CHAPTER II

PREVAILING STRATEGIES TO CHECK MODERN WARFARE
The chapter dwells on the efficacy of conventional and modern strategies in restricting the modern warfare. Strategy is generally understood as the science or art of combining and employing the means of war in planning and directing operation of war. It is not merely the art of military command. According to Clausewitz, "It has come to mean much more than the theory of the use of combats for the object of war".\(^1\) Charles Burton Marshall observed that strategy is very comprehensive. It is integral to maintaining peace. It involves bringing together all the nation's assets and capabilities for securing its interests. In his view it is "the principle of coherence between an organised society's capabilities for warfare and its enduring purposes".\(^2\) Today, strategy involves several non-military factors such as economic, psychological, moral, political and technological. Therefore, strategy is not merely a wartime concept but it is an inherent element of statecraft, which requires the art of controlling and

1. Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 177.
utilising the resources of a nation or a coalition of nations to promote and secure vital interests against an enemy or enemies actual or potential—addressed as grand strategy.

However, the central feature of strategy in the present context is not what the strategy means but assessing the role of some of the techniques in vogue in international politics which are employed in restricting the scope of war. Currently, several moves have been made for checking the wars including limitation of conventional and nuclear arms. How far these strategies or approaches can serve the purpose, is a big question. In fact the problem is the efficacy of the conventional strategies to prevent war, such as the collective security, alliances, deterrence and disarmament.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Collective security has been commonly regarded as the most promising of all the approaches to peace. As per the meaning, it seeks to confront the would be aggressors with the concerted power of states determined to keep peace.

The idea of collective security dates back to seventeenth century. The treaty of Westphalia (1648) obliged all its signatories (article 123), "to defend
and protect all and every article of the peace against anyone". Article 124 further obligated the members "to join the injured party, and assist him with counsel and force to repel the injury".\(^3\)

The Treaty of Osnabruck, also, of the seventeenth century, provided that "all and each of the contracting parties shall be held to defend and maintain all and each of the disposition of this peace against whomever it may be".\(^4\)

In 1713, the French Philosopher, Abbe de St. Pierre drew up plans for "an alliance of all states which should guarantee the territory of all its members ... and opposed by arms any power that should refuse to give effect to its judgement".\(^5\)

The elaboration of the collective security idea and its widespread popularity was distinctly a phenomenon of the opening decades of the twentieth century. In the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, France and Great

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Britain a variety of peace enforcement plans were offered. During First World War, a broadly Association, "The organisation Centrale Pour Une Paix Durable", functioned at the Hague as the focal point for groups interested in promoting the idea of collective security. In the United States, a number of more or less nebulous proposals were reduced to one and given a certain concreteness with the organisation of "The league to enforce peace" in June 1915.6

As World War I seemed to challenge man's survival, it gave rise to the argument that war anywhere was of universal concern. The underlying idea of all the private and public schemes that flourished in Europe as well as in America for peace was that wars were likely to occur, that they ought to be prevented, and that their prevention anywhere in the world was the concern of every state. This is summed up in the doctrine of collective security.

Wilsonian concept of collective security "posited a system of international organisation in which all nations would recognize an obligation to combine against any nation guilty of aggression as determined by impartial procedures and laws". 7

President Wilson's conception of collective security presented an emphatic contrast to the pre-existing balance of power system. He pictured the new system as one in which all nations, big or small, would cooperate in the common cause of guaranteeing security and justice to all, rather than engage in competitive alliances as in the old system.  

The Article 16 of the Covenant of the League laid down that resort to war by a state should be regarded *ipso facto* as an 'act of war' against all the member states. As a last resort the article also provided for the possibility of collective military sanctions, to be initiated on the recommendation of the council. Italo-Ethopian dispute of 1935 was the one where sanctions against an aggressor were proposed and applied in a successful manner.  

Collective security under United Nations was the post war development for world peace. In the London declaration of June 12, 1941 all the nations then fighting against Hitler announced their intention of working together, with other free people, to establish

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"a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security". This was followed by the Atlantic Charter and United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, signed by 26 nations and Moscow Declaration which recognised the "necessity of establishing, at the earliest possible date, a general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving states and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security. Security Council is an organ of the United Nations, which has a more comprehensive plans and programmes for the maintenance of peace in the world. The Charter of the United Nations itself provides the objective for its formation. The conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in August 1941 was the first in the series of war time conferences among the great powers which laid the foundations for the successful creation of the U.N.O. in 1945.

