CHAPTER VII

CONCEPTION OF SOUL (ĀTMAN)

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika divides reality into self (cetan) and non-self (acetan). The latter aspect of reality has been widely explained in the last chapters. Now, for the clear understanding of the nature of the physical world, it is also very necessary to know something about the nature of cetan aspect of the phenomenal world, which is generally known as Ātman. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, representing the realistic school of thought, believes in the existence of a conscious element without whose help this objective world cannot exist. In every kind of product, whether individual or collective, the necessity of a conscious agent cannot be gainsaid. This conscious active element according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is either the Jīvātman (Individual Soul) or the Paramātman (Supreme Soul). In accepting the entities, i.e., individual soul and the supreme soul, the joint system totally depends upon the Vedic texts. The Upaniṣads speak of two beautiful birds residing in the same tree, one enjoying the sweet fruit thereof, and the other merely looking on. They speak of the finite soul and the infinite soul residing in the same
tree, one enjoying the sweet fruit thereof, and the other merely looking on. They speak of the finite soul and the infinite soul residing in the same body, the finite soul being subject to happiness and misery, and the infinite soul, the inner controller, being a mere spectator without experiencing its happiness and misery. They advocate difference between the finite souls and the infinite soul. The Upanisadic texts emphasizing the identity of the finite soul with the infinite soul is intended to convey similarity (sāmya) but not identity (abhēda) between them.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, even in the state of liberation, the individual soul retains its integrity, and is not merged in God. It means Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes in the concept that there are two kinds of soul, viz., individual soul and supreme soul. Hence, both of these are separately treated under Section A and Section B respectively.

Section A: Jīvātman (Individual Self)

Proofs in support of the Existence of Individual Self

The description of the Supreme Entity from the

---

1. Kapēda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 3.2.21.
empirical point of view is that it is sat, sit and ānanda. The last two aspects naturally depend upon the first. If a thing has no existence (sat), it is impossible to state anything about it. Hence the first and the foremost attempt should be made to prove that it is sat. This has been done by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and hence the joint system occupies the first starting place in the realm of Indian metaphysics.

The existence of individual self is proved in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system through direct perception, inference and authority. Now, to begin with the first means, Kanāda holds that the term 'I' in the expressions—'I am happy', 'I am sorry', 'I know', etc., is an object of perception. This 'I' naturally refers to Jīvātman and not to any material object like body, sense-organ, manas, etc. The opponent may raise an objection here against the implication of the term 'I' in the above expressions; for, the term 'I' in the expressions 'I am fat', 'I am beautiful', 'I am blind', etc., really refers to either body, or a sense-organ; so that it is not quite sound to base the decision merely on the implication of the term 'I'. To this it may be said in reply that as the objection of the opponent is based on the false identity of the body with the Ātman, it has no weight. The substratum of the term 'I' is Ātman alone, while
in other cases it is due to wrong notion, and false imposition. Udayanācārya and other Viśāśīmites hold that Jīvātman is an object of direct individual perception.

There are direct śrutī passages to prove the existence of Individual Self. But the śrutī will not convince the unbelievers like the Buddhists; they adduce inferences to prove the existence of it. So says Gautama, in his Nyāya-āṭra, that desire, hatred, effort, pleasure, pain and consciousness are the various probens to prove the existence of Ātman. Kanāda adds the vital airs—prāṇa and apāna, the closing and the opening of the eye-lids, state of living, the movements of manas and the affections (vikāra) of the other sense-organs to the above mentioned probens of Gautama.

Now, desire, etc., being qualities, cannot exist without a substratum. Then, inasmuch as it is known that the qualities, which belong to the physical organism, etc., continue as long as the physical organism, etc., exist; and as desire, etc., are not found to be so, they cannot be regarded as qualities belonging to the physical organism.

1. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 3.2.9-14c
2. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya Bhāṣya, 1.1.10c
3. Gautama, Nyāya Sūtra, 1.1.10c
4. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 3.2.4c
5. Uddyotakara, Nyāya Vārtika, 1.1.10; Jayanta, Nyāya Manjari, Page 434c
Again, it is a fact of common experience that there exists desire, which has been defined as a wish for attainment of something not already obtained. This desire is produced in a man for the attainment of an object which had been the source of pleasure to him in the past. This means that desire supposes some permanent self who possesses consciousness and is identical with that which had experienced pleasure from certain objects in the past and which considers a present object to be similar to any of those past objects, and so strives to get possession of it. Physical organism, neither being conscious nor being an unchanging element, cannot be the required substratum. Recognition is not possible in physical organism. Sense-organs also cannot be the substratum of desire; for it is not necessary for a single sense-organ to be both the desirer and the expericker of the past. For instance, when a man perceives a mango and desires to have it, we cannot say that visual organ which perceives the fruit at present also possesses the experience of the good taste of the fruit. Again, manas, being accepted as a sense-organ and an instrument, cannot be the substrate of desire.

Just as the experience of one man cannot be remembered by another man, so the body or the senses which are really series of different physiological states and stages, and

1. Prāśastapāda, Bhāṣya, Page 261.
2. Vatsyāyana, Nyāya Bhāṣya, 1e1e10e
the mind or the empirical self, which is admittedly an aggregate of different momentary physical states and processes, cannot explain the phenomena of desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition.

As from the motion of a chariot the existence of a guiding agent, in the shape of a charioteer, is inferred, so also from the activity and cessation from activity appearing in the physical organism which have the capacity of acquiring the desirable and avoiding the undesirable, the existence of an intelligent guiding agent for the body is inferred. This conscious agent is no other than the Ātman.

The presence of the variegated functioning of the vital airs in an organism proves the existence of a conscious agent in the organism who acts like the blower of the wind-pipe.

From the regular action of the opening and closing of eye-lids, the existence of a conscious agent in an organism, who would act like the puller of the pulley, is inferred.

From the fact that the wounds of an organism are

1. Ibid., 101-102.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
healed up, we infer the existence of a conscious agent who would be like the master of the house repairing it.

From the action of manas towards the contact of the sense-organs apprehending desirable objects, we infer the existence of an agent, who would be like the boy in a corner of the house throwing a ball to another ball stuck in the ground.

When we see an object through the organ of sight, we recall the taste of that object (experienced before), we find a certain change appearing in the organ of taste. From this also, we infer the existence of a single guiding agent of the two activities, like a person looking through many windows. From all these proofs, it is evident that individual self exists.

