CHAPTER IX

LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS — CONCLUSIONS

The public sector in India has acquired great importance in the post independence era in view of its objectives, investment, production and employment. The industrial policy resolutions and the five year plan reports of the Government of India envisaged for the public sector a place of cardinal importance in the economic development of the country. As a result it has been expanding over the years. Naturally, therefore, labour-management relations in this sector are an object of serious thought and interest, particularly in view of the claim of the Government that public sector should be a model employer. It is, therefore, worth examining as to what extent the ideal of being a model employer has been achieved in practice.

Design of the Study

The objective of the study was to examine the labour-management relations in the public sector in India. It attempted to study the attitudes of workers, trade union leaders and management personnel, as well as some formal aspects of labour-management relations. However, the focus of the study was labour. A survey of the relevant literature was also conducted.

One possible method of study was to make a sample survey of public sector undertakings in the country. However, since this was beyond the resources of the researcher, it was decided to use the case method. It was proposed to select two plants with a contrasted history of labour-management relations, that is, one with a high and the other with a low incidence of disputes. In
other respects, however, the two plants were to be largely similar. This design would help us in identifying some of the factors associated with disputes. This would also open the way for an appreciation of the functioning of the public sector with respect to labour-management relations.

The two plants selected for intensive study were Heavy Electricals (India) Ltd., Bhopal and Indian Telephone Industries Ltd., Bangalore. The former had a high incidence of industrial disputes and the latter a low incidence. In HECIL, there were about twenty strikes and one lock-out between 1960 and 1971. On the other hand in ITI, there were only two strikes during the period 1943 to 1971.

These two plants had certain common features also. Both employed more than 12,000 employees in the year 1970. The form of organization for both was the same as provided for in the Companies Act, 1956. The wage structure in both the plants was in accordance with the Engineering Wage Board Award and the recommendations of the various Pay Commissions. A large expenditure was incurred in both the plants on working conditions and also on welfare facilities for workers.

The present study related to the period from July 1960 to July 1971 for the two plants. The data were mainly collected in the year 1971.

Three structured interview schedules were devised. These were for (i) workers, (ii) trade union leaders, and (iii) managerial personnel. In the workers' schedule a Likert type technique was used for the selection of items of 8 attitude scales.
Systematic stratified random samples of 194 workers were drawn from KE(I)L and 91 from ITI. They were interviewed personally according to schedule II by the researcher. The analysis is based chiefly on the responses received from them. The researcher also interviewed 17 trade union leaders in KE(I)L, and 18 trade union leaders in ITI (Schedule II). Further, 19 managerial personnel in KE(I)L and 14 in ITI were interviewed (Schedule III). The processing of data was done at Panjab University's Computer Centre at Chandigarh. For the purpose of analysis, both parametric and non-parametric tests were used. The chi-square test, the median test, rank correlation, multiple regression and stepwise regression analyses were used for drawing inferences.

**Recruitment, Promotion and Training**

A majority of workers in KE(I)L were recruited through the employment exchanges, while in ITI a majority of the workers said that they came to know about their existing jobs through newspapers. Contractors had not played any significant role in recruitment in either of the plants. In KE(I)L, the percentage of local employees varied from 42.9% in 1969 to 59.6% in 1974, while in ITI the percentage of local employees varied from 70.1% in 1968 to 71.8% in 1974. Bangalore being an industrial town, workers with the requisite skills were easily available, while inMadhya Pradesh, which was a comparatively backward state, the availability of skilled workers was limited. A larger percentage of workers and trade union leaders in ITI than in KE(I)L were satisfied with the recruitment policy.
In the matter of promotion of workers in HE(I)L, greater emphasis was laid on merit, while in ITI the main criterion was seniority. It was found that in HE(I)L workers perceived personal favour of the managers as having greater weight for promotion than any other factor. In ITI, workers gave the first rank to seniority among factors leading to promotion (Chapter II).

