Many philosophers have claimed that in addition to objects met with in sense-experience there exist entities of an entirely different and more esoteric kind, technically designated as 'Universals'.

The term 'Universal' means that which is common to, and shared by, all the particulars of a certain class or kind. The ordinary objects of our perception, such as a table, a chair, a red or white colour, are particulars in the sense that each of them exists in, and is limited to, a particular part of space and time. They are different and exclusive of one another. One table is different from another and excludes it from within itself, so also is the other table, in relation to the first. Similarly, it can be said that one colour is different from another colour, and both cannot be at the same point of space and time.

Whereas the particulars are thus limited in space and time, and are exclusive of one another, Universals, in contrast to the changing and passing phenomena perceived with our senses, have been described by many philosophers as being timeless, unchangeable and exact. It is said to be present in more than one particular occupying different spaces and different times. Things of a certain class have something common in them, by virtue of which they are grouped together.
in a class, and are called by the same name. Different colours red, yellow and green, have common characteristics; so they are grouped into the class of colours and are called by the common name 'colour'. The thought of what all the particulars of a certain class have in common is called a 'General idea' or a 'Class concept', and something which is common is their 'generality' or 'universality'. Colour, as something which is common to, and shared by all particular colours is their universal. So "a universal will be anything which may be shared by many particulars".¹ The particulars, like this red, that black table, exists in space and time, whereas the universals e.g. 'redness' and 'blackness' are beyond space and time.

In order to know what kind of thing 'Universals' are, one has to specify the criteria under which various entities are considered to resemble one another and hence fall under certain categories. Thus it could be said, according to Plato that if A and B resemble each other with respect to C, then C is a universal and A and B are particulars. To say A and B resemble each other with respect to C, is to say nothing more than A and B are classed together, since they would satisfy some criterion of resemblance. Therefore the concept of universal is superimposed on another concept,

i.e. resemblance (or similarity or likeness). Hence the clarification of this concept becomes a foremost task.

Socrates makes use of the concept of resemblance in his arguments for deducing the existence of ideas or universals. To Hume, Russell, Moore, Carnap etc. it is a fundamental relation indispensable to knowledge. Further, it is argued by some philosophers that since resemblance is not reducible to anything else, it should be regarded as either a primitive concept or the universal as such. Plato not only employs this concept in binding particulars together but also in assigning ideas to them, and later recognizes it as one of the three higher type of ideas which are predicable of the lower types.

Hume, like Plato also uses the concept of resemblance for explaining universals. Hume writes in Appendix that simple ideas admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and comparison without having any common circumstances the same, but Hume did not lay down any criteria for classifying objects, and on what basis one should believe that "blue and green are different simple ideas but are more resembling than blue and scarlet, despite their perfect simplicity." 2

Hampshire argues that,

"Hume in spite of rejection of abstract ideas, still thought of a perceived relation of resemblances as necessarily involved in all classification and use of language.... That he was never a complete nominalist, Hume's mistake was to regard the words 'similarity', or 'resemblance' as names of relations in the sense in which, for instance 'contiguous in time' or 'contiguous in space' or 'to the left' or 'after' are names of relations."

Here Hampshire seems to point out that, resemblance looks as if it is a descriptive symbol, but actually it is by itself vacuous. The main difficult with any 'philosophical relation' or even with the concept of 'resemblance' is that, philosophers who are engaged in a prescriptive metaphysics of events or substances are forced to give an account of resemblance in terms of their own preferred categories. If the real things in the word are 'material objects' or 'monads', or 'minds' or 'impressions', what then could be the status of such things as resemblance, identity, or causal sequences? Are they illusory or subjective or supersensible?

Plato talks of universals rather than for particulars and favoured logically equivalent statements to mere descriptive utterances. Aristotle assigns ontological priority to particulars. For him, secondary substances,

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qualities and relations are derivative. Whereas to Locke secondary qualities are unreal, but there are in the external world objective primary qualities which generate in the mind the ideas of secondary qualities. On the other hand, Hume's concern with the perceptions of his mind makes him to reduce every other phenomenon to impression. Necessity is in the mind of the one who infers, beauty is in the beholder; virtue is in the approver, space and time are nothing but the manner or order of articulation of impressions, says Hume.

Besides these metaphysical concerns and preferences, the universals occasion some semantical preferences, too. Hence for the language philosophers the problem of universal is regarded as, whether abstract words have meaning or not. Russell wrote that,

"... we "conceive" whether we understand the meaning of an abstract word; or think of that which is in fact the meaning of the word. If you see a white patch of snow, or recall it by means of images, you do not have a concept; but if you think about whiteness, you have a concept... The object of your thought, in such a case, is a universal or a Platonic idea."

