Language is a means or tool of communicating our ideas to others. Its use is not something extraordinary, rather it is the most common place thing that concerns us. It is through language that we make ourselves intelligible to one another. It is not necessary that language should be written or spoken. Even symbols, signs and gestures, if they are understood by others, become a sort of language.

Benson Mates classifies language into the language of face, the language of heart, the language of animals, and the language of stars. As such, language is the most important factor for social unity, for it is only through this medium that human beings come nearer to one another, share their ideas with one another and follow a common cultural heritage.

In a human society, we are not concerned with the importance of language, but with its analysis. Since a philosopher is also a human being who make use of it, it is not unlikely that certain words, and terms or expressions of language confuse and preplex him, with the result that he misses the crucial point and misinterprets a statement.

Under such circumstances, the analysis or clarification of language becomes an essential which cannot be ignored.

The term 'Analysis' is used for understanding the structure of language by looking into the working of its elements and their interrelations. From this definition we can deduce that the term 'analysis' is always applied when we deal with the problem of language.

Here it is important to distinguish between the philosophy of language and the linguistic philosophy. Linguistic philosophy consists in attempting to solve philosophical problems by analysing the meanings of words and by analysing logical relations between words in the natural language. This analysis may be done in order to solve traditional philosophical problems concerning determinism, scepticism and causation, or it may be done without special regard to traditional problems, but as an investigation of concepts or as an inquiry into certain aspects of the world by scrutinizing the classifications and distinctions we make in the language which we use to characterize or describe the world. The philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy, in which philosophers attempt to analyse, elucidate and investigate certain crucial linguistic concepts, such as meaning, reference, truth, verification, speech acts and logical necessity.

There is an intimate relation between the philosophy
of language and the linguistic philosophy or, in other words, between a subject and a method, because some of the problems in the philosophy of language can be attacked by the methods of linguistic philosophy; for example, the problems concerning the nature of truth may be regarded as a question about the analysis of the concept 'true', and more importantly because the methods which linguistic philosophers employ in conducting linguistic analyses depend on their philosophy of language. The way in which a linguistic philosopher carries out the actual investigation depends on certain general conceptions, which he has concerning what words mean and how they are related to the world. It is only by giving some general theory or approach to language that one can take up a particular analysis. It is for this reason that the spread of analytical philosophy in the twentieth century has occupied the central place in the whole enterprise of philosophy.

Though both the philosophy of language and the linguistic philosophy, are pursued nowadays with more self-consciousness than before, yet both are, in fact, as old as philosophy itself. Plato devoted much of his time to the analysis of concepts, such as 'knowledge' and 'justice'. Even Aristotle had been explicit in his emphasis on clarity. His metaphysics expressed the unruffled conviction that a systematic philosophical investigation demanded an enquiry into the terms involved in it, and he
tried to analyse the concepts, such as 'good', 'know' and 'cause'. Thus it is seen that there was an attempt to clarify concepts through an analysis of the meanings of words and concepts, but what differed from the traditional approach was the identification of philosophy with linguistic analysis. Here a question arises: 'Why did not the traditional philosophers, in spite of their occupation with language as an instrument of thought and communication, think that philosophy could be dealt exclusively with language? One of the plausible answers could be that since the traditional philosophers were more occupied with the metaphysical problems of Being, Reality, etc. They never took language as an object of cognition but, on the other hand, made use of it for making their systems more consistent, whereas the contemporary linguistic philosophers refuted the metaphysical problems as pseudo problems. By paying more attention to language, the analytical tradition grew up in shape. Language, which was once considered a means to metaphysical activity, turned out to be an object of cognitive interest. For example, the dispute between the modern and the traditional philosophers on the question of, Does time exist? did not remain merely a factual question, because both agreed that events had duration — past, present and future but they sought a clarification of the term 'Time'; Particularly its nature? Thus philosophy for the analysts became a better affair with language than an armchair reflection
of arriving at substantive conclusions concerning the nature of the World. Dissolving the metaphysical problems by looking into the function of language was taken up by Findlay, Max Black, to name only a few. Even for others such as Ryle, Ayer and Austin, philosophical problems of knowledge, belief, etc. were not factual but were matters of verbal confusions.

