CHAPTER IV
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

India's defence policy perspective requires also a general understanding of domestic environment in order to (a) assess political process (b) evaluate the internal threats potentiality (c) identify economic resources and (d) take note of military preparedness. This chapter tries to cover these aspects.

Political Environment

India under the political leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru adopted a gradualist approach to national development and National integration, which served well into the 1960s. By the time of Nehru's death in 1964, however, it was clear that integration was slowly emerging in India. Nehru was succeeded as prime Minister by Lal Bahadur Shastri.

In June of 1975, Mrs. Gandhi, who had succeeded Sastri, proven to be a shrewd and independent, declared a state of Emergency in India in response to internal agitation against her. When elections were called in 1977, she was defeated by the Janata Party. Morarji R. Desai, succeeded Mrs. Gandhi and defections from his diverse coalition, led to his resignation in July 1979. Deysi's successor, Prime Minister Charan Singh, resigned after less than one month
in office when Mrs. Gandhi's Congress(I) withdraw its support. Although Singh remained Prime Minister in a caretaker Government, India faced serious political instability for the first time since independence. As a result, the electorate chose to re-elect Indira Gandhi to power1.

However, a short while Mrs. Gandhi was able to consolidate her power. Mrs. Gandhi sought to establish India's military and economic power in south west Asia. In 1982 and 1983, however, Mrs. Gandhi suffered a series of setbacks. Serious splits developed within her congress(I) party, as local party leaders jockeyed for control of state organizations. State elections in Andra Pradesh and Karnataka in January 1983 resulted in serious reversals for the congress party, and local ethnically based organizations gained in strength2.

Intense rivalries among India's diverse religion groups have caused massive internecine bloodshed. In 1983, militant Hindus in Assam sought to prevent immigrant Muslims from voting in state elections. The resulting violence left an estimated 500 dead.

Punjab problem

In the Punjab, a two year campaign by Sikh separatists virtually shut down that state, before radicals in June 1984. The Sikhs demanded religious. An extremist element in the moderate Akali Dal party eventually occupied in Amritsar. The temple was turned into a heavily armed camp, which served as a relying point
for an intensification of the sectarian clashes that had left over 400 sikhs and Hindus dead since the first part of the year. At the same time, armed Sikh guerrillas occupied 38 other temples and religious shrines around the Punjab, starting a wave of gun battles with local security forces.

While the state was in the grip of a total news blackout, Indian Army troops stormed the Golden Temple compound with howitzers and tanks. The Sikhs were reportedly armed with machine guns, grenade launchers, and mortars. The number of insurrectionists killed many around 1000, while the Army sustained at least 90 deaths. Simultaneous attacks on the other fortified temples routed the majority of guerrillas.

Reaction in the Punjab was violent, as hundreds took to the streets in protest and rioting. In addition, hundreds of Sikh Army soldiers deserted or maintained. But outward stability and peace was restored within a few weeks.

Sikh violence finally took the life of Indira Gandhi herself, when she was associated by Sikh members of her own security guard on October 31, 1984. Her son Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister, doubts that he had the political capital to maintain control, as his mother had.

General elections in January 1985 confirmed the congress (I) party’s majority, with over 400 seats in the Lok Sabha going to that party. But political strife continued. A high level Government spy scandal in early 1985 led to the arrests of
several civil servants, the investigation of a number of prominent politicians, and a recognition of both the domestic foreign intelligence services, with the creation of a new Joint Committee on National Security (JCNS), headed by the Prime Minister.

**Regional Conflicts in South Asia**

Tensions with Sri Lanka increased over supposed Indian support of Tamil rebels. Exchanges of artillery fire on the Pakistani border also intensified.

During 1986 Rajiv Gandhi pursued an active campaign of seeking compromises to many of the divisive regional conflicts across India. While radical Sikhs continued their campaign of violence, more moderate functions welcomed a Gandhi inspired compromise which would repatriate the borders of the state and transfer some Sikh areas from Haryana to Punjab, and Hindu areas are other way, while Chandigarh, which had been the capital of both states, would become Punjab's alone. Gandhi also had negotiated an end to the conflict over Bengali immigrants in Assam, brought an end to the separatist war in Mizoram by bringing the Mezzo National Front into the territory Government and agreeing to make it a union state.