Hence it means that the term 'universal' is so used, that to say an abstract word, for example, a general name or a verb or an adjective, has a meaning is the

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something as to say it expresses a universal, so that the expression 'the universal for which a word stands' translates the expression 'the meaning of an abstract word'. In order to know whether there are universals it is only necessary to know the meaning of the general name or an abstract word.

Besides this, philosophers of language also stresses upon the problem of proper names, where a bearer for every expression is assumed; if not so, the whole expression is taken to be a pseudo name equivalent to a disguised descriptive statement. However we would be seeing in the following chapter as to whether proper names have meaning or not. In addition, importance is also given to categorematic expressions at the cost of syncategorematic expressions, to descriptive statements rather than to prescriptive statements, to analytical sentences rather than to synthetic sentences, to nominalist language rather than to realists language.

*By categorematic statements I mean systematization of the structure of classification of various universals, for instance Aristotle gave a list of categories regarding substance, quality, quantity, relation etc., or model categories like actuality, possibility etc., and any concepts which take the above as their analysandum and offers analysans for their articulations of these categorisations are syncategorematics. In any case none of them is a particular names or a generic universal, but are general names.
Stating one category rather than another is also to be taken into account. Nelson Goodman defines nominalism as "refusal to countenance any entities rather than individuals". It would be helpful, if it could be shown that a given category is more basic than any other in the sense that for certain purposes one should learn certain concepts, and unless and until one is familiar with the categories of the concepts, one cannot make use of other categories. Thus it is thereby implies, that unless one is acquainted with particular objects, one is unable to talk about their relations and properties. Strawson tries to argue that the categories of material bodies and persons are indispensable categories of the structure of knowledge, and shwayder, that one refers to colours as properties only when one has discovered and introduced criteria for distinguishing and identifying an unlimited number of colours, and one uses numbers for counting only when one employs them to refer to natural numbers.

A serious mistake committed by many philosophers, is to assume, that any entity which could not be categorized


that only those entities exist which can be covered by their categories leads some philosophers to argue, that since numbers are not only ink-marks on paper, or certain noises uttered by man, i.e. since they are not mere numerals, but signs which have a determinable meaning (a true premise) to a false conclusion, then there are meanings (essence) which exist independently of the signs. That is, it is assumed that since a pure formalist i.e. account of numbers leads to an absurdity, the only way left is Platonism.

Austin, in an early paper, demonstrated that a long time prejudice against the category of relations leads to a strange assumption that no relations could be perceived. As for example resemblance can be intuited but not perceived. The rejection of relations goes back to Aristotle, for whom things are real, as well as their qualities, for the qualities cannot be detached from things, but the relations are rather frail.  

8Austin argues that, "Philosophers concept for relations: 'entia semementalia' and what not ... goes back to Aristotle, who assumes, with the plain man, that 'what is real is things', and then adds, grudgingly, 'also their qualities', these being somehow inseparable from the things; but he draws the line at relations which are really too flimsy," J.O. Urmson & Wernock (Ed.) J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 49.
Many philosophers were puzzled about the nature of philosophical relations, especially of resemblance. G.E. Moore thinks that since one could say that, "everything does resemble everything else in at least one respect (being in the universe)" and also "that one thing may be quite unlike another thing — may not resemble it at all"; therefore, "there may possibly be more senses (of resemblance) than one." Again Moore writes:

"The resemblance between pairs does merely consist in the possession of a common property: Whereas the "resemblance" is in fact a completely different relation which does not consist in the possession of a common property."

Russell, in Our Knowledge of the External World, distinguishes between different kinds of resemblances, the resemblance of three hues that are exactly the same is symmetrical, whereas the resemblance of three hues that are analogous or closely similar is not symmetrical. After observing carefully Church seems to have rightly remarked that the term "resemblance" simply is not the name of a qualifying predicate; Rather it is a term, verbal which derives its connotation from its context."

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9 G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 332.

10 Ibid., p. 368.

Therefore the most important and frequent observation about resemblance and its nearer notions, such as 'likeness' and 'similarity' is that they are in some sense incomplete predicates, for to say that two entities or things resemble each other is simply to say that they have a common property, without specifying what is that common property. Price seems to be in complete agreement with Russell in maintaining that,

"... we must distinguish between different resemblance. Objects resemble each other in one respect, as well as in degrees. Red objects resemble each other in one respect, round objects in another respect.... Thus it would be much too vague if we said that red objects for example, are just a set of objects which resemble one another, or sufficiently resemble each other. That would not distinguish them from any other class of objects one cares to name. We must specify what resemblance it is."

