CHAPTER IV
CHIKKADEVARAJA’S RELATIONS WITH SAMBHANJI (1680-1689)

Mysore came into closer contact with the Marathas during the rule of Sambhaji than that of Shivaji. The appointment of Harji Mahadik to regulate the affairs of the Karnatak, Harji’s wars with Mysore over the question of Trichinopoly, Sambhaji’s devastating Karnatak expeditions in 1682 and in 1686 and Ekoji’s disposal of Bangalore to the highest bidder were some of the factors which brought the Mysore Raja and the Marathas closer together. But their relations were no better. The traditional policy of hostility continued between the two powers.

Shivaji died in April 1680. No sooner did he breathe his last than his two sons, Sambhaji and Rajaram entered into bitter quarrels for the possession of the throne of Maharashtra. Soyara Bai, the eldest surviving wife of Shivaji, resolved to put her son, Rajaram, on the throne. But Sambhaji defeated her design by proclaiming himself the ruler of Maharashtra on 20 July 1680. In these conflicts Mysore was completely ignored. None paid any attention to Chikkadevaraja. The Mysore Raja started his military adventure. He reduced Chikkatotlagere, Koratagere, Magadi, Maddagiri, Kadur, Wirannahurga, Channaravadurga, Bijjvara, Gundumaledurga and Bhutipura in the north of Mysore. This threatened the security of the Maratha principality in the Karnatak. Further, Channammaji’s political dealings with Sambhaji and the Golkonda Sultan had

provoked Chikkadevaraja. 1 In 1680 an expedition was sent under Kumaraiya, the Mysore Dalvoy against Ikkeri. A bloody battle was fought at Vasudhara between the two armies of Ikkeri and Mysore in which Kumaraiya was defeated. The far-reaching effect of the failure of the Mysore expedition was that Channamai took possession of Kadur, Banavara, Hassan and Belur and strengthened her defences against Mysore. 2

The Mysore-Maratha relations during the time of Sambhaji begin from 1681 when Maratha generals like Harji Mahadeik and Shamji Navak with Jaitaji Katkar and Baji Kakade were appointed to regulate the affairs of the Karnataka. 3 Sambhaji could not deal with Mysore in person upto 1692, on the contrary, he delegated powers to his Maratha generals to check the Mysore expansion. This was because Sambhaji’s position in Maharashtra was not secure. There was danger from Sovara Bai and her party. Sambhaji crushed her power by killing two hundred Maratha ladies who supported her. He beheaded the Maratha nobility, looted their houses and confiscated their property. Moreover, the Karnataka affairs needed his immediate attention. The death of Shivaji was an occasion for the Marathas of the South to assert their independence. Martin writes, “The news of his (Shivaji’s) death created a great confusion among the chief officers in these parts (i.e. in the province of Gingee and the eastern Karnataka).

Some of them seemed to stay in their Governments and render

2. Ke. Y. V. IX, pp.132-134; Keladi Samanthadasa Bavara Vamsavali, pp.54-55.
themselves independent". By the orders of Sambhaji, Janardana Pant and Bakhunatha Narayan who had been left in charge of the Karnatak territories by Shivaji, were arrested and put into prison. Sambhaji sent his brother-in-law, Harji Mahadik to take charge of Gingee and himself remained in Maharashtra. These troubles within and without prevented Sambhaji from taking active part in the affairs of Mysore.

Bangalore principality wielded a great influence on young Sambhaji. Before his enthronement in Maharashtra in 1680, Sambhaji had remained in Mysore. Several inscriptions found in Mysore State throw a flood of light on the activities of Sambhaji in Mysore. These inscriptions suggest that Sambhaji had spent the early part of his life in Mysore State as the Governor of Kolar and Chikkaballapur and that he was in know of the Mysore politics. Chikkadevaraja who had reduced a number of territories in "nakur" District was not able to extend his incursions into Bangalore, Kolar and Chikkaballapur because of the presence of Sambhaji. As Chikkadevaraja did not interfere in the affairs of Bangalore principality no event of any serious nature had happened between the Mysore Raja and Sambhaji before 1680.

Harji Mahadik was the sole master of the Maratha possessions in the Karnatak. He also followed the traditional policy of hostility towards Mysore. From Gingee, his capital, he extended his

3. Ambika Bai, daughter of Shivaji by his first wife, was married to Harji Mahadik.
4. See Appendix-4.
schemes of conquest and laid siege to the fort of Dharmapuri to the east of Mysore. The Mysore army resisted the siege. The siege continued for eight months. Harji, Dadaji, Jaitaji and other generals who persisted in their resolve to take the fort were at last remissed with heavy slaughter. Undeterred by this, they went and took up their stand in Samvamipattan (Southern Dharmapuri). Even from there they were pursued by the Mysore army.

The war between Harji and Mysore came to a close in December 1681. The relations between the Marathas and Mysore were greatly strained. The presence of Harji at Gingee and the frequent border disputes were the main obstacles in the way of better relations between Mysore and the Marathas.

Sambhaji's relations with Mysore were further strained over the Trichinopoly issue. Trichinopoly was the bone of contention between Mysore and Madura. Till 1681 Trichinopoly was under the control of Madura but after 1681 it became the disputed territory between Mysore and Madura. Both parties began to use all their arts and policy, one to retain it and the other to annex it. Chokkanatha, the Navak of Madura, unable to face the Mysore army which was superior in number, formed a confederacy consisting of Ekaji of Tanjore, Harji Mahadik of Gingee, and the Maravas against Mysore. The Marathas fought on the side of Chokkanatha. Consequently, the Mysore-Maratha relations were strained greatly.

In order to understand the Maratha relations with Mysore

1. A.V.C., III, 97; Sachchadrachara Tirnava, I, p. 59.
under Sambhaji, it is necessary to trace the Trichinopoly question. Since 1678 Chokkanatha Navak's power had been growing weak. His commander, Rustam Khan had usurped the power and begun to look down upon the Navak family. Thereupon Chokkanatha decided to make himself free from the clutches of his commander. He appealed to the Maravas and Chikkadevaraja of Mysore. Chikkadevaraja despatched his army under the command of Kumaraiya apparently to put down Rustam Khan and relieve Chokkanatha from his anxiety, but in reality to procure a true political picture of Madura and try with all possible means the reduction of Trichinopoly. The Mysore palace record mentions that Chikkadevaraja commissioned Kumaraiya to Madura for the purpose of exacting the arrears of tribute due from Chokkanatha since 1667. This implies that since 1667 the Nayak family of Madura had been tributary to Mysore. But Chokkanatha had not been a tributary of Mysore. So, the information given in the palace record is not reliable. On the contrary, Wilks and the Jesuit letter of 1682 state that the ultimate objective in undertaking an expedition to Madura was the conquest of territories.

The Jesuit letter states, "Kumara Raya the Mysore general attacked Trichinopoly with a strong army".

On receipt of the news, Rustam Khan advanced to Trichinopoly and fell upon the Mysore army but was repulsed with heavy slaughter.

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1. Letters to Fort St. George (1682).
further, Rustam Khan returned to the capital where Chokkanatha hatched a plot which brought about the end of the commander. Chokkanatha was freed from Rustam Khan's tyranny and was grateful to Mysore for her timely help. Chokkanatha wrote to the Governor of Madras, "We and the Naique of Mysore are now good friends". But this friendship was a short-lived one, because Mysore helped Chokkanatha not to save him but to take Trichinopoly. Kumaraiya had brought about the ruin of Rustam Khan and gained the upper hand. Realising the precarious position of Chokkanatha, Kumaraiya demanded the surrender of Trichinopoly to Mysore. Chokkanatha was greatly annoyed at this. He had to find out some means to defeat the design of Kumaraiya. He formed a confederacy consisting of Ekoji of Tanjore, Harji of Gingee and the Maravas. Among these confederates the Maravas were not sincere at heart. They joined the confederacy "on the pretext of defending their sovereign but the object was to get their share of pillage". The Marathas joined the confederacy for several reasons. First, the southern advance of Mysore as far as Madura and Trichinopoly during 1678-80 had become a source of anxiety to the Marathas. Secondly, Harji, Dada, Jaitaji and other Maratha generals had intervened in the affairs of Mysore in 1681 and actually laid siege first to Dharmapuri and then to Samvaminipattan but they had been put to rout by the Mysore army. Since then the Marathas had been waiting for an opportunity to check the aggression of Mysore. Thirdly, the Marathas were aware of the

2. Letter of Fort St. George, 8 March, 1682.
3. Ibid., pp.303-304.
unjust demand of Trichinopoly by Mysore. They were eager to retain Trichinopoly for Madura so that there would not be any trouble to their possessions from Mysore. Cessation of Trichinopoly to Mysore would mean the out-break of constant frictions between the Marathas and Mysoreans because Trichinopoly, Tanjore and Ginge were not far away from one another. Fourthly, Pkoji had a strong reason to join Chokkanatha against Mysore. His Prime Minister, Yasharanta Rao had been defeated and humiliated by Chikkadaivaraja in the battle of Hour. Lastly, at no time in the 17th century, had the Marathas and the rulers of Mysore remained as friends. One's adversity was another's opportunity. Therefore, the Marathas proceeded on the pretence of helping Chokkanatha but their real motive was "to repulse the army of Mysore whose proximity they feared". If the repulse of the Mysore army from Trichinopoly was the ultimate object of the Marathas, the intention of Mysore was to uproot the Marathas from Tanjore and Ginge and to revive the ancient Navaks family there. Thus Trichinopoly became a bone of contention between Mysore and the Marathas.