The organisation would be upheld, it was widely supposed, by the continued common interest of the victorious powers in preserving peace; by the growing economic and technological interdependence of mankind; and by general acceptance of the principle of national self-determination for dependent peoples both as an act of justice and as a contribution to world order. By establishing an international organisation the participating states agreed to cooperate on matters of common concern in the political, economic and social realms. A great attempt was made to eliminate the use of force in international relations by individual states and resort to arms was declared illegal except in self defence and in furtherance of collective measures. Norman Hill rightly observes that "the structure of the United Nations, like that of any international organisation is the composite

result of many conditions and forces." Further, he adds, "it is an instrument of cooperation, in its principal activities it is diplomacy grown up in maturity." It was hoped that under the circumstances in which the cold war and confrontations between the major powers were the most dangerous sources of international tensions, United Nations would influence the course of world politics in such a way as to promote a true peaceful existence. In fact, United Nations resulted from co-existence between great powers. The phrase goes that UN was born in a hot war, brought up in a cold war. So war-time alliance was a hope for peace-time cooperation. But this hope remains unfulfilled. The emergence of the Soviet Union along with the United States as a major force in world politics in the course of the Second World War, lent urgency to the question of finding ways and means of perpetuating the war-time collaboration between the Allies. The Russians, too,


* The structure of the United Nations, like that of any international organisation, is the composite result to many conditions and forces. Its multitude of commission and specialized agencies are a reflection of the fact that almost every public problem has become by this time an international problem, whether it be health, poverty, unemployment, nutrition, traffic in opium or the maintenance of peace and order. (Norman Hill, p. 126).

view peaceful co-existence as a part of their strategy to neutralize any hostile move of the Allies. We are neither in the state of peace nor involved in global war. Hence the United Nations is upholding a certain point of co-existence between the two powers through its six principal organs like the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. Together they are able to deal with all types of international problems — economic, social, undeveloped areas, disputes between nations, aggression and breaches of the peace. The facilities which they offer can be used for conference for the negotiation of programmes of action, for the application of sanctions against an aggressor for the settlement of international controversies, for research, for investigation, for publicity and for purpose of international administration. But international peace keeping by the United Nations may involve three different kinds of action, efforts to remove the causes of conflict (prevention), attempts to settle by peaceful

14. Ibid.

* The word prevention is here used in the sense of action to forestall or avoid a situation. Preventive action in the UN Charter, means provisional measures taken by the Security Council to prevent an aggravation of a situation and is without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned.
means those disputes which are not prevented and which endanger world peace (peaceful settlement) and coercive measures in the event of an immediate threat to peace or act of aggression (enforcement). There is, however, unmistakable evidence to show that it has materially contributed to the shortening of four wars: in Indonesia in 1949, in Palestine in 1949, in Egypt in 1956 and in Kashmir in 1965. It has been able to achieve these results because, as envisaged by the Charter, the great powers have a common interest in shortening these wars, or, at least, none of them had an interest in prolonging them. Power politics and problems involving majorities versus minorities were some of the causes of the United Nations intervention in international disputes which perpetuated a sharp division between the victors and the vanquished, between the 'have' and the 'have not' states. The major drawback concerning United Nations organisation is similar to that of the League of Nations which functioned mostly in the interest of the major powers.

United Nations imposes a system of collective security in which order will be enforced upon the smaller states if they resorted to violence, but because of the veto the same constraints cannot be imposed upon the Great Powers. Moreover, the central preoccupation of most of the attempts at creating international order has been the role of force in international politics. Though constraints on the use of force is there, it is not in accord with non-violent system. For, in a non-violent society, the weaker nation has the same opportunity as is available to the strongest. Though it is claimed that some of the heroic principles of the United Nations are in conformity with general view of a non-violent society, it has not functioned in accordance with those principles.

Further, the United Nations seeks not to change the fact of the power potential of the individual states, but rather to use this fact in the pursuit of order in peaceful ways. No attempt is made to curb the power potential of the individual states. Rather the power of the one is turned against that of the other thereby producing equilibrium. This is certainly not in accord with the non-violent system as viewed by Gandhi where...
self-restraint and self-reliance are the basic principles. It is true that some of the principles underlying the United Nation can be cited as in harmony with those of Gandhi's non-violent social order. Thus, Secretary General U. Thant on the occasion of the Gandhian Centenary observed that "many of the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi are in line with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations." For instance, the Charter calls upon us to refrain from the threat or use of force in Article 2, paras 3 and 4 and Article 33 states that in international disputes the parties shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice. But in modern war although the United Nations can be regarded as a means to international order through conflict control, the theory nonetheless makes allowance for violence as a last resort after availing all the peaceful non-violent norms. In post Gandhian violent

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era, there is a mood of restlessness and a desire for change. But peace and security among nations can be achieved only through the elimination of all concepts of violence from the minds of men for which the United Nations as yet has not taken any step. Moreover, the United Nations can be effective in restraining the parties to the dispute from using violence for the resolution of their conflicts only when there is an agreement among the great powers in doing so. If a conflict in the region serves the purpose of the great powers, United Nations becomes more or less ineffective. It is mostly reduced to a debating society. That accounts for several wars and mini wars or civil wars which are going on in the third world countries.

