CHAPTER IV

Nyāya-vaibhāṣṭika And Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā
Thought On Mind

The concept of Mind in the twin systems of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is quite different from that of the Upanisadic concept and the Śāṁkhyayoga concept. The Upanisadic term Brahman is totally absent in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Similarly, the Śāṁkhyayoga type of Antahkāraṇa is also not accepted.

The Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas categorise the Universe into seven categories. Among these, Dravya i.e., substance is the first category. This is subdivided into nine sub-categories. Ātman is one of these nine substances. This Ātman is further divided into Jīva-Ātman and Paramātman. It is this Jīva-Ātman that is the Individual Mind in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. However the other subdivision of Ātman
viz. *Paramātman* cannot be considered as Universal Mind in the same scope with which *Brahman* is considered as the Universal Mind in the Upaniṣadic thought. In a way, *Paramātman* is also an Individual Mind with certain special powers. This *Paramātman* is also called *īśwara* in this system.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* arrive at the concept of *Ātman* by reasoning. ¹ The objects around us are cognised by the senses and *Manas*. These are instruments. The instruments need an agent to function. Such an agent is *Ātman*. ² Further, the knowledge obtained through the senses and *Manas* is a quality. According to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system every quality should inhere in some substance. Among the nine substances envisaged, no other substance is capable of inhering knowledge. Therefore, *Ātman* is envisaged as a substance in which knowledge, desire, pleasure, Pain etc., qualities of a sentient being is inherent.

These qualities, knowledge, desire etc are the products. All products need an inherent cause or *Samavāyi Kāraṇa*. It is

¹ आत्मेन्न्यायात्मातिविद्यात करण हि सकवत् कम्।

   का. ४७

² इन्द्रियध्यात्मातिविद्याकी इन्द्रियान्त सरीरस्य च परपरश्च चैतन्यसम्पादकः।

   स० पु २०८
Atman that is the Samaväyi kāraṇa of knowledge etc. qualities. Thus, the category of Atman is established in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system by these three main reasons. This Atman is Vibhu i.e., all pervasive. It is eternal, it is Cetana i.e., sentiment. The expression Cetana is not used in the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika System in the same sense in which it is used in Upaniṣadic thought or Vedānta. In Vedānta, the expression Cetana conveys the meaning that it is of the nature of consciousness. consciousness is an essential constituent of the Cetana according to Vedānta. However, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, knowledge is only a quality of Atman i.e. Self, but not a constituent of its very nature. 3 This Atman i.e. Self acquires the knowledge of the external objects and also the mental states such as Sukha, Duḥkha etc through Manas.

Manas is an instrument of Atman

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas introduced Manas as an intermediary between Atman and senses, for the purpose of acquiring the knowledge of external objects. This Manas is also a substance. It

3 मनोगतें सुखादनु:ख इच्छा देवशो मति : करति :
is not all pervasive as Ātman is, but it is atomic. The reason for introducing Manas as an intermediary is this: Our senses give us knowledge of external objects one at a time. For example, when we see an object, we do not hear anything. When we hear something, we do not see anything, and so on. There is no simultaneity of cognitions provided by our senses. No doubt, in practical life, we do not realise the sequence of different cognitions or the gap between the two cognitions. This is because of the quick succession of these cognitions. But the fact is, there is no simultaneity of cognitions of objects acquired through different senses. Now this fact needs to be properly explained by working out the mechanism of the cognitions.

The Ātman or Self is all-pervasive, therefore, it is simultaneously in contact with all the senses, and the senses are in contact with their respective objects simultaneously. This warrants the simultaneous cognition of more than one object. But as explained above, the fact is, we do not have simultaneous cognition through more than one sense. Therefore, some factor that regulates the
functioning of these senses has to be envisaged. That factor is \textit{Manas}. It is \textit{Manas} that directs this or that sense to obtain the cognition of the object concerned. \textit{Manas} being atomic, is not in contact with more than one sense at a time. Therefore, we can have cognitions only through one sense at a time. The mechanism of obtaining cognitions of the external objects is explained as follows. The \textit{Atman} gets in touch with \textit{Manas}, the \textit{Manas} gets in touch with one or the other sense, and the sense gets in touch with the object concerned. This results in the cognition of the object concerned. It is for this purpose of coordinating of \textit{Atman}, senses and the objects, the category called \textit{Manas} is accepted in \textit{Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika} system.

