CHAPTER VII

CONCEPT OF ANALYSIS
It is very necessary, as in other fields of philosophical enquiry, that in analytical philosophy, one should ask for linguistic and logical verification and refinement in conceptual usage. It is well known that philosophical analysis in recent years has played a major role in making one's understanding clearer. Since B. Russell wrote his most famous essay, "Logical atomism" and G.E. Moore 'In Defence of Common sense', the impetus for reconstruction of philosophical language and also of ordinary language has been quite noticeable in contemporary thought. One not only reflects on the problems, keeping in view the past enquiries into it, but also intends that the analysis of the linguistic structure in which the problem is expressed would further help one to pursue knowledge.

Thus a philosopher analyses a language not to formulate a new methodology, but only to attempt to make philosophical problems clearer and precise, as Wittgenstein writes, "... Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts".¹ Complexities of everyday speech lead to complexities in the decision-making process which could

¹L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.111.
be removed by the clarification of the common-sense language, though Hall admits that any such clarification involves arbitrary decision. So he writes, "some distinctions that are ultimate for everyday speech must set aside as mere complexes of more fundamental elements in an idealized and philosophical language."  

The analytical approach is not simple and uniform; it has several species and objections against one kind which cannot be applied ipso facto against others. Before proceeding further, it is better to clarify the concept of 'analysis'. For any examination of Moore's philosophical position will not lead his readers to any conclusions because this notion plays a decisive role in determining the character of his views.

It is commonly agreed and known to be quite certain that in Analysis one starts from a given statement and reaches another statement, but the question which is mostly asked is, what exactly one analyses? Whether a statement from which one starts, or a proposition expressed by it, or the fact that is stated by it; or the statement one reaches, or the proposition expressed by it, or the fact that will be stated by it? All these questions are not simple to answer.

---

When analysing a certain statement to discover what it means, a moment's reflection will show that analysis cannot take place unless one already knows what one means by a statement. This will rather mean that one is searching for the real meaning. Real in the sense as to what is actually meant by a certain proposition or a statement. There are various ways in which one makes the other person understand what is really being conveyed, either by translating a particular statement into a foreign language, or by making it more precise, exact and clear of by defining the boundaries of the words and terms that are used in it. Analysis is not a translation from one language into another, but a translation within a language, to be more exact. Analysis is more than a mere translation, for in 'analysis' one tries to state the second statement more clearly, whereas in the translation, the two statements say the same thing, in different languages.

Thus in a wider sense 'analysis' is merely a tool for seeking clarification of propositions, terms, concepts and not for discovering, new facts. As already mentioned, Wittgenstein says, The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. But what do we mean by clarification? Uncertainty can be due to ambiguity, vagueness or confusion. Analysis does not remove ambiguity, for the term ambiguity itself is obscure. Ramsey correctly points out that, "Philosophy should clarify and distinguish notions"
previously vague and confused. Vagueness can be due to indefiniteness or lack of precision, or talking in a more general rather than in a specific way. Vagueness thus is that one does not know under what category or genus a certain class or its members fall, i.e. a person uses the word 'red' vaguely, when he is not sure into what class red should fall. Confusion is the other way round of vagueness, where one knows the definition of a colour word, but mixes up with the other notions. W.H.F. Barnes is of the opinion, that vagueness and confusion could be avoided by complete knowledge of the language. The purpose of analysis is to clarify and avoid the vagueness and confusion inherent in the language itself. It is not concerned with the misused or incorrect language of a particular individual nor does it mean the drawing up of new and better classification by arbitrarily defining terms.

Whereas on the other hand, some philosophers maintain, that it is not part of the views of practising philosophical analysis, that language suffers from an intrinsic inadequacy. As the works of Moore bear witness, it is unquestioned that language, even an ordinary discourse,

---


4 Ibid., p. 85.
is always capable of satisfactory emendation. It is usually supposed, that analysis yields an expression which is clearer than the original, and if it does so, it gives a positive and practical satisfaction unmixed by the hopeless dissatisfaction residing in philosophic complaints. It is when analysis is claimed at least to abolish vagueness\(^5\) that one wonders whether this means is being used to ally an ordinary or a pseudo dissatisfaction. I.M. Copilowish maintains that, "any border line case may be resolved by means of an analysis and definition of the term.\(^6\) He at the same time casts doubt on the possibility of fulfilling the promise of giving a clear definition. He admits that since the terms of definiens are vague, the definiens must likewise be vague, so that one hope of diminishing vagueness in the definiendum lies in repeated analysis. However, "We cannot assume an attainable limit to this process, even though we tend towards absolute precision as a limit.... This is perhaps not even theoretically possible.\(^7\) If it is not even theoretically possible to reach a goal, it is even difficult to see what it means to say, that one


\(^6\) *Ibid.*, p. 188.

approaches it, or for that matter, even that a goal exists. The process of removing vagueness, if conceived as a process of approaching what is not theoretically attainable is therefore no process of removing vagueness.