ALLIANCES

Alliance means the state of union or combination for a common object. They are one of the primary means by which states seek the co-operation of other states in order to enhance their power to protect and advance their interests. According to Bennett, "Alliance type


organisations are those whose military and political orientation is intended to provide security against external actors”. Similarly, George Liska observes, “Alliances merely formulise alignments based on interests or coercion”. In simple words, they have been nearest thing to 'Collective Security' in a world of power politics.

An alliance is, therefore, a formal agreement between two or more than two nations to collaborate among themselves on national security issues. Since the alliances are reciprocal and formal agreements, they increase the obligation of signatories to carry out specified commitment and cooperation. The ceremony and solemnity accompanying the formation of an alliance signify that sovereign states have surrendered important aspects of their freedom of action and obligated themselves to an interdependent relationship. The alliances may be defensive or offensive.

24. Ibid., p. 20.
A defensive alliance pre-supposes only a common interest in opposing threats from specific states or groups outside the alliance and does not necessarily or usually entail provisions for settling disputes among its members. An offensive alliance aims at forcibly changing the international status-quo territorially or otherwise to increase the assets of its members. For instance, NATO and OAU are living examples of active and passive defence.

It is said, "Since the days of the League of Delos in 477 B.C. when Athens gathered together most of the city states to repel the Persian invasion, the world has not known an alliance that has lasted as long as the one embodied by the Atlantic Pact. Nor has there been, at any time, one set-up with the sole purpose of maintaining peace rather than waging war". But alliance is formed to strengthen, without seeking military

* A defensive alliance may also be a local or regional collective security agreement. The OAS for example is both. (Robert E. Osgood op. cit., p. 18).
25. Ibid., p. 18.
superiority, its capacity to deter aggression and defend peace. Improvements in allied defence readiness and military capabilities contribute to this end. In the past bilateral agreements or several interlocking bilateral agreements were made during a war or in anticipation of war. And they usually became inoperative or ceased after the war. In the 18th century an alliance was both acquisitive and defensive and aimed at enhancing one's own power as against the power of the adversaries. The scope of these alliances varied from giving subsidies to an ally to lend forces to fight or to fight along the ally under the agreement. Britain enjoyed the role of balancer during that period. Alliances, therefore, equates the balance of power. The eighteenth and nineteenth century alliances were entered into by dynastic, aristocratic or oligarchic rulers. They were not as large as the post-World War II alliances that resulted from the growth of mass participation, rise of non-alignment and the hegemony of two superpowers. Further, after the Second World War the attitude of distrust and hostility has led to the formation of alliances. The alliance arrangement

among allies provides for joint military responses to
an attack on any member of the alliance so that any use
of force will meet with collective counter force. This
way bilateral relations between the super powers have
led to avoidance of direct military confrontation.
NATO and WARSAW have not faced direct confrontation
with each other so far as they are committed to their
own bloc.

In the third world the alliance strategy works
in the form of regional cooperation to enhance their
joint aims against militarization by great powers in
their territories. And it gave credence to non-alignment
policy among states with aspiration of national inde-
pendence and modernization. Modern non-alignment is
not an escapism. It is based on full participation
in world affairs and also an active and consistent
disapproval of and opposition to the alliance system.
Secondly, modern non-alignment is represented by a
significant ratio of world population and of the
number of states in the world. 29

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29. Even during the days of the old type of alliances,
there were always some states that remained outside
the struggles of military alliances. But present
policy of non-alignment is very distinguishable
from the older policy of isolationism or neutrality,
(M.V. Naidu, op. cit., p. 146).
The members of all current military alliances of this type claim that these pacts are compatible with the United Nations Charter. They are similar to collective security action and forward defense policy. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into existence soon after the end of World War II within the purview of the United Nations' Charter, under Chapter VIII dealing with regional arrangements. The treaty was signed on April 4, 1949. Article 52 of the UN Charter states:

1. "Nothing in the present charter percludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional

agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements. '*"31

Consequently, NATO* was conceived more than three decades ago as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, primarily in Central Europe to begin with — to regulate relations between its own members and to contribute towards peace and security in the world as a whole.


* After the coming of NATO in 1949 the western alliance system was further strengthened by the establishment of the ANZUS with U.S., Australia and New Zealand in 1951; the SEATO having US, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France and Pakistan in 1954; the Baghdad Pact comprising US, Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in 1955 — later constituted into the CENTO in 1956. The Soviets responded after rejecting the programme of the Marshall plan within their sphere of influence by setting up in 1949 the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance which included the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The establishment of Warsaw Pact followed in 1955 as a reaction to West Germany entering the NATO.
Actually, the Pact was concluded to respond to ensuring peace, settle international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN Charter. Later on to save communism WARSAW PACT came into existence following other pacts.

