CHAPTER VI

THEORY OF CAUSATION

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system holds that the ultimate particles of the four productive elements are the ultimate cause of this phenomenal world. These particles, through the operation of some conscious agency, combine together so as to form products. In this way, all the effects of this world and consequently, the world itself, are produced. All this is due to the principle of causality, upon which the entire metaphysical system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism has been built. The question arises: what is the principle of causality? The answer is that by the principle of causality, we mean that every event has a cause. In other words, whatever happens is made to happen by a cause. This is the common view of all the systems of Indian philosophy. According to all orthodox systems, the belief in causation is almost an instinct with the human mind. Without it, all practical activity would become impossible. But there are different views among the different systems upon some points like: Is the effect merely the manifestation of that which existed before, or is a real and fresh production? Is the effect absolutely identical with the cause, or is different from it? These
questions are upheld by the four important theories of causation which figure prominently in Indian philosophy, viz., (1) the modification theory of the Śākhyas (parināmavāda), (2) the theory of unreal or apparent production of the Advaita-Vedānta (vivartavāda), (3) the theory of dependent origination (pratītya samutpātavāda) of the Buddhists and (4) the theory of non-existence of effect in 'cause' (asatkāryavāda) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Śākhyas Theory of Parināmavāda

The Śākhyas view is succinctly put in the famous words of Gītā: "There can be no existence of the non-existence and no non-existence of the existent."¹

According to Śākhyas, an effect is not a new entity; it is already contained in its cause in an unmanifested state, and the production of an effect means merely its manifestation. Since an effect exists in its cause in an unmanifested state even before its appearance, it is said to be ever-existent (sat), and hence the Śākhyas theory of causation is known as Satkāryavāda (the theory of ever-existent effect). The manifestation of an effect is

¹ Bhagavad-Gītā, 2.16.
brought about by a change in the cause, and as this change is conceived as a real change, the causal theory of the Sāṃkhya system is called Pariṇāma-vāda or Viṅkarvāda, i.e., the theory of change, transformation or evolution from the cause. According to the Sāṃkhya school, there is an abiding substance which runs through the causal series. For example, when a gold vessel is broken and changed into a different form, the change occurs only in the arrangement of gold, but not in the substance, i.e., gold. ¹ Production means the modification of the form of the causal stuff. The fundamental stuff which runs through the causal series is neither produced nor destroyed. It is eternal. Thus, according to Sāṃkhya, the dharma (dṛṣṭa) does not change; only the dharma (bhāva) changes. The two, however, are identical. Sāṃkhya system holds that if it were not so, anything could arise out of anything. In that case, no body would make any selection of a particular material for the production of a particular effect. Moreover, causal capacity to bring about a certain effect belongs to certain things only, and they are these things which possess a potency necessary for the production of the effect. ² From these considerations, the Sāṃkhya philosophy comes to a conclusion that all the effects that

¹ Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga-Sūtra, 3.13.
² Īśvara-kiṃśana, Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, 9.
come into manifestation after the fulfilment of the necessary conditions, have a previous existence in potential forms. The world-process does not bring into existence anything new. It is a process of transformation of the potential (avyakta) effects into actual (vyakta) effects. The whole world of the manifold objects, except the Individual Soul, is the modification of the primordial matter, the 'prakṛti'.

Vedānta Theory of Viparitevāda

According to this theory, there is no real production because it holds that the essence of an effect is identical with the essence of its cause. The difference between cause and effect is not the difference between two basically different entities but the difference between the two forms of the identical stuff. This theory holds that in a causal process, the form of a cause is changed into a new form without involving any change in the essence of the causal stuff. Now, unless there is change in the essence of the causal stuff, there cannot be any real change even in the form of that stuff. The Advaitins, therefore, hold that what is regarded as the real modification of the causal stuff is only an appearance. There is no real change in the abiding eternal
substance, the 'Brahman'. The manifold world of different forms and names is not the result or the real modification of Brahman but only an appearance generated by the beginningless 'Avidyā'. Thus, the 'Perināmasa' of Sāṃkhya logically leads to the Viṣṇuvaśāda of Sāṅkara, according to which, there is no real production.

