The salient features of G. E. Moore's philosophical position is his defence of common sense. He does not go so far as to maintain that a common-sense view is right in all its beliefs. What he maintains is the truth, and indeed the certainty of a number of very general propositions which make up what he calls the common-sense view of the world.

The common-sense view of the world, as Moore represents it, consists primarily in a belief in the existence of two different sorts of entities — material objects and acts of consciousness. Moore fails to define common-sense when he takes it to mean a material object, but instead provides us with a long list of examples including animals, human beings, ink-pots, etc. He also attributes to common sense the belief that all these objects are located both in space and time.

The belief that there are acts of consciousness is Moore's interpretation of a belief which the man in the street would more naturally express by saying that men, and possibly some other animals, have minds. Again even here, he does not try to define acts of consciousness, but simply implies that they include such things as hearing, seeing, remembering, thinking and feeling. Moore attributes to common sense the belief that these acts of consciousness
are located in time and surprisingly, the belief that they are also located in space, his view being that the attachment of the acts of consciousness to human or animal bodies is thought to consist primarily in their being in the places where these bodies are. However, he further takes it to be a common sense belief that acts of consciousness are attached to bodies in the sense that they have a causal relation to them. Among material objects, this applies only to organisms and not to everything. The great majority of material objects are not thought to have any acts of consciousness attached to them, into whatever class they fall; they are regarded as things of which we can at times be conscious. Besides that they are thought to exist independently without our being conscious of them.

Material objects and acts of consciousness, along with space and time, as Moore states to be entities of some sort but not substantial things in the way that material objects and acts of consciousness are, constitute the only kinds of things, the existence of which, in Moore's opinion, common-sense takes it to be certain.

Another important feature of the common-sense view of the world, in Moore's version of it, is the belief that we not only know that material objects and acts of consciousness exist, but also know a great many facts about them. Among the facts of this sort, which he claims
to know for certain, were the facts that he has a body which exists for some time, that during that time it has continually been in contact with, or not far from, the surface of the earth, etc. and that he has experiences, remembers facts, dreams and imagines things which he has not taken to be real, besides that many other human beings have similar experiences.

Since Moore offers no argument in favour of the proposition that there are acts of consciousness, he presumably takes it to be self-evident. Had he thought it necessary he might have advanced the argument. If one doubts whether there are acts of consciousness, it follows that there are, since doubting is itself such an act. It is, however, seen that this argument itself rests on an assumption of an act of consciousness, namely the occurrence of the doubt.

The arguments which Moore advances in support of the common-sense view concerning material objects are directed against the philosophers who reject it, whether they believe that material objects are real or not. The facts of their existence are not something that we can know for certain. His method of refuting philosophers who deny the existence of material objects is to point out the absurdity of what this denial entails, including the proposition that they themselves do not exist. Besides
this, he even thinks that he has a stronger argument against philosophers who take what appears to be a moderate view that we cannot know that material objects exist, since he maintains that this position is self-contradictory. The ground for this is that in saying, we cannot know the existence of material objects, these philosophers imply that they know the existence of other human beings besides themselves, who have bodies, and are material objects. But if it is assumed from the beginning that persons have bodies, then a philosopher's knowledge of his own existence would be sufficient to prove that there is at least one material object. And if, like Descartes, one believes that it is logically possible for minds to exist independently of bodies, then the assumption that there are other persons who need not believe the existence of material objects for one while still believing that those persons exist only as minds. Moreover, the philosophers who say that we cannot know that such an such, is indeed, indicating that they believe there to be other persons, but can still consistently deny that this belief amounts to knowledge. They can make this, by saying that they cannot know whatever is in question, and that if there are persons, besides themselves, they cannot know it either. Therefore this argument of Moore's is not decisive at all.

On the other hand, Moore has no argument to give
beyond the simple assertion that he really does know what he claims to know. When Moore gives a paradigm of the existence of two hands, he accepts the inability of proving the premises, and what he means that he cannot demonstrate them, he cannot give a list of propositions from which it follows that they are true; this is not to say that Moore has no evidence for them. He did have an evidence, which is given in one case by sense perception and in other case by memory, and in saying he knows that the proposition in question is true he is implying that in the circumstances this evidence is sufficient. But if these are the assumptions that he is making, they sustain the argument which has far-reaching consequences. As applied to the Defence of Common Sense, the argument is that sentences, like 'This is a hand' are used in such a way that our having such sensory experiences as Moore is to be establishing the truth of the proposition which they express. There is a possibility of error, but that is only a verbal error, for to doubt or deny that there is a table in front of me when I can see and touch it, in what we call our normal conditions, is to be ignorant or to pretend to be ignorant of what 'perceiving a table' means.