The alliance has made a good start toward rectifying the conventional military imbalance. But now it has altered the basic foundations on which NATO stood at the time of its conception. According to Naidu, "Effectiveness of alliance depends upon alliance equality, degree of militarization and military integration, effectiveness of military operations, non-military activities, levels of alliance solidarity". 32

The changing nature of international politics and pattern of war is bound to affect the future and scope of the alliances. Nations, pursuing different political ideologies, today have a tendency to come close

** The WARSAW Pact came to respond to the new situation created by the formation of Western European union with a remilitarized Western Germany as member of NATO. This situation threatened the security and danger of war. The signatories claimed that the aim and principles of U.N. were to guide them and promised friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance based upon sovereignty and independence of nations and non-interference in internal affairs.

Moreover, they are trying to bridge up their differences. Either the old ones lose their utility or new alliances comprising different set of states may appear on the international surface. Emergence of China as a nuclear power and her differences with Soviet Union and her new alliance with U.S.A. and her recent policy of mending relations with the Soviet Union is a rare example of fluctuating alliance. By this, China has not only secured her frontiers from the Soviet Union but has also earned a political and technological lift by coming closer to the United States. If States get around China in creating a third camp, NATO and WARSAY Facts will have to re-assess their strategic dimensions and will have to redefine their role and responsibilities in the light of this new development. Tri-polarity, if it does not succeed, duality will remain the order of the world.

In such a tri-polar world, polarization can take place in regional organisations. The fading American interest in them further heightens the policy of their disintegration. Since the area even today is economically poor and militarily weak, Chinese can sway them politically. America will then no longer be able to assist them. Hence, America should spell out in clear words her security role, if at all she considers herself to be the defender of
democracy and desires to make them effective organisations for checking the spread of communism.

Further, in case the Chinese differences are bridged with the Soviet Union today, communist world will be more strengthened and NATO will be further exposed both to the nuclear black-mail and conventional threats. If an understanding is reached between China and United States, WARSAW Pact will be completely isolated and its members, who even today are aspiring for national sovereignty may join hands with China. Significant here is the mentioning of Poland a seat of Warsaw Pact, which has gone for non-communist government for the first time after the cold war set in. Earlier Yugoslavia chose to go independently in the socialist club.

Whatever may be the future of international politics, to save NATO and WARSAW pact from disintegration, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. must remain equal partners in attaining alliance objectives, which is to some extent, not possible due to continuing objection by member states and growing discrimination within the power bloc. Alliances, therefore, cannot be the sure guarantee for permanent peace. For, any alliance can be upset by a new development in world power politics.
Deterrence in the most general sense is the dissuasion of one adversary by another from undertaking hostile military action by convincing him that such an action would be unsuccessful or too costly since it would incur military counteraction.

This concept is as old as the ability of human beings to inflict pain on their fellow human beings and to anticipate the other person's capability to inflict such pains. For centuries monarchs and terrorists have practised taking and holding hostages to influence the conduct of others and many of those instances were exercises in deterrence, just as holding cities and populations hostage to nuclear annihilation is today. During the Second World War mutual deterrence operated in respect of the excessive use of chemical weapons.

Deterrence has formed the basis of adversary relations ranging from those between individuals to those between powerful kingdoms and nation states. Sun-Tsu advocated the concept of deterrence in the fourth century B.C. (400-320) as he said, "Supreme excellence (in the art of war) consists in breaking
the enemy's resistance without fighting."  

Event today, the holy Qur'an has been interpreted in Pakistan to project a concept of war incorporating deterrence as a component of the total strategy, their military strategy aims at striking terror into the hearts of the enemy from the preparatory stage of war while providing safeguards against being terror-striken by the enemy.  

Deterrence must be built on modern technology rather than on bayonets. Even though the strategy had been exercised through the ages and practised before Hiroshima but its deterrent effect was limited to the extent that for the absence of any unacceptable retaliation on the adversary resulted in the unleashing of several wars including wars at global scale. Further, the arms race of the prenuclear period inevitably ended in wars and the resolution of the question of the hierarchy of


power. But in the nuclear era such a resolution through war is ruled out. Deterrence calls for a visible adversary to be deterred. Nuclear deterrence has resulted in a situation where the dominant power can express its superior status only through a build up of weaponry, deployment of its forces worldwide and exercise of coercive diplomacy all over the globe. The responding power too, can formulate its response only in terms of competitive weapons build up, deployment of its forces as widely as possible and exercise of its share and style of coercive diplomacy. In this sense the exercise of deterrence is not confined to Europe, its play and counter play are seen all over the world.\(^\text{36}\)

**Albert Wohlstetter (1959) explains six main conditions that a nuclear power must meet in order to be assured of being able to retaliate against a nuclear attack.** In his view, the successful deterrence, to some extent depends on the ability of a country to retaliate. Thus, he explains deterrence according to these six terms:

1. The maintenance of a standing reliable deterrent force in peace-time.

2. The ability of this force to survive a pre-emptive first strike.

3. The ability of national leaders to make the decisions to retaliate and then transmit this command to the military forces (i.e. reliable command, control communication and intelligence or (31).

