INTRODUCTION
As suggested in the preface, this dissertation attempts to specify the meaning of the term "experience" in John Dewey. To delimit, to serve as a definite frame of reference and to render the specification as precise as possible, the following problems have been chosen:

1. What constitutes a paradigm instance of knowledge?—Locus and the criterion of validity of such an instance.

2. The nature of language and meaning in general.

3. Is value-judgment an instance of knowledge?

4. What is an art object?


6. Scope of metaphysics — its relation with knowledge, value and art.

With reference to specifically the sixth problem the introduction outlines the meaning of the term "experience" in a sketchy and preliminary sense. In the six chapters following introduction, each one of these problems has been taken up for a detailed discussion. Chapter seven presents a detailed account of the import of these six discussions for a fuller specification
of the meaning of the term "experience" in John Dewey.

Experience?

Dewey's philosophic theory may very correctly be termed as a philosophy of experience. Joseph Ratner finds his works naturally grouping themselves into "special (or specific) logic of the typical (or distinctive) modes of experience". Ratner is of the opinion that Dewey's theory of knowledge, ethics, esthetics and educational theory represent respectively logics of scientific, ethical, esthetic and educational modes of experience and his metaphysics integrates these special logics into a comprehensive logic of an un compartmentalised

\[1\] "When we take Dewey's works severally, they very naturally group themselves into special (or specific) logics of the typical (or distinctive) modes of experience. Thus to mention some of his representative works: Human Nature and Conduct in the special logic of the socio-ethical mode of experience; Art as Experience is the special logic of the esthetic mode; A Common Faith of the religious; the early logical works, The Quest for Certainty and Logic; the Theory of Inquiry comprise the special logic of the scientific modes of experience; Individualism old and New, Liberalism and Social Action -- comprise the socio-practical or utilitarian; .... And finally, Experience and Nature. All modes of experience are naturally interconnected, being socio-cultural differentiations of common experience. None, therefore, of the special logics enumerated is separated and isolated from the rest... Experience and Nature is the logic of widest and most inclusive generality."

totality of experience. As a whole Dewey's philosophy of experience forms a coherent whole, and it is the meaning he attaches to the term experience, which acts as the most obvious tying link to render his thought all in one piece.

The comment made by Joseph Ratner very rightly suggests that different modes of experience i.e. scientific, ethical and esthetic etc. are naturally interconnected because it is the same individual who endeavours to know, act and enjoy and that psychologically there is no division between intellectual, motor and emotional aspects of human individuals. But his comment fails to present a fair representation of Dewey, in claiming that his formulations of different modes of experience do clearly depict their logical distinctions, or that these specific and logically distinct themes have successfully been treated by him in separate books. Because this is precisely what is missing in Dewey's exposition and his thought needs to be supplemented especially in this direction. Dewey, in fact, could not work out the micro details of his thought because he was more seriously occupied with its macro aspect. His thought rather displays an overwhelming anxiety towards systematizing various human endeavours and bridging gulfs, created by
contemporary trends of narrow specialization both in the sphere of human knowledge and action. The problems which Dewey could foresee, and does attempt to find solution to, are more acutely felt as the trend in specialization has advanced. Andreas M. Kazamias displays his deep concern about the cultural split which results from pursuing intellectual or theoretical aims in isolation. He says, "The cultural split is becoming a matter of grave concern to English social theorists and educationists and the clamor now is for a more reasonable balance. Not only there is a split between literary intellectuals and scientists, but there is also developing a gap between scientists themselves. The pure scientists have gradually detached themselves from applied science and consider their more practically minded brothers as intellectually inferior. They seem to have supplanted the snobbism of the literary intellectuals of the previous century by a brand of their own."²

Totality of Dewey's thinking is geared to safeguard man's endeavour against the cultural split which

has already reached its grave limits. His empirical naturalism, as he prefers to name his metaphysics, is an attempt to build a hypothetical but an exhaustive perspective in which narrow hypothesis or perspectives of theoretical knowledge, experimental knowledge, values, art and a theory of education etc. do find their respective places. He qualifies his naturalism by the term empirical, because the totality of objects of his metaphysical theory are characterized by empirically observable traits. Though Dewey's metaphysical theory admits of only those objects as truly existing which find their support in empirical evidence, yet it is claimed by him, that these objects exhaust totality of man's universe. In his book on meta-physics, *Experience and Nature*, he has very clearly stated that "To discover some general features of experienced things and to interpret their significance for a philosophic theory of the universe in which we live is the aim of this volume."³

Dewey justifies his comprehensive empirical naturalism by reference to a very definite criterion, which he makes explicit and which he considers every

empirical theory must satisfy. What constitutes the domain of its objects is a basic question for any empirical theory. In fact the clarity with which an empirical theory enumerates its objects is important. The theory itself is necessitated because of some obscurity about the nature of these objects, but as the theory is formulated and is referred back to these objects they are rendered more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealing with them more fruitful. Any theory, whether physical, social or psychological, would enjoy an empirical status if it precisely defines the domain of its objects of study and finds these objects furnishing both the data for theorizing and materials for the ultimate test and empirical verification.