Further,\footnote{ननु अस्तु विज्ञानमेयत्था ज्ञानसुखादिकं नस्यैव आक्षरिः} the mental states like joy sorrow also need an instrument to cognise. This cannot be managed by the other senses which can deal with only the external objects. It is \textit{Manas} that is assigned this task of being the instrument for the cognition of mental states such as joy sorrow etc.

Recognition is another ground for the acceptance of \textit{Manas}. 
To recognise a thing that has been experienced earlier, invoking of the impressions of its past experience, is necessary. To be invoked later, these impressions have to be stored somewhere. *Manas* is envisaged as a storing place of these impressions. Similarly memory, dreams etc are also caused by the impressions. Thus, a storing place of these impressions is a necessity. Inferential knowledge and Verbal knowledge also need recalling of past cognitions of *Vyapti* relation etc., Thus, without *Manas*, it seems to be difficult to manage all sorts of cognitions other than perception also.

*Ātman*, is different from the body. Senses and *Manas*

5 The *Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas* reject the suggestion that the body itself can be treated as the Self. Their main ground for rejecting this suggestion is, that the body goes on changing. It is not constant. One grows from childhood to the youth and from youth to old age. According to *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* ..., whenever there is such a change the two stages constitute two altogether different entities.

51) शरीरस्य न चैतन्य युतेषु व्यविचारः

11) शरीरस्य चैतन्य बाल्ये विलोकितस्यम् स्थाविरे स्मरणानुपयते
शरीराणविवयोपवायपचये: उत्पादविनाशशालित्वादि।

का 48 सि यु P210
While changing from childhood to youth, certain particles of the body are cast away and certain other particles are added, whenever such dropping and adding of the parts takes place, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system holds that the entities concerned are different entities. They insist on Avayava and Avayavi difference (part-whole difference) and wherever the Avayavas change, a new Avayavi comes into existence. This background of their doctrine of Avayava - Avayavi difference and the consequent difference of Avayavins whenever there is a change, so the body of the youth is altogether different from that of the child. In view of this, if the body is considered as Self, the coherence and continuity of the experiences becomes impossible. The Ātman or Self is required to be constant while the body is not so. Therefore, they reject the suggestion that the body itself can be treated as Mind.

Another ground on which they reject the suggestion of the body being considered as the Mind is, knowledge is an attribute of the Self. Body has no knowledge as its attribute. It cannot be argued that, let the knowledge be the attribute of the body itself because,
According to *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* system, the qualities of the effect arise from the qualities of the cause. Now the body is made out of the five elements, *Prthvi*, etc. These elements are the *Samavāyī kāraṇas* or the causes of the body. It is clear that knowledge is not a quality of *Prthvi*, *Ap*, etc., elements. Therefore, it cannot be the quality of the body also. Hence, body cannot be the Self.

Both these arguments of the *Nyāya Vaiśesika* systems are based on their own special doctrines, viz 1. *Avayava* and *Avayavi* are different entities, and even a slight dropping or addition of *Avayavas* lead to altogether a different *Avayavi*, is a theory accepted only by the *Nyāya Vaiśesika* system. Only such gunas that are present in the *Samavāyī kāraṇa* i.e. cause will arise in the effect is *Kārya* is also the special view of *Nyāya Vaiśesika* system. These arguments do not have any psychological or epistemological significance, which is more relevant to the study of the concept of Mind.

*The Nyāya Vaiśesika* system also reject the suggestion that

---

71) *tathātāṃ cēdindrāṇayāpanāpātaṃ kathā śṛṇvanti: ।

11) *tathātāṃ caitanyam।*
one or all the senses together can be considered as Ātman or Self. In that case, they argue that even the mutilation of one sense should lead to the mutilation of the Self and consequent dislocation or the ceasing of the mental functions. But, by experience, we know the mutilation of one or more senses does not totally affect the functioning of the Ātman or Self. Further, knowledge cannot be the attribute of senses also since, senses are also created out of the elements according to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system. It is already stated above that knowledge is not the attribute of the elements.

Manas, which is accepted as an intermediary between the Ātman and the senses, cannot be treated as Ātman, because, in that case some thing that has to regulate the senses to avoid simultaneous Cognitions will not be available. The Manas itself cannot play both the roles of Ātman and Manas since one and the same cannot be both the agent and the instrument according to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system.