Buddhists Theory of Pratistha Samstapavāda

According to the Buddhist theory of causation, a cause is completely annihilated without leaving anything behind it and the effect arises after the annihilation of the cause. Thus, according to the Buddhist theory of causation, the relation between what is regarded as cause and what is regarded as its effect is nothing but the relation of antecedent to any consequent. The Buddhists hold that a cause is an invariable antecedent of its effect and the former is absolutely different from the latter. The Gārvākas' objection against their theory is that two absolutely different entities cannot be regarded as related by the causal relation. To hold that a thing is produced from an absolutely different thing amounts to hold that it is produced out of nothing. If it is produced out of nothing, then the thing which invariably precedes it has no causal relation to it. It then arises of its own accord, without depending upon anything else. The
Buddhists hold that in the objectively real world the occurrence of one moment means the death of the preceding moment, would not object to the Cārvāka's position which holds that a thing is produced out of nothing.

**Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Asatkāravyāde or Ārambhavāde**

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a system pledged to realism, advances a theory opposed to the Śāṅkha system. Theory of causation of a system is based on the relation conceived in that system between dharma and dharma. As we know that the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is the theory of dharma-dharma-bheda, i.e., the differentiation in essence between the substrate and their properties. Hence, to save the reality of the external world, this system holds that there is an absolute difference between a cause and its effect. A cloth in order to be real must have an essence different from that of the threads. This is the reason why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopts the theory of asatkāravyāde (origination of the non-existent effect). The position of this joint-system as formulated by Vācaspatsamyāra is—sataḥ asaj jāyate, i.e., from the existent (cause) comes into being an effect which was non-existent before.

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The empirical view of the theory of causation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system stands out very clearly in the definition of cause and effect. Cause has been defined by Udayana as an invariable antecedent of an effect. He also regards it as its unconditional or necessary antecedent. If an unconditional antecedent, which is always present when an effect is present, and which is always absent when an effect is absent, were not regarded as its cause, then the effect would be uncaused.

From the above mentioned definition of a cause, we would say that the first essential characteristic of a cause is its antecedence; the fact that it should precede the effect (Pūrvavṛtti). The second is its invariability; it must invariably precede the effect (Niṣṭapūrvavṛtti). The third is its unconditional or necessity; it must unconditionally precede the effect (AANYAsthāsiddha). Unconditional antecedence is immediate and direct antecedence and excludes the fallacy of remote cause.

Nyāya definition of a cause is the same as that in Western inductive logic. Hume defines a cause as an invariable antecedent. J. S. Mill defines it as an unconditional and invariable antecedent. Carneth Read

1. Udayana, Nyāya-kusumāṅjali, Page 89.
points out that unconditionality includes immediacy. A cause, therefore, is an unconditional, immediate and invariable antecedent of an effect.

An effect is the unconditional, invariable consequent of a cause. It is defined as the 'counter-entity of its own prior non-existence' (Prāgabhāva-pratīyogī).

It is the negation of its own prior negation. It comes into being and destroys its prior non-existence. It was non-existent before its production. It did not pre-exist in its cause. It is a fresh beginning, a new creation. This Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of causation is directly opposed to the Sāṃkhya theory of Sāṁkhya-vāda. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is the champion of realism. In order to uphold the reality of the manifold world of experience, it maintains that production does not mean the change in the form of the causal stuff, but the emergence (ārambhā) of a new entity which is completely non-existent (asat) in the cause. An effect is a real entity completely different from its cause. It is not identical with the cause. Between the new effect and its inherent cause there is an absolute difference (atyantabheda). It is neither an appearance nor a transformation of the cause. It is newly brought into existence by the operation of the cause.

1 Kesava Miśra, Tarka Bhāṣā, Page 3.
As to the relation of cause to its effect, two different theories have taken shape in the course of the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. These two theories are called the earlier and later theories. The theory of causation which is propounded in the Nyāya-Sūtra and in the Nyāya-Bhāṣya is not the same as the theory of causation discussed in the manuals of the syncretic school. The theory of causation which is discussed in the manuals of the syncretic school crystallised in Nyāya-kandū and Karnaṇḍali, though the beginning of this theory is made in the Nyāya-Vārtika tātparya-tīkā.