Dewey does claim that his metaphysics shares with sciences their empirical and hypothetical nature, but he does not claim it to be a science. Since he does not explicitly draw any distinction between an empirical and an experimental hypothesis, the status of his metaphysics as an empirical hypothesis is obscured. This obscurity leads Manley Thompson to conclude that, "He (Dewey) recognizes no form of critical inquiry with a

\[\text{Ibid., p. 10.}\]
different method. He professes to have a metaphysics which follows the method of natural sciences."

Certainly, Dewey denies the name warranted assertion to his metaphysical hypothesis which he reserves only for an outcome of experimental method of science. Yet Manley Thompson alone is not responsible for the above misinterpretation. Dewey failed to clearly see that a metaphysician cannot afford to ape scientific methodology for it would mean application of scientific norms to non-scientific subject matter. The absence of any explicit distinction between the empirical and the experimental leads him even to misconstrue the nature of value-judgments and claim that these are not methodologically marked off from other kinds of scientific judgments. But since this distinction is implicit in his thought of which his conception of art and metaphysics supply ample evidence, it can be significantly maintained that though Dewey grants science, values, art and metaphysics a similar empirical status it is not necessary that these must be empirically valid

in the same sense, because it is his very clear conviction that the nature of empirical relevance follows from the methodological procedures adopted to arrive at these empirical meanings.

Dewey's metaphysics accepts all that varied sciences, values and art register through their peculiar methodologies, but it also takes care of what is left out. It is therefore a more inclusive and intense statement of the meanings of existence. In fact, systematic theories of varied sciences, whether theoretical or experimental along with their methodology and the objects of their study, do equally occupy a place in Dewey's metaphysical universe with totality of other human affairs by way of moral, practical or esthetic activities.

To clarify what possibly is included as "experienced things" among the objects of his metaphysical universe, Dewey provides a random sample of such objects. These include "what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine -- in short, processes of experiencing "Experience" denotes the planted field, the sowed seeds, the repeated harvests, the changes of night and day, spring and autumn, wet and dry, heat and cold, that are observed, feared, longed for, it also
denotes the one who plants and reaps, who works and 
rejoices, hopes, fears, plans, invokes magic or chemistry 
to aid him, who is down-cast or triumphant. It is 
"double barrelled" in that it recognizes in its primary 
integrity no division between act and material, subject 
and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed 
totality.\textsuperscript{6}

A cursory look at the "experienced things" listed 
in the above quotation suggests that the term experience 
has a meaning in his thought which allows an 
interchangeable use of the phrases "things of experience" 
and "things of the universe". Departure of his 
conception of experience, either from Greek, modern 
and contemporary analytical empiricists, is quite 
evident. Greek and modern empiricists equated 
experienced objects with mere isolated and subjective 
sensations. Contemporary empiricists equate them with 
sense data — sense data too, are atomic in nature but 
does involve an objective reference, which experienced 
objects, as mere private and subjective sensation, lacked.

But sense-data cannot constitute the stuff of 
the universe because has no independent existence

apart from the ideas of which these are the functional correlates, e.g. the existential correlate of the concept of electron has no independent existence apart from the concept itself. The functional nature of sense data grows more obvious when it is realized that as science progresses, sense data of new order are brought into existence. According to Dewey, both ideas and sense data are constructions within a process of scientific inquiry. Moreover qualities are not limited to mere sense qualities i.e. primary and secondary. There are tertiary qualities like tragic, poignant disturbed, settled etc. These are considered mental by contemporary empiricists and are not given an equal standing with primary and secondary qualities. In fact locus of none of these primary, secondary or tertiary qualities is either mind or the external world. They belong to different modes of experience which cut across the dualism of subject and object, mental or physical. Yet these give the most obvious empirical evidence of the fact that things of the universe can be experienced in a variety of ways or modes.

It is, in fact, Dewey's fundamental thesis that contextual distinctions, either by way of qualities or substantial distinctions between subject and object, doer and the act, act and the content within any
particular mode of experience do not refer to any ontological distinctions. They refer to perspectival modes of human experience, which emerge as socio-cultural differentiations out of undifferentiated metaphysical mode presupposed in every narrow perspective. The category with which Dewey chooses to represent objects of metaphysical universe is event. He selects this category due to the neutrality with which it can represent undifferentiated objects of a naturalistic theory and the efficiency with which it refers to certain generic traits of these objects.

