CHAPTER V

BHĀSARVĀJĀṆA’S CONTRIBUTION TO NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

"In Indian philosophy the first systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) is to be found in Gautama’s Nyāyasūtras. It also deals with the objects of knowledge (prameyas). Later this study concerning knowledge came to be gradually separated from that of the objects of knowledge, and thus there came into existence works on pure logic and epistemology. This departure is noticeable first in the work of Buddhist and Jaina philosophers, and may be said to have taken place about the time of Dignāga (about 450 A.D.). The logicians of the Nyāya school, most of them commentators on the Nyāyasūtras, for a long time adhered to the old practice of treating epistemology as a part of metaphysics until the time of Bhāsarvājāna (950 A.D.), who included only the study of the means of knowledge in his Nyāyasūra."¹ Dr. D.N. Sastri² calls Bhāsarvājāna the

¹ Jvalaprasad, History of Indian Epistemology, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1958, pp.3-4.
² D.N. Sastri, The philosophy of Nyāya-Vaisēšika and its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga school (Acritiques of Indian Realism), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1978, p.116.
forerunner of Gaṅgeśa in treating the Nyāya as pure epistemology, that is, dealing only with the pramāṇas and in divesting the system altogether of metaphysics. Dr. Jwalaprasad also observes that the epistemological position of Gaṅgeśa and his successors is not very different from that of his immediate predecessors in the old Nyāya school since the most distinguishing features of the new school consisted of very subtle and systematic study of the means of knowledge as an altogether independent and distinct branch of study and which was full of subtle dialectic and highly complex technicality. The first logician who dealt with the theory of knowledge as a subject by itself in his work, was Bhāsarvajña, the author of Nyāyasāra. Dr. Jwalaprasad wonders why Nyāyasāra is not treated as a work of the new school either although there is no reason why it should not be regarded as really the first work of that school. These remarks clearly indicate the importance of Bhāsarvajña as a Nyāya logician.

The importance of Bhāsarvajña

The Nyāyasāra occupies a remarkable position in the history of Indian logic. In the Nyāyasūtra of

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3 History of Indian Epistemology, op.cit., pp.341-42
4 ibid., p.342
Gautama sixteen categories namely pramāṇa (means of right knowledge), prameya (object of right knowledge), samśaya (doubt), prayojana (purpose), drṣṭānta (familiar instance), siddhānta (established tenets), avayava (members of syllogism), tarka (hypothetical reasoning), Nirṇaya (ascertainment), vāda (debate), jalpa (wrongling), vitandā (cavil), hetvābhāsa (fallacies of reason), cēhala (quibble), jāti (futility) and nigrāhasthāna (point of defeat) are stated, defined and examined. On the other hand Dignāga and Siddhasena Divākara, the propounders of the systematic logic of the Buddhists and Jainas took up in their works only one of the sixteen categories viz., pramāṇa and elaborated it in such a way that it might include other categories also as far as they were consistent with the science of the means of valid knowledge. This doctrine of pramāṇa was treated so as to be applied to the religious systems of the Hindus, the Buddhists and the Jainas. Similarly, Inference (anumāṇa), a variety of pramāṇa, which was very briefly noticed by Aksapāda received a full treatment at the hands of the Buddhist and Jaina logicians. Numerous technical terms were coined and great subtleties were introduced into the definitions of philosophical terms, the theory of syllogism etc. They rejected prameya on the ground that it was useless
in works on logic to specify the objects of knowledge. Bhāsarvajña was the only person among the Hindu logicians who imbided the influence of the Buddhist and Jaina logicians. Following the method current in his time Bhāsarvajña treated in his Nyāyasāra only one topic, that is, pramāṇa which he divided into three such as Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (Inference) and Āgama (Verbal testimony). In contrast to Aksapāda he rejected Upamāṇa (comparison) as a separate pramāṇa and even goes to the extent of declaring that the Sūtrakāra accepted only three pramanas and the separate mention of Upamāṇa is due to its importance and includes it under verbal testimony. This threefold division of pramāṇa brought Bhāsarvajña close to the Sāmkhyas and the Jainas but distinguished him from the Buddhists who recognised only two types of pramāṇas - Pratyakṣa and Anumāṇa. Like the Buddhist and Jaina logicians Bhāsarvajña divided inference into svārtha (that for one’s sake) and parārtha (that for the sake of others). Following the Vaiśeṣikas he also divides inference into Drṣṭa (seen) and Sāmānyato drṣṭa (commonly seen) including the pūrvavat and śeṣavat inference under drṣṭa. He also gives a detailed account of the fallacious reasons, examples and so on.

The other topics such as cchala, jāti etc.,
and the prameya were not altogether overlooked by Bhāsarvajña. He deals with them in connection with the discussion of the number of pramāṇas, parārthānumāna etc. Dealing with the topic of inference he elaborately deals with vāda. Agreeing with the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṁsakas and differing from the views of the Vaiśeṣikas etc., who denied the eternality of pleasure at the time of Salvation (mokṣa), Bhāsarvajña defines Final Liberation of the Soul as the final release from pain accompanied by the experience of everlasting pleasure. He has also made some changes in the Yogasūtras. According to him yogic practices lead to the attainment of Release. He mentions only three klesas viz. Rāga (desire), dveṣa (hatred) and moha (illusion) and merges avidyā and asmitā under illusion. According to him yamas are purificatory acts such as cleanliness and so on. Thus we can see some notable difference in Bhāsarvajña from that of the earlier writers and it may easily be assumed that he was a scholar having thorough knowledge of all the philosophical systems current in his time which have considerably influenced him in shaping his logical theories. In this chapter an attempt is made to assess his main contributions to the development of the Nyāya philosophical system.
Conception of pramāṇa

