CHAPTER II

DEFENCE OF THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE

The Concept of Defence

All states arm to defend themselves against other states, and all Governments, therefore, prepare for war against other Governments. The more developed the state, is the more effectual is its preparations in terms of weapon systems purchases, spy-system and secret agreements and alliances. But these days each state and each Government is armed only for its “defence”, as armed aggression is not acceptable by most of the governments as an instrument of policy. Further, War as a means of increasing power has lost its validity. “Defence” is only regarded as justifiable and, is a force for repelling “aggression”¹ of any kind, against whom any state might need to defend itself. Therefore logically no danger can be anticipated from any foreign arms-unless, of course, what foreign states profess is not to be trusted. But if foreign states are not to be trusted, then any state is justified in distrusting the statement that arms are only for purpose of defence. Again, defence by weapons is necessarily regarded as aggression
by one against whom weapons are used. What one nation may consider defence of its legitimate interests may be unjustifiable aggression to another. Therefore, each nation is a judge for itself of what constitutes defence in its own case. In general, fear and suspicion breed preparations for war which increases fear in other nations and then lead to the very war against which they are supposed to protect themselves.

As a further action some countries have evolved the theory of "mutual defence". It seems reasonable enough to argue that the maintenance of peace is of common interest, and therefore should be achieved by common action. A conclusion can be drawn that the arms of each should be used for the "mutual defence" of both. It can be further said that armed forces are maintaining a common peace. Therefore, it is argued, they should act together².

In recent decades 'Defence' has often been considered synonymous to 'National Security' i.e., the methods adopted for the protection, and maintenance of certain 'values' which are valued by the citizens of a particular society. Both concepts have connotations of national self-determinism and the inalienable right of that society to determine its own destiny, free from any outside interference. 'Defence' more specifically is the provision of the means to protect the society, its members and its interests from internal and external threats. The specific interests to be defended are those which are known as the 'national interests.'
Defence in its general meaning would involve the protection of state's territorial integrity, and the well-being of its citizens against hostile forces. The concept is also viewed as the opposite of 'offence' i.e. slightly more passive and a protective posture without any threat, though it could be dynamic and active. In other words, the primary purpose of defence is "to prevent" or "to mitigate", rather than "to cause harm" or "to cause damage" i.e. reacting to aggression or to defeat the blatant initiative of the other. In technical terms 'defence' is a tactical component of ground warfare; i.e. Military defence implies resistance to an armed forces.

In Military parlance defensive operations require security forces to occupy forward positions; (a) to protect friendly units from surprise attacks; (b) to repel enemy reconnaissance; and (c) to give early warning of a pending attack. This defensive operations may take a wide variety of forms, defence in depth, fortified defence, hasty and mobile defence and passive and prepared defence.

Defence in depth is the organisation of positions to provide mutual supporting fire within an assigned defensive sector. The intention is to gradually weaken the impact of an attack, to prevent penetration into the defence positions, and to facilitate the displacement of friendly reserve forces. Fortified defence is an extensive co-ordinated defence system with field fortifications and obstacles that allows the commander to position his weapons in
such a manner as to maximize available firepower. Hasty defence is a type of defence established during contact with the enemy or when contact with the enemy is impending and there is little time for thorough preparations. Mobile defence utilises a minimum of forces and uses fire and manoeuvre to establish whether an attack is pending and if so to canalise the enemy. Passive defence is limited to camouflage and the protection of the individual soldier and his equipment. Prepared defence is a system with prepared but not fortified positions. 

It is also important to distinguish at what level defence is used. For example, at Politico-Military level, defensive operations can include offensive actions to forestall a suspected enemy attack. At this level defence presupposes a high degree of threat. At the operational level, the offensive use of Military units may require conquering of vital terrain or enemy positions to ensure effective defence.

Operational planning focuses on establishing a campaign's major operations and long term goals. For example, control of a geographical area, reestablishment of Political boundaries, or the defeat of an enemy force in the theater of operations. At the tactical level (the conduct of battles within the context of campaigns/major operations, normally at the level of corps and below) counter attacks may become an imperative part of defence if strategic terrain has been lost.
Further ‘defence’ is a value in itself and a practical means which provides protection to national interests. It has symbolic relevance, not a posterior for what is amounts to in terms of numbers and types of men and weapons, or for that matter, complex calculations of ‘capabilities’, but a priori, for the normative value it satisfies. Defence is generally perceived as being a desirable, and therefore a ‘good’ thing, in that in a positive sense it is both customary and prudent to have it and negatively, it is bad, even negligent, to be without it. Governments and states make provisions for defence because it provides the society with an important element of security.

