CHAPTER FOUR

FREEDOM, ALIENATION AND IDEOLOGY
Sartre is known for his exceedingly committed defence of freedom and for his deeply philosophical attitude towards the practice of freedom. In fact, he seems to have given a radically different interpretation of freedom in the context of human life. However it may be mentioned at the outset that his conception of freedom in *Being and Nothingness* is different from that of his later work *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. In the former he speaks of individual freedom and in the latter of collective freedom. For him freedom is not a faculty of the human soul to be envisaged and described in isolation. The being of man itself appears as freedom. Sartre says in this context:

Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible, the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of "human reality". Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his *being free*.1 (Italics in original)

This implies that the fact of human existence does not have priority over the possibility of human freedom. Man does not exist first in order to be free. In fact freedom reveals itself through a rigorous elucidation of being.
The being of men is continuously expressing itself through choices and actions. The essential characteristic of action, as Sartre sees it, is that it is always intentional and it always responds to a lack. Sartre says, "To act is to modify the shape of the world; it is to arrange means in view of an end."

Freedom of the for-itself constitutes itself into a project i.e., its conscious intentionality towards the future and power of negation is the defining property of the for-itself which in the context of 'action' is called its freedom.

We have shown that freedom is actually one with being of the for-itself. Human reality is free to the exact extent that it has to be its own nothingness. (Italics mine)

Sartre makes it clear that freedom is the negation of being-in-itself. It is a condition of being undetermined and being undeterminable. To be free means that my act is not subject to determination of motives. On the contrary, the ineffective structure of motives is the condition of my freedom. This uncertainty becomes simultaneously a source of anguish. It is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of freedom.
Will and passion are conceived by Sartre as mere modalities. However, they do not account for the original drive towards projected ends. Freedom and spontaneity are also not identical. This is one issue which seems to pose a subtle distinction between the thought of Sartre and that of Simone de Beauvoir. In her opinion, man is originally free in the sense that he spontaneously casts himself into the world. However, spontaneity considered as a facticity appears only as a contingency. For Sartre, the two concepts are primordial. Freedom is a state; spontaneity is a drive for a process.

In his analysis of the concept of freedom, Sartre speaks of two determinants of action: motive and motivation or drive. The original words used by Sartre are motif and mobile. Motive has also been translated as 'cause' in the English translation of Being and Nothingness. Sartre says in this context that the motive can be understood only by the end, that is, by the non-existent. "It is therefore in itself a negative." This position however gives rise to two important consequences. First, no factual state is capable by itself of motivating any act whatever. For an act is a
projection of the for-itself towards what is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not. Second, that no factual state can determine consciousness to apprehend it as negative or as a lack.  

Sartre goes on to say that the ultimate meaning of determinism is to establish within as an unbroken continuity of existence in itself. The motive conceived as a psychic fact i.e. as a full and given reality - is in the deterministic view articulated without any break with the decision and act, both of which are equally conceived as psychic givens.  

Freedom in this context has been interpreted not as a capacity but as a state.

While analysing freedom from the point of view of choice, action, projects, negation, Sartre draws attention to the intentional grounds of choice. The exercise of choice by the for-itself is difficult to account for. He says in this context: "freedom appears as an unanalyseable totality." It can be broadly apprehended as an organized unity of causes, motive and ends.

Sartre however, strikes a sceptical note when he says,

I am conscious of the causes which inspire my action. These causes are already transcendent objects of my consciousness, they are outside.
In vain shall I seek to catch hold of them; I escape them by my very existence. I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free. This means that no limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself or, if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free.12 (Italics mine)

It seems therefore that discovery of the fundamental act of freedom cannot be given to us in the form of any hidden causal mechanism but only as a transparent intentionality - a kind of self revelation. The truth of human freedom, thus seems to be located in the power to turn spontaneity into a project, to accept contingency and to ride it like a wave.

