Power is a term used commonly, understood intuitively and defined rarely. When the term is used, even our common cultural definitions conjure up in us a sense of its importance for understanding human behaviour and organizations. But the more we attempt to define it more complex it becomes. The problem of defining power in very precise terms arises because power is ascribed to different things on different grounds. For instance, we speak of horse power, power of ideas, economic power, power of social status, brain power, military power and the like. The common thread among all is that the term power, behaves in much the same way as the term 'ability' or 'capacity'. In fact the English word 'power is derived from French word 'poer' and Latin word 'potere' which meant to be able.\(^1\) Almost all definers of power agree that it is some form of energy but there the agreement ends. Different writers have taken different views with the result that its real meaning seems to hover from Carl Friedrich's description of it as 'a certain kind of human relationship'\(^2\) to R.H. Tawney's

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emphasis on the identification of power with the
capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to
modify the conduct of others in the manner which one
desires.\textsuperscript{3} Not merely this, Thomas Hobbes identifies power
'with some future apparent good', while a modern writer
like Harold Lasswell links it with 'influence'. Again
Mao-Tse-Tung claims that power comes from the barrel of
a gun while thinkers like M.K.Gandhi substitute the power
of gun with the power of love and truth. For the sake
of convenience we can divide the view of different writers
into the following categories:-

The power theory: the study of power in physical
terms, finds its brilliant manifestation in the philosophy
of Thomas Hobbes. According to him the desire for power
is basic to man and there is no end to this desire. He
defined natural power as, "the eminence of the faculties of
body, or mind: as extra-ordinary strength, prudence,
arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental are
these powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are
means and instruments to acquire more: as riches,
reputation, friends, and the secret working of god, which
men call good luck."\textsuperscript{4} Thus according to Hobbes, the
search for power is the root cause of competition among

\textsuperscript{3} Tawney, R.H., \textit{Equality}, (New York: Harcourt Brace,
\textsuperscript{4} Hobbes, Thomas, \textit{Leviathan}, (New York: Penguin,
individuals. The interests of individuals clash because each aims at acquiring more and more riches, honours and commands. The competitors even do not hesitate to use the foul means like killing, subduing and repelling their opponents. Hobbes admits that though the struggle for power has its incessant play among competitors, it is also true that men like to live in peace in order to enjoy the iota of power they possess, it disposes them to live under a common power. In his social contract theory, Hobbes stresses that individuals want to live in peace under a perfect sovereign to avoid the violent fear of death. From this it can be concluded that, in a strict sense his meaning of power means 'The power over other men'.

Hegel also absolutised the sovereign power to the extent of discarding the ethics of international morality. Power and the urge towards it were very much extolled in the 19th century by the writers like Nietzsche and Bernhardi. Among the leading advocates of this theory in the present era, reference can be made of Hans J. Morgenthau who in his 'Politics Among Nations' defines power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men". By political power, he explains, "we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority
and between the latter and the people at large. The power theory also finds its concrete manifestation in the emergence of Fascism in Italy, the Nazism in Germany and military dictatorships in several countries.

Though the element of truth of the power theory cannot be defined, it may still be said that it lays too much reliance on the physical power. As a matter of fact, power is a very broad concept that includes within itself much that cannot be covered by the compass of physical power.

So several recent writers like, Harold Lasswell, Abraham Kaplan and Robert Dahl, identify it with influence. For Lasswell and Kaplan the subject matter of political science is 'power as a process'. "Power is the participation in the making of decisions... The making of decisions is an interpersonal process: the policies which other persons are to pursue is what is decided upon. Power as participation in the making of decisions is an interpersonal relation... what is common to all power and influence relations is only effect on policy. what is affected and on what basis are variables, whose specific

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content in a given situation can be determined only by inquiring into the actual practices of actors in the situation. Lasswell also makes a distinction between the general concept of power and its specific forms as applied in politics. It is not only a question of power for whom, which has to be decided, but also power in such and such particulars. A and B may each have power over C, but with regard to different areas of C's behaviour. One has also to take into consideration, the availability and the use of sanctions for the production of intended effects on other person in case the intended effects are not forthcoming. It is the threat of sanction which differentiates power from influence in general. Power then becomes a special case of the exercise of influence, the process of affecting policies of the others with the help of (actual or threatened) severe deprivations for non-conformity with the policies intended. Harold Lasswell finds himself in complete agreement with Charles Harriman in repudiating the idea that the exercise of power rested always, or even generally, on violence, or that the essence of the power situation is force, in the sense of violence.

