CHAPTER IV

THEORY OF PADĀRTHAS (CATEGORIES)

The approach of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to the universe is purely a realistic one. According to this school of thought, there are things which have real existence in the objective world as objects of our cognition and are quite independent of the corresponding jñāna. In the words of J.C. Chatterji, "It is the standpoint of an absolute beginner;...... an unreflecting mind who regards all the objects of the universe as real things." Such objects are cognized either through the instrumentality of the external sense-organs or through the internal sense-organs, namely, the antahkarnas. In the former case, the external objects of cognition are naturally grosser, i.e., respective specific attributes of the five Mahābhūtās namely, rūpa, sparśa, gandha, rasa and śabda which have enough affinity with their respective sense-organs through which they are cognized. In the latter case, the objects of the sensible world are cognized through the instrumentality of the antahkarnas, and hence are subtler elements like paramāṇus, tanmātrās, etc.;

which are beyond the reach of our physical eyes. Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika system deals with all the forms of gross matter
in the most natural way so as to satisfy the common-sense
of man and be in agreement with the actual reality and the
conventions of the external world (vyavahāra and pratīti).

Padārtha means literally the meaning of a word. A
padārth is an object which can be thought (artha) and
named (pada). Praśastapāda defines padārth as a knowable
thing (jñeya), or as a validity cognizable thing
(premeya), or as a nameable thing (abhidheya).

Gautama’s Sixteen Padārthas

Gautama, in his Nyāya Sūtra, proposes a scheme of
sixteen topics which have been erroneously called
padārthas, viz., pramāṇa (method of valid cognition),
prameya (object of valid cognition), saṃśaya (doubt),
prayojana (purpose), drṣṭānta (probative examples),
siddhānta (established conclusion), avayava (members of a
syllogism), tarka (hypothetical reasoning), nirñaya
(conclusive knowledge), Vāda (arguing for arriving at a
truth), jala (arguing for victory), vitançā (merely
destructive argument), hetyābhāsa (fallacious reasons),

1 Praśastapāda, Padārthadharma Saṃgraha, Page 16.
chala (quibbling), jātī (pointless objections), and mīgrahaṃsthāna (vulnerable points in an argument). 1

Of these sixteen categories, the first nine constitute what may be called logic proper, while the last seven may be collectively termed as illegitimate or false logic. From the Nyāya point of view, the first category, i.e., pramāṇa which includes the four proofs—perception, inference, comparison and testimony, occupies the most important place. The object of valid cognition constituting the second category occupies rather a subordinate position in the Nyāya system. Under this category, Gautama enumerates the twelve cognizables, namely, ātma (soul), sarīra (body), indriya (senses), artha (sensible specific qualities), buddhi (cognition), manas (mind), pravṛtti (activity), doṣa (moral impurities), pretyabhāva (transmigration), phala (consequences of activities), dukkha (suffering) and aparārtha (emancipation from the state of suffering). These multifarious things have obviously nothing in common except the capacity of being known by one or other of the four proofs, and Gautama treats of them only in that light. He rarely troubles himself about the nature or forms of these things or of their production and destruction. This is the reason why

1 Gautama, Nyāya Sūtra, 1.1.1
2 Gautama, Nyāya Sūtra, 1.1.9
Gautama's definitions of soul, cognition, mind, etc. only tell us how they are known, but say nothing as to what kind of things they are.

Having thus dealt with the chief ingredients of knowledge, namely, the proofs and their objects, Gautama describes several accessories to knowledge, viz., doubt, aim, instance or precedent, general truths, premises, hypothetical reasoning and conclusion. Doubt and aim as incentives to every enquiry are necessary to knowledge. Precedents and general truths form the material, while premises and hypothetical reasoning are the instruments of acquiring fresh knowledge. Conclusion is the final and combined product of all these things.

The seven topics forming the second group have a negative function in logic, namely, of preventing erroneous knowledge. By exposing errors they teach us how to avoid them. They are like weapons for destroying the enemy's fortress than tools to build one's own.

Now, we see that these sixteen categories look like headings of 30 many chapters in a treatise on logic. They are merely sixteen topics which one should study in order to master the details of Nyāya dialectics. The Nyāya list of sixteen categories is intended to give us a general and comprehensive idea of all the various topics, in the
consideration of which the Nyāya is primarily interested as a Pramāṇasāstra. These sixteen categories of Nyāya system are not the ultimate ontological categories, i.e., they are not the most general kinds or types of reals. These categories do not represent an exhaustive classification of all aspects of reality. This is why, these categories were ignored and later on, in the syncretic age, the seven padārthas of the Vaiśeṣika came under the second topic, i.e., pramāṇya of Nyāya Sūtra. Because the aim of every philosophy ought to be to give an analytical demonstration of the universe, it being the way for obtaining the sumnum bonum.

Kapāla’s Seven Padārthas

Kapāla tries to analyze the things and then lays down the final liberation which follows the right understanding of things. His method is that of generalization. Vaiśeṣika is mainly a study of reality itself in its various aspects. Its enumeration of the six categories, with the seventh (Abhāva) added afterwards, is a complete analysis of all existing things. These categories again are not enumerated for a special purpose only, like the sixteen padārthas of Gautama; but they

1 Kapāla, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, le lede
resolve the entire universe, as it were, not excepting even the Almighty God, into so many classes. Gautama treats of knowledge only, but Kaśyapa deals with the wider phenomenon of existence. He divides all the reality into seven categories, viz., substance (dravya), quality (guna), action or motion (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa), inherence (samavēya), and non-existence (abhāva). The first six are called bhāva padārthas or existing entities and are thus contrasted, in a marked way, with abhāva, which amounts to non-existence. It is to be noted that Kaśyapa did not speak of non-existence as a separate category. One might very well explain the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras (9.1.1-10) without assuming that Kaśyapa was speaking here of absence as a separate category. Praśāstapāda also did not state whether absence should be considered a separate category. But Śridhara, Udayana, Vyomaśa and Śivāditya add the seventh category of non-existence. Śivāditya recognizes seven categories including non-existence in his work entitled 'Septapadārthī'. 1 Śridhara says, "Non-existence has not been mentioned separately, because it depends upon existence, not because it does not exist." 2 Hence abhāva

1. Śivāditya, Septapadārthī, Page 10.
2. Śridhara, Nyāya Kandī, Page 7.
is as good a category of reality as bhāva or being. All 1 2 the modern realists like Russell, Alexander recognize the reality of negation or non-existence. Thus it is clear that Kanada proposed seven categories, though he did not mention abhāva separately as it is dependent on bhāva.

This, however, does not imply that the Nyāya is opposed to the seven ontological categories of Vaiśeṣika. As a matter of fact, eminent writers of the Nyāya school are found to have clearly expressed their approval of the Vaiśeṣika ontological scheme and the Vaiśeṣika principle of classifying and labelling the reals. It is admitted by Vatsyayana that besides the twelve prameyas, there are countless other cognizables or reals and that it is possible to classify them all under the seven heads recognized by the Vaiśeṣika.

The Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhaṭṭa school recognize five padārthas—substance, generality, quality, activity and non-existence. The Prabhākaras recognize eight—the five bhāvas of the Vaiśeṣika system (omitting Viśeṣa) and potency (sākti), similarity (sādṛśya) and number (saṁkhyā),

non-existence not being accepted as a distinct category. The Śāṅkhya accepts two ultimate padārthas: primordial matter (prakṛti) and spirit (puruṣa). Among the Vedāntins, the Advaitins maintain that there is one ultimate reality, i.e., Brahman, and there are only two padārthas—spirit (cit) and non-spirit (acit), or soul (ātman) and non-soul (anātman); the Viśiṣṭādvaita school recognizes three—spirit (cit), non-spirit (acit), and God; and the Dvaitins reduce all the padārthas to two main categories—indeedependent and dependent.

In most of the syncretist works dealing with the tenets of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the arguments advanced by the Bhāṭṭas as well as the Prabhākaras to establish the existence of potentiality (śakti) as a distinct entity, and the view upheld by the latter school of Mīmāṃsakas that similarity (sādṛśya) should be given a distinct place in the list of categories, are refuted. Counter-agents (pratibandha) counteract the operation of causes and causes turn out to be unavailing. The counteraction that we experience in such cases cannot be explained otherwise than as consisting in the destruction of the causal efficacy or śakti as a distinct category must necessarily be recognized. The Māyāyāikas urged that counteraction consists merely in the presence of counter-agents, the total
non-existence of which is one of the elements 
constituting the full compliment of the causal apparatus 
(sāmakri). Thus they disapprove the necessity for 
recognizing śakti as a distinct category. Similarly, 
according to Prabhakaras, does not consist merely in the 
possession of parts or qualities or features of the same 
kind as the Naiyāyikas urge; but it is revealed in 
experience as a distinct category. The Naiyāyikas 
contend that a careful analysis of experience would show 
that similarity consists merely in the possession of 
parts or qualities or features of the same kind.

Undoubtedly it can be said that the various 
classifications of padārthas, given by Indian 
systematists, can be likewise reduced to the seven 
padārthas. We see that substratum (dharmin) is always 
in the form of a substance (dravya). But the properties 
(dharma) residing in a substratum are found, on further 
analysis, to be of various kinds. Some properties like 
colour appear to be of the nature of stationary attributes 
of their substrate. They are called qualities (gūpas). 
Others, for example, the motion of a body, are of an

1. Udayana, Kirṣṇavali, Page 6;
   Śivāditya, Saptapadārthi, Page 10.
evenessent nature. They are called movements (karma). We, thus, arrive at the first three categories:

(i) drava, (ii) guṇa, (iii) karma. Of the numerous objects of our knowledge, some are so similar that they are designated by a common noun, and there must therefore be something common to all individuals of a class. That common thing may be regarded as the universal (sāmānyya), which is the fourth category of the school. In case of atoms of the same class, differentiation of one atom from another was assumed to be due to a special property called viśeṣa residing in the atoms, which is the fifth category of the school. The properties (guṇa, karma, sāmānyya and viśeṣa) cannot exist as independent of a drava.

Therefore, the relation between properties and drava cannot be an ordinary one, called 'connection' (sāmyoga), which obtains between two substances that can be connected and separated at will. A sixth category, therefore, in the form of a special relation called 'samaśāya' was assumed. To these six categories, originally accepted by the school, a seventh one, namely, abhāva (non-existence) was added later on.

Of these seven categories, the first three, i.e., substance, quality and action possess a real objective existence. Kapāla calls them 'artha', and declares, in

1. Kapāla, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.2.7.
treat that we can have an intuition of them. The next three, i.e., generality, particularity and inherence are products of intellectual discrimination (buddhyāpekṣam). These first six categories have existence (astitva), nameability (abhidheyatva) and knowability (jñeyatva). They are objects of positive notion of beings. They can be known without depending on their counter-entities. They are capable of being expressed by names. They are capable of being known. They are not subjective notions but ontological entities. Negation (non-existence) is also an ontological category. It is not mere negation of a substance in thought, but real non-existence of a substance. When a jar is destroyed, there is a real negation of the jar.

