CHAPTER VI

PERCEPTION AND MEANING
The notion of 'Meaning' is central to Moore's philosophy, for the relationship between language and perception cannot be established unless and until this notion is clarified. One of the basic question in contemporary linguistic philosophy is: What does one mean when one talks of the 'meaning' of an expression; is it the sentence as a whole, a term, a phrase or a concept?

There are many divergent views on this issue; for instance, the object theory, the concept theory and the use theory. A.R. White maintains that Moore usually held a theory of meaning which equates the meaning of an expression with the concept, — perhaps sometimes even with the object — for which it stands; but sometimes he wavered between this theory and another which equates the meaning of an expression with its use. These remark shows that Moore has not been able to maintain a consistent view. Before we decide as to what is 'meaning' according to Moore, it would be helpful to examine the above theories.

Frege, the most important exponent of the method of name relation in the analysis of meaning says that


certain expressions are the names of objects, both concrete and abstract, and are said to name the objects. He also stresses upon the distinction between the nominatum of an expression, that is, the object named by it, from its sense; this is the way in which a nominatum is given by the expression. Thus the example of Frege can be explained, (A) by the two expressions, viz. 'the morning star' and the 'evening star' which name the same nominatum. This is because of the fact that these expressions refer to the same entity which is a certain planet; (B) but then, these two expressions do not have exactly the same sense. It is so, because these two expressions name the same nominatum in two different ways. After explaining, Frege applies to the ordinary declarative sentences. He recognizes the distinction between the proposition and the truth values of a sentence. Frege says that every declarative sentence expresses a proposition and at the same time has a certain truth value. This distinction is made to answer the question regarding the nominatum and the sense of a sentence. Frege argues that if one replaces a word in a sentence by another word with the same nominatum, but with a different sense, then this change cannot have any influence upon the nominatum of the whole sentence. According to this argument, two sentences alike in all respects, except the occurrence of two expressions, 'the morning star' in one and 'the evening star' in the other,
have the same nominatum. What is the common nominatum?
The proposition expressed by the two sentences may be different
and therefore the propositions cannot have one common
nominata. Hence, Frege argues, that the propositions
of the ordinary declarative sentences must be their senses.
On the other hand, the two sentences have the same truth-
value. Therefore the truth value can be regarded as the
common nominatum. On the basis of these arguments, Frege
reaches the following conclusive propositions: (a) The
ordinary sense of a sentence is the proposition expressed
by it, (b) the ordinary nominatum of a sentence is its
truth-value.

Frege thinks that these two rules (a) and (b) are
applicable only to the ordinary isolated sentences, but
when the same sentence occurs in the oblique context (i.e.
two sentences within the same system are not interchangeable
without altering the truth-value of the sentence), then
it cannot be interpreted on the basis of these two rules.
Take for instance, the occurrence of the (false) sentence
(i) "The sun revolves round the earth" within the oblique
context: and (ii) "X asserts that the sun revolves around
the earth".

According to Frege’s result (a and b) the ordinary
nominatum of (i) that is, the nominatum, which this
sentence has, when it occurs isolated in ordinary non-
oblique context is, its truth-value, which happens to be
false, and the ordinary sense of (i) is the proposition
that the sun revolves round the earth. Now Frege says
that the sentence (i) within the oblique context (ii) has
not its ordinary nominatum but a different one which he
calls its oblique sense. Concerning the oblique nominatum,
Frege maintains that it is the same as the sense of the
ordinary name, meaning thereby that the oblique nominatum
of a sentence is not its truth-value, but the proposition
which is its ordinary sense. Thus the oblique nominatum
of the sentence (i), i.e. the entity named by (i) in an
oblique context like (ii) is the proposition that the
sun revolves around the earth.

If this method of name relation, as the valid tool
of analysing the meaning of a sentence, is accepted, one
gets into a lot of difficulties as R. Carnap rightly
points out. Carnap maintains that the complication of
Frege's method becomes clear when one finds the same
sentence in different contexts. Example: When one finds
the ordinary sentence (i) 'Scott is human' in the varying
contexts (ii). It is possible that 'Scott is human',
(iii) 'John believes that it is possible that 'Scott is
human' (iv) 'It is not necessary that John believes that
it is possible that 'Scott is human'. Here by Frege's
method, the nominatum of (i) in isolation is its truth-
value, hence a certain entity \( e \) and the nominatum of (i)
in (ii) is the proposition that Scott is human, hence the entity $e_2$. Similarly the nominatum of (i) within (iii) is $e_3$ and its nominatum within (iv) is $e_4$, etc. Thus the same expression 'Scott is human' has an infinite number of different entities as nominata when it occurs in different context.  

Still further, Carnap again points out to the method of Frege, even if a sentence is in isolation, it would lead to different and infinite nominata, for every sentence names an entity, which is its nominatum. And since a sentence expresses a proposition, one must have a name for it and this name would be different from the original sentence because it is the name of an entity designated by it. The original sentence could be called $n_1$ and the name of the proposition $n_2$. Like any name, $n_2$ has a sense. This sense of $n_2$ must be different from the nominatum of $n_2$; it is a new entity $e_3$. In order to speak about $e_3$ one needs a new name $n_3$. The sense of $n_3$ is a new entity $e_4$ and so on ad infinitum.