Raising the question of spontaneity in his essay, 'The Artist and his Conscience', Sartre speaks of the naked power of creativity in music. If the artist's "music is committed, this commitment will be found in its intuitive reality...without reference to the artist or to previous traditions".13

In fact many such forms of music have grown spontaneously and have broken away from conventions, out of concern for liberation and freedom of men. Sartre says:

Couldn't music thus influence the course of history by providing the working class with the image of a "total man" who also has wrenched himself from his alienation, from
the myth of human "nature" and who, through daily struggle, forges his own essence and values according to which he judges himself? 14 (italics mine)

In fact, art and literature of this kind which seek to bring freedom are by nature committed. They are not dedicated to reflect the images and visions of the eternal but are social in nature, function and effect. Their deepest meaning is human freedom itself. 15 Sartre emphasizes freedom as the source of imagination "Freedom can only be through what is already freedom." 16

Man is his own sphinx, his own blindness and fate, his own judge revealing the depths of his own being to himself in a painful dialectical process. In Les Sequestrés d'Altona, Frans who is the witness of all men is finally able to pass judgment on himself. It is a revelation of man to himself in a painful dialectical process which made Frans a tragic figure. However, the protagonists of Huis Clos and Le Diable et le Bon Dieu act out the bloody force of refused or travestied freedom. Their lives exemplify absurdity. The play achieves the old catharsis through the persons becoming other than he thought himself to be. But then one
wonders where exactly is the truth of Sartre's assertion
that being is condemned to freedom. Is it a pure philo-
sophical concept - a possibility or a fact or a reality?
Whether the freedom of Franta, Johanna and Leni will
become liberation or sequestration is the suspended note
on which the action of the play comes to an end. The
fictional structure of the play manages to give concrete
form to good, evil, conscience, ambition, beauty and to
some extent to freedom.\textsuperscript{17}

Therefore we draw an inference that freedom consists
in the ability on the part of the consciousness to
affirm or deny, to accept what is true of the object,
and also to invent or think what is false or to reject
it. This freedom turns out to be that which constitutes
the 'gap' or 'lack' between thought and object.\textsuperscript{18} So
at the very centre of the for-itself, and right at the
beginning, we discover both freedom and emptiness.

Sartre defines lack as endemic to the structure of
consciousness; it is a lack of completed possibilities.
In fact negation also constitutes a gap which lies at
the heart of being for-itself.
Sartre has insisted on the ontological dimension of art as freedom which intends itself. He maintains that human action is not a mode of being at all but rather a mode of negativity. It is a totality always pursuing itself but never achieving unity. The idea of freedom as conceived by Sartre has been predominantly illustrated in his *Les Chemins de la Liberte* translated as *Roads to Freedom*. We also find that the impact of the ideas that Sartre elucidated in his *Being and Nothingness* is making an obvious appearance in these writings. The *Roads to Freedom* is like a canvas intended to give a synoptic picture of how different individuals adopt diverse roads to the attainment of freedom.

In the first volume, *The Age of Reason*, the hero Mathieu has a series of experiences after which he is led from one set of illusions about freedom to another.

In the opening passages of the *The Age of Reason* Mathieu is informed by Marcelle, his mistress, that she is pregnant. He strains himself trying to find money to pay for the abortion, yet is too scrupulous to let her go to an unsafe place for the same purpose. However,
he is equally resolute against the idea of marrying Marcelle to enable her to have the birth of the child. He is firmly persuaded that marriage would jeopardise his liberty, for he fancies himself an extremely independent man.

Mathieu has often given expression to his views on freedom, yet Marcelle encounters him with the accusation "you want to be free, absolutely free. It is your vice." This annoys Mathieu. However, he has no escape from the situation. He is caught like a fly in the amber, for he can neither disarm his own responsibility nor can he surrender his freedom in the name of fulfilling his responsibility. He finds himself locked in the web of a dialectical relationship of freedom and responsibility. Desperately and hopelessly, he looks for the way out.

Sartre adds an ironical touch by making Mathieu's pugnacious bourgeois brother Jacques, the spokesman of some revealing truths. He tells Mathieu "You who despise the family, exploit our family ties to touch me for money." Mathieu replies "All I want is to retain my freedom." However, his brother Jacques, immediately responds "I should have thought that freedom consisted in frankly
confronting situations into which one had deliberately entered and accepting all one’s responsibilities; you have, however, reached the age of reason, my poor Mathieu.23

Jacques accuses Mathieu of dodging the fact of his being what he is. To find solace in the company of the very young, Mathieu starts going out with a white Russian girl of eighteen – Ivich and her brother Boris. Mathieu seeks to assert his liberty in the presence of Ivich by performing acts for which he has no rational grounds such as ordering champagne which he dislikes and by sticking a knife into his own hand. Sartre brings out beautifully the absurdity of such acts and the absurdity of the belief that the behavior of this kind is in any way assertion of freedom.24

Boris, the brother of Ivich is depicted to be kleptomaniac and is a friend of Lola – a night club singer who is much older than him. Boris announces to Mathieu and Ivich one morning that Lola has died and he must consequently retrieve his love letters which he had written to her. Mathieu and Boris, while looking for the letters come across large bank notes which Mathieu
seeks to appropriate for Marcelle's abortion. Lola, however, was not dead, but was in a drug-addict's stupor. Mathieu later picks up courage, goes back and steals the money.

