CHAPTER III
COMMON-SENSE AND REALISM
G. E. Moore is not only a pioneer of the New Realist Movement, but has played a dominant role in the course of its development. He expresses the form of Realism in its purest way. Moore's importance lies not so much in stating and establishing a Realistic view of knowledge as in introducing a new method of argument, i.e. Analytical method, which influenced many thinkers e.g. Russell, Austin and Wittgenstein.

Moore's attitude to standard problems is rooted in native British traditions. He was greatly influenced by Berkeley in adopting a negative style, i.e. of refuting philosophical views, by Thomas Reid in the direction of giving positive solutions, and by David Hume in both directions. Of modern thinkers Bradley and McTaggart have stimulated him in many ways, though he has always vigorously attacked them.

The basic tendency of Moore's philosophy thus announces the strongest reaction against the school of Hegel and protested especially against its dogmatism, its tyrannical system. "Everything is what it is and not another thing", said by Butler, is the leading principle which governs all Moore's thinking. It shows his rejection of Bradley's Monism. Moore argues that the essence of a thing is always distinct.
from its relations. So to be at all is to be independent.

Philosophy for Moore is not a special science which is contributing something particular to history or any other science; rather it is concerned with the commonly agreed beliefs. In his autobiography, Moore writes that it is the philosophers, and not ordinary people or scientists, who are his main stimulus to philosophise. Moore further writes:

"I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences ... first, the problem of trying to get really clear as to what on earth a given philosopher meant by something which he said, and, secondly, the problem of discovering what really satisfactory reasons there are for supposing that what he said was true, or, alternatively, was false."¹

Moore was quite sure that the problems of philosophy were not to be resolved either by logical manipulation or merely increasing scientific knowledge; rather the key to solving philosophical problems lay in the different direction, i.e., by paying close attention to 'Common Sense', and its language, i.e. the ordinary language. Thus Moore was the first philosopher who tried to bring the philosophical talk in connection with the ordinary language, he tried to show

how to use the technique of analytical elucidation.  

Since philosophy is not a discovery of facts or truths, it becomes the job of philosopher to criticise the basis and the order of ideas, notions, concepts, etc. The ideas need not be always about the world, They could be about man also. Moore, while exploring or examining the philosophical theories, combined the use of a commonsense knowledge along with the analysis of those propositions in which it is expressed. So analysis is a technique or method for the clarification of certain concepts, propositions, terms, etc.

Moore, being a defender of common-sense, thinks that the propositions of common sense are unquestionable and true. According to Moore, the existence of the External World needs no proof, for the proof that two human hands exist consists in "holding up my two hands and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, 'Here is one hand', and adding as I make a certain gesture with the left, and here is another". The procedure here seems to be purely analytic. The consequent, that two human hands exist is simply a part of what is assumed as evident in the antecedent. Though the common sense propositions are generally accepted to be true, the possibility of their falsity is not ruled out.

Moore seems to have maintained universal or general acceptance as the identifying mark of a common-sense belief, which everybody believes to be true, until some of them turns out to be false, then the former criterion would be rendered useless. Moore was prepared to allow that for all he knew to the contrary, there might be false propositions included within the vague boundaries of the common-sense view of the world. We find that Moore had no special interest in critically shifting the beliefs of common sense to truth or falsity. He was mainly interested in knowing them for certain.

Similarly, Hawkins says that it would be contrary to common sense itself to say that everything is corrigible. Here are those data which, on the level of common sense, would be described as facts of experience, such as the existence of material objects and of other minds. The ordinary man would admit that he is at times liable to illusions, but he just simply knows that his whole experience is not an illusion. Nor is it enough for philosophers to point out that these facts are not objects of immediate experience, because the immediate experience is perhaps of sense data.  

While Moore regards a vast number of propositions

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about the existence of a material object as evidently true, the general approach of his writing on Perception shows that everything about what material objects are remains to be investigated.

Doubts about whether the External World exists or not is a question which troubles the metaphysicians. Russell writes:

"Physics started from the common sense belief in fairly permanent and fairly rigid bodies, tables, chairs, mountains the earth and moon and sun. The common sense belief is should be noticed is a piece of audacious metaphysical theorizing," and again that though

"... it seems to me that I am sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper and writing", yet "all this may reasonably be doubted and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true."6

While Moore's 'Defence of Common Sense' opens with a comprehensive list of just such truisms like 'I have a body', together with a view to denying that they are always 'open to reasonable doubt' and an assertion that 'everyone of them I know to be true', and he added, true, not just in some amended form or in some special usage of the words


employed, he meant by each of them precisely what every reader in reading them well has understood him to mean, i.e. what they are ordinarily understood to express. Such an expression as 'the earth has existed for many years past' is the very type of an unambiguous expressions the meaning of which we all understand.7

So from what has been stated above, it implies that common sense, therefore, enables us to know a considerable number of philosophical propositions that they are false, but it does not tell us how they are false and, consequently, although it is a valid refutation, it is not precisely a philosophical one. A philosophical refutation can consist only in an alternative analysis which both justifies itself on the philosophical level and is adequate to the data of ordinary experience. Philosophical propositions are those propositions which have some implications involved in them, e.g. This is a table. We would call this statement to be a philosophical proposition, because this requires not an ordinary understanding like what the meaning of the above propositions, but it requires an analysis like what do we know, when we say, this is a table. Moore asserts that the distinction should be made between the statements which are

known to be true with certainty and the analysis of such statements whose full meaning we endeavour to determine.