Nature of the Individual Self

In India, soul is generally accepted as an eternal and permanent principle. All orthodox schools agree that soul is essentially pure and that in its pure form, it is never affected by any kind of worldly impurities. There
is, however, no universal agreement among the different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the noumena (a ground of phenomena that is unknowable by the senses but is conceivable by reason) character of the \( \text{Atman} \). The Cārvākaśs adopt the materialistic conception of the self. They hold that the self is the living body with the attribute of consciousness. The Baudhās reduce the self to a stream of thought or a series of c cognitions. Like some empiricists and sensationists, they admit only the empirical self. The Advaita Vedānta takes the self as one, unchanging and self-shining intelligence (svapnaṇa Caitanya), which is neither a subject nor an object, neither the 'I' nor the 'me'.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, adopts the realistic view of the self. According to this joint school, the self is a unique substance, to which all cognitions, feelings, and sensations belong as its attributes. It is unconscious in itself. Consciousness is not the essence of the self. It is an adventitious quality of it. All cognitions or conscious states arise in the self when it is related to the manas, and the manas is related to the senses, and the senses come in contact with the external objects. The term 'consciousness (jñāna) in this joint system, is synonymous with intellect (buddhi) and
apprehension (upalabdhi). But the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga regard buddhi as an unconscious modification of Prakṛti, the root-evilant, in which the conscious self (puruṣa) is reflected. When buddhi catches the reflection of the self, it is intellligized, as it were, and appears to be conscious. But in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, buddhi is apprehension or consciousness of objects. It is not an unconscious substance; it is the quality of the self.

This non-recognition of the identity between self and consciousness constitutes an important feature of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. This is due to the fact that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy has recognized from the very beginning a distinction and not 'tādātmya' between the thing and its quality or essence. 'Jar' as a substance is different from its red colour as well as 'jerness' which is its essence; and both of them are related to it by the relation of inherence. The self as knower is also the substance in which the essence Ātmatva inheres. It is only when the soul comes in contact with the body and mind that qualities like knowledge, desire, aversion, pleasure and pain arise in it. Thus, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, consciousness is a quality of the self. The self is not identical with the organism, the

---

1. Gaṅgādaśa, Nyāya Sūtra, 1.1.15
2. Prāsaṅgikā, Bhāṣya, Page 171
sense-organs, or the manas as the Gérulmás hold. As we have seen, consciousness is the quality of the self.

Since consciousness is a quality, it requires a substance to support it. The body cannot be the substrate of consciousness, since it is not found in the dead body. If consciousness were a property of the body, it would exist in the various parts of the body and its material constituents. If consciousness is a property of body then it must be capable of being perceived by others also. The material causes of the body are unconscious, so the body must be unconscious. Again, the body is continually becoming new. The body of childhood is not the same as the body of the youth, and the body that one has in his old age is different from the body that he had in his childhood. If consciousness is a quality of the body, then it also will change constantly and, therefore, there will be intermittent breaks in the continuity of conscious life, which in turn will impair memory.

The sense-organs also are not the substrates of consciousness. Even when they are destroyed, there is a recollection of objects perceived through them in the past. Further, they are the instruments of knowledge,

---

2. Vēcasayana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 3.2.18.
3. Vēcasayana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 3.2.18.
and cannot be the knowing agents. It is the self who controls them, and synthesises their contributions. It is the self that confers unity on the various kinds of apprehensions. The eye cannot hear sounds nor could the ear see visions, and the consciousness that I who am seeing a thing now also have heard of it, will not be possible if the soul were not different from and beyond the senses. Again, being only products of matter, the sense-organs cannot have consciousness as their property.

The manas also cannot be the substrate of consciousness. Mind is an atomic internal organ. If the consciousness had been a property of the mind, then it would also have been atomic and, therefore, non-perceptible in nature, which really is not true. If consciousness is a quality of mind, then the simultaneous cognition of things such as yogis have would be inexplicable.

Thus, the self cannot be identified with the body, senses, and the mind, since it is present even when the body is lost, the senses are cut off and manas is quieted down. All these belong to the object side, and can never

---

1. Vatsyayana, Nyaya-Bhasya, 3.1.10
2. Ibid., 3.2.19
3. Prasastapada, Bhasya, Page 69.
be the subject while self is subject.

The self is not a stream of consciousness as the Buddhists hold. It is not a series of momentary cognitions, for then memory becomes inexplicable. No member of a mere series of cognitions can, like a bead of the rosary, know what has preceded it or what will succeed it. It is not a mind-body-complex. It is a permanent substance in which consciousness inheres. The self is the inherent cause of consciousness, though it is produced by a collocation of conditions.

The self is not transcendental consciousness beyond the distinction of subject and object, as the Advaita Vedānta holds. There is no such thing as pure intelligence unrelated to some subject and object. Intelligence cannot subsist without a certain locus. Hence the self is not intelligence as such, but a substance having intelligence as its attribute. The self is not mere consciousness or knowledge, but a knower, an ego or the 'I', and also an enjoyer. The self is the perceiver of all, the experiencer of all pleasures and pains, and the knower of all things. Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are all qualities of the self. The

---

1. Uddyotakara, Nyāya-Vārtika, 3.5.19.
2. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1.1.9-11.
substance to which these qualities belong cannot be made up of parts, for it is an assumption of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that compound substances are destructible while simple ones are eternal. The soul is partless and eternal. It is simple. Therefore, it is indestructible. It has neither origin nor end. It is neither created nor destroyed by God.

The self is all-pervading. It cannot have a limited magnitude, since what is limited has parts and is, therefore, destructible. It is not atomic as Rāmānuja holds. If it were atomic, it could not have consciousness in connection with the whole body, and could not perceive its qualities, since qualities of atomic substances are imperceptible. It cannot be of intermediate magnitude. It cannot be larger or smaller than the body. If it were so, it could not occupy the body and pervade it. It cannot be co-extensive with the body as the Jainas hold. If it were so, it would be too small for the body which grows and develops. Again, a human soul could not transmigrate into an ant's body or an elephant's body. Hence the self is all-pervading. But it cannot apprehend many things simultaneously owing to the atomic nature of the mind, which is its internal organ. Each soul has one manas which persists throughout its empirical life. It is separated from the manas in the state of liberation.

The soul is an eternal entity which is from time to
time connected with a body suitable to its desert. The unseen power in the soul (sdrsta) generated by actions done in the previous birth organizes a body for the self, appropriate to it. The organism assumed by the transmigration of soul is a fit medium for the maturation of merit and demerit acquired by it in the previous birth. The soul transmigrates into a body fit for the experiences it has to undergo. Pre-existence and future life are not so much proved as assumed. The new-born infant's desire for milk is due to experience in the previous birth. His pleasures and pains also are due to the same cause. His smiles and cries are not mere reflex actions. They are conscious actions determined by experience in the previous birth. If there is no pre-existence, there is gain of unmerited fruit. If there is no future life, there is loss of merited action. Inequalities in the present birth are ascribed to merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) acquired in the previous births. Actions done in the present birth will be rewarded and punished in the future birth. Pre-existence and future life are based on these ethical considerations. The self persists as a simple, eternal substance in the midst of a cycle of births and deaths.

