CHAPTER V

KIERKEGAARD, HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE -

THEIR CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

Kierkegaard gives prominence to morality. Moral values and ethical principles are significant in the sense that they assume a vital role in the life of man. Kierkegaard's interest in morality is more intense than in metaphysics. He remarks that elements of the fundamental values of life, namely, truth, beauty and goodness are deep-rooted in each man's self. To him, human freedom has to be seen in relation with the development of the self. Kierkegaard holds the view that existence is a quality of the individual. Man, he says, deliberately, voluntarily and actively participates in an act. Man, in his every day life, is confronted with many problematic situations. Kierkegaard says that abstract reasoning does not help man solve these problems. Rational explanations never guide him to genuine existence. The real problems that he comes across in everyday life are solved by choice by decision.
Kierkegaard mentions freedom in relation to the development of the self. He speaks of the realisation of the spirit as self-consciousness. This self-consciousness marks the first attempt of the self to relate itself to itself. To understand the notion of freedom of Kierkegaard and that of consciousness as developed by Hegel, first, we should have a knowledge of the self. Kierkegaard's ideas of self and freedom are polemically developed in opposition to the concepts of Hegel. Hegel first speaks of the stage of immediacy along with its sense-consciousness. In the second stage, through reflection, the manifold character of immediacy is negated. Here the thinking process becomes static, definite and self-identical. It is in the third stage that genuine reality appears in reason. According to Hegel, consciousness is the lowest level of awareness. This is a stage in which the subject becomes conscious of the fact that knowledge exists outside the subject.

Kierkegaard criticises this method of thinking advanced by Hegel. According to Hegel, reflection is the capacity to penetrate immediacy and to generate
abstract thought. Kierkegaard comprehends reflection as the relationship of reality and ideality. It also acknowledges consciousness as the relationship itself. According to Kierkegaard, in immediacy, the falsest and truest things are equally true. In immediacy, the most possible and the most impossible things are equally actual. Immediacy marks the very possibility of knowledge. It is something given and is presupposed. Kierkegaard views that in its search for truth the mind has to be related with something else. Immediacy is reality. Reality is actually the world of sense experience and observation. In his philosophy, immediacy is identified with reality and mediacy with ideality. Mediacy is word which expresses thoughts and ideas. To Kierkegaard, consciousness is not reflection. Reflection, to him stands for the power of abstract thinking. To Kierkegaard, it is the possibility of relationship. He speaks of two different types of reflection. (1) finite (2) infinite. In finite through the condition of immediacy the self determines itself. The self becomes dialectical with reference to the world. Reflection can be infinite in the sense that it does not stop itself on reaching the point of abstract determination. Kierkegaard believes
that consciousness is not a faculty in man. In reflection, no self-awareness is present. On the other hand, it involves an awareness of different thought processes. Kierkegaard says that theoretical consciousness gives scientific knowledge. Self knowledge is provided by practical consciousness. Kierkegaard observes that consciousness is not the relation of ideality and reality combined to form a negative unity. It is an intermediate activity coming in between ideality and reality.

Immediacy is marked by different stages and a dialectical movement is possible from the total unconsciousness, through finite consciousness, to abstract consciousness. It is the absence of reflection that causes the absence of consciousness. There is a stage in which finite consciousness is to be attributed to finite reflection. An instance is noted where consciousness is abstract as it is lost in the infinity of the imagination. The nature of true consciousness is both finite and infinite. An opposition between the two is established by the contradiction of the real repeated as ideal.
Kierkegaard says that a process called repetition breaks open the immediate unity and makes possible the opposition of reality and ideality. This, when united by the spirit's interest in the opposition, produces self-consciousness.

Kierkegaard observes that the interest of spirit transcends the activity of consciousness. It actually comes out as the activity of freedom. Kierkegaard says "...by turning inwardly man discovers freedom, and for his bliss, not freedom to do this or that, to become king or emperor or the exponent of 'public opinion', but freedom to know of himself that he is 'freedom'."  

According to him, spirit is freedom. Spirit realises itself as the freedom to relate necessity and possibility. To Kierkegaard, necessity possesses two different connotations, logical and existential. Necessity is applied in the fields of thought, logic, nature and history. Kierkegaard holds that it is logic that provides the a priori principles and thought is

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operated and defined by these a priori principles. Kierkegaard feels that necessity is not a synthesis of possibility and actuality. On the other hand, actuality, is a synthesis of necessity and possibility. Man, by nature, finds himself involved in bondage, and he is bound to obey obligations and duties in a way that binds him to the society. He is always conscious of his rights and duties. Freedom in this context means that we have full liberty to decide the type of person we want to become. Freedom also means that a man can have relation with Nothingness as well as with God. "This condition of indeterminate potentiality which Berdyaev calls 'meonic' freedom (because it derives 'from non-being), is a condition of anxiety. Thus man's position is not only above the brutes, it is intrinsically more precarious, and we may sometimes run away from it so as to return to the irresponsible bliss of an animal condition".  

2 Kierkegaard also points out that man cannot really escape, and because of his freedom each man becomes aware of evil desire, sin and

guilt as springing from himself. Thus, throughout history, human nature is an ambiguous mixture of two factors: (1) the goodness of creation which comes from God, and (2) the distortion caused by sin which comes from man. Finitude, temporality, selfhood and sexuality are not intrinsically evil. They are aspects of the goodness of creation. But he never encounters them in their unspoiled condition. The self of man is a mixture of the infinite and the finite, the freedom and the necessity.

Freedom can be conceived only with reference to man's inner relationship to God's individuality. In this context, Kierkegaard highlights the importance of man to lead an ethically good life which makes life great. Morality can be concretely expressed in and through the character of man. The realisation that he is a synthesis of both finite and infinite, itself shows that only in a morally good person is such a realisation possible. Kant also makes it clear that an ethically good person chooses himself to be morally good. That is, moral goodness should come from within. To Kierkegaard, what is of supreme importance is the
choice, and this choice is intimately personal. The various problems Kierkegaard confronts in his life arise out of his own experience. They arise for him in the form of alternatives presented for his own personal choice. Choice is an important concept in his philosophy. Kierkegaard has already mentioned as indicated in Chapter III the three stages of life: aesthetic, ethical and religious, what he intends to point out is that, whatever may be the stage in which he is placed, choice plays an important role. A man placed in the aesthetic stage may exercise his freedom to choose to be a 'sensuous' man and this choice is not, in any way a pre-determined one. A person placed in the aesthetic stage may focus his interest in a selfish manner and he is mainly concerned with enjoyment. The choice of a person, placed in the ethical stage, is in conformity with the established standards of the society. For instance, a man leads a harmonious married life and his behaviour in every aspect is an admirable one. The choice adopted by the person in the religious stage is above both these and he makes an attempt to enter into a new sphere of faith. Here, an altruistic response is made by the person in the sense that the activities performed by
him are directed towards the welfare of the society. Observation reveals that the individual is totally responsible for the various choices he makes.

