see that there is no fall in the gross revenue collections, sufficient regard was not paid to the prevailing economic conditions in the nearby and surrounding taluks by the survey officers. They acted as if their only motto was to chalk out a new assessment policy bringing in lots of revenue to the state exchequer.

4. Besides, the very practice regarding the revision survey assessment was defective in that the survey officers sent their formal report, formulating the proposals of rates for different classes of lands and then invited the opinions of Deputy and Revenue Commissioners. In such a course, the revenue authorities had to practically depend upon the materials contained in the report along with their own personal observations. They did not have the chance to discuss it personally with the survey officers, neither had they any first-hand information about soil quality and its value. Their opinions, therefore, consisted merely of a few general observations which did not materially aid in the final settlement.

5. Many Revenue Superintendents argued that government should arrange for a conference with the Deputy Commissioner and Revenue Commissioner with the survey officer and should lay down rules on which revision should proceed. They felt that only such a course would have obviated unnecessary correspondence and led to more satisfactory results both for government and the peasants (32). But, such a course was not followed by government. Thus, the peasant was always over-
assessed and was at a loss. A generalized formulation of assessment rates without consideration of basic knowledge about land was a primary bone of contention between peasant and government.

6. The peasant was not having security in "ryotwari" system. Because revenue officers resorted to attachment of crops under section 147 of the L.R.C., if a peasant failed to pay the land tax well in time, they were prohibited from reaping their crops. A village talwar kept a vigil over crops. The peasant, besides paying the fine had to lose his crops also. Another method adopted was the distraint of movables. But, usually land was appropriated for the payment arrears. But as against this traditional convention, Revenue Officers first of all proceeded against movable properties. Section 162 of the L.R.C provides that all property which was exempt from attachment in civil courts would be exempted. But in actual practice, cattle and grains were taken away, agricultural implements were seized and in fact, all things exempted under the civil procedure code were attached for recovering the revenue. To name a few, in Gubbi taluk, water supply was cut off to a certain land by closing sluices of a tank, for the non-payment of assessment by the peasants (33). In Srirangapattana taluk, Arkalgud, Belur, Keralapur, etc., water source was cut off for nearly two years during 1921-23 (34). In Sravanabelagola taluk, cattle were seized forcefully by the revenue authorities from the poor peasants (35). In Mandya, H.D.Kote etc., harvests were not allowed to be cut (36).

7. The revision assessment of gardens though were deemed as a liberal policy, it never had a positive approach to it. The remarkable difference between garden lands
watered by wells and garden lands watered by tanks created a lot of dissatisfaction among garden holders. The tank irrigated lands received revision if tanks breached, but well-irrigated land did not receive any such concessions when water source failed. Besides, these types of lands were assessed at the whims of the revenue Superintendent who always acted in favour of the Government in retaining the highest old assessment rates.

8. Problems never ended there. The introduction of 'Record of Rights' necessitated an additional taxation of Rs. 2/- per sub-division of land as 'hissa' or 'phod' charges. For a land which was not worth even Rs. 10/-, as much as Rs. 70/- was charged as "hissa" fees. In some instances, assessment on land came upto Rs. 4/- per acre, but the hissa fees exceeded Rs. 20/- and even more. In certain cases, "Jamabandi" amount was Rs. 1000/- and hissa fees was Rs. 2000/-. This inequity and injustice of levy was brought to the notice of the government frequently, but to of no avail (37). Peasants were facing heavy burden because of this and in majority cases, they had to pay as phoding charges, amounting greater than the "Kandayam" itself. The actual work of phoding needed heavy personnel and the peasant was made to bear them even it entailed a heavy loss and proved burdensome.

9. Another bone of contention, the peasant could not hurdle away, was the period fixation of paying "khist". If a peasant failed to pay the "khists" in due time, penalty equalling nearly 1/8 of the amount payable was charged under section 154 of the L.R.C. The penalty worked out at 12 1/2 percent and the defaulter was made to pay interest at 6 percent as a charge for notifying the sale of land and as
notice fee. This was an unjust levy as a Mysorean never heard of interest being levied even on instalments due (38). Such a factor always involved a cause for imposing penalties simply to show better collections (39). This matter came up for discussion in the Representative Assembly and heated arguments were exchanged because this amendment was passed without consulting the assembly. The members argued that government’s rates of interests even exceeded the Marwari money lender’s rates (40).

10. The rules already in force with regard to collection of land revenue were stringent enough, providing for the sale of land for default of payment within the prescribed time irrespective of the value of the land. An order had been passed to the effect that the property would be restored to the original owner if the sale amount was not paid by him or his agent within 30 days from the date of sale notice (41). In Mysore, the Khatadar (registered occupant) was different from the actual holder (hiduvalidar) and the "Khatadar" did not know the exact amount due to be paid for a particular land. Most of the owners were absentee landlords and even the sales were not given prior notice of. The concerned departments did not maintain registers. The Khata continued to show the same old revenue demand in the same old Khatadar’s name. This created a lot of problems between the Khatadar and the hiduvalidar. Peasants appealed to the government for the repeal of such a law, but government did not take any action even though such a representation had come up for discussion in the assembly as early as 1913 (42).

11. Another unjust fine in the name of ‘Takrar-taktas’ (a fine on disputed claims over land) was levied for unauthorized cultivation of lands resumed to government for
default in payment of land assessment. Once the lands were declared resumed, no objections could be raised in levying fines. But here, as the land had a number of joint holders, and as most of them did not commit the mistake of occupying a prohibited land, only such holders who had committed it, should be punished with a fine. But, government fined all connected holders of the plot which was really unjust and uncalled for (43). The difficulties created by such an action were very great. Firstly, all joint holders were prevented from raising crops on their own lands. Secondly, lands entered in the "takrar taktas" were not entitled to remissions and so, they were unable to raise loans from the banks on the mortgage of lands for the reason that the entire "khata" would have been resumed by government, even though only one of the joint "khatedars" might be committed to default (44).

12. Another defect with the revision settlement was that it affected the cultivator lot more than ever. The exorbitant increase in the new assessment was more and more burdensome. It was a cry in the wilderness for the cultivator. For instance in Kolar, the increase in the wet rate was stated to be unjustified as that taluk formed a part of the notoriously dry tract of the country (45). Peasants appealed to the government not to enhance the assessment rates, as the taluk had very poor irrigation facilities (46). In the maidan taluks of Hassan district, peasants represented quite often that the yield was low due to sandy soil and that only few irrigation facilities were available besides lack of communications. Hence, they urged the government not to enhance the rates of assessment (47). Srirangapattana accounted for an exceptional instance of high dry assessment where there were only 580 acres of dry land (48). Other
parts of this taluk, where there was no channel irrigation, was made to pay very heavily as much for its wet lands as other taluks (49) where channel irrigation was the chief feature. When the actual collections were put to the test of actual area, the inequality of assessment was more pronounced. The average incidence of the assessment showed that inequality was infinitely greater (50). The Revenue Commissioner of Mysore even suggested that the rates should be so revised that they may not operate as a bar to the expansion of cultivation. Both the Revenue Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner opposed the increase in the wet rates in Hassan district and other districts (51). At the same time, they vehemently opposed the increase in the dry rates as exceeding the maximum limit of 33 percent permissible under standing orders.