A pramāṇa, according to Vātsyāyana, is an instrument of knowledge that by which the knower knows the object as it really is. A cognition is said to be valid when it represents the true nature of an object and the validity and invalidity of cognitions are determined by or inferred from the successful and unsuccessful actions respectively. Bhāsarvajña defines pramāṇa as the means of valid cognitions which is freed from doubt (samsāya) and error (viparyaya). Following the Sūtrakāra five varieties of doubt are mentioned by him giving the same definitions and examples. Ūha (conjecture) and anadhyavasāya (non-apprehension) are included under samsāya since he finds no difference between them as they are non-determinate and there is nothing particular between them. Viparyaya (error) is false determination like the cognition of two moons or the perception of an elephant in a dream and it is nothing more than false knowledge. Recollective knowledge (smaṁajñāna) is excluded by Bhāsarvajña from pramāṇa. He also distinguishes between pramāṇa, pramātā and prameya. Valid knowledge (pramāṇa) is the correct apprehension of an object and the substratum of this knowledge is the knower (pramātā) and the object of this knowledge is prameya. If we
closely examine the definition of pramāṇa we can see that he has elaborated it in such a way that it must incorporates the definitions of the Buddhists, Jainas as well as the earlier Hindu logicians. Thus the terms samyak, anubhava and sādhana in the definition when elaborated by Bhāsarvajña comprehend all other definitions of the rival schools and that of his own so that it should be acceptable to all the logicians of the time. In defining pramāṇa in such way Bhāsarvajña must have been influenced by the Buddhists and Jainas and his definition is infallible in itself since it satisfies all the requisite conditions of a pramāṇa without deviating from any of the accepted tenets of the Hindu logic and at the same time satisfying the Buddhist and Jaina conditions of the definition of a pramāṇa.

The Jaina logicians consider Recollective knowledge (smaranajñāna) as a pramāṇa and includes it under non-perceptual (parokṣa) knowledge. The Buddhists, the Vedantino and the Mīmāṃsakas do not consider smaranajñana as a pramāṇa. They hold that it is not a

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5 grhitagrahaṇannesuṣtam samtāt "
(Pramāṇavārttika 2.5)
samtāt viкалpa[jñānam]
(Manoraṃḥananditīkā)
pramāṇa because it cognises which is already cognised.
The Buddhists in fact do not accept any knowledge involving thought (vikalpa-jñānamātra) as a pramāṇa.
Bhāsarvajña, following the views of the Naiyāyikas, Buddhists etc., and differing from the Jaina viewpoint excludes recollective knowledge from pramāṇa.

Thus according to Bhāsarvajña an asamyaganubhava or apramā or false knowledge can be classified as consisting of five kinds of samśaya, which include ūha, snādhyavasāya and viparyaya (which also includes svapnajñāna etc.) which the Vaiśeṣikas accept as a sub-division of apramā. On the other hand a correct cognition is that which is devoid of all apprehensions that has a tinge of falsity and it excludes recollective knowledge, doubt and error producing the knowledge of an object as possessed of attributes which are in accordance with the real nature of the object. This definition of pramāṇa, as pointed out, was given keeping in mind the definitions of the earlier Naiyāyikas and the author has tried to avert all the oppositions on the definition.

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6 In his commentary on Nyāyasāra, Bhāsarvajña mentions eight types of khyātis while he deals with the definition of viparyaya. Thus according to him the khyātis are 1. Asatkhyāti 2. Anyathākhyāti 3. Akhyāti 4. Atmakhyāti 5. Anirvacanīyakhyāti 6. Prasiddhārthakhyāti 7. Alamkārthakhyāti and 8. Sūrtipramoṣa. Rejecting one by one he establishes anyathākhyāti which is acceptable to the Naiyāyikas.
levelled against by the earlier philosophers. Thus this is one of the best definitions of pramāṇa given by the logicians of the time.

The sources of true knowledge as recognised by the various philosophical systems of India are the following: The Čārvākas recognise only one source of true knowledge viz. pratyakṣa (perception), the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists accept two pratyakṣa and anumāṇa (perception and inference), the Śāmkhyas, the Jainas and a group of Naiyāyikas accept three viz. pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama (verbal testimony). The Naiyāyika proper accept upamāna (comparison) to these three. The followers of the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā add Arthāpatti (presumption) to these four and the followers of Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas and the Śaṅkara Vedāntins accept non-perception (abhāva or anupalabdhi) in addition to these five. The Paurāṇikas further add Probability (sambhava) and Tradition (aitihya) to the above six while the Tāntrikas accept Cēṣṭā (gesture) as still another source of valid knowledge. Bhāsarvajña, supposed to be the representative of a group of the Naiyāyikas, following the Śāmkhyas and Jainas accepted only three kinds of pramāṇas and rejected comparison (upamāna) as a separate source of valid knowledge.

**Perception**

Bhāsarvajña’s definition of perception runs as
follows:- "perception is the instrument of correct and
direct cognition". This definition of Bhāsarvajña is
applicable to the generated as well as eternal perception.
The normal or ayogi pratyakṣa is the instrument of the
knowledge of the object capable of being perceived through
the peculiar contact of the sense organs with the object
helped by favourable circumstances such as light, time,
space, merit, etc. Things remote by distance, time or
by their very nature are perceived by the yogis through
yogipratyakṣa and seers can enjoy such super-normal
perception. Suklalji Sanghavi observes thus: "The
question arises as to whether perception is only of the
indeterminate type or it can also be of the determinate
type. In this regard the Buddhists submit that perception
can be only of the indeterminate type. The remaining
systems are, however, of the view that perception can
possibly of both types, indeterminate as well as deter-
minate."