The difficulty consists in

"... confusing the question whether we understand its meaning with the entirely different question whether we know what it means, in the sense that we are able to give a correct analysis of its meaning."

All this is clear that Moore is claiming to know with certainty only such things as anyone in the ordinary way would say he knew with certainty. Mace is right in saying that

"... the position might seem to be different in regard to some of the things concerning which Moore expresses doubt and a measure of surprise."

Roughly speaking, we may say that common sense provides us with a body of reliable but largely unanalysed truth, which, in turn, challenges the philosophy to determine their meanings. Thus from Moore's point, the philosopher's task is mainly that of coming to understand the truth rather than trying to discover it.

Understanding the meaning of a proposition and knowing its correct analysis are two different notions in Moore's philosophy. The understanding of the meaning

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cannot be doubted, whereas one is not sure about its correct analysis. Though Moore tries to give a certain evidence of the proposition, such as 'the earth has existed for many years past; Many human bodies have each lived for many years upon it. If Moore knows that the proposition This is my thumb is true, he can obviously know this only because he sees his thumb, i.e., because he "sees" a sense datum of a certain sort, but still he writes:

"... yet all this seems to me to be no good reason for doubting that I do know it. We are all, I think, in this strange position that we do know many things, with regard to which we know further that we have had evidence for them, and yet we do not know how we know them, i.e. we do not know what the evidence was."¹⁰

Thus strangest and most astonishing fact for all, however, is the fact that we cannot say with certainty how we know that a material thing exists even when we are actually looking at it.

Sometimes, the dispute arises over the philosophical statements, e.g. We do not know for certain the truth of any statements about the material things. Moore's reply to such questions was "Both of us know for certain that there are several chairs in the room, and how absurd it would be to suggest that we do not know it, but only believe it, and that perhaps it is not the case! how absurd it

¹⁰G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, p. 44.
would be to say that it is highly probable but not certain; whereas, on the other hand, there are some philosophers who would not consider the truth of any statement about the material object or empirical statements, such as "I see a table." Quoting C.I. Lewis he writes, "... all empirical knowledge is probable only." A similar view is also maintained by A.J. Ayer that, "... statements about material things are not conclusively verifiable."

Ordinarily, we do know for certain that some statements about material objects, e.g. This is a pen, This is a chair, to be true and there could be a possibility of being mistaken, but when philosophers assert never to know for 'certain' any statement about a material object, they are not talking of the empirical facts. This was clearly brought forward by Ayer, who maintains that when one is making a statement about a material object, one is not making an empirical judgement, but is rejecting a certain form of expression as improper. Ayer further held that:

"It must be admitted then that there is a sense in which it is true to say that we can never be sure

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with regard to any proposition implying the existence of a material thing, that we are not somehow being deceived, but at the same time one may object to this statement on the ground that it is misleading, because it suggests that the state of 'being sure' is one the attainment of which is conceivable, but unfortunately not within our power. But, in fact, the conception of such a state is self-contradictory. For to be sure, in this sense, that we were not being deceived, we should have to have completed an infinite series of verification, and it is an analytic proposition that one cannot run through all the members of an infinite series... Accordingly, what we should say if we wish to avoid misunderstanding is not that we can never be certain that any of the propositions in which we express our perceptual judgements are true, but rather that the notion of certainty does not apply to propositions of this kind. It applies to the a priori propositions of logic and mathematics, and the fact that it does apply to them is an essential mark of distinction between them and empirical propositions.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus when Moore shows by referring to the chairs and tables in a room, that we do 'know for certain', that there are chairs and tables, and it would be absurd to say that we only believe that the chairs are there, but do not know for certain. In doing so, Moore simply refutes the philosophical statements that we can never have a certain knowledge of material things. It is true that the phrase 'know for certain' has an ordinary use where it is applicable to the empirical statements. But some, according to Moore accept the claim that philosophers in refusing to accept any statement about material objects and saying that he only believes such statements, is tantamount to rejecting the

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., pp. 44-45.
ordinary and, therefore, the correct way of describing the situation in favour of an extraordinary and, therefore, an incorrect way. Moore seems to be wrong here for philosophers in disputing the certainty of a material object statements did not favour for an extra-ordinary usage, but stressed on for the logical certainty. I know for certain has a double application and the meaning conveyed in the two statements, i.e. empirical statements and a priori statements is different, because the philosophical doubt is different from any ordinary doubt. The doubt could be about the empirical facts and could be regarding the improper use of a language. The first, would imply the existence and non-existence of the material objects and abstract entities, i.e. whether it is an 'internal' or an 'external' question.

As Carnap says:

"To ask whether there are numbers, or whether there are propositions, is to ask whether we wish to employ a language in which reference to numbers or to propositions are made, or anyhow one that contains functions which have such entities for their arguments."\(^{15}\)

An internal question is one that can be settled by giving an example of a certain sort of entities whose existence is being questioned, i.e. they are asked within the framework. An external question is one which cannot be thus settled,

for it is a question about the framework itself. Berkeley, an idealist, would admit that there are chairs in the room, but would not agree to the existence of any material object. A nominalist would admit that there may be things which have the property of being red or coloured, but they do not believe in the universals, i.e. in abstract entities; to them only particulars are real. Even admitting this would not lead them to contradict, for they are not disagreeing over the empirical facts; rather they are involved in a conceptual criticism of one or more assumptions of these facts.