To achieve security, defence necessarily imposes certain costs in resources that each society has to bear. These costs tend to be high both in an absolute sense and in the sense of opportunity cost because other needs and aspirations of the society have to be sacrificed. The challenge Governments are farming, therefore, is not that security through an appropriate level of defence is a desirable condition but whether the costs are justified, with reference to ‘threat perception’ and welfare demand.

The term ‘defence Policy’ is widely used by both, the laypublic and professionals, but the concept has not been understood with any precision. Broadly, the term implies numerous politico-military activities at various levels. To some, it means ‘military policy’ or ‘military capabilities’. To other
it is related to 'strategic policy' and to still others it is the whole spectrum national terminological ambiguity. Although Defence Policy, military policy and security policy are different concepts and convey different meanings but related with each other in one form or the other in a broader concept known as 'Strategic doctrine'.

**Military Policy**

A military policy is a rule that governs the successful achievement of military objectives. It is a guide with respect to effective relationship between physical factors, military personnel and their functions under the direction of a leader in the process of achievement of military into the accomplishment of the objectives under the direction objectives. Thus military policy is guide to the organizational thinking in military terms to accomplish military mission.

**Policy**

In a most simple understanding 'policy' is defined as "a series of ongoing understandings built up by political administrators over a period of time, understandings left to run where practicable, repaired where necessary, and overturned where practicable, repaired where necessary, and overturned where they are desperate". Another definition of policy is that it is a "written or unwritten decision setting forth the proper course of action to
be followed in a given situation". (Peterson & Plowan).” In other words policy refers to a context, with in a given timeframe, and carries relevance to the circumstances (political, social, military or economic) and since circumstances keep changing, policy becomes a time related concept i.e. a policy adopted and accepted at one point of time may cease to have relevance at another.

The basis of a sound policy is a sound principle and selection of the principle, in turn, depends upon the organizational objectives. The policy making therefore is an argumentative activity in which many forms of discourses are involved. Which take the account different variable of time frame, context, organizational and non-organizational inputs and influences.

Defence Policy

The term defence policy and defence policy making suffer from a problem of “over familiarity”. Everyone knows what it means; consequently they are rarely defined. Part of the reason for this is the scale and the extent of the activities that they encompass. In fact it is an amalgamation of Foreign Policy, Fiscal Policy and Industrial Policies and ranges from routine decisions about acquisition of spare parts and ammunition stocks to major decisions about the development and deployment of costly weapons systems, and is perhaps best regarded as encompassing the provision, organisation, deployment and use of military capabilities.
Defence policy is essentially instrumental and is directed towards the negation of external threats and the fulfillment of national objectives by military means. It involves broad political questions such as 'how much is enough to deter adversaries from mounting threats to one's national security?' and narrower technical issues such as determining the most effective and efficient measures to carry out key roles and missions. Of all areas of Public policy, defence is perhaps the most important.  

Defence policy can be defined as the aggregate of the plans, programs, and actions taken by a nation to achieve security against external military threats and against domestic unrest. It endows a nation's defence effort with purpose and reconciles defence objectives and commitments with available and projected defence resources. In relating means and ends in the changing political and military environment, it considers defence not as an unchangeable element. And that is why, by the process of defence policy, the inherent means of a nation are continually reshaped so that the objectives can better be achieved.  

Defence Policy is concerned with the manner in which the protection of those objectives which are deemed to be of national interest should be accomplished. It is not merely directed at the protection of existing interests, but more especially of those relative to estimated or projected threats in the near, medium or long term future. As a continuing process operating in a dynamic and ever
changing environments, defence decision-making and the formulation of defence policy presents a formidable challenge to those responsible, whether they be political leaders, administrators, managers or as military commanders/executor. Since decisions about defence are essentially to provide a society with a hedge against future uncertainties, i.e. to ensure that a residual capability continues to exist with which to meet unexpected circumstances. Defence itself has often been seen as being analogous with a form of insurance.  