Till the time of the medieval age of Indian
logic, the philosophers while defining perception, used
to keep in view only the cases of generated perception,

7 Nyāyasāra, op.cit., p.2
8 Suklalji Sanghavi, Advanced studies in Logic and
   Metaphysics, Indian Studies - past and present,
   Calcutta, 1959, p.51
but in the medieval times, that is, after the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems of logic established the existence of God in the shape of the creator of the universe and the author of the Vedas, divine perception came to be regarded as an eternal variety, and hence there arose for the theistic philosophers the problem of formulating a definition common to the generated and eternal types of perception. The first attempt at formulating such a common definition has been made by Bhāsarvajña, for he defines perception which is applicable to the generated as well as eternal perception. Similarly Śālikānātha, the follower of Prabhākara, when he characterised perception as "direct awareness" (sākṣāt pratītī) was only offering an alternative definition of perception which is capable of covering both the sensuous perception of eternal objects as well as the non-sensual perception of soul. Bhāsarvajña's phrase "aparekṣāmabhava" and Śālikānātha's sākṣāt pratītī were elucidated in a new terminology by the neo-Naiyāyikas when they offered a definition common to the generated as well as the eternal types of perception.

Divisions of pratyakṣa

Bhāsarvajña first of all gives a twofold division of pratyakṣa (1) Ayogi (non-transcendental) and (2) Yogi (transcendental). Of these ayogi pratyakṣa is caused by
indriyārthasannikarṣa (sense-object contact) which is of six types. Yogapratyakṣa is also twofold yuktayogapratyakṣa (abstract meditation) and ayuktayogapratyakṣa (non-abstract meditation).

From a very ancient time almost all the philosophers except the Gārvākas divided perception into two kinds yogi and ayogi. According to them the non-transcendental perception is that which arises through the sense organs or the mind. The transcendental perception is named differently in different systems, the Sāmkhya-yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists calling it as yogapratyakṣa or yogijñāna. And it is supposed to be produced as a result of the merits acquired through yogic practices. The Mīmāṃsakas who is opposed to the idea of omniscience (sarvajñatva) accepts as a subsidiary to transcendental release (mokṣa) a kind of self cognition (ātma-jñāna), which, really, is yogic or transcendental knowledge. In Vedānta, it is the witness-consciousness in the form of God (Īśvara sākṣi-caitanya) that stands for the transcendental perception. To the Jainas, perception itself is that which is not acquired through the senses. In other

9 sarvatraiva hi vijñānam samskāratvena gamyate parāṇgam cātma-vijñānāda-nyatreyavadhāraṇāt (Śloka-vārttika p.240)
words, non-transcendental perception of the Hindu philosophers is not perception to the Jainas but transcendental perception. But Jainas divide perception into sāmyṣṭa-vahārika pratyakṣa and pāramārthika pratyakṣa representing the non-transcendental and transcendental perceptions respectively. According to them the cause of pāramārthika-pratyakṣa, the special competence of the soul (viśīṣṭa-ātma-sakti) is really the competence acquired through yogic powers (yogaja-dharma). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāmkhya-yoga and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā systems admit the existence of yogins and a yogic transcendental cognition on their part. The neo-logicians admit this non-natural contact of the sense organs with their objects brought about by concentration of mind (yogaja sannikārśa).

Bhāsarvajña divides the yogic-perception as yukta and ayukta, that is in a state of abstract meditation and in a state of non-abstract meditation. The yukta type is the power of seers to perceive through and intuitive vision the whole of the truth. A contact of the mind and the soul together with the merit which the yogin has acquired is the exact cause of this form of super-normal knowledge. The second type is the ayukta-yogi perception, which is of a lower grade of this super-normal perception and differs very little from ordinary.

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10 Tattvārthādhigamasūtra 1-11, 22
perception. It is originated by a contact of four, three or two of the sense-organs, that is, this perception results as in the ordinary case, according to the nature of the object known. He includes ārṣajñāna or cognition of seers also in the yuktayogipratyakṣa since it is derived from the high merits acquired by them. In this respect Bhāsarvajña, like the earlier Naiyāyikas differs from the Vaiśeṣikas who accepted ārṣa as a separate means of knowledge.

It is observed: "The question next arises whether transcendental perception is exclusively indeterminate or exclusively determinate, or both indeterminate and determinate. There is no unanimity in answering this question. According to the Buddhist logicians and the adherents of Śāṅkarite Vedānta transcendental perception has to be but indeterminate and never determinate. Rāmānuja holds a diametrically opposite view viz. that all perception empirical as well as transcendental, has to be but determinate and never indeterminate. The other Vedicist traditions like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc., seem to be of the view that transcendental perception may be either indeterminate or determinate. We say "seem to be " because the staunch Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña (in Nyāyasāra p.4) has clearly spoken of the two sorts of yogic perception, viz. 

indeterminate and determinate not withstanding the fact
that old texts like कन्दासूक्त्रa and प्रासादपादनांश्यa
contain no clear indication to that effect."11 The Jainas
say that the transcendental or पृष्ठ्यन्तिकa perception
is of both types, i.e. indeterminate as well as deter-
minate.12 भार्तर्जिणa giving a twofold division of योगी-
pratyaksa viz. determinate (सर्विकल्पकa) and indeter-
minate (निर्विकल्पकa) holds that the former is the cause
of apprehension of an object comprehending its connection
with name and such other attributed while the latter gives
the bare existence of an object not accompanied by the
apprehension of name, form etc., which is generated at
the very first moment of the contact of the sense organs
with the object as well as the knowledge of a thing of
the seers in deep contemplation.