The aspiration for promotion of the workers in ITI, where seniority was the main basis of promotion, was higher than in HE(I)L, where merit was given greater weight in the promotion policy (See Table 3.13).

Workers with higher aspiration for promotion showed higher interest in the job in ITI, while no such relationship was found in HE(I)L. In ITI, workers who wanted to rise took greater interest in their job than in HE(I)L. The study also found that as the age increased, the aspiration for promotion of workers in both the plants decreased. A positive relationship was found between education and training on the one hand and aspiration for promotion on the other in HE(I)L, but not in ITI (Chapters II and III).

A majority of workers in both the plants considered that the training after joining the plant was useful to them. The number of workers who expressed satisfaction with training were greater in HE(I)L than in ITI.

Our study in III revealed that imparting of proper training to the workers at the earlier stage, to which the management was alleged (by some of the workers and trade union leaders) to be

1. Table 3.13 means Table 13 of Chapter III.
disciplined to attach much weight, actually turned out to be an important factor, as workers with no training had not only a lower interest in the job but also a higher level of militancy. (Chapters II, III and VII).

Wage Structure and Welfare Facilities

In ITI, the management personnel and workers had been neatly classified into a few categories, while in HE(I)L a relatively large number of categories existed (Chapter II).

The wage revision in both the plants were in accordance with the policy of the Government of India. The recommendations of the Wage Board Award for Engineering industries, and those of the Pay Commissions appointed by the Government of India, were followed in both the plants (Chapter II).

A majority of the workers in the sample in HE(I)L and ITI were moderately satisfied with their wages. However, workers with a higher skill had a higher satisfaction with wages in HE(I)L. In ITI this relationship was not significant. On the other hand, non-operators in ITI had a higher satisfaction with wages than operators. Similarly, non-union members in ITI had a higher satisfaction with wages than union members. In HE(I)L these relationships were not significant (Chapter III).

When the two plants were compared on the aspired-minus-actual wage differential no significant difference was found. Contrary to our hypothesis, unskilled and semi-skilled workers exhibited a higher aspired-minus-actual wage differential than skilled workers in HE(I)L. The study shows that in HE(I)L, unskilled or semi-skilled workers had a lower satisfaction with wages.
and a higher aspired-minus-actual wage differential. Similarly, workers with no training in HE(I)L had a higher aspired-minus-actual wage differential than workers with training. However, in ITI, the relationship between training and skill on the one hand and aspired-minus-actual wage differential on the other were not found to be significant (Chapter III).

The incentive bonus scheme was working in each of the two plants. In HE(I)L, the emphasis was on direct individual incentives, while in ITI the emphasis was on indirect or group incentives. In HE(I)L, the efficiency of workers increased during 1965-71, while in ITI the efficiency during this period declined. In both the plants, a majority of the workers believed that incentive payments were conducive to harder work; the percentage of such workers was, however, higher in HE(I)L than in ITI.

In ITI, workers had been getting profit sharing bonus even before 1960. In HE(I)L, workers could get only a minimum bonus between 1967-71, as provided for a factory running at a loss. However, during 1961-67 even this bonus was not paid to the employees.

Although a large amount of money was spent on welfare items in both the plants, a larger number of workers in ITI than in HE(I)L were satisfied with the welfare facilities (Chapters II and III).

**The Work Situation**

A majority of workers in both the plants considered their jobs to be interesting. However, skilled workers in ITI had a higher interest in their jobs than semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Similarly, workers with training showed higher interest
in their jobs than workers without training. These relationships were not significant in HE(I)L.

Further, workers of HE(I)L and ITI differed in their feeling of tiredness or fatigue after finishing their day's job. Workers in HE(I)L felt more tired than workers in ITI as the formers were engaged in heavy work. However, when the two plants were compared on the workers' satisfaction with physical environment no significant difference was found.