2. Ibid., 4.1.10.
Its association with body is called birth. Its separation from body is called death.

**Plurality of Individual Soul**

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is a unique self in each body, hence there is an infinite number of souls. The plurality of the soul is inferred from the variety of experience and conditions of different souls. Some are happy while others are miserable. Some are bound while others are liberated. These differences in the status of individuals prove the existence of many souls. If there were not the plurality of soul then the bondage of one would lead to the bondage of others, and the liberation of one would lead to the liberation of others. Each soul reaps the consequences of its own actions, and hence some are happy while others are in pain.

The Advaita Vedānta, on the other hand, holds that the difference in the status of individual can be accounted for by the plurality of empirical selves (jīvātman), though the ontological self (atman) is one. The self is one, but the empirical selves limited by ignorance (avidyā) are many. Śrīdharma asks: To whom does avidyā belong? Does

---

1. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 3.1.15
2. Kanāda, Vaišeṣika Sūtra, 3.2.20
it belong to Brahman or to the jīvas? Brahman is by nature eternally pure and enlightened, and cannot, therefore, be subject to avidyā. If the jīvas are subject to avidyā, then there is mutual dependence. The jīvas depend upon avidyā for their very existence; since they are Brahman or eternal consciousness limited by avidyā. Avidyā abides in the jīvas which are subject to it. This is mutual dependence. The Advaita Vedānta may argue that there is beginningless series of avidyā and jīvas mutually causing each other like a beginningless series of seeds and sprouts causing each other. Śridhara contends that individual seeds are causes of individual sprouts, which are causes of other seeds, which are real, but that avidyā and jīvas are not ontologically real, which cannot, therefore, be related to each other by mutual causality. If the jīvas are assumed to be ontologically real and eternal like Brahman without origin and end, then monism of Advaita Vedānta is undermined. If there is one ontological self, then the variety of individual experiences cannot be accounted for. Hence the plurality of finite souls must be admitted.

1. Śridhara, Nyāya-Kandī, Page 87.
2. Ibid., Pages 87-88.
Section B: Paramatman (Supreme Self)

Indian thought-record begins with the Vedas. In them there are definite statements regarding God and His nature. At first the ideas were polytheistic. But this polytheism soon developed into monothelism (i.e., each God being elevated in turn to the position of the Supreme Deity). Monotheism in due course evolved into monotheism, which culminated in monism. So, the idea of the Absolute of later thought had germinated already in the minds of the Vedic seers.

In the Upanisads, we find more definite statements regarding the being and nature of God. The main current of Upanisadic thought flows towards a monistic conception: 'There is one without a second'; 'All this is Brahman.' This conception of God has been called the nirguna aspect. 'He is devoid of all attributes.' Nothing can be positively postulated about Him. He can be indicated only by 'not this, not this.' But side by side with this there is another current of thought. This is

---

1. Max Muller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Page 40.
2. BeVo 10:32-3; 4:40-6; 10:121-12
3. Ibid., 10:129-22
4. Mau U., 2:211; Chas U., 6:2:16
5. Chas U., 3:14:16
the conception of God as the ruler of the universe. He is the source of everything. He is the creator and destroyer. He is endowed with all virtues (gunā) and with omniscience. He is the cause of bondage and liberation.

From the Upaniṣads to the Indian Philosophical Systems is not far cry. What was in an embryonic state in the Upaniṣads appeared in fully developed forms in the philosophical systems. Attempts have been made either to prove or to disprove the existence of God in the orthodox and heterodox systems. The Gārvākas believe only in perception as the valid means of knowledge. Merit, life after death, heaven, hell, soul and God are not objects of perception. If anything is at all to be postulated, then the visible king who is known to everybody should get the appellation.

According to the Buddhists, a thing that has nowhere been perceived cannot exist. As God has not been perceived by anybody anywhere, hence he does not exist. But still, Buddhism had to concede to the inborn weakness of the common man for an object of worship and support.

1. Mae U., 6.
Thus it ended by incorporating Buddha as the supreme and central figure of a divine hierarchy. The historic Buddha was considered in the Mahāyāna School to be a manifestation of the Ultimate Reality called dharma-kāya, which is something possessing attributes of personality, viz., intelligence (prajñā) and love (karaṇa).

The Sāṅkhya system also is atheistic in its outlook. Though Max Muller thinks that the 'denial of an Isvara or personal Lord did not probably form part of the original Sāṅkhya, as presented to us in the 'Tattvasamāsa', according to traditional as well as modern consensus of opinion, earlier Sāṅkhya is positively atheistic. According to Sāṅkhya, there is no logical proof of the existence of God. The inherent teleology in Prakṛti is sufficient to explain creation, and the intervention of God is superfluous and unnecessary. But Sāṅkhya admits the Godhood of certain souls. These are individual souls who are merged in Prakṛti, each emerging as a god in the beginning of a new cycle of creation, and lording it over all during that cycle. Such a god can be established by logic. The Sāṅkhya accepts that wherever the word 'Lord'

1. Max Muller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Page 230.
4. Sāṅkhya-pravasa-Sūtra, 2.56.
5. Ibid., 3.57.
(Īśvara) is used in the scriptures, it is in reference to the liberated souls or these beings. Thus Sāmkhya system does not believe in God. That is why it has been called 'NirĪśvara (atheistic) Sāmkhya' in contrast with the system of Patañjali, which is called 'Sesāvar Sāmkhya'.

Patañjali opens the topic of God with the Sūtra 'Īśvara Prāpādhanād Vā' (and also by devotion of God). He means thereby that samādhi can be attained, among other means, by devotion to God also. Garbe and Geden hold that the concept of God is an extraneous graft on the system, loosely fitted and superficial and due to pragmatic considerations, a view with which it is difficult to concur, inasmuch as God is a metaphysical necessity in the system. God in Patañjali philosophy is a particular Puruṣa who is ever untainted by troubles, actions, and their effects and deserts. There are some Puruṣas who have become liberated and are free from all taints. There are others who are merged in Prakṛti and who are free from such blemishes at present, but may again be effected by them. God is, however, one who never was and never will be tarnished by any blemish whatever. Moreover,

1 Inde, 1995
2 Yoga Sūtra, 1.23
3 Garbe, Philosophy of Ancient India, Page 16
4 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, VI, Page 285
5 Yoga Sūtra, 1.24
God's attributes are the highest. He in whom pre-eminence reaches the zenith is God. He is not of a different category but is a singular type of Puruṣa. He is the first teacher, because, unlike other teacher, He is not limited by time. Though He has no desire, yet out of His grace towards all beings He saves people immersed in saṃsāra by imparting knowledge and virtue (dharma) to them. He is made up of the purest sattva; He is ever free and pre-eminent. He is omniscient.