These are the difficulties in Frege's method of name-relation, in the meaning-analysis, but Carnap in his book points out that the very method of name-relation of whatever type, is ambiguous and hence inadequate. The

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ambiguity of this method emerges with special reference to the consideration of the property and the class. This can be illustrated by the help of the sentence "Rome is large". Two logicians, who believe in the method of name relation may agree to the nominatum of the word 'Rome', but there may be disagreement concerning the nominatum of 'large'. One may interpret the sentence 'Rome is large' in the sense that Rome belongs to the class 'large'. Hence it is about the thing 'Rome' and the class 'Large'. Therefore, according to the principle of subject matter 'large' is a name of the class 'large' and hence, according to the principle of univocability, it cannot be the name of any other entity. Against this, the other logician may say that the given sentence means that Rome possesses the property 'large'. Therefore, according to the principle of subject matter 'large' is the name of the property 'large' and hence according to the principle of univocability, its nominatum cannot be any other entity, in particular it cannot be the class 'large'. Both these logicians may come to an agreement on the point that the sentence, 'Rome belongs to the class 'large' and the sentence 'Rome has the property large are one and the same thing, but the principle of univocability would be at stake, because the property 'large' and the class 'large' are two different things. It is so, when they agree, in recognizing the distinction between a property and a corresponding class.
Even on knowing the difficulties, the theory is still accepted for at least two reasons. First, in the case of many words, especially common nouns, one teaches and learns their meanings ostensively, i.e. by pointing to certain objects. One says, *That’s a table*, *That is blue*, means that, table means *a thing like that*, or *the sort of thing, often with four legs, at which people eat or write*. As Augustine said, *When they (my elders) named some object and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that this thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out... I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified.*

Though this is acceptable, yet to suppose that the object signified by the expression is the meaning of the expression is highly mistaken. One is mistaken in thinking so, by not distinguishing the correct point that it belongs to the meanings of those words which do signify or refer to objects and which, consequently, are taught and learnt ostensively, that they are used to refer to or signify these objects, from the incorrect point that the objects referred to or signified are the meanings of those words. The object theory takes the relation of expression and meaning as analogous to that of money, *and the cow that you can

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buy with it (But contrast: money with its use).  

Second, certain words, namely Proper Names, are related in a familiar way which one calls naming to objects which may be called their bearers, e.g. The President of India in 1950 was the bearer of the name 'Dr Rajendra Prasad' and the name names him. The object theory wrongly assimilates the antithesis of expression and meaning to that of the name and its bearer, the relation between Proper names and their bearers, and the objects to which the words refer are called their meanings. Besides this wrong assimilation, proper names are a dangerous analogy for they are in some ways hardly words at all.

It was B. Russell who, for the first time, points out the antinomic paradoxical character of the name relation. Russell lists three puzzles, which every theory of denotation (name-relation) must solve. The first puzzle, which is the paradox of the name relation is: "If A is identical with B, whatever is true of the one is true of the other and neither may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition."  

Further, he applies this principle

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to the simple statement, namely (i) "George IV wishes to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley"; the phrase, "the author of Waverley", is the same as Scott, therefore (i) becomes "George IV wishes to know whether Scott is Scott, which becomes meaningless for obviously George IV was not interested in the logical problem of law of identity, but against this, he was interested in knowing whether a certain individual, called Scott, really wrote the book called 'Waverley'.

This paradox could be dissolved by Russell's theory of Denotation, where, "A denoting phrase is essentially a part of a sentence and does not, like most single words have any significance on its own account." When one says "Scott is a man", here Scott is the subject, but when one says (i) 'The author of Waverley is Scott', one does not mean to imply that the phrase, 'the author of Waverley' is the subject. The sentence (i) would mean, 'There is one entity that wrote Waverley and that entity is Scott'.

This shows that even without the phrase 'the author of Waverley', one can express the same sense in another sentence. This possibility makes Russell to assert that "the phrase, per se has no meaning, because in any proposition in which

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7 R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 134.

it occurs, the proposition fully expressed, does not contain the phrase, which has been broken up.*

So Russell contends that although individual expression and class expressions may, in a certain sense, be regarded as naming individuals or classes, they do not occur in the primitive notation, but are incomplete symbols* without independent meaning. The descriptive phrases which are incomplete symbols get meaning when they are interpreted in the context of some particular subject which is not merely a grammatical but logical as well. For example, in the statement, "Moore was a great philosopher," the symbol 'Moore' is not merely a grammatical subject but is also a logical subject, for in no way can one change this symbol without altering the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs. But, on the other hand, the descriptive phrase, 'a great philosopher' could be changed so as to convey the same meaning.

Hence through this theory of description or incomplete symbols, Russell has not been able to avoid the method of name relation, but has been successful in

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*Ibid., p. 51.

*By incomplete symbol, Russell means a symbol which has no meaning in isolation, but is capable of being defined in certain contexts.
pointing that all expressions do not name, only the particulars name the particular objects. Thus the Proper name 'Moore', names a certain historical individual called by the name 'Moore', but 'a great philosopher' taken by itself does not refer to anything at all. This would mean that there are expressions, such as descriptive phrases whose meanings have nothing to do with denotation, whereas there are expressions such as proper names, whose meaning is always dependent upon denotation, but one does not think that proper names, as such, have to refer to something to be meaningful, to see whether the entity denoted by a proper name is existent or not, one has to examine empirically, but it is not that in order to be meaningful a proper name must refer to something which is there in the world.

Moore agrees to it, he says:

"... in the immense majority of cases in which proper names are used, both in common life, in history, and in fiction, nothing whatever is being said about the name used: it is only being used. That is to say, the proposition which is expressed by the sentence in which the name 'N' occurs, neither says nor entails the proposition 'somebody is called "N"'."10

However, Russell's theory of denotation and descriptions have gone a great deal to avoid some of the

difficulties which result from the method of name relation. And the most important thing is, that even remaining particulars or proper names are done away with by the same theory of Descriptions of Russell by W.V. Quine in his essay "On what there is". Quine says that, although it is difficult to apply Russell's theory of Description to the particular name such as 'Pegasus', but it can easily be made to apply. One can do it by changing it into a description as for example it can be rephrased as 'the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon'. Now turning 'Pegasus' into this phrase, one can easily proceed to analyse the statement 'Pegasus is' or 'Pegasus is not' precisely on the analogy of Russell's analysis of 'The author of Waverley is' and 'The author of Waverley is not'. But supposing that a particular name is so much basic that it cannot be translated into a descriptive phrase, then according to Quine, one can so use the word that it can be identifiable with a description as in the case of Pegasus.