Though analysis of a general term or idea or a definition has some merits, yet one cannot say that it is the removal of vagueness, or even the diminution of it. If an analysis is correct and if the definiendum is vague, it is difficult to know how the definiens can be any the less vague; for example the definition of 'animal' as any member of the group of living beings, having sensation and voluntary motion still leave one undecided in certain cases whether a thing is an animal or a plant, yet it is not to deny the utility of analysis, which at least helps one to see that the concept itself is vague and complex. The criterion for the application of a word in these cases has not been analytically derived, it has been merely added and the analysis does not yield anything. The only thing that analysis seems capable of doing is to make one's knowledge of the meanings of the words non-vague, but still this could be done only if the words themselves were clear or non-vague to begin with. If the application of a word is truly vague, the close inspection of it in an 'analysis' would only reveal its vagueness and would not remove or dissolve it. Thus the purpose of analysis is not to remove or dissolve vagueness and confusion, but to state the
complex character of the concept.

Likewise, A.C. Ewing points out another difficulty, a certain vagueness about common-sense propositions, so that it could seem to follow that no definite or ultimate analysis could ever be exactly right. A correct analysis of something indefinite cannot itself be definite. "A male parent" is a correct analysis of "A is a father" but then it is not an ultimate analysis. To make it ultimate, one ought to analyse the conception of human beings or at least a living being. 

G.E. Moore maintains that one knows common-sense propositions, and that the business of a philosopher is not to criticize or justify its truth or falsity but to analyse them. Moore, in his writings calls the original proposition or concept, the 'analysandum', and the proposition or concept reached at the conclusion of a process of correct analysis, the 'analysans', he further maintains, analysandum and analysans are in a very important sense the same proposition or concept and reaffirms this in his Reply to my critics, wherein he writes that "any expression which expresses the analysandum must be synonymous with any expression which expresses the analysans." Moore further

---

8 A.C. Ewing, 'Philosophical Studies', Essay in Memory of Susan Stebbing, Philosophical Analysis, pp. 67-84.
states that for it to be a case of analysis, it must be impossible for anyone either to know or to verify that the analysandum applies to an object without knowing that the analysans applies to it. By "analysing a proposition" Moore means making clear the proposition itself and not giving another proposition in some way connected with the first. He admits his drawback in not knowing clearly what is meant by saying 'x is a brother' is identical with 'x is a male sibling' and that even in cases of a straightforward analysis like this, there is a sense in which the two expressions are not quite synonymous. So the notion of 'analysis' itself obviously requires further clarification.

'Analysis' states a form of a definition, not of words, but of concepts or propositions as Moore states. He mentions that if one starts with a particular proposition or a concept, the analysandum, and attempts to provide another set of concepts or propositions — the analysans — which is logically equivalent to the original concept or proposition. Apart from some fragmentary notes of a course of lectures which Moore gave in 1933-34, the only published statement of his views on the question is to be found in his short reply to Langford's essays on 'The Notion of Analysis'.

*The terminology is borrowed from Langford's 'The Notion of Analysis' ed. P.A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, p. 323.
Though Moore was engaged in the analysis most of his life, he professed not to know clearly what he meant by the term.\textsuperscript{11} Regarding one point in his practice, he was clear and firm that his job is not to deal with words. One never finds him talking, in the manner of later Positivists, about philosophy as the analysis of sentences. \textit{"When I have talked of analysing anything, what I have talked of analysing has always been an idea or concept or proposition and not a verbal expression..."}\textsuperscript{12} A sentence to Moore is a string of words or sounds, or marks on paper, the proposition they express can be expressed equally well by a string of marks or sounds in some other language, and such strings are of no interest to the philosophers. The analysis of a sentence, he says, consist of resolving it into its constituents, i.e. words and letters, and Moore feels that philosopher can find more profitable things to do than merely analysing the grammatical sentence, for he writes, \textit{"verbal questions are properly left to the writers of dictionaries and other..."}


\textsuperscript{11}(ed.) P.A. Schillp, \textit{The Philosophy of G.E. Moore}, p. 661.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 661.
persons interested in literature, philosophy, as we shall see, has no concern with them.\(^{13}\) It is the thought expressed through language alone interests Moore, and if in any case he attends as closely as he attends to words is to see how the words are used with a different meaning in different sentences.