Kierkegaard finds that in our own everyday life we make so many affirmations and negations. There are certain subjective truths which we ourselves hold strictly and adhere to. Of course, our own subjective elements are, to a very great extent, reflected in our subjective truth. So also we have a tendency to form certain negative statements depending on our tastes, interests, aptitudes, etc. Also, man is by nature both constructive and destructive. In some persons, the destructive element may dominate, and in some others, the constructive factor. Some people keep a balance between the two tendencies.

Kierkegaard brings out the significance of despair deep-rooted in man and emphasises the fact that all men are subject to the state of despair. This statement becomes meaningful only when man is conceived as a spirit. It may be noted that Berdyaev also brings out the importance of the spiritual element in
man and establishes the truth that man is rooted in spirit and spirit is freedom. The existentialist reaction, from Kierkegaard on, was drastic.

Kierkegaard again points out, how universal is the phenomenon of despair. "Just as the physician might say that there lives perhaps not one single man who is in perfect health, so one might say perhaps that there lives not one single man who after all is not to some extent in despair, in whose most parts there does not dwell a disquietude, a perturbation, a discord, an anxious dread of an unknown something, or of something he does not even dare to make acquaintance with, dread of a possibility of life, or dread of himself, so that, after all, as physicians speak of a man going about with a disease in him, this man is going about and carrying a sickness of the spirit which only rarely and in glimpses, by and with a dread which to him is inexplicable, gives evidence of its presence within".  

It is a fundamental assumption in existentialist philosophy that, without any exception, every one is in

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a state of despair. Man should know what despair actually is. Some people, even if they do not have any concrete despair, feel themselves in a state of despair. Man considered as spirit, is, as Kierkegaard says, in a critical condition. If one person has to make a reference of despair, he must conceive of man as spirit. A physician should be well-versed with the nature of sickness and have a thorough knowledge of the remedies to be administered. So also, in dealing with despair, the physician of souls should possess a knowledge of the nature of despair and should have a close acquaintance with people who actually have despair and those who confuse despair with momentary dejection or grief. Really, it is not a genuine comparison to view that the disease of the body is similar to the despair of the mind. According to Kierkegaard, only when man is conceived as spirit, can one talk of despair. He says that bodily health is an "immediate" qualification, but it is meaningless to speak of "immediate" health of the spirit. Happiness is not spoken of as a characteristic of spirit. Moreover, it is observed that in the innermost recesses of happiness, there exists the anxious dread, which is
nothing but despair. Further most men are living without an awareness that they are really spiritual beings. Of course, it is only very seldom that we see men who do not have despair. Man is, so to speak, decided by the pleasures and luxuries of life that very rarely does he get a chance to become aware that he is a spirit. He is not conscious of the fact that he is an infinite power, namely, God, and he himself exists before this God. The self, according to Kierkegaard, is composed of infinity and finiteness. "But the synthesis is a relationship, and it is a relationship which, though it is derived, relates itself to itself, which means freedom. The self is freedom. But freedom is the dialectical element in terms of possibility and necessity".\(^4\)

Kierkegaard remarks that all despair is conscious, but from this it cannot be interpreted that he in whom it exists is conscious of it. "The more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; and the more will, the more self. A man

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 162
who has no will at all is no self; the more will he has, the more consciousness of self he has also". 5

The self, according to Kierkegaard, is in a process of becoming. The self is composed of both the finite and the infinite, and the finite is the limiting factor. Kierkegaard observes that the expanding factor is the infinite. The self is free from despair only when it is grounded transparently in God.

He wants to create a new rich subjectivity in himself and others who observe his idea. According to him only some kinds of subjectivity are a hindrance. He was a dialectician in the sense that he commanded the abilities to define a thought, to trace its implications and consequences and to juxtapose it against differing views. He holds that religious and moral strength for every man lie finally in subjectivity and inwardness. Gifted with a poetic talent, he could describe the kinds of inwardness that belong to human beings. Since despair is a disease of the spirit, the spirit alone can relieve it.

5 Ibid., p. 162
Kierkegaard's view is that man should aim at the satisfaction of pleasure, but experience shows that this cannot be carried through and hence it is not advisable to take an initiative. As Kierkegaard puts it, "A refined egoism perceives that it misses the very point in pleasure. So here we have a view of life which teaches one to enjoy life but expresses it thus. "Enjoy yourself in enjoyment, it is yourself you must enjoy". This is a higher reflection, but for all that it does not penetrate to the personality itself, which remains in its accidental immediacy".6

Kierkegaard believes that the essential conditions required for enjoyment are external. It is not under the control of man, though man says that he enjoys himself; he enjoys reflectively, not immediately. This is so because there is an aesthetic field in which man is subjected and confined. The aesthetic stage is one of the three stages in the life

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of man, as earlier pointed out in the chapter on Kierkegaard's man. To him, what is of utmost importance is not the different stages in life but the progress, the changes that take place in the different stages. Observation shows that the aesthetic view presents life itself to be despair. To Kierkegaard, despair is clearly an expression of the whole personality. "The personality is tranquilized only in despair, not by necessity, for I never despair by necessity, but by freedom, and only thereby does one win the absolute".\(^7\) He points out that the search for the absolute is despair- "it is the choice both of my heart and of my thought, my soul's delight and my bliss...".\(^8\)

According to Kierkegaard, man is spirit and it is the self; its peculiar characteristic is that it is a relation which relates itself to its own self. "Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short it is a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 217

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 217
between two factors, So regarded, man is not yet a self".9

Kierkegaard, referring to the state of despair of man in search of the absolute, points out: "in choosing absolutely I choose despair, and in despair, I choose the absolute, for I myself am the absolute, I posit the absolute and I myself am the absolute; but in complete identity with this I can say that I choose the absolute which chooses me, that I posit the absolute which posits me; for if 'I do not' remember that this second expression is equally absolute, my category of choice is false, for the category is precisely the identity of both propositions".10 Kierkegaard is of the opinion that necessity rules in the various spheres of logic, nature and history, which philosophy deals with. But to some people it is not necessity, but freedom, that rules in the sphere of history. Kierkegaard feels that history is wrongly conceived. Because history is


nothing but the results of the free actions of free
individuals, the individual's actions, Kierkegaard
holds, pass into the order of things which sustains the
whole of existence.