Carnap suggests that the concept Resemblance is an unanalysable concept. To show what is the common property between "X and y", and that there is a third property F to which 'x and y' have a kind of resemblance, this can be shown only ostensively. Wittgenstein shows, that, the function of resemblance on 'family resemblance' is very different from that of identity, for identity calls upon the synonymity of a term, whereas resemblance stresses upon the shared common property. It may be pointed out that, Wittgenstein while talking about the family resemblance simply denies

the truth of the Platonic claim that there is something common to all things having a name. So Wittgenstein, by giving various examples, 'game', 'colour', 'tension', 'exactness' shows in effect that, when the term resemblance is applied to these cases, it is not supposed that \( (x)(y)(z) (R_{xy} \text{ and } R_{yz} \implies (R_{xz})) \) is necessarily true. One also finds a similar view in Austin's works.\(^{13}\)

Hence taking it as an example, one could say that the two games resemble each other in the sense that they are indoor games; the second resembles the third and so on. The last in the series of game cannot be said to resemble the first, is not implied. To believe otherwise is to assume that resemblance like identity, is necessarily a transitive reflexive, and symmetrical relation, this is as unacceptable as saying that equality is not a transitive relation.

Thus Wittgenstein seems to be successful in destroying the Platonic myth, but this does not imply that Wittgenstein rules out the possibility of exact resemblance or exact similarity. Whereas one often makes a statement, that all

\(^{13}\)I call B by the same name as A, because it resembles A, C by the same name because it resembles B, D ... and so on. But ultimately A and, say, D do not resemble each other in any recognizable sense at all. This is a very common case; and the dangers are obvious, when we search for something 'identical' in all of them:* J.L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers*, p. 72.
these pens are exactly similar, or say are identical. Pitcher is of the opinion that Wittgenstein's 'Resemblance Theory' distorts the use of exact concepts or sentences which are analytic, for he writes,

"Wittgenstein's thesis, although highly plausible for terms like 'horse', 'lemon' and 'game' is not at all plausible for terms like 'brother' and 'vixen' for to be a brother, it is essential that one be male, and to be a vixen, it is essential that a fox be female."\(^{14}\)

However, from the above view, one could say with Wittgenstein, that the theory of family resemblance does not assume that no strict definitions could be given to any concepts in language games, but one can easily define the limits for a use of a term, again a remark from Wittgenstein makes it more explicit that,

"For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word 'number' for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier."\(^{15}\)

Thus, the importance of Wittgenstein lies in laying stress upon the actual use of the concepts, without having any a priori dogmas about it, for 'to be a vixen, it is essential that a fox be female' and 'for a brother to be


male*. This implies that what is essential is determined by the rules of the game and not by the nature of things or in other words it is the context and circumstances which determines what is essential and what is not. In the absence of a criterion, it is a matter of decision and not a matter of bare facts. In fact, it is now commonplace, after him, to say that the objects are not the stuff of the world; that are formed out of our verbal rules, from among the contents of our experience, i.e. primarily criterion for ostensive employment of names, that could not get away from the way an individual comes to use them. In other words, it is to be underlined that for Wittgenstein objects are not discovered, but are specified as the satisfactory instances of the correct designations of certain name-like expressions which have their rules of canonical use in standard contexts.

Thus, the need for understanding the concept of resemblance is not a need which could be satisfied by finding a synonymous term for 'Resemblance' which could be used in a similar way. 'Likeness' and 'similarity' are already synonymous terms for resemblance.

'Resemblance' thus, becomes a concept that one uses for classifying or sorting, and hence for characterising, distinguishing and referring to entities. One uses the expression 'resemblance', 'similarity' or 'likeness' to sort out various entities. It is true that much of the
linguistic entities do not require any classifications, but this is not to deny the fact that most or perhaps all of the functions of describing, promising presuppose usage of words according to which some classification is done. Hence it implies that none of these activities are the same as classifying things, but still one can maintain resemblance to be a primitive concept, but not to be vacuous or useless, since, of all linguistic activity, none can claim greater superiority than the activity of sorting entities and covering them by some general term. Russell seems to be correct in saying:

"... the world cannot be described without the use of the word 'similar' or some equivalent, (i.e. without the use of predicates) that seems to imply something about the world, though I do not know exactly what. This is the sense in which I still believe in universals."16

In this passage, Russell holds the realist theory of universals to consist in repudiating two errors: the nominalist error that predicates can be dispensed with in a true description of the world; and what we may call the "idealist" error that the repudiation of the nominalist error implies nothing about the world, because the truth of a description depends, not on how the world is, but on how thinkers think.