A.C. Ewing stresses the two senses of "know the meaning of" in the common-sense statements; first ordinary sense and second, in a sense of philosophical analysis, but goes on to add that so far nobody has satisfactorily differentiated these two. The ordinary sense of the term 'know the meaning of' is if a person understands and acts accordingly, the second, philosophical sense is when a person knows that 'to know the meaning of' is to understand what proposition is being expressed. Moore agrees with Ewing in saying that "(a) In one use 'know the meaning of' = "understand". And it seems I can understand words I use in the same sense in which I understand those used by others. And it is not by introspection I do this. Using them with a meaning is sufficient for understanding in this sense'. "(b) It can happen that I give an order, and when a person does something say "yes; that's what I meant." Here I am saying of something which I see that it

\(^{13}\)G.E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 2.
was meant by words that I used'. But this is not the question which Moore takes account of. If by mistake one uses a wrong word and later corrects it by saying "That wasn't what I meant: how does one finds this out. To Moore, 'it seems to be a case of using words in an unusual sense and therefore understanding them in an unusual sense. But it is not by introspection that I know that a certain use of words is unusual'. But understanding of the rules do not imply or hold any relation between them and something else which is, what one means by them, 'they are not "given" in the same sense in which the words are'.

The expression 'the meaning of the term' is not taken to denote objects and this is brought out by the fact that the expression, 'the literal use of a term' substitutes without any serious distortion of it. This is not to say that the two expressions are exactly similar, but the fact that in a large number of cases one can be used in place of the other shows the that 'meaning of a word', is not to name an entity, as is clearly brought forward by a last chapter it removes an intellectual illusion, that 'analysis' consists in resolving an object into its components, or by looking into their interior. The expression 'the use of a term', like 'the use of pen',

---

denotes an activity, actual or dispositional, and there is nothing so surprising that attaches to the idea of analysing an activity. Thus one can say analysing the use of an expression, say x, comes to nothing more than stating the rules for the use of X, and it does not imply anything else. It consists in stating explicitly the features by virtue of which X is applied to a situation. Therefore the analysis of the use of the term 'brother' informs one that the word applies to X's that are male and are siblings.

But here one might keep in mind that the 'concept of rules' also strengthens the diversity of meaning or 'uses', for instance, similar words belonging to the same part of speech, say adjectives, e.g. 'moral' and 'blue', both have rules that specify the correct use, but the fact does not entail any common object or 'resemblance' in the situation as compared with their correct use.

Moore lays down five conditions which he thinks that any analysis of a concept has to satisfy, if it is to be accepted. First, that, "nobody can know that the analysandum applies to an object without knowing, that the analysans applies to it", second, that, "nobody can verify that the analysandum applies without verifying that the analysans applies". Third, that "any expression which expresses the analysandum must be synonymous with an
expression which expresses the analysans. Fourth, that, "The expression used for the analysans must explicitly mention concepts which are not explicitly mentioned by the expression used for analysandum" and last, that the expression used for analysans should mention the way in which the concepts which it mentions are combined in the analysandum.

All these conditions given by Moore are not easy to follow, but requires further clarification. The first according to A.J. Ayer, seems to be inconsistent with Moore's own assumption which appears in his "Defence of common sense" that one can know that the proposition which is expressed by such and such a sentence is true without knowing what is its correct analysis, then trying to find out the correct analyses will not raise any problems, for then one would be knowing beforehand whether it is satisfied or not. This is taken note of only after the analysis has been found, but still then it is open to certain questions. One can come to the correct analysis merely by guess work, or still can have a doubt about it, and then how can one know that the analysans and analysandum have the same extension, but still one knows that they have the same

---


extension. But here Ayer has failed to realise that analysans can be arrived at only when it is achieved by analysandum. Knowing an analysans is different from knowing the analysandum and Ayer has misunderstood, for the two know have a different meaning. Knowing the analysans presupposes analysandum, but analysandum does not presuppose analysans.