Philosophers do not want concrete examples which Moore gave; by showing them chairs and tables, rather they were interested in some general proposition as to how any proposition of this sort could be proved. Moore was unable to give, yet he was aware of this fact, for he contends:

"Of course, what they really want is not merely a proof of these two propositions, but something like a general statement as to how any proposition of this sort may be proved. This, of course, I haven't given; and I do not believe it can be given; if this is what is meant by the proof of the existence of external things, I do not believe that any proof of the existence of external things is possible."¹⁶

and in order to prove this, Moore would have to prove that he is not dreaming, and how this is to be achieved? 'I have,' says he:

"... no doubt conclusive reasons for asserting that I am not now dreaming, I have conclusive evidence that I am awake, but that is a very different thing from being able to prove it. I could not tell you what all my evidence is, and 'I should require to do this at least, in order to give you a proof.' 17

Though Moore was not able to give a proof of it, i.e. a logical proof, yet he gave reasons for its acceptance that he showed by perceiving them, i.e. we 'see' material objects, e.g. a table, a chair, and remember doing so.

"This, after all, you know, really is a finger; there is no doubt about it: I know it, and you all know it.... The questions whether we do ever know such things as these, and whether there are any material things, seem to me, therefore, to be questions which there is no need to take seriously; they are questions which it is quite easy to answer, with certainty, in the affirmative." 18

Moore's proof is supposedly aimed at Kant, who writes in his preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason*,

"It still remains a scandal to philosophy... that the existence of things outside us... must be accepted merely on faith, and that, if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof." 19


and because it was directed against Kant, Moore's attack might be regarded as an attack on all Kant-like views which Russell was defending in the *Problems of Philosophy*. They face each other, as the two characteristically pre-positivistic views on the existence of the external world, and provide us with a controversy from which positivists fled or which they hoped to dissolve by paying attention to our use of language, the empiricist criterion of meaning and the notion of analyticity.

The main issue between the Russell of the *Problem of Philosophy* and Moore of the *Proof of an External World* is not whether material objects do exist but whether we can prove that they exist. Moreover both disputants share the conviction that the statement (a) *There are material objects* is meaningful in precisely the sense in which (b) *There are human hands* is meaningful. What they may be construed as arguing about is whether (a) can be deduced from another statement which is known to be true: in fact, about whether (a) can be deduced from (b) in a manner that gives a proof of *There are material objects*. (1) Here is one hand, (2) Here is another hand. From these two premises, Moore deduced the statement (3) Two human hands exist. At this point, he introduces what may be regarded as an assumption of the analyticity of the statement *All human hands are material objects*, or alternatively, the rule: From the statement, *There are two human hands*, we may deduce the statement
There are two physical objects and after appealing to this, Moore is happy to have proved in a rigorous way the existence of the things in an external world.

Here one could possibly raise a controversy, that the meaning of the term material object is not the same as external object. For there are specimens of material objects, e.g. pen, pencil etc., but the term external object has a use. But we find that Moore was not interested in drawing the distinction between the two terms.

By 'external things' Moore means 'things outside of our minds'. Things to be met within space are, of course, things outside of our minds, though not all things outside of our minds are to be met with in space. Now if Moore can prove that there are two things to be met within space, it would follow that there are two things outside of our minds. "By holding up my two hands, and saying as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, 'Here is one hand and adding as I make a certain gesture with the left' and here is another". Moore claims to have given the 'proof'.

Moore himself has given expression to his apprehension that what he proves may be accepted as true, but may at the same time be declared as unimportant. But quite apart from that, does the 'proof' succeed?

Malcolm has questioned if Moore is justified in saying 'I know here is a human hand'. Here, it seems that
Moore cannot on the basis of his theory of 'Perception' say with certainty 'this is a human hand' for the proposition 'I am now perceiving a human hand' is analysed into two further propositions, 'I am perceiving this', and 'this is a human hand'. Moore is sure about, 'I am perceiving this', but what exactly is known thereby he is not so certain. The analysis which is accepted is that the main subject of the proposition, 'I am now perceiving this' is a sense datum, and he is besides sure that this sense datum, is not a hand. Moore finds reasons to doubt — although he himself does not doubt, that this is a part of the surface of the hand. How can he under such circumstances be sure of the proposition. 'This is a human hand?' The distinction between 'knowing a proposition to be true', and 'not knowing the correct analysis of the proposition' does not help us here.

Furthermore, Moore in his essay on "Hume's Philosophy" admits that it is quite impossible for anyone to prove against the sceptic that one knows any external fact. "I can only prove that I do, by assuming that in some particular instance, I actually do know one." On this Stebbing remarks:

"The notion that we may have a reason, though not a logically conclusive reason for certain statements concerning direct observation is, I believe one of

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Moore's important contributions to philosophy. Hume gave those demonstrations to philosophy. Hume showed that demonstrative knowledge of the matters of fact is not possible. Moore seems to mean that even our non-demonstrative knowledge of the external world has its own certainty which should not be underestimated just because it is other than demonstrative certainty. This, if it were Moore's contention, would have been ranked as one of his valuable insights. But Moore disappoints us. He rejects this suggestion. The type of knowledge Stebbing has in mind is a "non-demonstrable certainty."