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and physical brutality. Power may rest on faiths and loyalties, habits and apathy as well as interests. Even constraints may not always take the form of violence. Power only entails an effective control over policy; the mean by which the control is made effective may be many and varied.

Robert Dahl elaborates his view of power with the help of the term 'influence' which he defines as "a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would not otherwise act", such that the wants, desires, preferences or intentions of one or more actors affect the actions or predispositions to act, of one or more other actors. Influence may be explicit or manifest and implicit or latent. Though Dahl dwells on the term influence, he attempts to distinguish it from the other related terms such as persuasion, inducement etc. Influence by means of communication that provides information, whether true or false about the merits and demerits of alternative courses of action can be called persuasion. It may be rational or manipulative.


If the transmission of influence is done by honest and moral means, it is rational, otherwise it is manipulative. Then influence, by means that bring about a change in the nature of the alternatives themselves by adding advantages, to an alternative or imposing new disadvantages on an alternative, or both, can be called inducement. Inducement may be positive or negative. For instance, it is positive when an employer asks his employee to do the job and then get such and such reward. It is negative when he issues a general warning that such punishment would be given to those who take part in the strike. Again, influence through communication that consists of a signal might be called control by training. But control may be unilateral or reciprocal. When the people through some demonstration, force their leader to do or not to do a particular thing, it is unilateral control. However, a case of reciprocal control may be visualised in the system of mutual deterrence that has helped to prevent nuclear war. But when an influence the compliance of which is attained by creating the prospects of severe sanctions for non-compliance, becomes power.\[9\]

However, this approach creates certain difficulties. It widens the scope of the term power to such an extent that it makes the very meaning of the term elusive resulting

\[9\text{Ibid., pp.50-51.}\]
in conceptual diffuseness. It smacks of the tendency to treat power simply as the generalised capacity to attain ends or goals in social relations independently of the media employed or of the status of authorisation to make decisions or impose obligations. The essential line of difference between power, on one hand, and other related themes like influence, control, persuasion, manipulation and the like, on the other, is blurred.

Power is also viewed as the authoritative allocator of values in an hierarchical social order. Society is a big whole (collectivity) in which several smaller units (sub-collectivities) exist and compete in a way that their modes of action lead to the use of power in varying degrees and forms. "Power (Macht) is the probability", writes Max Weber, "that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."

The use of the word 'probability' implies that Weber considered the actual realization of one's will was rather incidental to the basic problem of power. To be sure one must have a chance in order to realize one's will, but the two concepts are

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by no means identical. It may be said that this 'chance' is necessary but not a sufficient condition for realization of wills. Much of the contemporary literature has substituted 'ability' or 'potential' for Weber's 'probability', but maintains the distinction between this potential and actual realization of will. If power is to be defined as a potential, then in a confrontation between two opposing forces, the fact that the ultimate result can be described as a victory for one over the other does not necessarily mean power rested only with the victor. There may have been power in both forces, but the potential of one may have been greater than the other. If on the other hand, power were to be considered as the actual realization of one's will in a confrontation, ultimate victory or defeat would be the only criterion.

This approach takes power as something widely diffused among several sub-collectivities which determine the position of different social units. It also connects power with the element of legitimacy. It implies that the power of any social organization right from the family to that of state should be acceptable to the concerned persons. Power is, in this way, a social affair involving legitimation. In other words, "it is the generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are
legitimised with reference to their bearing or collective goals and where in a case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions whatever the actual agency of that enforcement.\textsuperscript{11}

Such an interpretation of the concept of power also finds its brilliant manifestation in the writings of David Easton who defines politics as "the authoritative allocation of values for a society\textsuperscript{12} and considers power as an essential part of the study of politics. The source of authoritative allocation of values finds place in the decision-making process and since the highest power of decision-making is vested in the state, the decision of the government carries the highest sanctity whose enforcement is backed by the use of physical force.

But this approach to the theory of power is applicable to a liberal-democratic society which has a pluralistic character. There is freedom for the sub-collectivities to exist and take part in the struggle for power so that values are allocated, de-allocated or


re-allocated in an unhampered way. But this approach has little or no value in the closed societies in which power is concentrated at the top and where decisions of the men in power are always treated as legitimate and for this reason binding.