A distinction can be made between the meaning of resemblance (classificatory concept) which is a constant, and the various criteria for the application of this concept. It has been pointed out that resemblance or 'similarity', or 'likeness' is a classificatory concept. This concept is taken into account not only to sort out things but to take care of future contingencies. The function of this concept is that it can be applied to an infinite number of things, that is, anything could be classified under some or other criteria and each class may be counted as an open class. If for each event there could be one name, then there would have been no need to build universals and apply them to past, present and future entities. Austin criticizes nominalism by saying:

"It is in any case simply false that we use the same name for different things 'grey' and 'grey' are not the same, they are two similar symbols (tokens) just as the things denoted by 'this' and by 'that' are similar things. In this matter, the 'words' are in a position precisely analogous to that of the objects denoted by them." 17

The main argument of Austin can be summarized thus, symbols are as much universals as what is denoted by them, for example, the reason for calling different things grey is that they have something in common, that the first occurrence and the last occurrence of 'grey' have something

in common, also by virtue of which these tokens are used. But then, one must give a criterion under which it could say that they resemble each other, or have something in common. 'Grey' and 'grey' are similar tokens under one criterion and different under another. To say that two tokens are of the same type, is to appeal for a criterion of 'similarity'. The criterion for using the same word could be either the same spelling, or the same sequence or phonemes, etc., but then the application of a criterion for verification of the statement where the term 'same' is used is entirely different from making use of that term, or the meaning of the concept. Thus what follows is that there are no different senses of resemblance nor is 'resemblance' a predicate but is somehow incomplete, nor is it a relation that could be intuited, but not seen.

All this seems to be confusing. 'Resemblance' as a concept, is used for classification, and is not to be defined in terms of a set of characteristics whose names are not used for classification. Instead of calling it as a classificatory concept, one could vote for an alternative name, that it is an organizing notion like "'same', 'similar', 'exist', 'true', 'certain' that systematically varies in the conditions of its application."¹⁸ What varies is the

full application of the criterion of resemblance, i.e. the grounds which are shared between pairs of instances only, say, (ab), (bc), (cd) ... successively, whereas it is possible that the beginning of the sequence (a) in the terminal (t) may not have anything in common. In this sense the concept of resemblance is an organizing concept of our knowledge of this domain (a... t), rather than its commonly shared minimal essence.

The concept of criterion and the role it plays in classification is fundamental. One not only says that something is common, but has to discover and the criterion helps one to give the clue it specifies the respect in which two things are similar.

Wittgenstein’s use of the expression family resemblance is most enlightening, for it refutes the dogma that there must be an something identical running through each link of the chain or each shade of red. One calls a certain segments of the spectrum red which includes both crimson and scarlet. But if a new system and a criterion are taken then, crimson would not be red but yellowish white or whitish yellow. The criterion for distinguishing entities is all important, for if the question is raised, where to draw the line between red and scarlet? the answer would be: it all depends upon what criterion is used and for what purpose, this criterion is taken instead of the other. Wittgenstein indicates that the question whether two or more things have
some element in common depends on a criterion of similarity. Wittgenstein is not very explicit about it, "Now what should we answer to the question?" "What do light blue and dark blue have in common". At first sight, the answer seems obvious, "They are both shades of blue". But this is really a tautology, so let us ask, "What do these colours I am pointing to have in common?" (Suppose one is light blue, the other dark blue). The answer to this really ought to be "I don't know what game you are playing" and it depends upon this game whether I should say they had anything in common, and what I should say they had in common. It would not make any difference, if instead of asking 'what game you are playing', one asks what criterion is being taken into account, and it depends on the criterion of similarity whether to say, if there is a common property or not.

G. E. Moore never doubts the existence of universals, nor does Russell, for he says, "In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we shall call universals..." The chief concern of Moore with regard to this problem is to answer the question: What sort of universals are there?

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Moore discusses this question in detail in the last two chapters of *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. He begins by making a distinction between two kinds of universals, which can be easily recognized, and then raises the question, whether there are any other kinds of universals besides these two, i.e. (1) relations and (2) properties which consist in the having of a relation to something or other. The first kind, i.e. Relations, is subdivided into (1) direct relations between two terms, (2) indirect relations between two terms where each has a relation to some third particular, and (3) indirect relation between two terms where each has a relation to some one or other of a group of particulars to which are added two sorts of indirect relations between two terms, where each has a relation to one or other of the two recognized types of universals.