"We could have appealed to the ex-hypothesi unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of being Pegasus, adopting, for its expression, the verb 'is-pegasus' or 'Pegasizes'. The noun 'Pegasus' itself could then be treated as derivative, and identified after all with a description: 'the thing that is-pegasus', 'the thing that Pegasizes'."

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Secondly, Quine contends that whatever one says with the help of names can be easily put in a language, which is completely bereft of names. This becomes possible on the basis that every sentence, which has got a singular term said to name a certain entity, can be translated into a sentence in which the singular term is replaced by the bound variable, variables or quantification, which are words like 'something', 'nothing', 'everything'. These words though meaningful do not purport to name anything at all, though "They refer to entities generally, with a kind of studied ambiguity, peculiar to themselves".

Hence the upshot of Quine's argument is this that it is not necessary that the meaningfulness of a statement containing a singular term should depend upon the entity named by that term, for there may be a meaningful statement and it may not name any entity whatsoever. He says,

"We need no longer labor under the delusion that the meaningfulness of a statement, containing a singular term presupposes an entity named by the term. A singular term need not name to be significant."

Strawson in his article 'Singular terms, ontology and identity' published in Mind of 1956, writes against the thesis of Quine, that singular terms are superfluous. He contends that from the viewpoint of reference singular

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Ibid., pp. 3-9.
terms are of utmost importance, and moreover, every meaningful statement is indirectly concerned with multiple bits of human experience and these particular bits of human experience and these particular bits of experience cannot be explained by Quine's bound variables, therefore, one must have at least some singular terms to account for these particular bits of experience. But Quine already points out that in the consideration of the meaning of a statement, one is not concerned with the entity or situation referred to by the statement and unless and until Strawson criticizes this assumption of Quine, his criticism of the theory of Quine is of no importance; because, it is quite irrelevant to what Quine asserts.

There are certain drawbacks in the Object Theory, for in the case of imaginary or fictitious things, there are no corresponding objects to which they are named, unlike the example that 'dog' names an object, i.e. a domestic animal, 'centaur' or 'unicorn' cannot name an object, for there are no centaur or unicorn, so some philosophers sought something else for it to name, to be its meaning.

Two assumptions which Moore mentions are, that it names something 'in the mind' or that it names an image which we hold 'before our mind'. The first assumption that these imaginary objects are 'in the mind' was rejected, for 'Centaur' and 'Unicorn' are not 'in the mind' in the
sense in which one can say that thinking and feelings are. The second is that 'any name which is the name of an imaginary thing is, in fact, no more or less than the name of some image' is also rejected, for there are many meaningful words to which no corresponding images are called to the mind. If one concentrate on words like 'horse' or 'red' it may be tempting to suppose that all words have corresponding images. But what about words like 'if', 'so', 'all', 'or', 'then' etc. What are the images corresponding to these? On the question, the idea that each word has its corresponding image seems absurd. What about the 'four dimensional space', one cannot form images of the theoretical entities in the way one forms images of tables or chairs.

Image theorists further maintains that an expression is meaningful only if it is associated with an image, still a question emerges, what image? Though it is true to say that if one is to explain the meaning of 'table' in terms of an image, it must be the image of a table rather than anything else, even here one has to lay down a criterion as to what makes a given image the image of one sort of a thing, rather than of another; the most relevant answer to this theory seems that an image X is an image of something y if x and y are observably similar — if, say, the shape of the image resembles the shape of whatever it is an image of. But one is mistaken here, for even if one always
has an image of centaur whenever one imagines of it, what one means by centaur and an image of centaur is two different things. Even the same can be said of a memory image, that though to remember involves having an image of what one remembers.

If the above interpretation of the object theory is correct then one finds that for Moore the expressions in case of imaginary objects do not name images or objects in the mind, rather they do not name at all, or in other words a thing or an object being as such and an image of the object are two different things. Even Ogden and Richards points out,

"There are good reasons why attempts to build a theory of interpretation upon images must be hazardous. One of these is the grave doubt, whether in some minds, they ever occur or even have occurred. Another is that in very many interpretations, where words play no recognizable part, introspection, unless excessively subtle and therefore, of doubtful value as evidence fails to show that imagery is present. A third and stronger reason is that images seem to a great extent to be mental luxuries."

When Moore says, 'this something which is called up to your mind by the word 'real' that it is not natural to call it an object, in the what that we call horse an object, because this might suggest that we are talking about 'the

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objects or things which are real; whereas we are talking about the property which they have in common by virtue of which we say that they are all real. This 'property' can be called a 'notion' or 'idea' or 'concept'.