Every event is different from other event spatially, temporally and functionally. The universe, which comprises events, does not simply have a present; it has a past and a future. Dewey is thoroughly impressed by Darwin's theory of evolution for it presents a dynamic portrait of the dynamic objects of nature. Darwin's thought contains an important implication for the scope of different sciences as independent disciplines, for it defies a fine line of demarcation between physics and biology or between inorganic and organic chemistry. Which in turn leaves a direct and more significant impact on philosophic thinking, for it changes its earlier conception of nature and man's relation to it. Man is not a ghost in a machine. In a world marked by evolution man is only an
emergent event characterized by different emergent functions absent at simpler level. Even matter that constitutes an evolving world is not governed by any principles like arrangement and rearrangement (as suggested by materialism). Matter too is characterised by functional principle of selective activity.

The organic has evolved from the inorganic and more complex organisms have evolved from simpler ones only in a growing nature. This unidirectional and cumulative time dimension which characterizes nature as a whole characterizes every event in it. Dewey traces the development of the psychophysical and the mental from mere physical. He finds that these transitional stages of human development are marked by distinctive empirical functions. Organization is an empirical trait that demarcates the organic from the inorganic events. A simpler inorganic event as a part of an organized complex event behaves in a different manner, e.g. iron, as a constituent of an organism, acts in order to maintain the type of activity, which marks the total organization and at the same time it maintains itself. This pervasive operative function of the whole for the part and of part for the whole constitutes feeling. Feeling exists in a formless condition or without configured distinction in plant life. It may be, at that level, only potentially
so. The quality of feeling is fully realized in psychophysical organisms, i.e. life forms marked by complexly mobile and discriminating responses. With them feeling is capable of receiving and bearing distinctions without end.

Psycho-physical organisms experience feelings which vary abundantly in quality but they do not know that they have them. Cognitive experience of qualities or feelings is possible only at mental level. Mind, according to Dewey, qualifies those feeling creatures, who have acquired the capacity of making use of symbols. Yet, even the symbolic activities of men are activities of nature; these are not what they arbitrarily inject into nature, their doings are doings of nature a further complication of its own domain. Interaction of inorganic events grows into a transaction between man and his environment and communication between men. The totality of man's transactions either with his environment or with other men constitutes experience.

Experience occurs continuously because an interaction of the organism with its environment is co-extensive with the life process itself. An evolving continuity requires that the gains of earlier interactions be made freely available to subsequent interaction. At sub-human
level this function of constant accumulation is carried on through organic memory and routine habits. But in specifically human context lower physiological and biological activities do not suffice. Man's symbolic activities whether by way of science, value or art represent the processes of accumulation necessary for life functions in characteristically human predicament. Although there exists a wide gap between activities at sub-human and at human level, yet Dewey makes sure that naturalistically higher symbolic functions like logical thinking or artistic creation are continuous with lower physiological functions in nature.

It is Dewey's fundamental contention that all interaction of the organism with its environment is governed by one and the same principle: that organism has certain needs, which cannot be supplied without activity on the part of the organism and this activity affects a two-way modification both of the surroundings and the organism. Creation of new sign-systems or giving new significance to familiar physical occurrences fall, therefore, under the self-same category of transformation of the environment along with, say, the building of a house or constructing a bridge.

Science, values and art are the most evolved of
all the objects of nature, these are not a subjective monopoly of human mind, these meanings are intimately connected with man's activities of knowing, moral choosing and creative activity and involve his transaction with the environment. Dewey is of the opinion that, "... facts are explicable only when it is realized that scientific and artistic systems embody the same fundamental principle of the relationship of life to its surrounding and that both satisfy the same fundamental needs. Probably a time will come when it will be universally recognized that the differences between coherent logical schemes and artistic structures in poetry and music and plastics are technical and specialized, rather than deep-seated." 7

Dewey, in fact, wishes to emphasize the fact that knowledge, value and art have empirical significance because these are all equally the outcome of man's co-operation and encounter with the world. He is right in maintaining that man as a thinking, feeling and acting being is involved in totality of his transaction with his environment but he fails to develop and account for the distinctions among them which could, according to his own naturalistic position, be empirically accounted

for in terms of the range and degree of intimacy of man with his environment manifest in the different methodologies in these various domains. Logical or linguistic differentiations and discriminations among science, values and art result from the different manners and range of the interaction of an observing, reasoning, emotional and imaginative creature; predominant aspect affects the subject matter differently.

This dissertation makes a very humble attempt to develop distinctions between science, values and art specifically with respect to the nature of meaning that these signify. It is maintained that scientific concepts contain operational meanings, values contain behavioral meanings (though behavioral not in defacto but dejure sense) and art symbols register comparatively wholesome experiences. It is further maintained that these distinctions are developed according to Dewey's own recommendation that nature of ideas depend upon the methodological means by which these are arrived at. Since these methodological considerations are best developed with respect to his operational theory of scientific concepts, his conception of knowledge or science has been chosen to constitute the first chapter.