In the meantime, however, Mathieu's friend, Daniel, succeeds in persuading Marcelle that she should have the child. Mathieu's appearance with the money for abortion at Marcelle's flat makes her revolt against him and she turns him out of her flat. Mathieu is informed that Daniel will marry Marcelle and that he will acknowledge Mathieu's child as his own.

Consequently, Mathieu finds himself entirely alone, for, like also comes to despise him as much as Marcelle does. She also fails in her examination and goes back to her province. The hero, Mathieu, faced the challenge of confronting the situation in which he looked for liberty while remaining uncorrupted. Even when he is left alone at last he finds himself no freer than before. He wonders whether he could have been more free if Marcelle had not exist. But thinking like that made him aware of his own self-deception. He says "No one has interfered with my freedom; my life has drained it dry."25
In the closing passages he is shown reflecting on life in relation to nothingness. Life had been given to him for nothing. He was nothing, and yet he would not change. He was as he was made. Ironically, he is made to realize the failures of life in the light of various ready-made well-bred moralities which had discreetly offered him their services. This makes him realize that he has indeed attained the age of reason.

In the words of Philip Thody, Mathieu is meant to be "the incarnation" of what Hegel called "terrorist Liberty", which, according to him is the very negation of true freedom. Could this mean that Mathieu would seek his salvation from this kind of negation in the later works? The hope is belied, as Sartre perhaps could never find a solution to the problem which he initially raised in his L'Age de raison.

Maurice Cranston seems to believe that Sartre made Mathieu die in the end as a character in the novel, so that he could feel that he is free at last. Though Mathieu had brooded much about freedom and cared for it so much, he has not discovered what freedom really is. However, there is a controversy on this point. Stern
and Murdoch seem to suggest that Mathieu is a portrait of Sartre himself. But this is not supported by writers like Maurice Cranston, who, on the contrary, believe that Mathieu does not represent Sartre even though he is portrayed like Sartre himself i.e. a professor of philosophy but there is no real identity between them. 26

Philip Thody, on the other hand, seems to suggest that the killing of Mathieu only indicates that Sartre cannot keep his characters alive long enough because he is running away from the necessity of describing how people do in fact come out of a solipsistic personal world into the real world, of political moral decisions. 27

Speaking about the other central character in L'Ame de raison Daniel, he too seems to be left with his central problem unsolved. He pretends to be different by putting an end to his own feeling of guilt by ending his feelings altogether. "To be a stone...motionless, without feeling, blind—to be pederast as an oak is an oak. To be extinguished. To put out the inner eye." Such was the dream of Daniel which naturally never came true because a man cannot exist in any other form t an
as a subjectivity - a transcendence, a being for itself.

Does Daniel attempt self-punishment as a result of his guilt-ridden consciousness? He makes up his mind to kill the cats he loves, then turns back; he decides to castrate himself, then changes his mind. He goes through the marriage with Marcelle, primarily due to spite towards Mathieu, but gets repelled by her female body and leaves her. The above illustrations from the novel symbolize his guilt and bad faith which are expressed through his condemnation of other people's conduct.

Even the conversion of Daniel to Christianity is a representation of bad faith as is his marriage. The only moments of authenticity experienced by Daniel seem to be when he returns to Paris and sees everybody running away in panic before the German advance.

Daniel experiences the thrill in rejoicing, for the people who had condemned him as a pederast, were in full flight facing a stampede.