Disturbed by the combination of the Marathas at Trichinopoly Kumaraiva realised that it was not wise to resist such armies with troops so inferior in number. He conceived two plans. He tried one plan with Chokkanatha and another with Harji but both of them failed. The first plan he tried with Chokkanatha was that he

1. La Mission Du Madure, III, pp.303-304.
3. La Mission Du Madure, III, pp.303-304.
4. Ibid.
"offered peace to the Navak promising to preserve his kingdom for him" and to "re-establish the successors of the ancient Navaks of Tanjore and Gingee". In this plan Kumaraiva assured Chokkanatha two things. First, he promised to preserve the Madura kingdom for Chokkanatha himself and secondly, he promised to revive the ancient Navaks' family at Tanjore and Gingee. By the first point, Kumaraiva wished to create confidence in Chokkanatha about the preservation of his kingdom and by the second point, he wished to isolate Chokkanatha from the Maratha combination on the pretext of reviving the ancient Navaks family at Tanjore and Gingee. But Chokkanatha did not agree. He could easily infer that it was a deception designed to trap him. The Jesuit letter of 1682 comments, "Undoubtedly the wisest course would have been to make a league with the king of Mysore to chase the Marathas". This observation of Andre Freire is difficult to agree because Chokkanatha could not trust the ruler of Mysore for several reasons. First, Chikkadevaraja had annexed Andivar and Kunnatur situated on the frontiers guarding the dominions of Madura and humiliated Ghatta Mudaliar, the ally of Chokkanatha. Then he had directed his marches towards Erode and taken it by reducing Akka Reddi, its ruler. Andre Freire himself writes, "The king of Mysore entered them, without striking a blow and took possession of the only two fortresses which Madura had preserved till then.

1. Ibid.  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid.  
in the north. Secondly, smarting under the tyranny of Rustam Khan, Chokkanatha had appealed to Mysore for help in order to free himself. Chikkadevaraja had sent his Dalvoy Kumaraiya to help him. Kumaraiya had gone to Trichinopoly, resisted Rustam Khan, brought about his ruin and freed Chokkanatha. Taking advantage of the situation, Kumaraiya had demanded the surrender of Trichinopoly. This Chokkanatha could not do. Lastly, it was to defeat the designs of Kumaraiya, the confederacy was formed consisting of the Marathas. How could Chokkanatha make a league with Mysore against the Marathas? In fact Chokkanatha had followed a wise policy from his own standpoint in allying himself with the Marathas against Mysore. Otherwise, he had to surrender Trichinopoly to Mysore as was demanded by Kumaraiya.

Having failed in his first plan with Chokkanatha, Kumaraiya implemented his second plan with Harji. He persuaded Harji to withdraw from the field of action by holding out prospects of booty. Kumaraiya offered him "large sums of money to corrupt his fidelity and pledge him to retire to Gingi." In resorting to this diplomacy, Kumaraiya wanted only to gain time to enable Chikkadevaraja of Mysore "to send him help which he had applied for" but his letters fell into the hands of his rivals. They had kept away these despatches and worked to bring about the ruin

2. Ibid., pp. 303-304.
3. Ibid.
of the general. Even this plan also failed. Kumaraiya’s diplomacy and tact were misfired. They allowed Harji and other Maratha generals to study the policy of Kumaraiya towards them. Kumaraiya’s offer of friendship with Chokkanatha, his revival of ancient Navaks rule at Tanjore and Gingee, his insistence on the Marathas to withdraw from Trichinopoly, his holding of prospects of booty to them and his secret correspondence with the ruler of Mysore for additional reinforcements convinced Harji that Kumaraiya had been slowly and steadily working to bring about the complete destruction of the Marathas in the south. So, Harji, adopted a retaliatory measure much more severe than that of the Mysoreans. He decided to attack Srirangapatna itself. The policy pursued by Kumaraiya at Trichinopoly had a tremendous effect on the attitude of the Marathas towards Mysore. Hitherto the Marathas had been intent upon securing the retreat of the Mysore army from Trichinopoly because they feared their proximity. But now their policy was to secure the possession of Srirangapatna itself.

Realising the critical position of Kumaraiya, Harji despatched his Maratha generals like Padaji Kakade, Jaitaji Katkar, Nimbalkar and others to effect the conquest of Srirangapatna. Harji expected that since the bulk of the Mysore army was at Trichinopoly, the Maratha generals would secure the easy conquest of Srirangapatna. But his expectation went wrong.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Jedhe Sakavali (Shivaji Souvenir, p.27) says that "Jaitaji Katkar, Padaji Kakade had been in the Karnatak to help Trichinopoly" against the Mysoreans. Therefore it can be inferred that those Maratha generals were sent by Harji from Trichinopoly but not from Maharashtra as Wilks (Mysore Vol.I, p.29) believes.
The three generals made a sudden dash into the country and encamped at Kothathi and Kasalagere, in Mandya District. Disturbed by the presence of the Marathas, Chikkadevaraja sent words to Kumaraiva desiring him to send back the army to face the Marathas. Kumaraiva despatched Doddaiya at the head of an army to Mysore. At the instance of Chikkadevaraja, Doddaiya selected three thousand oxen, fastened to their horns lighted torches and allowed them to move in the direction of the Maratha camps in the dead of night. The Marathas were terror-stricken at the approach of the oxen. Battles were fought and the Marathas were put to rout amidst great loss. Dadaji, Jaitaji and Madhalkar were captured and their heads were cut off. The defeat of the Marathas was echoed in the inscription of 1686: "Chikkadevaraja subdued in Panchavati, Dadaji, Jaitaji and others in the form of the Marathas. Having slain Dadaji, having cut off all the limbs and slit the nose of Jaitaji, Chikkadevaraja set forth for war." Tirumalaraya writes, "As Chikkadevaraja had exterminated Jaitaji, Dadaji and other Maratha generals, he came to be respected by all as God Narayana."

The results of the war were that the relationship between

1. G. Havavadana Rao says (History of Mysore Vol.I) that the other place of encampment of the Marathas was Kasalagere. But this seems to be incorrect because Mrs. Tho. Pur., II, 22 and Mysore Archaeological Report of 1912 (p.90) say that it was Kasalagere.
3. G. Havavadana Rao thinks (Mysore, Vol.I, p.206) that Doddaiya was the nephew of Kumaraiva but according to Annals (I, Ch) and Wilks (I, p.60) he was the son of the My Soor Dalavo.
4. Ibid., A.V.C., IV Chapters; C.Bin., p.2.
5. F.C., III (1) St.1 (1686). Annals (I, pp.114-115) gives a graphic account of the war and as also a remarkable military skill displayed by Doddaiya in the war.
the Marathas and Mysore went from bad to worse. Harji's hope of conquering Srirangapatna was dashed to the ground with the death of the three Maratha generals. Secondly, the Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb took notice of the Maratha disaster at Srirangapatna and praised Chikkadevaraja for his heroic deeds. Thirdly, the defeat of the Marathas at Srirangapatna had a tremendous effect on the attitude of Harji towards Kumaraiva. It avoided all possibilities of peace between Harji and Kumaraiva. It led Harji to adopt retaliatory measures against Mysore, much more severe than ever before.