But new regional problems emerged as well, with troubles in the Darjeeling area, where Gurkhas of Nepalese origin demanded a separate state called "Gurkhaland" and regularly clashed with
local marxists leading an attempt on Gandhi’s life in 1986, apparently by the Sikhs.

Gandhi continued to reshuffle the cabinet regularly; by the end of 1986 he had reshuffled the Cabinet eight times since coming to power. In the late 1986 reshuffle he dropped his cousin, Arun Nehru, who had been made Minister of State for security and had been seen as a growing influence.

In February 1987, India and Pakistan signed as agreement to de-escalate tension on the border, following a period when both sides had been conducting moreover and tensions had been rising. Both sides agreed not to attack the nuclear stations and to pull troops out of the Ravi and Chenab corridor in Punjab.

The five Sikh head priests called for the dissolution of all the factions of the Akali Dal Sikh political party, and asked chiefs of all the factions to tender their resignations⁶.

**Recent Developments: Terrorism**

Thus the years 1987 and 1988 were not easy for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Domestically the situation in Punjab continued to be his Government’s biggest problem. Gandhi had to dismiss the elected government of Punjab and place Punjab under New Delhi’s direct rule. Terrorism in Punjab continued. An estimated 800 people were killed by the terrorists in 1987 alone. The entire state was turned into a militarized zone of sorts with
paramilitary forces maintaining vigil at virtually every street corner. In September 1988, Gandhi paid his first visit to Punjab since becoming Prime Minister is 1985. His government announced massive investment schemes for the state in an effort to discourage youngsters from turning to terrorism.

Prime Minister Gandhi also faced unprecedented allegations of corruption, especially of defense related. His Government's $1.8 billion deal for 155 mm howitzers with before came under severe criticisms with charges of kickbacks being made against Mr. Gandhi and many of his close friends. The Bofors issue dominated the Indian political scene after 1987.

Defense scandals rocked the popularity of India's young Prime Minister, who nevertheless, continued to be the single most popular leader of the land Wire election scheduled to take place no latter than December 1988. Mr. Gandhi ran into further problems when he introduced in the Indian parliament the defamation bill, aimed at protecting individual rights against malicious press slander. The entire India Press lined up against Mr. Gandhi who was forced to back down on the bill.

Rajiv Gandhi gave a major fillip to India's defense industries. India acquired its first nuclear power submarine from the Soviet Union 1988 and the first of the 40 MIG-29s were inducted into the Indian Air Force in 1988. During that year alone Mr. Gandhi boosted the Indian annual defense budget by over 10 percent to almost $11-billion.
Insurgency Attempts

After Independence, India, saw 3 insurgency attempts differing in geographical location, political inspiration and in organizational characteristics. The first Kashmiri infiltration and subversion occurred in J & K in 1947 and 1965, and is still continuing. The second, tribal insurgency, was in the states of Nagaland and Manipur, and Mizo Hills districts of Assam since 1956 and 1966 respectively. The third, was extremist activities which started at Naxalbari (West Bengal) in 1967 treat affected Bihar, Andra, Kerala, Orissa, Assam, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab in varying degrees.

The Kashmiri infiltration and subversion, was by north western border tribesmen. They were organized and were given logistical support by Pakistan. Few foreign studies like Birdwood (1956), Stephens (1963), and Brings (1968) have established beyond doubt, the veracity of this statement. In August 1965, there was convincing evidence that Pakistan prepared and launched a guerrilla attack on U & K at widely separated points along the 470 Mile cease Fire line (CFL).

Nagaland - Mizoram

People in Nagaland and northern district of Manipur were unhappy with the civilization of the plains and hence demanded independence. Their movement was led by a militant guerrilla organization called “Naga Federal Government” (NFG) in 1956.
Almost similar circumstances led to the formation of “Mizo National Army” (MNA) in Assam in 1966. By now the Maoist type of split with the ultraleftist slogans from the communist party of India (Marxist).