If in the process of analysis, the analysandum with which one starts and the analysans with which one ends are really one and the same propositions, how can the process produce anything more than a tautology? Again, if there are different propositions, must not the analysis be incorrect, for one has then not analysed the proposition of which one intends to give an analysis? Even if it is maintained that what the analysis does is simply to make

clear what one already knows obscurely, even then, the difficulty arises, that 'X is y' known obscurely is either not a proposition at all, or a different proposition from 'X is y' known clearly, and in either case the view of the process as an analysis of common-sense proposition breaks down. This is quite different from what the ordinary man means by the common-sense statements of the meaning of which the philosopher claims to be giving analysis. But if one were to judge by some of the instances of analysis given by 'the defenders of common sense, then one finds that common sense benefits much more from his opponents, rather than from those who are its votaries. Example:

"I assert a common-sense proposition, like P, and the philosopher says "P is q + r'. But, even though if 'P' and 'q + r' are identical as objective facts, the presupposition of the whole procedure is, that I can assert P without asserting q + r. Otherwise, the analysis would have been already achieved before the philosophers starts on it. The analysis is a problem about which disputes are possible and is due to the fact that they may apprehend or think of something as a whole without apprehending its elements as such."  

Further Ewings maintains that if the common-sense propositions which one asserts is P, and if one asserts it without being aware of the constituents which are included in the concepts in P, it would be difficult to see, how the analysans q + r could ever be the same

---

18 A.C. Ewing, Philosophical Analysis, pp. 6-9.
proposition as the analysandum P. For the analysans include something more than P, i.e. p is q + r. The difficult which Ewing suggests is that if a man believes p, but does not accept the offered analysis, i.e. denies the truth q + r, how can 'p and q + r' possibly be the same, if a person ever, mistakenly, asserts p and denies q + r, or if a person believes p but does not believe q + r?

What Ewing has suggested above and his objections are in a way failing to respect the demarcation that separates what propositions says; and what it implies, for example, one says p is '7 + 5 = 12', then one also implies but does not say 'P' is 7 + 5 = 3 x 4 and then to recognize P = P cannot be exclusively a part of 'P'.

Max Black, not noting the ambiguity, attacks on Moore when he writes:

"... attention to what Moore says brings formidable difficulties to light. Consider, for instance, what is said about the proposition, P, say expressed by the words "This is a hand", when uttered in the appropriate circumstances. Moore thinks there are "three, and only three alternative types of answers possible". Let us suppose that three different propositions A_1, A_2 and A_3, are offered as possible analyses of P. Now if one of them is the correct analysis of P, it must, according to Moore, be identically the same proposition as P. So we must have either P = A_1, or P = A_2, or P = A_3, (where "=" means identically the same as). Since we know P to be certainly true, we must, therefore, know either A_1 or A_2 or A_3 to be certainly true. How is it, then, that Moore can say that none of the possible analysis of P "comes anywhere near being certainly true"
without at once using this as a conclusive ground for rejecting all of them?"19

G. Greig, says that:

"... there seems to be one and only one way for Moore to escape Black's criticism — to avoid the more serious charge of inconsistency he must plead guilty to equivocating on the word 'analysis'. Construing 'analysis' as other than 'analysans', he must claim that he may know P (to be true) and know A1 (to be true) while not knowing the truth of the analysis P = A1."20

Black implies that to speak of A1 as the analysis of P gives P = A. Black further maintains that, if one forgets how 'P = A1' is introduced, then one can easily be mistaken that 'P = A1' expresses the claim that P and A1 are one and the same proposition. To say P = A1 is not to say that P and A1 are the same proposition, but to say that further conditions are fulfilled such that A1 can correctly be taken to analyse P i.e. one may know the analysandum P and the analysans A1 to be true without thereby knowing that the analysis P = A1 is true. According to his own criteria that 'nobody can know that the analysandum applies to an object without knowing that the analysans applies to it. Moore knows that P and A1, and knows P = A1 as his statement of analysis, that if he knows P then he knows A1, without


knowing that \( P = A_1 \). 'It is true that Q' (R); Moore says that we could consistently affirm the sets: 'He knows Q', knows R, and knows R if he knows Q, and denies 'he knows Q = R'. Moore would deny 'he knows Q = R' because no one could know that Q = R, because Q = R is false to him.