At this stage one can pose such questions: Can the antimetaphysical spirit to do philosophy take up philosophical problems mainly with the help of language? How is it that the empirical tradition of D. Hume and others cannot reach that goal? The questions can be solved by going back to what they were actually doing, i.e. Humean tradition displayed their distrust of metaphysics by putting a limit to the abilities of understanding, and thus to deal with them was considered as a sheer waste of time. For to do so was to raise questions that could never be solved, rather they increased the doubts about them. Thus we can say that the traditional empirical schools asserted that the source of confusion and inconsistencies in the metaphysical system was due to our lack of understanding. So the anti-metaphysical outlook was there before the philosophy of language originated, but the philosophy of language is a second-order discipline which does not describe reality, but only clarifies the meanings of the propositions and removes ambiguity in the construction of concepts which we uncritically use about the nature of the external world. So the philosophy of
language is a talk about a talk.

Another difference which can be pointed out between the traditional and the modern approach is that the traditional metaphysicians were fundamentally interested in constructing 'isms' and 'systems'. They did not question the possibility of system-building and whether what they called philosophy was really a meaningful pursuit. These points, however, became the major questions for linguistic philosophers. The philosophers were mostly occupied in answering whether what philosophy talked about in the past was really meaningful and, therefore, worth pursuing or not. All these meta-philosophical questions were not the primary concern of the traditional metaphysicians; rather they subordinated these questions to the end of giving a transcendent view of reality or constructing individual systems and in them they found the fundamental field of philosophy.

These philosophical systems of the different philosophers definitely had different reasons behind them. Thus one had to see whether these different reasons could be talked about meaningfully, and this approach opened the gates to the problem of meaning, which was given the foremost importance in philosophy of language, and in the pursuit of doing so, the philosophers made use of the method of analysis.

Even the method of analysis employed was different in the case of the modern and the traditional philosophers.
The traditional philosophers were complacent in their belief that the study and practice of philosophy was meant to give a transcendent view of reality, and analysis meant contextual analysis, i.e. the analysis of the questions and answers that arose within that field. In contrast, the analysis of the linguistic philosophers was transcendental or metatextual, devoted to asking questions about the field within which a traditional philosopher moved. Their analysis was further different from that of Moore, who made use of analysis for the clarification of commonsense propositions and concepts. Their analysis was employed in the field of language and this analysis of language was different from the grammatical analysis, for it tended to show how two sentences that were grammatically similar might have a different meanings, for example the term *exist in Human beings exist* and *Unicorns exist* have different meanings.

Even within the same problem of Meaning, different philosophers adopted a different ways of solving them, e.g. Frege who thinks that the meaning of an expression is to be referred to by its sense and not by its nominatum. H.P. Grice makes a demarcation between the natural and the unnatural use of meaning, Searle talks of the speech acts etc.*

*Since Prof. G.E. Moore's first published *Refutation of Idealism* in 1901 and the publication of Searle's *Speech Acts* in 1969, there has been a widespread growth of philosophical works based on empiricists outlook. G. Frege and B. Russell were the pioneers in laying the foundations
Ryle says that the task of philosophy is the 'detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of recurrent of logic. A great deal has been achieved in the formalization of Mathematics and the nature of proofs. However, in close succession to these pioneers, one finds the work of L. Wittgenstein, in *Tractatus*, as one of the most prominent landmarks in the philosophy of language. This was closely associated, though never formally so, with the works of Vienna circle. The group of philosophers which was led by Schilpp, Carnap, Neurath, and others, their analysis of philosophical issues was designed after exact sciences. In this direction a systematic co-operative programme of unified sciences was also launched, and some very outstanding publications were made, like the works of Karl Popper, *Logic of Scientific Discovery* and Hans Reichbans, *Philosophy of Space, Time and others*. Among the English-speaking philosophers, only A.J. Ayer was influenced by this tradition. This programme was whole heartedly accepted by him, who published his now famous *Language, Truth and Logic*, whereas most other English-speaking philosophers continued to stick to the Empiricist theory of knowledge, and the analysis of perception and showed marked unwillingness to become philosophers of science, such as Ryle, Price, Ewing, Walsh etc.