Instead of emphasizing this "non-demonstrable certainty" of the external world and instead of exhibiting the phenomenological nature and roots of that certainty, Moore proceeds to offer a demonstrative proof, so he fails in his task. The external world is neither in need of nor capable of a logical proof. That such a proof is necessary is what the sceptics persuade us to believe though knowing fully well that we should not succeed. Moore has fallen to their persuasion and has offered a proof that hopelessly fails.

Moore thinks that those philosophers who doubt the existence of an external world are really confused about

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the 'understanding of an expression' with the knowledge which is derived through the analysis of such an expression', for he himself says:

"But to hold that we do not know what, in certain respects, is the analysis of what we understand by such an expression, is an entirely different thing from holding that we do not understand the expression. It is obvious that we cannot even raise the question, how what we do understand by it is to be analysed, unless we do understand it."

Understanding then becomes primary to analysis, besides maintaining the above point. Moore stresses that understanding is a prerequisite for analysing a proposition, still even to understand whether a proposition is true or false requires an understanding, for Moore is wrong when he says that we know our common-sense propositions to be true, but do not know what they exactly assert, the main point is that how can we know that a proposition is true without knowing what it asserts, i.e. what its analysis is. We do not know these propositions only in the sense of knowing that the words express something is true, whereas Moore on the other hand maintains that the meaning of a proposition is something simple and contained in the proposition and can be read at a glance by a mere inspection of a proposition. A proposition for Moore is a significant sentence whose meaning is already contained in it. Moore does not explicitly explains in what

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sense he says that the meaning is contained in it, for by themselves 'propositions' are structural symbols referring to certain 'states of affairs', symbols that are intelligible only with reference to a common convention and community of experience. Where either of the two is lacking, the proposition conveys no meaning and is merely a jumble of noises or unmeaning marks on paper. It is only with respect of the primitive and common objects of experience that propositions convey their meanings so immediately. Otherwise the meaning of most propositions needs to be determined with some exactness before the question of their truth or falsity can arise. 24

If this is so then the question arises as rightly being put by Ewing:

"Can we know any physical object propositions even at the common-sense level if we have not the slightest idea whether they refer to strictly independent things? Is not the analysis of a common-sense proposition, if correct, just a making explicit of the elements in a concept of which we are indistinctly aware as a whole? But if our awareness of the concept at the common sense level is somewhat confused, how can we say that we have certain knowledge of the common sense propositions? Must not the certainty of the propositions be affected by any doubts about their analysis." 25

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So from the above discussion it follows that the distinction should be made between the analysis of a proposition and the analysis of that to which they refer. The discussion on this distinction would be taken up in the following chapter.

In a 'Defence of Common Sense', and the 'Proof of an External World', Moore was defending common sense. But Malcolm asserts that common sense and ordinary language are the same. Malcolm's main criticism of Moore appears to be that having successfully shown how the sceptics are violating ordinary usage by doubting or denying that 'there are material objects', like 'this is a hand', etc. Moore proceeds to violate ordinary usage himself in saying 'I know that this is a hand', Moore's assertions, says Malcolm;

"... do not belong to 'common sense', i.e. to ordinary language at all. They involve a use of 'know' which is a radical departure from ordinary usage." 26

Rollins says of Moore's assertion:

"I do know that I held up two hands above this desk not very long ago", that "the conspicuous fact which must be accounted for is the fact that it was generally received and has generally been understood, as a very effective indeed." He was of the opinion that Moore was not misusing language, but generally proved 'that there was something undeniably confused and absurd in the sceptical view'. Moore intends to be using 'know' without violating ordinary usage." 27

It should be pointed out here that Malcolm has confused the meaning of 'ordinary language' with 'common sense'; the two are not the same. What Moore was defending, in fact, was common sense, his appeal was to "common sense" and not to 'ordinary language'. By 'common sense', Moore would mean the defending of the beliefs of the majority.

Malcolm in *Moore and Ordinary Language* emphasized correctly on one page that all philosophical statements exemplified 'go against "common sense". On the next page, he says:

"The essence of Moore's technique of refuting philosophical statements consists in pointing out that these statements go against ordinary language."\(^{28}\)

Similarly, in another article, 'Defending common sense', in which, he wishes to show that there is something wrong with Moore's defence of common sense, what he, in fact, tries to do is to show that Moore mistakenly thinks he is defending ordinary language while he is really defending is a use of language. Malcolm expressly equates the two appeals of his attack that 'Moore's assertions do not belong to "common sense", i.e. to ordinary language at all.' Sometimes, as these quotations show, Malcolm is confusing the two appeals. He thinks that whereas the latter appeal is legitimate, the former is a mistake.

\(^{28}\)P.A. Schilpp, *Moore and Ordinary Language*, p. 349.
Woozley criticizes Malcom's confusion of the two points, still thinks Moore might have been:

"... really making use of the fact that if I use an expression according to its ordinary usage, I cannot be misusing it as if it were the fact that if I use an expression according to its ordinary usage what I say is surely true." [29]

The confusion of the two appeals, therefore led some critics to suppose that they were merely two interpretations of the same technique, whereas they were quite a different part of Moore's method and hence to think that a protest that the conflict of philosophy and common sense is factual, and not linguistic, enables them to escape Moore's criticism.