Aristotle recognizes ten categories: (1) Substance; (2) Quantity; (3) Quality; (4) Relation; (5) Place; (6) Time; (7) Posture; (8) Property; (9) Activity; (10) Passivity. Of these, the last nine are predicables of substance, but substance itself being independent of all attributes, cannot be predicted of anything. Kapāla's categories stand for different kinds of things. They are metaphysical categories. Aristotle's categories are

2. *Ibid.*, 1.2.3c
3. Prasāstapāda Bhāṣya, Padārthadharma 3aagraha, Page 16.
mainly logical. They are mainly predicables or classes of terms which can be used as predicates. Kapäda's categories include not only things, but also subjects capable of having things predicated of them. Aristotle's categories are mainly different kinds of predicables. Kapäda's categories are mainly different kinds of objects of knowledge. The former are concerned with propositions. The latter are concerned with real objects. Dravya and guna of the Vaiśeṣika correspond to Aristotle's substance and quality. Aristotle's quantity is brought under guṇa. Relations are of two kinds: external, like conjunction (saṃyoga), or internal, like inherence. The first is regarded as a quality and the second is made a separate category. The remaining categories fall under relation, while space and time are taken as independent substances. Activity is karma, while passivity is only the absence of activity. Property may be either general or particular. Posture or disposition is a quality. Aristotle does not mention non-existence (abhãva) as he deals only with positive beings.

Now we shall deal these seven padarthaas in detail so as to enable us to have a clear understanding of each of them.

1. J.N. Sinha, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Pages 133-34.
I. Substance (dravya)

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, representing a realistic school of thought, considers that our common experience presents a world consisting of separate individual objects which are called substances (dravyas). The category of substance at once unfolds the pluralistic realism of this joint system. It has been defined as 'the substratum where actions and qualities inhere and which is the co-existent material cause of the composite things produced from it.' Substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. Without substance, we cannot have qualities and actions, for they cannot hang loose in the air, but must be contained somewhere. Substance is the basis of qualities and actions. In the words of Praśastapāda, "Substance is the main category. All categories depend on it for their existence. Substance is the substratum of all other categories. So it is first mentioned." Being the substratum of qualities, the substance is different from qualities. If it does not differ from qualities, it cannot possess qualities.

But the Buddhist refutes the conception of a

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1. Kapāla, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.1.15
2. Praśastapāda, Padārthā Daśarma Saṃgraha, Page 7.
separate substance apart from its qualities. In his view, the qualities like colour, touch, etc., are atom-like point-instants (kṣaṇas), or unique particulars (sva-lakṣaṇas). They are discrete and disconnected point-instants which come, one after the other, in a constant flux. Apart from these point-instants which are mere dharmas (qualities or properties), there is no substratum in the form of a substance in which these properties may be residing.

The above mentioned Buddhist view has been criticized in Nyāya-Waisesaika. "Our experience is the sole criterion for determining the nature of reality." We are able to recognize the jar we saw yesterday, which would be impossible if the jar were a string of sensations. In our experience, we distinctly see that there is a substratum (e.g., a jar) in which qualities like colour, touch, size, etc., reside. Our experience presents two separate realities, the properties and their substratum, which two are different in their essence and therefore the two cannot be identical; they must be different in their essence. For instance, in the case of the experience of

1. Uddyotakara, Nyāya Vārtika, 1.1.13.
2. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāya Vārtikatātparyatikā, 2.1.36, Page 506.
A white cloth, the white colour is experienced as a property which resides in the substratum, cloth; and, therefore, white colour and cloth are different in their essence. Essential differentiation between the substratum and its properties (dharma-dharmi-bheda) is the basic principle of the structure of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. In this context, we should keep in mind that in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the word 'property' (dharma) does not mean only qualities, but it is used in a wider sense and includes all the five kinds of properties (i.e., substance, quality, movement, the universal and viśeṣa), which subsist in their substratum by inherent relation. These properties are dependent for their existence on their substratum, i.e., the substance. So long as the properties exist, they can exist only as residing in their substance. But a substratum (substance) does not depend for its existence on anything else. Śridhara says that "apprehension of substance is just an apprehension of having independent existence."\(^1\)

The Vaiśeṣika holds that a substance does not possess qualities at the first moment of its production. If the qualities arise simultaneously with substances, there

\(^1\) Śridhara, Nyāya Kandī, Page 13.
cannot be any distinction between them. If they do not arise, then substances would be free from qualities, and then the definition of substance as that which possess qualities seems to be violated. To meet this difficulty, it is said that substance is the substrate of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (samvāya sambandha) or antecedent negation (prāgabhāva), i.e., future existence. Qualities inhere in a substance in the second moment of its production and continue to do so till its destruction.

A substance is the material cause (samvāyikārana) of its composite product. Threads are the material cause of cloth which is made by their combination. Only substance is capable of producing an effect out of its stuff.

Substances are nine—earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, spirit and mind. Prof. C.D. Sharma says, "The dravyas are nine and include material as well as spiritual substances. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy is pluralistic as well as realistic but not materialistic since it admits spiritual substances."

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1. Śaṅkara Mārā, Upaskāra, 1.1.5
2. Kapīśa, Vaiśeṣika Śūtra, 1.1.5
3. C.D. Sharma, Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Page 177.
Detailed exposition of Padarthas as accepted by Vaisesika System.
Kumarila regards darkness (tamas) as a distinct substance with the quality of colour, i.e., blackness, and the action of motion. The Vaśesikas point out that the experience with associates colour and movement with darkness is erroneous. For, a substance having colour can be seen only in the presence of light; and darkness, which is seen in the absence of light, cannot be a substance having colour. It is said to possess the black colour figuratively, even as the colourless sky is spoken of as blue. It is a variety of non-existence, being merely the negation of light. Hence darkness is not a distinct substance.

Out of the nine substances, the first five (i.e., earth, water, light, air and ether) are called physical elements (pañcabhūṭa), since each of them possesses a peculiar quality which is sensed by the external sense. Smell is the peculiar property of earth. Other substances have smell only as they are mixed up with some quantity of earth. There is smell in muddy water, but no smell in water which is pure. Taste is the peculiar property of water, colour of light, touch of air, and sound of ākāsā or ether. These five specific qualities are sensed by

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1. Kumarila, Ślokavārttika, Page 43.
2. Kapāla, Vaśesika Śītra, 3.219-20;
   Mādhavacārya, Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha, Ch. 10.
the five external senses. The external senses are constituted by the respective elements whose specific qualities are sensed by them—the sense of smell is constituted by the element of earth and so on.

The substances of earth, water, light and air are of two kinds, namely, eternal (nitya) and non-eternal (anitya). The atoms (paramāṇus) of earth, water, light and air are eternal because an atom is partless and can be neither produced nor destroyed. All other kinds of earth, water, etc. are non-eternal, because they are produced by the combination of atoms, and are, therefore, subject to disintegration and destruction. The atoms are different in kind. There are four kinds of atoms, namely, of earth, water, light and air, each having its peculiar quality. The Vaiśeṣika view is thus different from that of the Greek atomists like Democritus who believes that all atoms are of the same kind, and that they differ in quantity and not in quality.

Ākāśa is the fifth physical substance which is the substratum of the quality of sound. While sound is perceived, ākāśa cannot be perceived. There are two conditions of the external perception of a substance, namely, that it must have a perceptible dimension (mahattva) and manifest colour (bhabhūtarūpavattva). Ākāśa is not a
limited and coloured substance. ākāśa is an all-pervading bearer of the quality of sound and is inferred from the perception of that quality. Every quality must belong to some substance. Sound is not a quality of earth, water, light and air, because the qualities of these substances are not perceived by the ear, while sound is perceived by our ears. Nor can sound belong as a quality to space, time, soul and mind, for these exist even when there is no sound to qualify them. So there must be some other substance called ākāśa or ether of which sound is the quality. It is one and eternal because it is not made up of parts and does not depend on any other substance for its existence. It is all pervading in the sense that it has an unlimited dimension and its effect or operation is perceived everywhere.

Time and space, like ether, are one each, eternal and all pervading (vibhu). They are imperceptible and infinite substances and are partless and indivisible. They are conventionally spoken of as having parts and divisions. Time is the cause of our cognitions of past, present and future and of 'younger' and 'older'. Space (dik) is the cause of our cognitions of east and west, here and there.

1. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 2.12.27.
near and far, and is different from other which is substratum of the quality of sound.

There are innumerable souls and each is an independent, individual, eternal and all-pervading spiritual substance. It is the substratum of the quality of consciousness. There are two kinds of souls, namely, the individual soul (jīvātmā) and the supreme soul (paramātmā). The latter is one, and is inferred as the Creator of the world. The former is internally or mentally perceived as possessing some quality when, for example, one says, 'I am happy', 'I am sorry', and so on. The individual self is not one but many, being different in different bodies.

Mind (manas) is regarded as an internal sense (antarāindriya). It is atomic; but unlike the first four atomic dravyas, it does not give rise to compound objects. It is many and each is eternal and imperceptible. Each self has a mind. It is the organ through which the self comes into contact with the objects. Its existence is inferred from the fact that the self must perceive internal states of cognition, desire and conception through an internal sense, just as it perceives external objects through external senses. Moreover, in the perception of external objects the mind is selective and active. We do
not perceive colour, touch, taste, smell and sound simultaneously, even though all the external senses may be in contact with their objects. Perception requires attention and attention is active turning of the mind towards the object of perception. Hence in perception, the self must fix the manas on the object of perception with which the external sense is already in contact. Manas, therefore, is a substance and it is atomic and partless and can come into contact with one sense only at one time.

2. Quality (Guna)

A quality cannot exist independently by itself like substance. It inhere in a substance which is its substrate. It is non-constitutive or non-material cause of things in so far as it determines only their nature and character, but not their existence. All qualities must belong to substances and so they have themselves no qualities. Kapāda defines it as "that which has substance for its substratum, has no further qualities, and is not a cause of, nor has any concern with, conjunction or disjunction." He mentions seventeen qualities, viz.,

1. Kapāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.10.16.
colour (rūpa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparśa), number (saṁkhyā), size (parimāṇa), individuality (prthaktva), conjunction (sāyoga), disjunction (vibhāga), priority (paratva), posteriority (aparatva), knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (dukhā), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), and effort (prayatna). Praśastapāda adds seven more, which are heaviness (gurutva), fluidity (dravatva), viscosity (sneha), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), sound (śabda), and faculty (saṃskāra). Some add lightness (laghutva), softness (māyutva), hardness (kaṭhнатva) to the twenty-four qualities. But these are not separate qualities since lightness is only the absence of heaviness, and softness and hardness represent different degrees of conjunction.

The qualities that belong to eternal substances are called eternal, and those of transient ones, non-eternal. Those that subsist in two or more substances are said to be general, while those residing in only one substance are said to be specific. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, derived fluidity, gravity and velocity are general qualities, while

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1. Kaṇāda, Voīsēika Śūtra, 1.1.6.
colour, taste, smell, touch viscosity, natural fluidity, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, faculty and sound are special qualities which help to distinguish objects which possess them from others.