4. The ability of the retaliatory force to reach distant enemy territory.

5. The ability to penetrate enemy active defences (e.g., anti-aircraft missiles, interceptors, etc.).

6. The ability to overcome enemy passive defences (e.g., bomb shelters, civil defence). 37

Daniel Ellsberg in 1960 also elaborated Wohlstetter's argument by expressing deterrence in terms of an expected useful (advantageous) computation.

It means that a state could undermine deterrence by deploying forces that were especially well suited to

striking first, but ill suited to striking second (e.g. high accuracy missiles deployed on unprotected launchers, weapons that would be good for "Counter force" strikes intended to disarm an opponent, but poor for retaliating after an attack). Such forces might encourage an opponent to calculate that its best option was to strike first in a crisis in which case the state would be said to have undermined deterrence by "provoking" its opponent into striking.  

But the object of deterrence is to prevent an enemy power taking the decision to use armed force. The result which it is desired to achieve is, therefore, a psychological one, and it is sought by means of a threat.

The basis of modern war lies with the nuclear war risk. The nuclear weapon, therefore, represents a 'destructive capability' so great that it cannot be


* The way in which deterrence acts is basically the exact opposite of that of war, in that the object of deterrence is to prevent the enemy taking a decision to act, whereas the object of war is to force him to take the decision to accept the conditions, it is desired to impose on him.
disregarded nor can there be any doubt about the serious damage which it would inevitably produce. It is this threat of destruction which generates deterrence because of the undoubted level of risk implied. The nutshell was, therefore, that capacity for riposte was the key to nuclear deterrence, whereas capability to reduce the riposte was the key to nuclear initiative.

In simple terms, if deterrence, is used simply to prevent an enemy initiating against an action of which one is afraid, its effect is defensive; if on the other hand it is used to prevent the enemy resisting some action which one proposes to take oneself, deterrence is offensive.

This offensive or defensive action may be either direct or indirect depending upon its use either between two opponents or for the benefit of a third party.

Finally, deterrence may be total, if it is applicable to all. A situation, in which there were twelve or fifteen independent nuclear deterrents, was more stable than the one where only two or three or five nations possessed such deterrents. In Pierre Gallois viewpoint the increase in uncertainty for any
nuclear nation, consequent on the exercise of a number of independent nuclear weapon powers would increase the overall deterrent effect on all nations and such a multi-person game would make it difficult for any one or two nations to impose their nuclear hegemony on the international system.

Nonetheless, in today's usage deterrence is mostly equated with the defence policy of the western security system, that is, the members of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) Japan and countries closely associated with them. These countries regard deterrence as indispensable to their security. They see deterrence as the basis of 40 years of peace for countries that experienced two world wars in the first half of this century. But for many others in the world, deterrence evokes the spectre of an arms race to maximize nuclear terror, which threatens to end in a global catastrophe.


Military deterrence also operates independently of the super powers among countries not aligned with them. This is because deterrence is integral to any international conflict in which armed adversaries may resort to war or the threat of war. Among such armed adversaries, however, the post war record shows that incentive to go to war are much stronger. Consequently, there has been a great variety of inter state, transnational and international armed conflict among third world countries. This is primarily because of the intensity of national, ethnic and communal conflicts among countries that are still in an early and middle stages of national and international development following the dissolution of the colonial era. But it is also because of the general absence of those special conditions of military equilibrium among adversaries that help to sustain mutual deterrence between the super powers.41

Super-power deterrence on the other hand has also not brought peace and order to all aspect of international conflict and this even extend to those where they were directly involved. Nor has it prevented tensions or created harmony. Mutual deterrence has not prevented crisis, tests of nerve and will, efforts to intimidate

41. Ibid., P. 52.
and psychological and political warfare revolving around nuclear weapons and popular fears of war. For instance, the Russian withdrawal from Cuba and America from Vietnam; American hostages issue; Chinese diplomatic and military defeat in Vietnam and late Russian intervention in Afghanistan and American's interest in Central America are some of the countries events which had seen deterrence losing its lustre even though till now it has been able to restrict the war by keeping it in a limited form, arrest the occurrence of any major war on global scale.

Even though for the last four decades deterrence has imposed a measure of restrain upon international politics which is unique in the history of great power conflict. But for reasons of ethnic and self interest we should not be satisfied for ever with a system of deterrence that depends ultimately on the possibility of catastrophic destruction whether by highly sophisticated conventional armaments or by nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers and the industrialized world account for approximately 84 per cent of global military expenditure.42

42. K. Subrahmanyam, U.N. Study On Deterrence op.cit., p. 73.
But the deterrence based on stockpiles of weapons cannot be the final objective. Rather the political perception which initiated the deterrent posture needs to be reviewed to check its continued validity.