There was also no significant difference in the workers' satisfaction with supervisory behaviour in HE(I)L and ITI. However, workers with higher skill were found to have a higher satisfaction with supervisory behaviour in both the plants. Both the chi-square test and regression analysis show that workers with higher interest in the job had higher satisfaction with supervisory behaviour in HE(I)L as well as in ITI.

A comparison of the findings in respect of HE(I)L and ITI shows that three more factors — age, length of service and the level of income — were also significantly contributing to the explanation of workers' satisfaction with supervisory behaviour in ITI. However, these relationships were not significant in HE(I)L. It may be because of the different "ages" of the two plants that personal variables could influence satisfaction with supervisory behaviour more in ITI than in HE(I)L. At the time of this survey, ITI had been there for 23 years, while HE(I)L had completed only 11 years.

When the two plants were compared on the identification with the company, again no significant difference was found. Satisfaction with the supervisory behaviour emerged as the
strongest of all the variables studied in the explanation of the variance of the identification with the company in II(I)L and IIT. Workers with higher satisfaction with supervisory behaviour had higher identification with the company. Both the chi-square test and regression analysis showed that workers with a greater length of service also identified themselves more with the company in IIT than workers with shorter service. However, this relationship was not significant in II(I)L.

In III, which had been in existence for upwards of two decades at the time of the present survey, an interesting chain of cause and effect was found to link personal factors in the lives of workers with identification with the company. Identification with the company was greater among those who were more satisfied with the supervisory behaviour and such satisfaction in turn was largely explained (35% out of the total of 44%) by personal factors like age, length of service, and level of income.

Our study suggests that workers in the public sector were status conscious as they gave the first rank to 'quicker promotion', when asked 'what changes in the work situation would help them to contribute more toward production'? Higher wages, fair treatment by the management, and higher incentive pay were given second, third and fourth ranks respectively in both the plants. In short, workers in both the plants exhibited an almost similar ranking of factors which could determine their desire to work harder (Chapter III).

Workers' Participation in Decision Making

There were differences between the two plants in the working of the machinery relating to workers' participation in decision
making. In HE(I)L, workers' representatives to various bi-partite committees were nominated by the recognised union, while in ITI, the workers' representatives to a majority of these committees were elected directly by workers (Chapter IV).

In ITI, a large majority of workers considered these committees useful, while in HE(I)L the majority did not accept this view. Workers' satisfaction with the participative machinery was significantly higher in ITI than in HE(I)L. Indeed, in HE(I)L, a large majority of workers were not even aware of the existence of these committees. On the other hand, a majority of workers in ITI were well aware of the existence of these committees (Chapter IV).

The number of suggestions put forward by workers and accepted by the management was also higher in ITI than in HE(I)L. The financial savings traceable to these suggestions were again higher in ITI than in HE(I)L.

The workers' involvement in the bi-partite committees was higher in ITI than in HE(I)L. In other words, the study indicates that workers' involvement in the system of participation was higher where members were elected directly by workers than in the plant where workers' representatives were nominated by the recognised union.

It was also found that skilled workers had a higher participation in the bi-partite committees than semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Both the chi-square test and regression analysis revealed that workers with higher satisfaction with supervisory behaviour participated more in the bi-partite committees in the two plants. Similarly, union participation and workers' participation
in the bi-partite committees were positively related in both the plants. The regression analysis also showed that workers with a higher desire to participate also participated more in the bi-
partite committees in ITI. Contrary to our expectations no significant relationship was found in either of the plants between education and workers' participation in the bi-partite committees.

**Workers' Desire and Capacity to Participate**

Workers in both the plants showed a high desire to participate in the decision making, and a large majority of workers' sample in both the plants favoured workers' participation in various aspects of management. However, comparatively speaking, workers' desire to participate was significantly higher in ITI than in ITI. It may be hypothesized that the desire of workers to seek participation in the management through bi-partite forums is greater in a plant where the channels of communication through a union are not effective. Both the chi-square test and regression analysis showed that workers with longer service in ITI had a higher desire to participate than workers with shorter service. Similarly, workers with higher aspiration for promotion in ITI had a higher desire to participate than workers with lower aspirations. However, length of service and aspiration for promotion were not that powerful in determining the workers' desire to participate in ITI.