Qualities are divided into (i) those which can be perceived through one external sense-organ, viz., colour, taste, odour, touch and sound, and (ii) those that can be perceived through two external sense-organs, eyes, and the skin, viz., number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, fluidity and viscosity, and (iii) those that cannot be perceived through any sense-organ, viz., gravity, merit, demerit, and faculty. The qualities of the self, e.g., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are perceived through the mind (manas).

Colour (rupa) is a special quality perceived by the visual organ only. It resides in earth, water and light, though in the two latter the colour is permanent. In earth it varies when heat is applied. There are seven kinds of colour, viz., white, blue, yellow, red, green,

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1. Prasastapāda, Padārthadharma Sāngraha, Pages 95-96.
2. Ibid., Page 96.
Taste (rasa) is the special quality of things apprehended only by the gustatory organ only. Earth and water have taste. The tastes of earthly substances are due to the application of heat and are of six kinds, viz., sweet, sour, salty, pungent (kaṭu), astringent (kaṣāya) and bitter. The taste of water is sweet and not produced by the application of heat. It is eternal in atoms of water.

Odour (gandha) is the specific quality which is apprehended by the olfactory organ only. It resides in earth only and is of two kinds, viz., fragrant and the reverse, i.e., bad smell.

Touch (sparśa) is the special quality which is apprehended only by the tactual organ. It resides in earth, water, light and air. There are three kinds of touch—hot, cold, neither cold nor hot. This shows that touch is regarded as temperature. Water is cold, light is hot. Earth and air are neither cold nor hot. It is transient in earth. It is eternal in atoms of water, light and air, but transient in their composite products.

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1 Kaśyapa Misra, Tarka Bhāṣā, Page 24;
M. ReBodas, Tarka Sahagraha, Pages 185-86.
Sound (ādina) is a specific quality perceived by the auditory organ only.

Number (sākhva) is a generic quality (sāmānyaguna) of things by virtue of which we use the terms one, two, three, etc. Of these numbers, unity (ekatva) is eternal in eternal substances and transient in transient substances, while other numbers are non-eternal only.

Magnitude (parimāṇa) is the specific cause of measurement. There are four kinds of magnitude, viz., minuteness, largeness, length and shortness. Ether has extreme largeness (paramamahattvam) and an atom has extreme minuteness (parimāṇālyā). The dimension of non-eternal substances is determined by the number, magnitude and arrangements of the parts composing them. Dyads are minute, while the rest are of limited magnitude.

Individuality (prthaktva) is the basis of distinctions among things. It is real and objective. It is eternal in eternal substances, and transient in transient substances.

1. However, sound in science means a mechanical wave motion in an elastic medium. (Shortley and Williams, Elements of Physics, Prentice Hall, INC, 1961, Page 460.)
3. Ibid., 5.2.2.
Conjunction (saúraya) and disjunction (vibhága) refer respectively to the union of things which are separate and separation of things which were in union. Conjunction affects only parts of the things conjoined. It is destroyed by separation or by the destruction of things conjoined. Disjunction subsists in two substances disjoined. It is of three kinds, (i) due to the movement of one of the things disjoined, e.g., the flying away of a kite from a fixed pole, (ii) due to the movement of both things disjoined, e.g., moving away of two wrestlers fighting with each other, (iii) and due to another disjunction, e.g., separation of a body from a tree due to disjunction of hand from a tree.

Remoteness (paratva) and proximity (aparatva) are the basis of the notions of 'remote' and 'near'. Each of them is of two kinds, spatial and temporal. Praśastapāda does not regard remoteness and proximity as ultimate qualities of things, but as relative to each other depending on the relating activity of thought.¹

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort are the qualities of the soul.

¹ Praśastapāda, Padārthadharma Saṅgraha, Page 99.
Knowledge is the manifestation or apprehension of objects. It is a quality of the self. Knowledge is mainly of two kinds: valid knowledge (vidyā) and invalid knowledge (avidyā). Valid knowledge is of four kinds, viz., perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Invalid knowledge is of four kinds, viz., doubt, illusion, indefinite knowledge and dream.

Pleasure (sukha) is an agreeable feeling, produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with desirable objects. Pleasure is not mere negation of pain; it is a positive feeling of enjoyment.

Pain is a feeling of injury to the self. It is a feeling of self-abasement.

Desire is a craving for the attainment of an unattained object by oneself or by another person. It arises from recollection of an object that yielded pleasure in the past.

Aversion: In aversion, self flies into a rage which arises from pain and recollection of painful objects. It is the cause of effort, remembrance, merit and demerit.

1. Prāśastapāda Bhāṣya, Pages 172, 186.
2. Ibid., Page 263.
Effort is that activity which leads to the attainment of desirable and to the abandoning of the undesirable. It is of three kinds, namely, pravrtti or striving towards something, nivrtti or striving away from something, and jivanayoni or vital function.

Gravity (surya) is the quality of things by which they tend to fall to the ground. Falling is due to gravity, when conjunction, velocity, or effort is absent. It exists in earth and water. It is eternal in atoms of earth and water, transient in the products.

Fluidity (gradma) is the cause of flowing. It exists in earth, water and light. It is natural in water. It is caused or derived in earth and light. Gold and butter become fluid in contact with fire.

1. Itide
2. Kausika, Vaisesika Sutra, 5.1-7-12; 5.2-3. According to Sir Isaac Newton, Gravity is merely a special case of gravitation and it is the force of attraction exerted by the earth on all bodies lying on or near its surface. The value of gravity ($g$) can be ascertained with the help of this formula: $\frac{GM}{(R+h)^2}$, where $M$ is the mass of the earth, $R$ is its radius, $h$ is the height from which the body is falling and $G$ is constant. Bomford, G. (Oxford), Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Physics, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1961, Pages 502-04.
Viscosity (snaḥ) belongs to water, and is the cause of cohesion, smoothness, etc.

Merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) are qualities of the soul by virtue of which it enjoys happiness or suffers misery. Merit is the effect of the performance of the enjoined duties and demerit is the effect of the commission of forbidden acts. Merit and demerit are imperceptible. They are inferred from the body and other organs of enjoyment and suffering, which are brought about by merit and demerit. They are not brought about by effort. Merit and demerit are also known from the authority of the scriptures.

Faculty (sanskāra) is of three different kinds: 1
velocity (vega), which keeps a thing in motion (it exists in earth, water, light, air and mind); mental impressibility (bhāvanā), by which the soul is able to remember and recognize things already experienced, and

1. Prakāṣāstapāda, Padārthadharmasamgraha, Page 266. In science "viscosity (viscosity) of a fluid really expresses the resistance it offers to shearing stresses. If a pressure acts to shift laterally successive layers in a substance over each other; such a movement, if produced, is called a shear; the pressure or force producing it is called a shearing stress." Shaekel, R.G. 'Concise Physics', Longman's 1958, Page 156.

2. Velocity in science has been defined as the rate of motion of a body along a particular direction or the time rate of displacement. Merchant F.C., et al: Elements of Physics for Canadian Schools, The Copp Clark Company, Toronto, 1937, Page 94.
elasticity (sthitisthāpaka), by virtue of which a thing reverts to its original state even when it is disturbed. Elasticity is the quality of the substances which contract and expand.

These are the twenty-four qualities of substances. They are simple, passive qualities. "The Vaiśeṣika classification of qualities into twenty-four kinds is guided by these considerations of their simplicity or complexity, and reducibility or irreducibility. These gunas are what the Vaiśeṣika thought to be the simplest, passive qualities of substances."

3. Karma (Motion)

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards karma as an irreducible element of the universe. It is neither substance nor quality, but an independent category by itself. According to this joint-system, the existence of motion is necessary for the production as well as destruction of the phenomenal world. Pรมânu, out of which the non-eternal objects of the universe are produced, alone cannot do anything. During the dissolution period (pralaya)

2. Chatterji & Dutta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Page 269.
these paramāṇus remain separate, and in order that they
may combine together so as to form products, such as,
dvayaṇaṇa and the rest, we must have motion produced in
them. Similarly, for the destruction of the world, we
must have motion to destroy the produced things and
ultimately, the world itself. In any case, without motion
there can be neither production nor destruction of this
material world. Not only for the cosmic order but even
for the objective aspect of the psychic world, the
existence of motion is indispensable. It is a fact that
the various psychic products, namely, pleasure, pain,
desire, consciousness, etc., are mainly due to the contact
of the manas with the ātman, which contact is possible
through the motion of the former alone. Therefore, whether
it be the psychic production or the extra mental one,
presence of motion is necessary.

Kanāda defines an action as that which resides only
in one substance; is devoid of qualities; and is the
direct and the immediate cause of conjunction and
disjunction. Action resides in a substance like a

2. Umesh Misra, Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika, Page 196.
3. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.62.17. The branch of Physics
that deals with motion is known as Mechanics. According
to this branch, a body is said to be at rest when it does
not change its position with respect to its surroundings.
If, however, there takes place a change in the position
of the body with respect to its surroundings, it is said
to be in motion. Greene Ernest, S., Principles of Physics
quality. But an action is its dynamic and temporary feature, whereas a quality is its static and enduring feature. Conjunction, which is a quality, resides in many substances, which are conjoined with each other, but an action or motion abides in one substance only. It does not reside in many substances. Conjunction of a book with a table resides in two substances, but the motion of a fan resides in it only.

An action, like a quality, resides in a substance, and is devoid of a quality. It is destroyed by its own effect, namely, conjunction, but not by disjunction; for, in that case, there would not be any subsequent conjunction.

1 An action is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction. The motion of a carriage is the direct and immediate cause of its disjunction from one part of the ground and conjunction with another part of it. The carriage, which is a substance is the inherent (asmvāyi) cause of its disjunction from one part of the ground, and of its conjunction with another part of it. But its motion is their non-inherent cause (asamvāyi kāropa). Śivāditya observes: "An action is a non-inherent cause of the first conjunction and disjunction, which are not produced by any

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1. Ibid., Prasastapāda, Padārthadharma Saṅgraha, Page 220.
All actions or movements must subsist in limited corporeal substances (mūrta dravya), such as earth, water, light, air and the mind. There can be no movement of an all-pervading thing because it cannot change its position. Ākāśa, time, space, soul are devoid of action, since they are incorporeal. The genus of action subsists in an action which is non-eternal. The highest genus subsists in substance, quality and action of which the first two are sometimes eternal, but action is never eternal. It is always transitory. It is said to last only for five moments. So the genus of action is said to reside in a transitory entity.

A motion is incapable of producing another motion. If motion were to produce another motion, then it would do so just after its own production, like sound; so that, the previous motion alone have had produced disjunctions with all the combined substances, then with whom the second motion will produce disjunction; for, a disjunction is always preceded by a conjunction and there is no possibility of there being another conjunction; and if no

1. Śivāditya, Sāpta-padarthī, Page 39.
2. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 8.2.21; 2.1.21.
3. Ibid., 1.1.11.
disjunction is produced, then the very definition of
motion is falsified. We cannot, in order to get over the
above difficulty, hold that it would produce motion at a
later time; for, there should be no delay in the
production of the effect if the thing which is to produce
the effect has capability to do so; for, there is nothing
to depend upon, which alone can delay the production.
If it be held that the production takes place simultaneously
with the destruction of the previous conjunction, even then
there remains the impossibility of producing the
disjunction. The same will hold good in the case of the
production at the moment when the subsequent conjunction
takes place. There is no possibility of the production
after the production of the subsequent production; for,
then the very motion is destroyed. Hence no motion can
produce another motion.