Having heard the tragic news of the Marathas, Harji Mahadik proceeded to deal with Kumaraiva violently. On the other side, "receiving neither reinforcements nor reply to his letters, Kumara Raya (Kumaraiva) was obliged to seek safety in honourable retreat". He decided to take flight towards Mysore with all his army unnoticed by the enemies. But, the Jesuit letter says, "The Marathas would not allow themselves to be put on the wrong scent; for a long time past their self-conceit and audacity had been increasing by the inaction of Kumara Raya which revealed to them his weakness and their strength; they kept close to his army and none of his actions could escape them". Taking advantage of the distressing position of Kumaraiva, the Marathas fell on the Mysore army and as a consequence, a terrible battle in was fought in which some of the Mysoreans were killed, others including Kumaraiva were captured prisoners and the rest took

2. La Mission Du Madure, "II, pp. 304-305."
flight from the field of action. This account based on Jesuit letters is corroborated by Jedhe Sakaval. The Marathas "captured two hundred horses and also a commander, Kumar, of the army of Srirangaptna". The fact that Jaitaji Katkar and Dadaji Kakade also took part in the campaign needs clarification. It is well known from the study of the Kannada sources that Jaitaji and Dadaji who went at the instance of Harji to Mysore for the conquest of Srirangapatna, were captured, cut into pieces and their heads were hung on the fort walls of Srirangapatna by Doddaiya. Though the document, as G.S. Sardesai put it, "contains many correct and minute dates", yet "there are some evident mistakes which one can detect". It is true that Harji Mahadik conducted the operation at Trichinopoly against the Mysore army, and won a brilliant victory over the enemies capturing at the same time, Kumaraiya the commander of the Mysore army. But it is incorrect to say that Dadaji and Jaitaji too participated in the campaign. The Jesujs who resided at Kari near Bhor, some 30 miles south of Poona, had recorded the event which happened at Trichinopoly, The long distance might have prevented them from having a correct fact of the event.

The Jesuit letter of 1682 says: "The defeat and capture of this general (Kumaraiya), till then invincible completed the joy and pride of Arasumalai". Having vanquished such an invincible

1. Ibid.
2. Jedhe Sakval in Shivaji Souvenir, p.27.
4. La Mission Du Madure, III, p.305. What happened to Kumaraiya is not known to us as the Jesuit letter keeps silent. But the Kannada source (Annals, I. p.16) says that Kumaraiya retired from the service on the ground of old age. To his place was appointed Doddaiya, the son of Kumaraiya.
commander, Harji Mahadik expelled all the Mysoreans from Trichinopoly and the regions of Madura and proved himself a worthy Maratha general to rule over a distant region. In a way Sambhaji might have felt very happy for his action in removing Baghunatha Naravan from Gingee and bringing to his place Harji Mahadik.

Kumaraiya and Harji Mahadik were remarkable generals.

In tactics one excelled the other. If Kumaraiya believed that he was well-versed in military warfare, Harji showed the practical demonstration of his superiority in the field of action. The two generals were persons of high ability but with contrasting differences in their character. Harji had an inborn genius for handling large bodies of troops spread over a wide area changing his tactics so as to take prompt advantage of every change in the enemy’s plans and conditions, organizing combined movements. He knew well that delay was always dangerous. Taking advantage of the inactivity of the Mysore army, he attacked them from every direction and inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy capturing the commander himself.

Above all he had the support of a well-equipped army in addition to the plentiful supply of provisions whereas the Mysore general was denied of these advantages. Kumaraiya sent a major portion of the army to Mysore at the instance of Chikkadevaraja and the remaining army was not sufficient to fight the combined Marathas. Further his letters of request for reinforcements fell into enemy hands who hastened to ruin such a plan as to effect an honourable retreat from that dangerous place unperceived by the enemies, but

1. Ibid.
his plan was defeated when the enemies attacked him. The Jesuit letter of 1682 mentions him as "invincible" general. He fought for the glory of Mysore. His inadequate military equipment dragged him to be a captive in the hands of the Marathas. Harji Mahadik, on the other hand, was disloyal to his master. The hour of his victory was the hour of gratification of his vindictiveness.

The consequences of the Trichinopoly war were that Harji Mahadik grew powerful and ruled the eastern Karnataka with undivided power and practically as almost an independent sovereign. Sarkar rightly observes:— "The Maratha King's absorption in vice, the baneful predominance of the favourite Kavi-Kalas in his council, the consequent disorder of the kingdom and the increasing Mughal pressure on Maharashtra under the personal direction of Aurangzeb, all tended to extinguish Shambaji's authority in the far-off province of Jangi and make a local viceroy his own master".¹

Further Harji Mahadik proved disloyal to his master. He declared that he was the king. He assumed the title of Maharaja. He gave up the practice of submitting the annual account of the revenue to his sovereign at Raigarh.² Thus Harji Mahadik began to rule the Eastern Karnataka as an independent sovereign. Fortunately for him there was no fear of Mysore as all the Mysoreans were expelled from the region of Madura after the war of Trichinopoly.³

¹. Aurangzeb, VI, p.53.
². Ibid.
³. La Mission Du Madure III, p. 305.
Chikkadevaraja's victory over the Marathas near Srirangapatna appeared to counter balance Kumaraia's reverses at Trichinopoly. The Marathas arrested the progress of Mysore in the south whereas Chikkadevaraja delivered a rude shock to the Maratha dream of taking possession of Srirangapatna. In fact the Marathas were prevented from having a permanent foot hold in and near Mysore. The Kannada sources, the palace record, Apratima Vira Charitam and Sakala Vaidya Samhita exaggerate the achievement of Chikkadevaraja. The former source mentions that Chikkadevaraja's victory over the Marathas, apart from spreading his fame far and wide, "had also delighted no less a ruler than Aurangzeb, the Mughal Emperor, whose efforts to capture these leaders proved futile when they made an attack on his capital previous to their arrival in the Karnatak".1 Apratima Vira Charitam says that "Chikkadevaraja brightened up the fame of the Karnatak by throwing out the Marathas from his kingdom."2 The defeated Marathas said to themselves that "because they had roused the wrath of Chikkadevaraja, they had lost the chance of making permanent settlement in Mysore."3 Lastly, Sakala Vaidya Samhita says that "Chikkadevaraja converted his kingdom into a stage for the dance performance of the Goddess of Victory."4 It is clear that the sources have glorified the exploit of Chikkadevaraja.

While estimating the position of Chikkadevaraja in the Karnatak on the evidence of the Kannada source, the greatness of Harji

1. Annals, p.115.
3. Ibid., III, v.139; Chikkafl<ova'anaTo kenakldadarlm tam idesha- doliradantavta.
4. p.4.
Mahadik as a remarkable general of the age, cannot be overlooked. Harji had defeated no less an "invincible general" than Kumaraiva and upheld the greatness of the Marathas in the south. On the whole he was the greatest generals of the time.

Sambhaji launched his Mysore expedition in 1682. Among the many campaigns that fill the stormy reign of Sambhaji, his campaign against Mysore may rightly be assigned the pride of place. It was the third trial of strength between Mysore and the Marathas. There were certain causes for his invasion of Mysore. First, from a letter of Fort St. George dated 10 December, 1681, it is possible to infer that the South had not acknowledged the suzerainty of Sambhaji though he laid claim for it. Secondly, Sambhaji had an ideal of uniting all the Hindus against the Muhammadans. It was his ambition to unite south against the north. Thirdly, from the study of the political situation in the Karnatak, it can be gathered that the merciless slaughter of the three Maratha generals, Jaitaji, Dadaji and Nimbalkar by Chikkadevaraja at Srirangapatna, had not escaped the attention of Sambhaji. Lastly, Harji Mahadik drove out the Mysoreans from almost all the citadels which they had taken from Madura in the recent war but the Mysoreans withstood all the attacks of the Marathas, allied themselves with the Maravas and tried to retain their southern territories. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says:

1. Mary and Consultation Book, 1681, pp. 71-72. The letter says: "All the Company's servants were sent to give their opinions about settling a factory to the Southward in Sevagee's country, who very well approved of the motion. It is likely this country may become subject to Sambojee, he having already claimed it as his due".
latter (Mysoreans) still possess some fortresses, among others that of Madura, with the help of the Naravas. Naturally the disturbing activities of the Mysoreans in the region of Madura must have provoked Sambhaji to adopt rigorous measures to throw them out of that region.