At a later stage, the formal methods of R. Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, and Russell and Wittgenstein's works on *Philosophy of Logic* inspired many students of Meaning theory to formulate their grasp of these questions in artificial languages. Between such philosophers of meta-language and the conventional linguistic analysts almost seems to be a communication gap, as wide as might seem to be between the Existentialists and the Philosophers of Science.

The philosophical activity in the English-speaking countries after the II World War in late 40s was inspired by the seminal thoughts of two important philosophers. First, Wittgenstein who partly gave up his earlier formalist approach of the *Tractatus* in favour of a more open textured analysis of the sense of our uses of words and sentences in frightfully complex arrangements. All these were by way of his lectures to his pupils at Cambridge, which were put together in *Philosophical Investigation* after his death in 1952. Similarly, the work of J.L. Austin in regard to different types and modes of meaning led to the creation of philosophy of language which was somewhat in the shade under the influence of formalists method of Carnap and his group; as it is, Moore's philosophy of ordinary language seems to be an early anticipation of the
misconstructions and absurd theories'. Making a distinction between the syntactical form of an expression and the forms of facts it depicts, Ryle rightly argues that a great many of the expressions of everyday life are in virtue of their grammatical form 'systematically misleading'.

Ryle willingly grants that such expressions, e.g. unicorn is an imaginary object do not mislead one in everyday life, but the moment one tries to find a designata for them, thinking them to be on a par with the grammatical form one commits a category mistake. A category mistake occurs when something is taken to belong to a different category from its true one. Philosophy must try to restate sentences, to reveal the sort of confusion into which one is led by inapt use of analogies of language. It is, thus, the function of many philosophers to reveal at once the nature and the solutions of philosophical problems. By clearing our minds as to what philosophic puzzles are like, and how in principle they are dealt with. One finds that it is precisely a confusion between types or categories.

Later-day philosophy. Ever since, then the division between formal logicians and ordinary language philosophers seem to grow ever wider, as is clear from the works of P.F. Strawson, J. Wisdom, W.V. Quine, T. Goodman. All these philosophers show a common philosophical orientation and world view, yet in details the differences are fairly wide. In some it appears that more and more philosophers of language are going back to attend to the context, the universe of discourses, and the variety of uses that for the first time were taken note of by Moore and later by Wittgenstein.
Ryle takes an example of category confusion by citing the traditional Descartes's dualism. He treats the mind as an entity on equal footing with bodily activities, and this is a confusion of categories. The grammatical similarities between the talk of mental and bodily activities can mislead one into thinking that they are independent and simultaneous activities.

Another instance of a category mistake which Ryle points out is the confusion of knowing how and knowing that. Knowing how to do a certain thing is to know the truth of a certain principle and applying them to an activity, is wrongly assumed by philosophers, for a person may know how to perform a certain action or an activity without knowing what its rules and its application are.² So to know a thing that it is so is not to say that it is the case. It is then salutary to keep on reminding ourselves and one another, says Ryle:

"...that what we are after is, accounts of how certain words work... and what does the working of a word mean? Not how it is actually used, not how it might be used to secure various effects but its working in the special sense of its 'informal logic'.


One is interested in the informal logic of the employment of expressions, the nature of logical howlers which people are likely to commit if they are not careful about the syntactical and semantical rules.

Austin shared with other analysts the conviction that the study of language is of great value in dealing with philosophical questions. He also believes that a great deal of what philosophers had written was not so much false as it was misleading and confused. Taking in view his theory of illocutionary forces which stresses that a considerable number of utterances, even those in the indicative mood, like *I will meet you at 4 O'clock*, are such that in at least some contexts it would be impossible to characterize them as true or false.

To apply the notion of truth and falsity, Austin introduces a technical term "constative". The constatives are, e.g., reporting, stating, promising and asserting. Later, he makes the distinction between the 'constative' and 'performative acts', for both assumed some kind of an action. Whereas his later attempt of illocutionary forces makes clear that whenever a person says something, he may be performing a number of distinguishable acts, such as making noises, uttering words, stating, agreeing, reporting, describing and hinting. All these performatives may confuse a person. So Austin stresses the need to become clear, as far as
possible, how language operates before any attempt at solving philosophical problems is made. This also shows the importance of philosophy of language in Austin's works.