While according to the earlier theory a cause is destroyed at the moment of the origin of the effect, according to the later theory, the cause continues to exist along with the effect. According to the later theory, the effect resides in the cause by the relation of 'saṃvyaya'. Though the concept of the 'avaśyāvin' is discussed and defined in the Nyāya Sūtra and Nyāya Bhāṣya, yet the simultaneous existence of effect and cause is not accepted therein. Gautama says, "As an effect-substance is produced only when the cause-substance is disjoined, it is inferred that the cause is destroyed prior to the production of the effect."

2. Gautama, Nyāya-Sūtra, 3.2.16; Vātsyāyana, Nyāya Bhāṣya, 4.14.18.
According to the earlier theory both the cause-substance and the effect-substance are 'wholes' (avayavins). In a causal process, the cause-substance which is an 'avayavin' residing in its parts is destroyed leaving behind it its parts in which another 'avayavin' the effect substance is born. The cause substance is different from the effect substance. The latter arises when the first is destroyed.

Though according to this theory, the cause is destroyed before the emergence of the effect, yet it accepts some sort of bond between the cause and the effect through the identity of their parts. The parts left over by the destruction of the cause-substance the 'avayavin', carry, as if, the essence of the cause to the effect. This theory, thus, avoids the position of holding that an effect arises from void. Vātsyāyana says, "When an old 'avayavin' (cause) is destroyed by disjoining the arrangement of its parts, and the parts are re-arranged, a new 'avayavin' or substance (dravya) is born in them; the new born substance is not born out of nothing. According to this theory the parts are not regarded as separate substances."

1. Ibid.
According to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, there is no destruction of the cause prior to the emergence of the effect. The cause continues to exist even after its effect is produced. According to this, cause is not thought to be an 'avyayavin' residing in some parts but the parts themselves. While according to the earlier theory, the whole and the parts together constitute one substance, according to the later theory they constitute two different substances. The later theory holds that the parts form the cause and they continue to exist along with the emergent effect. It is to be noted that though according to the later theory, the cause continues to exist even after the effect is produced, yet there is no internal relation between the cause and the effect. The cause and the effect, the parts and the whole, are two different substances which are related by an external relation known as 'samavēya'.

According to the later as well as earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, an effect is entirely non-existent in its cause. But while the earlier theory holds that the parts of a cause-substance are identical with the parts of the effect-substance, according to the later theory there is nothing common between a cause and an effect. The parts which form the cause are different from the effect-

1. Deśhadri, A Critique of Indian Realism, Page 264.
substance.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an effect is never produced out of its cause. The cause is a substance which does not transmit its essence to the effect. Though the effect has nothing in common with the cause, yet the former can reside only in the latter. The effect arises in the cause and resides therein by the relation of inherence (saṃvāya) which itself is an entity and thus, while it relates the effect to the cause it also serves as a wedge and does not let the one merge into the other.

It should be noted that while according to the Śākhyas, there is identity of the fundamental stuff of cause and effect, according to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, there is no internal relation between cause and effect, no transference of an essence from the cause to the effect. The earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation holds the middle position between the Śākhyas and the later Nyāya Vaiśeṣika theory. It differs from the Śākhyas in holding that the cause-substance is different from the effect-substance. But there is agreement between them in so far as they hold that the destruction of a cause is not its complete annihilation.

According to the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of
causation, a cause is an 'avayavin' and its destruction means the destruction of cause as an 'avayavin' only. When a cause is destroyed, it is not completely annihilated but it leaves behind it its parts which are re-arranged and thus, the effect, a new 'avayavin' a different substance, is born therein. The main difference between the Sāṅkhya theory and the early theory of Nyāya is this that while according to the latter the whole residing in the parts is a new substance, a new entity, according to the former it is simply the new form of the abiding stuff.

Sāṅkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda has been criticized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as this joint system takes its stand upon the actual experience of the common people. According to it, an effect is non-existent before its production, since it is found to be produced and then destroyed. What already exists cannot be produced. Production is a fact. What is produced must be non-existent before its production. If there is no production, there is no destruction. The Sāṅkhya argues that if there were no permanent relation between a cause and an effect, any effect would be produced by any

1. Gautama, Nyāya-Sūtra, 4.1.49;
   Vatsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 4.1.50.
material cause. There can be no relation between an existent cause and a non-existent effect. The Nyāya-Vaśēśika replies that an effect is non-existent before its production and becomes existent after its production, so that it can inhere in its material cause when it is produced. The Śākhya doctrine of Śatārūgavaśēta itself cannot account for particular effects being produced by particular material causes. If all effects are modifications of Sattva, rajas and tamas, there can be no particular causes of particular effects.¹ The Nyāya-Vaśēśika system holds that particular material causes only can produce particular effects owing to their particular natures. Śatārūgavaśēta denies production of a new entity and destruction of an old entity, and so leads to collapse of all practical life. The Śākhya holds that an effect pre-exists in its material cause in a potential condition, and is manifested when it is produced. What is the nature of manifestation (abhivyakti)? If it is a property of an effect (kāryadharmā), then it was non-existent before its production. If it is perception of an effect (upalabdhi), then it is produced after the effect is produced. If it is in existence as an effect of what was existent as a cause, then it was non-existent before its production. If it is a particular arrangement of parts, then it was non-existent.

¹ Jayanta, Nyāya-Manjari, Page 495.
² Uddyotakara, Nyāya-Vārtika, 4.1.80.
at first and then becomes existent. If it is development of the intrinsic nature of the cause, then also it did not exist before production of an effect. All these alternatives undermines Sātākhyavāda, and imply

Sātākhyavāda. The Sākhyas argue that an effect must pre-exist in its cause because it is non-different from its material cause. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies that an effect (e.g., a jar) is perceived to be different from its cause (e.g., clay). Both the clay and the pot do not serve the same same purpose, which shows that there is a real difference between them. Though there is identity of genus between them, they are different as individuals. Similarly, the notion of the cause is different from that of the effect. The vypadeśa (naming) also supports the Nyāya-view point. Never the term ‘effect’ is used for the term ‘cause’, and also, vice-versa. Their functions, which are pre-determined, also help the theory of asatākhyavāda. Hence the doctrine of sātākhyavāda is not tenable.

Classification of Causes

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system distinguishes three kinds of causes, viz., (1) samavāyilākaraṇa (inherent cause),

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1. Ibid., 491-492
2. Jayanta, Nyāya-Manjari, Pages 493-496.
(ii) asamavāyikārāṇa (non-inherent cause), and (iii) nimitta kārāṇa (instrumental cause or efficient cause).

(i) Samavāyikārāṇa is defined as that in which the effect abides by the relation of inherence (samavēya). It is productive of the effect in the sense that the effect cannot come into being except as inhering in it. The effect is so intimately connected or identical with the samavāyikārāṇa that it cannot be separated from the cause without losing its own existence. It is that common factor between the cause and the effect which is identical or substantially the same in both of them. The yarns are the inherent cause of the cloth, since, as components (avayava) of the cloth, they are not only responsible for its production but also constitute the substratum in which it subsists by inherence.

The inherent cause is necessarily a substance, for an effect can inhere in substance alone. The inherent cause may have for its effect a substance, or a quality or an action. The yarns, for instance, are held to be the inherent cause not only of the cloth that is made out of them, but also of their own colour and of their dropping down from the hand of a careless weaver.

1. Kesava Misra, Tarka Bhāṣā, Page 28
2. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 10a2e1a
The principal cause (e.g., yarn) is not conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, as material cause or upādāna kāraṇa (as it is by the Śāṁkhyā School), but as inherent cause (samaṇavidkāraṇa). According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, an inherent cause is always in the form of 'parts' (avyayavas), while an effect is in the form of a 'whole' (avyayavin). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains against the Buddhist that a 'whole' is not merely an aggregate of its parts, but an altogether new entity quite different from its parts. A 'whole' (avyayavin) emerges as residing in its parts by inherent relation (samaṇavid sambandha). This means that an effect is different in essence from its cause in which it resides by inherent relation as a separate entity. Cause and effect are not conceived by the Śāṁkhyā as different entities; they are identical. A piece of cloth, according to the Śāṁkhyā, is only a different arrangement of threads. The thread imparts essence to the cloth, or more exactly, the essence of both is the same. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, the inherent cause, which exists simultaneously and side by side with its effect and as such retains its full essence to itself cannot, in any way, impart essence to its effect. An inherent cause is thus not a material cause. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, the inherent causes (e.g., yarn) is as extraneous to its effect,
as the accessory causes (nimitta-Kāraṇas) like loom, shuttle, etc. Uddyotakara clearly suggests that an inherent cause is not a material cause, but is extraneous like the accessory causes. He says: "Yarn is an entity quite different from cloth, because it is the cause of the latter like the shuttle, etc. As the shuttle, etc., which are the cause of cloth, are different from it, similarly, the yarn also (which is a cause) is different from cloth."