Since 1956 the goal of NFG and MNA has been trying to achieve independence of the Indian Union, by waging a war of “liberation”. The objective of extremist since 1967 could be summarized as “The task of freeing and liberating themselves from India, inspring the working class carrying the agrarian revolution in the countryside.” building a people’s army by organizing peasant’s guerrilla consolidating rural liberated areas in order to win victory in the revolution for want of economic and industrial developments after independence together with the exploitation of labour by other Indians in tea industries.

The Naga and Mizo insurgency, had an elaborate political as well as military organization side by side. The Naga military strength, varying from 5000 in 1956 upto 15000 at the peak period of insurgency, with ranks, uniforms and insignia of the India ARMY (to confuse the latter). Their recruits, following the classic pattern were from among the natural idealists, the converted, the deceived and the educated who soon started getting trained by Pakistan in Modern armaments and sabotage in the chittagong hill facts of then East Pakistan reached through the jungles of Burma and a latter, by China in sophisticated weaponry and Most political ideology plus a training tour at times in vietnam at fukung and Kunming in Yeoman province. Some reports spoke of Chinese guerrilla experts helping to ran a big training center 75 miles
from Assam border to train Nagas, Mizos and other tribes such as Kukis and Metas. The indigenous sources of finance were coerced money realized as "house tax" and "income tax", if not a part of crop produces in kind. As regards Mozo insurgency, their main political and military inspiration had been the underground Nagas and, in consequence, copied faithfully a similar pattern in the "Mizoram Government" and "Mizo National Army" (MNA). The latter being 2000 strong at the peak of insurgency, the main bulk of MNA seemed to have their hideouts in the then East Pakistan, less for ease of operation than for preventing surrenders from their ranks. Arms, ammunition, training and suppliers of finance had been comparable, but inferior to those of the real Nagas until the arrival of the Chinese arms and training facilities. The poverty of people exploited by foreigners against India

**Naxalites**

As regards the Meoist extremists, their "Liberation Army" did not appear to be a cohesive force, and extremist activities in the various states, except for a general Maoist allegiance, did not seem to be highly centralized. As a result of the feeling that the failure of "Naxalbari revolt" was due to lack of powerful party organization, inability to create a strong mass basis and the leaders ignorance of Military Strategy, a third communist party of India (Marxist Communist) (CPI (M-L)) grew up in May 1969 with Charu Mazumdar as the Chief theoretician leader and "Liberation" (English), "Deshbrati" (Bengali) and "Ghatana Praboha" (Bengali) as party organs clandestinely published. Estimates of the number of "Naxalites" were
put as 6000-7000 in Andra Pradesh, 5000 in west Bengal, 3000-4000 in Kerala, 1000 in Bihar, 700 in Uttar Pradesh, 200 each in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, 32 cells in Orissa, and some cells each in Punjab and J&K, Nagi Reddi, the Andhra Leader, had been something of a pragmatic dissident from the beginning as opposed to Mazumdar the nearly enerechical extremist. Thus, Reddi' Rule print contained a more practical attitude in planning an organized and sustained uprising than did CPI (MC) draft political program and was more orientated towards doctrinaire Museum than CPI (M-L) who apparently had a "Disregard of sustained work among the masses and greater reliance on formation of secretive armed guerrilla units", a leach Guevera. Further rumblings of dissent were noted, including some on the party's policy of attack on educational institutions and lack of movement by the party's intellectuals from the urban to rural areas.10.