Power is not merely a fact having its manifestation in the forms of control, influence, coercion, persuasion and manipulation; it is a value also. Power also signifies the capacity of an individual which may either refer to his ability to develop his personality or to extract advantages from the like abilities of others. In this way, power as a capacity has both developmental and extractive capacities and thereby it carries normative dimensions in the former and empirical in the latter. Since power in this sense means ability to use and develop human capacities, it may be precisely described as a man's developmental power. Here power has a qualitative character. It has an ethical connotation in the sense that it informs man to seek the best possible development of his personality. The idea of power thus desires the use and development of the essentially human capacities. Besides, man should use his capacities in a way that he may extract benefits from others. It leads to the idea of extractive powers. Obviously the idea of power has both qualitative and quantitative aspects.
According to C.B. Macpherson, the liberal democratic theory of power assumes two important proportions. First, it integrates the idea of political power with the power of money. Political power issuing in forms of franchise, elections, propaganda, persuasion etc. is governed by the role of money power. As a result, the destiny of millions of people is controlled by a few families having monopoly over the purse of the nation. In a technical sense, it may be put that if power means the extractive capacity of men, it lies in the hands of those wealthy persons who can extract the benefits from others and thereby remain the rulers of the country. Obviously, 'in a full capitalist model, the whole power of everyone is nearly equivalent to his extractive power. Each non-owner's whole power is nearly zero, and his extractive power is zero.'

From this point of view maximisation of democracy is possible only when the extractive power of the few is substituted by the similar power of many. He has regretted over the fact that political power, being power over others, is used in any unequal society to extract benefits from the ruled for the rulers. Focus on the source of political power puts out of the field of vision any perception of the necessary purpose of political power in any unequal

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society, which is to maintain the extractive power of
the class or classes which have extractive power.
Power, because it is seen as control over others, is
certainly not seen as something whose increase or
maximisation is desirable in itself.\(^{14}\)

Secondly it is also necessary that the
developmental aspect of power should not be thoroughly
discarded. Man is not merely a power-hungry creature, he
is also a value loving creature. He not only fights for
power, he has a sense of discrimination, too. Thus, while
extracting benefits from others by virtue of his capacities,
he is also expected to see towards his as well as his
fellow beings' development. The developmental and the
extractive aspects of human capacities should be joined
in such a way that the maximisation of democracy takes
place without causing loss or destruction of the values of
humanism.

But the liberal democratic approach of power is
not free from defects. It offers a rich source of confusion
by identifying power with capacities. Macpherson holds:
"No fewer than three different quantities are liable to be
confused in the one notion of a man's capacities: (i) his
actual present capacities, (ii) the supposed capacities he

\(^{14}\) Ibid., pp.47-48.
might have developed up to the present if society had placed no impediments in his way; (iii) the supposed greater capacities he could develop during his whole life if society placed no impediments in his way. Further, the assumptions of this theory cannot be appreciated by the Marxists who examine power in terms of class composition of society, nor can it be accepted by non-Marxists who consider power in physical terms.

Karl Marx treats power as an instrument that connects economics with politics. In Marxian sense, politics signifies a sphere of social activity in which two contending classes engage in a struggle for the control of the state. It is the means of production whose ownership involves control over the labour power of those who own little or no means of production and it is this fact that determines the distribution of political power or what Marx says, the relations of production. In this sense, property ownership involves control over production as well as the political control. Only a class whose members are aware of their objective class interest, who have a will to forward that interest, and who possess a political organisation, can be said to act politically. Hence, “political power, properly so called, is merely

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15 Ibid., p.56.
the organised power of one class for oppressing another.\textsuperscript{16}

Thus Marxian analysis views power dialectically. On one hand, political power is seen as deriving from definite prevailing economic relations. On the other hand, the attempt of those who wield political power to stabilize and consolidate the derived, provokes counter tendencies. These counter tendencies first express themselves as competitive economic behaviour: as technical knowhow increases, they take the form of changes in the means and organization of the production in the productive forces in general, gradually transforming the whole economic basis and thereby the foundations of prevailing political power. Revolution occur when the economic foundation of the ruling class, already undermined by changes, begins to crumble. Then it requires only the clan of a new political elite, clamouring for power to overthrow the ruling class and to usurp its place.\textsuperscript{17}

Marx sought to apply this schematic analysis of transfer of power on the basis of economic factors to


societies of all times and climes. History then becomes
the history of class struggle. He comes to see political
power as determined by two factors: first, that those who
wield political power are always in minority; secondly,
that the retention of power, the way it is exercised and
finally its transfer are all determined by changes which
occur in the sphere of economic production.