Moore's recourse to ordinary language is mainly to discover what a philosopher's view comes to when put into the language we all understand, namely ordinary language and to indicate what, in fact, are the beliefs of common sense by referring to what we all ordinarily say. The appeal to 'ordinary language' is subsidiary to the appeal to 'common sense'. For he clearly draws the distinction between the truth of a statement and the correctness of its language. Of course a man may be using a sentence perfectly correctly even when what he means by it is false, either because he is lying or because he is making a mistake; and

similarly a man may be using a sentence in such a way that what he means by it is true, even when he is not using it correctly, as for instance, when he uses the wrong word for what he means, by a slip or because he has made a mistake regarding what the correct usage. Thus using a sentence correctly in the sense explained and using it in such a way that what one means by it is true, are two things which are completely logically independent of each other; the either may occur without the other. Moore did not confuse the appeal to 'common sense' and that to 'ordinary language' in this way any more than Berkeley confused his similar appeals to 'the truth of things' and to 'propriety of language'.

Moore's Realism The common-sense view of the world, which Moore conceives, is the belief that there are in the Universe an enormous number of material objects. By material objects he means those which have shape, size and duration in time. He includes human bodies, plants, animals, mountains, chairs, houses "besides all these things upon the surface of the earth". Second, that men, and possibly some other animals, have minds i.e. have acts of consciousness, such as hearing, remembering, feeling, thinking and dreaming.

Moore thinks that these acts of consciousness take place, at any moment, in the place in which our bodies are at that

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30 G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 3.
moment. These acts of consciousness are being attached to the bodies and he says that what this attachment is principally thought to consist in is just that they take place where the bodies are. He allows it, also to be a common-sense belief that acts of consciousness are attached to the bodies in the sense that they are causally dependent.

It is part of the common-sense view of the world that acts of consciousness are attached to some bodies, but it is also part of its view that, "to the vast majority of material objects, no acts of consciousness are attached," and while we believe that we are at times conscious of material objects, we also believe that material objects, including those to which acts of consciousness are attached, continue to exist when we are not conscious of them. This goes with the belief that material objects existed at a time when there were no human beings on the earth, and perhaps no acts of consciousness anywhere in the universe, and that "there may come a time in future when this would again be so."

The third main belief which Moore attributes to common sense is, the belief that we really do know that there are material objects and acts of consciousness, and

31 G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 8.
32 Ibid., p. 10.
that they have the properties. Not only that but,

"...we believe that we know an immense number of
details about particular material objects and acts
of consciousness, past, present and future. "We
know", he says, "most indeed about the past, but a
great deal about the present, and much also about
the future."33

Much of this knowledge is thought to come from the special
sciences, the function of which is to give no detailed
knowledge about material objects, or in the case of history
and psychology, about acts of consciousness as well.

"In the case of all these sciences, there are a
great many which were formerly believed, but are
now definitely known to be errors, and a great
many which we do not know and perhaps never shall
know, but there are also 'we believe', an immense
number of things which are now definitely known to
be facts."34

Besides material objects and acts of consciousness,
there are certainly somethings, but they are not substantial
things in the way in which material objects and acts of
consciousness are. This is a question which common sense
does not discuss.

The doctrine which has influenced Moore's contemporaries
most strongly is the Realist theory of knowledge. Moore
developed it first in his essay "Refutation of Idealism."35

33Ibid., p. 12.
34Ibid., p. 13.
35G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (London; Routledge
This is not meant to be a refutation of the idealist world view, as such, but only as the subjective theory of perceptual knowledge, as represented by Berkeley.

Berkeley maintained that, "Esse is percipi" which is the implicit premise in all idealist theories of knowledge. This premise asserts that everything existent exists only so far as it is experienced, or is a content of consciousness. There is a necessary connection between existence and being perceived, and when the object is made a content of consciousness, every distinction between the subjective and the objective vanishes.

An objective idealist, such as Bradley, did not make use of Berkeley's principle that, "to be is to be perceived". Rather, he opposed Berkeleyan subjectivism, whereby reality is made to depend on finite minds. In his account, reality imposes the demand on thought that the world of facts be viewed as something interdependent and interrelated. They stressed that nothing could be understood without understanding its relationship to every other thing. Bradley wrote,

"... a relation must at both ends affect and pass into the beings of its terms" and "every relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms and is in this sense intrinsic."35

Moore criticized the objectivist view, for to him, everything

is independent and is not dependent upon the percipient. Relations are either internal or external.

Before attacking Berkeley's view, Moore tries to clarify the meaning of the terms 'esse' and 'percipi'. Moore says there are three different meanings which the statement of it might be taken to bear. First, as asserting that words 'esse' and 'percipi' are synonymous. Of this interpretation Moore is content to say that he thinks he need not prove 'that the principle that esse est percipi is not thus intended merely to define a word; nor yet that, if it were it would be an extremely bad definition. 36

A second possible interpretation is "that what is meant by esse, though not absolutely identical with what is meant by percipi, yet includes the latter as a part of its meaning." And this proposition does not seem to Moore to be worth discussing. 'I do not, indeed, think', he says, 'that the word "reality" is commonly used to include "percipi", but I do not wish to argue about the meaning of words'. He then makes the point that whether or not esse is correctly taken as containing percipi, it must include some other factors, or set of factors, which he proposes to call X, so that the question arises how percipi is related to X. Now there would, Moore maintains, be nothing in the principle that esse is percipi to arouse any interest if it implied

36 Ibid., p. 9.
only that $X$ and $\text{percipi}$ were contingently related: the claim has to be that there is a necessary connection between them. It cannot be an analytic connection, since $X$ does not overlap $\text{percipi}$, but it could be synthetically necessary.