मक्षोऽधमि न तथा ज्ञानानुभव्यं तदा भवेन्।

का 49
The *Nyāya* vādeṣṭika's also reject the suggestion that *Vijnana* can be considered as *Atman*. They reject both Buddhistic type of *Vijnānātmavāda* and the *Vedāntins* type of *Vijnānātmavāda*. If *Vijnāna* is to be considered as *Atman*, the question has to be clarified is, whether it is *Savishaya* or *Nirvishaya*. *Nyāya* Vādeṣṭika system flatly reject the possibility of *Nirvishaya jīnāna*. There can be no knowledge without any objective content. If this so called *Vijnānātma* is to be *Savishaya*, then the question is, whether it cognises all objects or only some objects? If it cognises all objects, then there will be no variety of knowledge. If it cognises only some objects, then there is no criteria to fix any particular object as its objective content. Therefore, neither *Nirvishaya jnana* can be considered as *Atman* or *Savishaya jīnāna* can be considered as *Atman*. The *vijnānātma* of Buddhists is refuted with detailed arguments in *Nyāya* classics. We will mention some of these arguments while treating the concept.
of Mind in Buddhistic thought.

Though the Nāya Vaiśeṣika's establish a separate Atman by the above arguments, they also see that the Ātman is Pratyakṣa siddha. According to them, the experience 'I' ('I know', 'I am happy', etc.) give us the direct knowledge of Ātman, in these experiences, the Ātman is perceived. This perception of Ātman, of course, is the Ātman of one self. As regards the Ātmana of others, one has to infer by their Pravṛtī and Niḥvṛtī.

Qualities of Ātman

The Jñāna, Sukha, Duḥkha, Icchā, Dveṣa, Prayatna, Dharma, Adharma, and Samskāra i.e. knowledge, happiness, sorrow, will, hatred, mental effort, virtue, sin and mental impressions, are the important qualities of Ātman. The fire quality Śāmkhya, Parimala etc. are also considered as the qualities of Ātman in common with certain non-sentient objects. Thus, the Ātman or Self has fourteen qualities.

10 धर्माधयायः ध्यायो विशेषत्त्वो योगकर्मवर्गोत्पत्तिः।

cā 49

11 योगविशेषत्त्वस्य जनसुखादेव संस्केतनेन तत्र न संस्केतनेन जाने अर्थं करोभि इत्ययात्रितंः।
cā 50 सियु 232

12) विशेषत्त्वकर्मवर्गं अथं आत्मं परदेशादेव प्रयत्नवत्त्वं अनुमौदितं।
cā 50 सियु 232

11) चेष्ट्याप्रयत्नवापत्त्वो अनुमौदितं।
In the case of paramātman however, he has only eight qualities. He has no Sukha, Duhkha, Dvesha, Dharma, Adharma and Samskāra. He has no Dharma and Adharma because the scriptural vidhi and nisedha do not apply to him. Consequently he has no Sukha and duhkha also. The question of Dvesha does not arise in his case because he is impartial to all. The samskara is also not necessary to him because he has eternal knowledge of all the things to be known. The Paramātman has no body or senses. The Nyāya Vaisēśika system envisages a kind of perception without the mediation of senses on the part of Īśawara. Yogins also have this privilege.

As stated earlier, the Paramātman of the Nyāya Vaisēśika system does not constitute the Universal Mind with certain powers. The Nyāya Vaisēśikas accept Paramātman, because for every created entity, they need a creator. They are Ārambha vādins not Parināma vadins. All the created objects are created things. Among these for
only a few things men are the creators. For a few others, the various creatures are the creators. But, large number of created things need a creator, who is other man and other creatures. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* envisage *Paramātman* or *Īśwara* to be a creator of all these created things. They propose a syllogism to establish such a creator as follows:

**Establishment of Paramātma**

'क्षित्यांकुर्णिकम् वकार्तकम् कार्यात्म', The sprouts, the plants, the trees etc created things have a creator, because these are created things. Whatever is a created thing, that has a creator. Now, instead of envisaging a creator for each one of these, it is better to envisage one creator for all created things in whose case no observable creator is available. Now, a creator is expected to have the necessary knowledge about the things out of which he creates things. He is also expected to have the will to create, and the necessary effort to undertake creation. Thus, *Jñāna, Icha*
and *Kṛtī* are the necessary requirements for the creatorship. Hence, this *Paramātman* or *Tāwara* is envisaged as *Sarvajñā* and *sarvasāktīman*. So, the chief role of *Paramātman* in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system system is that of a creator but not that of a liberator. He is also not responsible either for sustenance or for destruction. He is not *Antaryāmin* nor he guides the *Jīvas* in the good or bad conduct. Therefore, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika concept of *Paramātman* is neither that of a religious god nor that of a metaphysical central principle. He is accepted only as creator to support the *Āraṃhavada* doctrine of the Nyāya.Vaiśeṣika system. Nyaya.Vaiśeṣikas classifies knowledge as Anubhava- first experience and *Smṛti* memory.