Again, if a motion produces another motion, then
when a man moves there should not be the stoppage of his
motion; for, every motion will go on producing another
motion of its own type ad infinitum. If it be held that
the movement of the man would come to an end when the
desire to move further and the effort to that effect are

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1. Śankaṭa Māra, Vaiśeṣika Upasakāra, Lelele

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stopped, then we should say that the cause of the subsequent motions is the desire and the effort and not the motion itself.

An action does not produce any substance. That is, although an action produces conjunctions which, in their turn, produce a substance, so that, indirectly a motion does produce a substance, yet a motion is never regarded to be the cause of a substance. The reason is that at the time of the production of a substance, motion does not exist. It disappears just after the production of the subsequent conjunction.

Kinds of Motion

Motion is always understood in reference to a certain direction. Taking direction as the basis of classification, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system has distinguished the following kinds of motions:

(i) Utkṣepaṇa
(ii) Apakṣepaṇa
(iii) Ākṣaṇa
(iv) Prasūrana
(v) Gāmana

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1. Śridhara, Nyāya Kandī, Page 291.
2. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Śūtra, le102le.
4. Śridhara, Nyāya Kandī, Page 291.
5. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Śūtra, le107e.
Of these, the first one, i.e., nikṣapana is the cause of the contact of a body with some higher region, e.g., throwing a ball upwards. This is due to weight, effort, and conjunctions.

Apakṣapana is the cause of the contact of a body with some lower region, e.g., throwing down a ball from a house-top.

Ākumāna is that kind of motion by which the upper parts of an extended substance are disjoined with those parts which they were connected before and are combined with the parts at the bottom; so that, the substance becomes curved, e.g., clinching of the fingers.

Prasārana is that kind of motion by which the upper parts of a substance become disjoined with the parts of the same substance at the bottom and become connected with the upper parts with which they were disconnected before; so that, the object becomes straight, e.g., opening one's clenched hand.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Whatever type of motion is not covered by the varieties mentioned above is referred to by the generic term *gacema*, which, therefore, implies motion in general. *Gacema* embraces different kinds of motion as rotatory motion (*bhramana*), going up of flames, flowing down of liquids, falling down due to weight, etc.

In all these cases of motion, we find that there is no certainty of any one definite direction. It is thus clear that *gacema* is the cause of conjunctions and disjunctions between parts of different uncertain directions.

**Causes of Motion**

A body is intrinsically static and is supposed to be set in motion by some quality present in it. Motion

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Sir Isaac Newton, in 1686, propounded the three laws governing the motion of the bodies in general, which bear resemblance to that of Kanada's view. Newton's First Law states that every body in this universe continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless it is compelled by some external force to change that state. This inability on the part of the body to change by itself its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line is sometimes called inertia and for this reason, the First Law of Motion is called the Law of Inertia. His Second Law states that the rate of change of momentum (mass x velocity) is proportional to the external forces (mass x acceleration) and takes place in the direction of the forces. His Third Law states that to every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Shortley and Williams: Elements of Physics, Prentice Hall, INC, 1961, Pages 52-59.
is produced by weight (sūrutva), effort (prayatna), and conjunction (saṃyoga). Prāṣastapāda adds fluidity (dṛavatva) to the above. Āḍrṣṭa and saṃskāra also produce motion.

(i) **Weight (sūrutva)**— It is defined as the cause of the falling motion (patana karma), e.g., a fruit from a tree. The force of weight is counteracted by volitional effort (prayatna), as when a flying bird keeps itself from falling down; by contact (saṃyoga), as when a bird's nest is supported by the branch of a tree; and by impulse (vega), as when an arrow flies on transversally for some time before dropping down on the ground.

(ii) **Effort (prayatna)**— It is of two kinds—one which proceeds from life (jīvana) and the other that proceeds from desire and hatred. Of these, the former is the cause of vital-airs, namely, prāṇa and apāna. This action occurs while a man is sleeping. In other words, the activities of vital airs, in a sleeping man, are due to an effort. The other is the cause of the activities which are capable of leading to the desired and of removing the

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1. *Ibid.*, 1.1.89e
2. Prāṣastapāda, Padārthadharma Saṃgraha, Page 290e
3. *Kamāda*, Vaiśeṣika Jūtra, 5.1.15e
4. *Ibid.*, 5.1.17e
5. Sankar Mītra, Vaiśeṣika Upasakāra, 5.1.7e
undesired, e.g., the movement of one's hand for taking food, or for striking an enemy.

(iii) Conjunction (śāyoga)—Motion due to conjunction is produced by forcible contact (abhīghāta) or by impulsion (nodana). The former produces sound when two things between which conjunction takes place come together; while the latter does not produce any sound at all. Forcible contact is the cause of that motion which causes disjunction between that object which strikes against another object and vice versa. This also produces motion in all the four mahābhūtās. As for instance, when a stone or a similar other object falls upon a hard substance, it produces motion which is due to abhīghāta; so that, when the muddy earth is either impelled or struck by the feet, the conjunction thus produced is known as sahyuktā—śāyoga depending upon forcible contact, individually or collectively. It also produces motion in earth, etc., which are neither impelled nor struck.

On the other hand, impulsion (nodana) is a form of conjunction, because it is the cause of that motion which

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2. Ibid., 5.1.3.
3. Ibid., 5.1.10.
4. Śrīdhara, Nyāya Kandā, Page 305.
5. Prāṣastapāda, Padārthadharma Samgraha, Page 304.
produces the non-disjunction of the impeller from the impelled; and it is only by means of the conjunction in the form of impulsion that the impeller impels the impelled. This impulsion is helped by weight, fluidity, velocity and effort operating either collectively or individually. It also produces motion in all the four Mahābhūtas.

(iv) **Fluidity (dravatva)**—It is the cause of the motion of flowing. It belongs to earth, water and fire. It is natural in water alone, while it is extrinsic to earth and fire. The fluidity belonging to snow, ice, hailstone, etc., is due to the contact of the earthly (e.g., physical) tejas, as it is in the case of gold. The extrinsic fluidity belonging to earth and tejas is produced by the contact of tejas. For instance, in the case of butter, lac, honey, and the rest, a motion is produced by the contact of the tejas helped by velocity in the paramāṇus which constitute them.

(v) **Samkāra**—It is also a cause of motion. It is of three kinds, viz., velocity (vega), mental impressibility

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
4. Sridhara, Nyaya Kandī, Page 266.
(bhāvenā), and elasticity (sthitisthāpaka). Out of these three, only two—vṛata and sthitéṣṭhāpaka are required here as only these two, not the third, are the causes of motion. Vṛata is produced by motion with the help of impulsion (nodana), forcible contact (abhīghāta) and other causes, in all the five kinds of substances possessing limited forms, namely, earth, water, fire, air and manasa. Motion alone cannot produce velocity, as is clear from the fact that velocity is not found in slow motion where there is neither impulsion nor forcible contact. It is the cause of series of motions in one particular direction. It is counteracted by a particular kind of conjunction of tangible substance. It is, sometimes, preceded by a similar attribute belonging to the constituent parts of the substance.

Sthitéṣṭhāpaka (elasticity) exists in tangible substances of which the constituent parts are very closely combined together. It brings back the substance—its own substratum—to its original position, if that substance had changed its position otherwise, on some other

1. Śrīdhara, Nyāya Kandā, Page 267.
We find its effects in bow, branch of a tree, horn, tooth, bone, thread, cloth and the rest (all of which are products of some animate and inanimate objects) which are subject to contraction and expansion. The various known materials differ widely in their elastic properties and a knowledge of these matters is useful not only to the engineer who designs a bridge or a ship but also to the physician dealing with the more complex structural materials of the human body, and to the layman who cares to understand how things work.

(vi) Astrapa—Such motions which cannot be explained through ordinary causes mentioned above, are attributed to the astrapa, i.e., unseen force, which is mainly due to merit, or demerit, or both. The first motion of atoms on the eve of a fresh cosmic creation, the upward motion of the flames of fire, the transversal motion of air, the movement of an iron-needle towards the magnet, etc., is said to be by astrapa. In all these cases, the operation of

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1. It has been defined in science as:

"Elasticity is the property of matter by virtue of which it recovers from deformation produced by force."


adrata is assumed because of the belief that no empirical causes can be ascertained by any of the accredited instruments of knowledge.

These causes sometimes operate separately, independent of any other cause and sometimes, they join together to produce one joint effect.

Motion as an object of perception

Motion, according to Kanada, is visually perceived when it inheres in a visually perceivable substance.

Sankar Miara adds that motion is the object of tactual perception as well, provided it belongs to a tangible body. There is, therefore, no possibility of perceiving the motions of atoms or of minds.

There is an old view, recorded in the Mahabhashya, according to which there is no such objectively real thing as motion; what is called motion is only a conceptual construction to explain the fact of one's reaching a particular place and thus having contact with it. The Prabhakar, though a realist, was in all

1. Sankar Miara, Vaisesika Upankara, 5.1.15.
2. Kanada, Vaisesika Sutra, 4.1.1.6.
4. Patanjali, Mahabhashya on Panini-Sutra, 3.2.12.3.
probability influenced by this old theory of motion. For, according to him, motion is under no circumstances an object of perception. We perceive only the moving body and the successive conjunctions and disjunctions that its motion produces. The presence of motion in the body is inferred from these conjunctions and disjunctions.

The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃskas and the Vaiśeṣika adopt more or less the same line of argument to refute the Pṛbhākara view. When a moving body comes to be conjoined with or disjoined from certain points of space, the conjunctions and the disjunctions must have both the body and the space as their substrates. If, therefore, motion is to be inferred from these conjunctions and disjunctions, it must be inferred as belonging to the body as well as the space. This, however, is an obvious absurdity, for it is the body alone that moves, and space by its very nature is incapable of motion. Conjunctions and disjunctions thus

1. Śālikānātha Miśra, Pṛbhānakapāṇiśa, Page 79.
In Mechanics (the branch of Physics), Absolute Motion is the motion of a body with respect to another body whose position in space is absolutely fixed. But since there is no such body in the universe, absolute motion cannot be realized. Thus absolute rest and absolute motion are unknown to us. We know only of relative rest and relative motion.
Michels and Patterson: Elements of Modern Physics
do not constitute the valid logical ground for the inference of motion in a perceived body. Such motion should be supposed to be an object of direct perception.