This was the case in most of the taluks in Shimoga, Kolar and Davangere also. Even though Revenue and Deputy Commissioners voiced against the excessive rise in the assessment rates as detrimental to cultivation, government always sided with the Survey Commissioner. In almost all the villages where new survey rates were increased, there was a complaint against its arbitrary nature. In fact, the Deputy Commissioners and Revenue Commissioners could hardly do anything but to silently accept the rates so levied and collect it from the ever poor peasants.

13. Many of the Settlement Commissioners while sanctioning the new assessment rates satisfied themselves by proclaiming that the rates they have sanctioned were unduly lenient, forgetting that the settlement once effected lasted for 30 years and no alteration could be effected at least for a generation to come.
14. Another problem of revision assessment was 'tari' assessment that was raised exorbitantly. Survey department was pursuing a policy of levying the Irrigation Cess separately. This was a direct extortion on cultivators because it was levied on all lands whether irrigated or unirrigated. But government kept on defending that the total dry assessment together with the Irrigation Cess was not higher than the ordinary 'tari' assessment. It was argued that there was no difference between the full assessment now paid and the two items levied separately. But the power to levy Irrigation Cess separately gave power to government to enhance it any time. Government gratefully forgot the "khushki" land converted into 'tari' or wet by the efforts of cultivator, for which the cultivator paid the "tari kandayam", to which was added Irrigation Cess that enhanced the land revenue burden. The crux of the problem was that in some taluks, the Irrigation Cess was merged with the "tari kandayam", while in some cases, it was shown separately (52). Thus, while sanctioning the revision settlement of Tumkur, government was pressurized to convert the lands which were indiscriminately assessed with water rate into dry lands. Settlement Commissioner had as early as 1874, expressed the opinion that "constant discussion and difficulty occur regarding the levy of Irrigation Cess which is beyond all doubt the cause of much dissatisfaction among the people who look on it as an extra imposition and very differently to what they would do if the amount was included in the ordinary land revenue (53)". He had recommended the abolition of such a cess.

In the event of its abolition, it was decided that it would be reconverted into a local fund cess. The incidence of the cess would merge in the general assessment which would
be 'pro tanto' raised, consequent on its abolition. The cultivators from Gangasandra village petitioned for the remission of wet and garden assessment until the construction of the anicut across Uttara Pinakini river was completed. Crops had failed for want of irrigational facilities, but still they were paying Irrigation Cess along with land revenue assessment (54).

15. The maintenance and management of the channels were other sources of extortion for the cultivators. Government always looked after the upkeep of the main channels only and branch channels were left to cultivators for maintenance. When peasants failed to maintain these tanks in order, government levied an extra cess on such peasants besides, other taxes. This rule acted fair when the rates of assessment on lands fed by branch channels were comparatively less than on lands fed by main channels. But during resurvey, same rate of assessment was fixed on both channel lands and at the same time, cultivators were not relieved of their responsibilities of maintaining the branch channels in proper condition. In many instances, villagers were fined at the very sight of mismanagement and sundry reasons were afforded for fining them. Thus, the rule was both unjust and uncompromising, but the government's view was that it would be at great financial loss to allow cultivators to maintain main channels and it would be robbed of plans to fine them.

16. Finally, contrary to the standing orders of the government, there was the practice of treating a survey number, partly as occupied and partly as unoccupied which gave unlimited powers to the survey officer. Most of the times, sub-division was effected without reference to the survey department. As a result, various modes of effecting
sub divisions sprang up. Besides, various modes of treating these sub divisions also came up. This created lot of discrepancies, for the peasant was paying different types of rates for different plots, of the same soil quality.

These were some of the implications hidden in the revenue assessment policy of the government which was always a hurdle to smooth cultivation. Peasant had thus to fight the -

a. uncalled for interference of revenue officials in the production.

b. unrivalled authority of survey officers

c. superimposition of arbitrary land laws.

d. uneven application of land revenue rules.

Summarizing the drawbacks of the revision settlement, Revenue Superintendent of Mysore stated that "the partial character of resurvey, the piecemeal character of the original settlement and the frequent changes in the territorial jurisdiction have greatly increased the difficulty in collecting useful statistical information and thereby the fixation of land rent" (55).

d. Misuse of remission rules

If peasants had to overcome all these problems before paying an enhanced rent, they had no satisfactory solution for the climatic encroachments through remissions. There was no prescribed programme to solve this. The grant of remission of revenue in affected tracts was unduly delayed (56). In majority of cases, coercive steps were resorted to, for the recovery of revenue even where a remission rule was
applied and recommended. Instead of taking any strong step to stop the attitude of the village officers perforcing on innocent ryots, government satisfied itself by simply directing the Revenue Commissioner to authorize the Deputy Commissioner to postpone the collection of revenue which was recommended for remission. The "pahani" or the revenue book account written by the Shanbog did not help the ryots from demanding remission, as they were not being maintained correctly. Amildars never checked the "pahani" accounts and there was every chance for him to hide the real facts from government, in order to show the highest percentage of collections.

In the year 1899-90, crops failed totally. Under section 140 of the famine code, petitions praying for remissions of "kandayam" were presented to the Jamabandi officers who did not give ryots any relief. Consequently, cultivators of the region held meetings and the resolutions of the meetings were submitted to government. The Deputy Commissioner who was dissatisfied at the conduct of the villagers reported to the government that there was no famine in that taluk and neighbouring taluks. The cultivators then petitioned to the government to institute an enquiry committee. Government did not pay any attention to this and 500 cases of lands were attached, as there were no bidders of land so sold owing to the inability of the people to bid for the lands. Therefore, they were forfeited to government. The defaulters who lost their lands tendered their duties by borrowing money before the sales of the lands were confirmed. An extra amount by name 'malki' was recovered from them. This was an exploitation of extreme kind.
In Kolar, in 1922-23 when ryots asked for remission because of drought, Dewan had to interfere and order the stoppage of coercive methods in collection of revenue (57). In Shimoga in 1929-30 crops failed and ryots received no remission in spite of repeated appeals (58). In Hassan taluk, rains failed during 1918-19 and there was crop failure, but ryots received no remission. Likewise during 1929-33 depression years, when there was no value for the produce grown, peasants were badly handicapped for want of money and there was no help from the government by way of remissions. In Shimoga, peasants opposing the high handedness of government officials in not announcing remissions, staged a general hartal which culminated in the no-tax campaign of 1930s sponsored by Mahatma Gandhi (59).