Speaking of morality, he says, "Morality is
calendar, character is that which is engraved but the
sand and the sea have no character and neither has
abstract intelligence, for character is really
inwardness. Immorality, as energy is also character,
but to be neither moral nor immoral is merely
ambiguous, and ambiguity enters into life when the
qualitative distinctions are weakened by a growing
reflection".11

To Kierkegaard, the Absolute is himself in his
eternal validity. The self, he says, is the most
abstract of all things, yet at the same time it is
concrete, as freedom. He remarks that men, by nature,
cling to their own selves, though they undergo a great

11 - - -. The Present Age and the Difference Between a
(London: Collins, 1969) p. 45
deal of suffering, etc. But at the same time, there is something in man which is absolute and the absolute is of course chosen by man himself. This choosing is not to be understood in the finite sense, but should be interpreted in an absolute sense. "This self which he then chooses is infinitely concrete, for it is in fact himself, and yet it is absolutely distinct from his former self, for he has chosen it absolutely".12

What Kierkegaard clearly brings out is that this self which man chooses did not exist already in the sense that it came into existence only through his choice. This implies the truth that the self he chooses was already there, in the sense that this chosen self was in fact "himself". In Kierkegaard's perspective, two opposite processes take place here. The chosen self does not exist and, with the choice, it makes its appearance. The chosen self exists, because otherwise how is choice possible? If the chosen self did not exist, but only with choice it comes into existence, choice would not be possible; it would then mean a

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simple creation but in effect, choice is made by the self. Hence Kierkegaard convinces us that, as a free spirit, "I am born of the principle of contradiction, or born by the fact that I choose myself." Nature, he says, is a spontaneous creation, and as one's immediate personality, the self is created out of nothing.

Kierkegaard proceeds to point out the various relationships man has with the other individuals of the race and to the race as a whole, and says that a certain amount of courage is needed for man to make a choice of the self. In this connection, he reminds us of the different kinds of love which man has in society and establishes the truth that there is also a kind of love by which man loves God; it is the language of repentance that expresses the love of God.

Kierkegaard holds that the self, as it were, is outside of man and it has to be acquired; repentance is his love for this self, and man chooses the self completely because it exists in the hand of God. "Only

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13 Ibid., p. 220
when I absolutely choose myself do I infinitize myself absolutely, for I myself am the absolute, for only myself can I choose absolutely, and this absolute choice of myself is my freedom, and only when I have absolutely chosen myself have I posited an absolute difference, the difference, that is to say, between good and evil."

The man who lives in the aesthetic stage develops by necessity, not by freedom. In Kierkegaard's opinion, the ethical view of life considers personality and life and their significance. The love of man towards God also brings out the morally good element in him to have the freedom to direct his attention to God. Kierkegaard tells us that God is in the creation though not directly visible to the human eye. "Only when the individual turns to his innerself, and hence only in the inwardness of self activity, does he have his attention aroused, and is enabled to see God".

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14 Ibid., p. 228

Like Berdiaev, Kierkegaard also points out the mystic element in man and says that the mystic chooses himself in his loneliness and this action is really an inward action. It is in terms of his freedom that the mystic makes such a choice. The mystic man develops metaphysically in the sense that the religious virtues become more significant in his life. Kierkegaard has no appreciation for a man who simply neglects every thing: that is, a man who has various obligations to the family and society all on a sudden turns to mysticism and then to loneliness. A man who has fully discharged his obligations in the various spheres and turns to mysticism may be regarded as doing something inwardly good to himself.

Kierkegaard suggests that the man who chooses himself ethically chooses concretely. The individual who does not choose ethically, attains a stage where he finds that he loses something higher and greater which Kierkegaard considers is the choice of freedom in which man is in a state of absolute continuity, because he chooses himself as a product. It can also be said that
he has a unique place in the world and with freedom only this place can be chosen by the individual. Man becomes a definite concrete individual at this stage. The long-cherished goal of man is also attained at this level. Thus Kierkegaard establishes the fact that it is freedom that enables man to have a unique place.

Heidegger

The problem of man's existence is to be solved by man himself; because beyond man there is nothing which is capable of solving it. Heidegger often uses the term 'freedom' as a prefix to a number of concepts like, authenticity, inauthenticity, death, choice, etc. Hence, concepts thus formed for example, freedom for authenticity or unauthenticity, freedom for oneself, freedom for freedom of choice, etc. find place in his philosophy.

Heidegger attaches great significance to the freedom which is concerned with one's own potentiality for Being, since it is to this freedom that all other freedoms mentioned above direct. Man's life says
Heidegger, is marked by this prime necessity - freedom, in other words, participating in the revelation of what is as such. In expressing this view of freedom, Heidegger never speaks of freedom from the fear of death; rather he gives importance to 'freedom towards death'. He holds the view that only freedom towards death can lead man to an authentic life which can reveal to him, his own potentialities. Expressing his view on 'existence', Heidegger says that the existence of man is revealed through man. 'Being' which is the "total dimension of man" is the primal structure of man. Man's quest for happiness, his life and freedom are rooted in 'Being'. Man by nature, seeks liberty and the love of life is what gives him an impetus to live and develop his social relationships. Man, no doubt, is egoistic and very often he is governed by the motive of pleasure. But his egoism, craving for pleasure, love of life, etc., are rooted in Being. They, in fact, point to the unveiling of 'Being'. The fact that man has an existential 'place' really makes him a 'man' in the real sense. Heidegger suggests that this 'place' should become the house of our 'Being'. It is here that our 'Being' unfolds itself and finds
completion. What Heidegger terms as 'place' is the dimension of our ontological and existential uniqueness. 'Place' places us both horizontally and vertically.

The 'Being' of the human being, his essential nature, is 'place', the ground or clearing within which there can be disclosure of beings as what they are, that is truth. "The Being of beings" means the coming on of the past out of the future as the presenting of the present—that is the presencing (showing) of beings on the basis of thrown projection. Man exists in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of place, in both empirical and ontological dimensions. At the same time he is separated from these dimensions. This really creates tension in various situations. Heidegger says that the possibility of estrangement from the ontological dimension in consciousness is the realisation of it. To be separated from 'place' means to become aware of the placing character of place.