4. Generality (Sāmānaya)

The category of generality was accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas to explain the notion of commonness in the objects of a class. Individual jānas, though different entities, but as they all produced a similar cognition, they were designated by a common name ‘jar’. There must, therefore, be something common in all the individual jars, and that common element was ghaṭava, the universal. Kanāda seems to regard the generality as a conceptual product. He defines generality and particularity as mental concepts, i.e., they depend upon the intellect. He lays stress on the activity of thought in relation to generality and particularity. By generality, he means a quality by which the intellect assimilates a number of objects and forms a group or class. By particularity he means a quality by which the intellect differentiates one object from others. Thus generality and particularity

1. Śridhara, Nyāya Kandī, Page 196; Pārthāsārthi Misra, Śāstra-dīpikā, Page 71.
2. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.2.3.
are mental concepts. But Kanāda admits that the common quality (sāmēṇya) exists in external things. So Kanāda may be regarded as an advocate of conceptualism, which regards generality as a mental concept. Bodas goes to the extent of suggesting that the sūtra of the Vaiśeṣika which enumerates six categories (the last three, sāmēṇya, etc., at par with the first three, substance, etc.) is an interpolation. But if even that suggestion were incorrect, there would be ample evidence to show that Kanāda did not assign objective reality to the last three categories, sāmēṇya, etc. In the first instance, only three categories, substance, quality and movement, are included in the term ‘artha’ which obviously means an objective reality. Secondly, the highest universal (sattā) which means ‘existence’ is held to be residing only in the first three categories. Moreover, although sāmēṇya, etc., are included in the list of padārthas, Kanāda seems to differentiate between artha and padārtha. While artha seems to mean an objective existence, padārtha seems to have been used in its literal sense, viz., ‘the meaning of a word’. Padārtha, therefore, can include even an intellectual entity because it can be expressed by a

1. Jnanesinha, Indian Psychology Perception, Page 181.
2. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.1.1.7.
4. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.2.7.
words. Further, it has been already pointed out that sāmānyā and vīśeṣa are explicitly declared to be dependent on the intellect, which is a direct evidence to show that Kanāda never conceived sāmānyā, etc., as objective realities.

Again, the terms 'sāmānyā' and 'vīśeṣa', are used in the sense of genus and species which are always relative, throughout the Vaiśeṣika sūtra. The same property may be sāmānyā in relation to one class and vīśeṣa in relation to another. For instance, in the case of a jar, the universal dravatva residing in it is genus (sāmānyā) in relation to pṛthivitva, but it is at the same time species (vīśeṣa) in relation to the universal sattā. These two terms indicate that there are two aspects (general and particular) of every object Uddyotakara expressly says: "Every object has got two aspects, the general and the particular." Sridhara says: "When we have the notion of commonness (aṅgatākāra buddhi), we cognize the universal dravatva, etc., but when we have the notion of differentia (vyāvyātī-buddhi), we cognize the individual substances, earth, etc." These

1. Ibbid., 1ae33
2. Uddyotakara, Nyāya-Vīrtika, Page 131e
3. Sridhara, Nyāya-Kandli, Page 315e
statements of Uddotakara and Śridhara indicate that sāmānya and viśeṣa are not conceived as objective realities which reside by inherent relation in their individual objects, but as two aspects of the object itself.

Praśastapāda (who first assigned objective reality to categories, sāmānya, etc.) regards the generality as eternal and residing in many things belonging to the group of substance, quality or action. But it is an interesting point that Praśastapāda himself says that one of their common properties is that they are indicated by intellect (buddhilakṣaṇata). Explaining this Śridhara says, "If somebody doubts the existence of sāmānya, etc., there is no other proof of their existence except through the intellect. In the case of the first three categories, substance, etc., the proof of their existence may be provided by their effects also, but this is not possible in the case of the last three categories."

Praśastapāda held that sāmānya performed both the functions, viz., that of causing the notion of commonness (anuvṛtti) and also that of differentiation (vyēvṛtti).

1. Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmaśāngreha, Page 11
2. Ibid., Page 15
3. Śridhara, Nyāya-Kandikā, Page 19
4. Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmaśāngreha, Page 11
He supposed that they were sāmānyas primarily, and viśeṣa in a secondary sense. The function of differentiation having thus been assigned to sāmānya, the term 'viśeṣa' was restricted to the ultimate particulars (antya-viśeṣas).

Thus Praśastapāda paved the way for the generality being assigned an objective reality. Being regarded as objectively real, the generality was also conceived as eternal. Hence, Praśastapāda was the first to hold sāmānya to be objectively real and eternal, but it is probable that the idea might have existed some time earlier, because, as Randle has pointed out, the Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama already speaks of sāmānya as eternal and perceptible by a sense-organ. This clearly implies acceptance of the theory of objective reality of sāmānya.

However, it is clear that while Kapāla insisted more on the activity of thought and therefore the inseparable relation between the universal and the individual, Praśastapāda shifts the stress to the eternal nature of the universals.

The Buddhists are not in favour of the above mentioned nature of sāmānya. According to them, the individual (svalakṣaṇa) alone is real and there is no

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1 Randle, Indian Logic in Early Schools, Page 7; Gautama, Nyāya-Sūtra, 5155.
class or universal other than the particular objects of experience. The idea of sameness that we may have with regard to a number of individuals of a certain character is due to their being called by the same name. It is only the name that is general, and the name does not stand for any positive essence that is present in all the individuals. It means only that the individuals called by one name are different from those to which a different name is given. Thus certain animals are called cow, not because they possess any common essence but because they are different from all animals which are not cows. So there is no universal but the name with a negative connotation. Thus, in Buddhist philosophy, we have the nominalistic view of the universal.

2 The Jains and the Advaita-Vedántins adopt the conceptualistic view of the universal. According to them, the universal does not stand for any independent entity over and above the individuals. On the other hand, it is constituted by the essential common attributes of all the individuals. So the universal is not separate from the individuals, but is identical with them in relation to existence. The universal and the individual

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1 Kesava Misra, Turka Bhāsa, Page 28.
2 Prāchāsandra, Prameya-Kaml-mārtanda, Ch. IV.
3 Dharmaśādhvendra, Vedānta-paribhāṣā, Ch. 1.
are related by way of identity. The universal has existence, not in our mind only, but also in the particular objects of experience. It does not, however, come to them from outside and is not anything like a separate 'essence', but is only their common nature.

But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas enunciate the realistic theory of the universal. According to them, universal is a real entity which corresponds to a general idea or class-essence in our mind. Annamśhaṭṭa defines universal as one, eternal and inhering in many individuals. There is the class-essence of man in all individual men. It is one, though the individuals in which it inheres are many. It is eternal, though the individuals in which it inheres are born and die. It is common to many individuals. We know individual men as belonging to the same class because there is the same universal or class-essence of man (nārātva) in all men. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are realists. They recognize the reality of the universal corresponding to a concept in our mind. Some of the modern realists like Russell also hold that a 'universal is an eternal timeless entity which may be shared by many particulars'.

1. Annam śhaṭṭa, Turka-Śāṅgraha, Page 94.
2. Ibid.
3. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Ch. IX.
The sāmānya subsists in substances, qualities and actions.  Jarringness of jars subsists in individual jars which are substances.  Colourlessness of colour subsists in individual colours which are qualities.  The class-essence of movement subsists in all individual movements which are actions.

The universal does not subsist in another universal.  If there were such a universal, it would have another universal and so on.  So, in order to avoid infinite regress, the universal subsisting in another universal is not recognized.  There is only a single universal subsisting in all individuals of the same class.  All individual cows have the same essential qualities because the same class-essence (gotva) subsists in them all.  If there were two or more universals in them, they would possess contrary qualities of different classes.

The universal does not subsist in particularity, inherence and negation.  Absolute non-existence is eternal, and is also a quality of many things, but is not intimately related to, i.e., is not a constituent element of, many things.  Similarly, particularity is not sāmānya, since then it would lose its nature and become confused with the

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latter. Inherence cannot be confused with saṃsāra, since then it will require intimate relation with intimate relation, and so on ad infinitum. Saṃsāra is thus an independent category.

The universal exists in each individual wholly. It can never exist partly in each individual, because it has no parts. When a particular individual comes into existence it comes to be related to the universal. "Though the universal is eternal, its relation to a particular individual comes into existence only at the moment when the individual comes into being." ¹

The universals have been distinguished in three classes according to their scope, viz., para or the highest, para or the lowest, and the parāpara or the intermediate. "Being-hood" is the highest universal. It covers the largest number of things. It includes all, and is not included in anything. The genus of jar is the lowest universal present in all jars, since it has the most limited or the narrowest extent. The genus of substance (dravyatva) as another universal is parāpara or intermediate between the highest and the lowest. It is

³ Kanāda, *Vaidyāsā.Śtra, 1,2.4, 7-10, 17.*
para or wider in relation to substances like earth, water, etc., and apara or narrower in relation to the universal 'being-hood' which belong to substance, quality and action.

A distinction is also made into jāti and upādhi. The jāti of a thing is inborn, natural and eternal, while the upādhi is adventitious and transitory. Every common characteristic is not a jāti. Since some persons are blind, we cannot have a jāti of blindness. If it were so, blind men, blind cows and blind horses would be grouped under the same class. Humanity distinguishes human beings from other animals, but blindness does not differentiate blind men from blind cows. Again, if men are grouped according to their language, race or religion, the same persons may belong to several classes. So, the classification of men as human beings is a jāti, while their grouping according to their language or religion is an upādhi. Jāti is eternal while the upādhi is transitory. Jāti is a natural classification while upādhi is an artificial class.

Udayana says that there is no jāti, or generality, where only one individual exists (abheda), where there is no difference of individuality (tulyatvam), where there is confusion of objects belonging to different classes (saṁśāra), where there is infinite regress (anavasthā),
where there is a violation of essence (rupaheni), where there is no relation (asambandha). These six conditions have been described by Śaṅkar Miśra as under:

(i) Ṇhada:

Generality inheres in many individuals. If there is only one individual, it can have no generality inhering in it. Ether is one individual substance. So there is no genus of etherness.

(ii) Tulvatvam:

Potness and pitcherness are not two different classes, because they are co-extensive. They are two different names of the same class.

(iii) Śaṅkūra:

If there is a cross-division between two classes, they cannot be recognized as true universals. Four kinds of atoms (i.e., earth, water, fire and air) and ether are physical substances (bhuṭadraya) while the four atomic substances and the mind are corporeal substances (mūrtadraya). Ether is physical but not corporeal.

2. Śaṅkar Miśra, Vaiśeṣika Upasakāra, 1e2.3e
Mind is corporeal but not physical. So physicality (bhūtatva) and corporeality (mūrtatva) are not generalities, because they involve cross-division.

(iv) *Anavastha*:

There cannot be a class of class. No generality can subsist in another generality since it would lead to infinite regress.

(v) Nābhāni:

Generality cannot subsist in particularities since it would contradict their nature. Generality is inclusive; particularity is exclusive. So particularity absolutely refuses to allow of inherence of generality in it.

(vi) *Asambandha*:

Generality cannot subsist in inherence, since there is no relation of inherence between that generality and inherence so there is no generality of inherence.