The trends of the tables in both the plants also showed that skilled workers had a higher desire to participate in decision making in both the plants than semi-skilled or unskilled workers.

2. This relationship was not significant through chi-square analysis.
However, this relationship was not statistically significant. Similarly, no significant relationship was found in any of the two plants between education and the desire to participate.

Our analysis in ITI also revealed that technical skill too had an indirect bearing on the desire to participate in decision making, because higher skill fosters higher interest in the job, which induces a higher aspiration for promotion and thence leads to a greater desire to participate in decision making.

In HE(I)IL, on the other hand, satisfaction with supervisory behaviour led to workers' participation in the bi-partite committees, which in turn induced further desire to participate in decision making.

With regard to workers' capacity to participate in decision making, the findings show that though the levels of income, education and skill were almost the same in the two plants, yet from the trade union and industrial relations point of view, ITI had a more suitable environment for workers' participation in decision making than HE(I)IL.

A large majority of the managerial personnel favoured the idea of workers' participation in decision making. However, they differed about the degree of participation to be allowed to the workers. A larger percentage of managers in ITI than in HE(I)IL favoured the idea of the joint management council and the membership of workers in the Board of Directors. The acceptance by the management of the workers' participation in decision making was higher in ITI than in HE(I)IL. The results of the study thus indicate that the higher the acceptance of the management of workers'
participation in decision making, the higher would be their actual participation; and the higher the actual participation of workers the higher would be their satisfaction with the participation machinery.

A majority of the trade union leaders in both the plants said that workers' participation should be encouraged at all levels. But a majority of them were also critical of the existing machinery of participation. In HE(I)L, non-recognized unions were not favourable to the existing machinery of participation as they did not have any representatives on these committees. The recognized union also took little interest in the working of these committees as their capacity was only advisory. In ITI, where a majority of the bi-partite committees were directly elected by the workers, the trade union leaders, by and large, did not want a rival in the form of these committees (Chapter IV).

A larger number of workers in ITI perceived that the management encouraged workers' participation in decision making. In HE(I)L, the position was quite the reverse (Chapter IV).

Trade Unions: Formal Aspects

There were variations in the trade union structure in the two plants. HE(I)L had as many as 24 unions and associations, while ITI had only one union. Three major unions of HE(I)L were affiliated to different central trade union organizations, while the union in ITI had an independent identity.

Although a majority of the workers, trade union leaders and management personnel showed their resentment against the multiplicity of unions the multiple union structure continued to exist in the plant. In ITI, a large majority of workers, trade
union leaders and management personnel were in favour of continuation of the single union. However, some difficulties in maintaining the solidarity of the union in ITI, such as the language problem, did exist.

Involvement of outside political leaders was reported to be high in IE(I)L. Different political parties shared the leadership of different unions. Political leaders helped their affiliates during strikes and at the time of negotiations (Chapter V).

In ITI, on the other hand, the intervention of external political leaders in the trade union activity was low. From the very inception of the union, the union leaders had agreed to exclude party politics from the affairs of the union. In contrast, in IE(I)L, the militant activity had started from the very beginning. Inside leaders had to take the help of political leaders from outside to pressure the management.

However, it is interesting to note that in both the plants a majority of the management personnel, trade union leaders and workers were against the intervention of political parties in trade unions.

In IE(I)L, elections of the office bearers and members of the executive committee of the union were irregular, while in ITI there were regular elections of union office-bearers and executive committee members. Moreover, workers in ITI took keen interest in the elections of the union (Chapter V).