Though Moore did distinguish between objects which have the properties denoted by a word and the properties themselves, he seems to think of the property or notion as a sort of object which is somewhere and could be brought up before the mind. By using the word which denotes it means that even if one does not know of the existence of the word 'real' or of any word synonymous with it, one could have before one's mind the notion which reflects these words call up to some one who does understand them. The meaning of the word is something, a notion or a thought, which in some sense is in the world, which could be made clear by the utterance of a word. Similarly with 'propositions' which are what the whole sentence name. "There certainly are things in the universe which have the properties which I shall mean to ascribe to a thing which I call it a proposition."\(^\text{14}\) A proposition is an apprehensible meaning of a sentence, which has two truth values, i.e. truth and falsehood, but not both. To think of 'properties' and 'notions' and 'concepts' as some sort of thinks makes it easy to see that Moore refers to a concept theory rather

\(^{14}\)G.E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, p. 56.
than to an object theory. In case of false beliefs, a similar shift is made from the object theory to some form of concept theory. Thus Moore approves and then steps back. For instance: If someone believes correctly that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815, then he certainly does believe something. There seems to be no difficulty here, for there was something which was a Battle of Waterloo in 1815; the sentence 'The Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815' does refer to something which happened. But suppose on the contrary, if someone believed falsely that the 'Battle of Waterloo' was fought in 1812, then certainly he believes something. There is something which he believes, but since there was no such thing as the Battle of Waterloo in 1812, the sentence 'the Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1812' does not refer to anything which happened; it would seem as if there is no such thing which he believes, so the statement is meaningless. This contention ultimately shows the assumption that only those statements can be meaningful which refers to fact and since there is no general fact, the general statement cannot have a general fact for its designate, and since it has no designate, it must be meaningless. But it would be quite wrong to think that only those statements could be meaningful, which designate some fact. There is no need of considering the reference or designate, for it to be meaningful. Here Moore says that in the statement 'all beliefs true or false', it refers
to an act of believing and the object of belief. Any two beliefs are different, because they have different objects. The words which express what is believed could then be said to express the object of belief, which is nothing but a proposition. Thus Moore makes a distinction between the object of belief from the words which express that object. So 'propositions' are introduced to answer the generic question of "What is it that one believes when one believes?"

The object theory leads to the concept theory, for what the words which name the object of a false belief name is ex-hypothesi not an object at all, but a proposition, and Moore says:

"Propositions" in the sense in which upon this theory, the object of belief is always a proposition, is not a name for any mere words.... It is a name for what is before your mind when you not only hear or read but understand a sentence. It is, in short, the meaning of a sentence - what is expressed or conveyed by a sentence...."

Moore extends this theory to true belief, since he says that there is no difference between a true and a false belief as such. Almost immediately, Moore saw an objection to his argument, since the subclause in, 'I believe that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1812' must be the name of something — for all expressions name — and yet it is not the name of anything in the world, or is not a

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fact; therefore it is the name of a proposition. Moore objected, though he may make this reply and may thus recur to the theory that there may be two different things having the same name and that though only one of them is in the present case, yet that one most undoubtedly is, yet surely this reply is not satisfactory. In making a distinction between the propositions which is, and the fact of having the same name, is not that one is conceiving both, for it could not even be said that the fact is not without conceiving it. It is possible to conceive or to believe without there being any kind of object of one's conception or belief. Hence The battle of Waterloo was fought in 1812 is not the name of anything at all. Furthermore;

"... if sometimes the words which seem to use to denote the thing believed or conceived, are not really a name of anything at all, I think there is no reason why we should not admit that this is always the case in false belief or in conception of what is purely imaginary. We should then have to say that expressions of the form "I believe so and so", "I conceived so and so", though they do undoubtedly express some fact do not express any relation between me... and an object of which the name is the words we use to say what we believe or conceive. And since there seems plainly no difference, in mere analysis, between false belief and true belief, we should have to say of all beliefs and suppositions generally, that they never consist in a relation between the believer and something else which is what is believed." 16

And since in this respect, there seems to Moore no difference...
between what is believed in a false belief and what is believed in a true belief, he expresses his conclusion as 'there simply are no such things as propositions'. But later, he again takes up the same problem.

Moore, in his essay 'On Propositions' equates the meaning of the term "Proposition" with the apprehensible meaning of a sentence, "It is quite plain I think", says Moore:

"... that when we understand the meaning of a sentence, something else does happen in our minds, besides the mere hearing of the word of which the sentence is composed, and it is no less plain that the apprehension of the meaning of one sentence with one meaning differs in some respect from the apprehension of another sentence with a different meaning.... There certainly are such things as two different meanings apprehended. And each of these two meanings is what I call 'Proposition', when we hear certain spoken words and understand their meanings, we may do three different things, we may believe it, disbelieve it or we may simply understand what the words mean, without either believing or disbelieving it — this sense is which we apprehend a proposition in these three cases is one sense of the word apprehension."17

Thus what Moore calls a proposition is the monolithic ideational meaning-content of a sentence. When a proposition is defined as the apprehensible meaning of a sentence, and such a meaning is defined as a proposition, one does not feel particularly enlightened except as satisfying a fad

17Ibid., pp. 53-59.
for profoundity. When Moore explains the nature of a logical fiction. But this fondness for a term wraps up a fiction in the mantel of an ontological entity. Moore asserts:

"The fact is that absolutely all the contents of the universe, absolutely everything that is at all, may be divided into two classes, namely propositions on the one hand, and into things which are not propositions on the other hand... the sort of thing that I mean by a proposition is certainly one of the things that is... certainly absolutely everything in the universe either is a proposition or is not."\(^{18}\)

when the hearer hears a sentence, he, apart from hearing, performs a second act of consciousness, that is apprehends the meaning of the sentence. This meaning, "then, is the sort of thing that I mean by a proposition.... There certainly are things which are propositions in this sense."\(^{19}\)

Thus the meaning-content of a sentential apprehension is for Moore not a logical abstraction, but something like a substantive entity over and above the sentence and the objective fact it refers to. Accordingly, if one follows Moore's view to its logical climax, there should be as many entities as there may be sentences in the past, the present and the future. This way every logical fiction may be hypostalized into a metaphysical entity.