Moore agrees that, as described, \( P \) is known to be true, and the statement \( P = A_1 \) is the statement of analysis, then \( A_1 \) must also be known to be true. He says that a correct analysis must be identically the same proposition known to be certainly true, the reverse of it, that is, any proposition not known to be certainly true must be rejected as there is no place for doubt, either one knows it or not. Moore claims that if \( A_1 \) is inconsistent with \( P \), and \( P \) is certainly true then there is sufficient reason for rejecting the analysis \( P = A_1 \). Gordon Greig writes that:

"Moore's original claim and the revised claim suggested by Black's interpretation involve parallel paraphrases of Moore's procedures. The first (Black's) goes: 'A is known' is not true, while 'P is known' is, therefore, 'not \(- (P = A_1)\)''. The second goes: 'Not - P' follows from 'P = A_1' but 'P', therefore, 'Not - (P = A_1)'. In neither case does it follow that \( A_1 \) (Black's unique candidate for 'analysis' status) is false, merely that \( P = A_1 \) is false, that is \( A_1 \) does not analyse \( P \); \( A_1 \) may well be true and not an analysis of \( P \) - it may for example be a partial analysis."

What seems to follow from the above discussion is that, 'A is known' follows from the conjunction 'P is known' and 'P = A_1 is known. 'A_1 is known' is not true while 'P is known' is, so P = A_1 is not known and is compatible both with 'A_1' is true and 'P = A_1' is true. Moore says that no analysis 'comes anywhere near to being certainly true'. The above analysis would have proved to be false had Moore claimed that a statement of analysis, if true, must be known to be true.

But here, if one goes back to Moore's fourth condition, where he maintains that, "the expression used for the analysans must explicitly mention concepts which are not explicitly mentioned by the expression used for analysandum", here now after analysing the concepts, if one tries to bring to the notice of others that ultimately the concept includes these constituents, though previously of which he was unaware. Making explicit what is implicit in a concept is nothing more than describing features, the presence of which makes it correct to apply a term to an object or use it in a given context. It consists in stating rules which, without conscious awareness for the most part, determine our use of an expression. The feeling that analysis teaches something new in a way can be partly justified, for it makes one conscious of the criterion which normally one uses unconsciously. When Moore distinguishes between the
meaning of a word, and the analysis of its meaning, and maintains quite rightly that one can know the former without knowing the latter, here Moore simply stresses the application or the understanding of the use of the term, without being consciously aware of the criterion which determines its use.

*Of course, a man may be using a sentence perfectly correctly, even when what he means by it is false, either because he is lying or because he is making a mistake; and, similarly, a man may be using a sentence in such a way that what he means by it is true, even when he is not using it correctly, even when what he means by it is false, either because he is lying or because he is making a mistake, and similarly, a man may be using a sentence in such a way that what he means by it is true, even when he is not using it correctly, as, for instance; when he uses the wrong word for what he means, by a slip or because he has made a mistake as to what the correct usage is. Thus using a sentence correctly — in the sense explained — and using it in such a way that what you mean by it is true are two things which are completely logically independent of one another either may occur without the other.*

Here Moore makes a contrast between the analysis either of a verbal expression or sentence, or alternatively, of a concept or a proposition,

*Central to Moore’s view of analysis is his careful and important distinction between questions about the meaning of an expression and questions about the analysis of that meaning, between a definition of an expression

and a definition of a concept or proposition, between a philological and philosophical interest in language.②³

But the corresponding activities of 'giving an analysis' are utterly different. There is a correct use, or more strictly, a not incorrect use of the word 'analysis' according to which one can speak of the verbal expressions; and there is another quite distinct use of 'analysis' according to which one can speak of the analysis of a concept. Moore makes it unambiguously clear what he means by the analysis of a verbal expression —

"To take an example from Mr. Langford: consider the verbal expression "x is a small y" I should say that you could quite properly be said to be analysing this expression if you said to it. "It contains the letter 'x', the word 'is', the word 'a', the word 'small', and the letter 'y'." It seems to me that nothing but making such statements as this could properly be called "giving an analysis of a verbal expression". And I, when I talk of "giving an analysis" have never meant anything at all like this.②⁴

Moore, therefore, is making the following claims (1) that one may speak, not incorrectly of giving an analysis either of a concept or proposition or of a word or verbal expression, (2) that the activity of giving such analysis is distinct, (3) that he is concerned solely with


②⁴ Ibid., p. 661.
the former, i.e. the analysis of a concept; and (4) it is a definite mistake to say that to give a philosophical analysis is to give an analysis of a verbal expression.

What one can readily say about conceptual analysis is that it brings out as per the individual analyst's judgement the simplest and the most articulate representation of the content of the notion which underlies commonly used concept or the unanalysed analysandum (in the terminology of Moore) that the analytical philosopher may be philosophizing about, at that given time.