Economic Environment

In 1947 agriculture was the mainstay of the Indian people and it contributed more than half of the national products which was one of the lowest in the world when calculated on per capita basis. The industrial sector was dominated by lower forms of production. This is evident from the fact that industrial activities other than organized mining and manufacturing, accounted for nearly 59 percent of the national product. The development of the industrial sector was not only lopsided, but technologically very backward. It was dependent on imported technology and know how
which cost the country heavily. The infrastructural facilities were inadequately developed and they were insufficient to sustain the development of the Indian company

Self Reliant Economy

After Independence, Indian leadership devised the strategy of building a self-reliant modern economy. It was in the form of public sector, central planning, heavy goods sector, and institutional reforms. The country declared the establishment of a socialist society as its goal which meant socio economic justice. Agrarian reforms were introduced, including tenancy reforms, land ceiling laws, doing away with bounded labor and share cropping. All these reforms helped in strengthening the socio economic infrastructure in villages only on paper as policy of Government for all dissenters.

Industrialization was another feature which helped in economic development since 1951. The industrial sector then accommodated range of consumer, intermediate and capital goods, and provided a measure of self-sufficiency, in other sectors. The commodity composition of India’s foreign trade of late 50s and early 60s reflects this change. Gradually India become a reliable exporter of industrial goods in general and of engineering products in particular. This progress of industrialization was accompanied by a corresponding growth in technological and managerial skills. India made considerable strides in Industrial research in coping with sophisticated technology
Measures like concessional finance, long term-lending institutions, subsidy on fixed capital investment, preferential treatments in industrial licenses need-based allocation of public sector units and creation of infrastructural facilities, did help in solving the problem of regional imbalances to some extent. With this idea of self-reliant, industrialized economy India faced the challenges to its territorial integrity, with independent foreign policy, based on non-alignment and Universal peace. India thus depended on its own domestic resources for economic development and defense requirements. It was primarily because India insulated itself from the violent fluctuations of the world economy, and this is the only reason why Indian economy has shown a positive rate of growth.

This strength has enabled India to fight for a new international economic order, restructuring of international economic relations and reforming international economic institutions in accordance with the changed circumstances. It has been advocating disarmament and world peace so that the funds released there from could be utilized for harnessing natural and human resources for bettering the lot of humanity.  

**Defense and the Economy**

Conceptual, foreign policy, military policy and economic policy of a nation state are interdependent. In fact military policy must balance foreign policy objectives, and the two must be modified in accordance with domestic economic priorities. For India, nonalignment has been the basic foreign policy instrument
which helped in adjusting external political conditions with domestic economic and military capabilities. Nehru had believed that by remaining outside the military alliances in the cold war would reduce military threat and thus enable India to concentrate on her economic development.

To begin with, it would be useful to examine some of the overall trends and patterns in Indian defense spending since independence in 1947, focusing for the greater part on the decade between the war with China in October 1962 and with Pakistan in December 1971.

Between the budget years 1950-51 and 1961-62 the annual Indian defense budget had averaged under 2 percent of the GNP. During the same period, the Indian GNP grew at an annual average rate of 4.6 percent. The decade of the 1950s therefore witnessed modest successes in India’s domestic economic programs. The grounds for establishing the actual size of the defense program before 1962 were, however, somewhat unclear. After the 1948 Kashmir war with Pakistan, there appeared to be no determined and planned effort to increase defense expenditure to any appreciable degree. Between 1949 and 1954, defense spending was maintained at about 1.8 percent of the GNP.

There were 16 ordinance factories in India at the time of independence, after independence India considered it undesirable to set up any new major weapons factories at the time. The industrial base in India was relative narrow. The only major
defense related factory set up before independence was Hindustan Aircraft Limited in Bangalore. Thereafter, Bharat Electronics was set up in the public sector in 1954 as a public limited company with technical assistance from the Compagnie de Telegraphic sans Files of France. Efforts in 1954 to set up a production plant for the manufacture of armored vehicles by Tata Iron and Steel Company in collaboration with Deimlar Benz of Stuttgart, Germany, was first shelved and then dropped. The general Indian policy at that time was to avoid commitment to establishing a major domestic weapons production base in view of the paucity of existing Indian technical know how.

The first conscious effort to review the requirements began after 1954-55, the years during which Pakistan entered the SETO and CENTO defense pacts with the United States. It was estimated that between 1955 and 1965, the United States gave Pakistan about 1.5 billion dollars worth of planes, tanks and a submarine, together with at least another half billion dollars worth of communications equipment. The modernization and re-equipment of the Pakistani military necessitated similar action of the Indian side, thus weapons modernization program began in India after 1954.