The existence of indeterminate type of cognition
is accepted under one name or another, by all the tradi-
tions except three, that is, the मधवa and वल्लभa
school of Vedantins and the grammarian philosopher
Bhartrhari13 and earlier vaiyākaraṇas preceding him who
do not admit the existence of 'perception of the general'

11 Suklalji Sanghavi, op.cit., p.56
12 Satkari Mookerjee, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-
Absolutism, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1978, p.146
13 K.A. Subramania Iyer, Bhartrhari, Deccan College,
Poona, 1969
anywhere in the course of cognitive process. But this
perception of the general (sāmānya-bodha) was acceptable
to the Jainas who calls it 'darśana', the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas,
Sāmkhya-yoga and Pūrva as well as Uttara Mīmāṃśa who
name it 'nirvikalpaka' or 'ālocaṇāmṛta'. The Buddhists
too adopt it and call it by the name 'nirvikalpaka'.
Thus all these traditions agree in maintaining that all
cognitive processes invariably arise in a cognition which
grasps the bare existence of the object concerned, but
where nothing is revealed in the form of the qualified
or the qualification.

All the traditional schools which accept indeter-
minate cognition agree in admitting the existence of non-
transcendental indeterminate cognition, that is, the
indeterminate cognition born of sense-object contact and
also transcendental indeterminate cognition. Both the
Jaina and the Buddhist traditions accept a type of in-
determinate cognition which arises independently of sense-
object contact and on account of yoga or some kind of
special competence of the soul.

Bhāsarvajña not only accepts the indeterminate
and determinate cognitions as pramāṇa but he includes them
under pratyakṣa. His definition of pratyakṣa is shaped
in such a way that he has merged the views of the Buddhists,
Jainas, the Mīmāṃsakas and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems as well as the Śāmkhyayoga view points of a pratyaksapramāṇa. He has also elaborated it in a way that it may include all the varieties of pratyakṣajñāna including that of the yogins which were accepted by the various philosophical traditions before his time. Thus he shows a very keen sense of observation and intelligence that he never goes against a theory which is justifiable on reasonable grounds on the mere basis that it is against his philosophical tradition but tries to receive such reasonable arguments into the fold of his system which is helpful to the enrichment of his philosophical traditions.

To summarise the classification of Bhāsarvajña’s pratyakṣa pramāṇa, first of all he broadly divided it into yogi and Ayogi pratyakṣa. The ayogipratyakṣajñāna is derived through the sense-object relation of six types and the yogipratyakṣajñāna is divided into two kinds viz. yukta-yogi and ayukta yogi. This yogic perception is again divided into two - savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka. The ārṣajñāna or perception of yogins is also included under yukto-yogi pratyakṣajñāna. The perception of yogins in deep contemplation is treated as nirvikalpakapratyakṣa by Bhāsarvajña. Thus the division of pratyakṣa proposed
by Bhāsarvajña runs as follows:

**PERCEPTION (PRATYAKŚA)**

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**YOGIPRATYAKŚA**

including Arṣajñāna

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**AYOGIPRATYAKŚA**

derived through indriyārthaśānnikāraṇa of six types

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**Yuktayogipratyakśa**

**Ayuktayogipratyakśa**

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**Savikalpakajñāna**

**Nirvikalpakajñāna**

including yuktayogijñāna

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**Treatment of inference**

"The most important method of knowledge is Anumāna or inference. Its nature, form and contents have been discussed by all schools leading to the development of an elaborate literature, unequalled for its precise expression and analysis. The basic document, for all these discussions was the Nyāya theory of inference. The Naiyāyikas naturally influenced to a considerable extent the thought of many schools and many of their theories regarding inference were accepted almost in toto by some of the other schools."**¹⁴** This

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statement clearly shows the importance of inferential knowledge which held a prominent position among the logicians especially that of the Jainas and the Buddhists. The philosophical development of inferential cognition is divided into three periods viz. the Vedicist, the Buddhist and the Navya-Nyāya period. Among them the Vedicist period represents the initial stage of the development of the theory of inferential cognition. This is called the Vedicist since the Jaina and the Buddhist traditions had no part in the initiation of this development but had, in the beginning literally adopted from the Vedicist tradition the systematic account of inferential cognition. Two traditions of the Vedicist period may be cited one being the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā represented by Praśastapāda and Śabara respectively. Both these mention just two types of inference. The other Vedicist tradition includes the system of Nyāya, Śāmkhya and Caraka accepting three types of inference. Though the words designating the types of inference are identical, the examples elucidating these types are not identical among these schools.

The Jainas mention three types of inference and the terms by which these three types are mentioned are

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15 Suklaḍī Sanghavi, op.cit., pp.78-82
literally the same as in the Nyāya system of the Hindus. In their example the Jainas incorporate, through their divisions and sub-divisions the Vaiśeṣika-Mīmāṃsā tradition of accepting only two types of inference.

The Buddhist tradition contains an account only of the three types of inference accepted in Nyāya-sūtra and it may be observed that until 4th or 5th century A.D., the Jaina and the Buddhist logicians simply accepted the account of inference as given in the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-Mīmāṃsā texts.