Anubhava is again classified as *Prama* and *Bhrama*, valid knowledge and error. *Prama* and *Bhrama* are classified further into *viparyaya*-error proper, *Saṅdeha*-doubt and *Tarka* reductive argumentation. The *Prama* or valid knowledge is of four types viz-perceptual, inferential analogical and verbal. They have a detailed scheme of the process of acquiring perceptual knowledge.
Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika Theory of Perception

In perception two stages are envisaged viz. *Nirvikalpaka* and *Savikalpaka*. At the *Nirvikalpaka* stage, the substance and its attributes are cognised in an isolated way. While at the *Savikalpaka* stage, the substances are cognised as qualified by the attributes. According to *Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas* the knowledge helps to cognise the objects but it is not self revealing. To cognise the knowledge, another knowledge is necessary. These two stages of cognition are designated as *Vyāvasāya* and *Anuvyāvasāya*. According to *Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas*, in perception, not only the substances and the qualities are cognised but also the Universal Present in the object concerned is cognised. According to some, even the *Samavāya* relation between the substance and qualities, parts and whole of the substance is cognised. The *Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas* go to the extent of saying that even the absence of an object is perceived. All these details are more based on their metaphysical doctrines than on any psychological considerations or the physiological contacts of the senses concerned.

\[15 \text{ ज्ञानं चन्द्रिन्दिकल्पाकां तदविष्कारिण्यम्यते । का 58} \]
In addition to the perception through the senses, *Nyāya Vaśesārikas* have also thought of certain extra-sensory perceptions. These are of three kinds. 1. *Sāmānya lakṣaṇa*. 2. *Jñāna lakṣaṇa*. 3. Yogi pratyakṣa. When one cognises a few instances of Dhūma or smoke, he comes to acquire the knowledge of the whole class of Dhūma or smoke. This extension of cognition from the cognition of few particulars to the cognition of the whole class is termed as 'sāmānya lakṣaṇa pratyakṣa.' This kind of cognition cannot be classed in any other manner. It is not inference, it is not memory. It is a case of the extension of the scope of perception from particulars to the whole class.

The instance of *Jñāna lakṣaṇa* is Surabhi candana. When one observes a piece of sandal wood from a distance, and observes that there is a fragrant piece of sandal wood, what he is actually seeing is only a piece of sandal wood. But, he adds the information as a part of his cognition that, this piece of sandal

16 अलौकिकस्य व्यापारः त्रिविधः विवकृतिः ।

कः 63

||यत्रेनिन्द्रसंप्रयुक्तो धूयादिः तद्विशेष्यवं धूय प्रति ज्ञानं यत्र ज्ञातं तत्र ज्ञाते धूमस्तवः प्रकाशस्तयः धूयतवेन सत्रिकर्षेण धूय इत्येवं रूपं सर्वधूमविवेयं ज्ञानं जापते ।

सं यु P275

|| बद्धापि सामान्य-विशेषविधी सौरभस्य धानं सम्प्रवति तथापि सौरभस्य धानं ज्ञानलक्षणां ।

सं यु 283 -84
wood is fragrant. This piece of information viz. fragrance, is introduced as a part of his cognition on the piece of his previous knowledge of fragrance being associated with the sandal wood. Here, the past knowledge itself functions as a contact point. such a cognition of a fragrant sandal wood is neither an inference, nor memory. The observer is not remembering the fragrance of the sandal wood seen by him in the past, but cognising the presence of fragrance in the very piece of sandal wood that is before him. Such cognitions, Nyaya Vaisesikas’s have termed as ज्ञाना लक्षणा परट्याक्ष.

17 In Indian tradition, almost all systems credit to Yogins with the privilege of extra sensory perception. The Nyāya Vaisesikas have also followed this tradition and accepted Yougika pratyakṣa.