Though Moore suggests that a usage of a term is known without one being aware what rule a criterion is applied, but his way of putting things sometimes gives rise to misunderstandings that knowing the analysis of the meaning of a word comes to something more than knowing explicitly the criterion for its use, his writings sometimes suggest that some hidden facts about things are revealed, rather than revealing only the linguistic facts. If analysing the meaning of a certain expression is nothing more than analysing its use, the analysis cannot be other than being simply a clarification.

Whereas to some philosophers, analysis does more than merely clarifying, they are in a way wrong, for the objection can be raised that analysing a concept is not the same as explicating the use of a word, for it is a
process which uses words to help them to reveal the implicit constituents and is not about the words. One cannot analyse the use of an expression without bringing into analysis an expression which has that use, but one can analyse the meaning of an expression without bringing in the expression into the analysis. According to some philosophers,

"... you could, conceivably, analyse the concept without using any word which names the concept. The correct result of an analysis is an a priori true proposition and an a priori proposition is not verbal."²⁵

A priori propositions are known to be true in themselves i.e. they do not require any empirical verification, but some a priori propositions are synthetic i.e. they are not like analytical propositions, whose predicate is already contained in the subject, rather, the synthetic a priori propositions are those whose predicates tell us something new, in addition to what the subject tells us about the kind of phenomenon referred to. So it becomes possible for analysis to go beyond a given concept to new concepts, to which it is connected by a logical necessity, whereas its denial gives rise to a logical impossibility, i.e. this is connected with the fourth criterion of Moore where "the expression used for

analysans mentions the way in which the concepts which are mentioned are combined in the analysandum*. E.g. the proposition that a uniformly red surface is nowhere brown is a priori, and, according to some philosophers, is synthetic, for being not brown is not a conjunctive constituent of being uniformly red. Thus it follows that the analysis of a given concept can give us new knowledge of the nature of things falling under the concept. So saying that the analysis of concept is not the same as the analysis of usage, and the analysis gives new knowledge, can be more than clarificatory, is to be explained first, for there are synthetic a priori propositions.

If we say that analytical propositions are not verbal, then the analysis of concepts is not to be identified with the analysis of usage. If we take the term 'verbal' as it is really used, it is right to say that analytic propositions are not verbal for the nature of analytical propositions themselves make clear that the analysis of concepts is nothing more than the explicit listing of the rules for the use or application of terms stated in the ontological or non-verbal way. The proposition, 'A brother is a male sibling' is the result of a verbal analysis; it states the criterion for the use of the word 'brother', but does this without mentioning words.

If we take the sentence in English which expresses the analytical proposition that a brother is a male sibling,
What we know and all that we know in understanding this sentence is usage, the use of 'brother', of 'male', of 'sibling' and the fact that 'brother but not a male sibling' has been assigned no application; but the sentence itself says nothing about the usage. If we take a sentence 'A brother is a male sibling' and 'It is logically impossible for anyone to be a brother and not a male sibling' or if we say that it is physically impossible for a person to jump 30 ft. high. The difference in impossibilities between these two propositions is not of a degree but of a kind. But if we take the physical impossibilities then they have a descriptive use. If we consider the sentences that express physical impossibilities, it can be pointed out that they have a descriptive content. What is being claimed that physically impossible state of affairs are not visualizable within the available information about the facts. However, there is no impropriety in the suggestion that anything which is impossible in one language would always produce in any well formed language violation of equivalent rules but the converse is not true, violation of a rule need not bring a logical impossibility.

Moore has demonstrated a keen awareness of the problem of distinction of analysing a concept from analysing the usage in which the concept is expressed. He quite characteristically demonstrates that there is no overlap between conceptual content and sentence expressing the
content. Take for instance: Brother means a male sibling is a redundant utterance for ordinary discourse, so would Moore contend, however, in case, "the sentence "Brother is a male sibling" is used to express the behaviour of the term, Brother, then this use is non-redundant and asserts a fact regarding the expression 'brother' in English language.

While philosophising one need to discriminate in offering an analysis of usage as against reconstructing the conceptual content of a concept though a process of analysis. The latter is not necessarily overlapping the former, though quite often correlated with it. Nonappreciation of this point has led to accusations of verbal quibbling against Moore and his brand of conceptual analysis. The irritation that people feel with Moore's mode of philosophizing would be considerably reduced if the above sharp distinction between analysing the usage and the analysis of the concept is kept in mind, which often is a difficult job and few can afford to be as discriminating as G.E. Moore was.