The second kind of universals is subdivided into (1) Properties, which consists in having a relation to a particular, like the property of being in the neighbourhood of London (2) Properties which consists in having a relation to some member or other of the group of particulars, like the property of being in the neighbourhood of some city or other, and (3) properties which consist in being a member of a group of particulars, as London is a member

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of the group consisting of London and Paris. To these are added the three further sorts of properties which consist in having the corresponding relations, not to particulars, but to universals of the recognised types. Moore thinks it is important to distinguish relations from relational properties:

"A relation is a recurrent feature of the world which presents itself in complexes of objects or events, such as this besides that, this preceding that, or B between A and C. It is also convenient sometimes to speak of relational properties. If A precedes B, we may say that A has the relational property of preceding B, and B has the converse relational property of succeeding A." 22

To objects can have the same relational properties, or even if they have not the same relational properties, they can be termed in the same relation, in the sense in which the relation which C has to the group consisting of B and C is the same as that which A has to the group consisting of A and B. Relational properties are said to be constituents of relations, and relations to be the constituents of facts, but to Moore they are real, because every single fact or state of affairs when grouped together, would stand for the nature of reality, but a universal is a common property.

By granting existence to universals, Moore rejects the theory of Berkeley and Hume, who refutes the existence

of abstract or general ideas. Moore seems to be mistaken about Berkeley and Hume's views, for all they denied was the existence of universals, which could not be wholly analysed in terms of relations between particulars. It is not to deny the fact, that Berkeley and Hume might also have held the wrong views, that these relations could all by themselves be analysed in terms of the single relation of resemblance. Berkeley and Hume equated quality with what Moore calls the relational property of being a member of a group, and it is at this point that Moore seems to be incorrect. It is only that if qualities could not be treated in this way, that Moore takes into account other kinds of universals, in spite of what he gave in the beginning. Here one must keep in mind the various distinctions between the relational universals and property predicative universals. Relational universals specify the connection or resemblance between two terms or a common point, whereas the property predicative universals refer to the quality or attributes which characterize the particulars.

When one says that an object A is white, what one is saying is, that A is a member of the group of white things, where this group is constituted by enumeration. But Moore rejects this view. He thinks, that a group such as the one which consists of all the sense data which one could call white is, in some sense, a natural and not a
merely arbitrary group. By a natural group, Moore means "that there is some other property besides mere membership of the group, which is both common and peculiar to all its members." Moore’s main concern is with sense data, for he thinks that, if given a quality of being white to a physical object, then that physical object is not separated from the sense data which has the qualities i.e. white can be easily predicated. Then the question still remains, what other property is common to these things besides just being members of a group of white things?

Moore offers three answers as a solution to the above question, without being sure which is the most relevant. The property which white things have in common is that there is one among them which they all resemble. In discussing this answer, Moore takes note of the pure white cases, where the resemblance is said to be more exact, but to Moore himself, the theory cannot be extended any further because of the grouping of a yellowish white patch which may resemble a whitish yellow patch in colour more closely than it resembles the pure white one. Therefore to Moore, there are other kinds of resemblances which are not exact, i.e. have some sort of similarity meaning thereby some elements which are common and others which are different. There has

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to be a sufficient likeness between them, e.g. between all the objects to which the concept white applies. What degree of likeness is sufficient and where the borderline comes between something which falls just within the concept's sphere of application and something else which just falls outside it, is often difficult to decide. Prof. Moore finds a hitch in accepting this theory, because the sense datum which serves as a model of whiteness cannot be said to resemble itself. Consequently being white will have to be a disjunctive property of either being identical with A, where A is a model or resembling A in colour with exactness, if so then it would be a different disjunctive property, according to a different sense datum. Moore does not think it objectionable to the theory, but the conclusion seems to be counter intuitive. Therefore the argument seems to imply, that while verifying each statement or instance, one has to choose a different criterion.

Since talking about the colour resemblances is a sort of relation, the acceptance of this theory would not entail the acceptance of a new kind of universal. The second theory admits, that a 'pure white' is capable of being in different places at once. So the common property between the two white patches is the place which pure white occupies. Moore rejects this view, on the ground, that one cannot even think of any particulars at all, except of particular places or times. But one finds that Moore's basic
confusion lies between colours and colour patches. Moore writes in the Appendix to *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, that "When we have two sense-given "patches"... which is exactly the same shade of colour as one another, and each of that particular shade all over, then... the colour of the one is identical with the colour of the other," which Moore considers to be true. And later in the article 'Are characteristic of Particular Things Universal or Particular?' he relies on the argument that the specific colour of a thing can be locally separated from itself to refute Stout's contention that the characteristics of particular things are themselves particular. "Characters are as particulars as the concrete things or individuals which they characterise."