(ii) Asesavāyikāraṇa or non-inherent cause is that which produces its effect by being intimately connected with the inherent cause of that effect. For example, the conjunction of the threads, which inheres in the threads, is the non-inherent cause of the cloth. It inheres in the threads and not in the cloth, threads being its inherent cause. Hence it is the non-inherent cause. Similarly, the colour of the threads is non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth, for although it contributes to the production of the colour of the cloth and hence is a cause of it, it inheres in the threads and not in the colour of the cloth. The non-inherent cause is always a quality or an action, while the inherent cause is a substance.

1. Uddyotakara, Nyāya-Vārtika, 2:1,36, Page 513.
2. Sridhara, Nyāya-Kanda, Page 101;
   Kesava Miśra, Tarka-Bhāṣā, Page 31.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
The admission of the non-inherent cause is a special feature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, which explains every case of production of a substance as a case of fresh combination of parts forming a new whole. It is not enough that the parts should merely exist, they are also required to be conjoined in a definite order, because they have little significance when taken by themselves, apart from their participation in the whole. They can participate in the whole only through being joined together, i.e., through the mediation of what is called the non-inherent cause. Thus, the non-inherent cause appears to be an extremely necessary factor with a peculiar position and function in the process of causation. It is intimately bound up with the inherent cause, but at the same time it sustains the product and determines its distinctive form and character.

Non-inherent cause is not recognised in other systems of Indian philosophy as distinct from the inherent cause. Both the inherent and the non-inherent causes of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are classed under one head, namely, the upādāna kāraṇa (the material or the constituent cause) by the Śāṅkhyā and the Vedānta School.

(iii) The nimitta or the efficient cause is different from the two kinds of causes mentioned above. It is the
power which helps the inherent cause to produce the effect. The weaver is the efficient cause of the cloth. The efficient cause includes the accessories (sahākāra), e.g., the loom and shuttle of the weaver or the staff and wheel of the later. The efficient cause may be a substance, a quality or an action.

Sometimes a distinction is made between a general or an ordinary (sādhāraṇa) and a peculiar or an extraordinary (asādhāraṇa) cause. Space, time, God’s knowledge, God’s will, merit, demerit, prior non-existence and absence of counter-acting factors are the eight general causes. The extraordinary cause is called the kārana or the instrumental cause and is included in the efficient cause. In this sense, instrumental cause is a special cause (asādhāraṇa kārana) or the most effective cause (sādhakatam kārana). It is the motive power which immediately produces the effect, e.g., the staff of the potter. The ancient Nyāya regards an instrument as an instrumental cause, but the modern Nyāya regards the efficiency itself (vāpāra) which inheres in this cause as the real instrumental cause.

All these three kinds of causes are meant for

1. Kesava Miśra, Tarka Bhasa, Page 31
2. Kesava Miśra, Tarka Bhasa, Pages 38-40
positive (bhāva) things alone. As for the non-existing things (abhāva), there is only one cause and that is the instrumental; for, there can be no relation of inherence between the non-existing things; so that, neither the inherent cause, nor the non-inherent cause can be connected with non-existences. Again, all the three kinds of causes operate together in the production of existing things. Even if any one is absent, there can be no production.

**Anyathāsiddha (Unnecessary Antecedent)**

Anyathāsiddhas, in the words of Dr. Umesh Misra are: "The invariable antecedents which are not at all necessary for the production of the effect but are invariably connected with the effect too remotely are known as anyathāsiddhas." Conditional or unnecessary antecedents are non-essential, accidental antecedents which do not play any part in the production of the effect. They are not causally connected with the effect; but they are indirectly conjoined with it. Gaṅgāśa mentions four kinds of unnecessary (anyathāsiddha) antecedents.