Summarizing the general characteristics of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, one has to say that this policy — if it ever has created any benefit for its advocates — has produced the nuclear arms race, undermined peaceful and stable international relations and hardened East-West confrontation. In our day, this concept, with its insistence on the role of nuclear weapons and with far reaching programmes in the strategic and conventional fields — becomes more and more dangerous. Security cannot be based on new and more numerous weapons. The times urgently demand a new concept of security.

DISARMAMENT

'Disarmament' means an action of disarming, to deprive of means of attack or defence or to divest of hostility etc. In a broad sense, it implies the reduction or limitation of the size, equipment, armament and armed forces. The problem of controlling the arms race has attracted the attention of the world public for more than a century. At the end of the nineteenth century
when Europe was overburdened by arms growth, Friedrich Engels recognised that there was an alternative to a devastating war on a scale the world had not seen before: this was 'Disarmament', which is possibly also a guarantee of peace.

In his analysis of the arms-race, Engels allowed two eventualities: Either the people will be economically ruined by war or it will inevitably lead to a universal war of annihilation. This was a period when the rise of militarism brought into being, and, in fact, stimulated the growth of forces with a stake in halting the arms race.

In every way efforts are being made to distinguish disarmament among various possible forms. In the world of today where armaments if not used as a means of influencing the relation between communities can be covered under the terminology of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD). The other way is through conventions when all states would not agree to abolish armaments altogether. But would freeze them through mutually agreed levels. The form 'Arms Control' will mean adopting of limited measures in some countries or
involving only particular weapons. This last form is most prevalent today.

The idea of disarmament was also mooted in 1920, by the former President of America, Woodrow Wilson who had embodied the principle of disarmament in his "Fourteen Point", and in the League Covenants.

Another serious attempt was the Washington Conference which met on November 11, 1921, at the call of President Warren Harding. The Conference resulted in a treaty for the limitation of naval strength with these ratios: United States, 5; Britain, 5; Japan, 3; France, 1.7; and Italy, 1.7. It included provisions for the destruction of certain ships and for a cessation of construction of capital ships by the three leading powers to achieve these ratios. It also limited additional fortifications by the United States, Britain and Japan in the Pacific Ocean. The treaty of renunciation of war popularly known as the Kellogg Briand pact of 1928 was the net result of world moral forces to preserve peace. The bi-lateral deal between U.K. and U.S.A. provided ample security to

enable nations to agree on reduction and limitation of armaments. A significant departure from previous agreement was the conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments (known as the World Disarmament Conference) which met at Geneva on February 2, 1932 having fifty-nine nations plus United States in attendance. Following the violation of the approach "Tardieu plan was introduced". It further got impetus in mid 40's when agreement among U.S.A., U.K. and France called for "qualitative" rather than "quantitative" limitations on certain type of vessels and the calibre of guns. The provisions included in the treaty were to work as a check and balance on armaments construction between the nations.

To stop the world-wide arms spiral United Nations in the course of four decades has used a variety of bodies, methods, techniques and approaches in the search for disarmament to preserve world peace. The U.N.'s Charter itself envisaged arms limitation

* Tardieu plan urged that nations place their more powerful weapons "in escrow" to be used only when directed by the league or in the event of invasion; that an international police force be established under the orders of the League of Nations Council; and that the security provisions of the league convenent be strengthened and applied to violations of the Disarmament Convention.
and disarmament as elements in the progressive establishment of an international security system. It was this legal yardstick that the international military tribunal, convened at Nuremberg to prosecute Nazi leaders after World War II, applied in concluding that the law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition, as well as judicial decisions. And the cumulative effect of those restrictions is such that nuclear war cannot be

* The spirit of the Charter calls for:

a) Renunciation of force, that is to say renunciation of the use and threat of force, conflict must be settled by peaceful means.

b) No aspiration to dominance over other, no interference with the internal affairs of other countries; respect for the right of self-determination of all nations.

c) Responsible action in the awareness of global interdependence, moderation and restraint in pursuing one's own interests.

d) Readiness for dialogue, negotiation and cooperation.

e) No aspiration to superiority; the desire for balance at the lowest possible level of armaments; active policy of preserving peace through cooperation on issues of international security and in particular of arms control and disarmament.

f) Elimination of the North-South Confrontation as a policy of world wide partnership & safeguarding peace.
initiated with obedience to the rules of international law. 44

The arm race in the twentieth century, especially after the Second World War, has posed a big threat to humanity which has led to such an intensive race in weaponry that we have been able to misuse the space surface for Star war programme. The distrust to disarm, is so great among the super powers that it has affected the arms race between developing countries. Initially, it witnessed violent anti-colonial wars - the Indonesian, the Indo-Chinese and the Algerian ones followed by the prolonged anti-colonial insurgencies in Cyprus, the Yemenas, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. There have also been wars due to local causes such as Arab-Israeli wars, Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan wars, the Ethiopia - Somalia war, Sino-Vietnamese and Iran-Iraq war. Besides the so called low intensity conflicts in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, erstwhile East Pakistan, Kurgan and now Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, in the coming years, the decision between nuclear and conventional weapons is fast

eroding which enhances the risk that any conventional conflict involving nuclear power could escalate into a nuclear holocaust.