What Stout seems to assert is where 'A' and 'B' are names of two different concrete things, the expression 'A is round' and 'B is round' may each of these express a true proposition. Landesman writes that,

"Stout would presumably say that a and b differ positionally where a and b are the colors of two coexistent spots; they occur at different positions, a at p1 and b at p2, and this is the ground of their difference. Things that are qualitatively identical can differ positionally, so there is room for difference after all. Let us call that entity which consists of the sum of a shade of color and the position the color is at a color spot. It is true that the sum of a and p1

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is a different color spot from the sum of \( b \) and \( \sum_j \). We do have a difference here under the "enumerating concept" color spot. But this does not at all establish that \( a \) is different from \( b \); it is perfectly compatible with their being the same. \( A \) and \( b \) are colors, not color spots; the two sums are color spots, not colors, though they contain colors as parts. Thus a positional difference, though it does lead us to a difference in entity, fails to yield a difference in the required kind of entity.\(^26\)

Moore contends that somethings can be entirely separate from themselves, namely universals. Though Moore concedes that any two concrete objects must be spatially distinct (if they coexist), he denies that this condition applies univocally to qualities. According to Moore, a quality \( f \) is spatially distinct from a corresponding quality \( g \) just in case \( f \) is a quality of \( a \) and \( g \) is a quality of \( b \) and the sums \( a \) and \( b \) are spatially distinct. Nothing follows about the alleged numerical difference between the qualities \( f \) and \( g \). Therefore Moore maintains that qualities are identical. He writes,

"We can never say "This red differs from that red, in virtue of having a different position" or "in virtue of having a different spatial relation to this other thing" or "as being the one I think of now whereas that was the one I thought of them". The positions differ, the spatial relations differ, my thinking now differs from my thinking then, but it is always the same red which is at both positions and is thought

of at both times."\textsuperscript{27}

If the qualities $f$ and $g$ are identical, then it would follow that one and the same quality is spatially distinct from itself. It is for this reason that Moore denies local separation as being a sufficient condition for numerical difference. According to Moore, a quality is locally separate from itself provided that one and the same quality is present in two coexisting objects which are spatially distinct:

"For I maintain that the same indivisible quality can really be locally separate; maintaining that all this means is that it can really belong to both concrete things."\textsuperscript{28}

If a quality is to be taken as an individual member of a subclass of individual qualities, then no quality can be locally separate from itself. Stout says,

"... can the roundness of one billiard ball be, in this way, locally separate from the roundness of another? I say that it cannot if the roundness is regarded as a single quality numerically the same in both balls."\textsuperscript{29}

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It must be pointed out here that the shape, size are the qualities which 'belong' to the things and, the things differ numerically, and it is not that the quality itself is different.

Further Moore maintains that when two objects stand in some relation to each other, it is a mistake to think that they are related, not only to each other, but to the relation as well, for otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Having a relation, he says, is an 'ultimate notion' and relational properties simply 'belong' to the things which have them. Accordingly, he thinks that one might adopt the theory to have a property of being white consists in being related in this ultimate way to a thing which he calls X. This can be interpreted in a different way also, that what the white patches have in common is not, that they are related to X, but that X itself belongs to them. In either case, X would be a universal of a new kind, nor a relational property, though on one version of the theory, white colour patches would have the relational property of being related to it. If they were all related to it as a quality, they would resemble one another in this respect, but they would not resemble it.

Moore refers to the universal which the theory presupposes as X rather than white, or whatever, for he thinks that it could not be seen, but only discovered by
some mental intuition. His objection to this theory is that one cannot perform this act, one cannot discover that one ever has such a thing as \( x \) before one's mind. He rather thinks that being white is a disjunctive property, without concluding that there are no new kinds of universals other than the two, which he distinguishes. Numbers are universals and not relations or relational properties. The property of being a number like the number two or three can be a disjunctive relational property, like the property of being white. But he holds not taking in view Russell, that the property of being so-and-so in number, the property which is common to all pairs or triads is simply that the number 2 or 3 belongs to them. But what Moore writes in his Common Place Book, he is mainly disposed to regard a number as a property of properties, and in particular remarked that, when one says, 'That's one thing,' one is not making what would be the nonsensical statement 'That a thing has the property of being "one". Later, Moore amends his statement by saying that the 'qualities' which 'belong' to a patch in the same non-relational sense in which its relational properties belong to it, then these 'qualities must be things which one never sees is quite absurd, i.e. one is aware of the shades of colours, just as one is aware of size and shapes. Though Moore would not agree in believing that the sense in which we see abstract things is the same in which we see concrete patches. With regard
to colour, Moore stresses the point that being white is a relational property on the ground that 'In saying that a sense datum is white, we are saying that every part of it is of some shade of white.' This entails that a sense datum has to a shade of white in question the relation which consists in the colour being spread over the whole of it. At the same time, Moore thinks that 'the property of being a white', which belongs not to sense data but to colours, is not a relational property, in which case it would again be a disjunction, in which one of the disjuncts is identity and the other in terms of resemblance between colours, but a universal of the kind that Moore was looking for. What is sensibly presented, what one sees a colour which is universal, but it is an in finca species, in the sense that no quality is subordinate to it in the way that it is subordinate to red, primrose yellow, or whatever colour it may be. Similarly, the shapes of sense data presented are specific, and these specific characters cannot be abstracted therefore they cannot be named, his reason being, first, that when two such shades of colour are not simultaneously presented, it is impossible to say for certain, the one which is seen is not perceptually different from the one which is remembered and second, even when they are