When a man is considered as a means or when he is used as an employable tool of a social or economic power, estrangement from the empirical dimension emerges as an
effect. To Heidegger, estrangement from 'place' is the shock of the absence of freedom. To have 'place' means to be free. 'Place' really brings out the special nature of man; it is what really conditions his existential activity. Freedom is revealed in and through 'place'. It is actually the ground of his Being. The uniqueness of man is realised through freedom. Just like freedom, power is an ontological dimension. It is in the state that man's power is manifested. Man cannot be separated from the State in the sense that both are interdependent and interrelated. Various political laws are enforced by the State and man is bound to obey them.

Again Man possesses the creative ability. In the creativity of his individuality, man is separable from the State. Both freedom and power are introduced to man. The unique and special nature of man is defined by the relations of freedom, non-being and anxiety. Man's uniqueness is realised both in freedom and in power. This is what Heidegger terms as "consciousness". The creative encounter with life reveals the depth of man's subjectivity.
Human reality, conceived in terms of individual ontological freedom, does not explain man's involvement in the State. Belonging to the State means to be within the structure of power. Within the State man is capable of rising from the mere state of individuality into a more complex and higher totality. Man feels the pulse of others in the State, and his status and importance as an individual gets a wider connotation in the State, which is the house of man. Man attributes more and more meanings to his existence as well as to the existence of other human beings.

Individuality implies that man belongs to the State. This belonging is not determined by his freedom, but is the necessary condition of that freedom and it brings out the freedom. Heidegger states that the consciousness of man is posited in his encounter with freedom and the State. It may be noted that creativity is the essence of man. In a sense, freedom of creativity can be called people's authentic being.

A distinction is made between real facts as they are and real values as they might be. The whole process
of creativity is based on discovering these two. Everyone possesses the freedom of creativity to a certain degree, but it may be noted that there are different degrees of creativity. In some, only a minimum degree of creativity is present. It is only through creativity that people can be 'persons' in the strict sense. It is also in self-creativity that persons become self-possessed and possessed of their world within the limits of real possibility. Man becomes conscious of his freedom and also understands the creativeness that automatically develops out of freedom. What is ultimately ensured by all these is the recognition and awareness that man feels of his individuality.

Man, is really both constructive and destructive. "Man is therefore the tragic centre as well as the dialectical centre of Being. Man can be destroyed by his own creation—which is at once more than its creator—the State. The distorting possibility of individual creativeness can destroy man, the source of creativity. Being both a tragic and dialectical centre, man experiences both theoretical and
existential estrangement". 16

In the Heideggerian sense, man, as Dasein, is the only being who can see Being. Man, he says, is ek-sistence, by his own very nature, man stands beyond himself in his orientation to Being. Man's capacity for rational thinking enables him to have a comprehension of Being. Heidegger emphasises the point that man's rationality is constituted in such a way as to attain Being. The nature of human freedom can be understood from this perspective.

Man is free with regard to beings as man stands beyond himself in his relation to Being. Man's standing out to Being is consciously accepted by man. That constitutes his freedom. This is also termed as 'transcendence'. It is really the intellectual revelation, the determination and acceptance of Being. Freedom of man is explained in the light of this. The one speciality that is observed in this type of freedom is that no being has any power to force man. "Man is existentially involved in freedom and power, and

participates tragically in them. That is, he is free to choose at his own will and pleasure. Thus, we come to the negative idea of freedom in which there is the possibility of choosing. Man is focussing his whole attention towards Being. With regard to the primitive manifestation of Being, which really forms his freedom, man is not free in the secondary sense of choosing. So also, freedom will not be there and man will not execute his choice, if the fulness of Being is revealed to him directly, because the constitution and essence of man point to the unlimited fulness of Being. This fulness of Being is not directly presented to man. Instead he is given the freedom to choose in all aspects of his relationships with other beings.

Here Heidegger turns our attention to freedom of action which presupposes freedom of choice. Freedom of action consists in man's readiness to accept Being. Exercising the freedom of action, man chooses the being which is valuable for him on account of the presence of the element of Being in it. Freedom of man, as Heidegger puts it, directly points to his openness to Being and his acceptance of the Being in beings in the

17 Ibid., p. 30
positive and primary; other words, it is the freedom of action. It also consists in his choice of being as per the virtue of their Being in the negative and secondary sense. This is the act of freedom. This shows that freedom is nothing but the natural tendency of man to transcend, to accept being in its totality. Man is Dasein: the Sein that is found in his Da, summons him to a Sein which is higher.

**Authentcity:**

All the Existentialists deal with the question of authenticity and inauthenticity of existence. Existentialists, however, are not unanimous in their discussion of this. The inauthentic man is separated from his original self; he is led by the crowd. Man, placed in different spheres of society, comes across situations, strange realities, and obstacles. Some of them may be surmounted by his intelligence and ability; some of the problematic situations remain unsolved. At this juncture he finds the necessity to transcend. To some of the Existentialist thinkers, this does not possess a religious meaning. It means merely
transcending oneself to 'other'. Heidegger observes that, in a broad sense, the authentic life is based on an accurate appraisal of human condition. "The being that exists is man. Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not exist. God is, but He does not exist". ¹⁸

Heidegger agrees with Sartre that it is consciousness that distinguishes man from both 'beings.' According to Heidegger, authenticity is the real character of man. Man exists authentically when his original possibilities, which belong to his being as man, are fulfilled. In Heidegger's idea of authenticity, the part played by anxiety and death deserves special mention. Man has the conviction that he really lives in a secure world. When the mood of anxiety plays its dominant role and man realises that he is no more secure in the supposedly secure world, he resorts to certain means to escape from this situation.

It is anxiety that reveals the finitude of man. Death is accepted as the most vivid mark of human finitude. It is death that furnishes him with the clue to his authentic existence. Man is compelled to face death. Death is the extreme potentiality of Dasein. Death makes it possible for man to cut off all his associations with the world.

According to Heidegger, every individual has the freedom to choose to live his own personal life. That is to say, he has the liberty to transcend what he is at a particular moment, and to reach something which he has not yet reached. Man has also the freedom to renounce the right to live his own personal life, thus succumbing to a routine pattern in which his many possibilities are taken over by others; and, finally, it is others who decide what is to be done.

"Authenticity and inauthenticity, as possible modes of living, centre around the fact that the existence of every individual is characterised in every case by a certain mineness".  