\(^{19}\)Ibid., p. 58.
Later, Moore revises his opinion. The term proposition is used in philosophy, with the awareness of the meaning one attaches to it. Whether a proposition is true or false, there is always a conceptual content in understanding a sentence. This conceptual content in its logical nature is an abstraction and not an entity, and this abstraction is the meaning of a sentence. There is nothing wrong in calling it a proposition, if it does not turn into a substantive entity but remains as a synonym for a sentence in its logical aspect.

Hence one could say from the above argument that to Moore, a 'proposition' is the apprehensible meaning of a significant sentence. That this meaning is quite different from the "fact", can easily be assumed, because one could grasp the meaning of a sentence even when there is no fact; for instance, "The rose is blue". So there is such a thing as a false proposition, but no such thing as a false fact. 'Fact' by its very definition means something which is, but Russell talks of the negative facts. There are negative facts in the sense that they deny the actual states of affair; like saying, 'the dog is not a domestic animal', it is a negative fact, but not a false fact, for there are no facts which are false or true. It is not to deny the various uses of the term 'fact', for it has been used differently by different philosophers. First, a 'fact'
is the condition of assertability; it is a condition of objective communication. Factual questions are different from the questions of opinion. A certain opinion has nothing to do with the objective state of affairs in the external world, unless and until that opinion be in the form of some factual statement. Facts are not things, because thing is always particular, so that it could be named, but a factual statement is not a name of a particular theory, and why a thing or particular could not be regarded as a fact is for the reason, that a mere particular thing could not make a proposition true or false. When, one says 'Socrates is dead' one states the fact that Socrates is dead. But if one only says 'Socrates', one does not state anything and if one understands this word, one understands it as stating some fact of such kind 'Socrates was a great philosopher' and so on. This fact is a sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence not by a simple name like 'Socrates'. And when a simple word, such as 'wolf' comes to express a fact it is due to unexpressed context.

It was Wittgenstein who points out that propositions are not names for facts, for there could be two propositions corresponding to each fact, one true and the other false. This illustrates how the relation of a proposition to a fact is different from the relation of a name to the thing named. There are two ways in which a proposition can be related to a fact; either it is true or it is false to
the fact. But there is only one relation of the name to
the named. It just names a particular thing and if it does
not name anything, it is not a name, but even if a proposition
is false it does not cease to be a proposition. But if a
name does not name anything, it is just an utterance.
Facts are thought to be complex and their complexity is
mirrored in propositions. To Wittgenstein there is always
a fundamental identity of structure, between a fact and the
symbol for it, which is the proposition.

If a 'proposition' is taken to be a sort of a thing
alone susceptible of being believed, disbelived or doubted, then a fact' and 'a true proposition' mean the same thing.
But if by 'a proposition' one means a sentence or a certain sort of thought, then indeed a true proposition in either of these two senses is not the same thing as 'a fact'.

Rather, it then represents or 'corresponds to a fact', but then the question could not be left unraised, as to what sort of a thing is then the 'fact' corresponded to by the sentence or the thought? Here Moore maintains that a proposition is true when it corresponds to a reality; here is involved a contrast between the proposition commonly thought of as a set of words having a meaning or a set of ideas and the 'reality it represents'. Moore identifies a

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20 Stebbing, _A Modern Introduction to Logic_, p. 33.
'true proposition' and 'reality'. Once it is recognized, he wrote in his article on 'Truth' in Baldwin's Dictionary, 'that the proposition is to denote not a belief nor a form of words but the object of belief; it seems plain that it differs in no respect from the reality to which it is supposed to correspond, i.e. the truth, that 'I exist' differs in no respect from the corresponding reality "My existence". Thus Moore is not of the opinion that there are only existential propositions, but they are asserting relations between concepts. The world is composed of eternal and immutable concepts, propositions relate concepts one to another and 'a true proposition' predicates truth of such a relation of concepts and is 'a fact' or a 'reality'. There are two kinds of simple concepts or universals: a priori concepts (attributes, substance) which do not have any temporal duration and which may be taken to be non-existent. (2) Empirical concepts (red, yellow) which do possess temporal duration and which do contingently exist i.e. get connected with the concept existence, all substantives or things, including minds, judgements and propositions are composed of simple or adjectival concepts. Existential or empirical propositions are those that contain empirical concepts in their composition. "This body is heavy", a priori propositions are those that contain only a priori concepts. "A substance has attributes". All that there is, all that one perceives or knows, consist
ultimately of simple concepts, which are completely independent of each other and of any substantive thing like mind or judgement. In fact minds are judgements are merely complexes of concepts.

Moore does maintain that a shade of colour is not a particular and that, though one sees a patch of some shade of colour when one sees a yellow patch, the particular (or sense data) is the patch, not the shade of colour of which it is the patch. For one must, if one is to be consistent, describes what appears to be most substantive as no more than a collection of such supposed adjectives and so the concept turns out to be the only substantives or subject or no one concept can be either less an adjective than any other. So from the description of judgement no reference is given to the mind or the world. None of these can give "grounds" for anything except in so far as they are complex judgements. The nature of judgement is more ultimate than either and less ultimate only to the nature of the concept or logical idea.

Hence one can infer that for Moore 'fact' and 'reality' are identical, but there is a difference between 'a true proposition' and a 'fact'. This is clearly shown in his The Common Place Book, where he writes, 'This is scarlet' is equivalent to 'That this is scarlet is a fact' but is not equivalent to 'The proposition that this is
Scarlet is a fact is not correct which shows that "is a fact" and "is true" are not interchangeable, although the 'that this is scarlet' is a fact', and 'That this is scarlet' is true' have the same meaning.  