The Buddhist period in the development of the account of inferential cognition starts with the renowned logician Dignāga, who opposed the Vedicist definition and classification of inference offering a new definition and classification of his own from the Buddhist standpoint and this definition of Dignāga was accepted by the later Buddhist logicians as well. This Buddhist tradition influenced the Jainas also and Siddhasena Divākara offered an independent definition of inference from the Jaina viewpoint and the later Jaina logicians following him rejected the Vedicist definition. They also developed this doctrine of inference in such a way that in no other systems of logic this type of pramāṇa acquired an elaborate treatment.
The Nyaya-Nyāya period while retaining the definition of inference offered by the earlier Vedicist logicians, introduced it in such subtle refinements, as were honoured in later times. These were accepted not only by the later Hindu logicians of the Nyaya-Nyāya school alone but also by the Vedicists who resorted to the refining of inference.

At the time of defining anumāna and elaborating it giving its divisions, Bhāsarvajña has in his mind all the earlier philosophical traditions of the Hindus as well as of the Buddhists and hence he tries to give a definition which is acceptable to all those schools. He defines inference as the means or instrument of indirect cognition of an object, by way of its infallible and invariable concomitance with another object. An invariable concomitance or avinābhāva is the pervasion by nature (svabhāvataḥ) of the middle term by the major term. Vāsudeva the author of Nyāyasārāpadapančika commentary points out that this invariable concomitance must not be arbitrarily conceived, but must be in the very nature of things. Thus in the stock instance of

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16 D.C. Guha, Nyaya-Nyāya system of Logic, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1979
the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire we know that there is the causal relation between smoke and fire and hence there is a thoroughly convincing reason for believing them as ever together, for, the cause is bound to be there where the effect is. But we know that whereas an effect cannot be conceived without a cause, a cause can be conceived as without an effect. Smoke cannot be without fire, but fire may give rise to smoke or may not give rise to smoke, its effect. So a true vyāpti or avinābhāva must be a natural one and not one that is assumed for the time being nor that which depends upon some conditions and hence Bhāsarvajña uses the word svabhāvataḥ in his definition of vyāpti or avinābhāva. In defining vyāpti Bhāsarvajña seems to have been influenced to a certain extent by the Buddhists and the Jaina since his definition of vyāpti is quite similar to that of the Jaina and the Buddhists. Similarly the definition of anumāna also is given, it seems, under the influence of the Buddhists. In the very definition of anumāna Bhāsarvajña uses the term "indirect knowledge" (parokṣā-nubhava) which the Jaina and Buddhists used to call as anumāna. In the same way in the definition of vyāpti, Bhāsarvajña inducts the term avinābhāva - which the Buddhists used to name-vyāpti and the definition of vyāpti is quite similar to that given by the Buddhist and Jaina logicians.
Following the earlier Naiyāyikas Bhāsarvajña divides avinābhāva into two, viz., the Affirmative (avyāvavāpti) and the Negative (vyatirekavāpti). The first is the pervasion relation of the universal middle term with the universal major term. The second is the pervasion of the absence of the universal middle term with the absence of the universal major term.

Threefold division of middle term

All the earlier Naiyāyikas accept three kinds of hetu (reason or middle term) and these three types of hetu correspond to the three kinds of inferences accepted by them. That is, the earlier Naiyāyikas accept three types of inference viz., purely affirmative (kevalānyāyī), purely negative (kevalavyatirekī) and affirmative-negative (avyāvavatirekī) which correspond to the three types of inference mentioned by earlier logicians like Uddyotakara etc. Bhāsarvajña also, following the earlier Naiyāyikas accept the threefold division of the middle term but in the classification of inference he does not follow these Naiyāyikas.

Classification of Inference

In his classification of inference Bhāsarvajña
prefers to follow the path of Kaṇāda and declares that inference is of two kinds viz., drṣṭa (directly perceived) and sāmānyato drṣṭa (recognised by universality). Drṣṭa is that inferential cognition of an object which leads to the direct perception of that object as in the case of smoke with regard to the knowledge of fire. Sāmānyato drṣṭa is the inferential cognition of an object that is naturally remote from the sense organs like the knowledge of colour, form etc., by the sense organ eye and so on. Bhāsarvajña also includes the pūrvavat (a priori) and sēsavat (a posteriori) types of anumāna accepted by the Śūtrakāra under drṣṭa apart from accepting the other variety sāmānyato drṣṭa.

Two varieties of inference

After defining drṣṭa and sāmānyato drṣṭa types of inference, Bhāsarvajña again proceeds to divide it into svārtha (inference for one's own sake) and parārtha (inference for the sake of others). The former is that which serves to arrive at a conclusion by one's own self while the latter is that in which a man having himself inferred a thing wishes to carry conviction to another person and for this purpose puts forward a complete syllogism consisting of five members.
Dr. A.B. Keith and other scholars maintain that the division of inference into svārtha and parārtha is one of the important and original contribution made by Dignāga to Indian thought and borrowed by the Hindu logicians such as Praśastapādā and others from Dignāga. But Shri Barendranathra Vedāntatīrtha refutes this view thus: "The very doctrine which is regarded as a contribution of Dignāga to the logical theory is traceable to the 'Śūtrakāra' and the 'Bhāsyakāra' of the Nyāya system. That the problem viz., the division of inference into 'svārtha' and 'parārtha' had occupied the attention of earlier, logicians is clear from Dignāga's and Uddyotakara's references to different views prevailing on the subject. Gotama's enunciation of a five membered syllogism and Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, where he speaks of anumāna as distinct from paramanyāya or nyāyaprayoga would be unintelligible if it were assumed that Gotama and Vātsyāyana were not fully alive to the importance of the division in question and as such they evidently presuppose the division of anumāna into 'svārtha' and 'parārtha' though it is not explicitly expressed in so many terms. It follows from this that a careful investigation into the Śūtra and the Bhāṣya would clearly show that the division in question should be held to be at

37 A.B. Keith; Indian Logic and atomism, Oxford University Press, 1921, pp.106-108
least as old as the Sātrakāra himself. However it is clear that Dignāga was the first person to divide inference into svārtha and parārtha and deal with it so elaborately that it developed as an important logical doctrine. Later on the Jainas, Buddhists and the Navya Naiyāyikas adopted this division propounded by Dignāga.