While launching forth the Karnatak expedition, Sambhaji was perhaps well convinced of the military skill and diplomacy of Chikkadevaraja, as he had stayed in the south for long. Kannada sources, literary and epigraphic and the Jesuit letter are emphatic in saying that Sambhaji formed a triple alliance consisting of the Nayak of Ikkeri, Outb Shah of Golkonda to deal with the Mysore ruler. This makes us believe that Sambhaji realised the futility of fighting an enemy much stronger than himself, single-handed, too at a distant place.Anyway Apratima "Ira Charitam says that Sambhaji entered into an alliance with Rasappa Nayak of Ikkeri and Outb Shah of Golkonda against the ruler of Mysore. This is confirmed by the Jesuit letter of 1682: "He (Sambhaji) is helped by Iquerian (Ikkerian) or the king of Canara and by the king of Golkonda, both of whom are united against the king of Mysore who is regarded as the common enemy." Epigraphic record also speak of Sambhaji’s alliance with the Nayak of Ikkeri and the Shah of Golkonda. Being supported by the allies in men and materials, Sambhaji proceeded on his Karnatak campaign and ultimately encamped...
at Ranavara, north-west of Mysore. The unexpected approach of the combined army took Chikkadevaraja by surprise. Nevertheless he rose to the occasion and ordered his entire army to move and fall upon the enemies. The result was a bloody battle between the two armies in which the allies were completely defeated and driven out. This took place in June 1682. The victory of Chikkadevaraja over the enemies was described in epigraphic as well as literary sources. The Srirangapatna inscription says that "Sambhu (Sambhaji) lost his valour, Qutb Shah failed in his purpose, Ikkeri-Basava was disgraced". The inscription further details that "as the animal in the forest at the sight of the lion, as the birds at the sight of the hawk, as the hares at the sight of the tiger so did Sambhu, Shah and Basava sink down in terror and roll on the ground at the sight of Chikkadevaraja as if he were himself the terrible Narasimha". Another inscription of Srirangapatna dated 1722 confirms what is stated above, "Shambhu's valour came to a stop, Kutupu Shah lost all hope, even Ikkeri Basav was disgraced, when mighty Chikkadevaraja set forth for war". Of course, this inscription is of a later date. The value of the inscription cannot be dismissed on the ground that it is not a contemporary inscription. Since the event and the style are sketch almost on the same model as in the case of the Srirangapatna inscription of 1686 its value as the source of information for Sambhaji's

1. A.V.C., III. v.21.
2. E.C. III (1) St. 14 (1686) text, p.36; Shambhu Sthambhitha Vikramah Kutupu Saho Sanhataso hathad Ikkeri Basavo Pidhikkrita.
3. Ibid., text, 37.
4. Ibid., Sr.64 (1722) p.20, text, 56.
fight with Chikkadevaraja cannot be minimised. As to the literary source, Apratima Vira Charitam says: "Chikkadevaraja a mighty ruler that he was, had crushed the pride of Sambhaji, the son of Shivaji". Chikkadevaraja Binnapam states: "Chikkadevaraja arrested the progress of Sambhaji, the son of Shivaji and broke his pride with marvelous valour". Sachchudra Chara Nirnaya and Gita Gopala also speak of the event of 1692. The detailed reading of the texts reveals that they rely upon the inscription of 1686 in narrating the event.

It was exactly at this time Ekoji arrived in Banavara with an army to help Sambhaji. But he was also defeated by Chikkadevaraja. Thus all the attempts made by the Marathas to overwhelm the Mysore army proved futile. The far-reaching consequences of this battle of Banavara were that it marked Banavara as the boundary limit between the two kingdoms of Mysore and Bednur; it prevented the Marathas from making headway in the direction of Mysore; it increased the prestige of Chikkadevaraja as the foremost ruler of the Karnatak and lastly, it showed no hope of accommodation or cordiality in the relationship between Mysore and Maharashtra. The traditional policy of hostility between the two powers continued. No one attempted to narrow down his differences with the other, with the result, the relations between the two were greatly strained.

2. C.Bin., p.1, V.5; Sorkinim dalliriva Sivaji suta Sambhaji velgevanurbu korbumam tellenegeyda naddhuta parakramadim Chikka-devaraja Bhuvaram.
4. C.Bin., p.4, V.16: Avunge (Sambhajige) neravagi banda Ekkoji Jannavav Samkumadi. For Ekoji's disgrace see E.C. III (1) Sr.14 (1686) and Sr.64 (1722).
Frustrated in their ambition to subdue the enemy, the allies shifted the theatre of war from Banavara to Trichinopoly. In doing so, Sambhaji counted upon the help of Harji Mahadik, Governor of Gingee. Further Tanjore and Gingee were the strong Maratha centres. Sambhaji might have believed that by going over there, he could get all the military equipment from these places to carry on the war. The combined army marched and encamped at Trichinopoly, a strong place of Madura. The political condition of Madura was much worse. Realising the distressing position of Chokkanatha Nayak of Madura, Sambhaji resorted to exactions and brigandages which desolated the country and hastened the death of Chokkanatha. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says: "The Navak (Chokkanatha) attacked by Samboji in his fortress of Trichinopoly fell into a fit of melancholy which caused his death".1 This occurred on 16 June 1682. Muthu Mirappa Nayaka III (1682-1689) succeeded his father in July 1682.2 He was too weak to control the deteriorating position of Madura. Added to this, Harji Mahadik was still chasing the Mysoreans from their important strong holds in Madura. Ekoji too inaugurated his despotic rule and subscribed to the worsening political situation of Madura. He taxed the people heavily and treated them inhumanly. Thus the disturbing activities of Sambhaji, Harji Mahadik and Ekoji in south India was rather a knotty problem for Mysore. It roused Chikkadevaraja to a lively sense of danger to the Mysore outposts in the region of Madura. Mysore had no ally. Chikkadevaraja could not

1. La Mission Du Madure, III, pp. 305-06.
count upon the help of Madura ruler because the new ruler, Muthu Wirapa Navak was weak and a puppet in the hands of the Marathas. On the other hand Sambhaji was strengthened by the armies of not only his old allies, Basappa Navak of Ikkeri and Cutch Shah of Golkonda but by his own people, Harji Mahadik and Ekoji as well. In this perilous hour, Chikkadevaraja appealed to Aurangzeb then at Aurangabad for military help. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says: it is said that "the Moghul, at the request of Mysore, is sending a formidable army against Sambaji". The expected help from the Mughals did not come. Perhaps Aurangzeb could not pay much attention to the affairs of Mysore as he himself was involved in a serious struggle with Bijapur. It is well known that Aurangzeb descended into the Deccan with a definite objective of uprooting the Marathas. When Chikkadevaraja appealed to him for help, Aurangzeb could have conveniently befriended him as a faithful ally and helped him so as to overcome the menace of the Marathas. A timely pact with the ruler of Mysore would have helped him to say that there was one sincere ally who could check the onrush of the Marathas in the Karnatak. But Aurangzeb missed the opportunity for he was occupied with the reduction of Bijapur.

Chikkadevaraja had to face the situation created by the Marathas in the region of Madura. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says that "in the northern provinces of Madura, he (Sambhaji) has

1. La Mission Du Madure, III, pp. 306-07.
several of its fortresses, all the province of Dharmapuri and other neighbouring territories. Thus Sambhaji occupied several fortresses in the northern provinces of Madura that belonged to Mysore. The territorial loss was a terrible blow to Mysore. The presence of Sambhaji in the South affected the interests of Madura as well. Madura was divided into five portions among the warring and mutually jealous powers. The Jesuit letter of 1622 gives a heart-rending picture of the political condition of Madura. "The ancient kingdom of Madura is in shreds; the Nayak keeps a small portion of it, another is occupied by the king of Mysore a third by the petty king of Marava, a fourth by Samboji (Sambhaji), lastly, a fifth by Ekoji." It was a fine opportunity for Sambhaji to dispute with the King of Mysore his claim for supremacy in south India. He exploited the situation and recommenced his aggression against Mysore from the east and the south. The aggressive attitude of the Marathas naturally dealt a blow to the power of Mysore in Madura. This is clearly stated in the Jesuit letter of that year: "The power of the King of Mysore begins to grow weak, because, violently attacked in his own dominions by the troops of Sambogi, he cannot sustain and reinforce the armies he has sent to those countries. The provinces he had conquered there shake off his yoke gradually to claim their independence or become attached to some one of the princes who have partitioned the shreds of the kingdom, once so flourishing, among themselves." This letter brings out clearly that Mysore was not able to retain her

2. Ibid., p. 337.
3. Ibid., pp.337-338.
conquered territories in the northern province of Madura. Mysore could not maintain her position of ascendancy over the conquered regions of Madura, especially with the advent of Sambhaaji and his allies. The half-subjugated vassals gave up paying allegiance to Mysore and asserted their independence. Realising the futility of further resistance, Chikkadevaraja honourably entered into a negotiation with Sambhaaji and thus brought the war to a close by paying his tribute. Early in 1683 Sambhaaji returned to Maharashtra with his army.