The Purva Mīmāṃsā, according to the traditional view, is atheistic in its outlook. The universe having neither beginning nor end, does not require any creator. God also cannot act as a supervisor of dharma and adharma, as the Vaiśeṣikas hold, since dharma and adharma belong to the performer, and God cannot have any knowledge of them. God can have neither conjunction with nor inference of dharma and adharma in Him, because conjunction is possible with substances and not qualities which dharma and adharma are, and because they inhere in individual souls and cannot inhere in an extraneous God. Perception, inference and scriptures do not prove God. But scholars like Max Muller and P. Shastri infer that the Purva

3. Max Muller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Page 210; and P. Shastri, 'Introduction to the Purva Mīmāṃsā III'.
Mīmāṃsā rejects God only as creator of differences in the lots of men, but not God as such. But this view does not seem to be tenable, because the early Mīmāṃsakas are silent about the question of God and the later ones reject the proofs of God. This system cannot even be called polytheistic, because even the deities invoked by it are not said to have existence anywhere except in hymns that describe them. But the Mīmāṃsakas of the later period introduced God into the system. Venkatesā, the author of 'Sāvāra-Mīmāṃsā', grafted Vedānta doctrine on Mīmāṃsā. Āpadeva and Leuṅēśī Bhāskara hold that if sacrifices performed are dedicated to God, they will lead to the highest good (niḥśreyasa). This inclusion of apavarga ideal in the system is a later innovation.

According to Sankar, the Vedas are the only valid means of the knowledge of God. Reason in itself is futile 'on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation'. He, however, concludes, 'Our final position therefore is that on the ground of scripture and of reasoning subordinate to scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world.'

1. Āpadeva-Mīmāṃsā Nyāya-Prakāśa, Leuṅēśī Bhāskara-Arth-saṅgraha.
2. Brahma-Sūtra, Sankara-bhāṣya, Ze illumin.
Rāmānuja, more or less, agrees with Śankara's view that the scriptures are the only means of the knowledge of God. He says, "Because Bṛähman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not an object of perception and other means of proof, but to be known through scripture only. But reasoning plays a secondary part with regard to supersensuous matters. Scripture alone is authoritative, and reasoning is to be applied only to the support of scripture."

According to Madhava also God transcends all perception. But His nature is not indefinable, because we can know His nature through a study of the Vedas.

God in Vaiśeṣika System

In the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra of Kanāda, God is not openly referred to. His famous aphorism which is repeated twice by him has no reference to God. The Sūtra 'Tad Vasanādēma-nāyasya Pramāṇya' (Being His words, the validity of the Vedas) has been held by some scholars to mean that the Vedas are the works of the seers, and that the Sūtra has

1. Brahme-Sūtra, Rāmānuja-Bhāṣya, 1.1.3.
2. Ibid., 2.1.12.
3. Brahme Sūtra, Mādhava Bhāṣya, 3.2.23.
4. Ibid., 3.3.1.
5. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.1.3; X.2.9.
no reference to God. Paddegon is also of the same view. He says "The Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras expose at length the essential concepts of the soul theory as we find it later in developed Nyāya Vaiśeṣika (esp. V.3, 3.24). But nowhere is a highest soul mentioned, nowhere is Isvāra named and no passage directly refers to Him." Efforts have been made to interpret some of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras to show that the Vaiśeṣikas also, like other orthodox schools were originally theistic in nature. But the interpretations are very doubtful. One can easily interpret these two Sūtras and see that Kāṇāda did not mean to include Isvāra in his Sūtras. And it is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Vaiśeṣikas have been called half-atheists (ardha vaināśika) by the latter orthodox writers. But all the great writers on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra are openly theistic and some of them, e.g., Udayana give classical arguments to prove the existence of God. We cannot, therefore, treat the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system as an atheist. Moreover, Kāṇāda believes in spiritualism and makes the physical universe subservient to the moral order. Prāśastapāda opens his commentary by paying homage to

2. As for example Jānaka Māra in his 'Upaskāra' sees a relevance to God in the third Sūtra.
Iśvara, the cause of the world. He then goes on to say that the knowledge of the six categories is the cause of liberation; this knowledge itself, however, results from dharma which is prescribed by Iśvara. In the last śloka of the book he mentions Mahāśākara, whom Kaṇṇāda is said to have pleased. Praśāstapāda describes how the world is created and destroyed by the desire of Iśvara. In the description of creation, he says that the great Egg (mahādāna ātm) is said to be brought into existence by the mere thought of the Supreme Lord. Further, when treating of the quality dimension (parimāṇa), Praśāstapāda explains that largeness (mahatva) and length (dīrghatva) are produced in the molecules by plurality (bahutva samākhya), just as minuteness (aprutva) and shortness (hrasvatva) in the binary atoms is produced by duality (dītvamābhikṣyā). But this duality and this plurality depend for their existence on the knowledge of Iśvara. Thus the author of Bhāṣya accepts the existence of God without attempting to prove it. Theism is not treated as an integral part of his philosophical system. Prof. Keith suggests that early discussions between Kaṇṇāda and Praśāstapāda resulted in the assumption of a creator, to explain the periodic cosmic process.

1. Praśāstapāda Bhāṣya, Page 209.
2. Ibid., Page 329.
3. Ibid., Pages 48-49.
The next Vaiśeṣika authors made further progress towards philosophical theism. Vyomāśīva and Śrīdhara (I will consider Uddyana with the authors of Nyāya) devote several pages to the proof of the existence of God and to a description of His nature. They do this, not in connection with the soul-theory, but when commenting on Praśastapāda’s exposition of the process of creation. Śivādītya mentions Iśvara only once; but he does so when dealing with the substance soul: 'The soul is of two kinds: supreme and individual. The Supreme Soul is Iśvara and only one.' From the above exposition it is clear how theism was only gradually incorporated into Vaiśeṣika, which originally ignored Iśvara altogether.

**God in Nyāya System**

In the 'Nyāya-Sūtra' of Gautama, God has not been mentioned as one of the twelve prameyas. From this it has been concluded by some modern scholars that the Nyāya Sūtra originally was not theistic. Garbe says that "The fundamental text books of the two schools, the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya Sūtras, originally did not accept the existence of God; it was not till a subsequent period that the two systems changed to theism, although neither ever went so

---

1. Śivādītya, Saḍtapaḍārthī, Page 20.
far as to assume a creator of matter." Muir is also of
the same view—"I am unable to say if the ancient doctrine
of the Nyāya was theistic." But to this, Vyātikāra
Viśvanātha and others say that Ṛṣam as postulated among
the premyas included both Jīvātmanas and Paramātmanas.
That is why no separate mention of Isvāra has been made.

There are three aphorisms in the Nyāya-Sūtra which
discuss God. While Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakar and
Viśvanātha regard it as the Nyāya view, Vācaspati,
Udayana and Vardhamāna interpret it as a criticism of the
Vedānta view, that God is the constituent cause of the
universe. To the objection that man does not often reap
fruits proportionate to his acts, and so everything seems
to depend on God's will and not on human effort, the
Nyāya says that human acts produce their results under
the control and with the co-operation of God.

Vātsyāyana supports theism when he declares that the self sees
all, feels all and knows all. This description loses all
meaning, if it is applied to the imperfect individual self.