Supplementing the Marxian theory, Lenin declared
that there were two possible ways in which the proletariat
could seize power: the peaceful democratic way and the way
of violent revolution. This is not to say that he failed
to reckon with the bourgeoisie's will not to resist; on
the contrary, he believed that once the final bastion of
power was threatened the ruling class might well 'resort
to violence for the defense of its privileges'. In the
event, the proletariat would eventually be forced to take
the path of force to power, even though they might prefer
the more peaceful way. Lenin justified "the use by the
people of force against those who used force against the
people".

But the communist doctrine of power can also be
challenged on various grounds. Firstly, it is grasped as

18. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers,

a mechanical theory in which the economy determines absolutely the political structure. But the source of power lies not only in the realms of economics but also very much in the forces of psychology and sociology. Further, Marx argued that power is an essential instrument of class war and as such serves the interests of dominant bourgeois class alone. But state is also a welfare agency. Again Lenin has put too much emphasis on force.

Power also flow from political and bureaucratic organizations. Politics cannot be studied properly without identifying the ruling class, or governing and non-governing elites, and measuring their respective roles. Theoretically democracy is said to be a government in which political power is shared by all but practically even in a democracy the power is used by governing or non-governing elites. Democracy therefore, becomes the role of an organised minority which in spite of appearances to the contrary and for all the legal principles on which government rests still retains actual and effective control of the state.

The argument of power invariably with a minority is further adumbrated in the 'iron law of oligarchy as laid down by Robert Michels. He states that all organizations,
however democratic their ideology, become necessarily oligarchic and bureaucratic. It means the rule of bureaucratic official over democratically elected parliamentary representatives and an authority based on position in a hierarchy of salaried officialdom. These organisations give a birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. who says organisation says oligarchy."

In short, the essence of the elite theory lies in the affirmation that if the principal aim of a political theorist is to uncover key factors in the arena of power, then the study of elites is indispensable. There can be no organisation without power and power always resides in the hands of a very small section of the chosen few. The struggle for power virtually takes place between contending elites. It may be described as the conflict between the governing and counter elites. But this theory, too, does not tell the whole truth. In no conflict in a democratic society or even in a non-democratic society, masses can be entirely ignored. For, they generate power.

Power is also viewed as a specific form of communication flow. W.J. Buckley, in his book *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory*, suggests a way in which power may be reconceived, namely as a specific form of communication flow. According to him, society comprises a system of inter-related mechanisms, organisms and socio-cultural sub-systems, linked together by physical, energy and information flows. At the level of the social and cultural systems, the physical and energy components of the flow are of only marginal importance, the system being linked 'almost entirely by conventionalised information exchange.'

Such information flows can 'trigger' action at any level, organic, social or cultural. In these modified cybernetic terms, therefore, power may be defined strictly, at the most general level, as that type of information flow which symbolises non-self-regarding action for the recipient. The purport of the first clause is obvious: it is to be emphasised that power is a specific type of information flow, whose meaning depends upon the coding practices of the recipient. Roderick Martin lists three advantages of this definition. First, it makes

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clear that power is the property of a relationship, not of the individuals in that relationship: power is a specific mode of communication, a signal. But, second, signals have meaning only in terms of the frame of reference of the actor in a situation - the senders and, especially, receivers of the signal or information flow. Third, the relevant frame of reference is that of the subordinate, for it is the limitation upon his self-regarding activity which indicates the existence of a power relation. Despite these advantages, this definition of power can still be criticized for failing to permit the recognition of situations in which subordinates fail to realize that their actions are non-self-regarding. According to this view subordinates may be socialized into accepting a false conception of their own interests and may therefore misinterpret their own activity. Superordinates may use their influence over the formulation of social values, and over the processes of communication, to persuade subordinates that their actions are in their own best interests, strictly defined, and therefore, not the result of power relations. This kind of persuasion is likely to be especially successful in societies which derogate compliance as 'unmanly'. Those who obey because they are afraid do not like to think themselves unmanly or cowardly; in an effort to maintain a decent regard for themselves, the fearful frequently find
ingenious ways in which they can define almost any demand made upon them as legitimate. This view has been elaborated most recently, although in slightly different way by Steven Lukes in his 'Power: A Radical View'.