For twenty years he had been on trial. There had been spies even beneath the bed. Every passer-by had been a witness for the prosecution, a judge, or both at once, every word he spoke could have been used in evidence against him. And now, in a flash - stampede."28
In a very famous incident described in the novel, Daniel describes freedom to Philip — a good looking young French soldier — after successfully persuading him not to commit suicide. He tells him that freedom means liquidation of all moral values. He suggests further the way how freedom can be realized through the act of deliberate destruction — not merely in words but in acts. He says in this context “Every thing you have borrowed from others will go up in smoke.” However, the sort of freedom taught to Philip by Daniel was only a greater farce and mockery of freedom than what could be claimed to have been attained by Mathieu.

The third most important character in *Les Chemins de la Liberté* is Brunet whose way to freedom “is of particular interest even though he too sees freedom in the illusory and false way”. For Brunet the question of liberty needs to be solved by the Marxist definition as a recognition of necessity. In a very inscrutable statement, he tells Mathieu to join the Communist Party by saying “You have renounced everything in order to be free, take one step further; renounce your freedom and everything shall be rendered unto you.”
The second volume of *Les Chemins de la Liberte* is *La Bourge* symbolizes the state of captivity brought about by the war situation, yet the path to freedom remains entrenched in the heart and will of Nathieu, who struggled and fought with all kinds of situations, personal and social, which hampered his freedom. Thus, freedom indeed became identified with the subjectivity of the human self in the traditional existential idiom.

Sartre describes the situation in which the paths of the individual are ossified and in which human individuals and characters become things and objects, and the total relationships of the kind that exist between human beings become dissolved. In this context, Sartre writes "Nathieu remembered them already as an event, like the death of Louis XVI, and in the same dispassionate way. They belonged to the world's past, not to his, he no longer had a past." 32 (Italics in original)

Sartre describes the sensation of loneliness in his description of the situation in which Nathieu finds himself and feels "A nobody from nowhere in particular, possessing nothing, he now was nothing." 33 However, his desire to live was so invincible that he walked through
the yard "I am free and shall remain so" 34 he thought.

Mathieu longed for the life that awaited him back home in his sitting room and in his bedroom. He would go back and slip into the life he knew so well. Nothing would remain except for an almost imperceptible scar or fracture in the continuity of his life. 35

The third volume of Sartre's Les Chemins de La Liberté is La Mort dans l'âme which has been translated as Iron in the Soul. The essential structure of this volume is death, destruction, fire, fighting everything leading to a feeling of death in the soul as signified by the title La Mort dans l'âme.

Describing the conditions of hard labour, slavery and dejection in the prison camps which had passed over to the authority of Germans, Mathieu thinks:

At once innocent and guilty, too severe yet too indulgent, impotent yet responsible...yet rejected by each several individual, perfectly lucid, yet utterly deceived, enslaved yet sovereign. I'm just like everybody else. 36

And speaking of Daniel, Sartre describes him as dumb, transparent, mysterious, and alone. He too says, "I'm tired of incessantly evaporating into an empty sky. I
want a room. 37

In a beautiful passage which has a high degree of literary elegance, Sartre describes a scene in which Daniel and Philip were conversing with each other.

Daniel opened the window, leaned out

... above the emptiness below, and breathed in the violet fragrance of the silence. How often, at this same time, I have longed to escape, and have heard the sound of mounting steps that have trampled on my thoughts...

The night was untamed and mild. The flesh, so often wounded by the darkness, had healed. A virgin night, deep, profound, a lovely night with never a man to be seen, an exquisite blood-orange without pipe. Regretfully he closed the shutters and turned the switch.

The room leapt from the shadows, the various objects took on familiar identity. 38

Le Chemise is an exploration of man's thirst for freedom. It is a study of the ways in which people assert or deny their freedoms in their endless pursuit of fullness of being, a theme which has been described by Sartre as characteristic of human consciousness. Sartre studies at length what he considers to be three main types of consciousnesses, that of the ineffective intellectual (Mathieu), the pervert (Daniel) and the communist (Brunet) and introduces a host of minor characters who are also analysed and "placed". 39 The simplest of the three main cases is that of Daniel.
He, like Roquentin, is tormented by the elusiveness of his own existence. He is obsessed with a desire to change the non-being of his consciousness into a stable thing like being. 40

Daniel wishes to be a poet. He has a single project whose form remains the same though content changes, but unlike the other characters he is not pursuing a variety of human ends. Reflection strips his life to an awareness of a certain persistent structure. For Roquentin, metaphysical discovery and philosophical detachment are the basic fabric of his existence but Daniel turns them into either an obsession or psycho-analysis.