18 These three extra-sensory perception are termed as Aloukika pratyakṣa.

Nyāya-Vaiseṣika Theory of Truth and Error

The Nyāya Vaiseṣika theory of truth and error is quite inter-

17)युग्म युग्मारूपयोगिन्निविद्यादुर्द्वयविविद्यमिति भवः।
सि यु P284

18)सत्याश्चत्तलक्षणो ज्ञानलक्षणो नोग्मकर्भो।
भा ६३
esting. It is already stated above that the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas classify Anubhava i.e., experience into two kinds viz Pramā-Valid, Bhramā-erroneous. They call these as yathārtha and Ayathārtha. That piece of knowledge which agrees with the facts is Yathārtha and that which does not agree is Ayathārtha. The stock example quoted for Ayathārtha is that of śukti-rajata, a piece of shell being mistaken to be a piece of silver. “Suktou idam rajatam iti Jñānam” here, the content of the experience is Rajata while the object that is actually present is Śukti. Thus there is no factual agreement between the content of the experience and the object present. Therefore, this experience or this cognition is erroneous. Such an appearance, of one in place of another is called Anyathā Khyāti. Here, the object that is present before is Śukti. This Śukti is characterised by Śuktitva But, the observer takes it as Rajata that is to say, as characterised by Rajatatva. This Supression of the True characteristic, and introducing of a characteristic that is not actually present is what is called Anyathā khyāti. This characteristic Rajatatva is brought here by Śāmānya laksana pratyāśatti.

19) अप्रया च प्रया चेति ज्ञानं द्विविधभिभति।

का 126
In respect of the validity or otherwise of an experience, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas have a different theory than that of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas theory is known as "Parataḥ Pṛamāṇya" theory. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas say that the knowledge by itself is neither valid nor invalid. A piece of knowledge has to be considered as valid if there are gunas. That is to say, all the requirements that are necessary to produce true knowledge. Similarly, a piece of knowledge has to be considered as not valid if there are Doṣas or defects in the mechanism of producing knowledge. Thus, Pṛamāṇya of the knowledge is due to gunas and the Aprāmāṇya of the knowledge is due to Doṣas. In this way, the Pṛamāṇya or the Aprāmāṇya of the knowledge is dependent upon something else. Therefore, Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas are called "Parataḥ prāmāṇya vādins".

In respect of the ascertainment of the validity of knowledge also, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas are "Parataḥ Pṛamāṇya vādins". This is because, they hold that the validity of a piece of knowledge has to be ascertained by the results of it. If one is successful in obtaining
the expected results by a piece of knowledge, then it is a valid piece of knowledge. But, if expected result does not follow, then that piece of knowledge is not valid. For example, when one sees water in a lake, and acquires the knowledge, 'here is water', if he proceeds and tries to fetch the water, he gets the water. On the contrary, if one follows the mirage and then forms the knowledge that 'here is water' and proceeds to fetch the water, he will not be able to get the water, he will not be able to get the water and fails in obtaining the results of his knowledge. Therefore, this piece of knowledge is not valid. Thus, 'Samartha pravṛti janakatva' is the criteria for ascertaining the validity of knowledge and the obesence of if helps one to ascertain the absence of the validity. Thus, in respect of the ascertainment or otherwise of the knowledge also, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas are Parataḥ prāmāṇya vādins.
The *Pūrva Mīmāṁsa* concept of Ātman and Manas are broadly the same as that of *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* concept of Ātman and manas. However, there are some important differences which we will notice here. Further, there are two schools of *Pūrva Mīmāṁsa* viz.: *Bhāṭṭa* and *Prabhākara*. There are some significant differences between *Bhāṭṭa* and *Prabhākara* schools. Particularly in respect of the nature of knowledge and the process of awareness.