Later Naiyāyikas are frankly theistic and enter into a
discussion of the nature of God in considering the theory

---

4. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, I.1.9; IV.1.21
of Ātma. Annap Bhaṭṭa classifies souls into two kinds, supreme and human. While the supreme is God, one, omniscient; the human souls are infinite in number, different in each body. God is looked upon as a special soul by Uddyotakara when he proves the authority of the Vedas by the fact that they have been asserted by a special self (Puruṣa Viśeṣa). The meaning of special self is clear since the Sanskrit word, chosen by Uddyotakara, is taken from the classical definition of God in the Yoga-Sūtras.

Nature of God

God has been defined by the author of the Nyāya Sūtra as the efficient cause of the universe. It is He who gives the fruits of different actions. By the author of Kusumēñjali, He is defined as one whose worship is declared as the means of heaven and liberation. He possesses eternal consciousness, bliss and other similar qualities, which are generally ascribed to Him. He is omnipotent as regards creation, etc., though He is also influenced by actions done by the souls. Vātsyāyana regards God as a particular soul (Ātma Viśeṣa) endowed

---

1. Annap Bhaṭṭa, Tarkasaṅgroha, Page 171
2. Prof. Jacobi must have overlooked this when he said that Vārtika does not teach that God has revealed the Vedas (ŚNTM, Page 47).
3. Gantama, Nyāya Sūtra-IV, 119a
4. Udayana, Kusumēñjali, 142a
with merit, knowledge, intuition and devoid of demerit, false knowledge and inadvertence (pramāda). He possesses eight kinds of supernatural powers due to His merit and intuition.

God is absolutely different from the souls. He possesses the distinct qualities such as eternity of intelligence, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, desire and effort. He possesses the six perfections in their fullness—majesty, power, glory, beauty, knowledge and freedom. God is above bondage and liberation. As He does not possess nescience (avidyā) and pain, He is not bound. As He possesses merits and eight-fold āśvāryas, He cannot be called liberated. Liberation is a relative term, and the God who is never bound cannot be called liberated.

God directs the merits and demerits of the individual souls, which inhere in them. How does God come into relation with them, in order to activate and guide them? God is a ubiquitous substance. The individual souls also are ubiquitous substances. Some hold that two ubiquitous substances are related to each other by uncaused

1. Nyāya Bhāṣya, IV.1.21
2. Nyāya Vārtika, IV.1.21
conjunction, God is forever connected with the individual souls and through them with their merits. Vasaspati offers another explanation: God is connected with atoms; the merits and demerits inhere in the individual souls. So God is indirectly connected with the merits and demerits of the individual souls through the atoms. This is a queer hypothesis which has no metaphysical significance. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa recognizes the existence of eternal happiness in God. But Vatsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Udayana and Gangesa deny the existence of eternal happiness. They hold that God is absolutely free from pain. He is the substrate of eternal happiness, which does not constitute His essence.

Proofs for the Existence of God

The great Naiyāyika, Udayanāgārya, who has written an elaborate thesis on the proofs of the existence of God in his famous treatise 'Kusumānjali', has examined the foregoing arguments and found them wanting. At the beginning of his book, he says, "What doubt can there be in God, experience of whom is admitted throughout the world." So any argument in support of His existence is

3. Udayana, Kusumānjali, I.
unnecessary and redundant from the standpoint of
Naiyāyikas. But even then proofs of His existence have
been adduced. Because, as Udayana writes, "This logical
consideration of God is tantamount to thinking (manana)
about Him. It follows hearing (śravaṇa) from Him, and is
undertaken as a form of worship (upāsanā)."

History tells us that Jñānaśrī, a most formidable
Buddhist dialectician, refuted theistic arguments in his
'Iśvarabhangaśālikā'. Udayana, who came after him had
enough confidence in him to meet the arguments advanced by
Jñānaśrī and declared in a most emphatic way that he
rescued theism from the clutches of the Buddhist critics.
The work of Udayana led all later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers
under a deep debt of gratitude who all derived inspiration
from his outstanding work. Even the great Gangesa, who
set forth a most masterly defence of theism in his
'Tattva-saṁśāsāri' followed in the footsteps of Udayana.

In putting forward the various inferential proofs,
Udayana writes, "From effects, conjunction, support, etc.,
from the use of things, from the authoritativeness of the
Vedas, from the composition of the Vedas, from sentences
and from particular numbers, an immutable all-knowing God

1 Iibid, 1:3
can be deduced.

(1) The Causal Argument

The earth, etc., must have a maker since they are effects like the pot. Everything that is composite must possess an intelligent cause. Without such a cause, the material causes cannot produce definite effects. This intelligent agent is God. The order, design, co-ordination between different phenomena comes from God. Nyāya maintains that God is the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) of the world. The atoms of earth, water, light and air are its material cause (upādānakāraṇa). They are co-eternal with God. They are neither created nor destroyed by God. God does not evolve the world out of His nature. He does not create the world out of nothing by a mere fiat of will. He fashions the world out of the pre-existing atoms in time and space. He combines and arranges them in a particular order. He gives them unity, order and harmony. He does not create the atoms of earth, water, light and air. He does not create ether (ākāsa), time and space. He combines the atoms into diads, diads into triads, triads into quarads, quarads into more complex things.

1 Udayana, Kusumānjali, 510
This first argument of the Nyāyāyikas resembles the causal argument for God's existence as explained by some Western thinkers like Paul Janet, Hermann Lotze, and James Martineau. According to them, the world of finite objects requires an intelligent cause which gives order and co-ordination to their concurrent physical causes. Thus Janet lays it down as a principle that all co-ordination between divergent phenomena implies a final cause or an intelligent agent who effects the complex combination of such separate phenomena. So also, both Lotze and Martineau start from the fact of physical causation in the world and rise up to a conception of an intelligent principle as its ultimate ground and reason. Indeed, the Nyāyāyika view of an efficient cause as an intelligent agent strikingly anticipates Martineau's idea of cause as well directed to the realization of ends. There is, however, some difference between these theists and the Nyāyāyikas. Western theists generally believe that God is not only the cause of the order and unity of things in the world, but also the creative energy that gives existence to the things of nature. For the

1. Paul Janet, Final Causes, Ch. I.
2. Hermann Lotze, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, Chs. I and II.
3. A Study of Religion, Ch. I.
Nyāyaikas, however, God is only the cause of the order of nature, and not of the existence of the ultimate constituents of it.

2. God as the Creator of Motion in Atoms and the Cause of their Combination

The combination (āyojana) of the atoms is brought about by the agency of God. Atoms are inactive by nature. They are devoid of motion. The earlier Nyāyaikas ascribed the motion of the atoms to the Unseen Principle (adṛṣṭa). A diad is produced by the conjunction of two atoms. The two atoms are its material or inherent cause (samsāvāyik kāraṇa). Their conjunction (saṁyoga) is its non-material or non-inherent cause (asamsāvāyik kāraṇa). But the later Nyāyaikas ascribed the motion of the atoms to the Will of God. The atoms can move only when they are supervised by an intelligent agent. Motion of an unconscious thing is known to be due to the activity of an intelligent agent which directs it.