Much of the new acquisitions also began after the arrival of Krishna Menon. The main purchases between 1956 and 1958 for army were the British centurion heavy tanks and the French AMX light tanks, Nissan jeeps and Shaktiman trucks. For the Air
force, it was British Canberra bombers and Hunter fighter-ground attackers, French Ouregons and Mysteres. And some modest purchases of British anti submarine and anti-aircraft frigates were also made for the Indian Navy.\[16\]

The India defense program at this time, consisted mainly of purchases from abroad. However, in the post independence period imports rose sharply and exports declined in spite of the Rupee being devalued in 1949 by thirty percent. By 1951-52 the trade deficit had reached Rs.221 crores. Thereafter there was a sudden spurt in Indian exports because of the world-wide 'Korean boom' and better international market conditions for Indian primary products. By 1956-57 Indian exchange reserves stood at Rs. 231 crores.\[10\]

Such generally favorable foreign exchange conditions between 1945 and 1957, the general lack of experience in domestic weapons production, and the apparent absence of any serious and immediate military threat to India, prompted the Government of India to follow a policy of weapons purchases from abroad, mainly from Britain and France. Nevertheless there were some moves to initiate domestic weapons production as well from 1955 onward. Apart from beginning the Goat and HF-24 aircraft program in 1959, some effort was also made to design an indigenous semi-automatic rifle to be produced at Ishapore in West Bengal. Whatever little effort was made after 1955 for establishing a domestic weapons production base was therefore only modestly fruitful.\[17\]
The problems of the first five year defence plan were acknowledged by the Defence Ministry in its annual report for 1970-71. In order to mitigate some of these drawbacks in defence planning, the 1969-74 plan was constituted on a 'roll-on' basis. This system was expected to facilitate the planning of projects that took five years or more, and to revise, add or eliminate projects depending on the prevailing foreign exchange situation and availability of domestic resources.

India also recognized the need for streamlining the defence apparatus and making more efficient its production functions. Efforts were therefore made to introduce new techniques in defence management such as systems analysis, project management, operations research methods of cost-benefit analysis in the selection and production of weapons.

Thus the internal security situation is grim at present. It can only be hoped that gradually the stability, can be restored. But that demands a long drawn political effort. Thus India's strategic internal instability has the potential to continue for a decade or more at various levels of society.

India has to maintain a sizable armed forces and hence she was to be self-reliant in defense production. It is with this objective India began the process of defense planning in 1964. (A fillip to indigenous defense industry had in fact been given earlier by V.K. Krishna Menon during his stewardship of the ministry of defense)
Few people outside defence circles realise that the 30-add ordnance factories together with the nine public sector undertakings under the ministry of defence from the largest industrial complex in the country, accounting for an annual production of over Rs.1000 crores worth and employing a work force of 2.6 lakhs. The products range includes clothing, small arms, ammunition and explosives machine guns, artillery guns, transport vehicles, tanks, warships, supersonic aircraft and sophisticated electronic and communication equipment. Even then it is estimated that atleast 25 percent of our major weapons and equipment are still being procured from other countries. Such dependence on foreign sources is undesirable since it can jeopardising fighting capability and can restrict our freedom of action. There is however a school of thought which holds that whatever advantage of internal strength the war industry may have enjoyed earlier, it will never come into play in a short, swift war which is now accepted as the basis of future defence planning. War materials in current production, the argument runs, cannot reach the front before fighting stops due to security council dictation or other international pressures. In other words, the war will be fought with the stockpile of weapons and ammunition already held and the strength of our production line cannot possibly affect the outcome. Should a war get prolonged it will be sustained by proxy involvement of the superpowers which makes irrelevant the indigenous capability of either contestant. Moreover, so long as we are not fully self-sufficient in oil and in essential raw materials going into defence production, our war
machine remains subject to outside constraints even if we were to produce all our defence needs within the country. Ergo, have your own defence industry by all means, but don’t think it really adds to your chances of winning a war.