The objective of defence policy is to ensure that the nation state is in a position at any moment in time to have at its disposal the means to prevent or defeat any threat to its national interests. Although alternatives of a non-physical nature have been explored, nearly always in theoretical terms, these means are normally equated with military capability, expressed in terms of weapons, men and technologies. They may also include less quantifiable factors such as public morale, popular support and the nation’s war waging potential. Military equipment and armed forces together are not sufficient. They have to be integrated and organized into a structure so that, when and where necessary, against the perceived or real, source of the threat. In other words, defence policy is manifested in military capability, which could be used at any given time.

The choices that are made by the defence policy making
community are not simply responses to threat perceptions but they also reflect all kinds of domestic political and economic considerations. Furthermore, different elements in defence policy making operate in different ways. Many decisions are made at the lower levels of the bureaucracy as a matter of routine, others have to be made at the highest political level; some are subject to private and public pressures, others are made relatively free from external political considerations. Another complication is the dynamic nature of both the external and technological environments to which policy makers have to respond. Changes in the international system and developments in technology require changes in national defence policy, although, the necessary adjustments are sometimes made slow because of the established procedures and practices, and the persistence of old mind-sets.

Broadly, "Defence Policy" consists of five major operational components - Threat perception and assessment, Force posture, Arms procurement, Training and Force Projection.

The process of "Threat Perception" and assessment involves (a) locating sources of internal and external threats, (b) determining the nature of threat, i.e. whether it is imminent or long term, (c) the extent of the threat i.e. whether it is conventional or non-conventional or both (d) estimated duration of conflict in case threat materializes and (e) resulting doctrines, both offensive and defensive.
Further defence policy can roughly be divided into strategy and structure, correspondingly manifesting itself through (i) the development and implementation of strategy (in particular military strategy), and (2) the instrumentalities by which military forces are organized and controlled. Like other national policies, it is the product of the interplay of many factors, including (a) defence culture as derived from historical experience (b) political ideology; (c) character and the capabilities of the soldiers; (d) the ingenuity of the scientists and engineers; (e) social organization; (f) current public opinion; (g) demographic factors; (h) economic strength; (i) the geopolitical environment with the military balance; and (j) domestic political dynamics with reference to potential or actual adversaries.

However, there are four broad processes a Defence Policy has to undergo. They are:

1. International Environment which incorporates factors like (a) relative position in the international system (b) threats (c) self-perceived role and opportunities for the State within the International system (world view), (d) Linkages and Interdependencies.

3. The Defence Decision-Making Process which incorporates factors like (a) the nature of the process, (b) degree of concentration or fragmentation of power domestically, (c) relative importance of bureaucratic politics in the process, (d) relative importance of personality in the process, (e) constraints on Defence Decision makers.

4. Recurring issues: Defence policy outputs which incorporates factors like (a) civil-military relations, (b) Weapons acquisition, (c) force posture, (d) arms control, (e) the use of force and (f) other issues, etc.\textsuperscript{13}

On the basis of the foregoing the present study proposes that a comprehensive examination of India's Defence Policy as follows:

\textbf{Threat Perception} which is defined as the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in any inter-state or interaction in state environment. When threat is not perceived in the face of objective evidence then surprise results and mobilization of resources for defence does not take place. Conversely, threat may be perceived and counter-measures taken, even when the opponent possesses no malicious intent.

The concept of threat is used in the passive sense of an anticipation of impending danger rather than in its active sense of an undertaking by one actor to impose a sanction on another. The threat perception, therefore, consists of four indicators: (a) the
articulations of decision-makers - their expressions of judgment and of personal reaction to the threatening use, (b) descriptions by contemporary spectators (foreign diplomats, colleagues, etc.) of the state of mind of decision makers, (c) evidence of exploration by decision-makers of alternative responses to the threat (such as intensive internal support) and (d) finally, 'coping processes' put into effect by decision makers in response to the threat (such as the strengthening or mobilization of resources, diplomatic counter-moves, etc). Any single one of these indicators might be present without the existence of the other to form a perception of threat.

Usually it is assumed that threat perception, like perception as such, refers to a more or less immediate act of recognition. According to this view threat is perceived in the sense that a book is perceived. That is one learns the concepts of 'threat' in the same way that the concept of a 'book' is learnt; threat perception involves the recognition that a certain pattern of sense-data is subsumed under the concept of threat.