Daniel hopes to realize manifestation of freedom through identification of the tormentor and the tormented within him. To do the opposite of what one wants is freedom according to Daniel who symbolizes elusive consciousness, one’s transmutation into a thing and making life one long quivering moment of pain. But his attempts at self-torment are frustrated.

In another episode highlighted in La Mort dans l’âme, Brunet is shown to be the friend of a mysterious intelle-
ctual named Schneider who is discovered to be the famous Marxist writer Vicarios, who had left the party as a protest against the Nazi-Soviet pact. While making a bid to escape, Vicarios was shot dead and died in the arms of Brunet. He says at this crucial juncture "No power of man could efface that absolute of suffering. It was the party which had killed him, even if the Soviet Union won, men were alone...two lost men could, at the last moment, conquer solitude. To hell with the party! You are my only friend." Of course this last line was never heard by Vicarios for he was already dead. and Brunet, walking back to the German guards, contemplated a lifetime of despair that lay ahead of him.

However, earlier than this, until the moment of Vicarios' death, Brunet had as Sartre conceived it, embodied a man who had fled into the finished product of the values of the Communist Party as an escape from the anguish of moral choice. Brunet discovers the fact of human solitude and unhappiness from which his activity in the party had shielded him.

Sartre, finds in the description of the abnormal, the exaggerated forms of normality. That is why these
studies by Sartre have been described by Iris Murdoch as accurate and powerful. In her opinion human condition shows us the malaise of the human spirit in the face of its freedom. What occurs in the consciousness can receive its explanation only from the consciousness. This may be explained, however, in terms of subject's own choice of purposefully sustained symbolism.

Sartre rejects the idea of the unconscious mind and in place of that substitutes the notion of half-conscious unreflective self-deception which he calls bad faith. The metaphysics, the ethics and the psycho-analysis of Sartre all refer to and derive relevance from the fundamental notion of freedom which symbolises the thematic structure of his *Le chemins de la Liberte*. Here, philosophy of freedom is totally fused with the image of freedom.

The explicit analysis and the introspective musings make the characters amazingly transparent to us. Their reflections deepen our sense of concreteness and complexity about human situations and yet do not strip them to the bare structure of the particular problems which they embody.
Ivich symbolises the inward, the momentary and the irrational, and Mathieu alternates between getting lost in the events and having just mere glimpses now and then of his kind of freedom. Here, therefore, there is a swing from a total blindness to a total freedom from the silence of unreason to an empty and alarming reflection.

Sartre takes his heroes to the point of insight, realization and despair, and leaves them without going into a deep apprehension of the complexity of moral values. The emotion of deep commitment is hinted by Sartre in the relationship of Brunet and Schneider. The touch of its intensity, however, remains unanalysed.

The patterns of human relationships which emerge in *Le Chemins de la Liberté* suggest that all human communion is impure and opaque and that reflection only dissolves it without purifying it. If not analysed the characters of Sartre would remain impenetrable. In fact, this fruitless cogitation is only an alternative to descending into a meaninglessness.

While *Le Naused* of Sartre describes the de trop (superfluousness) of things, *Le Chemins de la Liberté*
describes the horror of the flesh. The flesh symbolises the absolute loss of freedom. Mathieu's questions only express the absurdity of his acts. What he achieves is the density and completeness of action which excludes reflection. Liberty is terror, the final going away and the final losing of oneself.

So human victory could efface the absolute suffering of loneliness described in the death of Schneider. This on the positive side affirms that the moment of human love has an absolute value and that its loss is an absolute loss.

For Sartre, the individual is the centre for all his literary and philosophical explorations. The individual has a dream of human companionship but it evades his experience and he at best only has an intuitive insight of the paradise which in concrete terms is never realized.

Another important concept in the philosophical and literary writings of Sartre is alienation. The term 'alienation' implies a state of being other than what one is essentially. It is the concrete and synthetic relation of the agent to the other through the mediation of the thing. Sartre conceives alienation as a complex
phenomenon and says that its conditions are present at all levels of experience. Nevertheless, we must indicate in what it is grounded. For example, alienation exists as a constant danger within the serial mode of co-existence. 44

Sartre discerns an equivalence between alienated praxis and what he calls the domain of 'praxis inert'. He distinguishes between the manner in which the group has to constitute its common praxis and the way the individual praxis is constituted. The former comes into existence through the latter. Scarcity is fundamental for the understanding of alienation.