Langford shows a 'paradox of analysis' in Moore's notion. He maintains that:

"Let us call what is to be analysed the analysandum and let us call that which does the analysing the analysans. The analysis then states an appropriate relation of equivalence between the analysandum and the analysans. And the paradox of analysis is to the effect that, if the verbal expression representing the analysandum has the same meaning as the verbal expression representing the analysans, the analysis states a bare identity
and is trivial; but if the two verbal expressions do not have the same meaning, the analysis is incorrect.\textsuperscript{26}

Many things about this formulation could be noted. First, it is assumed that what is to be analysed is not a verbal expression, but something represented by a verbal expression. Moore suggests himself that the only thing that could properly be called analysing a verbal expression is to say what words or letters it contains and in what order,\textsuperscript{27} and this is not what Moore wants. Second, what is analysed is a concept, and the analysans should be 'in some sense' the same concept, and then the analysis does seem to collapse into a 'bare identity'. Third, it is assumed, that the analysis will take some such form as 'an $x$ is a $y$' or 'to be an $x$ is to be a $y$', where '$x$ and $y$' are the verbal expressions representing the analysandum and the analysans respectively.

The solution to resolve this paradox can be provided, if one takes a seer, a knower and a patient i.e. A, a person who offers the analysis i.e. an seer, B, a competent knower of the language and the concept in question i.e. knower and third, C, or a patient with only an incomplete knowledge of the language which is being used and who hears.


\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 665.
For instance, there are two verbal expressions 'x and y' which are synonymous in a certain language say 'L' i.e. 'C' is a patient know the meaning of 'y' in language 'L' but not the meaning of 'x' in L, while the A i.e. a seer offers the analysis, that C could not understand the meaning of 'x' and 'C' knows that A is aware of his limitation. Then if A were to say to C in L 'x means y', he would be saying something which is true, and informative to C though not informative to A himself or to B. A could convey this same information to C by saying simply 'A x is a y' or 'to be an x is to be a y' or in English "occulist means an eye doctor", he would say, 'an occulist is an eye doctor', or 'to be an occulist is to be an eye doctor'. The question which is at issue sometimes is'. 'How can one convey an information about meaning without mentioning meaning?' It could be possible only, since C does not yet know what 'occulist' means, where he hears A saying, 'an occulist....' he could only take this to be an equivalent to whatever is called an occulist in English is an eye doctor. If A had said to B that 'an occulist is a menace' and C hearing could say that whatever is called an occulist in English is a menace, C would not have learnt much, for he would not have been able to understand the real meaning, but since A had said 'an occulist is an eye doctor' to C he could not have used the predicate expression 'an eye doctor' analogously with 'a menace' to B, A would have
intended C to be able to get some definite knowledge, so he i.e. C must have been using an 'eye doctor' not as a further description of whatever is called an occulist in English, but as a way of specifying what this is, and C, knowing that A is aware of his limitation, is able to take A's remark in the intended way.

On the other hand, if A used that 'an occulist is an eye doctor' to B, then either A would have been wrong for the word 'occulist' with its standard meaning and stating a tautology, just as he said, 'an eye doctor is an eye doctor' or as Moore would say 'to be a brother is to be a brother' or he would simply be telling B what he already knows, that occulist means an eye doctor'. Secondly, one can also say that to repeat a known truth is not objectionable, as to state a mere tautology.

Some philosophers have thought definitions to be tautologies, but this is clearly wrong. For many different kinds of statements are called definitions, even the verbal definitions are not tautologies, for the lexical definitions, which shows the use of a word, i.e. in what sense or senses it is now or has been at various times used, this is an information regarding the language, and is based on empirical reach and could be wrong also. The other is a stipulated definition*, a proposal to use a

*Stipulated definition is an attempt at rendering meaning and sense by means of simplest specification of rules, where the awareness of meaning might have been
certain word in a certain way in a particular situation. Since it is a suggestion it could not be true or false, so cannot be a tautology. 'An X is a Y' has three uses, either it is informative, or one can use a word in such a way that 'X and Y' are used without conveying any information or stipulation of these terms and if one uses 'X' in this way, then either it could be a definition or a tautology but cannot be both.