The continued arms race, the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction and the accelerated work on new types of such weapons have led to unprecedented activities by men of all countries for arms control or convention. Several voluntary peace associations in the world are carrying on propaganda for nuclear disarmament — Campaign for nuclear disarmament (CND), European Nuclear Disarmament (END) and 'Ban the Bomb Movement' are building up public opinion against the manufacture of nuclear armaments. As a result, moves for disarmament agreement have been going on, for the enhancement of peace in the modern world.

Much effort has been made to make it effectively verifiable or successful even unilaterally to halt tests or deployments of system be they the B-I, the MX, Sea launched cruise missile, the pershing II or nuclear missiles. Through international and bilateral efforts some 20 multilateral and bilateral arms regulations have been concluded. To avoid accident, misunderstanding and
miscalculation negotiations had resulted in a considerable narrowing of the gap between the two sides. At first major attention was given to the possibility of a balanced and far-reaching programme of general disarmament but later, the emphasis switched to the measures of partial disarmament. Two powers came to resolve on these issues.

1. The objective should be disarmament by all states down to the levels needed for maintaining internal security.

2. To improve international relations, agreements on partial disarmament should be concluded.

3. There should be no political preconditions to the entry into force of a disarmament agreement.

4. Universal disarmament should proceed by stages.

5. Levels of armed forces at each stage should be "balanced" and each step in the process of disarmament should be designed to increase the security of all.
6. To make the inspection system effective, it should include reciprocal serial inspection at some stage.

7. The testing of nuclear weapons should be suspended and controlled.

8. The dispersal of nuclear materials to peaceful purposes should be a prime target.

9. Security arrangements to be made to avoid nuclear accident and their radioactive repercussions.

10. An agreement on disarmament to be made effective should be implemented within the framework of the United Nations. 45

In their limited way, they have helped to prevent the arms race from entering into some new and dangerous areas. Indeed the strategy of disarmament carries within it the seed of nuclear weapon proliferation seeing the result of SALT I & II.*

The fact is that we cannot risk a third world war. It does not serve any purpose of asking why or how

45. From United Nation Documents. (Also from the special issue on Disarmament and Human Survival, United Nation Disarmament Fact Sheet etc.).

* SALT - STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY - SALT II Treaty (unratified) limited both sides to 2400 strategic missile launchers with the stipulation to bring down to 2250.
we have reached this stage. The future generation will judge us whether we have succeeded in putting the world on the course of peace, of development of survival; or whether we have got involved in confrontation on arms race and ultimately catastrophe. The greater immediacy for disarmament is enhanced due to billion trillion dollars wasted on arms. According to 1988-89 findings, the world today is spending $1000 billion per year or more than 2 billion per day or some $1 million every minute on the arms alone. The figure has been increasing at the rate of 4 per cent every year. In 1986-87, it rose by 18 per cent in the third world countries. The common effort is to solve this global dilemma through total or complete disarmament. The plea given is that some arms can produce some security but that more arms do not necessarily produce more security. Thus, the elimination of weapons are required and it has a universal validity.

* Over the past 41 years, there has been considerable structural change in world armament trade.

** Though the more recent figures are not available, yet there is no denying the fact that the trend is increasing at a fast rate.

Other general observation on the disarmament development, like U.N. preparatory committee circulated a provisional agenda for the UNSSOD-II, emphasizes the close relationship between disarmament and international peace and security as well as between disarmament and economic and social development particularly in the developing countries.

It clearly shows military security as the cohesive concept for the North, while economic security for the South. Here, non-aligned movement is also the driving force behind disarmament. It got recognition at every level due to arms control measures. Latest progress toward peace based on mutual trust between


** Non-aligned countries had a major thrust on anti-militarisation and nuclearisation for their self-defence and global stability. But the process of armament in the third world had a starting point of almost zero before it becomes a question of disarmament. The argument at present is how to formulate a strategy which could help change the minds of northern group against overarmament of weapons for the purpose of security.
nations and nuclear disarmament is the six nation initiative known as "Beyond War".