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Man is not determined in the sense that no external force exerts an influence over him and conditions him in such a way as not to have any freedom to exercise. That is to say, man takes his stand on his foot and he can very well take a stand of his own to have a firm determination unaffected by the determination of other persons. An objective thing on the other hand, is determined. According to Heidegger, Dasein is the sum total of possibilities. It is considered as 'existential', and is the most important ontological determination of Dasein. Heidegger is of the opinion that man is a being who can be himself or not be himself. He uses the word 'existence' for this possibility or potentiality to be himself or not to be himself. An existing being makes an effort to understand Being. This understanding is the criterion by which we distinguish an existent being. "Understanding of Being is one of the determinations of Dasein".20

Man stands in openness to Being: because of this, he can establish the various types of relations with Being. Man exists in a certain existential environment. This environment is not created by man himself. On the other hand, it is a situation in which man enters quite accidentally. It is also an environment into which he is born. Man is a moral being who exercises his reason and freedom. And hence, it may also be said that the surrounding or the environment mentioned above may be one which the individual chooses. To say that man lives his life or exists means he is existing in an existential environment.

Different possibilities are opened before him. He can utilise the possibilities in various ways. By his ingenuity and wisdom man can develop the possibilities and can make the best out of them. He may also negate or reject the possibilities. He may also have a critical attitude and use his own unique techniques to handle the situations. That is to say, man adopts the various means and methods to handle the possibilities present in an environmental situation. This actually makes it possible for him to have a self-understanding.
Heidegger's description of man may be called phenomenological anthropology. A knowledge of human nature will definitely lead to a knowledge of the human being and this will further lead to the knowledge of Being. Heidegger remarks that Dasein has attitude towards its world; and these attitudes affect its response. One way of response lies in understanding the world. The other way, it also tries to understand Being. Dasein is interrogating itself about Being. It will respond to our interrogation. It will enter into a "Dialogue" with us. Heidegger makes an attempt to study the mode of Being which is characteristically human.

Heidegger has already emphasised that man and the world should be understood as selected concepts. He expresses this relation by introducing concepts of (1) readiness to hand, (2) concern, (3) living ahead and (4) understanding. There is a unique way in which the individual is related to the world. The things we experience are not things that are present at hand, but things that are really to hand. That is, we manipulate and utilise them in one way or other. The world of
things really serve as potentialities for us in various ways. There are innumerable ways of performing things and are characterised by concern. Concern or care is the inner organising principle. It is that which decides his relation to the world. Man is presented in an objective situation. Obstacles are there and man is ever anxious and, by his own masterly way of dealing with the various situations, he can shape his own experience and realise the best in a particular situation. Man has ever so many possibilities to deal with a particular situation, and man's freedom lies in choosing the best. Man by nature is far-sighted. The expression, 'Living ahead of itself' shows the forward-looking, future-looking creature. Man has understanding and knowledge. By his will power and freedom, he can make better use of the knowledge he possesses. The individual's relation to the world is an active participation.

To Heidegger, man is metaphysically free. An ordinary thing is unfree, because it is determined in every respect by its essence or character. In man, on the other hand, there are many possibilities which are
not determined by his own essence or the essence of anything else. According to Heidegger, Dasein constructs the world and gives an intelligible meaning to the world and tries to ascend to the Being of beings. The essence of transcendence constitutes the freedom of the individual. Everything has its basis in freedom, that is to say, in the limiting, finite, human freedom. Transcendence is a fundamental characteristic of Dasein. Transcendence is really Being-in-the world. Dasein has to project the world as it understands beings. Through projecting a world, it understands beings. Transcendence of the world means getting a knowledge of the Being of beings, that is, beings should be understood in their inter-related wholeness.

Projecting the world does not mean creating the world. Transcendence is more fundamentally to be conceived as being-in-the world. This means that it should be interpreted as transcendentally connected with the world. Transcendence is an essential factor of all understanding and willing. Probing deep into the layers of its essence, Heidegger denotes it as freedom.
The intimate relation between 'freedom' and 'ground' is expressed by the fact that freedom in its original form discloses itself as ground. This is what is meant by 'grounding'. Three distinct aspects of grounding are stated. They are: (a) Grounding as founding (b) Grounding as footing (c) Grounding as establishing. In the process of transcendence, Dasein ascends from being to the Being of being. To ascend, Dasein projects the world. It is also a projection for the sake of itself. It is called 'founding' because ultimately the world is founded in it. Beings are present only as a part of an inter-related meaningful system. It is in this understanding alone that the world is founded. Dasein is present as one among beings. The world formation is possible only by the involvement of beings with Dasein. This involvement is the second aspect of grounding. Grounding in this aspect is called "footing" because, this involvement with beings, enable Dasein to find its secure position.

Finally, Dasein makes an attempt to establish the beings which it encounters and tries to reveal to itself the very truthfulness of the Being of these beings. This is the third aspect of grounding called
establishing. Freedom is the essence of Dasein.

**Being, Truth and Freedom**

In Heidegger's later writing a remarkable change is noted in his emphasis on the problem of Being itself. A shifting of attention is observed from the emphasis on Dasein to Being. The language he uses for this purpose is Greek; because the traditional language is not sufficient to explain the truth.

In traditional philosophy, Being is simply assumed to be there. This Being-in-itself is supposed to be true and it is also understood that if our ideas correspond to the truth of Being, the ideas are believed to be true. According to Heidegger, the world cannot be explained in the light of this "Correspondence theory" as there exists no difference between 'objects of consciousness' and 'objects in themselves' on which the correspondence is assumed to be based. Correspondence is only a derivative idea of truth. It cannot be recognised as truth as such. Heidegger's notion of truth is closely related to the human behaviour. It actually gives us a practical idea
of truth. Human behaviour, is grounded in the Being of Dasein, particularly in freedom. Hence, in the Heideggerian perspective, the essence of truth is freedom. Truth is within limits in the sense that it exists and its boundary is the human subjectivity. Freedom, as he remarks, is a participation in the disclosure of what-is-as-such. Freedom, he says, shows itself as the 'Letting be' of what is. Truth is a revelation through which something "overt" comes into existence. Truth about ourselves forms the basic truth. Philosophy is primarily concerned with this type of truth—the original truth. If we accept that truth is the disclosure of Being, we can ask, 'What is the status of Being'? It is really a structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Whatever exists for Dasein constitutes Being. It is not something that simply corresponds to Dasein's ideas or experiences. Whatever is encountered by Dasein is represented as Dasein. We hold the view that an inseparable relation can be spoken of as existing between "Being" and "Dasein". It is similar to the relation we ascribe to Dasein with the world.
Philosophers from the time of Plato made a distinction between thinking and Being. Thinking deals with universals. 'Being' on the other hand, deals with particular beings. Here, the object of thought is distinguished from true Being. Heidegger points out that it is a mistake and this lies in our failure to differentiate entities from Being and supposing that thinking and Being are separable. According to Heidegger, Philosophy proceeds beyond the distinction between subject and object. When things come into the light of human awareness, being-there, they are themselves the truth. They are being itself uncovered and illuminated. "Truth, is the same as human freedom, for freedom lies in our capacity to reveal Being appropriately, and the same also as the beauty which reveals things in their own essential being". 21