Third, Moore proposes, that 'esse' be construed as denoting $X$ alone. The third and, in his view, the only interesting interpretation of $\text{esse est percipi}$ is that $\text{esse}$, in this sense, stands to $\text{percipi}$ in a synthetically necessary relation.

At this point, Moore has to concede that if $\text{esse est percipi}$ is put forward as a synthetic a priori proposition, it cannot be refuted.

"If the Idealist chooses to assert that it is merely a self-evident truth, I have only to say that it does not appear to me to be so." 37

At the same time, Moore does not think that any idealist would take this proposition for a self-evident truth, if he apprehended it distinctly. In his view, the reason for the idealists to believe that the words $\text{esse est percipi}$ express a necessarily true proposition is that they confuse the proposition which he has just interpreted as expressing a different proposition which he thinks that he can refute, and that is the proposition that $\text{esse}$ and $\text{percipi}$ are analytically connected in the sense that there logically could not be an object which was not an object of experience.

37 Ibid., p. 11.
Moore's ground for saying that he can refute this proposition is that he can show it to be self-contradictory. The result is that, even if it cannot be proved that idealists' doctrine is false, it can at least be proved that they are not justified in believing it, since the only reason which they have for holding an essential part of it is based on a self-contradictory mistake.

Moore points out the fallacy which lies in Berkeley's argument that 'to exist is to be perceived'. Moore says — that if we have any kind of presentation or sensation, we must carefully distinguish two elements: (1) the consciousness in relation to which all sensations exist and (2) the object of consciousness in relation to which every sensation is different from every other.

Consciousness is an element which is common to all sensations and always accompanies them. Moore says that we have the sensation of the blue colour and that of red; both these are different from sensing consciousness to which they are given alike as objects. So we have the sensation blue and the object blue identical, as it is given by Idealism, but to Moore, here lies the gross mistake, for the 'sensation of blue' and 'blue itself' are not identical. It follows that consciousness is different from blue, since consciousness is present also in the consciousness of green or sweet, whereas blue is not, and if consciousness and blue are different, Moore continues, it must be self-
contradictory to say that 'blue exists' is equivalent to 'blue and consciousness exist'; so he concludes:

*If anyone tells us that the existence of blue is the same thing as the existence of the sensation of blue he makes a mistake and a self-contradictory mistake, for he asserts either that blue is the same thing as blue together with consciousness, or that it is the same thing as consciousness alone."38

Hence it follows from the above argument that since blue and consciousness are different, it must be logically possible that they should exist independently. If it were logically impossible for blue to exist independently of consciousness, it would have to be identical with it. But as a general principle, this is false. For instance, being red is not identical with being coloured, yet to be red is the same thing as to be coloured red; waltz is not identical with dancing, yet there cannot be a waltz without a dance; there are card games other than bridge, yet one cannot play bridge without playing cards.

Ayer suggests that Moore's argument would be relevant, if the relation of blue to the sensation of blue were that of a part to the whole, because a part can logically said to exist independently. But if this applied to consciousness and its objects, it would follow not only that the objects could exist unrecognized but also that consciousness could

38Ibid., p. 18.
exist independently of any object. Ayer says, "it is not clear to me whether Moore accepts this conclusion" for he talks in one place of the element of consciousness as being 'extremely difficult to fix' and as seeming to be transparent, but later he says that this 'diaphenous element' can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for.\textsuperscript{39} Still then it is very difficult to understand how there could be a state of consciousness which had no 'object'.

Moore says that in being aware of something, being aware stands to something to which it is aware (blue) in a quite peculiar relation. This relation is not that of a thing to a content nor that of a part of a content to another part of it, and is, a quite specific relation which is essential to all knowledge and to it only, the relation is such that it cannot be further analysed. We cannot say that when we know 'blue' we have in our consciousness a 'thing' or an 'image' of which 'blue' is the content. To be aware of sensation 'blue' does not mean to be aware of a mental image and therefore of a 'thing' of which 'blue' and some other element are constituent parts in the same sense in which colour and hardness are constituents of some external object. It means nothing but to be aware of the awareness of 'blue'.

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., p. 25.
Moore discusses that blue should be said to be the content of the sensation of blue. He begins by asking what is meant by saying that one thing is the content of another, and answers that the word 'content' is being properly used when it is said that blue is part of the content of a blue flower. Since he takes this to mean that blue is one of the qualities of a blue flower, he concludes that to say that blue is the content of the sensation of blue is to say that it qualifies the sensation in the way that it qualifies a flower or a bead when we speak of the blue flower or a bead. The sensation of blue must, indeed, also have the quality of being a sensation, or if we think of the element of consciousness as the common substance which is differentiated into different sensations, it must still be represented in the sensation of blue by some factor which is other than blue, so that blue cannot, in any case, be the whole of the content of the sensation; however, it might be part of it.