Steven Lukes makes a conceptual map of power and its cognates (all modes of significant affecting). Needless to say, this map is itself essentially contestable although it is meant to analyse and situate the concept of power which underlies the one, two and three dimensional views of power. It will be seen that in this scheme power may or may not be a form of influence —depending on whether sanctions are involved, while influence and authority may or may not be a form of power —depending on whether a conflict of interest is involved. Consensual authority, with no conflict of interests, is not, therefore, a form of power.

The question is whether rational persuasion is a form of power. The answer can be both Yes and No. Yes, because it is a form of significant affecting: A gets (causes) B to do or think what he would not otherwise do or think. No, because B autonomously accepts A's reasons, so that one is inclined to say that it is not A but A's reasons.

Steven Lukes "Power: A Radical View"
or B's acceptance of them, that is responsible for
B's change of course. It may be further asked whether
power can be exercised by A over B in B's real interests.
That is, suppose, there is a conflict not between
preferences of A and B but that A's preferences are in
B's real interests. To this there are two possible
responses: (i) that A might exercise 'short term power'
over B (with an observable conflict of subjective
interests), but that if and when B recognises his real
interests, the power relations ends: it is self-annihilating;
or (ii) that all or most forms of attempted or successful
control by A over B, when B objects or resists, constitute
a violation of B's autonomy, that B has a real interest
in his own autonomy so that such an exercise of power cannot
be in B's real interests. Clearly the first of these
responses is open to misuse by seeming to provide a paternalist
licence for tyranny; while the second furnishes an anarchist
defence against it, collapsing all or most cases of influence
into power. Steven Lukes adds, "Though attracted by the
second, I am inclined to adopt the first, the dangers of which
may be obviated by insisting on the empirical basis for
identifying real interests. The identification of these is
not up to A, but to B, exercising choice under conditions of
relative autonomy and, in particular, independently of A's
power—e.g. through democratic participation."25

25 Ibid., p.33.
The power is also treated as a type of causation. Herbert Simon, James March, Robert Dahl, Jack Nagel etc. popularized this approach. They maintain that compelling similarities exist between power and cause; both denote relations that are, in some sense, asymmetric. When intuitive ideas of power are spelled out, they seem to be causal. In the behaviourist analysis of power, the action that A is supposed to perform before B responds is assumed to indicate, whether crudely or subtly, the response by B that A would like or desire. Similarly, in the case of anticipated reactions, B expects a reward from A if his behaviour pleases A, or punishment if A dislikes what he does. Correspondence between controller's desires and respondent's behaviour is thus implicit in both types of power. Indeed some notions of 'what is desired' seem inherent, which can be understood more comprehensively by the term 'preference'.

Jack Nagel in his book 'The Descriptive Analysis of Power' developed this idea of defining power as causation by preferences. A prefers B to do x, it implies that if certain conditions obtain before B responds, A will attempt to cause B to do x; and/or if certain other conditions are fulfilled after B responds, A will reward B if he has done x or punish him if he has not done x. Since A's preference,
if stable, exists both before and after B's response, causality can be attributed to it even when conditions for its manifestation in A's behaviour do not occur before B responds.

In the behaviourist case, A's behaviour is the proximate cause of B's response. A's preference, however, indirectly causes B's response, because it can be regarded as a cause of A's behaviour (figure 2).

In the case of anticipated reaction the middle step in the sequence is omitted, it can be substituted by B's anticipation (figure 3).

Thus A's preference causes B's response in both sequences, whereas A's behaviour is a cause in only the first. Thus a power relation, actual or potential, is an actual or potential casual relation between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself.\(^\text{26}\) Actor here refers to an individual, group, organisation or other collectivity. The outcome is a variable indicating the state of behaviour, beliefs, attitudes or policies of a second actor.