Thus, there exists a close relation between truth and freedom. It propels us to make an enquiry into the hidden ground in man's nature and being. In this, we are also shifting our attention to the original living realm of truth. Freedom is really the foundation of the inner possibility of rightness. The reason behind

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this is that freedom receives its own essence from the uniquely essential truth. According to Heidegger, the term 'freedom' indicates "Freedom for the revelation of something already overt.... The freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' at the moment be what it is. Freedom reveals itself as the letting-be of what-is".  

The term 'letting be' in the ordinary sense has a negative meaning of 'disregarding', or 'renouncing' something. But, here, the term 'letting be' has a positive meaning. "To let something be (seinlassen) is in fact to have something to do with it (sich einlassen auf) .... To let what-is be what it is means participating in something overt and its overtness, in which everything that "is" takes up its position and which entails such overtness".  

From the point of view of the nature of truth, the nature of freedom is an exposition of the disclosed


23 Ibid., p. 333
nature of what-is. Thus, according to Heidegger, "freedom is a participation in the revealment of what-is-as-such. (das-seiende als einsolches). The revelation of this is itself guaranteed in that ex-sistent participation whereby the overtness of the overt (die Offenheit des Offenen), i.e. the "There" (Da) of it, is what it is". 24

The fundamental basis on which man is able to exist is preserved in this Da-Sein. Here, existence does not mean existentia as an indication of "occurrence" and "being" (Dasein), that is presence of an "existent". Existence, based on truth as freedom signifies the revealed nature of what-is-as-such. Heidegger remarks that "Man does not "possess" freedom as a property, it is the contrary that is true: freedom, or ex-sistent revelatory Da-sein possesses man and moreover in so original a manner that it alone confers upon him that relationship with what is in totality which is the basis and distinctive characteristic of his history". 25

24 Ibid., pp. 334-35
25 Ibid., p. 336
**Intellectual Truth**

While discussing the nature of intellectual truth, Heidegger says: "only when truth, as conceived in early philosophic thought, has entered into human life and has transformed it profoundly in such a way that it thereby is "Dasein" is it possible to speak of truth in the full sense; that truth, arising with the first thinker's question; what is the essence of all that is?, is of a far greater incisive and revolutionary significance for man and his civilisation than is commonly supposed; and that truth, once it has come into being, is fundamentally one and indivisible".  

Heidegger believes that the idea of truth is always related to the interpretation of the nature of all that exists. Freedom is the revelation of truth. Heidegger says that freedom means the revealment of what is in totality, it cannot be interpreted as 'experience' or 'feeling', because such an interpretation makes, a different sense of freedom and

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26 Ibid., p. 151
it may connote 'life' and 'soul' which only appear to exist in their own right so long as they do not turn aside from their real meaning. Such an interpretation would at once be deprived of its being also. Human behaviour is turned in such a way as to reveal the essential nature of what-is-in-totality. When we are confronted with the varied situations in daily life, this in-totality, appears. It is also something which cannot be calculated and is unintelligible.

Sartre

Sartre presents a highly subjective nature of existentialist thought. A dignified status is given to human being. The fact that existence is given more importance than essence in Sartre's philosophy clearly shows that man is responsible for what he is. The entire responsibility is entrusted in man. Sartre's concept of freedom is based on the distinction between being-in-itself (en-soi) and being-for-itself (Pour-Soi). Being in itself is unchangable, Self contained; being for itself is susceptible to change and has the capacity to evolve. Being-for-itself is constituted by consciousness, freedom
and transcendence. Being-in-itself is the object of consciousness. A clear analysis of the concept of consciousness, freedom and transcendence leads to the conclusion that consciousness and freedom have their origin in "nothingness".

The presence of nothingness or gap leads to the further principle—the principle of freedom and responsibility. "Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man and which forces human reality to make itself instead of to be". Sartre regards freedom as the first condition of action; ".... there is no determinism—man is free. Man is freedom". Nothingness is the principle of emptiness. It is the gap that bestows the being-for-itself the possibility of freedom. It is this principle that makes the being-for-itself free. If there is no gap between the two, the being-for-itself can never become free from the being-in-itself. This difficulty is over come by

maintaining the gap. According to Sartre, only being-for-itself can be free. There is no limit to his freedom. "Freedom is the condition of the pour-soi, and since the pour-soi exists as "lack", its freedom is the expression of its Nothingness. The pour-soi is what it is not, and is not what it is. This instability defines its freedom. Again, since this is the condition of the pour-soi, man is condemned to be free, because man is freedom".29

What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of human reality. "Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free".30 Freedom is not a phenomenon which we can derive from something. It is also not something which we attain. Sartre's man is free, as existence precedes essence. Apart from man's existence, there is nothingness.

For Sartre, freedom does not possess any essence. "It is not subject to any logical necessity; we must

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30 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943) p. 25
say of it what Heidegger said of the Dasein in general: "In it, existence preceeds and commands essence".31

The fact that man exists is a sufficient proof for this. Freedom is something that he possesses throughout his life. It is inevitable to man. It cannot be defined also. For-itself is always in the process of making. It is observed that Sartre identifies consciousness with freedom. Consciousness is always in search of its identity.

An activity, is a projection of for-itself towards 'what is not' and 'what is', can in no way determine by itself, 'what is not'. Sartre thinks that all actions have end and the end in turn is referred to a cause. To call something a 'cause', it has to be practically experienced. The for-itself is that which gives the cause its value as cause or motive. The end at once determines the motive. Sartre observes that the act, the motive, and the end rise together and form a unity. Act gives significance to the motive and the end. The same thing is applicable to the motive and end. Such is the mutual relationship between these

31 Ibid., p. 438
three structures. Sartre learns his freedom through his acts. "Cause, act, and end constitute a continuum, at plenum. These abortive attempts to stifle freedom under the weight of being (they collapse with the sudden upsurge of anguish before freedom) show sufficiently that freedom in its foundation coincides with the nothingness which is at the heart of man". 32

Cause and motive are co-relative—the fact that we become conscious of something is, self consciousness. What is called the motive is nothing but understanding the cause.