On the occasion of the presentation of "Beyond War" award to him, Rajiv Gandhi, has said that India continued to strive for mobilising world opinion for the achievement of these objectives and added that it was "our moral duty towards our own people and to all mankind to help and build a world free of fear and distrust".47

But without any arms controls there will be further quantitative increases and qualitative developments in nuclear and conventional arsenals. There is so much nuclear fission stock-piled that there are grave dangers of leakage as these bombs will need to be preserved for over twenty thousand years and the known


* The futility of arms race can be better evaluated with President Eisenhower observations:
  - The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this:
    A modern brick school in 30 more cities.
  - It is two electric power plants each serving a town of 10,000 population.
  - It is two-five, fully equipped hospitals.
  - It is some 50 miles — of concrete highway.
("The Chance for Peace", an address reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, 27th April, 1953).
history of mankind is ten thousand years. The scare caused by the leakage of nuclear heat and radiation from Harrisburg atomic plant (Harrisburg nuclear plant for peaceful purposes) Sellafield plant (then called Windscale) and now disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor is a timely warning. Otherwise the hazards of big stock piling will be unimaginable. At this stage, we have the choice of two risks, the one lies in continuing the mad atomic race with its danger of an unavoidable atomic war in the near future. The other is the renunciation of nuclear weapons, and in the hope that America and the Soviet Union and the peoples associated with them will manage to live in peace. The first holds no hope of a prosperous future. The second does, we must risk it. 48

In fact, disarmament alone cannot bring peace and security in the world as arms are simply a manifestation of the inherent tension among states. So long as tension continues violent solution to them cannot be neglected. Once tension is removed and political understanding reached arms will automatically become unnecessary. As Morgenthau explains, 'men do not fight because they have arms.' They have arms because

they deem it necessary to fight. Take away their arms, and they will either fight with their bare fists or get themselves new arms with which to fight. Thus, Morgenthau traces these sources in the unformulated conflict of power. And in this way, this approach suggests that for the achievement of peace it is essential to identify the areas of political conflict, define respective interests of contenders and then make an attempt for a realist settlement. For instance, the failure to implement Article 6 of the NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty) is now an acknowledged fact, as is the failure of the NPT acknowledged in the second NPT Review Conference. The first UN Special session on Disarmament produced a final document by consensus in 1978 which contained, "priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that state should undertake as a matter of urgency.


* According to the Article VI of the NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty):

> Each of the parties to the treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. (Facts and perspectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation published for U.S. International Communication Agency, American Centre, New Delhi), p. 42.
with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. And it has not been implemented. Moreover, it has a good list of failures, i.e. (SALT) Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I & II, use of chemical weapons, Comprehensive Test Ban, etc. This testifies the dispute for elimination of weapons or arms freeze existing among nations due to tension, in global politics. Nations are not ready to for disarmament simply for 'disbelief' or distrust.

On NAM initiatives on nuclear arms limitation and the Six Nation Move, for strategic disarmament, the Soviet Union many times offered total disarmament and also balanced reduction in conventional arms and forces. This unilateral Moratorium on nuclear tests was effective from August 6, 1985. It was extended five times and

* The Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was held in 1978, stated:

There are certain negotiations on disarmament under way at different levels, the early and successful completion of which could contribute to limiting the arms race. Unilateral measures of arms limitation or reduction could also contribute to the attainment of that goal (paragraph 41) (UNITED NATIONS Fact Sheet No. 40. Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament Measures).
remained in effect for over 18 months. The U.S. not only did not respond to the appeal of the Delhi but also carried out 24 tests during this period. Previously, the United States was prepared only to discuss reduction and not elimination of strategic arms. Recently, the agreement for the reduction of medium range missiles was however, agreed upon with the mutual consent of two super-powers. While another superpower summit for the further reduction of arms has been scheduled for the next year. For which modalities have already been worked out by the foreign ministers of the two countries. One basic reason of this development could be the early realization of the fact that nuclear war cannot be fought and won.

In this context most sensible way out is to delegitimize and outlaw nuclear weapons as instruments of war. There is general acceptance that the bacteriological, chemical and radiological have also to be outlawed. On the first, there is already a convention. On the second, there is the Geneva protocol of 1925. A ban

on radiological weapons is also being actively pursued. But it is only in respect of nuclear weapons that the delegitimization of nuclear weapons is being resisted by the countries who are the followers of the cult of nuclear deterrence.

Even though convention to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons would not completely eliminate deterrence exercise by the existence of nuclear weapons, just as the Geneva protocol of 1925 did not have an adverse impact on mutual deterrence which operated during the second world war because both sides possessed chemical weapons. A nuclear weapon convention would, however, strip nuclear weapons of their legitimacy, their mystique and their use as a currency of international power. Over time, it would help to change attitudes toward nuclear weapons and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and make them as unacceptable to the world as are biological and chemical weapons.

However, the major hindrance to disarmament today is the imperialistic designs of the major powers of the world and their plans to exploit the less powerful countries of the world. And in Gandhi's version,
to find escape from the impending doom unconditional acceptance of non-violent method is required, which involves unilateral disarmament. Gandhi himself thought that it would be a miracle if the great powers accepted his ideas, but he also added that miracles have happened before and may happen again perhaps, with the power shown by him in non-violence.