Svārthānumāna is informal knowledge and represents the mental process through which an individual passes when he arrives at an inferential cognition. When a conviction is sought to be produced in the mind of another one shall have to describe in words the existence of an object through the premises. Thus parārthānumāna is based on svārthānumāna, since it is possible through a person who has observed the existence of a thing by himself. These premises which are recognised by the person and imparted to another through the medium of language must be precise, since it may lead to misunderstanding, if not explained clearly. Dharmottarācārya (847 A.D.) the author of Nyāyabindutikā says that parārthānumāna is in the form of words (śabdātmaka). Words are the cause of conveying to the hearer's mind lingajñāna (knowledge of the sign or mark) which leads one to anumāna. That is, the process is induced by another's words in the hearer's mind and the hearer, through the mental process arrives

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18 Narendra Chandra Vedāntatīrthā, Introduction to Nyāyakusumānjali, University of Calcutta, 1964, p. 37
at an inferential cognition. So an inferential cognition for the sake of others must essentially employ Nyāya or syllogism.

The various factors involved in the inferential reasoning are clearly brought out in a syllogism. Akṣapāda Gautama divided the process of reasoning into five avayavas or members which form the essential parts of a complete syllogistic expression. This division of five members of syllogism was accepted by all the later Naiyāyikas.

Many have objected to Akṣapāda Gautama’s division of inferential reasoning saying that its division into five is unnecessarily prolix and that the Buddhists syllogism is more simple. But in his Nyāyabhūṣāna, Bhāsravajña examines all such opposite views and rejects them. From Nyāyasūtra itself it is clear that the Sūtrakāra has adopted the three kinds of hetu, two types (homogeneous and heterogeneous) of example, (udāharana), application (upanaya) and Conclusion (nigamana). So it is not possible to say that the Buddhists are the propounders of the syllogism even though they developed the system. So Bhāsravajña defines the five membered syllogistic expression in a line that it is given by the earlier Naiyāyikas such as Vatsyāyana, Uddyotakara.
etc., but in elaborating the system he closely follows the Buddhist and Jaina traditions accepting and incorporating their views about the fallacies of reason, example, etc. Bhāṣarvajña, also following the earlier Nyāya teachers, accepts the five membered syllogism saying that this syllogism is of the highest importance in as much as it serves to convince an opponent and is helpful in discussions since it leads to the correct understanding of a thing. He again holds that the process of inference is complete only with the statement of the reason and vyāpti (invariable concomitance) because it is capable of establishing the means of valid knowledge which again is capable of establishing the absence of the contradictory major term and without this the existence of the major term (sādhyā) cannot be established.19

Divisions of Hetu

Bhāṣarvajña defines reason or Hetu as the statement of the instrument or middle term which is capable of pointing out the reason. As stated above, he divides hetu into three anvayavyatirekā (affirmative-negative), kevalānvayī (purely affirmative) and kevalavatirekī

19 Nyāyasāra, op.cit., p.15
(purely negative). The anvayavyatirekī type of hetu is divided by him into five kinds - (1) paksadharma (the presence of the characteristics of a reason in the minor term (pākṣa) (2) sapakṣe sattva (the presence of the characteristics of a reason in a similar instance (sapakṣa) (3) vipakṣāt vyavruttītva (the absence of the characteristics of a reason from an opposite or dissimilar instance (Vipakṣa) (4) abādhitaviśaya (non-subjection of the statement in the minor term) and (5) asatpratipakṣatva (the absence of a genuine antagonistic instance). This anvayavyatirekī reason is again twofold, one being wholly existent in the homologue (sapakṣavrūtti) and the other being partially existent in the homologue (sapakṣaika-dēśavrūtti).

The concomitance between reason and conclusion can either be affirmative or negative and in normal conditions it is possible to establish both the relations. This twofold nature of concomitance is attributed to reason and thus Bhāsarvajña accepts three varieties of reason, that is, the statement of concomitance in an affirmative form, negative form and affirmative-negative form. Five varieties of the affirmative-negative forms are mentioned. Of these five conditions the kevalānvayī hetu is required to fulfil four and the fifth vipakṣāt vyāvrtti is, by the very nature of the case is excluded;
for, as a matter of fact the conclusion in such a case is co-extensive with all existence and thus no heterologues can be found. This kevalānvayī is also divided into two with regard to its existence in the whole of the homologue and in a part of it.

The kevalavyatireki hetu is purely negative in form. This reason also must fulfil four conditions, for sapakṣasattva cannot exist in it since no sapakṣa is existent in it as it is of a negative type. This reason can be stated in two different ways with the usual ablative ending of the words indicating the reason or by appending prasaṅgat to the word expressing the reason.

In his definition and elaboration of reason Bhāsarvajñā had followed the Nyāya tradition, for one can see that the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Buddhist school accepting three types of the necessities of a hetu while the Jainas accept neither the threefold division nor the fivefold division. Bhāsarvajñā elaborates his theory following the earlier logicians like Vācaspatimiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa etc., though he deviates from the view of Uddyotakara who accepted only a threefold division.