Sartre observes that human beings are placed in various situations. History proves how motives arise out of situations. Two ways are suggested of being conscious of something. One may have something in his own non-reflective consciousness. Here the mere awareness alone is present in the sense that one does not think anything regarding it. The second way lies in the fact that one may totally dissociate oneself from it and think about it. In this second line of approach, plans and projects can be carried out in the

32 Ibid., p. 440
light of one's experience. That is, the present experience of a man can be turned into motive for deliberate action.

"There is marked contrast in some of Sartre's examples between the mere riot, into which workers might be led without thinking and which would lead to no serious consequences, and the revolution, which must be planned and must arise out of education and detached reflection". 33

Sartre explains further that the past in itself is really insufficient to give man an impetus to act. A situation by itself cannot create revolution. It is an unbearable situation that causes the revolution. That means it operates as a motive. "It is by a pure wrenching away from himself and the world that the worker can posit his suffering as unbearable suffering and consequently can make of it the motive for revolutionary way of action". 34

34 Ibid., p. 116
According to Sartre actions are possible because human consciousness of freedom is only a part of the meaning of action; freedom is a necessary condition of action. It is only a part of the experience of our own being that we have our relation with the external world. Man is capable of performing the various actions because of his capacity to frame negative. Man as a moral being possesses a capacity to choose his actions as well as his character. According to Sartre, it is facticity, the contingent circumstance of our life-forms the materials of our choice. Human beings are really free and always free. Even if a man is imprisoned—he may choose the possible means to escape from the prison. This is what Sartre means by the For-itself, or consciousness, 'choosing itself'. Sartre very often emphasises the point that conscious beings are essentially free.

In order to promote the aspect of authentic choice, existentialists in general emphasise human freedom and its implications. Most of the Existentialists, Sartre in particular, speak of freedom as the being of man. "The indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of
the acting being.\textsuperscript{35} Authenticity, commitment, and freedom are interrelated concepts and they are complementary to each other. Authenticity is one's capacity to listen to the innermost being, closely when left alone. According to Sartre man is always in the process of becoming. The most important characteristics of action in Sartre's view are that it is always intentional and that it always responds to a "lack". The implication present in the latter is that every action is a venture into non-being.

"It follows at the same time that no actual state of affairs can determine an action, that as such it cannot even determine that I should see in it the lack that might lead to action. For that matter I cannot even recognise a 'state of affairs' without invoking the power of negation/determination which we have seen to be the defining property of the for-itself and which in the context of action is called its freedom".\textsuperscript{36} Freedom, as is conceived by Sartre, is really a state.

\textsuperscript{35} Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943) p. 437

\textsuperscript{36} Peter Caws, Sartre. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979) pp. 112-13
Sartre in his "Existentialism and Humanism" has shown that freedom is the goal of man's desire. Man wants to build up his own life. Man's activities are not determined by the external world. This clearly shows that man is constructive, creative and the logical reflection is present in man. This also brings to light that man is not a slave of the environment but a master of the environment. It may be noted that Berdyaev, in his Personalistic existentialism also establishes the fact that man is creative and creativity is freedom.

Sartre is of the opinion that when a man takes a decision, he takes his decision for the whole mankind. Every man, he asserts, is an individual human being and the decision of one individual is the decision of the whole humanity. When a man is engaged in the war age it is also the responsibility of all men, because whatever may be the decision, it is the decision adopted on behalf of all men. An element of subjectivism is reflected in Sartre's account. Sartre is of the view that man is goal-directed and he always protests against injustice, because it creates obstacles to his development.
Sartre holds the view that God is an enemy of human freedom. In his philosophy the aspect of 'godlessness' and freedom are connected. He himself says that he is a more consistent atheist than the Marxist. The Marxists believe in the victory of social reason and holds on to the objective optimistic view. Sartre doesn't attach any significance and meaning to the historical process. Sartre's whole attention is centralised to the concept of freedom and he is completely depending on the freedom of man.

Freedom is an ideal principle in Sartre and it, in a way, is a limit to the gloomy atmosphere that he sets in his philosophy. But this freedom produces no effective consequences and viewed in that perspective, it has no aim. He never admits that negative statement carries along with it a positive affirmation. The non-being in God is concerned with a distorted form of the knowledge of God.

Being an atheist Sartre denies the existence of God. He says, there is no God to determine or command.
man. Man is totally free. The freedom that is enjoyed by human beings is characterised by a **nothingness** which insinuates itself between motives and acts. Man's activities are not subject to determination of motives. Sartre says, "we are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free, condemned because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world, he is responsible for everything he does".\(^{37}\) Here Sartre uses the term 'responsibility' to mean "Consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an object".\(^{38}\) This responsibility is the consequence of our freedom. When man is free, he is responsible for what he is or what he does.

"The first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence as it is, on him, so that he cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility."


\(^{38}\) - - -. *Being and Nothingness*. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943) p. 553
squarely upon his shoulders". By saying that man is responsible for himself, it is implied not only that he is responsible for himself but also that he is responsible for all men. "When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose himself, but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men". That is, when we choose we always choose the better, and whatever is better to us must be better for all. Thus man's responsibility is concerned with mankind as a whole. This feeling of responsibility leads to anguish. "When a man commits himself to anything, fully realising that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is there by at the sametime a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind-in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility". This is what causes the anguish in man.

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40 Ibid., p. 29

41 Ibid., p. 30
Anguish and Bad faith

Sartre holds that human beings adopt their freedom in different attitudes. Believing in some psychological determinism they try to conceal their freedom which according to Sartre, results in failure because he can conceal it only to the extent of his recognition of the freedom. Anguish according to Sartre, is our experience of freedom. Anguish in its essential nature is consciousness of freedom. Sartre maintains that "it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his freedom, or if you prefer, anguish is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself".42

The following words express the standpoints of Kierkegaard and Heidegger in this context. Kierkegaard describing anguish in the sense of what one lacks, characterises it as anguish in the face of freedom.