5. **Particularity (Viśesa)**

According to Vaiṣeṣika, the true realisation of the Ātman, the highest end of Indian philosophy is possible by
the right knowledge of each and every category accepted by the system. This is possible only when every object is distinguished from its homogeneous and heterogeneous classes. Everything in this world is differentiated from another on account of different attributes, different qualities and different universals. But in the case of two objects (e.g., two jars) which have not only the same universal but, being quite similar, have the same qualities, the question arises how one of them can be differentiated from the other. The obvious answer is that they are differentiated on account of the difference of their parts. But what about the two atoms of the same class, say of earth, which have the same universal and the same qualities, and which have no parts? How can one atom be differentiated from another of the same class? If they are not differentiated, they will coalesce and form one mass, and the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas will come to an end. The Vaiśeṣika seeks to explain the position by supposing that each atom possesses an ultimate differentiating characteristic called particularity (vīṣēṣa) by means of which it is distinguished from all other atoms. That all atoms are judged as distinct individuals is because each of them has its own

1. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1:1:44
particularity. What is true of atoms is also true of all. Other eternal substances (e.g., ākāśa, kāla, dik, ātman and manas), are exactly on the same grounds.

Kanāda defines viśeṣa as the ultimate distinguishing feature of an eternal substance, which is known by its discrimination from the other eternal substances. It depends upon the intellect to indicate its existence. Praśastapāda also defines particularity as the ultimate distinguishing features of eternal substances. They are called viśeṣas, because they are the causes of the ultimate distinction of their substrates from one another. They are the final distinctive characters of eternal substances.

From the definitions of particularity accepted by Kanāda and Praśastapāda, we may say that Kanāda believed the doctrine of viśeṣa in the sense of particularity or exclusiveness, i.e., viśeṣa was an aspect of every object which caused the notion of its exclusion or differentiation from other objects. Though the term 'antya-viśeṣa occurs in the Viśeṣika-Sūtra' also, but it is not explained there.

The theory of viśeṣa as differentiator of atoms, which is

1. Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmaśāstra, Pages 321-22.
the corner-stone of the atomic theory, is not found in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras. The atomic theory is usually supposed to be associated with the Vaiśeṣika school. The name of the founder of the school, Kapāla, meaning an atom-eater, also seems suggestive of the same. The category viśeṣa being intrinsically associated with the atomic theory, it has also been suggested that the name of the system, Vaiśeṣika, might have been derived from it. But this is not probable, because the theory of viśeṣa in that sense, as pointed out above, is not found in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the doctrine of viśeṣa, in the sense of particularity or exclusiveness, which along with sāmānya (the universal) has been accepted as an aspect of every object in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras, was an important principle of that school. It is possible that the name of the school might have been due to the term ‘viśeṣa’ used in that sense.

Praśastapāda makes particularity an objective reality. He restricted the term ‘viśeṣa’ to the sense of ultimate particulars residing in eternal atoms and other eternal substances. Particularity inheres in each of them, which distinguishes it from the other eternal substances. Particularities are held to be eternal because we cannot conceive of any eternal substance remaining indifferentiated.

1. Praśastapāda, Padārthadhermāsāgraha, Page 321.
from others at any time. Particularity is thus an independent self-sufficient principle of differentiation. It is the unique feature of a single individual, and so its only function is to differentiate (vṛśṭti). It is ultimate (antya) in the sense that it functions even when every other means of differentiation fails. Thus, Praśastapāda introduced the theory that the term viśeṣa is exclusively used in the sense of antya-viśeṣa residing in the atoms and other eternal substances. In later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, especially in the manuals like Tarka-bhāṣā, Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī and Tarka-Samgraha, the idea continued to use the term viśeṣa in the above mentioned sense.

This antya-viśeṣa does not belong to the qualities and motions possessed by eternal substances; for, the differentiation in those cases is possible through the help of their own intermediate jātis, namely, śūklatva, 1 raktatva, gamentva, etc., and also through the viśeṣas of the form of their substrata. 2

Particularities do not require other particularities to distinguish them from one another, because it would lead to infinite regress. They distinguish themselves

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1. Śivāditya, Saptapadārthī, Page 12
from one another. Through their own nature, they cause differentiation and do not require the help of another vīśeṣa over it. Thus they perform a double function. Firstly, they distinguish the eternal substance from other eternal substances, and secondly, they distinguish themselves from other particularities.

There cannot be any class-character (jāti) like 'vīśeṣatva' common to all particularities, for a particularity of such a class-character will be distinguishable by means of that character from things by means of that character from things of other classes and thus forfeit its own self-differentiated nature. Moreover, particularities sharing a common class-character, like the individuals of any other class, can only be differentiated from one another through some individual characteristic or distinctive feature of each of them. But in that case, again, particularities will cease to be self-differentiated reals. They exist in single substances only. They are devoid of generality. They do not exist through inherence of Being in them, which is a generality. Śivāditya supports this view as: "vīśeṣa is an entity inhering in a single substance, and devoid

1 Prācāntapāda Bhāgya, Pages 321-222.
2 Udayana, Kṛṣṇāvalī, Page 25.
3 Ibid.
The Neo-Maṇḍūkya discuss the logical necessity of acknowledging particularity as a distinct category. They hold that if particulars can distinguish themselves from other particularities without the aid of other particularities, then atoms themselves may distinguish themselves from other atoms without particularities inhering in them. The Vedāntins and the Māṇḍūkya, Kumārila and Prabhākara also do not accept particularity as an independent category. They ask how one particular viśeṣa is differentiated from another viśeṣa. To this Praśastapāda replies: "Cognition caused through the agency of a thing relates to things other than itself. For instance, a lamp causes the cognition of a jar, etc., but the cognition of a lamp is never brought about by another lamp. Just as the flesh of a cow and that of a horse are unclean by themselves and their contact defiles other things also, similarly, in the cases of viśeṣas, differentiation being their nature, they are differentiated by themselves, and by their contact atoms are also differentiated."

Moreover, Praśastapāda believes that yogins are

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1. Śīvaṇḍita, Saptapāḍṭhā, Page 40.
3. Praśastapāda, Padārthadārmanirūpaṇa, Page 322.
able to perceive the ultimate particularity of the simple substances. It may be argued that the yogins can distinguish them from one another by dint of their merits born of meditation without the aid of their particularities. But this argument is invalid. Just as they cannot perceive a white thing as non-white, and recognize a thing never perceived before by dint of their own merits, so they cannot distinguish the atoms of the same kind from one another by dint of them without the aid of particularities. If they could distinguish them from one another without particularities inhering in them, their perceptions would be invalid. The Vaiśeṣika system advocates realistic pluralism. It recognizes the category of viśeṣa as an independent category to emphasize the individuality of eternal substances. Viśeṣa, according to Vaiśeṣika, is a distinct type of real and cannot be brought under any other category. It is not substance, because it is not the substratum of quality; nor is it quality or action, for it does not participate in a universal. It is manifestly not a relation and so cannot be identified with svamāya. Each particularity inheres only in one eternal substance and is, therefore, not a universal, which is supposed to be related to many

1: Ibid.
2: Ibid.
individuals (substances, qualities or actions). Mutual non-existence cannot serve the purpose of viśeṣa. Mutual non-existence exists in two entities, which have dissimilarities. There is a mutual non-existence of a cloth and a jar in each other. But particularities exist in two eternal substances, which have similar qualities, and distinguish them from each other. So mutual non-existence cannot serve the purpose of particularities. Therefore, the existence of particularities must be admitted to account for the ultimate distinction of eternal substances. "Particularities are the ultimate distinguishing characters of the atoms of the same form, quality and motion, and of the released souls, and of the internal organs (manas) by which the yogins distinguish them from one another."

6. Inheritance (saṃśaya)

The category of inheritance plays a very important part in upholding pluralistic realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika insists that whatever comes into the range of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world. 'Cloth is white'; in this cognition, whiteness appears as an entity separate

from the cloth in which it is experienced as residing. Again, there must be some device to unite these two components, i.e., cloth and whiteness. That device was conceived in the form of inherent relation called 'samvāya'.

The function of samvāya is to relate two entities which are inseparable. Thus, not only are there two separate objective entities, cloth and whiteness; there is, besides them, a third entity, the relation between them which is yet another objective reality. It is necessary to relate a substance to its quality, action, generality and particularity which are all real. If the first five categories, i.e., substance, quality, action, generality and particularity are the bricks of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika structure, the mortar to unite them is provided by this sixth category samvāya. The category of inherence enables the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system to hold qualities and movements to be entities separate from their substance, and to hold the jar and jariness to be two realities, different in their essence.

The category of inherence explains the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of causality as a new emergence. The effect is different from its material cause, in which it does not pre-exist before its production. The
effect resides in its material cause by inherent relation (samavāya). It is for this reason that material cause is designated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as the 'samavāyā-kāraṇa', i.e., the cause which contains its effect within it by samavāya relation. The samavāya relation is thus the basis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

Kanāda defines inherence as "that which produces in respect of cause and effect the notion of this being contained in that."

From the above definition, it seems that the conception of samavāya at first originated in connection with the relation of cause and effect, because Kanāda does not speak of qualities, movements or universals to be residing in their substances by samavāya relation. But after Kanāda, the scope of samavāya was extended to the subsistence of qualities, movements or universals, and later on, when a separate category 'vaiseṣa' was formulated, it was also held to be residing in atoms or other eternal substances by the same relation. Praśastapāda defines inherence as the relation which subsists among inseparable things, which are related to one another as the container and the contained; and which

is the basis of the idea 'this is in that'.

According to this definition, the two entities necessarily stand in the relation of the container and the contained (ādhara-ādheya-bhāva) in samavāya. That which cannot exist without the other is always the contained (ādheya), and the other which can exist independently is always the container, the sub-stratum, e.g., effect, qualities, etc., are always the contained and the substance in which they reside is the container or the sub-stratum. The second feature of the definition is that inherence subsists in inseparable things. It is not the relation between two entities, which are capable of separate existence. Separable entities are capable of existing apart from each other and residing in different substrates. But inseparable things cannot exist separately, and are those, one of which abides in the other, without being destroyed. The whole and the parts, quality and substance, action and substance, generality and the individual, particularity and an eternal substance are inseparable things. The whole inheres in the parts; quality inheres in a substance; an action inheres in a substance; generality inheres in an

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individual; particularity inheres in an eternal substance. Inherence is one eternal relation. While the substance, quality, action, generality and particularity have the character of inherence (samavāyitvam) and plurality (anekatvam), or possession of forms differentiating them from one another, samavāya is only one and has no plurality. Prabhākara, a Māṁsāsaka, recognizes many inherences. When an individual is born, a new relation of inherence is generated, by which the individual is brought into relation with the generality subsisting in other individuals. Inherence is many, because the inseparable things, among which it subsists, are many. Prabhākara recognizes inherence as eternal and non-eternal accordingly as the things in which it subsists are eternal or non-eternal. But Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognizes inherence as one and eternal.

Inherence is one, because it has the same distinguishing feature. There is no evidence of its distinctions. One inherence can account for all notions 'this subsists in this abode'. So it is useless to assume many inherences. One inherence is enough to relate all its relata,—substances and their qualities, substances

1. Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, Page 324
3. Ibid., Page 8.
4. Ibid., Page 326.
and their actions, wholes and parts, generality and individuals, eternal substances and their particularities. Though inheritance is only one, there is a restriction due to the differences of the substrates and their contents. The genus of substance inheres in substances. The genus of quality inheres in qualities. The genus of action inheres in actions. Thus, though inheritance is one, it has a restriction as to its substrate and its content due to the differences in the power of being the manifest and the manifested.