The conclusion of the war was a great relief to Chikkadevaraja. At no time had he experienced such stress and strain. The Maratha policy of exaction of tribute made Chikkadevaraja grow cold towards them. Chikkadevaraja’s schemes of conquest in the south were checked for the time being. His influence in the northern region of Madura began to grow weak as a result of Sambhaaji’s war with Mysore. Sambhaaji who had suffered defeat at Panavara, changed the theatre of war to Trichinopoly and overwhelmed the Mysore army. His success brightened up the Maratha prospects for the supremacy of the south. Naturally, the differences in viewpoints between Mysore and the Marathas were widened and their relations went from bad to worse. The far-reaching consequence of the Maratha war was that Chikkadevaraja was driven to make friendship with the Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb.

1. C.Bin., p.47. V.16: Mattam Sambhogige Kappa Vittum Kutamam Kalipi.
Chikkadevaraja Binnapam suggests that it was at the invitation of Chikkadevaraja that Aurangzeb descended to the south and conquered Bijapur and Golkonda. "The mighty Chikkadevaraja well versed in diplomacy secured the surrender of the two powerful kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda to the Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb whom he had invited". It is not quite likely that Aurangzeb arrived in the Deccan because of Chikkadevaraja. The author has exaggerated Chikkadevaraja's relations with Aurangzeb. In fact Chikkadevaraja joined Aurangzeb for his own advantage. There were no powerful chieftains in the Karnatak to whom Chikkadevaraja could look as reliable allies in case of necessity against the Marathas. Basappa Nayak of Ikkeri was the ally of the Marathas. Chokkanatha Nayak died in June 1682 and was succeeded by his son, Muthuvirappa Nayak. He was weak and a puppet in the hands of the Marathas. Moreover, the interests of Mysore in the region of Madura were hampered. Harji Mahadlik was still pursuing the people of Mysore from their important strongholds in Madura. Ekoji too was up in arms against Mysore. Under these circumstances, Chikkadevaraja was left with no other alternative but to win the support of Aurangzeb. Chikkadevaraja had entered into a treaty with Sambhaji on his distress. He never seemed to have fulfilled the obligation of his treaty with the Marathas as his subsequent attitude reveals

Aurangzeb set his eye on the conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda. Aurangzeb had his own reasons according to Kannada

2. La Mission Du Madure, III, pp. 190-191.
source to reduce them. He felt that Bijapur and Golkonda were at the back of Sambhaji's insubordination to the Mughal emperor and that unless they were reduced, Sambhaji would not submit to Mughal authority. What Aurangzeb thought was quite true. Sambhaji had invaded Musore in close cooperation with the Sultan of Golkonda in 1682, and therefore they were on good terms. Sikandar Shah, the Bijapur Sultan had offended Aurangzeb by writing a spirited letter in 1684. This letter made Aurangzeb think that Bijapur Sultan and Sambhaji were on good terms. So, Aurangzeb regarded Bijapur and Golkonda as the two great obstacles in the way of destroying Sambhaji. Aurangzeb conducted the siege of Bijapur fort with all his vigour and on 13 September 1686, he saw the fall of Bijapur monarchy. This was followed by the reduction of Golkonda on 21 September 1687. During the siege of the fortresses, Chikkadevaraja's army was present. The assistance rendered by Chikkadevaraja to Aurangzeb, though looks meagre, its importance cannot be minimised. Aurangzeb could count upon Chikkadevaraja as his ally in arresting the progress of the Maratha in the south. Chikkadevaraja gained a more advantageous position by helping Aurangzeb. He rose high in the estimation of his enemies, particularly the Marathas.

However, Chikkadevaraja's friendship with Mughals, aggravated the situation. Sambhaji took offensive and invaded the kingdo

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of Mysore in 1686. When Aurangzeb was involved in his war against the Sultan of Bijapur, Sambhaji projected his Karnatak expedition. Kavi Kalasa, the prince of poets, and the chief adviser in the Maratha court wielded a great influence on Sambhaji. The Kannada source says that Kavi Kalasa was the spy of Aurangzeb but the truth of the statement can not be established unless it is corroborated by further evidences. Edward Scott Waring, the Jesuit letter of 1686 and Chikkadevaraja Binnapam are the main sources for Sambhaji's wars with Chikkadevaraja. P.S. Waring writes, "Sambhaji in 1686 was engaged against the forts and districts belonging to Bijapur Government in the Carnatic." This means that Sambhaji was occupied with the conquests of territories in the Karnatak-Bijapur-Balaghat in 1686.

The Jesuit letter of 1686 speaks of the atrocious war of Sambhaji in the heart of the Mysore kingdom. Sambhaji rightly visualised the situation and undertook the expedition. First, since Chikkadeva aja sent the bulk of his army to Bijapur in support of the Mughals, most of his forts and districts were defenceless. Secondly, Chikkadevaraja's power in Madura was growing weak. Several chieftains in the northern region of Madura began to shake off their yoke of Mysore. Thirdly, Chikkadevaraja had violated the terms of the treaty of 1683 by not paying the tribute due to Sambhaji.

1. Appendix.
2. History of the Marathas, p. 117.
3. La Mission Du Madure, III, p. 337.
4. C. Bin., p. 4.
5. La Mission Du Madure, III, p. 337.
Taking advantage of the situation Sambhaji invaded Mysore. His task of conducting war was further facilitated by the revolts of the inhabitants against their own sovereign. The chieftains of Morasa, Tigula, Kodaga and Malavala helped Sambhaji against Chikkadevaraja. They were lured by Sambhaji's promise of booty and honour. With these allies at the head, Sambhaji attacked Srirangapatna, the very heart of the Mysore kingdom and began to conduct war against Chikkadevaraja mercilessly. Chikkadevaraja faced two problems. One was the problem of the army and the other was the problem of money to meet the expenses of the war. He recalled his army from the citadel of Madura but Sambhaji sent his troops and held up the Mysore army. The atrocious war which Sambhaji conducted in the province of Mysore prevented Chikkadevaraja from sending reinforcement to his army which was shut up in Madura. However, he despatched 10,000 pagodas to its relief. At the request of Chikkadevaraja the Maravas helped the Mysore army to return to Mysore. About the problem of money, Chikkadevaraja resorted to "exactions and cruelties in the eastern provinces of his dominions". The Jesuit account says, "Sambogi is strongly helped by the revolt of the inhabitants". Chikkadevaraja put down the rebellion with a strong hand. While laying siege to the fort of Srirangapatna,

3. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 308.
6. Ibid., pp.360-1.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., pp.390-1.
the troops of Sambhaji ravaged the kingdom of Mysore. Chikka-
devaraja defended the fort ably. Chikkadevaraja Pinnapam says, "in the fight that followed the chieftains of Morasa, Tigula, Kollaga and Malavala countries who advanced against Chikkadevaraja depending upon the promise of the Marathas were defeated and pursued". The allies were so badly routed that the same Kannada source mentions "Sambhaji was drowned in the sea of fear" at the approach of Chikkadevaraja. Having suffered defeat, Sambhaji retreated to his homeland towards the end of 1686. Neither Harji nor Kokoji was able to help Sambhaji in his adversity. They were held by the troops of Maravas and "Kallans". Sambhaji hurried back to Poona because he feared that Aurangzeb might invade Panhala.

The consequences of the Maratha war with Mysore were that the differences between the two parties continued to be wide, that Mysore continued to lay claim to its supremacy in the south and that the political relations between the two were strained further. The most disastrous consequence of the war was that it paved the way for Ekoji of Tanjore to dispose off Bangalore to Chikkadevaraja.