simultaneously presented, and there is no perceptible difference between them, still it cannot be said that they are not really different. If two simple qualities do seem to be alike in some degree, all that could be done is to invent a new criterion which would show their common quality.

Thus Moore says, that a universal is anything which could be asserted about each of two different things, 'That is Socrates' could have been asserted about different people, but admits that 'Socrates' or even 'being socrates' as a universal, qualifies his answer by ruling that 'the sort of thing' which one asserts about a referred object which is used as a proper name is not to count.

What seems to be Moore's drawback, that he takes all the trouble in making a difference between kinds of universals, but fails to explain as to what he means by saying, that, there are such things, for he thought that being in the sense is an 'ultimate notion' which does not call for any explanation.

Thus universals are of a higher logical type than entities which fall under them, i.e. a red dress, a sweet flower are all perceptible materials and are located in space and time, but the 'redness' and 'sweetness' are neither perceptible nor spatio-temporally locatable entities, thus a shape is not a kind of thing, no beauty is beautiful.
and colour is not coloured etc. One ought to make a difference between an identity concept and an object. With the identity the question is always whether anything, i.e. falls under it. With an object such questions are irrelevant. What is important is their spatio-temporal properties. By saying that universals are of higher types than their instances is to make a distinction between particulars and Ideas (Plato) or between universals and particulars (Aristotle) or between concepts and objects (Frege). Therefore it could be said that there are concepts which fall under other concepts, like the concept of universal, would include the lesser concepts, like resemblance, identity, likeness, similarity. Then there are objects which fall under the concepts, like the concept of chair, would include all different kinds of chairs, e.g. a steel chair, a wooden chair and an arm chair etc. Then there are certain organizing concepts, which classify, and group together other conceptual activities which calls for the general theory of universals.

Thus universals are meanings, assigned to general terms and the meaning of general terms are either explicitly stated or implicitly controlled by usage. In this case, choice is to be made between two classes of words - categorematic and syncategorematic. General terms mostly belong to syncategorematic expressions without there existing any entity which is supposed to be its meaning. Thus being aware of the use of the expression 'red' correctly
would know what sort of a thing the universal 'Red' is.

The question about the existence or non-existence of universals is a question about the meaning of general terms. The saying that 'number 2 has no meaning', or 'Red has ceased to exist', is making a metalinguistic utterance, i.e. 'the number 2' has no meaning or 'The connected with the philosophical idea that the meanings of abstract words are common properties is the idea that common properties or universals, are entities, different in kind from the things they are said to 'characterize' and such that they could exist even when characterizing nothing. Quine on the other hand is of the opinion,

"That we may say some dogs are white and not thereby commit ourselves to recognising either doghood or whiteness as entities. 'Some dogs are white' says that somethings that are dogs are white; and in order that this statement be true, the things over which the bound variables 'something' ranges must include some white dogs, but need not include doghood or whiteness".31

Whereas some philosophers have asserted that 'Universals can be in many places at one time'. The statement 'Whiteness is now in many places' is not merely an unusual way of expressing the commonplace fact that there are many white things; rather it shows that universals are entities. Stout points out, that the term 'entity' has been misused,

it is a misuse in violation of the necessary proposition that nothing can be in several places at the same time and according to which it implies that there were self-contradictory entities, that no object can be in 'local separation' from itself, as the term 'entity' is ordinarily used, it is self contradictory to say that 'the entity whiteness is now in a number of different part of the world'. Moore is right in maintaining that:

"... the class of things with regard to which it may, I think be plausibly argued, that though they undoubtedly are, they don't exist... may be called 'general ideas', or abstract ideas or "universals". Moore invites his readers to distinguish two kinds of objects we can think about: "those which do have being, and those which simply have not got it, are purely imaginary, and don't belong to the Universe at all."32