Alienation has been conceived by Sartre in its two primary forms as alteration and objectification. He deems them both as necessary and a priori. These are two forms of necessity given in the dialectical structure of human interaction, in which the result is not identical with the intention of the agent. An alteration occurs when my action passes from 'my-action-for-me' to 'my-action-for-you'. Whether the form of alienation is alteration or objectification, the resultant is always more or less, other than the intention.
Towards the later part of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre seems to suggest that these two aspects of primary alienation are not induced by external constraints. The basic experience of necessity is that of a retro-active power that nibbles at my freedom. This negation of freedom and this primary alienation is to be distinguished from alienation in the Marxist sense which begins with the notion of exploitation.

Sartre calls the above alienation of one's praxis through alteration and objectification as one's truth and reality which constitutes practice-inert matter. Human praxis in so far as it is subject to matter, can form itself into social impotence and inertia.

Sartre makes it clear that fundamental alienation does not derive from some prenatal choice. It derives from the univocal relation of interiority which unites man as a practical organism with his environment. It is the necessity of this fundamental relation which explains why man projects himself in the milieu of the in-itself to for-itself. 45

There seems to be a clear departure from the position maintained in his Being and Nothingness with regard to
his notion of freedom, when in his Critique of Dialectical Reason, he says:

"It would be quite wrong to interpret me as saying that man is free in all situations, as the stoics claimed. I mean the exact opposite: all men are slaves in so far as their life unfolds in the practico-inert field and in so far as this field is always conditioned by scarcity. In modern society, in effect, the alienation of the exploited and that of the exploiters are inseparable; in other societies, the relation between master and slave - though very different from what Hegel described - also presupposes a reciprocal conditioning in alienation." 46 (Italics mine)

It is through the experience of alienation as necessity that the practico-inert is revealed. 47

Sartre criticizes the Marxists by saying that they do not realize that unless the fundamental reality of the moment of individual praxis is preserved, the reality of alienation will have to be rejected. He says further that the experience of alienation is not an instantaneous intuition, but a process which temporalizes itself in and through experience. This experience is constantly eluding itself.

Sartre links necessity with freedom, with praxis, with practico-inert activity and social sorrality. For
he says:

Necessity as a limit within freedom, as blinding obviousness and as the moment of the inversion of praxis into practico-inert activity, becomes, ... structure of alienation... 49 (Italics mine)

Towards the end of the critique, Sartre makes a mention of the modalities of alienation. In this context he says,

Without constituted praxis, everything would disappear including alienation, since there would be no longer anything, even reification, to alienate, since man would be an inert thing by birth, and it is impossible to reify a thing. 49 (Italics mine)

There can be no alienation without praxis. He speaks of individual praxis, constituted praxis, and praxis process as the three modalities of human action which are not distinct from the practico-inert process but on the contrary are its foundation. The praxis he identifies with oppression and the process with exploitation.

Freedom, seen from the point of view of alienation, is appropriated freedom. Alienation has to be transcended, and yet perhaps, it is a hopeless striving like elusive freedom itself.

The above theme of alienation is fully explicated in Sartre's Le Diable et le bon Dieu translated in
English as *Lucifer and the Lord*. In this play the hero Goetz is the ideal representation of a man who finds himself fully alienated from his social situation. In this context he says, "I shall remain alone with this empty sky above me, since I have no other way of being among men." 50

Sartre seeks to identify philosophy with humanism. It is for that reason that he stresses aloneness. However, he seeks to dissolve subjectivity and seek humanism through a perfect solidarity. Goetz says to Hilda 'we shall be alone together'. It is through the subjectivity of others that our autonomous subjectivity, our aloneness is revealed to us.

Sartre wishes to make it obvious that Goetz has a place in collective enterprise and therefore forsakes solitude. Goetz says:

Men of today are born criminals; I must demand my share in their crimes if I desire my share of their love and of their virtue. I wanted love in all its purity: Ridiculous nonsense. To love a man is to hate the same enemy, therefore I will embrace your hatred. I wanted to be good; foolishness. On this earth and at this time, good and evil are inseparable. I accept my share of evil to inherit my share of good.51 (Italics mine)
Coez tries to recuperate his being by tormenting his flesh and at the same time by possessing the whole of mankind symbolically through this flesh. He seeks to avoid the alienation imposed by other men, by playing the scapegoat and the prophet.