Thus the two wars that Sambhaji fought with Chikkadevaraja first in 1682 and then in 1686 were suicidal to the interests of both Mysore and the Marathas. In his first war of 1682, Sambhaji was defeated at Banavara by the Mysore army but he overhelmed them

1. C. Bin., p. 4.
at Trichinopoly. Sambhaji had conducted the atrocious war at Trichinopoly. With the support of Harji Mahadik he had expelled all the Mysoreans from the northern region of Madura. The hostility of 1682 was terminated with the conclusion of a treaty. Chikkadevaraja had agreed to the treaty only in his distress but he never fulfilled it. This war reduced the power of Mysore in Madura. The second war of 1686 went against the Maratha interests in Mysore. Sambhaji was defeated and pursued. Consequently, his relations with Mysore were greatly strained. Neither the Mysoreans nor the Marathas tolerated the existence of the other. Each worked to bring about the ruin of the other.

Sambhaji's defeat at Banavara was the most disastrous event experienced by the Marathas. His defeat was compensated by the subsequent success in Madura. In offering to end the war and in proposing to pay the tribute, Chikkadevaraja exhibited rare qualities of statesmanship. These efforts indicate his consciousness that Sambhaji was no ordinary invader. The second Maratha war had crushed the pride of the Chieftains of Morasa, Tigula, Kodaga, Malavala regions and affected the Maratha interests in the Karnatak. Their defeat at Srirangapatna increased the prestige of Chikkadevaraja. He declared himself the emperor of the Karnatak. On the whole the relations between Chikkadevaraja and Sambhaji were strained and this continued hostility between the two in the Karnatak made the Mughal intervention in the south inevitable. Besides, the success that attended the Mysore army in the second Maratha war made Ekoji dispose off Bangalore.
Why did Ekoji dispose of Bangalore?

Two factors were mainly responsible. They were the internal troubles and the external danger. Ekoji was not popular among his subjects because of his tyrannical rule. He plundered his own men and appropriated all the income of the temples including their richest possessions. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says that "after plundering his own men he (Ekoji) has fallen on the pagodas of his own idols and appropriated the treasures of the pagodas and their large possessions." Added to this unwise policy "an inundation has wrought horrible ravages on the sea-coast, because it has been accompanied by a terrible gust of wind". More than 6000 persons were perished. Agriculturists were treated inhumanly "taxes were heavy. They were to be paid both in cash and kind. Thus the economic condition of the people went from bad to worse under the rule of Ekoji."

The external danger was that his kingdom was subjected to the frequent incursions of the Kallans (thieves), Maravas, the king of Mysore and the Navak of Madura. Of all the powers, Mysore troubled him most. Chikkadevaraja, freed from the fear of the Marathas, projected his campaign of conquests. During April-May 1687 Chikkadevaraja seized the principal Maratha possessions, namely Chikkannavakanahalli, Kandikere and Tyamagondlu.

1. La Mission Du Madure, III, p. 306.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 337-8.
and incorporated them into his kingdom. The fall of these places roused Ekoji to a full sense of danger to his richest possessions from an extension of the Mysore kingdom in that direction. These acquisitions meant no doubt, the weakening of Ekoji's power in the Karnatak-Bijapur-Halaghat. The increasing power and influence of Chikkadewaraja made Ekoji realise that it was very difficult for him to control his distant Bangalore principality. So, he decided to dispose it off to the highest bidder. Thirdly, Wilks believes that Ekoji decided to sell away Bangalore because he thought that controlling of a distant place was a costly affair. Fourthly, according to Palace Record, Chikkadewaraja's successful expeditions to Madura and Trichinopoly persuaded Ekoji to think that he was no match to Chikkadewaraja. Therefore he decided to sell Bangalore. It was not so much the desire to be on good terms with the king of Mysore as the hostile surroundings in the midst of which Ekoji lived that made the latter decide to sell away Bangalore.

In the meanwhile, the fall of Bijapur into Mughal hands in September 1686 and the imminent siege of Golconda awakened Sambhaji to the danger to his possessions in the Karnatak by an extension of Mughal authority in that direction. As a defensive measure, Sambhaji sent Kesava Dingle and Santaji Chape with

12,000 horse southwards in October 1686 to strengthen his garrisons in the Karnatak.

This measure of Sambhaji seems to have alarmed the Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb, who detached a large body from the siege of Golconda to invest Bangalore which was still in the Maratha hands. Aurangzeb was confident of the success because Basavapatna, a principal centre of Maratha activities was already ceded by Qutb Shah of Golconda to Aurangzeb at the beginning of 1687. It appears that Aurangzeb was determined to conquer the Maratha possessions in the Karnatak one after another. The Mughal detachment sent under Khasim Khan proceeded southwards pursuing the Maratha army that had already gone under Kesava Pant and Santaji. On 1 March 1687 the Mughal army marched by way of Penu-konda towards Tumkur. Leaving Tumkur undisturbed to Chikkadevaraja, the Mughals proceeded further.

In the meanwhile Fkoji opened negotiations with Chikkadevaraja through a visit on the question of selling Bangalore and agreed to transfer the city for a sum of three lakhs of Rupees. While the transactions were in progress, the Mughal general Khasim Khan arrived at Bangalore and after taking possession of the city, he hoisted the imperial flag on the ramparts of Bangalore fort on 10th July 1687. Almost simultaneously the Marathas with a

4. Annals, I, 106.
5. Mys. Dho. Pur., II, 38; Annals, I, 110; Orme (Historical Fragments, 155-156) places the surrender of Bangalore to Khasim Khan early in August 1687, Wilks (I,110) about July 1687; Sarkar (Aurangzeb, V, 54-55) places it on 10th June or July 10,1687. The former is preferred here as the correct date.
detachment under Harji Mahadik (Governor of Gingee), Kesav Pant and Santaji (generals of Sambhaji) came and encamped at Bangalore. At the same time Chikkadevaraja also went and stood before the walls of Bangalore.

As to the point who won the victory, sources display conflicting versions. First, the palace record states that Chikkadevaraja fought a severe battle with Khasim Khan and that after defeating the enemy completely he took the Fort of Bangalore on 14th July 1687. Secondly, the Maratha chronicle—Jedhe Sakavali fully corroborates the statement: "Ashada Shukla 10 (10th July 1687), chief of Mysore brought aid to Bangalore and seized Khasim Khan with forces". Thirdly, Sambhaji Patra Sara Sangraha says that Chikkadevaraja with the help of Harji defeated Khasim Khan on 10th July 1687. Fourthly, Wilks gives entirely a different version: "The Raja was far too shrewd to attempt any such rash act. He saw that the courting of Khasim Khan's friendship would by far be the better thing to do under the circumstances as it would enable him to put himself in favour with the Emperor Aurangzeb who had already set an eye on the territory of the Raja". The Raja foresaw the folly of turning hostile to the Emperor. He had reduced a number of petty chieftains in the Karnatak but there was no protest from the Mughals. He had

1. Orme: I, C; Wilks, I, 110.
3. Ibid., A Khasim Khanam haoco dv^ili nindsada saddha 15 ralli tamma thanavaram hakkondu.
annexed a number of petty principalities but the Mughals did not object to it. Therefore there was no reason for him to be on inimical terms with the Mughals. The Emperor's friendship would be a source of strength to him as it would enable him to overawe the many turbulent chieftains whom he had subjugated. On the other hand the Emperor too was not prepared to quarrel with Chikkadevaraja because his friendship would facilitate the marching of the Mughal army through his territories. So, Wilks continues that Chikkadevaraja made common cause with Khasim Khan and opened negotiations to buy Bangalore from him. 1 Fifthly, Sarkar on the basis of the Persian sources states that Khasim Khan captured Bangalore with the assistance of Chikkadevaraja, the enemy of Shivaji's house. 2 Sixthly, Vincet and Parasnis say that Aurangzeb despatched an army to attack Bangalore, still in the hands of the Marathas. "The straits to which Bangalore was soon reduced led Harji Mahadik and Keshav Pingle to forget their jealousies and march to its relief. But in August 1687 it fell before the relieving army reached it." 3 Seventhly, Colonel Reid says that Khasim Khan carried fire and sword into the south, dispossessed Bangalore from the Maratha control and took several Hindu chiefships converting them into Subhas. 4 Now the first three sources agree in stating that Chikkadevaraja won a brilliant victory over Khasim

Khan at Bangalore. This may not be a fact because Chikkadevaraja could not go to the extent of fighting the Mughals who were the only strong power in the south, and who had reduced the two impregnable forts of Bijapur and Golkonda without much difficulty. Moreover, according to Chikkadevaraja Binnapam, Chikkadevaraja actively supported Aurangzeb in his attempt to reduce Bijapur and Golkonda. How could an ally bound by mutual understanding and goodwill suddenly fall upon the Mughal general and harbour disloyal feelings? Further a few years later, Chikkadevaraja sent a goodwill mission under Karanika Lingaiah to the court of Aurangzeb which was kindly received and sent back with titles and presents. If Chikkadevaraja had been the destroyer of the Mughal element at Bangalore what was the necessity to send an embassy to the Mughal court? Or if Chikkadevaraja had really committed aggression against the Mughals, would Aurangzeb, noted for intolerance, receive kindly the goodwill mission of Mysore and send it back with presents?