Moore allows that this suggestion is logically possible, but no more than that. We have no reason whatever, he says, to suppose that the sensation of blue is itself blue and even if it were its being blue would not make it a sensation of blue, anymore than the fact that an image is blue is sufficient to make it a representation of a blue object.

The issue between Ducasse's on Moore's Refutation of Idealism[^1]
and Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism'\textsuperscript{41} is with regard to
the question, whether certain entities can exist without
being experienced. Moore introduces entities, the ontological
status of which seems extremely dubious to Ducasse. The
basic distinction which Moore draws between an object and
an act of awareness, helps him to criticise Idealists
especially Berkeley. To whom \textit{esse} is \textit{percipi}, Ducasse on
the other hand wants to reallocate them to the mental realm
by calling them 'experiences' instead of 'objects'. But at
a later stage, Moore accepts Ducasse's point, that there
are 'certain class of cases' to which this distinction is
not applicable, he writes, "and I may say at once that, on
this point I now agree with Mr. Ducasse and Berkeley, and
hold that early paper of mine was wrong ... that a toothache
certainly cannot exist without being felt, but that, on the
other hand, the moon certainly can exist without being
perceived."\textsuperscript{42}

Ducasse maintains a distinction between (1) alien
coordinate cognitum; (2) alien subordinate cognitum,
(3) connately subordinate cognitum and (4) connately
co-ordinate cognitum. The alienly co-ordinate cognitum of
"experiencing" is 'object' or an 'objective event'. Alien


\textsuperscript{42}P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), \textit{The Philosophy of G. E. Moore},
p. 653.
subordinate cognitum of "experiencing" is 'quinine' or 'a rose'. Connately subordinate cognitum of "experiencing" is 'taste' or 'smell' and connately co-ordinate cognitum of 'experiencing is 'experience'. \(^{43}\) When an accusative e.g. an obstacle is alienly coordinate with an activity, e.g., jumping, then this accusative can exist independently of existence, such as obstacles can exist which are not jumped, where as, in so far, as it is transitive, jumping cannot exist without an object being jumped. Second, when an accusative e.g. ditch, which is alienly subordinate to an activity e.g. jumping, then a ditch can exist without being jumped, but here even when it is of a transitive kind it cannot occur independently of the existence of a given accusative alienly subordinate to it: transitive jumping can exist, even if there were no ditches, but fences. Third, connately coordinative activity, do not exist independently i.e. a jump exists in jumping, dance in the dancing etc. Lastly, connately subordinate accusative can occur at a time when the given accusative do not; dance could be of some species other than the waltz. On the other hand, an accusative connately subordinate to a given activity cannot exist independently of that activity, a waltz could only be in a dance, it is a species of dance.\(^{44}\)

\(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 246.

\(^{44}\)Ibid., p. 231.
Moore further seeks the clarification of the two words 'blue' and 'bitter'. He says that when we say that a tie is blue or an after image is blue, and when we say quinine is bitter and a 'taste which is bitter', these terms are used in a very different way. He is of the opinion that when Ducasse says, that the adjective 'bitter' can be applied both to tastes and to substances; we speak of a bitter taste and of a bitter substance:

"... 'bitter taste' expands into 'taste of the species called 'bitter', whereas the expression 'bitter substance' cannot similarly be expanded into 'substance of the species called "bitter", but only into the "substance having the property 'being bitter"'. In the case of 'bitter taste' the relation of bitter to taste is that of species to genus; whereas in the case of 'bitter substance' the relation of bitter to substance is that of property to substance."  

Ducasse's passage seems to suggest that there is some one and the same entity to which the name 'bitter' is given, such that when we say that quinine is bitter, then 'bitter' is taken to be the property of quinine, whereas when we say of taste which we are tasting, that it is bitter, then this is taken to be 'a species of ' of taste which we are tasting. This does not seem to appeal to Moore, for Ducasse is attributing the property 'bitter' to quinine, and at the sametime calls 'the taste bitter' the 'species of ' taste, to call a 'species of taste' is same as to call it a taste. Moore seems to have misunderstood Ducasse, for the

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"... difference between the alienly subordinate and the connately subordinate of tasting is what he refers to as "one of the basic contentions". To say what Moore thinks, then Ducasse would be meaning that "one and the same entity" can be both alienly subordinate and connately subordinate to tasting and this is what he wants to deny. "Although 'linguistic inertia' leads one 'to believe that when a word is the same it means the same so that when we speak of the tasting of bitter and of the tasting of quinine there is a temptation to believe that 'of' means the same in both halves of each pair."46

Here the question emerges, what do we experience, when we have a bitter taste? Is bitter an object which can be differentiated from the taste, or is bitter a content of taste. To Ducasse 'bitter' is an experience and not a object, for he thinks that 'bitter' is not a property attributed to a thing, but an inherent quality, where as Moore says that:

"... it is not at all necessary to suppose that there is some physical object such as a blue necktie associated with the sensation of blue. The blue patch could be, say an after-image."47

After-image cannot exist unsensed, so there is content of aware, act of awareness, and our awareness of the act of awareness. If 'bitter' for Ducasse is an experience then this is not independent of the taste which is bitter, but Moore argues, "that there is a sense of 'taste' in which there can be two tastes exactly like one another ... That

is, which differs numerically only.* If this is the case then to Moore taste is an objective thing and not like Ducasse an experience, but then he also holds the view that each sense is unique and private, if it is unique and private, then how can we have a 'same taste'. Moore seems to fall a victim to both the views of immediacy and objectivity, i.e. On one hand he says that what we are directly aware of is a sensible quality which is private, and then to say that it is exactly like the one before, assume an objective criterion, which Moore does not explicitly spell out.