According to *Bhāṭṭa*, Ātman is 20 *Cetana*, it is 21 *Vibhu* - all pervasive, *Nitya*-eternal and 22 *Mānas* pratyakṣa - gamya could be cognised by Manas. 23 It has the qualities of *Jñāna*, *Sukha*, *Duhkha*,

20 आत्मा चैत्यान्यायः। स च मानसप्रत्यक्षगम्यः।

21 मानमेयोद्यः: 2-2-8

22) तस्मान-मानसप्रत्यक्ष एवात्मा।

23 बुद्धिसुखदुःखहितार्थम् आत्माकथितेषुगुण:।

मानमेयोद्यः: 2-2-112

तत: बुद्धिवितरितं सुखार्थिना मानसप्रत्यक्षगम्यं।

बुद्धि: पुनर्विधारणादिप्राण: प्रसूंताविभावपति।

मानमेयोद्यः: 2-2-94

तत: न धीर्यतमपालण ज्ञानपालितो निन्दितः।
and Prayatna. But, Dharma and Adharma are not the qualities of Atman according to Mimamsakas. Bhavana between these qualities is not of Samavaya as in Nyaya Vaisesika, but it is Tadatmya or Bhedabheda. The qualities Sukha, Du/kha, etc are perceived by Manas, but Jnana i.e. knowledge is not perceived by Manas. The Bhatta Mimamsakas do not accept the stages of knowledge, viz:- Vyavasya and Anuvyavasya. According to them, when one acquires knowledge in the first stage, only the objects are comprehended. But later, knowledge of these objects is inferred on the basis of a quality of these objects, viz:- Praktya or Jnana. All objects that become the objects of some or the other cognition have the quality called Praktya, that is to say, the ability to reveal themselves through the cognition. At this stage, one is only aware of the objects so cognised. But he is not aware of the cognition itself. He has to infer from this revelation of the

24 व स च देहनिर्बन्धानुस्थित्वो व्यतिरिच्छते ।
नानाभूतो विश्वस्ते विधुर्तित्यो भोगस्वर्ग-पवर्गभानकः।

25) प्राकृतविषयप्रभावकः सर्वदेहभवति सापान-प्रृणः । स च संयुक्तात्मात्मसंबंधेन

26) प्राकृतविषयप्रभावकः सर्वदेहभवति सापान-प्रृणः । स च संयुक्तात्मात्मसंबंधेन

पानेयोद्यो: 2-2-95

पानेयोद्यो: 2-2-35

पानेयोद्यो: 2-2-36

पानेयोद्यो: 2-2-24,25
objects or Prākātya, \(^{27}\) that he has a cognition of the objects. This discovery of cognition is a kind of inference. It is called ānunā or Prākātya ānunā.

Thus according to Bhāṣṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, knowledge is not perceived by the Manas, but it is inferred. Thus, they have arrived at a curious position that, while Sukha, Duḥkha etc, psychological states are perceivable by Manas, the knowledge of different objects has to be inferred. Though this looks curious, they have a valid reason to take this position. Their chief opponents are Buddhists, particularly, Viṃśīnavādins. These Viṃśīnavādins argued that there are no separate and independent objects independent of knowledge or ideas.

All our notions of objects are simply the ideas or the knowledge. Now, if one has to counteract this posi-

---

27 सुखाध्रापरोपक्षसाध्यन्त्रयवेन कल्पयपन्तातनित्र्य विपुवरियाणस्पंदं च मन: । मनस: विन्द्रनित्रक्यानुसारीरेण वर्तक्यकारत्वस्वाकारात् । मान्यभोद्यः 2-2-126
Viśiṣṭa-śāstrins, one has to suggest some methods of verification of the presence of the objects, as separate from ideas. But every verification has to be of the nature of its knowledge or idea. Thus, it is difficult to reach the objects without the medium of knowledge or ideas.

To counteract this, the Mīmāṃsaka devised a method by which, they said, the objects have the capacity to reveal themselves, and the fact that certain objects are revealed to us, is the ground for ascertaining the fact that we have the knowledge of the same. Thus, they made the objects the medium to ascertain the knowledge instead of the knowledge being the medium to ascertain the objects. No verification is needed to ascertain the presence of the objects beyond their revelation to us. But, to ascertain the fact that we have the knowledge of them, the revelation of the objects has to be the ground. Thus, Prākātya or Jñātāṁśa is the means by which, the knowledge is to be ascertained. This Jñātāṁśa līṅgaka
process, the ज्ञातता लिङ्गका अनुमान is an epistemological method leading to an important metaphysical position.