Therefore one is able to resolve the paradox which Langford points out to be true and informative, but this kind of argument is helpful only for those who have an incomplete knowledge of a language. This is about the meaning of a certain expression and not what Moore calls an analysis of a verbal expression, but, on the other hand, nor is it an analysis of a concept. It gives the meaning of an expression by associating it with a concept which the recipient of the analysis already has. It would seem that an analysis of this kind would not be of philosophical interest; philosophical analysis is carried on among persons who are presumed already to have a grasp of the language they are using. It is to see now that whether one can modify and can bring in changes, so than an analysis could be informative even to such persons?

---

inarticulated. The formulation of a rule is not true or false but unsatisfactory or satisfactory. In Analysis we make a substantive proposal. Analysis is more like a stipulative definition.
To have a certain concept is to have a way of recognizing someone who has a concept of a tree is able to classify observed objects as trees or as not being trees, someone who speaks another language may have the same concept of a tree as one has if he groups the same class of objects together under the term in his language, one might also say that someone who does not use a language at all, or who, if he uses a language, has no term in it that can be translated as 'tree' still has the same concept of a tree as we have if he gives other evidence of classifying the right set of objects together. These are only minimal requirements, they do not constitute a sufficient condition for having 'a', or 'the', concept of a tree.

When a person is able to recognize that he would be responding to certain cues i.e. following the rules and using a criterion, but it is possible that a person might not be able to know what rules he is following, if he is unaware of the rules, then the analysis can be informative by making someone aware of the rules which he unconsciously follows.

The problem of giving an analysis of a proposition was thought to be, in a sense, just the problem of saying what the proposition means. One might be inclined to object at once that if so the task of analysis ought not to be so laborious so as Moore says and his practice often seem to show that it is we who do not know the meanings
of the sorts of propositions he considers? We can reply to this objection that though certainly we all know what is meant by the proposition. 'This is a hand' but we do not know English would not understand it — yet we may not be able, without careful thought, to say what it means. To know how to use a form of words correctly is one thing, to be able to say how we use it is another. Part of the difficulty in giving a correct analysis may consist in the difficulty of saying clearly what it is that some phrase or proposition, whose meaning is probably not in doubt, does actually mean.

But Moore finds the problem of giving analysis to be different. The term 'analysis' involves some complexities something constructive is to be split into its component parts and the way of combining these parts is to be made clearer. There are certain propositions which are known intuitively but now what can we say of the proposition. 'This is a hand'. Is the notion of being a hand absolutely simply or is it incapable of any analysis? If not so, in what elements can it be analysed, and what are the simple entities, or more basic than hands from which 'hand' could be said to be in some sense, constructed? Moore had no doubt that there were simpler entities of some sort, on which our knowledge of 'hands' was in some way based and which were what we always directly referred to in uttering
such propositions, as that this is a hand. But certainly these entities have no familiar name, nor are we aware of such entities. Moore employed the term sense data, Moore had to explain the meaning of the term sense data as well as of the proposition. 'This is a hand' to be analysed, i.e. how are sense data related to 'hands'? Moore was never satisfied for he never thought that he had finally answered the question of the relation between sense data and material objects and could never choose in his own views to be the final condition for abstract entities.

Though Moore's analysis is able to bring forth the hidden contradictions, there is a difference between Moore's actual theory and practice. In theory Moore seems never to have given up the idea that the goal of a philosophical inquiry is to establish very general truths about the world, even about Reality as a whole. He believes no doubt that such truths, if any such were established would not be at all so strange and surprising as his predecessors had held, he never thought that the common-sense view of the world would be untrue. But still his practice consists in analysis, which gives rise to philosophical clarifications and not discovery that its concern is with meaning and not with truth. The subject matter of analysis is thought or language and not facts. Moore laid more emphasis on practice than on laying down a theory of analysis.
Thus the most important things which are accomplished through analysis in philosophy is that it lays down clearly one thing the hidden contradictions in theories, it clarifies— theories by a process of translating them into the concrete for the purpose of bringing them into confrontation with matters of fact. And finally, it discloses new facts or implied facts which are not referred to in the definition of the term analysed. Moore's way of analysing concept is to bring them into concrete cases is to show that they go against the common sense and are to be interpreted as showing that they go against the language of common-sense and that they are attempts to change it which, according to his lights, should be resisted.

'Analysis', as Moore and others have used the term is a technical innovation of philosophers; it is not of 'the very type of an unambiguous expression, the meaning of which we all understand'. This being so, one is free, within limits, to confer a meaning on, give a sense to, the word, and different people may confer differently with the result that there is no one ordinary, established correct use for the word 'analysis'.

---