L. Wittgenstein believes that metaphysical preplexities arise out of a deep-seated failure to understand the complex functioning of one's language. This failure to understand the way one's language works give rise to a kind of "linguistic anxiety", which expresses itself in the temptation to try to ask and answer metaphysical questions, regarding *p Reality.

So the main work of Wittgenstein is to clarify language and remove confusion. This work is not to be mainly demonstrated by showing that the questions are meaningless, but by describing those features of language which give rise to the temptation to pose metaphysical questions.

With Wittgenstein, looking for the meaning of the term is replaced by looking for its use. The meaning of an expression is its use. This does not mean that 'meaning' and 'use' are synonymous, but by the 'use of an expression' Wittgenstein mean the special circumstances, the 'surroundings' in which it is written, or spoken. The meaning of an expression depends entirely on, how one uses it, is explicitly mentioned by Wittgenstein in *The Blue and Brown Book*.

The other important questions, besides the above are the question concerning reference and predication, language and mentalistic concepts and questions of truth.
Thus all these questions were dealt with by the philosophers of language. Two schools of thought dominated the philosophy of language. One arising from the work of early Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle is logical positivism, and the other by the works of later Wittgenstein, Moore, Ryle, Austin* is ordinary language philosophy. Both schools proposed linguistic approaches to the problem of meaning and arguments, in general. Both advocated that attempts to answer traditional philosophical questions be based on the knowledge of the linguistic form which these questions and their answers should assume. Both took up this question, because they thought that an uncritical and uninformed reliance on language was responsible for throwing philosophy into the trap of metaphysics.

However, these two schools of thought differed in their conception of how to guarantee that the language they talked about would be suitable for philosophical purposes. Logical positivists believed that the formulation of philosophical question in the natural language had led philosophers into confusion. Therefore it was essential to construct an ideal or an artificial language into which sentences of a natural

*What is being written in the text concerns more the system of ideas and should not be interpreted to mean any strict chronological order, for instance Moore was earlier than both Carnap and earlier Wittgenstein.
language could be translated if they were either non-
philosophical sentences about matter of fact or about
mathematical truths, or philosophical sentences whose
translation revealed their linguistic character. Some
logical positivists saw the construction of such ideal,
artificial language as a way of revealing the form of natural
languages, and others saw it as a way of doing away with
natural languages in philosophy. The ordinary language
philosophers, while sensitive to abuses and misuses of
categories, do not approve, however, of completely giving
up natural languages, for they think that ordinary uses need
not be replaced but understood, and when, so elucidated, shall
be effective in serving the functions of conceptual life
without erring into metaphysical pseudo propositions.

Ordinary language philosophers also believed that
the formulation of philosophical questions in the idiom
of natural language led to confusion. They, however, believed
that it was both unnecessary and impossible to circumvent
natural language by going back to the construction of
artificial languages. Thus for ordinary language philosophers,
the task of linguistic philosophy lies in the clarification
of the ordinary concepts that give rise to philosophical
puzzles.

The rebirth of British Empirical Philosophy in the
present century is rightly regarded as the result of the
works of G.E. Moore. According to Moore, philosophers have tried to give a general description of the whole of the universe, i.e. by telling what the important things known are and how they are related to one another. He tells us that there are material objects and there are acts of consciousness. The acts of consciousness are hearing, seeing, remembering, imagining, feeling, etc. To a great extent, these acts of consciousness are attached to material objects, and the material objects are those which have shape, size and duration and have an existence in space and time. The acts of consciousness are attached to human bodies, which are also material objects; acts of consciousness and material objects are substantial things in the universe. There are also space and time which are not substantial and they are neither material objects nor do they belong to the domain of the acts of consciousness. It was a commonly held opinion that material objects could exist independently, without any one being aware of their existence, besides knowing that there were material things. It was also generally believed and known that there could be other things, of which we were not conscious. Since all this knowledge was accepted by a common man, Moore's philosophy is known as a common sense view of the World.