No nation is completely self-sufficient in defence production. Even the superpowers depend on outside sources for some raw materials or the other. But as a general rule self-reliance increases in inverse proportion to such dependence. Indeed, self-reliance is better defined as a negative concept: minimising dependence on imports. In our situation, the implications of the force’s combat readiness depending to some extent on imported materials and components which go into defence production must be faced and long-term strategies adopted to fill prominent gaps even where purely economic considerations militate against it.

The ordnance factories turn out an impressive array of military hardware in sufficient quantities to meet the greater part of the training and operational needs of the armed forces. But they work in a sheltered environment and under a veil of secrecy. This is as it should be, but the taxpayer has no means to knowing whether they are efficiency run, whether the maximum output of the requisite quality is being obtained from the given quantity of resources. However, with plant and machinery of widely disparate vintage, varies product mix and diverse technologies, there are found to be production and capacity utilisation problems which the best managerial talent would find hard to overcome. These
problems are compound by a fluctuating workload, though erratic defence ordering is a feature not peculiar to India. 20

When the country embarked on defence industrialisation in earnest, it was on the basis of license-production and transfer of technology from advanced western nations. Licenses were obtained for a variety of selected items from whichever country offered the most suitable weapon or equipment on acceptable terms. This diversification is not only in keeping with out nonaligned stance but also implies that no single country is in a position to cause production collapse. We continue to be selective in establishing new lines of production; for example, the Jaguar from the UK, Mirage from France, AN-32 from the USSR and so on. If over the years we have tended to rely more on the Soviet Union it is not due to any ideological tilt but simply because most western countries, particularly the USA, have been unwilling to transfer weapons and weapons technology, in pursuance of policies in which militarily strong and self-reliant India evidently does not fit.

Defence preparedness of India

It was only in 1962 that India changed its defence strategy from 'peaceful co-existence' to complete military readiness. Because policy of "Peace and co-existence" failed, it was realised that there is no substitute for 'Defence expenditure' as guarantee to national borders. Since then India has been spending progressively on the armed forces to equip it.
Justifying the level of defence expenditure K.C. Pant, argued that defending India is inevitably a costly business involving as it does the defence of high Himalayan frontiers, a long coastline and distant groups of islands, offshore oil installations and extensive Indian Ocean shipping lanes. Similarly Dr. Raja Ramanna also advocated that: "When our neighbors are getting arms from other sources at subsidized cost or even free of cost, we will have to defend ourselves... As long as we have the world in the present state, I don’t think India’s defence expenditure will come down". In fact significant proportion of India’s defence expenditure is utilized in procuring sophisticated weaponry from external source. This weaponry included second aircraft carrier (VIRAAT) from UK: FH 70 howizers from Sweden, the Chakra (type Charlie I) nuclear powered submarine from USSR. India also joined a exclusive club of nations capable of manufacturing and firing intermediate range ballistic missiles. The development of short and medium range missiles gave India an additional means, apart from aircraft drop, of delivering nuclear warheads. India had plans, too, to build its own aircraft carries, nuclear powered submarine, battle tank and light combat aircraft.23

The Defence build-up continued during Rajiv’s period and in fact it got accelerated. This buildup later was considered as the output of the RDVC3 although it is not written anywhere but one can construe from what Rajiv said and did in the defence arena. The operation and operation Cactus were unconnected in their purposes but they sent the message. The Indian peacekeeping
forces was sent under a July 1987 treaty to restore peace in the island and to restore some amount of autonomy for Tamil minority. The deployment in the Maldives a year later was in response to a call for assistance from President Gayoom, who was being threatened in a coup attempt.