Mr. Nadig Shivappa, Assembly Member speaking on this in the assembly stated that "such a procedure is likely to ruin the ryot in great ...", and needs "consideration of the government" (60). Government had to accept that the grant of remission of revenue in affected tracts is unduly delayed and in some cases coercive steps were taken for the recovery of the revenue" (61). But, government only directed the Revenue Commissioner to postpone the collection of revenue in those tracts which were recommended for remission. The power of sanctioning the remission to individual holders of lands rested with Deputy Commissioner. Remission was given only when more than half the area of wet and garden lands, excluding those under perennial garden crops, like areca, coconut etc., was affected. The remission so granted had to be submitted by the Deputy Commissioner through the R.C to the government (62). These rules applied to only those lands under tanks and not to those under rivers and channels.
There were heated arguments in the Legislative Assembly and Council. Representatives demanded a drastic change in the remission policy. They vociferously condemned the deliberate delay in announcing remissions (63). They stated, "The hardship caused to landholders by such delay and want of consideration has formed the subject of legitimate complaint" (64). Thus, a remission was denied to cultivator, only because Deputy Commissioner of the concerned district did not recommend such a measure. So the representative assembly members argued in the assembly that the question of remission "should be placed, instead with the discretionary powers of the executives, it should be given a statutory basis" (65). Even cultivator’s plea for decrease in the wet rates near breached tanks went unheeded. Government categorically argued that it was not possible under the Mysore Land Revenue Rules to change the settlement policy during the currency of a settlement. This rigidity of policy of the government raised many eyebrows in the Assembly. Mr. B.S.Puttaswamy a Council Member raising the issue stated that ‘the remission rules in Mysore are very conservative and must be liberalized’ (66). To receive remissions, the applications had to be made by the cultivator before the Jamabandi time. In case, where any local officer could have inspected the matter, government insisted on retaining the Bombay system, though such a policy meant a lot of discrepancy. Assembly Members demanded that remission powers should be given to local revenue officers. The fact that large areas of wet lands in some districts like Kolar, Tumkur, and Bangalore remained uncultivated and government was often made to consider that immediate relief to cultivators was an urgent necessity for itself, showed the hollowness of the policy (67).
LAND DISTRIBUTION

In Mysore, the total occupied area was 71,79,548 million hectares in 1901-02, which increased to 79,49,918 million hectares in 1941-42. The enormous rural population depended upon small pieces of land. The strength of land lordism in Mysore is revealed quite thoroughly by a comparison of the average size of peasant holdings with that of landed estates in India's chief provinces (68).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Average Peasant holding in 1946-47 (acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysore</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travancore</td>
<td>-3.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As there was increase in the number of rich peasants, there was naturally a shortage of land in the hands of average peasant. Most of them were not the owners of the land they cultivated. This is shown by a comparative Table below (69a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Average Peasant holding in 1926-27 (acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysore</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travancore</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table shows that Mysore witnessed a tremendous change in the acreage holding during a period of 25 years. Besides, the area under crops dropped from 6.72 million acres to 6.34 million acres. Per capita acreage of cropped land was 91% in 1881 and it dropped to 69% in 1941, as against the estimated minimum requirement of one acre per ryot. As against this background of shrinking crop land, the 1951 census had discovered the disturbing fact that the number depending upon agriculture had shot up from 5.6 million in 1941 to 6.34 million in 1951, or by 25.5 percent, while those sustained by non-agricultural avocations had risen only by 20% or from 2.27 million to 2.73 million. Another weakness of the state's economic position was its appallingly heavy dependency burden. In Mysore, every bread earner had to support 3 dependents, while in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and other states the ratio was 2:3. Mysore had the dubious distinction of carrying the heaviest dependency burden in India, as against the all India average of 10.6 percent. Only 3.4 percent of the state's population were earning dependents. Taking Sir John Russel's estimate of 0.74 acres of cropped area as sufficient for a minimum livelihood, the districtwise density showed that mean density exceeded the optimum in case of Bangalore, Mandya, Mysore and Kolar, which meant lower yield per unit. An economic survey conducted in 1940, showed that an average income of the Mysorean was Rs. 65/- in 1941 as against Rs. 120/- which was considered as necessary by the authors of Bombay plan. This meant that an average Mysorean of that time was not earning enough even to buy the bare necessities of life. Hence, he was under-fed, under-clothed, under housed in 1901 and in 1951 also. The tragedy was heightened, when census reports showed that cultivators of owned land were only 41 out of 10,000, while rent receivers of agricultural land were 140
out of 10,000. From a mere 55,300 in 1941, their number scaled up to 262,305, an increase of 374.3 percent and they claimed 2.9 percent of the total population, whereas in 1941, they constituted 0.8 percent of the total population (69b). The number of landless agriculturists for every 1000 agricultural land holders was 190. Thus, in 1947-48, the area under cultivation was 64,23,987 acres, out of the total area of 188,71,161 acres. Of this the area available for cultivation was 88,25,686 acres and nearly 81,86,639 acres were under occupancy and Inams were 86,72,701 acres or 45.9 percent of the total area and fallow lands were 1,004,5475 acres. The incidence of Land Revenue per head of actual cultivators of Mysore as compared with other provinces, reveals the high burden of taxation in Mysore (70).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Rs.a.p</th>
<th>Present day equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>6-09-4</td>
<td>6 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>3-15-9</td>
<td>3 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Provinces'</td>
<td>1-13-6</td>
<td>1 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>2-07-6</td>
<td>2 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysore</td>
<td>8-09-8</td>
<td>8 62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The incidence of taxation of Land Revenue was, thus, very uneven. Kolar, for example, paid Rs 1-13-0 (Rs 1=78) per head in 1901-02 and in 1934-35 it was paying as much as Rs 2-4-6 (Rs 2=30) and Tumkur for the same period was taxed 1-13-10 (Rs 1=85) and 2-10-9 (Rs 2=65) per head respectively. The incidence for the whole state increased from Rs 1-12-4 (Rs 1=75) in 1900-01 to Rs 2-1-8 (Rs 2=10) in 1936-37. The following table clearly shows this (71).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rupees</th>
<th>Rs-a-p</th>
<th>Present day equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>1-14-6</td>
<td>1 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>2-03-1</td>
<td>2 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-29</td>
<td>2-05-5</td>
<td>2 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>2-06-6</td>
<td>2 40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The depression years saw further increase even though there was a continuous request for the reduction of land assessment.