Individual souls have finite knowledge. They cannot perceive the atoms. They are incapable of producing motion in them. They cannot combine them into diads.

1 Udayana, Nyāya Kusumāṅjali, Page 55.
triods, and gross material objects. God is omniscient
and omnipotent. He perceives the atoms. He creates
motion in them by His will, even as the individual soul
creates action in the body by its will. God creates
motion voluntarily and brings about conjunction between
two atoms through it, and produces a diade. He voluntarily
creates motion, and brings three diads into conjunction
with one another, and produces a triade. God is the cause
of motion of the unconscious atoms, which are the objects
of His will.

3. God as the Supporter and Destroyer of World

The whole world with all its things directly or
indirectly requires the will of God to support it in its
place and prevent it from falling. The support (dhṛti)
of the world is God who sustains it by His Will (vīdhāraka
prayatna). Physical objects are unconscious. They cannot
support themselves without being directed by an
intelligent agent. The unseen agency (adhyāta) cannot
support the world. It is unintelligent. It cannot act
without the will of God. The world is sustained by God
endowed with knowledge, desire and volition. He has

1. Ibid., Page 56.
2. Ibid., Page 88.
knowledge of the world. He has desire to support it. The world is also destroyed by God. Every product is destroyed like a jar. The world down to the diads is destroyed by action due to the will of God.

Thus God is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world. It is produced by God's creative will. It is supported by God's supporting will. It is destroyed by God's destructive will.

4. God's existence proved from the use of things

'From the use of things' denotes that there must be a teacher for imparting the knowledge for the use of things. We find that instructions are needed for teaching the modern arts. So, for the traditional arts, which are current from endless time, there must be an instructor. And that instructor must be God.

5. From the Authoritativeness of the Vedas

The Vedas are valid and authoritative texts. This is due to the supreme authority of their author who must be omniscient, and so none other than God. The individual self cannot be the author of the Vedas, since the

1. Nyāya Kusumānjali, V, Page 59; Nyāya Manjari, Page 199.
2. Nyāya, Kusumānjali, V, Pages 54-60; Nyāya Manjari, Page 201.
supramundane realities and the transcendent principles related in the Vedas cannot be objects of knowledge of any ordinary individual. Hence the author of the Vedas must be the supreme person who has a direct knowledge of all objects, past, future and present, finite, infinite and infinitesimal, sensible and supersensible. That is, the Vedas, like other scriptures, are revealed by God.\textsuperscript{1}

The Mīmāṃsā urges that the Vedas are authoritative because they are eternal. The Nyāya contends that words are valid because they denote proper objects; they owe their validity to their denotative capacity and not to their eternality.\textsuperscript{2} Words are sounds. Sounds are perceived as being produced and destroyed. They are not eternal. Words are utterances of persons. Just as 'Abhijñāna Śākuntalam' was composed by Kalidas, so the Vedas were composed by God. The Vedas consist of sentences. Sentences consist of words. Just as threads cannot arrange themselves into a cloth, so the words of the Vedas cannot arrange themselves into sentences. Just as threads are arranged into cloth by a weaver, so the words are arranged into sentences by God. It cannot be argued that the composition of the Vedas differs from the

---

1. Nyāya Bhāṣya, 2.1.63;
2. Nyāya Kusumānjali, Page 62;
3. Nyāya Bhāṣya, 2.2.68;
4. Nyāya Manjari, Page 235;
composition of 'Abhijnāna Śākuntalam' and, therefore, it is eternal. Just as the arrangement of a mountain differs from the arrangement of a jar, so the arrangement of the Vedas differs from the arrangement of a human composition. A jar is produced by a human being, while a mountain is produced by God. An epic is composed by a human being, while the Vedas are composed by God.

6. The Testimony of the Vedas

God exists because the Vedic scripture bears testimony to His existence. "He is the Lord of all, omniscient, the inner controller, the cause of the world, its creator and destroyer." "He is the Supreme person; He is omniscient." "He is the Lord of all, the controller of all, the Ruler of all, the Lord of all creatures." "He gives the fruits of merits and demerits to individual souls." Thus the Vedas speak of God as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, the inner controller of the souls, the giver of fruits of actions, the moral governor of the universe. The Vedas are authoritative; they bear clear testimony to the existence of God. Therefore, God exists.

1. Nyāya Manjarī, Page 236.
4. Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, 4.4.22.
5. Shvetāsvara, Upaniṣad, 4.2.
But it may be argued here that why should one believe in God simply on the authority of the scriptures? An ordinary man may be inclined to do so, if he has not the spirit of critical enquiry in him. But a critical philosopher may say that scriptural testimony has no importance for philosophy, which is satisfied with nothing short of logically valid arguments in the attainment of true knowledge about anything, human or divine.

1 But as Kant and Hermann Lotze have clearly shown, none of the so-called proofs can really prove the existence of God. In truth, mere reasoning or logical argument cannot prove the existence of anything. The existence of a thing is to be known, if at all, through experience, direct or indirect. Experience is the only source of our knowledge about fact or existence. Lotze told us the truth about our knowledge of God when he said: "Therefore, all proofs that God exists are pleas put forward in justification of our faith and of the particular way in which we feel that we must apprehend this highest principle." This point becomes clearer when in his criticism of Anselm's form of the ontological

---

1. The Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II, Ch. XIII.
2. Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, Ch. I.
proof, he observes: "To him (Anselm) the assumption that God does not exist seemed to conflict with that immediate conviction of its reality, which all our theoretic, aesthetic and moral activities constrain our souls to entertain."

Some like Rousseau, have not even trusted logic and reason but have believed that our significant problems are solved by intuition, as though profound knowledge were hidden away in our sub-conscious minds, to be discovered only by probing deeply into our sentiments and by placing our faith in instinct and feeling rather than in reason.

Kant, in his critique of Pure Reason, states the case for "a priori" knowledge. His argument is that, although reasoning is initiated by experience, the mind is aware of, and makes use of many instinctive truths which are independent of experience. This belief that there is a sort of intellectual conscience that guides us instinctively in our thinking and which is quite apart from the sensory reality is called Transcendentalism.

It becomes clear from all this that God must be known through direct experience and not through any process of

---

1. Ibid., Pages 9-12.
reasoning. Those who have no direct experience of God, must depend, for their knowledge about God, on others who have that direct experience. The Šruti being the expression of such direct experience of God is a just source of our belief in God.

7. God as the Author of Moral Injunctions and Prohibitions

The Vedic sentences deal with moral injunctions and prohibitions. The Vedic commands are the Divine Commands. God is the creator and promulgator of the moral laws or codes of dharma. He is the source of moral authority.