In short, the argument is that since the expression 'is a true proposition' and 'is a fact' are not universally interchangeable, facts and true propositions could not be identical. This would be a valid argument, if its premise were true, but to show whether the premise is true, the truth of the conclusion is very necessary, but those philosophers who do not differentiate between 'the fact' and 'a true proposition', would find no difference between the two sentences, 'The proposition that this is scarlet is a fact', and 'the proposition that this is scarlet is true'.

Accepting a certain proposition requires that a person must have some sort of a belief, whether true or false. As has already been pointed out, what is believed or the object of belief — the proposition is something which is there. Such a thing is in the universe whether a belief is true or false. This suggests a simple theory of relation of a "true belief" to the "fact" to which it refers. Whenever a belief is true, there really is such a thing in the universe, and if there is no such thing in

21 G.E. Moore, The Common Place Book, p. 3.
the universe to which the belief refers, then the belief is false. For example, when someone believes that "griffins exist in the world", the existence of griffins is a particular fact which could prove one's belief to be true or false, as it is the case. The difference between truth and falsehood in this particular belief which one has depends on the fact whether griffins exist or not. When somebody believes that "rose is red" and that "this belief is true", in this case, this belief is true, because there is a fact having the name 'the rose is red'. There is a relation between a belief which one holds and the fact to which it refers. This belief could not be true if the fact or the rose to which it refers is not red and if this is red and he believes it to be so, his belief cannot be other than true. Therefore the rose being actually red is both a 'necessary' and 'sufficient' condition of the truth of belief. One's beliefs could not be true if this condition were not fulfilled and according to Moore, it must be true if this condition is fulfilled. Similarly for the falsity of a proposition or a belief, similar conditions should

22"To say of this belief that it is true would be to say of it that the fact to which it refers is — that there is such a fact in the universe as the fact to which it refers, while to say of it that it is false is to say of it that the fact to which it refers simply is not — that there is no such fact in the Universe."

G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 255.
be fulfilled. If the rose, in fact, is not red, and someone believes that it is so, then his belief could not be other than false. In this case, the rose not being red is the necessary and sufficient condition for the falsity of his belief. According to this theory, there is a relation, 'this' belief, if true, and 'this' fact and does not hold between 'this' belief and 'any other' fact. It means that the relation between the belief that 'rose is red' and if true, the fact that rose is red and to no other belief. In saying that there is such a relation, Moore says:

"... we imply that every true belief has some peculiar relation to one fact and one fact only... every different true belief having the relation in question to a different fact." \(^{23}\)

Though Moore does talk of a 'true proposition' and 'true beliefs' corresponding to reality or external state of affairs, if one goes deep into the matter one would definitely agree with J.L. Evans that the consideration of meaning has nothing to do with the correspondence of the term with the reality, as he further says, "It is one thing to claim that a sentence is meaningful and another to claim that it is true." \(^{24}\) Similarly, Strawson contends that the meaning is the function of the sentence or expression.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., p. 256.

To give the meaning of the statement is to give general directions for its use. The meaning of the sentence cannot be identified with the object which is referred to. He says:

"... so, the question of whether a sentence of expression is significant or not, has nothing whatever to do with the question of whether the sentence uttered on a particular occasion, is, on that occasion being used to make a true or false assertion or not or of whether the expression is, on that occasion, being used to refer to or mention, anything at all." 23

In 1910-11 lectures, Moore takes the 'meaning' and 'naming' as synonymous. He writes, "pure white considered as occupying this place, either has the same meaning as 'pure white' or has no meaning at all. What he says is "... this phrase" pure white considered as occupying this place" is either merely a name for a universal or it is not a name for anything at all. There is nothing at all distinct from the universal, for which it could be a name. It is true that the whole sentence "Pure white, considered as occupying this place is round", really would have a meaning and a meaning distinct from that of the sentence, "Pure white is round".... The difference is between the meanings of the two sentences (1) 'Pure white is round' and 'Pure white considered as occupying this is round'. The phrase "pure

white considered as occupying this place" is not by itself a name for anything at all distinct from "pure white".

In his article on "The conception of Reality", he discusses another instance fatal to this theory. In an attempt to understand the meaning of the sentence "Time is unreal", he says:

"I have just said that we have pointed out one particular one, and that the most important, among the conceptions for which the term "reality" may stand; and that is an excusable way of saying what we have done. But it would, I think, be more correct to say that we have pointed out one particular, and that the most important, usage of the terms "real" and "unreal", and that one of the peculiarities of the usage is that it is such that the terms "real" and "unreal" cannot, when used in this way, be properly said to stand for any conception whatever."  

According to the concept theory, a word would be meaningless if it stands for no conception, but with a use a word cannot be meaningless.

Moore makes a double distinction between the verbal expressions, psychological things, like thought (on the one hand) and between consciousness, images and concepts which are expressed by a linguistic expression, on the other. Here one raises the question, Is it necessary that the expressions be distinguished from what Moore calls a 'Concept' or a 'Proposition', because there could be a

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26 G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 212.
situation where different sets of words may have the same meaning as each other. In translation from one language into another or in synonymous expressions in the same language and cases where the same set of words may have a different meaning on different occasions, example could be the different occasions of use of any word or personal pronoun; the more difficult situation arises where we express a proposition without having any verbal expression at all, but only images and gestures. It is for the sake of 'unexpressed thoughts' people often introduce 'concepts' and 'propositions', as Moore maintained in Some Main Problems of Philosophy.

* One might make a remark here that Moore's reference is to different propositions or events in the case of different utterances of tensed propositions like, It will rain tomorrow, would, among other things imply that Prof. Moore's analysis of the meaning of a tensed proposition, like, It will rain tomorrow, as denoting a different events themselves, which as we noted earlier in this chapter he denounces.