**Yield per acre**

In Mysore, the yield per acre varied very remarkably. Paddy, which was the staple food in this region, yielded as low as 5.5 "pallas" in Narasimharajapura taluk and 3.5 "pallas" in Nagar and a maximum of 11.5 "pallas" in Shringeri and 14.5 "pallas" in Kumsi taluk per acre. The highest yield was in Holenarasipur, 19.5 pallas and poorest in Heggadadevana Kote, two "pallas" per acre. Chitaldurg was the poorest district for paddy, the minimum and maximum being 2.5 "pallas" and 10 "pallas" respectively. In other districts the minimum and maximum average yields were 4 pallas and 19 pallas.

**Sugarcane**: Sugarcane yield was the lowest in Tumkur being 8.93 tons per acre, Holenarasipur 8.80 tons, Channagiri 8.03 tons. The average yield in other districts was 25 tons, the maximum yield was 51 tons in Gundlepet, 46.5 tons in Kunigal, 46 in Mandya and 45 tons in Theerthahalli.
**Ragi:** The yield of ragi varied from 3 pallas per acre to 6.8 mounds in different taluks. But, the State's average was 6 "pallas" on a minimum and 10 "pallas" the maximum.

There was, of course, no change since 1881, in the area of the state which remained at 29,458 square miles or 189 lakh acres. Out of this, more than half, i.e., 99 lakh acres was uncultivable. Out of the remaining, the area under occupancy and the cropped area went on increasing. correspondingly, the population also went on increasing, but this proportionate increase was not even (Table-2). But after 1931, both had decreased remarkably.

The occupied area which was 45.44 lakh acres in 1881, reached the maximum of 8357 in 1931-32, but was reduced to 78.19 in 1938-39 and the net cropped area which was 43.54 lakh acres in 1881, reached the maximum of 66.46 lakh acres in 1930-31 and was reduced to 63.06 lakhs in 1938-39 (72). An increasingly large area of occupied land was not cropped. The unoccupied area which was less than 2 lakhs in 1881, increased to 20 lakhs in 1923-24 and in 1938-39, it was more than 20 lakhs (73).

Out of a total cropped area of 63 lakh acres, 52 lakhs were under food crops of which ragi, jola and paddy were most important. The largest area under ragi was in 1895-96, i.e., 26 lakh acres and in 1941-42, it occupied only 22 lakh acres, jola and paddy about 7 lakh acres each. The total area under food crops which was 38 lakhs in 1881, had increased by only 37 percent, to 52 lakhs in 1941 (Table-3), whereas the population had increased by more than 75 percent.
The decrease in the area under food crops had revealed that agriculture was on a deteriorating trend. Government recommended the cultivation of commercial and industrial crops. Among such crops, largest scope was given to cotton. Till 1915-16, the quantity of raw cotton exported was about three times the quantity imported. Owing to the increased demand of the raw cotton within the state and due to development of cotton mills, raw cotton supply fell far short of demand. State began to import raw cotton. This was a great drain on economy. By 1930s, the quantity of raw cotton imported was nearly 3 times the quantity exported. The area under cotton which was 99,000 acres and 110,000 acres in 1913-14 and 1914-15, the First World War years, it went down to 84,000 acres in 1938-39.

There was also a large import of pulses particularly togari. Government had to pay large sums for these imports. As an improvement measure, Director of Agriculture recommended the intercropping of short duration ragi, cotton, togari and such other pulses, as a means of utilising the huge area under ragi for the production of much needed cotton and togari. Even government took several measures to popularise intercropping and dry farming as a sole solution of cereal and pulse shortages.

Crop structure

Mysore, Mandya and Bangalore districts grew most of the ragi followed in order by Tumkur, Kolar and Hassan in that order. Chitradurg and Mysore had the largest area under other dry grains such as jola, jawar and oilseeds. Chitradurg was prominently a cotton district. Kadur was in the bottom of the list, being the lowest wheat grower.
Mysore was leading in tobacco growing. Shimoga was a chief rice producing area. Mandya, Kolar, Shimoga and Hassan were the principal sugarcane districts. Mulberry cultivation was confined to the eastern part of the state. Tumkur stood highest in cocoanut gardens followed by Hassan. Shimoga excelled in areca. Kolar cultivated the largest extent of vegetables and Kadur and Hassan districts were almost exclusively coffee districts.

E. TREND OF AGRICULTURAL PRICES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEPRESSION YEARS

The downward slump of prices generally affected all agricultural commodities. It was influenced by many factors such as political difficulties, war debts, monetary adjustments, currency destabilisation, security speculation, etc. The prices began their downward trend by 1929 and showed a precipitous fall by 1931, the slight rise in 1931-32 period was due to the rise in prices of coffee, areca, cardamom, turmeric, oil, etc, as given in the following Table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
<th>Areca</th>
<th>Cardamom</th>
<th>Turmeric</th>
<th>Oil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But, other commodities always showed a downward trend. By 1933, prices were more than 52 percent below the pre-depression level. As most of these commodities occupied the largest cultivated area in the state, it most adversely affected the purchasing power of the entire agricultural community. These Malnad products deserved special
consideration as they occupied an important position in the external trade of the whole state. For instance, out of 10,204 tons of coffee valued at Rs 61.23 lakhs was produced in 1935-36, nearly 9201 tons valued at Rs 55.21 lakhs were exported from the state. From the height of prosperity, Malnad products had a disastrous fall in 1930. This caused a great misery to the producers as it was too sudden and unexpected. The downward trend of prices ruled from 1930-36 with the exception of perceptible rise in 1932 which was due to a sudden rise in the prices of commercial product's consequent upon a failure of crops and a shrinkage in the area of cultivation. Eventhough there was a sign of recovery which was perceptible from 1936 onwards, the price level was still far below the pre-depression level. It was, therefore, an admitted fact that Malnad producers were the worst sufferers as their commodities were more directly hit by the world depression. Moreover, as the survey report on the marketing survey of coffee conducted by the Department of Industries and Commerce revealed that Mysore coffee planters obtained about 63 percent of the London wholesale price, about 70 percent of the wholesale price of Bombay, and less than 55 percent of the retail prices of the same type of coffee. This non-realisation of the prices ruling in other markets for the same type of coffee greatly increased the misery. These price fluctuations were violent and sudden.