Recognized unions in both the plants were provided with various facilities. However, in IE(I)L, the management provided no facilities to the unrecognised unions.
It was reported that in RS(I)L, the attitude of the management towards trade union was not favourable. It was alleged that the recognition was accorded to a weaker union, while the stronger union was clamouring for its right to recognition. In spite of the fact that, at times, some of the unrecognized unions had a large following, the management refused to negotiate with those unions. The trade union leaders and active trade union workers of those unions were allegedly victimized. Hostile relations between those unions and the management continued between 1960-70 (Chapter V).

In ITI, the management and the union had, by and large, a co-operative attitude towards each other. Generally, the management did not interfere with legitimate trade union activity. It was reported that the approach of the union leaders was also for settling the issues through negotiations or third party intervention, rather than through strikes.

**Trade Unions: Involvement of Workers**

In RS(I)L, where a multiple union structure existed, we found that a comparatively lesser number of workers were members of the union/unions than in ITI. Moreover, in RS(I)L, no proper record of membership was kept. Membership figures were politically manipulated. In ITI, the degree of unionization increased near the elections of office bearers and executive committee members of the union; or when the union achieved some notable success; or when the management introduced check off. The membership of the union declined immediately after the failure of strikes.

Workers in both the plants ranked in a similar manner the various factors which could motivate them to join a union. Economic reasons received the first rank in both the plants. The most
important reasons given by the workers in HE(I)L for not becoming members of a union were (a) multiplicity of unions; (b) unions were not doing anything substantial; and (c) fear of victimisation.

It was also found that workers' participation in trade union activity was significantly higher in ITI, where there was one union, as compared to HE(I)L, where there were numerous unions and associations (see Table 5.2).

In HE(I)L, the regression analysis showed that union identification, militancy, aspiration for promotion and workers' participation in the bi-partite committees on the one hand and union participation on the other were significantly related. Except for union identification, similar conclusions were also arrived at with the help of chi-square analysis. This means that the relationship between union identification and union participation existed in HE(I)L provided other factors were held constant.

Similarly in ITI, both the chi-square test and the regression analysis showed that union identification, length of service and workers' participation in the bi-partite committees on the one hand, and union participation on the other, were positively related. However, the relationship between wage satisfaction and union participation, which emerged as significant with chi-square in ITI, disappeared through regression analysis.

Regression analysis for union participation gave very promising results in both the plants. Total explanation of union participation by the independent variables was about 58% in ITI and 45% in HE(I)L. The most important factor influencing workers' participation in the union activity in both the plants, was union identification.
It was found that workers' identification with the union was significantly higher in ITI than in HS(I)L (See Table 5.7). However, in HS(I)L, identification of workers with unions had been varying over a period of time. It had been varying with the strength of HSITU (later called HSITU).

The study does not find any significant relationship between union identification on the one hand, and age, marital status and wage satisfaction on the other.

A comparatively larger number of workers in ITI than in HS(I)L said that the recognized union was successful in negotiating with the management. For the success of negotiations between the recognized union and the management in ITI, trade union factors like 'unity of workers' and 'capable union leadership' were given first and second rank respectively. But these two factors were given very low ranking in HS(I)L. For the success of negotiations between the recognized union and the management in HS(I)L, 'justified demands' and the power of the unrecognized unions were given first and second rank. At the time of our survey, the general feeling of workers in HS(I)L was that it was due to the pressure of the unrecognized unions that the management had been forced to negotiate with the recognized union (Chapter V).

**Industrial Unrest**

It was found that the frequency of strikes and other forms of agitations was high in HS(I)L and low in ITI. Moreover, strikes in HS(I)L were generally violent, while the two stay-in-strikes in ITI were peaceful and disciplined.

From the facts and opinions collected for the study it appears that the strikes in ITI could be explained in terms of
economic reasons, while in HE(I)I, apart from economic reasons, motives like recognition of the union, attempt to spread communist ideology, suspected discriminative attitudes adopted by the management towards various types of workers, reinstatement of the dismissed employees and intervention of political leaders from outside also existed (Chapter VI).