This position with regard to the use of tense words does not seem to be revised in his latter words. "And in general whenever we use the present tense in its primary sense, it seems to me plain that we do mean something different by it each time we use it," and again "and if so, if I say "It will rain tomorrow", these words have a different meaning to day from what they would have if I used them tomorrow. What we mean by "tomorrow" is obviously a different day, when we use the word on one day, from what we mean by it which we use it on another."27

Then one might be tempted to say that Moore becomes unwittingly a victim of denotative theory of meaning, as far as the analysis of tensed words is concerned.

27 Ibid., pp. 135-36.
"We may thus apprehend a proposition which we desire to express before we are able to think of any sentence which would express it. We apprehend the proposition, and desire to express it, but none of the words we can think of will express exactly the proposition we are apprehending and desiring to convey." 28

Moore was often taken aback by the situation in which one tends to say 'I know what I want to say but I am not sure how to say it', which he takes as evidence that there is something behind and before to our talking, something which he regarded as a thought, idea or notion. 29

Hence one can say it is for these reasons that Moore feels the need to distinguish between the expression of something and that which is expressed, something which is expressed is called a proposition. One could say of two expressions either that they express the same or a different meaning; to change the meaning of an expression is to analyse the proposition conveyed. 30 To talk of a proposition is to talk what those words mean.

Having distinguished an expression and what it expresses or means and having called the latter a proposition — or in case of some expressions, a concept — Moore still

28 G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 61.
29 Ibid., p. 109.
wishes to protect against supposing that the proposition is in some way psychological. In 1899, he writes, the concepts are possible objects of thought, but that is no definition of them. It merely states that they may come into relation with a thinker, and in order that they may do anything, they must be something. It is indifferent to their nature whether anybody thinks of them or not. Moore also laid stress on the difference between 'the act of apprehension or consciousness' of a proposition and what is apprehended. His view is that the 'apprehension of the meaning of one sentence with a different meaning' and since 'each act of apprehension is alike in respect of the fact that it is an act of apprehension, and an act of apprehension of the same kind' they can only 'differ in that whereas one is the apprehension of one proposition, the other is the apprehension of a different proposition. Each proposition, therefore, can and must be distinguished both from the other proposition, and also from the act which is the apprehending of it'. Indeed the possible thing of supposing a proposition, or concept, to be psychological, of confusing it and the thinking of it, or of supposing it depends on the thinking of it, is so great that he is puzzled about the use of the terms. Moore then decides that 'one natural way of naming it is to call it the meaning of the word.... *Meaning* in this sense of what is meant, for in fact the thing I want to
talk about is the object or property or notion or idea which is conveyed or meant by the word ..., and is in that sense its meaning. Similarly, one may fail he says:

"... to see that a proposition is quite a different sort of thing from any image or collection or collection of images', because, if you ask, what does happen in your mind, when you believe this proposition... you may, I think, find it very difficult to discover anything at all except two kinds of things', namely 'images of words' and 'a more or less vivid image of your hat hanging up in the hall..."32

He thus negatively explains a proposition (or concept) by distinguishing it from either the words and images which express it or the psychological acts and images which accompany it. This use of 'proposition' and 'concept' instead of 'meaning' in his more recent papers of 1942 and 1944 is not specifically explained, but the context makes it clear that his purpose is to differentiate between a verbal expression and what it expresses.

Moore considers that the problem of universal is as to how general expressions like 'dog', 'animal', 'red', 'round', etc. are used. Moore regards it as the problem of saying what it is that these expressions name. When this is called a universal (general idea, concept), the

31G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 218.

32Ibid., pp. 60 and 72.
problem is to discover what sort of thing a universal is
to talk of the meaning of 'colour' Moore says is to talk
of that which the word 'colour' names, and this is the
common property which all those things which are colours
have. We can hold this universal before our minds and
can examine it.*

From all this discussion A. R. White draws the
conclusion that the term 'meaning' is not univocal (1) It
can be taken either in an ordinary sense or (2) in a
technical sense, having the notion of the meaning of
certain terms before our mind is the ordinary sense of
'meaning' but being able to say what this notion is, define
it, which is knowing then it is taken in a technical sense. 33

There is a slight drawback in Moore's use of 'meaning'
in an ordinary sense. Moore says that to know the meaning
of a word is to know how it is commonly or generally
used, to be able to use it rightly in so far as we are
able to understand sentences in which it occurs and to

*In the Vth chapter, Moore discusses the problem
of universals, he does not define what is universal, but
merely stresses upon its different kinds. After discussing
in length the properties, relations etc. We come to the
conclusion that a question about universals is nothing
apart from settling the question of common names. Thus
universals are to talk about particulars, and they are
nothing except the applicability of using a criterion
for understanding the general terms.

33 A. R. White, G. E. Moore: A Critical Exposition,
p. 53.
know how to use it. To talk about the ordinary meaning of the word is to know its use, but sometimes he says that words are used to stand for ideas or concepts or objects, or, in other words, the use of an expression is to know or to be aware of the notion for which it stands.

Moore sometimes uses the word 'definition' in its ordinary sense:

"Sometimes, a definition is verbal and it merely says that this is the way that I or most people use the word or it gives a synonym of it, sometimes to define is to call up before people's minds the notion signified by the word." 34

In the case of ambiguous terms, a correct definition will be attained if we enumerate all these different predicataes which the word is commonly used to signify says Moore in (1903) lectures.

To know what predicates are attached to the things is to discover 'the nature of that object or idea'. Moore often says that as if there is something in common to all the things to which a word refers in all its meanings. A doubt about the meaning is said to be a doubt whether there is anything common between these various predicates, and if so, what?