Due to allround decline in the prices and the consequent low purchasing power of the agriculturists, there was a fall by 50 percent in the original value during this period. This naturally put the agricultural classes in serious difficulty. During the period of post-war boom, people began to lead a higher standard of life and their wants increased entailing higher expenditure. At the same
time, the higher credit that the peasant and ryot commanded as a result of appreciation in land value was a bait to borrow heavily. The result of the sudden reduction in the price of agricultural commodities by 50 percent and more made their economic stability to go out of gear, added to this was the weak bargaining power and poor resources. The peasantry were the worst sufferers. The peasants, proprietors and land holders were intensely hit by the fall in the prices. They found it impossible to clear off the improvement debts taken during boom. At the same time, great pressure was applied on the agricultural classes by the village sowcars (money lenders) to repay their debts. This was the indirect but severe effect of the world currency muddle into which India was drawn by virtue of her position as exporter of raw materials. The miserable plight of the agriculturist was clearly reflected in the ever growing load of indebtedness. Various estimates were made of the agricultural debt of Mysorean agriculturist and it was reported that per capita debt was not less than 50 percent amounting to Rs 35/- crores by 1936.

State policy, peasant and land market

The colonial state policy and the consequent expansion of the hitherto closeted land market were two synonymous aspects which were greatly accountable for the impoverishment of the Mysorean peasant during the later part of the 19th century. The British state policy was instrumental in making the land as a commodity in the market for open sale. Earlier land rights were not ordinarily transferable because, land had little or no market and the economy was not considerably monetised. In majority of cases, land was given out as a gift rather than as a sale deed. Along with improvement in
demographic factors and change in agricultural trends, like pressure to grow commercial and industrial crop etc, land progressively and gradually acquired value (74).

Another main reason which gave land saleability was the development of infrastructural facilities such as expansion of irrigation, roads and railways resulting in the expansion of the market for agricultural produce, thereby creating a long term hike in the prices of agricultural commodities. Thirdly, the British removed all customary constraint's connected to land ownership and control through legislation which legalised and systematised the land transactions such as sales and mortgages. Legislations regarding the land sale were -

1. Repeal of usury laws of 1855 paved the way for the release of land for sale from debts

2. Civil procedure code of 1859 strengthened the judicial position of the creditors

3. The Indian Registration Act of 1866, defined the scope of land registration and made it easier

4. The Transfer of Property Act of 1882 defined the categories of sales and mortgages

Above all, failure to pay land revenue resulted in the compulsory resignation of land by peasants and was made a penalty (75) which made alienation of land for debt a common thing. All these factors made land a valuable property of highest importance and its saleability acquired unquestioned prominence.
But, there was an absence of regular land market in princely Mysore. Jacques Poucheypadass in his highly illustrative and educative essay states that "In the princely states not only did land have little or no price, but in many cases the right to sell land was not at all recognised" (76). Moreover land was burdened with too many exactions and heavy land revenue, which, often did not allow smooth and quick transactions of land (77). The land revenue demand in princely Mysore was always more than half the produce. The transfer of land rights was still a delayed legalistic process which the new occupant could hardly withstand and understand. As a consequence of heavy exactions, cultivator became indebted naturally to the local money lender and in due course of time, the money lender gained accession over his newly acquired property and land began to pass from agriculturists to non-agriculturists (78).

Besides, Mysore had quite a number of Inam holdings (79), where the ownership rights were still not clearly defined and a sale or a mortgage meant a death knell to the peasant. Private sale of land for debt was not an established procedure yet. Thus, the phenomena of mortgage came to be widely accepted.

In Mysore, land market in maidan region was different from that of the Malnad, for land transactions in maidan tract commanded high prices compared to that of Malnad, where land was scarcely sold or leased (Table-6). In Malnad, sowcars or the money lenders advanced money freely without any security through lease. In most of the cases, money lender himself was the landlord, who was also a trader and a merchant. If at all land came up for sale, it was always of an inferior type of land and when such a land was mortgaged,
it fetched very moderate prices. At the same time, land transactions in maidan parts commanded very high prices. Wet lands in these parts were occasionally sold at, from Rs 800/- to 4,000/- per acre. In Tumkur in most cases, a house was also given along with land as lease. Dry lands, as a matter of fact, were leased on waram system. Owner received a portion of the produce. An acre of good dry land was valued at Rs 200/- per acre.

In Kadur district, mortgages fetched more than the sales. This was because the owners of the superior class lands, chiefly gardens, were unwilling to part with them or abandon them as they could always raise loans on these gardens. Further, the investors who were generally money lenders engaged in trade preferred to leave the lands in the hands of the owners themselves who were better suited for it and were equally, if not more interested in the proper upkeep of the property.

But the question as to why mortgages fetched more money than sale was difficult to answer. It was a well known fact that ryot often got indebted to the sowcar and sowcar advanced more money on mortgage than he could receive from the outright sale of the land. This brings us to the question why a ryot got into debt. The causes for indebtedness could be summed up as follows:

1. Instability of farm holdings
2. Varying climatic conditions and famine recurrence
3. Epidemics
4. Unreliability of harvests
5. Unprecedented movement of commodity prices
Debt was, thus, indispensable for the ryot. Its incidence was high in areas where crops of commercial and industrial nature were grown. For example, the coffee lands in Manjarabad, Koppa, Kadur and the areca garden lands in Shimoga, Sira, etc, carried more debts compared to dry lands in Malnad. In Malnad, the money lender was himself a merchant or a trader.

Outright sale of the land fetched less price because it was difficult to get a loan on land which was not well above the amount of the loan in value. Thus, sale amount bore a smaller ratio to the assessment than the loans did, particularly, when the mortgage had to supplement his original advance by a further sum required for the proper upkeep of his security. The very fact that investments on land was favoured indicated that there was a margin of profit to the investor. The increase in population and competition for lands, resulted more in the expansion of cultivation than in the increasing value of lands thereby reducing the margin of profits. One could, thus, notice a very great increase in land transactions all over the state between 1878 and 1907, the 'years of expansion'. This period is called 'expansion years' because there was an expansion in the -

1. total cultivated area; (2) population; (3) number of dependents on land; (4) railway network; and (5) irrigation facilities

Kolar, one of the dry tracts of Mysore enjoyed a mortgage loan worked out to a higher multiple of assessment than sale amounts, compared to all other dry districts. Bangalore also figured in this list where every type of land claimed high saleability. But then, Bangalore was quickly
becoming an industrial centre and heavy capital was invested there. In the plain taluks of Hassan district, lease of land was not much in vogue. It was thought here, that profits from gardens were largely lost to the owner if they leased it out and there was further danger of the lessee neglecting the garden which deteriorated easily and quickly. Good lands, especially in the vicinity of the railway tracts and high roads were eagerly sought for. The dry coconut gardens were valued by the number of trees standing and a garden containing trees in bearing, commanded a price of Rs 8/- per tree in 1870s to Rs 38/- per tree in 1901-02.