The methods which were most commonly used to end strikes in HE(I)I were (i) intervention of political leaders, and (ii) alleged repression of the native workers and trade union leaders by the management and the State Government. In ITI, the major issues involved in the two strikes were referred to either arbitration or adjudication.

A majority of individual grievances in both the plants related to promotion. Further, it was found that a larger percentage of promotion disputes took place in ITI (where seniority was the basis of promotion) than in HE(I)I (where merit was the basis of promotion). It might be because seniority was more arguable than merit.

The time taken in the settlement of grievances in a majority of cases, in both the plants, was much more than that prescribed in the grievance procedure. However, in ITI grievances took longer to settle than in HE(I)I. It was difficult for a single union in ITI, with only a few leaders, to take up the grievances of a large number of workers. Moreover, a worker-management committee dealing with individual grievances of workers was functioning in HE(I)I but not in ITI.

Militancy of Workers

Militancy of the workers was significantly higher in HE(I)I than in ITI.

3. As alleged by a majority of workers, trade union leaders and also some management personnel.
The present study did not find any significant difference in the militancy of workers belonging to different age groups or income groups. Similarly, no significant difference was found between the militancy of married and unmarried workers.

Workers with training were found to have lower militancy in ITI than workers without training. The trend of the chi-square tables in both the plants showed that workers with lower education had a higher militancy. This relationship between education and militancy also emerged as significant in HE(I)L with the help of regression analysis.

In ITI, a significant negative relationship was found between militancy and psychological inducements for job satisfaction like interest in the job, identification with the company and satisfaction with supervisory behaviour. However, economic inducements for job satisfaction like wage satisfaction and aspired-minus-actual wage differential were not significantly related in any of the two plants. Similarly, aspiration for promotion and militancy were not significantly related in either of the two plants.

In HE(I)L, union members were more militant than non-members. Similarly, in HE(I)L, workers who actively participated in the trade union activity were more militant than those who did not participate actively. It may be because of the alleged policy of suppression of trade union activity, the workers having a higher degree of militancy became members of the union or participated more vigorously in its activities. In HE(I)L, it was also found that workers belonging to the union committed to the communist ideology were more militant than workers belonging to other unions.
Regression analysis reveals that in HE(I)1, union variables were more important (they were responsible for 10% of the total possible explanation of 20%) in the explanation of militancy, while in ITI satisfaction with various aspects of the job played a greater role (17% of the total possible explanation of 22% of militancy). The highest explanation of militancy in ITI was provided by the "dissatisfaction with the supervisory behaviour" while in HE(I)1, 'union participation' and 'union identification' were the most important factors. The lower influence of union variables in ITI, a single union structure plant, may be due to the reported peaceful worker-management relations over a long period.

However, on going a little deeper into the analysis of workers' militancy in ITI, it was found, that dissatisfaction with supervisory behaviour, which emerged as the most important factor in the explanation of militancy, was due, inter alia, to the lack of interest in the job, which in turn was mostly due to lack of training. Thus it appears that lack of training in ITI could have been a factor ultimately contributing to workers' militancy.

In HE(I)1, on the other hand, union participation was the most important factor determining militancy which in turn was influenced by higher aspiration for promotion. It appears that workers whose aspirations for promotion were frustrated over a long period, participated more in the union and were more militant in their attitude towards the management.

However, the total explanation through regression analysis was not high. Militancy being a socio-psychological variable, it might be influenced by a large number of factors. It was diffi-
cult to cover all those factors in the present study. A broader based study would be required to analyse the militant behaviour of workers.

A majority of workers participated in the strikes which took place in the two plants. As a reason for participation in strikes, workers in both the plants gave first rank to 'fulfilment of demands'. The second rank was given to the reason 'to follow the majority decision'. A large number of workers in the multiple union plant also complained that they could not go to their place of work due to picketing.