Moore has failed to point out adequately the distinction between knowing the truth of a proposition and knowing its analysis, which requires much attention. In his Defence of Common Sense, Moore makes the assumption
that one could conclusively establish the truth of a proposition like 'Here is a hand' without at all knowing how it should be analysed. But if one does not know how the proposition is to be analysed, how does one know what proposition it is that one has discovered to be true? The regular answer to this objection is that we must distinguish between knowing the analysis of a proposition and knowing its meaning. A sentence like 'Here is a hand' has, in the context in which Moore used it in ordinary sense which any common man would understand. It is sufficient to take it in this sense in order to determine whether the proposition which it expresses is true. The question how to analyse this proposition comes later. But if analysis consists in the redescription of the circumstances which justify us in accepting the proposition which is being analysed, then we cannot exclude the possibility of its showing that the way in which we have constructed our sentence, if we are to be justified in accepting the proposition which they express, is not the way in which they are ordinarily understood. Thus this turns out to be an another question whether anything is capable of existing unperceived? When Moore answers, that his hands exist, he is saying something that he has the right to consider it as true, and this amounts to very little until we can determine what this something is. If the sceptics are right and their arguments have some life in them, then it may be no more
than that what Moore is having certain sensations, perhaps even no more than that certain sensations were occurring.

The procedure which Moore follows is that of trying to show that a concept undoubtedly has application by pointing to an instance in which it is exemplified. So in that way, it becomes a paradigm argument, and on that basis sceptics are ruled out. The argument fails not only because the fact that an expression is used successfully leaves room for considerable disagreement as to what it could legitimately refer to — whether size, shape, colour, etc., but the expression in use could also be taken with theories which are unacceptable.

Taking the above points, still one could make a dispute with Moore that his use of 'Common Sense' is not in agreement with refuting philosophical issues.

The word 'Common Sense' as Moore uses has an unusual sense. Gilbert Ryle has rightly drawn attention to the fact that 'Common Sense' is ordinarily taken to stand for a particular kind and degree of untutored judiciousness in coping with slightly out-of-the-way practical contingencies. To make common sense, therefore, a partisan in philosophical disputes would appear monstrous to a common-sense itself. For, 'Common Sense' in its ordinary unphilosophical use, does not stand for a set of beliefs or a set of propositions like those listed by G.E. Moore. A man who possesses
common sense does believe in many or even all of those propositions but so does, those who lack common sense. Moore, therefore, when he takes upon himself, as one of his philosophical jobs, the task of defending common sense in the sense of defending a set of propositions in which he, along with most of us believes, must be using the word 'Common-Sense' in a somewhat technical sense.

Some could say that it is the beliefs of the plain man, uninstructed in philosophy, which Moore might be defending, but as has been seen from his writings, this is not his intention. For Moore certainly does not believe in all that the layman believes to be true. And he seeks to defend the truth only of some of the beliefs.

What Moore seems to be defending is the belief in certain propositions as in proving certain beliefs of philosophy to be false. Many philosophers have believed in such propositions as 'Time is unreal', 'Matter is unreal' etc. Moore's purposes is to show that these propositions contradict the beliefs of common sense, but the truth of the proposition 'Time is real'. The belief that 'matter is unreal', contradicts the belief that 'matter is real'. Since it is understood that what a person rejects throws light upon what he, at the same time, believes is implied what he believes; so we can assume that Moore seeks to defend the beliefs, 'Matter is real', 'Time is real', etc.
but what is the nature of such beliefs? can we say that these beliefs are the beliefs of ordinary people untrained in philosophy? A ordinary layman, unless he is also a philosopher, does not consider such propositions as 'Time is real', or 'Matter is real'. Defending the truth of these propositions may therefore be taken as amounting to defending a certain philosophical theory and not what an ordinary man believes in.

Seeing the other alternatives, one could suggest that though an ordinary man does not explicitly formulate his beliefs by saying 'Matter is real' or 'Time is real', yet the other propositions, which he believes to be true certainly imply the truth of the proposition 'Matter is real'. Like "here exists at present my right hand which I am raising", his belief in this proposition implies belief in the reality of matter, time and space and, therefore, contradicts the philosophical beliefs in the unreality of matter, time and space. The contradiction which Prof. Moore finds out is not between the said philosophical beliefs and certain beliefs of common sense, but between the philosophical beliefs and certain other beliefs implies by the beliefs of common sense. That the said philosophical beliefs are not necessarily incompatible with the truth of the propositions in which common sense believes is admitted by Moore, but he also says that the philosophical propositions may be understood in such a way that they contradict the
common-sense beliefs. In other words, although the propositions, 'Matter is unreal', is not incompatible with the proposition; 'There is a human hand here'; the former proposition may be so understood that belief in it amounts to believing that the latter proposition is false. It seems that in stressing this latter possibility is to say that the possibility of the said philosophical beliefs may contradict the said beliefs of common sense, Moore is on the wrong side.