In the Malnad taluks of Shimoga district, rice lands which were selling at Rs 15/- to Rs 20/- per acre in 1880, shot up to Rs 40/- and Rs 50/- because of the coming of the railway line into this tract. Here, lands not only commanded high prices, but the rates also went on increasing. The market value of the land was regulated by population and that too of skilled population.

Another feature of the land market in Malnad was that lands in better populated and accessible tracts were never parted or leased. For instance, in Sagar taluk, there were only 4 acres of garden unoccupied land in 1914 and in Talaguppe region, there were only two acres of land unoccupied. Thus, there was hardly any room for outsiders to invest their money. In certain taluks in Malnad, a considerable extent of garden lay waste and no one was willing to take it, simply because it lacked labour facility inspite of natural advantages. In Sorab taluk, land transactions indicated a low market value, because here, the owners of the land, mainly Havika Brahmins, never entertained outsiders and cultivated the lands themselves (80).
Gardens were often leased out on 'geni' or 'gutta' system. The geni per acre ranged from 12-16 maunds of supari which represented 3-4 times the assessment. Besides gardens never thrived in the hands of new owners. Inexperienced people were not very anxious to acquire property because the maintenance required high skill and labour. In Channagiri and Honnali taluks, the total number of sales and mortgages examined for 33 years was only 1,736 giving an average of 60 per year. Besides, in Malnad area, the land lord and the Sowcars were one and the same and they acted in the capacity of merchants also.

The variation in the land market transactions was peculiar and striking. It all depended on land revenue collections. As the revenue demand increased, more lands came into market, because peasant could not meet the revenue demands of the government and he found it difficult to pay the assessment on due date fixed (81). Agricultural land did not attract outside capital and land owners were made to import cattle and labour to maintain it. Besides, the land market was not based on perfect competition. Though the land under occupation increased, there was no improvement in the life of the peasant. Further, with the increase in assessment rates, the peasant found it difficult to maintain his landed property, surviving the climatic odds such as famines, floods, insufficient monsoons, etc.

Another noticeable factor of land market was that whenever there was a land transmission, it was between a borrower and a lender rather than between a vendor and a purchaser. The agricultural indebtedness acted as a main hurdle in such transactions and a peasant was forced to transfer his land to his lender being unable to pay off his
debts (82). Every mortgage transaction did not result in an immediate transfer of landed property. When a land came up for sale, land in question did not change hands but only the right to collect revenue from such land changed (83).

The high value of land never meant that there was any increase in the net income from cultivation. Any slight increase in the agricultural profits was due only to the increased cost of production and gradually this profit was neutralised because of the increase in prices. According to fundamental law, the cost of production had a tendency to augment with every addition to the population in the gross profits of production. The fact that mortgages fetched more value than the sales (84) directly showed that only mortgages could serve to strengthen the money lender's hold over produce and not its outright sale. So, money lender's only easily realisable security was the debtor's crop and cattle and not his land, which he did not hold as an exclusive proprietor and thus could hardly sell to any outsider.

The question of relieving the agriculturist from this chronic indebtedness engaged the attention of Government as early as 1890s. In the year 1894, an agricultural bank was started (85). Though banks were started with lofty intentions they failed miserably. The entire financing of the scheme by direct grant from Government tended to weaken the motive for self-help and cooperation. Besides, large advances given to Malnad land holder could be realised due to depression in coffee trade. By the time Mysore Cooperative Societies Regulation was passed in 1904, the malfunctions in agricultural banks had extended to such an extent that Government decided to abandon the scheme and in pursuance of the policy, all existing banks were wound up by 1917 (88).
Majority of agriculturists were indebted agriculturists and could hardly offer any security for loans. The repaying capacity of the borrower had also been so greatly affected by the agricultural depression that there was heavy accumulation of arrears. Any extension of the transaction of the bank could not be easily made in these areas without seriously jeopardising the interests of the banks. Only such places as abundant water supply areas, perennial rainy areas, and places of assured harvest were selected for establishing a bank and there were comparatively few such places in Mysore. But, all mortgage banks by insisting on security of cultivable land for further payment of loans to agriculturists delimited the ryot’s chances of borrowing. The great majority of indebted ryos were not in a position to furnish even this margin and hence the banks could cater to the needs of a handful of agriculturists only (90). Even the usurious loans regulation of 1923 with its reserved power to exclude any area, any class of ryots and any class of transactions from the operation was left to the discretion of the judge to decide about the rate of interest, thereby giving hardly any relief to debtors. As this act failed to provide enough security to the debtors, the Mysore Agriculturists Relief Regulation of 1928 was passed. It gave a number of privileges to the debtor, though the act conferred many benefits regarding the discharge of existing debts, their chances of rising future loans were curtailed because the creditor who lend money on personal security had no means of recovering it legitimately and he could not use coercive steps to recover it. Thus, the chances of unscrupulous agriculturists alienating their lands could not be eliminated or reduced (91). The Debt Conciliation Boards Regulation of 1937, with its clause that the Board was empowered to take evidence with regard to the amount of debt
and its decision being binding on both parties delimited the ryot's rights. Therefore, there were great chances for the Board to prevail upon the creditors' statement rather than the ryots'.

Thus, several of these enactments were mere palliatives which adversely put off the evil day of expropriation of the lower and middle order ryots. According to the report of the Chandrashekar Iyer's Committee on cooperation, unless income from lands and other sources were substantially increased, there was no solution to the problem of indebtedness. The credit societies and banks started in response to the urgent need of the ryot became just another source of borrowing and as there was no check on the expenditure of loans raised, very little progress was made in the liquidation of debts. The capital structure of these societies was not satisfactory. Debt conciliation and land mortgage banks did not work hand in hand.

There were nearly 16,500 villages and societies were only 1,400 (92). The total agricultural indebtedness was estimated at 30 crores' and the land mortgage bank covered only 5% of the debts. The interest charged on the loan was very heavy i.e., nearly 8% and a debtor annually paid Rs 10 per every Rs 100/- he borrowed. As a result the land transfer became a continuous process besides relief enactments. As land market in Mysore was never an open market, the supply of saleable land was not at all regular and competitive. The ideological factors such as land as ogod, land as bread earner, land as earth mother, etc, prevented the peasants from putting it up for sale. Sometimes due to over assessments, the peasants was forced to abandon his land. The mean annual income of the Mysorean
peasant was roughly Rs 35/-.
Out of this, he remitted Rs 29/- as land tax. Thus, British sponsored land proprietary laws successfully completed the commercialisation of tenant rights (93). The transferability of occupancy rights which had several customary traditional hindrances were legalised and were brought within the scope of law.