Philosophy for Moore originates in questioning, in which it is born, lives and has its being. For him, everything
is questionable, he said that what induced him to pursue philosophy was what others had said, and though much of confusion could be avoided if we asked whether the question was rightly put at the beginning and whether the questioning process was conducted rightly to the finish. Moore writes:

"In all philosophical studies the difficulties and the disagreements are mainly due to a very simple cause, the attempt to answer questions before discovering precisely what questions it is you desire to answer." 4

Herein lies the source of error which could be easily removed, if before starting, the philosophers asked what the true meaning of a question was. Moore says:

"I have endeavoured rather to exactly what is the meaning of the question and what difficulties must consequently be faced in answering it, than to prove that any particular answer is true." 5

Moore generally had an anti-metaphysical attitude, he was against any system building, but this is not to be interpreted that his was an incoherent approach to solving problems. We do sometimes find streaks of metaphysics in his philosophy, i.e. where he talks about Reality, Existence, Being, etc. By metaphysical, Moore sometimes meant to refer to non-natural objects or qualities, i.e. objects or qualities which are the constituents of the universe but not of temporal...


5Ibid., p. 223.
events. Sometimes, he refers to the sort of philosophical inquiry that concerns itself with the overall constitution of the universe, and it is in this sense that he was a metaphysician, not a speculative but a critical metaphysician. He went deeper into the clarification of the meanings of concepts like Reality, Existence, Being, etc.*

Moore thinks that there are three sorts of things in the universe (1) those that exist (2) those that are but do not exist, (3) those which neither exist, nor are, they simply are not. Somethings which have the property of being, the others are devoid of this property. Further, he makes a distinction between being and existence. What has duration in space and time is said to exist. The others, like imaginary objects have a mere being. He also maintains that objects of sensory perception exists, but did not specify the connection between the two criteria of existence.

Moore has never been consistent in his views about Reality. Sometimes it is said to have an existence, at other times it is equated simply with being, still at other times it is referred to as a property, but he was definite.

*However, in contrast to most analytical philosophers, there are streaks of naive realism in Moore's glorification of commonsense beliefs regarding material objects, human bodies, etc. But he, quite in contrast to other philosophers (say E. Russell), seems to show no inclination to elucidate the deliverances of physical sciences, thinking them to be outside the province of philosophy.
that there is no sense in attributing degrees to Reality. Within the category of Being, Moore distinguishes particulars, universals and facts.

Another important aspect of Moore's philosophy is that the suggested proof of an external world, i.e. through perception is scarcely informative. He was of the opinion that analytical thinking could be informative. His principles on this matter are stated at the beginning of *Principia Ethica* where he tells, what he is doing in asking what "good" means. An arbitrary verbal definition tells us how someone intends to use a word — a verbal definition of the kind to be found in dictionaries tells us how people generally use a word. But there is another kind of definition which is of greater importance in philosophy, and which corresponds to what traditional logicians mean by a real definition. "We may mean that a certain object, which we all know is composed in a certain manner". When we know the meaning of a word, we can go on to inquire into the nature of the range of objects referred to by it. This is a tautological analysis by which we come to know clearly and distinctly what we previously knew only vaguely, and that it performs this task either by revealing the constituents of a notion which turn out to be complex or by exhibiting the essential relativity of a notion which turns out to be primarily independent. This is the widening of Moore's views and not its negation.
His important paper 'External and Internal Relations' points out with utmost clarity that neither material nor formal implication, as understood in Russell's and Whitehead's logic, corresponds with the usual sense in which one thing is said to be deducible from another. Material and formal implications are defined in terms of what happens, facts, to be the case, one proposition materially implies another if it is not the case that the former is true and the latter false. But deducibility in the usual sense is an intelligible relation, a connection of meanings, one proposition entails another when one sees that the latter must follow from the former by virtue of their respective contents in any case.