The fact that India engaged in military operations beyond its own shoreline is the main evidence of its new "defence" posture that goes beyond the strictly defensive. The new 'Defence Position' indicated that India is prepared for a policeman role in the entire Indian ocean area. During this time foundation stone for a new naval base at Karnataka was laid which was described as the biggest and most sophisticated in South Asia. Supporting this role Rajiv Gandhi argued that "If we have to remain independent, we must look to the south and the Indian Ocean for safety and security". India stands committed to a policy of making the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. "Unfortunately", said Mr. Gandhi whilst commissioning India's first nuclear-powered submarine, INS CHAKRA, into the Navy, "the Indian Ocean has been militarized and infested with nuclear weapons flouting the overwhelming sentiment in the region in favor of establishing a Zone of Peace". On another occasion, he advocated a gathering of Asian statesmen in Delhi that "Uninvited military presences in our area have grown and assumed increasingly dangerous proportions". He went on: "The challenge before us is to put an end to all outside intervention
and interference and not allow our countries to become the cockpit of conflicts engineered from outside, at the behest of others and in the interests of others".22

The crux of the Rajiv doctrine was to exclude extra-regional powers from the region. This was implicit in the exchange of letters which accompanied the signing in July 1987 of the Indo-Srilanka accord. This also secured a promise from Srilanka that neither the US, nor any other power, would be allowed to use the strategic port of Trincomalee for military purposes. The logic of the doctrine was that India would itself look after policing and peace-keeping need in the region. The US reaction on both these operations signaled Washington's endorsement of the "policing" aspect of the doctrine.

Rajiv Gandhi pursued the policy initiated earlier by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. She had been incensed during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, that the US aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE sailed into the Bay of Bengal. She promised the nation that it would never happen again. She initiated naval expansion program towards "a blue-Water Navy".23

By the time the doctrine of excluding other nations' armed forces from the area came to be known as "the Rajiv doctrine" which implied the control of the sea approaches to India's 3,800 miles long coastline. At the time of induction of INS CHAKRA: Rajiv Gandhi said: "The defence of India requires our undisputed mastery over the approaches to India by the sea. If we are to keep the destiny of India in our hands,
we must have full control of the waters around us and the thousands of kilometers of shoreline which stretch along the Arabian sea and the Bay of Bengal and abut upon the Indian Ocean.

The lease from the Soviet Union of the INS CHAKRA—which was nuclear-powered but not nuclear armed is another demonstration of the blue-water capability. It was believed that the Soviet Union wanted India to operate the submarine to confuse American Surveillance systems, with the induction of INS CHAKRA, India became the six nation to operate nuclear-powered submarines. Now for some years, India has been developing its own nuclear-powered submarines.24

The purchase from Britain's HMS HERMES® was also part of the blue-water naval policy. The plan was that one carrier should patrol each of India's coastlines. By the time INS VIKRANT reaches the end of its active service, towards the end of the century, India hopes to have designed and built its own aircraft carriers.

When two thirds of India's naval fleet were anchored in Bombay harbor in early 1989 for the President's review, one newspaper reporter wrote of "the happy affirmation that the maritime neglect of our pre-independence days is over". According to the same unnamed reporter, even President Venkataraman a former Defence Minister spoke of "the maritime renaissance" the country was going through after "half a millennium of neglect". Indian defence analyst Ravi Rikhye is probably near the truth when he writes: "Navies are symbols of power. We want to be a world-
class power. So we must have a Worlds-Class navy" Rikhye argues that a coastal navy is what India needs to ensure that its territorial sovereignty is respected so the decision to opt for a blue-water navy suggests a more ambitious objective. The main battle tank ARJUN will not be totally home-made. Some key components will have to imported, though most other parts will be developed by India own considerable defence and research organization.25

The plan is to have around 1,500 ARJUN tanks in service by the end of the century.

Notes and References

2. Ibid., p.484
3. Ibid., p.484
4. Ibid., p.485
5. Ibid., p.485-86
6. Ibid., p. 486-87
8. Ibid., p. 59-62.
9. Ibid.,
10. Ibid.,
12. Ibid., p.26-27
13. Ibid., p.27-28
15 Ibid., pp. 101-105
16 Ibid., pp. 105-109
17. Ibid., pp. 109-114
18. Ibid.,
20. Ibid.,
21. Ibid.,
22. Ibid.,
24. Ibid.,