**Prevention and Settlement of Disputes**

Collective bargaining, conciliation, arbitration or adjudication, were followed in both the plants as methods of dispute settlement. A larger number of agreements between the management and the recognized union were made in HE(I)L (where MPIR Act 1960 applied) than in ITI (where Industrial Disputes Act 1947 applied). We also found that involvement of the trade unions in adjudication was higher in ITI than in HE(I)L.

A larger percentage of trade union leaders in ITI than in HE(I)L believed their bargaining power to be high. Further, a larger percentage of workers in ITI than in HE(I)L considered that in the preceding years the recognized union had been successful in negotiating with the management.

In both the public sector plants under study, it was complained that collective bargaining was hampered because (a) there was lack of a clear cut delegation of authority to the management; (b) the management of the public sector plant was not bothered about losses; and (c) the management had also to take into account
the repercussions of a particular agreement over other public sector plants.

Collective bargaining in the two plants was also influenced by the different types of trade union structures. Different unions were generally antagonistic to one another, and did not work in unison even in matters of strikes which affected the workers most. Each union tried to weaken its rival unions. Also, there was factionalism in the recognised union and that reduced its effectiveness in conducting negotiations with the management.

The spirit of collective bargaining was adversely affected in three ways: (a) If one group of unions resorted to a strike, the other group of unions opposed it and tried to break it; (b) rival unions assured the workers that they could secure higher benefits for them than those obtained as a result of the negotiations between the recognised union and the management; (c) existence of separate groups within the recognised union lessened its capacity and authority in representing the workers' point of view.

However, in ITI there was a single union. The plant, therefore, did not have to face the type of problems which existed in \( \text{BC}(I)\) \( \text{L} \) (Chapter V).

A large majority of management personnel and trade union leaders in both the plants were in favour of internal settlement of disputes through collective bargaining. However, none of the management personnel and trade union leaders in either of the two plants was in favour of adjudication as a method of solving industrial disputes.

A larger number of individual grievances were referred to courts in \( \text{BC}(I)\) \( \text{L} \) than in ITI. However, decisions in a majority of
cases of individual grievances in both the plants went against the complainant workers (Chapter XV).

It was also found that the process of adjudication was time-consuming. A majority of cases of individual grievances in HE(I)L and ITI took more than six months to be settled. Similarly, group grievances in courts also took a lot of time to settle in both the plants.

Moreover, adjudication was expensive. The ITI Employees' Union had to face deficits for several years on account of the high expenditure it had to incur on litigation (Chapter VIII).

In the end, we may submit the broad characteristics of the two plants under study:

In HE(I)L, the frequency of strikes and other forms of agitation was high. There were 24 unions and associations in this plant, and inter-union and intra-union rivalries were rampant. Political influence on unions and their affairs was also high. The attitude of the management towards trade unions was not favourable. At times, though, some of the recognised unions had a larger following than the recognised union, the management refused to negotiate with those unions. The services of a large number of trade union leaders and active workers were terminated during the strikes. The attitude of the unrecognized trade union leaders remained hostile towards the management during 1960-70. The wage structure of managers and workers was not neatly classified. A majority of workers were dissatisfied with leave rules, hours of work, recruitment and promotion policy of the company. They also showed their dissatisfaction with the welfare facilities provided by the company. They complained that the management
followed discriminative policies with respect to different categories of workers. The channels of communication, such as Joint Committee, Production Committee etc. were not functioning properly.

On the other hand, in ITI the incidence of disputes was low. There was only one union in that plant and it was not affiliated to any central trade union organization. The intervention of outside political leaders was low. The management and the union on the whole co-operated with each other. The approach of trade union leaders was to settle the issues through negotiations or through third party, and not through strikes. Further, the wage structure of managers and workers was neatly classified into a few categories. By and large, workers were satisfied with the recruitment and promotion policy. A large majority of them were fairly satisfied with welfare facilities. The channels of communication, like Works Committee, Incentive Committee etc. were reported to be working smoothly and usefully.