Fallacious reasons

Bhāsarvajñā’s definition of Hetvābhāsa or
fallacious reason is the same as that given by the Bāṣyakāra. Hetvābhāsas do not possess all the characteristics of the true reason and yet they are sufficiently similar to a reason to appear as such. With regard to the general classification of hetvābhāsas logicians hold divergent views. Akṣapāda Gautama admits and gives the definitions of five types of fallacious reasons. Uddyotakara holds that the true reason, that is put forward in support of the proposition is endowed with three characteristics viz., pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣat vyāvṛttih and notes some points of similarity between true probans and fallacious probans that (1) just as the true reason is put forward in support of a proposition, the same is the case with fallacious reason and this constitute a similarity, (2) the true reason is endowed with three characteristics and if the fallacious probans happens to possess any of these three characteristics this constitute a similarity with true reason. Any way Uddyotakara accepts the five types of fallacious reasons accepted by the Sūtrakāra. Kanāda makes a clear

\[20\] Nyāyasāra, op.cit., p.7
hetulaksanaraḥitah hetuvadavabhāsamānah hetvābhāsah
Also cf. Nyāyabhāsyā, Chowkamba Sanskrit Samsthan, Varanasi, 1970, p.105
hetulaksanāh bhāvādahetavo hetusamānyādhetuvadābhāsamānah
mention of three types, but Praśastapāda, while explain-
ing Kaṇāda's aphorisms, makes a fourfold division viz.,
asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika and anadhyavasita. The
Mīmāṃsakas also accept four kinds of fallacious reasons
such as asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika and asādharana.
He also mention fallacies of minor term. The Sāmkhyas
accept the three accepted by Kaṇāda. Dignāga, the Buddhist
logician, in his Nyāyapraveśa mentions three kinds of
fallacious reason viz. asiddha, anaikāntika and viruddha.
The first type (asiddha) is divided by him into four
kinds and the second into six and the third into four.
Dharmakīrti and other followers of Dignāga accept these
three divisions of hetvābhāsa even though there are
some differences with respect to their sub-divisions.
They also deal with fallacies of the minor term (pakṣā-
bhāsa) of which Dignāga mentions nine varieties.

The Jaina logicians also give an account of
three types of fallacious reasons such as asiddha,
viruddha and anaikāntika. They define the fallacious
reason as that which arises from doubt, misconception
or non-conception about the middle term. Bhāṭṭa Akaḷāṅka
and other Jaina logicians like Māṇikyaṇandin accept four
kinds of hetvābhāsa, the three accepted by the former
logicians and a new type known as 'ākiñcitkara'. In
his division of fallacious reasons Bhāṣarvajñā followed
both Akṣapāda and Kanāda and enumerated six types of it constituting of the five accepted by the Naiyāyikas and adding to it one - the anadhyayasita - which is accepted by the Vaiṣeṣikas. In elaborating the hetvābhāsa doctrine Bhāsarvajña gives many varieties of each of these types. In illustrating these varieties he has vastly made use of the Buddhist and the Jaina classification of the varieties of the hetvābhāsas and the fallacies of the minor term accepted by them. In this respect Bhāsarvajña is the first Hindu logician to give a detailed account of the fallacious reasons along with its sub-varieties and he is the first person to give a scientific classification of the fallacious reason. In classifying the fallacious reasons in a scientific and systematic manner giving its sub divisions and clearly expounding them along with their example he excelled the Buddhists, the Jinas and the Hindu logicians.

Bhāsarvajña defines the asiddha (unproved) hetvābhāsa as the fallacious reason in which the existence of the middle term in the minor term is not ascertained beyond doubt. In Nyāyasūtra the name of asiddha is mentioned as sādhyasama.21 This fallacious type puts forward a reason which is not different from

21 Nyāyasūtra 1-2-8
what is to be proved and itself requires proof. That is, when the object put forward by way of proof is such that it has still to be made known as an inference. The later Naiyāyikas divide asiddha into three types viz., (1) āśrayāsiddha (that which has an unknown substratum) (2) svarūpāsiddha (that which has its very form not known) and (3) vyāpyatvāsiddha (that which has its invariable concomitance not ascertained). That is, where the substratum is unknown it is 'āśrayāsiddha', where the nature of the middle term is absolutely unknown we get 'svarūpāsiddha' and when the invariable concomitance is not known we have 'vyāpyatvāsiddha!

Aksapāda Gautama in his Sūtra and Vātsyāyana in his Bāṣya do not mention any varieties of this fallacious reason. But Praśastapaṇḍa and Dignāga give a clear and almost similar account of the four kinds of asiddha. 22 The Śāmkhya philosopher Māthara 23 in his Vṛtti too speaks of four sub-varieties of asiddha. Dharmakīrti, apart from accepting the four types of the earlier Buddhists again divided āśrayāsiddha variety into two. 24 The Jaina logician

22 Praśastapaṇḍa-bāṣya, Chowkamba Sanskrit Series Office Varanasi, 1966, p.190
ubhayāsiddhavyutarāsiddha tadbhāvāsiddhānumeyāsiddhasaṁceti
Nyāyapravēṣa, Gackward Oriental Series No.38, Oriental Institute, Beroda, 1966, p.5
ubhayāsiddhavyutarāsiddha sandigdhāsiddhānāśrayāsiddhasaṁceti.
24 Nyāyabindu, Chowkamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1954, p.67
Māṇikyanandin follows Dharmakīrti in his classification of asiddha though he changes the terminology of Dharmakīrti in explaining them.