It is quite likely that Chikkadevaraja, realising the seriousness of the situation, remained a spectator of the event. Of course, there were more advantages in making common cause with the Mughal general to Chikkadevaraja as Wilks believed. We could enlist the love and confidence of the Emperor which would enable him to threaten the numerous chieftains of the south and secure their submission.

What happened at Bangalore was that by the time Harji and Keshav Pant had arrived at Bangalore after patching up their

differences, Bangalore was already taken by the Mughal general. Disappointed in their hopes, the two Maratha generals returned to Gingee leaving Khasim Khan the undisputed master of Bangalore.

It is held by Kincaid and Parasnis that Harji returned to Gingee and sent 18,000 horse under his two new allies to invade Mysore. This statement contradicts the version given by Sambhaji Patrasara Sangraha that Chikkadevaraja defeated Khasim Khan with the help of Harji Mahadik. As the differences between the Mysoreans and the Marathas continued to be wide, there was no likelihood of the two houses coming together for greater end of south Indian solidarity. Such being the trend of the period the fact that Chikkadevaraja was assisted by Harji Mahadik against the Mughals does not seem to be correct. However, Khasim Khan on his part saw that the Raja would be of immense use to him as an ally. Further finding that he himself would be unable to hold Bangalore for any length of time on account of the expeditions had to make, was prepared to dispose it off to the Raja for a consideration of three lakhs of rupees "which the Raja was still willing to pay". Chikkadevaraja paid the stipulated amount and took Bangalore. This is confirmed by the Imperial Gazetteer: "Wenkoji had agreed to sell Bangalore to the Mysore Raja for 3 lakhs of rupees. But Khasim Khan first seized it and then carried out the bargain pocketing the money himself". Aurangzeb after the capture of Golconda on

1. A.I.M.P. I, p.142.
3. Wilks, I, III.
4. Imperial Gazetteer, Mysore and Coorg, p.21.
21st September 1687, appointed Khasim Khan to be the Foujdar of the Karnatak with Sira as his capital.

Two factors, among others had brought about the death of Ekoji. The conquest of Bangalore by Khasim Khan and his ultimate sale of the fortress for 3 lakhs of Pupees to the king of Mysore dealt a death blow to Ekoji. Secondly, Chikkadevaraja conquered important Maratha places like Chikkanayakanahalli, Kandikere and Tyamagondlu in Mysore. The Mughals on the one side and the Mysoreans on the other systematically worked out to uproot the Marathas from Mysore. The territorial losses without and the troubles within were responsible for the death of Ekoji. About the date of his death sources give different versions. Jedhe Sakavali says that he died in 1684. Orme mentions that Ekoji was still alive at Tanjore in August 1687. Wilks states that he was still alive in July 1687. The Palace Record says that Ekoji, having completed negotiations with Chikkadevaraja of Mysore regarding the sale of Bangalore for Pupees 3 lakhs, was about to receive the money from the king of Mysore. Exactly at that time Khasim Khan came and occupied Bangalore finally hoisting the Mughal flag over its fort on July 10th 1687. This means Ekoji was alive in July 1687. Sarkar places the death of Ekoji in January 1685.

The weight of the evidence is in favour of the view that Ekoji

1. Wilks, I, 111.
5. Annals, I. C.
6. Aurangzeb V, p. 53, F.N.
was alive in July 1687. So his death might have taken place sometime in August 1687.

Like many other Marathas, Ekoji too followed a policy of hostility towards Mysore. He supported Sambhaji wholeheartedly in his war against Mysore. Even his internal and external difficulties drove him to dispose off Bangalore for a consideration of Rs.3 lakhs to Chikkadevaraja. But Khassim Khan occupied it. Chikkadevaraja got it from Khassim Khan. Bangalore which had been in the hands of the Marathas since 1638 was occupied by Chikkadevaraja in 1687. The loss of Bangalore was a terrible blow to the Marathas. It signifies that the Maratha influence in Mysore was definitely on the wane. Ekoji followed an unwise policy in disposing off Bangalore. He undid the work of his father in the Karnatak. Although the foundation of Tanjore principality was his contribution, the transference of the principal Maratha principality like Bangalore to the highest bidder was not a good policy. On the contrary, he could have conveniently adopted the policy of his father namely of permanently settling at Bangalore and controlling distant territorial possessions by means of appointing able Maratha generals.

But he failed to do that. On the whole his action showed the weakness of the Maratha principality in the Karnatak and in later years it paved the way for the disappearance of the Maratha influence in Mysore. The Mughal intervention in the affairs of the Karnatak brought a diversion in the Mysore-Maratha relations. Chikkadevaraja befriended the Mughals who were also bent upon the
reduction of the Marathas. However, Ekoji's relations with Mysore were far from friendly.

The purchase of Bangalore by Chikkadevaraja only aggravated the situation. The Marathas bore a severe grudge against Chikkadevaraja. Harji had arrived at Bangalore with a view to rescuing the city from falling into the hands of the Mughals but Khasim Khan had already taken possession of it. This disappointed Harji. Besides, the political transaction that went on between the Mughals and Chikkadevaraja further estranged Harji's relations with Chikkadevaraja. It is known that Aurangzeb was busy in the Deccan with the definite objective of rooting out the Marathas. The courting of friendship with such an enemy by Chikkadevaraja was not much liked by Harji. Therefore, he decided to reduce Mysore into a Maratha vassalage. He despatched Keshav Pant and Santaji at the head of 18,000 horse in order to devastate the kingdom of Mysore and destroy Chikkadevaraja. Keshav Pant and Santaji entered and plundered Mysore territory. A terrible battle was fought between the Mysore army and the Marathas in the neighbourhood of Srirangapatna in which the Marathas were defeated. Highly elated at the success, the Mysoreans ridiculed the Marathas by saying, "Oh! Marathas, quit Mysore. This place is neither Bhaganagar nor Bijapur for your game of fight". This is the

2. Ibid.
5. Ibid., Velele Maratarira nim tolatalagim Bhaganagara Vijaya nurada nelanaltidu nimmatake.
version we get in the Kannada source. Grant Duff and the Marathi Rivasat give different versions. Grant Duff maintains that "they (the Marathas) entered the country of Mysore where they levied contributions and remained several months but made no permanent conquests". Marathi Rivasat says that Keshav Pant plundered Mysore. These sources suggest that the Marathas plundered Mysore before they came into armed conflict with the Mysore army. Harji's ambition of reducing Mysore received a staggering blow when the Marathas were defeated and pursued by Chikkadevaraja. Grant Duff's view that the Marathas remained for several months in the Mysore territory does not seem to be correct because Harji had to defend his Ginge principality against the Mughal attack. The Madras Diary of 1687 states that ten thousand Mughal horse descended to "the Ginge country commanded by Phisim Khan to war against the Marathas". Therefore, Harji was left with no alternative but to recall his Maratha army from Mysore immediately.

The consequences of the Maratha invasion of Mysore were that the relations between the two powers were not improved. The differences between the two continued to be wide. Harji followed the traditional policy of hostility towards Mysore. After Ekoji's death, Harji was the principal Maratha general in the south working for the preservation of the Maratha interests. Chikkadevaraja

2. Part 2, p. 91.
defended himself against the Maratha onslaught and with the occupation of Bangalore, his task of eliminating the Marathas from Mysore became easy. On the whole the policy of hostility between the Mysoreans and the Marathas was neither beneficial nor honourable because in their quarrel a third party was benefitted, namely the Mughals.