Coez explicitly returns to the dialectics of being and non-being, of being and having, which in fact he has never been able to outgrow. "Until I possess everything, I shall possess nothing. Until I am everything I shall be nothing." In both cases the apparent goal is not to be through not having. Coetz had been against God and Man and now he sides with God against man:

I asked you, Lord, and you answered me.
Blessed be Thou for Thou hast revealed to me the wickedness of men. I shall punish their sins through my own flesh. I shall torment this body..." (Italics mine)

and again,

I am coming, Lord...stretch your hand to help me...cover me, devour my soul body, slip between my soul and myself and destroy me. I demand the catastrophe, the shame, and the loneliness of scorn, for man is made to destroy man in himself." (Italics mine)

Sartre seeks to make allusion to the modern situation in which no group of men can achieve material happiness and spiritual peace, or sleep, in complete isolation from
the rest of mankind. Humanity is no longer an abstract or sentimental, literary or scientific myth; humanity has become a human concern. It is clear from the above that Sartre is always keen to think in relation to his times. He points out a new advent of the human age.

Freedom and alienation are intimately bound up with the concept of ideology. In fact, any ideological perspective can be spelt out only with reference to the values of freedom and transcendence of alienation. The writings of Sartre are highly distinguished for their ideological orientation. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the notion of ideology in the context of his philosophy and other literary works.

Sartre calls existentialism as an ideology in so far as he implies a conscious affirmation of certain values and of the writer's function as an agent of freedom. There can be no great work of literature which contributes to the oppression of man by man. And literature to be authentic must become a powerful means of liberating the reader from the kinds of alienation in which humanity finds itself enmeshed. The implications of the concept of freedom lead us on to the
postulation of an ideology of commitment and authenticity — a theme which we shall explore in the next chapter.

Existentialism is conceived as an ideology of not only self awareness but also of choice and action. In fact, *What is Literature?* is a vindication of the standpoint that literature is a form of social action. He defends a literature of disclosure and demands a literature of *praxis* capable of becoming an essential condition for action and reflective consciousness. The pen was treated by Sartre as a sword by which man could manifest the image that he has acquired through critical reflection.

With the political radicalism of Sartre having been intensified, he has constantly insisted on the need to abandon narrow and schematic concepts of literary realism. Being a defender of socialist humanism, Sartre nevertheless believes that dogma and freedom are antithetical. In his opinion, a valid appeal to the individual's potential liberty depends on a more subtle, indirect and dedicated treatment of man and society. He rejects ideologies which have lost sight of ends.
and have got fully absorbed in the modalities of implementation. An ideology which is evasive, ambiguous and full of cryptic insinuations and dogmatic assertions is already obsolete. 35

In his Problem of Method also Sartre takes up the problems of ideology. He affirms and strongly supports the impressive arguments that Marxism is the only possible philosophy for our age. He also examines some specific types of concrete situations analysed by existential writers and elucidates the concept of ideology giving us a critique and confirmation of the same.

Sartre was deeply concerned with different kinds of political situations and events and in many of his interviews made his ideological views rather explicit. However, one of the important questions relevant in this context is whether he is able to reconcile his extreme individualism with the later emphasis on social collectivity.

Sartre seems to think that freedom is a phenomenon that was denied, almost halted, as a result of the influence of the First and the Second World Wars. He
believes that today in the left wing movement, liberty plays a more important role as an ideological dimension. It opens up new horizons to the world. He confesses that he is not an individualist. Though it is easier for an individualist to attain freedom, the idea of collective freedom can be conceived and realised by groups of free individuals as they would possess certain rights.

At the same time, Sartre liked to distinguish himself from the position of the left-wing thinkers because of his own views that man understands and creates values through his choices and not because of external or environmental factors. His ideological position again is different from that of Marxism in so far as the relationship between the super structure and the infra-structure is concerned. It is a coincidence of the development of ideas that Sartre finds himself in close proximity to some corresponding ideas in the left-wing ideologies.

He argues further that an ideology gets obsolete or in any case needs modifications as the socio-historical conditions change. He believes that the true and positive ideological framework can evolve only
with the times. In this context he finds that leftist ideology must assimilate a number of new concepts.