Inheritance is eternal, since all positive products are produced in their material cause by the relation of inheritance, and if inheritance is produced, it will require another inheritance, and so on ad infinitum. So in order to avoid infinite regress, inheritance is regarded as eternal. Śivāditya defines inheritance as an eternal relation. Just as one Being inheres in many existing entities, so one inheritance subsists between innumerable pairs of relata. Just as Being is eternal, so inheritance is eternal. Inherence is different from conjunction, which is a temporary relation.

1. Viśvanātha, Siddhānta-muktāvalī, Pages 85-86.
2. Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, Page 327.
3. Ibid.
4. Śivāditya, Saṃkṣetanādīrthi, Page 40.
   Praśastapāda, Padārthadharma-saṅgṛaha, Page 328.
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that samavāya does not require any other relation for its subsistence. It subsists by itself (saṃvārytti). If it be by another samavāya or some other relation, that will lead to a process of infinite regress. To the question "Why is samavāya regarded as independent?", Uddyotakara replies: "It is because it has no other samavāya relation for its subsistence. Whatever subsists elsewhere must subsist by some relation, and, therefore, samavāya (which has no relation for its subsistence) does not subsist anywhere." Uddyotakara is the solitary instance of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writer who holds that samavāya does not subsist anywhere. Other writers merely maintain that samavāya does not subsist in its substratum by another relation. They never say that it does not subsist at all. Pradāntapāda, however, includes samavāya also in the list of the entities which are subsistent (āśṛta) in some object. Commenting on this inclusion, Śridhara says that subsistence (āśrītatva) here means 'being cognized as dependent. Inherence has no other relation by which it can relate itself to its relation. Śridhara also remarks: "It does not subsist in an object. Being itself in the

1. Ibid., Page 19.
2. Uddyotakara, Nyāya-Vārtika, Page 158.
3. Pradāntapāda, Padarthadharmaśāstra, Page 16.
4. Śridhara, Nyāya Kandī, Page 16.
nature of a relation, it subsists in an object by itself (without the need of any other relation)."

Inherence is different from substance, quality, action, generality and particularity, because it is a relation between a substance and the other categories. It is different from non-existence. So it is a distinct category.

About the perception of inherence, there is a difference of opinion among Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Nyāya school holds that samavāya is perceptible while, the Vaiśeṣikas deny it. The Nyāya system accepts six kinds of contacts and holds that any object, substance and non-substance, comes in contact with the senses by any of the first five forms of contact, and if there resides in that object any non-existence as its attribute, the non-existence is perceived by the sixth form of contact, i.e., Viṣeṣa-bhāva. Samavāya is also an attribute of the object in which something resides by that relation, and that samavāya also, like non-existence, is perceived by the sixth kind of contact. Kesāva Miśra maintained, while describing the sixth kind of contact, that samavāya

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1. Ibid., Page 329.
2. Pradāntapāda Bhāṣya, Page 326;
   Sankar Miśra, Upaskāra, 7.2.a.26.
was also perceived through (viśeṣaṇa-bhāva) contact.\(^1\)

The Vaiśeṣika school held inheritance to be merely inferable. According to this school, inheritance is not perceivable. It is not perceived to subsist in perceptible entities. There is no distinct perceptual cognition of it. The relation between a rose and its colour is not perceived. It is inferred from the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. It is not perceived as an object (viṣaya). Viśvanātha says that inheritance is inferred from the qualified cognition of a substantive, an attribute, and relation between them. A jar is endowed with a colour. The jar is a substantive; colour is an attribute. Inheritance is the relation between them. The jar and its colour are perceived. But inheritance between them is not perceived.\(^3\) Again, samavāya is itself in the nature of subsistence and has no other relation of subsistence. Praśastapāda says, "Samavāya is imperceptible, because it has no relation of subsistence, as is found in the universal existence (sattā) which resides by samavāya relation in the objects that are perceptible.\(^4\)

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2. Praśastapāda, Bhāṣya, Page 329.
Dr. Radhakrishnan regards inherence as an internal relation. He says, "Conjunction is external relation, while inherence is internal relation. In conjunction, two differents are joined together without forming a real whole which enters into each. Inherence is a real coherence." But in the view of Prof. J.N. Sinha, "It is misleading to regard inherence as an internal relation. An internal relation is one which enters into the being of the relate and constitutes their nature. The relate cannot exist apart from each other. An internal relation implies mutual dependence of the relate on each other. But we know that whole cannot exist apart from its parts, but parts can exist apart from the whole; a quality cannot exist apart from a substance, but a substance can exist apart from a quality, an activity cannot exist apart from a substance, but a substance can exist apart from an activity, an individual cannot exist apart from a generality, but a generality can exist apart from an individual. So only one term of the relation depends upon the other. There is no mutual dependence of the members of the relation on each other. So inherence may be regarded as an intimate or necessary relation, but not an internal relation." Prof. Hiriyana regards

2. J.N. Sinha, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Page 173.
inherence as an external relation. In our view, inherence should be regarded as an eternal relation, since one of its terms can exist apart from the other. In this relation, only one term depends upon the others and is inseparable from it. There is one-sided dependence in it. In internal relation both the terms should depend on each other. There should be mutual dependence of both the terms of the relation in an internal relation. But this is not in case of inherence. Hence it cannot be called an internal relation, but it should be called an external relation.

Sankara criticizes the theory of inherence. He holds that if cause and effect are inseparably connected, as the Vaiśeṣika admits, then it is far simpler to assume that there is identity of essence between the two. Kumārila also holds: "If samavāya is something different from the class and the individual that resides in the class by samavāya, then it (the samavāya) could not exist in them as a relation; on the other hand, if it be identical with them then, these two would be identical by the law that things that are identical with the same thing are identical with themselves." Vaiśeṣika system has refuted this misunderstanding. According to it, the two inseparable

1. M. Hiriyana, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Page 236.
2. Sānkar, Sāṅkar Bhāṣya, 2.2.13-17.
entities, which are related through inference do not produce the cognition of one thing. They produce two different cognitions, which apprehend them. The cognitions have different contents. So the relations of inference are different from each other. They are not really one and the same thing. Therefore, inference is not essential identity, but the relation between two inseparable entities, which cannot subsist in different substrates apart from each other. The relations of inference are different from each other. Inference is not non-difference or identity, as the advaita Vedanta wrongly maintains.

Inference is not svatāpa-sambandha, which is a relation that is identified with either of its relata. If there is a svatāpa-sambandha between a jar and its colour, the jar itself is the relation of colour to it. Therefore, an infinite number of svatāpa-sambandha must be assumed to account for the relation between countless substances and their qualities and actions. This will contradict the law of parsimony of hypotheses. Further, the assumption of svatāpa-sambandha between a material cause (parts) and its effect (whole) would undermine

1. Śrīdhara, Nyāya-Kanda, Page 152.
2. Padmanabha Miśra, Kṛśṇa-viśeṣthākara, Page 47.
the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Āsatakāryavāda. The effect is a new beginning, which is different from, and inheres in, its material cause. The whole is different from its parts. It inheres in its parts. Therefore inherence is not svarūpa-sambandha.

Semavēya distinguished from Saṁyoga

There are two main relations recognized in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. These are saṁyoga or conjunction and semavēya or inherence. Saṁyoga is a temporary, accidental and non-eternal relation between the two things (e.g., a pen and an ink pot) which can exist apart from each other. A pen comes into contact with an inkpot. This contact is conjunction. It is a temporary relation. The pen and the inkpot existed apart from each other before their conjunction and will exist apart from each other after they are separated from each other. But inherence is a necessary, uncaused and inseparable relation. It is a relation between a substance and a quality, a substance and an action, a genus and an individual, an eternal substance and its particularity, a whole and its parts. Secondly, saṁyoga exists between two substances which can be separated,

1 Prāśastapāda, Bhāṣya, Page 324.
whereas the inherent relation exists between the entities which cannot be separated. A man with a stick which are related by saimyoga can be separated but, of the cause and the effect which are related by samavaya, the effect cannot be separated from its cause, i.e., a cloth cannot exist independently of threads. Thirdly, in samavaya, the two entities necessarily stand in the relation of the container and the contained (adhara-adheya-bhava), but in the case of samyoga, the two substances connected by it are not necessarily in the relation of the container and the contained. In the instance of 'the fruits in the basket', there does exist the relation of the container and the contained, but in the instance of the 'two connected sticks' that relation does not exist; one of them is not the substratum of the other. Fourthly, samyoga is produced, but inherence is uncaused, samyoga is destroyed by disjunction of its relata. But inherence is indestructible. 1 Inherence is one while conjunctions are many. Inherence is imperceptible while conjunction is perceptible. Inherence is a distinct category, while conjunction is a quality of conjoined things. Conjunction resides by samavaya relation in the two substances which it connects. Thus, samyoga, which connects two

1. Praśastapāda, Bhāṣya, Page 326.
substances, is itself related to them by samavāya, but
inherence does not require any other inherence to relate
itself to its members. It binds its members with each
other into a concrete whole. If it requires another
inherence to relate itself to its members, that would
require another and so on ad infinitum. Inherence is a
natural and inseparable relation while conjunction is an
adventitious and separable relation.

7. Non-existence (abhāva)

The category of abhāva is absolutely necessary for
the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy of realistic pluralism.
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system holds that every experience has its
counterpart in the external world. When we see a piece of
ground without a jar, we experience the absence of the jar
in that place. Similarly, when a jar is destroyed, there
is the experience of its destruction, i.e., its non-
existence. This experience must have its counterpart in
the external world, i.e., the non-existence of the jar
should have an objective reality. Because the non-existence
of the jar is not unreal like a hare's horn or a sky-flower.
It is a negative reality. The non-existence of the jar is
the reality of a negative kind. If things simply exist and

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1. Śridhara, Nyāya-Kandhā, Page 326.
do not become non-existence, then all things would be eternal. Again, also the metaphysical conception of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is based on the theory of the reality of abhāva. The causal theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika known as asatkāryavāda which is opposed to the satkāryavāda of the sākhya, is also based on the reality of abhāva. Sākhya system holds that a jar is not non-existent before its production or after its destruction. It exists in its manifested state even before its production and after its destruction. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds that a jar is non-existent before its production as well as after its destruction. Thus the reality of abhāva is necessary for the realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The first six categories, i.e., from substance to samavāya, are of a positive kind while the seventh category of abhāva is of a negative kind.

Kaṇḍāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system, does not directly mention abhāva as an independent category. But he indicates non-existence with its four kinds as a possible object of knowledge. 1 Sankar Mīra interprets the aphorisms as referring to prior non-existence, posterior

1. Kaṇḍāda, Vaiśeṣika Śūtra, 1.1.4; 9.1.1-10.
non-existence, mutual non-existence and absolute non-

existence. 1 Praśastapāda also had no idea of the theory
of the objective reality of non-existence. He recognizes
the six categories and states that right knowledge of them
is the means to liberation. 2 But Śridhara says that
"Praśastapāda did not hold abhāva to be a separate category
because it was dependent on bhāva, and not because abhāva
did not exist." 3 Udayana holds the same view and says,
"Non-existence is a distinct ontological category. But it
is not separately mentioned because it is indicated by
the six categories of existence, which are its counter-
entities." 4

The clear-cut idea of the non-existence as an
'objective reality' occurs in the Nyāya-Vārtika of
Uddyotakara in connection with the discussion on the
sense-object-contact (sannikāraṇa). It is stated there
that samavāya and abhāva are perceived through the sixth
contact called viśeṣaṁ viśeṣaya-abhāva. This statement
of Uddyotakara that abhāva is perceived by our senses is
possible only if the abhāva is accepted, as an external
objective reality. But Śivāditya introduced the abhāva as

1. Śankar Miśra, Upasakāra, 9.1.1-10.
5. Uddyotakara, Nyāya-Vārtika, Page 97.
a separate category. The very title of Śivāditya's work 'Sapta-pāda-rthī' indicates that he wrote it with the object of establishing seven categories in place of the original six. The syncratic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises like 'Tarkasamgraha', 'Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvali', 'Tarka-Kamudī', 'Tarkārtha', 'Tarka-bhāṣā' and 'Tarka-raksā', hold non-existence to be a distinct category.

The Vaiśeṣika, being a realist, believes that just as knowledge is different from the object known which exists independently of that knowledge and necessarily points to some object, similarly knowledge of the negation is different from the thing negated and necessarily points to some object which is negated. In the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, "Though an empirical classification of existent things has no need for an independent category of abhāva, still the dialectical representation of the universe requires the conception of negation. When the Vaiśeṣika enlarged its scope and attempted to give a coherent account of experience as a whole, it developed the category of abhāva."

Udayana divides the categories into existence and non-existence. He divides the former into substance,
quality, action, community, particularity and inherence; and the latter into prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, absolute non-existence and mutual non-existence. 1 Sridhara and Sivāditya also recognize these four kinds of non-existence. The manuals of syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school divide non-existence into two kinds, namely, saṁsārabhāva and anyonyābhāva. Saṁsārabhāva means the absence of something in something else. Anyonyābhāva means the fact that one thing is not another thing. Saṁsārabhāva is of three kinds, namely, prāgabhāva, dharmaśabhāva and atyentabhāva.

(1) Prāgabhāva (prior non-existence)

It is the non-existence of an effect in its material cause before its production, e.g., the non-existence of the cloth in the threads before its production. Cloth is produced from threads. There was prior non-existence of the cloth in threads before its production. It had no beginning, but it had an end. It was brought to an end, when the cloth came into existence. Thus prior non-existence is not produced but destroyed. It is beginningless but non-eternal. If it is not destroyed,

1. Udayana, Laksanavali, Pages 1, 13.
3. Vāmanātha, Bhāṣapariccheda and Muktāvalī, Page 12;
   Kesava Miśra, Tarka-dhāsa, Page 29;
   Annam Bhaṭṭa, Tarka-saṅgraha, Page 89.
the effect cannot be produced. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system believes in asatkāryavāda, which regards the effect as non-existent in the cause.

(ii) Pratibhāsabhāva (posterior non-existence)

It is the non-existence of a thing after its destruction. It has a beginning, but no end. When a jar is destroyed, it has posterior non-existence. It is not perceived again, because it is not produced again. Posterior non-existence is produced by the destruction of an effect, but it cannot be destroyed, since the same jar cannot be produced again. Thus posterior non-existence is produced by the destruction of the thing, but the non-existence cannot itself be destroyed. It is said to have a beginning, but no end.

(iii) Anyonābhāva (mutual non-existence)

It is the non-existence of one thing (e.g., a jar) as another (e.g., a cloth) which is different from it. A jar is not a cloth. Here there is mutual non-existence of the jar and the cloth. They exclude each other. In other words, there is non-existence of either as the other.

1. Śridhara, Nyāya-KandH, Page 230.
2. Ibid.
Mutual non-existence has its counter-entity, the identity of things. Identity is the opposite of mutual non-existence.

(iv) Atvantabhāya (absolute non-existence)

Absolute non-existence is the absence of a connection between two things in the past, the present and the future. Colour did not exist in the air in the past time, does not exist in the present, and will not exist in future. So there is absolute non-existence of colour in the air. Śrīdharā says: "Absolute negation is denial of an absolutely non-existent entity, which is not limited by space and time, but which is only conceived by the intellect. Absolute non-existence is different from mutual non-existence. Mutual negation is denial of identity between two things, which have specific natures. But absolute negation is denial of an absolutely non-existent entity in all times and in all places."

These four kinds of non-existence are necessary for the realistic pluralism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Śrīdharā

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2. Ibid.
3. Śrīdharā, Nyāya-Kandā, Page 230.
4. Ibid.
says that if there were no prior non-existence, an effect would not be produced, if there were no posterior non-existence, there would be no destruction of an effect, if there were no mutual non-existence, there would not be different things with specific natures and if there were no absolute non-existence, all things would exist always and everywhere. The same idea has been expressed by Dr. Radha Krishan also. Prior non-existence is limited by future, posterior negation is limited by the past, mutual negation is limited by the present, and absolute negation is unlimited by any time. Prior negation is limited by production of an effect in future. Posterior negation is limited by its existence in the past. Mutual negation is negation of identity between two things at present, which is its counter-entity. It is limited by their specific natures. Absolute negation is non-existence of relation, which is not limited by any time.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system holds that non-existence not only possesses an objective reality, but it is also directly perceptible by the senses like all other eternal objects. The cognition of non-existence depends upon the cognition of its counter-entity. A jar is the

1. Śridhara, Nyāya-Kandī, Page 230.
2. Dr. Radha Krishan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Page 221.
4. Śivāditya, Saptapadartha, Page 40.
counter-entity of the negation of the jar. The non-existence of a jar on the ground is perceived. Kumārila, on the other hand, holds that non-existence cannot be perceived by the senses, but it is comprehended by a separate pramāṇa, called non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). Kumārila pointed out that abhāva, being of a negative nature, should also be comprehended by a negative means of knowledge, viz., 'non-comprehension' which means the negation of comprehension by any means of knowledge. 1 Jayanta ridicules the idea that an object and the means of its knowledge should be held to be similar, and says, "there is no propriety in holding that non-existence should be comprehended by a negative means of knowledge; it is not necessary that the offering to a deity should be of the same nature as that of the deity." 2 Śrīdhara says, "When vacant ground is comprehended through sense-contact, there also occurs the cognition of non-existence in the form 'the ground is without a jar'. That being the case, why should the cognition of non-existence be not held to be a sense-perception like that of the ground itself." Jayanta holds the same view: "When we open our eyes, we perceive the ground as well as the non-existence

1. Kumārila, Śloka-vārtika, Abhāva, Section 11.
3. Śrīdhara, Nyāya-Kumāli, Page 226.
of the jar, but when we close them, we do not see either. Both the cognitions being, thus, equally consequent on the same phenomenon (opening of the eye), there is no reason to make the distinction that cognition of the ground should be held to be a sense-perception and that of the non-existence to be non-sense-perception. Sridhara says: "Non-existence is also grasped by the sense as much as an existent (positive) object is. The function of the senses having been thus observed some form of sense-contact should also be assumed." The sense-contact in non-existence is in the form of vīṣeṣa-bhāva-sannikāraṇa. Non-existence is held to be the attribute of the ground which is connected with the sense, and, therefore, the contact is called saṣyukta-vīṣeṣa-bhāva-sannikāraṇa, i.e., the contact in the form of an attribute of the object which is connected with the sense.

The Mīmāṁsakas of the Kumārila school point out that, although the non-existence of a jar and the ground seem to be simultaneously cognized by the senses, the former cannot be a sense-object, because "firstly, it is devoid of colour (rūpa) which is a necessary condition of visual perception and secondly, it can have no contact with

the senses. Jayanta rejects these points. With regard to the first point that non-existence has no rūpa (colour), Jayanta says: "To be perceptible by the eye depends on being the object of cognition produced by the eye, and not on possessing colour. Although atoms possess colour, they are not perceptible by the eye." Similarly, the objection regarding the sense-object-contact is also met by rejecting the established principle that the senses grasp an object only through their contact (samikṣaraṇa) with it, i.e., by reaching that object. Jayanta says: "The principle of senses reaching an object (for cognizing it) applies only to vastu (positive objects). The non-existence being avastu (negative), the eye can produce its cognition even without having a contact with it." Thus, the answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to the objection of the Mīmāṃsaka is that the non-existence of a jar is perceived by the eye, although it has neither colour nor contact with the eye. The two usual conditions of visual perception are not applicable to the perception of a negative object.

The Mīmāṃsakas of the Prabhākara school discard

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 49.
4. Ibid.
altogether the theory of the reality of non-existence. They hold that if non-existence were a reality, then the negation of non-existence also must be another reality, and so on ad infinitum. To avoid this infinite regress, the ancient Nyāya maintained that the negation of a negation was equivalent to the positive. The modern Nyāya repudiates this view and holds that a negation can never be equivalent to a positive, but it admits that the negation of the negation of the first negation is equivalent to the first negation.

The Vedānta also rejects the category of non-existence. The Mīmāṃsakas of the Prabhākara School and the Vedāntins regard it as simple substratum and nothing more. Negation is identical with its locus. The Vaiśeṣika urges that if negation of a jar were identical with the ground, then the non-existence of the jar would be perceived even on the ground on which the jar exists. But Vedānta rejects this view. He says that negation of a jar is identical with the mere ground (kevalabhūtala), which is different from the ground on which the jar exists. Absolute negation of a jar on the ground refers to the mere ground, which is a positive entity. A positive entity is called a negation in relation to another positive entity. So there is no negation. The Vaiśeṣika thinker Mādhava Sarasvatī urges

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that negation is a distinct category. If negation were non-existent, the notion and use of 'non-existence' would be devoid of an object. He asks Vedāntins what is meant by the mere ground? If it is the ground unrelated to anything, then the ground on which a jar exists also would be spoken of as negation of the jar. If the mere ground is the ground, which is the locus of negation, the negation is admitted. If the mere ground is the ground, which is different from the ground with a jar, then also negation is admitted. There can be no knowledge of an entity being different from the ground with a jar without the knowledge of its being the locus of its negation. Therefore, negation must be admitted as a distinct category to account for the knowledge and use of non-existence. Viśvanātha urges that negation exists in a locus, which is its abode. The relation of an abode (ādhara) and a content (ādhaya) between the locus and negation is possible only if they are distinct from each other.

Thus, the above mentioned seven padārthas of the Vaiśeṣika system represent an exhaustive classification of all aspects of reality. All these padārthas have been treated in this system in the most natural way so as to

1. Mādhava Sarasvatī, Mit Bhāgini, Pages 76-77.
2. Viśvanātha, Siddhānta-muktāvali, Pages 97-98.
satisfy the common-sense of man and be in agreement with the actual reality and the conventions of the external world (Vyavahāra and pratīti).