G. SUMMARY

The agrarian structure of princely Mysore presented a very precarious picture, though Mysore Government followed an arbitrary and wilful policy of taxation, thereby yielding to the pressures of colonial requirements and it failed to create a class of contented peasantry. The revision assessment was always unfavourable to ryots. The whole policy proceeded with a prejudicial outlook of gaining at the cost of ryot. Every revision settlement meant an increase of assessment whether deserved or undeserved. The Government's authority to levy irrigation cess as distinct from land revenue gave it power to enhance it any time, because a khushki or dry land was converted into tari or wet by the single handed efforts of ryot for which he paid the tari kandayam in addition to oppressive irrigation cess. This cess was, in fact, a double levy and was wrong in principle. The crux of the problem was that in some districts, the cess was merged with tari kandayam, while in other, it was shown as levied separately. Besides, there was no justification for levying a cess in cases where no kind of obligation was discharged by Government towards ryots. The irrigation cess was levied in Malnad where not even one-sixteenth of portion of the total area of wet lands was fed by tanks and channels.
Another disgusting feature of revenue settlement was that it gave absolute discretion to Government to fix the rate of levy. Ryots had no say in this matter and their representatives in the Council and Assembly failed to get any redressal. Though Assembly members argued that there could be no taxation without the consent of legislature and without proper representation, and tax payers should be given a definite voice in fixing the land revenue, Government maintained a deliberate silence. Many of the amendments to land revenue code was passed without proper statutory basis.

Above all, the land taxation did not go hand in hand with canons of taxation. There was no equity because the burden of taxation fell heavily on landless tenants and labourers. There was no permanency because the revenue was enhanced at every revision settlement. There was no certainty and fixity. Whenever there was a representation from cultivators on the excessiveness of assessment, Government waved off the objections as not having much force and as not disclosing any serious ground. Even the representative members were helpless though they demanded justice on the floor of the House. Even, Dewan had to accept that there was very little scope for additional taxation and most of the taxed money was adjusted to Imperial Government in the form of indirect levies which made the economic situation in Mysore wholly unsatisfactory and was further aggravated by the imposition of heavy subsidy.

The land revenue policy suffered from many scientific defects. Both land revenue code and land revenue rules were essentially empirical and the settlement officers' final decision depended not upon the formal working out of the results based on theory but on the subjective impression of
total knowledge and enterprise. The ryot's were saddled with all sorts of cesses and responsibilities with no adequate return therefrom. Moreover, the rates of assessment were so high that it almost hindered the cultivation process. The demands of the Government on the tax payers continued to be indisputably heavy without any compensation in expenditure either in constructive or productive schemes. Hence, increase in the expenditure in no way led to a corresponding growth in the average income per head of population which stood almost stationary at a meagre Rs 35/-, even in 1951.

Another bemoaning fact was royts were harassed by the revenue officials. Revenue officials put a lot of pressure on village officers so that they might collect as much revenue as possible. Village officers in their anxiety to please the higher authorities often went out of their way to collect revenues. The revenue registers were filled on the day of the month hastily without giving any proper justification.

Though Dewans often declared in the Assembly that ryot is the backbone of the economy, the attempts to ameliorate his conditions were very few. During 1930s, Government began to show some false concern towards ryots in the wake of national struggle gaining momentum. But the efforts were not whole hearted and thus proved ineffective.
REFERENCES


4. It was argued "... almost every British Institution introduced into India in the 19th century had some effect on land holding". A.T. Embree "Landholding and British Institutions" an article in R.E. Pykenberg (Ed.) "Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History", Oxford Press, London, 1982, p. 35


7. Statistical Abstract of Mysore, 1951, p. 21


10. "The promotion of railways was due to British pressure consequent upon by the industrial revolution in Britain". Daniel Thorner, "Shaping of Modern India", Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, p. 108

11. Proposal for the instructions of the introduction of rules defining the powers of landlord in the recovery of rent file No. 23, 1870, Sl.No. 1-8, L.R. 1876, Karnataka State Archives (hereafter abbreviated as KSA), Bangalore, p.7, para 18

12. Ibid, p.7, para 18

13. Ibid, p.7, para 18


15. Lewis Rice. Gazetteer of Mysore, p. 268

16. Ibid, pp. 268-269

17. Malnad Economic Development Enquiries Committee Report stated that ".. there is a very high rate of assessment and is operating as a heavy burden of taxation on the poor Malnad ryot and has greatly discouraged bagayat cultivation", The Report, 1931, p.122

18. "Increased cultivation in the Malnad is relatively far more important than in Mainland... in Malnad every additional acre means extra capital sunk.." Revision settlement of Sorab taluk, 1908, p.4, para 13
19. But the main mature in introducing revision settlement was stated in a letter of the Chief Commissioner to the Secretary of the government of India. A survey in the Province was needed to protect the interests of the government.

Introduction of Revenue Survey into Mysore file (hereafter called IRS). No. 3, 1862, S1.No.3, 1862, S1.No.1-7, L.S. 1862, KSA (B), p.9, para 12

20. In one taluk there were 147 rates on wet lands varying in rentals from Rs 1/- to Rs 34/-, ibid, p.9, para 12

21. Proposed Revenue Survey of Mysore Territory (hereafter called PRS), Foreign Department, Revenue 'A', Sep 1862, No. 35-36, National Archives of India (hereafter called NAI), New Delhi, p.2, para 12

22. ".. under so vicious on arrangement, the Shanbog becomes the king of the village", ibid, p.30, para 13

23. Ibid, p. 30, para 13

24. Chamberain himself had stated in 1885 regarding Inam tenures as ".. any examination into the titles of landlords, carried back for many generations might be undesirable and very unconventional..", as quoted by James Platt, p. 78

25. PRS (NAI) op. cit., p.4, para 15

26. IRS (KSA) op. cit., p.10, para 18

27. PRS (NAI). op. cit., p.10, para 18
28. As early as 1840s only, government had recognised the importance of coffee gardens. Excerpts from letter from Montogomery, Superintendent of Astagram Division to Secretary to the Government of India, File No. 26, Astagram files, 1842, KSA (B), para 8

29. Mark Cubbon had tried to arrange for a proper survey of all coffee lands and he argued that such a policy would in turn prove highly profitable to government

30. PRS (NAI), op. cit. p.4, para 18

31. In a settlement involves the disposal of many a delicate and intricate question and its dealing has been eminently unsuccessful..." excerpts from the Reconstruction of Mysore Administration. Foreign and Political Department 'A', July 1879, Sl.No. 278-283, NAD (New Delhi), p.7, para 19

32. Proceedings of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore (hereafter abbreviated as (PGHM), January, 1910, para I, Revenue, p.34, para 3