For he says philosophical beliefs do not contradict the common-sense beliefs, they contradict only certain other beliefs which are associated with these common-sense beliefs. The associated beliefs are also philosophical beliefs: so the conflict is between two sets of philosophical beliefs. The philosophical proposition, 'Matter is not real', contradicts the proposition 'Matter is real', only when the latter proposition is a philosophical proposition, but in that case the proposition 'Matter is real' is not an implicate of the common-sense beliefs and, therefore, there is no contradiction between these beliefs and the philosophical proposition 'Matter is real'. On the other hand, if the proposition 'Matter is real' is taken to be an implicate of common-sense beliefs, it would not be a philosophical proposition, but would be reduced to a mere proposition about physical objects in which we ordinarily believe, so in that case it would not be a contradiction
of philosophical beliefs that matter is unreal, and no
contradiction could exist between the philosophical beliefs
that 'matter is unreal' and the common-sense beliefs;
therefore it follows that in no case does the philosophical
proposition, 'Matter is unreal', contradict the common
sense proposition like 'Here is a human hand'. Moore's
defence is therefore uncalled for.

Nor would it help to insist that what G.E. Moore is
doing is to defend not beliefs but ordinary use of words,
for neither the two propositions 'Matter is real' and
'Matter is unreal' make an ordinary use of the word real.
Both make philosophical uses. Doubt which Moore aims at
dispelling by asserting 'I know for certain this is a human
hand' is a philosophical doubt and that his use of 'know'
in this context is not an ordinary use. In his eagerness
to defend common sense, Moore ends up by distorting it.
There is no question of the same proposition being true
from the common-sense point of view and false from the
philosophical point of view. We cannot imagine the common-
sense saying 'Time is real' for the assertion 'Time is
real'. It is made only when the doubt, 'Is time real'
is dispelled and to me common sense is never given this
doubt. Common sense may be doubted, when in given
circumstances it is asked, 'Is this a real tree?' and this
doubt could be cleared by making a distinction between
the real tree and the painted tree.
As we have noted, Moore confines himself to a discussion of cases in which what we perceive are familiar molar objects, typical of the objects which he mentions are his own body, an envelope, a coin, a door, an inkstand, a sofa, a tree, etc. Furthermore, he did not apparently regard it as necessary to discuss what specific qualities such objects possessed; for the purpose of refuting idealism, he merely examines the meanings of general assertions which idealists had made. As a consequence of this mode of argumentation, problems such as those concerning illusions or the distinction between the so-called primary and secondary qualities of objects did not play a significant role in his epistemology. Whatever may be the advantages of this mode of argumentation, it has the overwhelming disadvantage of failing to make clear the scope of what it actually establishes. Even if Moore's method could establish the independent existence of a particular object, such as an inkstand, it does not follow from any of Moore's arguments that the perceived characteristics of that object are characteristics which exist in it independently of its relations to us as precipients, and independently of its relations to other things. For example, as Berkely, insists, no epistemological idealist need deny our common-sense descriptions of objects, an idealist, no less than a realist, may speak of a particular inkstand as being
made of transparent glass which is slightly greenish in
tinge, as smooth to the touch, as capable of holding ink,
etc. Therefore our ability to give such description
does not in the least settle the question of what properties,
if any, exist in this particular object independently of
its relations to other objects in the physical environment,
or independently of its relations to us. It is when
questions of this last type are raised that problems
concerning idealism, phenomenalism and realism inevitably
arise; and it is here that we find a lack of specificity
in Moore's position. Having sought to disprove the
statements made by some epistemological idealists, he
fails to examine in any detail what the position of common
sense, upon which he relies, is itself willing to affirm.
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that he
sees no problem with respect to whether such affirmations
are warranted, nor that he fails to examine how, if at
all, they are to be reconciled with the description of
material objects which physical scientists give.