According to Sartre, all men are endowed with minds, and are part of social institutions - inherited, existing, and those yet to come. As such, they are either fighting against them or surrendering before them. Their value dimensionalities which in fact constitute their ideological stances are naturally determined by their perceptions of the relationships between men and society. Sartre's own existentialism is such an ideology which has its roots in his analysis of human consciousness as invested in his 'Being and Nothingness,' but which he transcended in his 'Critique of Dialectical Reason.' This marks a transition from individual to collective freedom.

It was necessary to situate men in relation to other men within society. Therefore, 'Being and Nothingness' provided the basis of an existential ontology which established the connection between man as a free agent and another or with other men who were equally free. But it did not establish a society, nor did it take society into account. Yet plurality of men does not
by itself constitute a society.

Sartre was forced to give up the idea of deducing an entity such as that of society from the principles he proposed in his *Being and Nothingness*. This idea of society had to be obtained from somewhere else. He preferred to take it from Marxism which examined societies and the internal class relations within the society. This is where a way had to be found to pass from the knowledge of individuals and their inter-personal relationships to arrive at the idea of a society which brings individuals and groups together. This is what Sartre did in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* where he continued to give importance to the idea of the individual but within the framework of a group.

In his interview on the theme of ‘Revolution and the Intellectual’ Sartre spoke of criteria of assessment and evaluation of an ideology. Sartre was, as we have seen, a great votary of freedom. We can attribute only one kind of ideology to his way of thinking and this is the ideology of freedom. He says in yet another interview on ‘A Theoretician in Bolivia’
"in the name of the freedom, we must...demand that
Ségis Debay be unconditionally set at liberty."57

Speaking on the ideological position of an intellec-
tual, he says that he has to be defined in terms of
the function which society assigns to him. As such,
an intellectual who is recruited from a socio-
professional group becomes that Sartre calls only 'a
theoretician of practical knowledge'.

However, Sartre seems to think that what defines
an intellectual in our society is the deep-seated
contradiction between the universality which bourgeois
society is obliged to grant his knowledge, and the
particular ideological and the political framework
within which he is forced to apply it.

In this context, Sartre gives an example of a
doctor who analyses blood as a universal reality, i.e.
in so far as blood groups exist everywhere in the
same way. This theoretical awareness constitutes a
spontaneous denunciation of racism. But, since he
represents the particular class and survives on the
basis of this affiliation, he finds himself in contra-
diction to the interests of the class ideology. This
ideology is itself particular, and is instilled in him from the very beginning, vis-a-vis universal awareness that he has attained through his education. As such, a class-rooted intellectual remains dependent upon his particular and non-universal ideology.

Sartre lays down two criteria for the affirmation of ideology. First, that all irrationality be abolished in its formulation because the only way to eradicate contradiction is to use reason to combat ideology. In so far as reason is inherently opposed to racialism, the intellectual is one who suffers from racialism, and the only way in which he can help all those who suffer from it is by formulating in and beyond himself a rational critique of racialism.

The second criterion must be radicalism. In the struggle between the particular and the irrational on one hand and the universal on the other no compromises are possible. Hence, Sartre suggests a radical elimination of the particular. And above all the idea of a radical action. An intellectual is impelled to choose which ever is most radical in order to
retain or regain universality. This enables an intellectual to become a universal individual seeking the fulfilment of ideologies consisting of universal values which have their moorings in human and social reality at the same time.
REFERENCES

2. Ibid. p.529.
4. Ibid. p.553.
5. Ibid. pp.35-36.
7. It is argued by authors like Peter Caws, however, that the translation of *motive* as cause is misleading. According to him, *motive* is an objective state of affairs, but it cannot by itself be the cause of the action; and *mobile* may be just the recognition of a *motive* as such.
10. Ibid. p.150.
12. Ibid. p.537.


22. Ibid. p. 107.

23. Ibid.


25. Ibid. p. 300.


(ii) Maurice Cranston, *Sartre*, p. 68.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid. p. 163.


33. Ibid. p. 397.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid. p. 396.


37. Ibid. p. 178.

38. Ibid. p. 177.
42. Iris Murdoch, *Sartre*, p.17.
    See also, Daniel Bell, "The Rediscovery of Alienation" *The Journal of Philosophy*, XLII, 24 (November, 1959)