Though the most obvious instances of entailment are tautologies, yet Moore does not say that all entailments are tautologies or analytic. In *Principia Ethica*, from the meaning of 'good' he inquires into the things and situations which are good. He asks us to acknowledge that his indefinable character of goodness attaches to a number of things in whose definition goodness is not included, i.e. to recognize a number of synthetic entailments. Aesthetic enjoyment is good, personal affection is good, but these are not tautologies.

Since the present study intends only to remain within the domain of Moore's views on language and perception, we shall deal only with the nature and the existential status of the perceptual object, i.e. the nature of the material
object. With his method of analysis, we are able to deal with the common-sense beliefs and propositions concerning the existence of an external world. Moore did not equate analysis with philosophy, but analysis is a technique which he combines with the use of common-sense knowledge to explore philosophical theories with the analysis of those propositions in which that knowledge is expressed. We shall see how Moore employs this technique, and how he clarifies the confusions between the using of a proposition and its adequate analysis.

Moore felt that he could not do away with a number of basic common-sense beliefs and convictions, like I have a body, I was born a certain number of years ago, he was certain of its truth but there was a dispute with regard to its correct analysis. The meanings of these propositions Professor Moore tried to give by an empirical procedure. Further, we shall assess whether he has been successful in demonstrating the proof of his premises or not, as to whether the sceptical conclusions are done away with, or do they have an upper hand.

Professor Moore emphasized the point that the correct analysis of any perceptual judgement should start from the notion of 'sense data'. The sense datum is a patch of colour, quality, size and shape. The notion of a sense datum is employed by Moore only to differentiate between
what we see and what we directly see. What we see is a material object and what we directly see is a sense datum. Then what possibly is the relation between the two was the question which Moore could not decide whether it was a correspondence, identity, or causal relation. While trying to work out the relationship between the sense data and the material objects, three possible types of answer taken into account: (1) the sense data are parts of the surface of the particular material object; (2) the sense data are not themselves part of the material object, but have a representative relation; and (3) material objects are 'permanent possibilities' of our sensation.

The intention of Moore in this continual analysis of the proposition, This is a human hand, is to reject the view of those philosophers who deny the existence of a material object, and to show them the correct analysis of the term 'Material Object'. We shall take up the examination of this question which, as it goes, would bring us to the position that Moore holds. However, in passing we shall say that Moore's sense-datum approach to the analysis of perceptual knowledge and then its relation to the external world disagrees with the sceptical conclusion which goes on doubting the existence of a material object.

Moore is not an epistemologist in the traditional sense; nevertheless, he is an analyst, he has something to
say about knowledge. Again, his theory of knowledge gives importance to the transparency of the 'mental acts' by the help of which we are able to apprehend what is objectively real. By knowledge, Moore means the purely psychic function of being aware of anything by means of which one apprehends immediately what is objectively given without the interposition of copying images; such as the theory of knowledge argued for, and which were alleged to interpose themselves like a medium between the act and the object. We shall see what the relation of knowledge to perception is.

Moore's theory of proposition is important for understanding the problem of meaning and what the status of imaginary objects which have no designation in the real world are. Are they to be considered meaningful or not. Again, his theory of universals is important for understanding the use of general concepts, and the applicability of the general terms. When we see anything, we try to describe it in a form of a proposition or a statement. How does his philosophy of language supplement his philosophy of perception? How far has he been successful in that attempt?

Moore being a pioneer of the philosophy of language, has left an everlasting influence on the contemporary thought. He gave us the proper method to follow. To think properly is to give an answer to certain questions and to find out the solutions we have to ask what sort of question it is there and to which one wants an answer.
One of the two most important jobs which Moore's philosophy of language has done is to bring a philosophical talk in connection with ordinary language. The other is to show how to make use of an analytical method, for detecting errors and confusions which are the root cause of all philosophical puzzles.

Moreover, in this thesis we are trying to explore the connections which Moore's life-long interest in questions of perception, perceptual terms and concepts has to the general constitution of human thinking. The brightest results of this method usually are not evident, and often even qualified philosophers are deterred from studying the reiterated reformulations of usages regarding perceptual words in which Moore's philosophical writings abound, leading often to the devaluation of his real significance. We hope to reappraise the value of Moore's work on perception as a source revealing the connection that knowledge, language and perception have.