In the second place, we may note that Moore's mode
of argumentation overlooks the fact that it is by no means
easy to specify what it means to say of anything that
it is "a material object". This being so, his failure
to speak of the specific qualities of the kinds of objects
with which he is concerned makes it difficult to know
how far Moore's arguments are to be extended, and whether
they can prove the existence of entities which differ widely from those which he names. For example, we may ask whether those arguments would apply in precisely the same ways, and with equal force, to the existence of rainbows as material objects, and whether they would serve to establish what we perceive when we see a flash of lightning is something which does, in fact, exist in the sky as we perceive it. Such questions are not raised by Moore. As a consequence, the small list of tenets, which he attributes to common sense, fails to provide us with any adequate clues as to what general sorts of entities or events are regarded by him as existing independently of our perception of them. Had Moore been more specific, difficulties might have arisen, nonetheless, the implications of his position would have been clearer and one would not then have been reduced to discussing merely those sorts of familiar, middle-sized, rather ordinary objects which he generally chose to discuss.

It may be noted that, if Moore had the slightest interest in the results of scientific inquiry he could not have used his method of simple pointing to designate what it means to say of an object that it is a material object and to prove that it exists independently of our perception of it. Actually, one looks in vain among Moore's writings for discussions of, say molecular motions or of the existence of electrons, and one is at a loss
to see how he would have been able either to solve or to
dissolve the problems which other philosophers have raised
concerning the legitimacy of regarding such objects or
events as characteristic of the nature of the physical
world. Under these circumstances, Moore's Realism avoids
some of the traditional problems of epistemology at the
cost of having nothing explicit to say concerning how we
are to interpret what physical scientists have been able
to discover about the nature of the physical world.

One of the weaknesses of Moore is to leave most
of the questions unsettled; he leaves the disputed questions
for his readers to decide. To take one of the instance,
the relationship between the material objects and the sense
data, Moore was not much clear as to whether the relationship
between the sense data and the material object was that
of identity, or that the sense data were the part of the
surfaces of the material object, or the relationship was
that of representation.

We see, that if Moore had seen the question in a
different way, it would have become 'What does one see?'
This single question could have been answered in two
different ways: first, one identifies what one sees and
the other describes; the identification answer is given
in terms of material objects and the descriptive answer
in terms of sense data. Or, in other words, one could
say the dispute between this question is only about the priority of immediacy and the privacy of seeing, i.e. *what do we immediately apprehend?* i.e. we see things as they are presented to us, and then we try to tie up these immediate experiences into a descriptive form. So in that way, one could also solve the problem of the incompatible or contradictory qualities which seem to be there in a single object, for it depends upon the individual percipient what he intends to see, for seeing a thing from one point would offer a different description if seen from the other point.

Moore has been one of the greatest philosophers of the British tradition to give us an analytical method for approaching philosophical problems. His method of analysis has been quite successfully used in finding out the contradictions and thereby making explicit what is implicitly contained in the concept itself.

Moore, while criticizing a denotative theory of meaning, unwittingly falls into its traps, when he points out that the tensed words and personal pronouns, can mean different things at different times, but he ought to have seen that he is telling us that meaning is nothing apart from seeing the relationship of the uses of the different words.

With regard to Moore's discussion on knowledge
and perception, we come to the conclusion that 'To know' is not an achievement term regarding entities such as 'knowing that' alone. Here are other paradigms that expressions, 'To know' might refer to. We have seen that the verb 'to know' stands for a different meaning in a perceptual judgement, where we pass a judgement on seeing what is the case, and second, in 'sense' where we see as it is directly given to us, and the inferences which are derived from perceptual judgements, like 'two hands exist' i.e. where we draw the conclusion from the premises and know that the conclusion follows from the premises, and this last use of 'know' is different from the earlier two. Moore would have done well to explicitly drawn the distinction between knowledge based on immediate sense content, and knowing other 'beliefs' as are constructed from them logically either as (i) derivable or (ii) equivalent to them and (iii) their logical presuppositions. Had he done so, he would have been less perplexed about the logical use of 'to know'.

Moore's awkwardness of analysis is very largely due to his desire to ride the two horses (a) the phenomenalistic immediacy of self validating 'protocols contents', as well as assimilating these after taking them off from their phenomenal background into public descriptive system of common objects of everyday world, and to decline to distinguish their varied modes of being.
Last, coming down to the question of language and perception, we find that his theory of perception is based upon his philosophy of language, for the questions which are raised in the area of philosophical psychology are, as to what one knows when one knows that this is a hand, how do we relate what we see and what is there in the external world? How are we to account for the beliefs about the external world and how these beliefs account for the certainty of having a kind of knowledge? What is the analysis of the concept of knowledge itself? All these questions are raised in the philosophy of language and since we see, we pass a judgement which is nothing but putting the whole issue in a verbal form, for the dispute is not on matters of fact, but on how best we can describe a situation. Thus language ultimately helps us to do so. And Moore has been very successful in at least analysing the different concepts, which are used in the problem of perception.