Prabhakara Theory of Knowledge

The Prābhākara theory of knowledge and the awareness of knowledge is altogether different from that of Bhāṭṭas. Their theory of knowledge and its awareness is known as Tripūṭikaraṇa theory. According to them, the knower and the known (māta, meya) are the contents. Meya-. The knowledge which they call Saṃvit is self revealing while the knower and the known are revealed by the knowledge and the knowledge reveals itself. The revelation of these three is simultaneous. One is aware of these three together. This kind of awareness of the three, viz: the knower, the known and the knowledge together is called Tripūṭi kāmaṇḍa. This theory also is evolved to meet the Viśīnavāda criticism that there are no objects separate from the knowledge or the ideas.
According to Prabhasakaras every knowledge necessarily refers to the knower and the known. Therefore, to ascertain the presence of the objects, one need not resort to any other means of verification outside the knowledge. Both the object i.e. Meya and the knower i.e. Mātā are necessary the contents of the knowledge. Since the Prabhasakaras consider the knowledge or Samvit as self revealing, they reject the idea of the inference of knowledge by means of Prakāṭya or Jñātatā this is an important difference between the Bhāṭtas and the Prabhasakaras.

28 Another curious point is, Manas is Vibhu according to Bhāṭtas. The Bhāṭtas do not agree with the Nyāya Vaisēśika stand that there cannot be Samyoga i.e. contact between the two Vibhus- all pervasive, substances, The Bhāṭtas think of two types of contacts viz Janya and ajanya caused and uncaused. 29 In case of the contact between the two both of which are not Vibhu, the

28 विषयूच्यापि परमरसम्बन्धत्वाभ्यंत्तत्वाभ्याभ्यवसीयमावताद्वादृत्तमाभि: 
मान्येयोद्यम: 2-2-128

29 विषयूच्याय सत्त्वां पंजादर्शपितागप्तत्वम्।
मान्येयोद्यम: 2-2-26
contact is caused contact. But, the contact between two Vibhus is uncaused.

However, the Prābhākaraśaś take the stand that Manas is Aṇu. This will eliminate the round about effort of somehow managing the contact between two Vibhu dravyas. Both Bhinītaśaś and Prābhākaraśaś accept the Nirvikalpaκa and Savikalpaκa types of perception.

Before Kumarila, probably the Mīmāṃśakas did not accept Īśwara. Kumarila accepts Īśwara probably under the pressure of the theiristic schools, of Indian thought. The Prābhākaraśaś also accept Īśwara. However, the duties of creation, substance etc assigned by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikaś to Īśwara are not assigned to in Pūrva Mīmāṃśa. In Pūrva Mīmāṃśa, it is Karma that is the central principle and is responsible for the functioning of the man and the universe, but not Īśwara or any other super human being.

The Prmaṇaś of Upamaṇā, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi

In respect of the Prmaṇaś the Bhinīta Mīmāṃśakas accept
two more Pramāṇas viz Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi. They explain the nature of Upamāṇa or analogy in a different way than that of Nyāya Valśeśikas-When one observes a forest cow, from the similarity that it has with the village cow, he comprehends the similarity of the forest Cow present in the village Cow. This is Upamiti or knowledge acquired through Anology. For Bhātta, one and the same, the similarity is not found in both in the forest cow and the village cow. The similarity of the forest cow is found is the forest cow, The two similarities are not one and the same. One understands the similarity in one from the similarity in the other. This explanation of the nature of Upamāṇa Pramāṇa is quite different from that of Nyāya-Valśeśika explanation of Upamāṇa. It involves both psychological and epistemological processes. in fact, it is difficult to isolate the psychological and epistemological processes in analysing the various types of cognitions. The Prābhākaras also accept Upamāṇa Pramāṇa.

Both Bhātta and Prābhākara accept Arthāpatti as a
separate $Pramāṇa$. When two facts are validly known by certain $Pramāṇas$ but still have a conflict, then a third fact has to be envisaged to resolve the conflict. The $Pramāṇa$ by which this third fact is envisaged, is called $Arthāpatti$. Two stock examples are given to explain the nature of the knowledge obtained by this $Arthāpatti$ $pramāṇa$.

1. A Person is alive, but is not found in the places where he is normally found. Now, here both the facts viz.-he is alive and he is not found in the places where he is usually found are validly known. Now, these two facts cannot be properly explained unless a third fact viz.-he must be in altogether in a different place is envisaged. Such envisaging is known as $arthāpatti$. The expression $Arthāpatti$ could be explained as. $Arthāt Āpattih$, $Arthasya Āpattih$. $Arthāt Āpattih$ refers to the way in which the third fact is envisaged. $Arthasya Āpattih$ refers to the envisaging of the third fact.