(1) That which is antecedent to an effect by virtue

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1. Ibid.
of its relation to its inherent cause, is its unnecessary antecedent. The colour of a staff depends upon it as its inherent cause in order to be followed by a jar. The colour of the staff does not contribute to the production of a jar. So it is its unnecessary antecedent. (2) The cause of a cause is not a cause of an effect. It is a conditional antecedent. The potter is the cause of a jar. But the potter's father is not its cause. The potter's father is the cause of the potter. The potter's father is the remote cause of the jar. But a remote cause is not a real cause. It is an indirect and mediate cause. The cause of an effect must be a direct and immediate antecedent which is necessary for the production of the effect. (3) That antecedent, which is other than the invariable, necessary antecedent of an effect, is its unnecessary antecedent. The prior non-existence of colour is an unnecessary antecedent of smell due to heating, since the prior non-existence of smell is its invariable, necessary antecedent or cause. (4) That which is known to be antecedent to an effect after it is known to be antecedent to some other effect as its cause, is its unnecessary antecedent. Ether is already known to be an antecedent of sound as its inherent cause so it is an unnecessary antecedent of a jar, though it is its invariable antecedent, since it is not necessary for its production. A cause is determined by its presence and
absence both—not by its presence only. Eternal and ubiquitous substances, which cannot be eliminated are unnecessary antecedents. 1 Vārdaṁśa adds another kind of unnecessary antecedent. (5) That which is antecedent to the effect, together with the cause, is its unnecessary antecedent. A staff is an auxiliary cause of a jar, whose presence is followed by its production, and whose absence is followed by its non-production. It is its necessary antecedent. But the generic character of a staff is not followed by the production of a jar independently of the staff. Hence, it is its unnecessary antecedent. Viśvanātha also mentions these five anathāsiddhas. 3 All these invariable antecedents which are not directly connected with the production of an effect are anathāsiddhas or unnecessary antecedents. The invariable, unconditional and immediate antecedents, which are necessary for the production of an effect, constitute its cause. Adventitious, collateral, or unnecessary antecedents or accompaniments should not be regarded as a cause.

Plurality of Causes

Plurality of causes has been rejected in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. According to it, the causal relation is

1. Udayana, Nyāya-Ksaumānjali, Page 82; Gangesā, Tattvacintāmani, Page 36.
4. Ibid.
Reciprocal. The same cause produces the same effect. The same effect is produced by the same cause. But sometimes, we find that the same effect is brought about by a variety of causes. Fire, which is a particular kind of product is produced from different causes, namely, grass, arani (a piece of wood of the semi tree used for kindling fire by attrition), and also a particular kind of jewel (mani). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues that it is wrong to think that there are several different causes to produce a single effect. The specific causes produce specific effects. In the above-mentioned example, no doubt, there are three reasons to produce a single fire, but at the same time, the effect, i.e., the fire is not one but three. In other words, the fire produced by grass is different from the fire produced out of either arani or jewel. Udayana says that if fire were produced from different causes, then the inference of fire from smoke would not have been possible.  

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that though the effects appear to be the same, but really they have special antecedent consequences. If they are considered with their distinctive features, then specific effects have

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specific causes. If there is a specific difference in the causes, there must be a specific difference in the effects, even though they appear to be homogeneous.\(^1\) A specific cause has a specific effect. Plurality of causes appears to be true, because we ignore the distinctive features of effect. Vācaspati and Jayanta regard the cause as an aggregate of operative conditions, and the effect as an aggregate of necessary consequents. If we take a concrete view of cause and effect both, the doctrine of plurality of causes proves to be wrong.

Thus, according to the theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is an absolute difference between a cause and its effect, and there is entirely a new and fresh production. But, in spite of this, both are mutually bound together by a mysterious tie of relation, so that as long as the effect lasts it inheres in its cause, and even when it does not exist, as for instance, before its production and after its destruction, its non-existence, in both states, technically called praśabha and dharmaśabha, is also attributed to the same cause. Kapāla's is the first attempt to explore a relation between cause and effect. The evolution and development of science is also based on the implicit faith in the law of causation, as the scientific study means the search of a cause or a number of causes leading to a particular phenomenon.

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\(^1\) Ibid., Pages 26-27.