33. Proceedings of the Mysore Legislative Assembly (hereafter quoted as PMRA), June, p.163

34. Ibid, 1927, Oct. p.157

35. Ibid, 1934, June, p. 256

36. Ibid, 1937, June p.353

37. Ibid, 1936, June, p.251
38. Ibid, 1937, October p. 117
39. Ibid, 1937, June p. 112
40. Ibid, 1937, October p. 119
41. Ibid, p. 255
42. Ibid, June 1913, June p.29
43. It was argued in the Assembly ".. these inconveniences and hardships to people were made capital of by the agitators for stirring up discontent against government ..", para 1940, June p.131
44. Ibid, p. 161
45. In total, there were only 3,000 acres of wet land. Revision Settlement Report of Kolar, 1915, KSA (B), p. 17, para 8
46. Resettlement Report of Kolar District, 1921, KSA(B), p.4, para 4
48. Revision settlement report of Srirangapattana Taluk, 1925, KSA(B), p.1, para 2
49. Melukote and Tirumala Sagara Chattra Magnis were made to pay double the dry assessment compared to other magnis of this taluk. The total assessment demand on wet land was barely 9 thousand rupees from 6 thousand kandies of produce in 1863-64, which shot up 14 thousand for per thousand kandies in 1887-88, ibid, p.8, para 3

50. Survey Superintendent himself remarked thus ".. I have never yet in any long experience of the province of Mysore met with any instance of such unequal and at the same time inadequate assessment on land as in this case..." The letter dated 12th January 1889, Revision settlement did Report of Srirangapattana taluk, 1889, KSA(B), p.5, para 14

51. The ryots of Manjarabad taluk opposed severely the increase in the land assessment "as it would aggravate the hardships of Malnad ryots". D.C. of Hassan district answering the petition stated that both dry and wet rates on land were abnormally high and should be immediately reduced. This subject came up for discussion in the Assembly in 1924 and after much hesitation, government reduced the rates slightly. Resettlement Report of Manjarabad taluk, 1923, KSA(B), p.4, para 2

52. It was levied in lumpsum in maidan taluks and separately in Malnad, op. cit. p.6, para 7

53. From officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Mysore to the Secretary to the Government of Mysore, dated 3rd June 1874, PGHM, 1874, p.18, para 15
54. Petition from the ryots of Gangasandra file No.2 of 1924, Sl.No. 55-58, L.R.1924, KSA(B), p.4, p.12

55. Revenue Commissioner of Mysore, in his letter to the Secretary to the Government of Mysore, dated 18th January 1889. Revision settlement of Davangere taluk, 1889, KSA(B), p.18, para 24

56. "..The hardship caused to landholders by such delay and want of consideration was formed the subject of legitimate complaint in the assembly." PGHM 1928, July, p.21, para 4

57. "Petititon from .. Kolar", opcit, p.7, para 3

58. The remission issue was connected to national movement and government declined to issue remissions alleging that villagers were involved in no-tax campaign and that there was no need for any concessions, PMRA, 1931, October p.246

59. Speaking on the nature of protests from villages in Shikaripur Taluk, M.R.Hosakoppa Krishna Rao stated that "..in and out of the place in this taluk, people who were utterly uneducated and were not subject to the impact of the political conditions outside the state stood firm and vehemently protested against the incessant demand for increased payment ..". Ibid, pp. 247-8

60. Proceedings of the Assembly of the Representative of Ryots merchants and others of the State of Mysore, 1905

62. Supervision and Remission of wet assessment on tank irrigated lands. PGHM October 1925, GO dated 3rd October 1925, p.43, para 2

63. PMRA, October 1922, pp.6-7

64. PGHM, July 1928, p.21, para 4

65. PMLC, June 1937, p.55

66. Ibid, June 1937, p.56

67. Remission of assessment of revenue on account of distress and seasonal conditions. 375 of 1919, Sl.No. 1-13, L.R. 1918, KSA(B), p.4,para-2

68. Source: Agricultural Statistics for India, 1950, p.117

69. (a) Ibid, p. 117

69. (b) The percentage of non-cultivating owners was just 0.2 percent 1891, Census of India, Vol. XXV (25), Part-I,A. p.343


71. Ibid, p. 18

73. (a) Ibid, 1941, Tables, p. 158

74. According to government Report on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness, 1895, land sales had to be officially recognised as it was a consequence of the modernisation process, adopted by certain states, p. 112

75. In the year 1931-32, an extent of 86,990 acres of land was resumed by government as penalty. Report on the administration of Mysore (hereafter MAR), 1931-32, p. 7, para 3

76. Jacques Puchepadass. "Land power and market and the rise of land market in gangetic delta" in Peter Robb (Ed.) Rural India, Segment Books, New Delhi, 1986, p. 79

77. The laws affecting mortgages, loans on property need amendment and the present dilatoriness of legal procedure must be changed before capital can be safely invested. Representations of SMPA regarding the depressed state of coffee industry, File No. 5, Sl.No. 1-2, Agri. 1901, KSA(B)

78. See Table No.5, appendix

79. Inams constituted nearly 45.9 percent of the total area in 1947-48, MAR 1947, p. 118

80. "... So jealous are these Wargadars of any one else coming in as landlords that they will pay assessment for the land, they do not really require rather than relinquish it .." Revision Settlement Report of Sorab, 1908, p. 6, para 20
81. The total land sales for the period 1889-1911 was 43,012 registered while the number was 18,214 for 1878-81 period

82. See the table No.6 (appendix)

83. There was no provision in the rent recovery act for forfeiting the land and to sell it free of all encumbrances and when lands were sold, only the title right passed to the purchaser

84. The total mortgage debt was equal to about 8 times the annual income of the cultivator. "Mortgage debt in Mysore", an Editorial article in Indian Journal of Economics (IJE), Vol. 1931, No. 6, p. 18; see also Table

85. Inspector of Agricultural Banks was placed under Revenue Commissioner and rules for issue of loans needed security of assets. R. Balakrishna, "Cooperative rural credit in Mysore" IJE, Vol. 22, p. 471

86. Source: "Report on the progress of cooperative movement in India", Statement 1-B, 1940-41, p. 1


89. Scheme for the grant of takavi loans, LR, 451, Sl.No. 1-5, 1941, para II, KSA(B)
90. The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India admitted that the Agrarian Legislation in India had failed to achieve its purpose. The Report 1927, p.380, para 2

91. Ibid, Table No.7, Appendix

92. Ibid, Table No.8, Appendix

93. "... the liability of land, to sale for debt is the natural and logical carollary of the conferment of the proprietary right." Keatings Memorandum as quoted by H.E.Jones, M. Acting Commissioner of Sindh to the Governor and President in Council, Bombay, 1892, Selection from papers on indebtedness and land transfer TNA(M), undated p. 132