8. God as the Moral Governor
Guiding the Law of Karma

We reap the fruits of our own actions. Merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) accrue from our actions and the stock of merit and demerit is called Adrasta, the unseen power. But this unseen power being unintelligent, needs the guidance of a supremely intelligent God. God is the moral governor (karmaphala datā). He makes merits produce pleasure. He makes demerits produce pain. God is the supervisor of the Law of Karma. He places the soul in their proper environments according to the Moral Law.

1. Nyāya Kusumānjali, Page 139;
Nyāya Manjari, Page 355.
9. The Argument from Number

According to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika the magnitude of a dyad is not produced by the infinitesimal magnitude of the two atoms each, but by the number of the two atoms. Number 'one' is directly perceived, but other numbers are conceptual creations. Numerical conception is related to the mind of the perceiver. At the time of creation, the souls are unconscious, and the atoms and the Unseen Power and space, time, minds are all unconscious. Hence the numerical conception depends upon the Divine Consciousness. So God must exist (Sāṁkhya Viśeṣaṭ).

By these various arguments the Naiyāyikas try to establish God. The Vaiśeṣikas believe inference and scriptures to be the valid means of the knowledge of God. God is proved by the inference of an active principle as the creator of the world, independent of adṛśa. As the author of the Vedas also He can be inferred.

Aim of Jñāna in Creating the Universe

Action is motivated by some ulterior purpose of satisfying a need either in the way of acquisition of an advantage or avoidance of an evil. In the case of God no such motive can be supposed to set free an activity.

---

as He is completely free from all disadvantages and is self-sufficient and self-satisfied. A God with an unsatisfied want would be a contradiction. Some hold that God engages in creative activity in a sportive mood. Creation is but a game and pastime with Him, and no question of motive therefore can be urged as necessary. But Uddyotekar refuses to be convinced by this argument, as even play is not a motiveless activity. It is restored to only with a view to enjoyment of the pleasure which is derived from it, and also because abstention from play causes uneasiness to those who are lovers of it. But such a contingency cannot be conceived to be possible with reference to God, because He is absolutely free from all shades of uneasiness and worry. The theory of playful activity therefore cannot be regarded as a satisfactory explanation of God's creative impulse.

Others, again, think that God wants to make others know His own infinite powers and glory (Vibhūtīkyūpama) and, therefore, creates the universe. In European philosophy Herman Lotze subscribes to this view when he says that God's motive in creating the world was to communicate His holiness to us. But this view is rejected.

---

on the ground that as God is fully satisfied in every respect, why should He like to make a show of His infinite powers and glory which does not add to Him anything; nor does He lose anything without making a show of His powers.

After criticising these two views, Uddyotakara gives his own. According to him God's creative activity follows from His very nature. It may be then asked that if creative activity follows from His nature, it would never cease and there would be no dissolution. To this Uddyotakara replies that creative activity follows from the nature of God who is endowed with intelligence. God creates the world with the aid of merits and demerits of the individual souls, which mature in particular times. He produces diverse effects out of the atoms in the presence of diverse merits and demerits. So the nature of God aided by diverse merits and demerits of the individual souls accounts for the erection of the multiform world for their enjoyments and sufferings.

God is one

It may be said that many gods produce the world out of the atoms. But the world has a unity. If it is

1. Uddyotakara, Nyāya Vaṃśika, 4.1-21, Pages 462-63.
2. Ibid., Pages 463-67.
created by many gods, it cannot have a unity. If there are many gods, they have conflicting purposes. They have conflicting volitions. So they cannot be co-ordinate lords of the world. They all cannot be moved by compassion for creatures. They cannot guide the merits and demerits of the individual souls uniformly, and create the world in accordance with them. This universe, full of order, unity and harmony cannot be created by plurality of gods with conflicting wills and purposes. If they are held to work in harmony with one another, one of them is enough for creation. Persimony of hypotheses demands one God instead of many gods. If they are guided by a president, He ought to be regarded as the Creator and Ruler of the world, and not the republic of gods. Merits and demerits of the finite souls are supervised by one God according to the Moral Law. If there are many gods, they are either omniscient or not. If they are not omniscient, they will be as impotent and helpless as we mortals are, and so they will not be equal to the task of creation and control of the world, which requires just these attributes. The result will be a failure to explain the world-order. If they are omniscient, one God is

adequate to the task of creation, and others are redundant. If all are equally supreme, they cannot always have unanimity and, therefore, create one world. There is unity of purpose in the world. So we must infer that there is only one God as the creator of one world.

Relation of God to the Individual Souls

Nyuâya-Vaisëśika School does not believe in monism, and its philosophy can be characterized as uncompromising pluralism. The relation of individual souls to God is neither one of pure identity nor one of identity in difference, but one of the absolute and unqualified otherness. The relation of God to the individual selves is not internal but strictly and purely external. The individual souls are neither parts nor qualities nor modes of God. They are co-eternal substances belonging to the same genus. Both the individual souls and Supreme Soul, are endowed with spiritual qualities. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit and demerit are the qualities of the individual soul. Eternal knowledge, happiness, desire, volition and merit are the qualities of God. Both possess the generic qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction.

1. Śrīdhara, Nyūya Kandî, Page 57.
and disjunctions. Both are ubiquitous substances. Both are eternal. God is not the creator or destroyer of the individual souls.

But there is a remarkable difference between them. God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-perfect, while the individual souls have fragmentary knowledge, limited powers, and moral imperfections. God is free from pain, aversion, false knowledge, attachment, delusion, inadvertence, demerit and disposition, while the individual souls possess them all. God has eternal supernatural powers, while the individual souls are ordinarily devoid of them, but can acquire them to a limited extent. God has eternal moral perfection, while the individual souls acquire moral perfection by severe moral discipline and true knowledge. God is neither bound nor liberated, while the individual souls are bound first and then attain liberation. God is never in bondage, and consequently cannot attain liberation.

God is like father to the individual souls. He treats them as father treats his children. He rewards them for their virtues and punishes them for their vices to work off the load of their merits and demerits and

1. Uddyotakara, Nyaya Vartika, 4.10.21, Page 470.
favours them with liberation by His infinite grace. He is like our own near and dear one constantly looking after our welfare.

God as the Efficient Cause of the World according to Nyaya-Vaiseshika

The Nyaya-Vaiseshika regards God as the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) of the world. God is not its material cause, as He is for Vedanta. He does not create the world out of nothing by a mere fiat of will. He fashions the world out of the pre-existing atoms in time and space. He combines and arranges them in a particular order. He gives them unity, order and harmony. He does not create the atoms of earth, water, light and air. He does not create ether, time and space. He combines the atoms into diads, diads into triads, triads into quartets, quartets into more complex things. He is not the creator of souls. Atoms and souls are co-eternal with Him. They can neither be created nor destroyed by Him.