42 - - -. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943) p.29
But Heidegger, who had been to a very great extent influenced by Kierkegaard, comprehends anguish, as the **apprehension of nothingness**. These two interpretations of anguish do not seem to be contradictory. Infact the one **implies** the other. According to Sartre, Kierkegaard is right in holding the view that anguish is different from fear. Sartre says, fear always refers to an **object**. Anguish though has the experience of fear, has no definite object. Here the object becomes the for-itself. And anguish can be experienced only by a for-itself which is marked by a distinction of a nothingness which is a possibility. He says "... fear is unreflective apprehension of the transcendent and anguish is reflective apprehension of the self; the one is born in the destruction of the other". 43 But apart from these, there are situations where anguish remains pure without anything to follow before or after. "Anguish, infact is the recognition of a possibility as my possibility; that is, it is constituted when consciousness sees

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43 Ibid., p. 30
itself cut from its essence by nothingness or separated from the future by its very freedom". In such a condition man is fearing of himself. And this fearing of oneself is anguish. By experiencing such anguish we are positing ourselves in bad faith.

Bad faith comes in association with anguish which is associated with fear. Being afraid of his boundless freedom, man tries to conceal himself from his freedom and there by avoid his responsibility. He tries to attribute his action to the determining casualty of the past. Then one seems to tend to believe in passivity and not in possibility. This is the condition of bad faith. About bad faith Sartre says that" .... One determined attitude which is essential to human reality and which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward tself. This attitude, it seems to me, is bad faith (mauvaise foi)". 45

44 Ibid., p. 35
45 Ibid., p. 48
It is something like lying to oneself. But lying here implies the fact that "the liar actually is in complete possession of the truth which he is hiding". And a question is meaningfully asked that, why human being is experiencing bad faith. Sartre answers that man always wants to escape from his freedom. Man, when he realises that there is nobody to determine him, his complete and naked freedom causes anguish and makes him aspire for a fearless condition. And for this man pretends that he is not free or that he is determined. And this is the state of bad faith where man hides him. They hide in themselves as they want to run away from themselves. It is a conscious hiding. Though he affirms the truth within himself he denies it in his words. That is, practitioners of bad faith hide a displeasing truth by presenting a pleasing untruth as truth. It is from themselves that they hide the truth. Hence the duality of the deceiver and the deceived is not there. In fact bad faith implies the unity of a single consciousness. He says, "It follows first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies

46 Ibid., p. 48
are one and the same person, which means that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived".47

Sartre then moves on to explain what he calls 'patterns of bad faith' by giving an example of a woman going out with a man for the first time. Here the woman though she knows the intentions of her companion and her urgency to make a decision does not want to realise it. Avoiding the possibilities of temporal development of the companion she pays heed only to his respectful attitudes. She takes only the explicit and immediate meanings of what he says, which she imagines as objective qualities which are fixed in a permanance as in the case of a table which is round or square. Sartre identifies her personality to her full freedom and says that she is in need of a feeling which is a recognition of her freedom. A situation such as when the companion takes her hand, demands immediate decision—whether to consent or to withdraw. But according to Sartre she is aiming at postponing the moment of decision as long as possible. Here she is in bad faith. She adopts various procedures to maintain

47 Ibid., p. 49
this bad faith. These are what Sartre means by **patterns of bad faith**. He says, "It is a certain art of forming contradictory concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and the negation of that idea". Sartre maintains that the consciousness in being-for-itself wants to run away not from being-in-itself but from itself. This is the cause of bad faith. "The condition of the possibility for bad faith is that human reality, in its most immediate being, in the infrastructure of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is". Hence anguish, bad faith etc. are the net results of freedom.

It is in this context that Sartre speaks of being-for-others. In "Being and Nothingness", Sartre discusses the facticity and transcendence. Facticity consists of certain characters which pertains to us in factual way. It also implies what is really happening to us. Transcendence means the accepted ways of behaviour. Consciousness and facticity are not the same. The important forms of facticity **that restrict the freedom of man**; (1) My place (2) My past, (3) My environment (4) My fellow men, and (5) My death.

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48 Ibid., p. 56
49 Ibid., p. 67
according to sartre, I have a particular relation to my place. the place in which I exist depends on other places and finally it leads me to the place of my birth, which is not determined by my choice. sartre points out that the particular place which an object occupies is the result of my organizing the world. man exists in a certain place. at the same time he has the freedom to go to some other place. sartre says that this place has been assigned to me by my freedom. he observes that the place in which I am placed is a relation. it is a univocal relation which defines my place operates as a relation between something which I am and something which I am not. sartre holds the view that I am responsible for the place I take. the intimate relation between freedom and facticity is evident when he says "without facticity, freedom would not exist—as a power of nihilation and of choice—and without freedom facticity would not be discovered and would have no meaning". 50

50 ibid., pp. 495-96
Sartre is of the opinion that freedom means an escape from the past. He holds that the meaning of the past is strictly dependent on my present project. The past is not within my reach. Being a project, it is an anticipation. There is an end in my view, and I select the past in the light of this end. But the compelling force of the past depends on individuals. Individuals possess the capacity to negate the given. To Sartre past has an existence in the sense that, I can exist without having an association to it. Sartre says that an unchangeable element is present in the past. "The past is integrated with the situation when the for-itself by its choice of the future confers on its past facticity a value, an hierarchical order, and an urgency in terms of which this facticity motivates the act and conduct of the for-itself".\textsuperscript{51}

My Environment

My environment is constituted by the various things which serve as a means to attain my end in view.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 504
Changes may take place in the environment. Others may have a role in producing this change. Things exist in the world are independent of me. It is in terms of this independence, a freedom is constituted.

My Fellowmen

I belong to a world implies the presence of my fellowmen. I may have my own interpretation of the world. My fellowmen may have a different perspective and interpretation regarding the world and other things. Others frame particular opinion of me especially about my externals. The existence of others in the society really constitute a situation for me. Others in the society is a limit to my freedom.

My Death

Death is something which we cannot determine. Death is a pure fact as birth and it comes from external. It is a door opening upon the nothingness of human reality. The life which I experience is something personal and peculiar. So also I become
responsible for my death as for my life. According to Heidegger, death is man's only possibility which cannot be overcome. Sartre thinks that death is not my possibility. It is the destruction of my possibilities. To Sartre death is a contingent fact. Death is the limit of everything and in that sense it is the limit of my situation.

Sartre's account of intersubjectivity is unique. In his "Existentialism and Humanism", he points out that man is responsible for his own individuality. Also he is equally responsible for all men, is emphasised. He emphasises that the existence of other persons are essential for his own existence. Man is the creator of values. He creates values for himself and others. In doing so, he becomes responsible for all others.