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Figure 2

A's preference

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A's behaviour (Influence Attempt)

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B's response

Figure 3

A's response

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B's anticipation of A's future reaction

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B's response
The causal variable in the definition is actor's behaviour, not the actor himself. The statement "A exercised power over B" is to be construed as "A's preferences caused B's behaviour". Further the preferences must concern the outcome caused. If A's preference for C₁ over C₂ causes D₁ to occur instead of D₂, A does not necessarily have power over D.²⁷

Causal conception of power avoids the danger of needless repetition. Unless the military uses its weapons to cause political outcome they like, political power cannot be attributed to it. This approach recognizes that the relation between armory of the armed forces and political power must be stated empirically. Causation approach also enables power researchers to employ methods developed for more general applications. Among them are experimental designs, statistical measures, etc. Causation approach creates some suspicions also. To some causality itself is suspect. Again the causal theorist equate power with its exercise, ignoring the traditional identification of power with potentiality or capability. Despite these shortcomings the causal version of power has achieved widespread acceptance. In the present study, this approach to power will be used. However there is a need for more explanation for better understanding.

²⁷Ibid., p.30.
Some of the definitions view power as a class of acts themselves, while others consider it as the potential or capacity to act. Some definitions stress the personal or individual character of power; others see it as an organisational property which individuals share only by virtue of their positions in these organisations. In many definitions the element of coercion is integral; people are forced to perform certain ways against their wills. Some see power as related to the degree of participation in the decision-making. Assuming that the various emphases in these definitions identify many of the parameters of defining power, they still raise several questions.

Is power an organisational or personal property?

Talcott Parsons regards power as an inherent property of organisation. Power does result from the summing of human energy, but does it always or only serve collective purposes? The answer must be that sometimes it does, but sometimes it does not. We do create organisations, i.e., sum power, to achieve collective purposes for example, an army. But this capacity can operate to achieve unintended as well as intended effects. In service, many times one

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has to modify his behaviour vis-a-vis his supervisors. One does because supervisors have more power in the sense that they have greater access to pooled energies. In sum, power exists, whether or not it serves collective purposes, it is not sure.

A very important question about power is: Is the element of coercion essential to the definition of power? R. Bierstedt chooses to stress heavily the coercive aspect of power. He also conceives of it as a latent organizational property. To coerce is a verb: A coerces B. If this is power it is no longer latent. If this is no longer latent then in Bierstedt's terms, it is no longer power. If power is meant as potentially coercive, then at least the problem of contradiction disappears. But does power have to be potentially coercive to the exclusion of all other potentialities? Pooled energy can be and is used to coerce others, but it can be used to serve collective purposes.

Power simply is. It is not inherently directed; it is directed by people and in a multiplicity of ways, not all of them are coercive. The relationship between power and social control can be described as (i) Power is latent energy locked in by human organization (ii) It is not directed

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29 Quoted in Ibid., p.7.
30 Ibid., pp.7-8.
energy in and of itself. Others direct it in a variety of ways, coercive or otherwise, (iii) As latent energy it must be taken into account by those who need it or value its particular forms. In this process of taking into account the persons or groups may feel coerced or they may not.

Is power located exclusively or even primarily in the decision-making structures? To the extent that the concept of decision-making structure is an organizational concept, it follows that power will vary with the organizational characteristics of the structure: its degree of integration, the energetic involvement of the members and so on. Of course, the attribution of organizational properties to these structures may be empirically invalid in some cases. But setting that distinct possibility aside, the real question here is not whether these structures have any power, but whether or not they are the primary loci of power. There is a difference between decision makers and decision-shapers. The former are in the decision structure but the latter are not, yet the latter have great access to power. Decisions may be shaped by the perceived attitudes and opinions of specific persons, but they may also be shaped by predominant values and norms. Values, norms, customs or traditions are not synonymous with power but they are highly relevant to understand decision-processes as long as they are determinants of the action of people who have unusual access to power.
How does political power come into the world?

Of what situation is it born? Many answers to this question can be made. The fatherhood of power can be found in violence, in raw will to dominate; in some divine sanction which makes of power a second religion; in some moment of contract between members of the incipient political society. Their importance cannot be minimised but here the problem is somewhat different: what are the situations under which political power develops in human relations? There was power long before there was a written word for it. What then are these situations from which power emerges?