To give the technical meaning or definition of a

34 G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 217.
word 'X' is merely to be able to say or point out what is the common property which all things, called 'X', have. But Moore also seems to think that this way of putting it makes it too near to the ordinary sense of 'meaning' and 'definition' makes it too like the ability merely to call up before your mind and see, the notion signified by the void; whereas it is the business of the technical definition to 'raise some questions about this notion or property, which is what is meant by the word'.

Moore draws the difference between seeing what is meant, or indeed a case of seeing anything, and being able to describe or say what it is you see. This is bound up with his view of the relation of thought to language. We may thus apprehend a proposition which we desire to express, before we are able to think of any sentence which would express it knowing the meaning, in the ordinary sense, seems to cover not only having the notion before

*Moore here again discusses the same problem which is discussed few pages back. He makes a distinction between describing and identifying or seeing as it is presented to the perceiver. When the question arises 'What do you see?' one expects at least two different kinds of answers, each of which would be given in the same form 'I see such and such'. One identifies what one sees and the other describes. Looking only on the material object, one finds that the identificatory answer is given in terms of a material object, whereas the descriptive answer is given in terms of sense data. There is a possibility of agreement in the identificatory answers, the disagreement could be in their descriptive answer. The description of what one sees is different from a person who sees with a blue spectacles. What is visually described and what is,
your mind but also seeing exactly what it is, and then these two together are contrasted with being able to say, to describe, what it is that you see to before your mind’?

"I confess I don’t know how to describe the property which belongs to all truths and only to truths; it seems to me to be a property which can be pointed out and seen, but if it can be analysed, I don’t know how to analyse it. The case seems to me to be the same as if you were asked what 'a colour' is. All of us who are not blind, know perfectly well what a colour is, and, with regard to anything whatever which may come before our minds, we can tell, with perfect case, whether it is a colour or not ... yet ... it is extremely difficult to define what it means by "being a colour" — to say what the property is which belongs to all colours and only to colours."35

Moore suggests that one should distinguish between the meaning or notion under consideration from other notions referred to by either the same or different expressions. Moore stresses that there may be several predicates denoted by a word, there may be several ideas or notions called up in the minds of the people who know the word. To relate the given notion to all others is to define it. In some necessarily differently described by touch, hearing may be identified as the samething. The various descriptive answers may all be right and thus they do not really contradict each other. The samething may appear very differently to different people in different circumstances, but the identification remains the same.

cases where the two different answers are right in saying that A and B are X, one could be mistaken if one thinks that the sense in which A is X is the same as that in which B is X. Failing to see the difference means failing to give an adequate definition. There is a close connection between distinguishing and analysing. Even when tackling various problems of perception, Moore often speaks of analysing statements about physical objects.

Thus coming down to a final answer, one would say that the object theory of meaning could not be accepted, for to name a thing is different from a thing named. Though it is true that proper names are designed to name or refer to particular things, and all actual proper names are used or have been used at sometime or other to name or refer to some particular thing or other, but these uses are logically independent of, and distinct from, any meaning function or use they may have. H. Khatchadourin is right in pointing out a defect in Denotative theory, which confuses and identifies labelling, naming, referential use of proper name with their meanings. For the meaning of proper name is not to be replaced by its description, for a name is referred to only one individual at a time, whereas a descriptive referring phrase could characterize

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36 H. Khatchadourian, "Meaning of Proper Names", International Logic Review No. 12 December 1975, ed. by Franco Spisani, p. 188.
and fit more than one individual at a time. Thus:

"... a particular name is not itself a particular configuration of sounds or marks but is what is brought about by a correct application of the rules or conventions to the production of noises or marks where the intention is to communicate." 37

One can also say that a proper name is a name assigned as a mark to distinguish an individual person or thing from others without implying in its signification the possession by the individual in question of any specific attributes. Though Searle rejects the connotative theory of proper name, yet he takes, one definite description as providing the meaning of a proper name, i.e. the description which fits only one person who was born or is true of him at a certain time and certain place. This is also true for Zink, who thinks that, it is the meaning which fixes the original location which in turn determines the person's subsequent location." Further Zink says,

"... that there are plenty of descriptions other than these locational ones which will enable us to locate the person bearing the name"; 38

this is true, for the description itself entails a certain location, but it is not only the birth-place or a certain


time is taken into account, for to say the 34th President of the U.S.A. does not entail was born in Washington D.C., and that is quite a side remark, for the specifying of the time and place by no means is sufficient for its being the alleged "definiens" of proper names. P.F. Strawson right asserts that for a sentence to be meaningful it is not necessary that it refers to or names, an object, but how to use a certain expression, i.e. to know the rules governing the use of an expression are the rules allowing or forbidding the use of an expression in a certain situation or context. But there is nothing in the expression itself that implies the rules of its use and certainly nothing that makes obvious in a particular situation whether the expression is used correctly or not. Meaning is nothing but laying down a set of criteria and the organization of certain rules which helps one to know the sense of a proposition, for apart from rule following rules, words are just tokens or as Russell would say 'incomplete symbols'.

Thus Moore is correct in rejecting the object theory and accepting the concept theory, that the meaning of an expression or 'concept' is used in a certain statement, and it stands for some meaning. Meaning for him is the understanding of the conveyed sense, which is nothing apart from knowing how the terms are used.
... to know the meaning of a sentence is to know how to use it, to know in what circumstances its use is correct or incorrect.... A sentence is meaningful if it has a use; we know its meaning if we know its use.*39

and again:

... to know the what an expression means is to know how it may or may not be employed....*40

But at times one finds that Moore is not firm about the whole issue; he dangles in between.

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