Some Vedantaists maintain that Brahman is modified into the world, even as clay is modified into earthen vessels. Though Brahman is modified he does not lose his eternal nature. This is the doctrine of modification of Brahman (Brahmaparipāññavāda). Others maintain that

1. Vatsyayana, Nyaya-Bhasya, 4.1.21.
Brahman appears to be the phenomenal world-appearance through the limiting adjunct of beginningless cosmic nescience, which is the matrix of empirical names and forms. This is the doctrine of appearance of Brahman (Brahmavivartavāda). Brahman limited by cosmic nescience (mayā, avidyā) is the ruler of the world. Rulership consists in the power of consciousness (Cetnāsakti) and the power of creation (kriyāsakti), which exist in the Lord. He is the material cause of the world. Neither non-existence, nor prakṛti, nor atoms are its material cause, because they are unconscious. The śruti says: "That resolved: I shall become many." So God is the material cause of the world.

Vācaspati criticizes the Vedānta doctrine. If Brahman is modified into the world, as alay is modified into earthen vessels, he is either entirely modified or partially modified. If He is entirely modified into the world He loses His essential nature. If He is partially modified into the world, he has parts and is non-eternal. If Brahman is eternal in spite of his being modified into the world, then it also is eternal because it is characterized by the characteristics of its cause. Hence the world is not the modification of Brahman. If Brahman appears as the false diverse world-appearance through the
limiting adjuncts of empirical names and forms, which are modifications of beginningless cosmic nascence, then also the same difficulty will arise. One, partless, conscious, self-luminous Brahman cannot appear as the unconscious, material world of manifold objects. If one Brahman appears as many objects, he loses his identity. Then what is the status of the world appearance? It has the reality of Brahman, that is its ground. So it also is real and eternal. An illusion is due to the perception of the common characters of two objects and the non-perception of their individual peculiarities. A nacre is misapprehended as silver owing to the perception of brightness, which is their common character, and the non-perception of their individual peculiarities. One who knows the real character of a nacre, never misapprehends it as silver. But Brahman is one, partless, conscious and self-luminous, while the world is manifold, possessed of parts, unconscious and non-luminous. Hence there can be no perception of their common character and non-perception of their individual characters. Therefore, one, homogeneous, self-luminous Brahman cannot appear as the manifold, heterogeneous, non-intelligent world-appearance. Further, Jayanta urges that Brahman being pure and faultless cannot be the material cause of the impurities of the world-appearance. The world is real and non-eternal. It is
material, and cannot be a modification of consciousness. That the world is a false appearance of Brahman, is an irrational doctrine.

The Sāṃkhya regards Prakṛti as the material cause of the world, which is modified into the physical world, organisms, sense-organs, manas, intellect (Buddhi) and egoism (ahāmkāra) for the enjoyments and sufferings of the finite souls (puruṣa). Prakṛti is unconscious, active, modifiable, and eternal. The souls are conscious, inactive, unmodifiable and eternal. Prakṛti is equipoise of sattva, rajas and tamas, which are in the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. Prakṛti evolves into mahat, buddhi or cosmic intellect, which evolves into ahāmkāra or cosmic egoism. Ahāmkāra evolves into the manas or mind, the five cognitive senses, and the five motor senses, on the one hand, and the primal matter (bhūtādi), the five subtle essences (tattvān) and the five elements of earth, water, light, air and ether. The five tattvān of colour, sound, taste, odour and touch produce the five elements or substances. The finite souls are in the nature of transcendental consciousness; they are inactive and indifferent. They are reflected in transparent buddhis.

1. VasṬpati Miśra, Nyāya Vārtika Tātparya Tīkā, IV.1.20; Jyanta Bhatta, Nyāya Manjarī, Page 636.
in which sattva predominates, which are modified into the form of objects; the mental modes are reflected in the conscious souls, and appear to be cognitions of the souls, though they are unconscious modes of Buddhi. The inactive souls appear to be active owing to their reflection in buddhis. Erroneous identification of the souls with buddhis is the cause of their apparent bondage.

Discrimination of the souls from buddhis is the cause of their apparent release. In reality, the souls are eternally pure, conscious and liberated. When they have discriminative knowledge of their essential nature as pure, transcendental consciousness, Prakṛti ceases to evolve for them. But all souls are not liberated at the same time. So the evolution of Prakṛti continues.

Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit and demerit are modifications of unconscious buddhi.

Cognitions of objects due to the sense-object-intercourse also are modes of buddhi. The pure self transcends them all.

The Nyāya refutes the Sāmkhya doctrine. Pleasure, pain and delusion are feelings of a conscious self, which are produced by physical objects. The physical elements are composed of these feelings is incomprehensible.

Buddhi is the knowledge of objects. Egoism is self-conscious. They cannot produce the external sense-organ.
Substances have qualities. But the subtle essences of
colour, colour, sound, taste and touch cannot produce the
physical substances of earth, water, light, air and ether.
Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition,
merit and demerit can exist in a conscious self but not
in an unconscious buddhi. The self knows an object which
is determined by buddhi owing to its reflection in buddhi
which is reflected back in the self. But the self is
immutable and immovable, and cannot be reflected in
buddhi. If buddhi is reflected in the self, then it
becomes known like buddhi. But the self by nature is a
knower and can never be known. Further, if the self is
by nature a knower, its reflection in buddhi is needless.
If the self and buddhi are reflected in each other, and
erroneously identified with each other, how can the
former be known to be conscious and inactive and the
latter be known to be unconscious and active? The self
cannot have cognition without an eternal internal organ,
which is its instrument. The assumption of eternal
unconscious buddhi is needless, and the attribution of
cognition, volition and the like to it is unwarranted.
It is absurd to maintain that unconscious Prakṛti binds
the soul to the chain of birth and death. Who guides
Prakṛti not to bind the soul which has discrimination of
itself from Prakṛti? The self by its very nature is a
knower; it is said to know its intrinsic nature in release. But why does not Prakṛti bind a released soul? The soul is said to be in the nature of pure consciousness. But pure consciousness unproduced by an object is never experienced. So it cannot exist in the self in release, because there is no intercourse of the sense-organs with objects at the time cognition, desire, volition and the like are the qualities of the conscious and active self, and not of unconscious Prakṛti or buddhi.

If they are the qualities of buddhi, then its origin is due to merits and demerits, which are the auxiliary causes of all effects. These unseen agencies (adhṛtā) are modifications which can exist in Prakṛti, and cannot be destroyed because Prakṛti is eternal. If they exist in buddhi, which is supposed to be eternal, then reflection of the self and buddhi in each other will continue for ever, and the unseen agencies of buddhi will always be attributed to the self, which cannot be released. Unconscious Prakṛti cannot evolve and dissolve for the soul's bondage and release. Inactive souls cannot direct the evolution and dissolution of Prakṛti. Further, bondage and release of the souls are not real, but apparent. So evolution and dissolution of Prakṛti are apparent only. Hence the Sāṃkhya doctrine is not tenable.