To the second class he assigns 'pure fictions' like Griffins and Chimaeras. He writes:

"If you fix clearly in your mind the sense in which there certainly are no such things as griffins and chimaeras... it seems to me quite plain ... that universals are not in any way to be classed with griffins and chimaeras; that, on the contrary, there is the most fundamental difference in the world between the two, a difference ever so much more important than that which separates universals from particulars."33

33Ibid., p. 373.
What Moore seems to be saying is that universals do not exist in the sense in which a physical entity exists, but they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless. Universal is the meaning of a certain type of token. One often thinks as if a reference is made to a form or matter or a property and not to a thing having that property. Wittgenstein says,

"In reality, however, we get ready to say that a particular colour exists; and that is as much as to say that something exists that has a colour", 34

and this helps us to believe word 'red' has lost its meaning. 'Red' would lose its meaning if no objects were red. If this happens, then one could say with Wittgenstein, "We have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language". 35

What guarantee the existence or non-existence of a universal is that in the case of a existing universal there is an existing corresponding instance, whereas in case of a non-existing universal there is no corresponding existent i.e. the round square, the instance should be differentiated from the universals and hence the method of verification for establishing the existence of a universal from the method of verification for establishing the existence of a particular.

35 Ibid., para 52.
And this helps us to believe that there are referents for properties in the same way the using of a place name with success implies the existence of someone whose name is used. Common terms to Shwayder do have, among other functions referring use. They refer to objects to say something about these objects, e.g. 'Red is brighter than brown'. Shwayder recognizes that the referent of a property need not be in a space, time or region, quoting him:

"If we refer to a material object, it must exist in space and time"... similarly, if we refer to a property then it too certainly does exist, but not necessarily in space and time. There is no doubt that we can speak meaningfully of a certain shape, say a regular 90° gon. Where there is a room to doubt whether there be an object having that shape, there is such a property whether or not it actually "subsist" in rebus."36

Thus general terms do have meanings, and when it looks as if one is referring to properties by using a general term or a predicate expression, it is the fact, that a term is meaningfully used, talk about things which may or may not fall under that term. E.g. "Red is brighter than brown" is not to say that the property red which exists independently of red things, is brighter than the property brown which exists independently of brown things. This would create entities without necessity. What is really implied is, the

36 Shwayder, Modes of Referring and the Problems of Universals, p. 72.
things which fall under the concept 'red', such as red roses and red dress are brighter than those things which fall under the concept 'brown' such as a certain colour of chocolate, assuming meanwhile that some shades in both categories are excluded. If, on the other hand, no reference is made to things which fall under the concept 'red' then what about the meanings of general terms. 'Red' and 'brown' and the relational term 'brighter than' which may be true or false, according to the rules which determine the scale of colour ordering in the system? One could refer to a concept or a meaning as well as to objects. But referring to a concept differs much from pointing to an object. One often says, "Here is a black spot", but not Here is the black'.

Wittgenstein points out that "Naming is so far not a move in the language game... naming is a preparation for description".\(^37\) In the same way, one could say that determining a place of a concept in a system is a preparation for describing its relations to other concepts and not to refer to a concept as such. Therefore talking about properties is not talking about properties as such, and talking about properties as such is not talking about things

or referring to entities. Thus it can be agreed with Santayana "Essences do not exist".

To conclude, a general term is used for various purposes such as identifying, distinguishing, grading and organising all sorts of entities. To describe an event, one should be able to identify the thing to be described by either passing it through the established criterion or against a paradigm to see what sort of thing it is. So universals could also be considered to be paradigms or models on the basis of which particulars are described or evaluated.

Moore, despite his utmost zeal to discover a Platonic paradigm, came to the conclusion that he could not discover them among his sense data. When Plato suggests that universals may stand to their particulars in relation of a model or pattern, to its copies, he is, I think, certainly thinking that they resemble them in precisely the respect in which they all resemble one another. And it is very natural, for instance to think of the universal "pure red" as resembling particular patches of pure red in precisely the respect in which they all resemble one another.

"It is therefore, important to realize that this cannot possibly be the case (since if z is something in common belonging to all patches of particular "creamy
white", then Z cannot possibly resemble them in this respect, in which they all resemble one another, and when this is realized, it does, I think, diminish the plausibility of the theory that there is any such thing as Z. The objection which I feel to the theory is simply that I cannot discover any such thing. I cannot discover that I ever have it before my mind.38

Thus universals are to talk about particulars, and they are nothing but the applicability of using a criterion for understanding the meaning of general terms.