If Bangalore went to the possession of Chikkadevaraja, Doddaballapur, another Maratha centre, was occupied by Khasim Khan. An inscription from Doddaballapur says, "in the reign of Aurangzeb Alamgir Badshah, the fort of Balapura was in the hands of Sambha family. Through the exertions of Khasim Khan, foujdar of Karnataka province of the Bijapur Subah, it then passed from the hands of Sambadud son of Sivadud Maratha and came into the possession of the Supreme Government". Thus the Maratha territories were divided between Chikkadevaraja and Khasim Khan. The Mysore Raja and the Mughals were united to put down the Marathas and confiscate their territorial possessions, in the Karnataka. The Marathas could not survive the shocks of the loss of Bangalore and Doddaballapur. The power of the Marathas began to grow weak in the Karnataka.

For two years from 1687 to 1688 when Sambhaji was involved in life and death struggle with Aurangzeb, nothing particular happened in his relations with Mysore. Harji Mahadik too could not turn his attention towards the affairs of Mysore.

owing to the Mughal disturbance in the south. Besides this Mughal aggression Harji had his own project of extending the territories of Gingee. The Madras Diary of December 1687 says "Having advice from the Maratha camp that Maratha forces in the Gingee country under the command of Harji Maharaja were upon their march with 2000 horse and 5000 foot with a greater number of pioneers and scaling ladders that they had plundered and taken several towns and committed various other atrocities and that most of the inhabitants left Conjeevaram and other places to secure their persons and estates". In undertaking the devastating expedition in the region of Arcot and Conjeevaram, Harji never acted in concert with the other Maratha generals. Kesava Pant opposed Harji. Orme writes, "Harji summoned Keisswa Puntolo to march and reduce the countries to the north of Paliar, which had just submitted to the Moghul. Keisswa Puntolo seems to have refused any connection with him, on which Harji sent forward a detachment under the command of two officers who in a fortnight were in quiet possession of Arc Conjeevaram and Punamalee". These conquests naturally did not allow Harji to concentrate his attention on the affairs of Mysore.

Chikkadevaraja followed a consistent policy of conquering the Maratha territories in the Karnatak. He launched the expedition at the right time. Harji was occupied with the defence of his Gingee principality against Khasim Khan's attacks where as Sambhaji was involved in life and death struggle against Aurangzeb.

1. Records of Fort St. George, 1687.
2. Orme: Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire of the Morattoes and the English Concerns in Indostan, p. 158.
"Aurangzeb swore that he would never return to Delhi until he had seen the head of Sambhaji weltering at his feet." Ekoji was succeeded by his son, Shahji II to the throne of Tanjore but he was not a strong Maratha. Taking advantage of the situation, Chikkadevaraja directed his Deputy, Chikkaiya (Gurikara Chikkaiya) of Sankagiri to seize Hoskote and its dependencies which were under the control of the Marathas. Accordingly Chikkaiya went and occupied the Maratha territories. In November 1688 Chikkadevaraja secured the surrender of Manugonde durga, Mannargudi and Vamalur and in January 1689 he reduced Dharmapuri. These places had been lost to Mysore during Sambhaji wars. Chikkadevaraja recovered all those Maratha territories and established his rule over them. Chikkadevaraja was able to reduce those Maratha territories because there was no opposition from the Marathas. Sambhaji could neither pay personal attention to the affairs of the Karnataka nor direct his general, Harji, to arrest the progress of Mysore because his life was in danger.

Intent upon uprooting the Marathas, Aurangzeb instructed his general, Shaik Nizam to capture Sambhaji who was then at Sangameswar. Linganna Kavi says, "proceeding with rapid marches, Shaik Nizam arrived at Sangameswar, bribed the guards of the gate and captured Sambhaji who was playing with a number of girls on the bar of the river, Sangameswar." This took place on 1 February 1689.

1. Orme: Historical Fragments, p.201.
3. Ke.N.V., p.159, Vs. 75-76.
Sambhaji and his followers were taken to Aurangzeb. Sambhaji showed disrespect to the emperor and the consequent result was that Aurangzeb ordered the execution of Sambhaji. On 11 March 1690 Sambhaji was tortured to death.¹

The news of Sambhaji's death spread like a wild fire.

Chikkadevaraja felt that the main obstacle in the way of Mysore expansion was removed. He invaded Paramathí and occupied it in May 1689. At the instance of Chikkadevaraja, his another Deputy, Lingarajaiya (Gurikara Lingarajaiva) stationed at Coimbatore, seized Kaveripattan and occupied it in July. Chikkadevaraja reduced Kunturdurga (Kunnathur) in September and in the subsequent month he annexed Anantagiri.² Harji Mahadik could not resist Chikkadevaraja's aggression because he had neither the sufficient monev nor the well disciplined army to cope with the situation. In view of these difficulties, Harji entered into an agreement with Chikkadevaraja by which Anantagiri remained the southern limit of Mysore.

Harji did not survive long to protect the interests of the Marathas in the south. He passed away in 1699. His death dealt a death-blow to the very foundation of Maratha interests in the Karnatak. The era of Maratha greatness in the south ended. Mysore grew in extent and power. Chikkadevaraja occupied Bevuhalli and Sairamahathi and extended the Mysore zone of

¹ Ve. N. un., p. 159; Shivaji Souvenir, p. 22.
² C.Bin., p. 2, 's. 6-9; Gita Govinda, p. 53; A.V.C., I. 8; III, 57.
influence up to Sira, the Mughal centre in the Karnatak.

Chikkadevaraja reached the height of his glory in 1690. He had conquered a number of Maratha strongholds both in the south and the north. He had securely established in the northern as well as in southern frontiers of Mysore at the end of his continued struggle with the Marathas as the Apsrimala Vira Charitam testifies.

Viewed from the angle of the Mysore - Maratha relations, it can be said that the relations between the two powers had been far from friendly. The bitter hostility between the two powers paved the way for the Mughals to take part in the changing politics of the south. The Mysore Raja and the Mughals were united together to suppress the Marathas in the south, with the result, the Maratha power declined in the Karnatak. Had the Mysore Raja and the Marathas adjusted their relations, it could have been possible to prevent the Mughal incursions into the south. But none of them realised the value of accommodation in the face of the Mughal danger.

Several factors widened the gulf between the Marathas and the Mysore Raja. Chief among them were Ekoji's attitude towards Mysore, the role of the local chieftains, the ambition of Harji Mahadik and the ability of the Mysore Raja. First, Ekoji never maintained friendly relations with Mysore. He had cor

1. Sachchudrachara Mirnava.
2. A.V.C., I, 8.
in support of Sambhaji when the latter launched his Mysore expedition in 1682 but had been defeated and pursued by Chikkadevaraja. He had followed an unwise policy in disposing off Bangalore to the highest bidder. Bangalore which had been the strong Maratha centre in the Karnatak since 1638 had been lost to the Marathas in 1687. In doing so, Fkoji had weakened the Maratha cause in the Karnatak. Chikkadevaraja had purchased Bangalore from Khasim Khan and made it his military base for further conquests in the north.

Secondly, the chieftains of Tigula, Morasa, Coorg, Malavala countries, the Navak of Ikkeri and Qutb Shah of Golkonda spoiled the relations of Sambhaji with the Mysore Raja. They were selfish and unimaginative. They had supported Sambhaji in his two devastating expeditions into the kingdom of Mysore. They had assisted Sambhaji thinking that their political position would be improved but Sambhaji’s defeat at the hands of Chikkadevaraja had disappointed and made their position still worse. They did not work to improve the relations of Sambhaji with Chikkadevaraja.

Thirdly, Harji Mahadik followed a traditional policy of hostility towards Mysore. His attack of Trichinopoly, his treatment of Kumaraiva at Trichinopoly, his sending of Dadaji Kakade, Saitaji Katkar andimbalkar to attempt the immediate acquisition of Srirangapatna, and his subsequent wars with Mysore show that he was not prepared to narrow down the differences and accommodate matters with Mysore. His relentless wars and mutual rivalry
had paved the way for the Mughals to intervene in the affairs of the south.

Lastly, Chikkadevaraja was an able ruler. He had been wedded to both camp and court. He had led the army in person to the battlefield and conducted the military operations. In devising strategy, and in planning night attacks to surprise the enemies, he was an expert. In war and diplomacy of the period he had excelled others. With such an able person, the relations would not be smooth. On the whole during the time of Sambhaji, the traditional policy of hostility continued unabated between the two powers. Viewed in the larger interests of the need for friendly relations, the policy of hostility was neither honourable nor beneficial to either of the two states, Mysore and Maharashtra.

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