While directly aware of a sensible quality, Ducasse says, that his awareness is bluely, to dance waltz is to dance waltzily, cannot be accepted, for how can awareness be coloured and here Moore seems to be right in saying that when he is directly aware of a sensible quality, e.g. blue, he is also aware of something which has the quality say, a blue patch and not that the awareness itself is blue.

Thus, Moore wants to show that what is separable is distinct, and Ducasse, that there are some distinctions which are logically not separable.

Thus common-sense realism is the view held by many Oxford linguistic analysts. This tradition has its beginnings with Thomas Reid and was revived by Moore. When Moore argued, for example, that to deny the certainty of the simple perceptual statement, "this is a hand", leads to
inconsistencies between one's beliefs and one's behaviour, he was evoking common sense. In a similar way, Moore evoked common sense when he claimed that the grounds on which such perceptual statements were denied were less certain than the perceptual statements themselves. But Moore's subsequent defence of the sense-datum inference led him away from common-sense realism. Practitioners of common-sense realism reject the sense-datum theory and claim that in instances of illusions, mirror images and refraction, it is the object which we 'see'. Further, hallucinations are not on the same footing with normal perceptions, even though they are sometimes confused with perceptions because of special circumstances, such as fever or the taking of drugs.

Each of these examples of direct realism share the view that perception is immediate and not mediate. That Moore wished to maintain some form of direct realism, undoubtedly the common-sense version, is evidenced throughout his writings by his reluctance to give up the identification of sense data with the surface of physical objects.

Moore's realism was based on the principle that the material objects did not require the existence of a percipient. They are independently real, the object of awareness, and the act of awareness are independent of each other. He also held that some entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any human mind. The proposition
is refuted by Stace in his article, but without much success, for Stace says that there are two ways in which the existence of sense objects can be established (1) through perception, (2) through inference, i.e. from a particular fact of the existence of any material object which we are now experiencing, we cannot infer that this particular object will exist tomorrow. Russell wrote in *Analysis of Mind*.

"A belief in the existence of things outside my own biography exist antecedently to evidence, and can only be destroyed, if at all, by a long course of philosophic doubt.... But from the standpoint of theoretical logic, be regarded as prejudiced, not as a well grounded theory."

Inductive reasoning for Stace is not possible, since we have not observed any instance where the unexperienced entities are supposed to exist. Perry refuted the idealistic claim that it is impossible to discover anything which was not known to the conclusion that all things are known. It was through his 'egocentric predicament' which proved the Idealists wrong. Stace says that:

"... it would be a fallacy to argue that, because we have never observed a unicorn on Mars and therefore there is no unicorn there, but by pointing out this fallacy one does not prove the existence of a unicorn and by pointing out that one's ignorance of the existence of unperceived entities does not prove their non-existence, one does nothing whatever towards proving those unexperienced entities do exist, and Perry's argument proves nothing in favour of realism."**

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Since Stace gives an example of a 'sense object' as a piece of paper. Here it should be pointed out that, the distinction ought to be made between a 'sense object' and a 'physical object' which Moore rightly made. Stace is undecided, as to whether the object of perception is a sense object i.e. sense data, or a physical object. Whatever is the case, it seems justifiable that we can have a belief in the existence of what transcends our immediate awareness. If the object of perception is a sense datum even then, we are aware of pieces of paper and reasonably believe, it follows that our knowledge is not limited to perceived things, or if the object of perception is a physical object, it again follows that perception transcends sense awareness, since we are certainly not aware of the pieces of papers in the same way as we are aware of a white patch. In each case, one finds it reasonable to believe in the existence of what is not immediately present in sense awareness. If they cannot be proved not to exist, neither can we affirm its existence which could be explained by perception, inference or instinctive belief. Realists explained the rest of the world through the sense datum and our knowledge of the unexperienced entities can only be said to exist in the sense that minds have chosen by means of a fiction to project them into the void of interperceptual intervals and thus to construct or create their existence in imagination. Idealists are wrong for there definitely is a difference
between the object and the awareness of that object.

Moore is a defender of common sense, but his questions were not concerned with the proper usage as established by custom, philosophy has no concern with them. What I want to discover, he said, "is the nature of a certain object or idea." He says that my main object has been to try to make the reader see it.

The general principle on which Moore acted, namely that we should separate common-sense propositions from philosophical ones, and on the other hand that a consideration of our common-sense propositions is highly relevant to philosophy, because in that field we have means of cognition which yield us truth immune from philosophical criticism.

Philosophy cannot create its epistemology, but must start with what we cannot help accepting as true at the level of common sense, asking what criteria we use there, even if common sense should not give us as Moore thought certainty, it can at least provide in regard to many matters good reasons for beliefs and even if we cannot give any physical object propositions, an analysis which is both precise and completely accurate, it is still a very important question whether physical object propositions are really

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49 Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 6.
only propositions about actual and possible human experiences and a question with which Moore dealt properly. Philosophical problems arise because of conceptual confusions and they need conceptual analysis, which Moore did with exceptional skill.