2 Another stock example that is given is, a person is quite
healthy and has put on weight, and he does not take any food during the day. These two facts are validly known. These will be incongruence unless another fact is envisaged that he takes his food during the night. The *Pramana* by which this third fact is envisaged is *Arthapatti*. The *Nyāya Vaisēšikas* are inclined to include the instances of *Arthapatti* into *Anumāna* however, the *Mīmāṁsakas* insist on its being a separate *Pramāṇa*.

The intention of the *Mīmāṁsakas* in accepting this *pramāṇa* as a separate *Pramāṇa* is altogether different. They are concerned with validating every statement in the *Vedas*. Many a times, they find conflict in different *vedic* statements. To resolve thus, they envisage certain factors by this method. For example in *Vedas*, it is stated that *Dārśapūrṇa-māsa* etc rituals lead to *Swarga*. Thus, a kind of *Kārya kāraṇa bhāva* between *Dārśapūrṇa māsa* being a ritual and an activity, it ceases at a certain point *Bṛu Swarga* has to be realised much later after the *Yajñamāṇa* departs from this world.
Normally, the cause and effect are expected to be continuous. The effect is expected to occur immediately after the causal operation is completed. But this does not happen in this case. Therefore a link between the two has to be envisaged. This link is Apūrva. a kind of supernatural power or teleological power that links the rituals and the results. this Apūrva is envisaged by Pūrva mīmāṃsakas with Arthāpattī Prāmāṇa. An Arthāpattī Pramāṇa may arise in respect of the matters known through Pratyakṣa, Anumāṇa, Sābda, Upamāṇa and Arthāpatti itself. That Arthāpatti which arises out of Pratyakṣa etc. other than sabda is known as Drśti Arthāpatti and that which arises out of Sābda Pramāṇa is known as Srutārthāpatti this is who Bhātta position. However, the Prbhākaras do not accept Srutārthāpatti as a separate subdivision of Arthāpatti.

Anupalabdhi is accepted as another Pramāṇa by Bhāttas.

It is our experience that, not only we have the cognitions of the objects, but also the absence of these objects. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas say that the cognitions of these obscomes is also perception. These
Absences are perceived as the adjutives of the relevant places where in the objects concerned were expected to be perceived. However, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas do not accept this contention of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. They say, whenever an object is expected to be cognised by a certain means and if it is not cognised even when such a means is present, then this no cognition nor Anupalabdhi itself gives us the knowledge of the absence of the object concerned. Thus, the knowledge of the absence of a given object is not perceptual but it is obtained by the absence of the knowledge of the relevant object, even when the means of the cognition of that object is very much present. Thus, the absence of the knowledge of the object concerned is made the means or Pramāṇa for the knowledge of the absence of the object. Thus, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas have enlarged the scope of the epistemology by envisaging two more Pramāṇas viz: Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi the Prabhākaras however, do not accept Anupalabdhi since they do not accept Abhāva as a separate category at all.
Prābhākara's Akhyāti Theory

In respect of truth and error the two schools of Purva mīmāṃsā have two different theories. The Bhattas go by Anyathā Khyāti Vāda more or less on the same lines as Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas. But the Prābhākaras have promulgated a new theory called Akhyāti vāda which is a unique theory. According to Prābhākara all knowledge is true, there is no erroneous knowledge at all. The so-called instances of error are not instances of error, but the instances of complex knowledge the difference between the components, being not realised. For instance, the cognition. ‘This is a piece of silver’ when there is a piece of conch shell, is a complex cognition. Here, two pieces of knowledge are involved. One, is, Anubhava or the perceptual experience of the object before viz. the piece of conch shell merely as ‘Idam’ without realising its characteristic viz S'uktitva and the other is remembering a piece of silver that was previously experienced without reference to the past time and place. These two viz:- the perception of the object before and the memory of the
object experienced in the past takes place so quickly that their difference is not relaised. Because of the non-realisation of the difference, the observer proceeds to fetch the object before and relises his mistake. Thus, according to Prābhākaras there is Akhyāti i.e. non relisation of the difference between the contents of the two experiences, viz:-the perception and the memory. Therefore this theory is known as Akhyāti vṛidda.

Our study of the concept of mind according to Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas and the two schools of Pūrva mīmāṁsā will reveal that, they treat epistemological functions of the Mind in greater detail than the psychological functions. However, for a student of the Mind, a probe into both these aspects is equally important.