It is only rarely that cues are immediately recognizable as threats. Troop concentrations on one's border will usually be perceived as threatening. But what about troop concentrations on somebody else's border? Here it is found to be more helpful to distinguish between two stages of perception: An initial stages of observation at which cues are received; and a secondary stage of appraisal at which they are evaluated and defined as threatening.
Thus defence policy of any nation state is a response to threat perception at a particular point of time. Therefore, threat perception is a sum total of perception of policy makers, political leaders, military leaders and intelligensia. It is only at the highest point that it depends on the nature of government where threat perceptions are synthesized, analyzed and concretized. But in a nutshell, the process of threat perception involves (a) locating sources of internal and external threats.

Determining External threat

Threat poses fundamental dilemmas, to defence policy makers defence runs the risk of ignoring enemies and too belligerent a defence runs the risk of creating enemies. How can one, therefore discover enemies? The criteria in this regard are:

i. One should fear large militarily powerful countries;
ii. One should be careful about countries closer at hand than those that are distance;
iii. One should fear countries which have in the past intervened in one's affairs;
iv. One should fear countries which adopt belligerent rhetoric against countries which fail to conform to one's ideology;
v. One should fear countries which have a motive for intervention;
vi. One should fear countries which are unstable and those which are stable:
vii. One should fear countries which already have a foothold;  
viii. One should fear countries which are hostile; and  
ix. One should fear countries whose defence polices are directed towards it.  

The concept of force structure is the central idea around which most of the armies, navies and air forces in the world are designed, formed, and supported. A force structure is the set of military units in an armed force or in all of the armed forces of a nation and describes, in part, the potential military capability of the armed force or nation. Military units are battalions, Companies and batteries, ships squadrons, and any other organizational entity that is called a unit. Aggregations or sets of units are organizations (associated by a Common Commander) and forces (associated by a common mission). A force structure may be considered as a set of forces, although the exact size and composition of a force depends on the mission and situation. A force structure may be regarded as a set of units of various types from which organizations and forces may be created to accomplish military missions.

Force structure consists of three elements: "Posture", "Location" and "readiness". Force posture is an expression of the peacetime ability of a military force to accomplish wartime missions. Location is relative to the place where the wartime mission will occur—in the potential combat zone. Readiness in
its Physical sense is the extent to which the force structure units have their wartime authorization of people and equipment on hand in peace time. Force posture can be expensive than that of location and readiness because it conforms to wartime demands.\(^1^5\).

In order to reduce the fiscal and manpower burdens of supporting military forces, units within a force structure are commonly placed in peacetime into different components-active, reserve, and standby (cadre) each with a different mix to full-time, part-time, and augmentation personnel. The total force structure potentially available for combat operations includes all of the units from these three components plus additional units that may be formed upon mobilization.

The size of a force structure is described by its structure strength—the aggregate of the total wartime authorized personnel strength of each units. Describing the size of a force structure in terms of military personnel authorized or assigned in peacetime is inaccurate. It is advantageous to use structure strength to compare the sizes of different or alternative force structures because it is independent of peace-time economics, and establishes the demands that the personnel and supply systems must plan to meet during wartime. It is useful for some purposes to describe the content of a force structure in terms of the major organizations or items of equipment it contains.
A navy can be described by the numbers and types of battle groups or combatant ship it includes; an air force, by the numbers and types of aircraft wings or squadrons, and an army by the numbers and types of combat divisions or battalions. Strategic nuclear forces usually are described by the numbers and types of nuclear delivery vehicles they contain. Merely listing major organizations or equipment items, however, fails to capture the contribution and cost of the many diverse support units required to sustain the combat operations of the ships, squadrons, and combat battalions, nor does it convey an idea of the total size of a force structure.¹⁶

The concept of force structure facilitates explicit recognition of demands for the military and civilian personnel to man the units, for the material to equip the units, and for the consumable supplies needed to train in and operate the units. It allows military planners to make estimates of combat capability and not assessments of relative combat power, and it makes possible the rational design of military forces to provide maximum combat power for a given set of resources.
Notes and Reference


2. Ibid., pp. 40-41.


4. Ibid., p.714.

5. Ibid., p.715.


17. Dupuy N. Trevor, op.cit p.715.

18. Ibid., pp.715-16.