Charles S. Herrion has grouped these situations under three main heads without too great emphasis on this special form of classification.\(^{31}\)

(I) Power is first of all a phenomenon of social group tensions which give rise to the need for organised political action. The problem of cohesion in the modern state involves the relationships between various ethnic groups, religions, economic classes, geographical regions and cultural groups. There is the possibility within the groups themselves of further differentiation into many minor groups which break up into yet more minute splinters. And if there were no groups there would still be individuals, as aggressive as groups themselves. The accommodation of these groups

\(^{31}\) Lesswell, Herrion and Smith (ed.), "Political Power", op. cit., p.15.
(end of the individual as within them) produces a situation from which political power emerges. The functional situation out of which the political power arises is not the demand for force as such, but the need for some form of equilibrium, adjustment, modus vivendi between the various groups and individuals of the community, as a substitute indeed for force in many cases.32

(II) Different types of personalities must be adopted and adjusted under all systems by whatever means are available —by force, customs, persuasion, social pressure, individual orientation etc. And this adoption of value systems constitute one of the great tasks of social and political control. Not only are there many widely varying types of men amongst whom the conduct and objectives of the government must be adjusted but the attitudes of the same persons change from day to day and still more one mode of experience to other modes and shades of social contact. Much of the personality adjustment is indeed effected without the aid of government, some through the family, the religious institutions, the occupation and groups etc. and other through less organised forms of associations. But many adjustments require 'the assistance of political power groups to effect the reconciliation of

32Ibid., p.21.
competing claims and interests'. Not only this is true but the governmental mechanism must further take account of the development of the personality through various stages of growth and change, the varying age groupings and changes that take place as the individual advances from one stage to another of the life drama and here we find the birth of political power.

(III) The birth of political power is not only the result of social group tensions and personality types to be adjusted in the society but likewise of "the power hungry, the leaders, who are ripe for these group situations and these personality arrangements". Out of this whirl of events there come leaders, governors, specialists in the art demanded or made possibly by the social environment of the moment: those who know how and have the urge to act. It is not the question here whether the situation makes the man or man makes the situation but surely they work together in the formation of power complex. If the rulers are examined carefully, it becomes evident that the qualities of leadership are found in a group of individuals who together are able to function as a politicizing instrument for the community and for themselves.

33 Ibid., p. 27.
34 Ibid., p. 15.
In the interplay of these factors, the birth of power may be observed and its essential characteristics and processes discovered.

Power is the central concept in the present study but there are several closely related terms which require clarification. Many have exchanged the terms 'power', 'compliance', 'coercion', 'authority', 'influence' for each other at will, and in so doing have added considerably to the confusion.

Compliance refers to the attitudes and behaviour caused by power, or more formally, to the non-self-regarding actions performed at the behest (direct or indirect) of others. Rather in more broad sense compliance refers both to a relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive supported by another actor's power, and to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied.

Coercion comprises the application, or the threat of application, of physical sanctions such as infliction of pain, deformity, or death; generation of frustration through restriction of movement; or controlling through force the satisfaction of needs such as those for food, sex, comfort and the like, in order to persuade some persons.

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or groups to take some decisions or perform some action which otherwise they would not be likely to do. There are few major problems in this definition. Firstly it is difficult to distinguish between behaviour in response to implicit threats, and behaviour regarded as appropriate to a given status; fear of the consequences of non-compliance and belief in the rectitude of compliance are often difficult to distinguish. Similarly, behaviour may be conditioned not by violence, or threat of violence, but by anticipation of unfavourable reactions from powerful others. Further, is deprivation of happiness (a frequent result of fulfilling moral obligations) a form of coercion?

The essential element in the concept of authority is legitimacy. Authority is said to lie in the right to expect and command obedience. Hence authority is considered as that type of superiority which involves the legitimised right (and/or obligation) to control the action of others in social relationship. The superordinate's right to exact compliance is based upon the consent of the subordinate. This consent may be founded upon a number of different bases—tradition, charisma or legal rationality etc. In general terms, authority relationships exist where subordinates consent to their own non-self-regarding actions, regardless of the basis for that consent.36 To be more specific,

Authority is a consent legitimately given to groups or individuals to direct certain activities and to utilise certain resources to achieve collective purposes.

Influence is a relation among individuals, groups, associations, organizations and states. Rather it is better to state that influence is a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actor, to act in some way they would not otherwise act. A influences B to the extent that he gets B to do something that B would not otherwise do. Of course this also includes instances in which actor A induces B to go on doing something he is now doing, though B would stop doing it except for A's inducement. Thus influence is a factor which may alter the behaviour of an individual in a desired direction when it is exercised. But it denotes uncertainty regarding the likelihood of desired efforts being produced when A exercises influence over B, compared to the much higher degree of probability of production of desired effects, when A exercises power over B.

Since political power is the main theme of the present study, it can be defined as that kind of power which is wielded for political objectives. In the present study, when used alone, the term power is to be understood as referring to political power.