Sub-varieties of Asiddha

Bhāsarvajña is the first logician who formulated fourteen sub-varieties of asiddha. The fourteen varieties illustrated by him are (1) svarūpāsiddha, (2) vyadhikaraṇāsiddha, (3) viśeṣyāsiddha, (4) viśeṣaṇāsiddha, (5) bhāgāsiddha, (6) āśrayāsiddha, (7) āśrayaikadesāsiddha, (8) vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddha, (9) vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddha, (10) sendigdhāsiddha, (11) sendigdhaviśeṣyāsiddha, (12) sendigdhaviśeṣaṇāsiddha, (13) viruddhaviśeṣyāsiddha, and (14) viruddhaviśeṣaṇāsiddha. All these varieties are well illustrated by Bhāsarvajña. In the Nyāyavārtika of Uddyotakara and in the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa the authors give as many sub-varieties of fallacious reasons prompting F. Th. Stcherbatsky to vehemently criticise the division of Uddyotakara stating that the aim of Uddyotakara was to bluff the naive reader by an exhibition of extra-ordinary cleverness. 25 The way in which Bhāsarvajña

divided the asiddhahetvābhāsa is the same as that of
the Nyāyamañjari of Jayantabhaṭṭa. In his commentary
Prameyakalamārtāṇḍa on Parīksāmukha the author mentions
and illustrates a number of such sub-varieties of as
asiddha which do not occur in the original aphorisms
and which were taken from the Nyāyasāra. 26 Ācārya
Hemachandra’s aphorisms on asiddha follows Nyāyabindu
and Parīksāmukha and his series of illustration literally
follows that of the Nyāyasāra. 27 Vādidevasūri’s general
definition is quite independent of Dharmakīrti’s and
Hemachandra’s definitions, but the series of illustrations
given in the commentary Ratnavārttika is a literal
collection of the illustrations of Nyāyasāra and Nyāya-
mañjari, even though the author gives some of his own
illustrations. 28 From these it can be concluded that
this division of Bhāsarvajña were commonly accepted by
the later logicians especially the Jainas and the Buddhists.
This is due to the fact that Bhāsarvajña’s classification
is systematic and scientific and that he includes all

26 Prameyakalamārtāṇḍa, Satyabhamabai Pandurang,
Bombay, 1941, pp.632-34
27 Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, Tara Publications, Varanasi,
1970, 2-1-17-19 pp.60-61
28 Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal,
Bombay 1967, Chap. VI, 48-51, p.437
the probable varieties accepted by the other schools coming under this variety in his classification giving justification for his rejection or accepting them. 29

Sub-divisions of Viruddha

Bhāsarvajña defines viruddha-hetvābhāsa (contradictory fallacious reason) as that in which the middle term abides in the minor term as well as in its opposite. That is, a contradictory fallacious reason is one that is uniformly concomitant with a contrary inference as well. There is only a general account of viruddha in Praśastapāda's Bāṣya, the Sūtra of Gautama as well as in the commentary of Vātsyāyana. The illustrations and explanations given by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas are different. Ācārya Dīgnāga, Dharmakīrti, Māthēra and others accept viruddha and divide them into four by the first two while Dharmakīrti accepts only two. The most exhaustive and complicated division of viruddha was attempted by Bhāsarvajña. He divides this fallacious reason into eight types four covering the cases of where a homologue exists and four covering those where the homologues does not exist. Thus the eight varieties

29 In his Nyāyabhūṣana, Bhāsarvajña deals elaborately with the theories of rival schools especially that of Dīgnāga, Prajñākara Gupta and Dharmakīrti. See Nyāyabhūṣana, op.cit., pp.308-20
accepted by Bhāsarvajña are: (1) paksavipakṣavyāpakah, (2) vipakṣaikadeśavr̥tti pakṣavyāpaka, (3) paksavipakṣaikadeśavr̥tti (4) paksaiikadeśavr̥tti vipakṣavyāpaka (5) paksavipakṣavyāpakah, (6) paksavipakṣaikdesavr̥tti, (7) paksavyāpakac vipakṣaikadeśavr̥tti and (8) vipakṣavyāpakah paksaiikadeśavr̥tih. Of these the first four occur when there are homologues in the minor term and the last four occur when there are no homologues in the minor term. These eight varieties either with their full examples or partly or in essence in the later logical works notably that of the Jainas.

Sub-divisions of Anaikāntika

The third fallacious reason accepted by Bhāsarvajña is Anaikāntika or uncertain in which the reason abides in the minor term, its homologue as well as in the heterologue. When a middle term is found to concomitant neither with the major term nor with the opposite of the major term but with both then it is said to be tainted with uncertainty. Some differences with regard to the definition of the fallacious reason can be found between the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. According to Akṣapāda Gautama the fallacious reason of anaikāntika lies in its co-existence with the major term as well as with the opposite of the major term and not in its giving rise to
a doubt. According to the Vaiśeṣikas it occurs giving rise to a doubt. As the middle term is not uniformly concomitant with any one alternative it is called anaikāntika by the Navya-Naiyāyikas. In the Nyāyasūtra it is designated by the name 'savyabhicāra' and Kaṇāda names it as 'sandīgdha'.

There are indentity regarding the definition of anaikāntika between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists and even the Jaina definition is a miniature version of the definition as given by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. But Praśastapāda and Dignāga differ with regard to the number of sub-divisions of anaikāntika. Thus Praśastapāda does not accept asādhāraṇa and viruddhāvyabhicārin as the sub-types of anaikāntika and calls them as sub-divisions of anadhyavasita-hetvābhāsa. But later on Dharmakīrti has rejected this argument of Praśastapāda.

Bhāsarvajña takes no note of the controversy regarding the number of the sub-divisions of anaikāntika, between the Hindu logicians and the Buddhists. He offers eight varieties of this fallacious reason along with their examples. He does not say 'generation of doubt' as Praśastapāda does as the determinant of anaikāntika but seems to follow the Sūtrakāra's view. The Jaina logicians
Prabhācandra, Vādidevasūri, Hemacandra etc., accept this eightfold variety of anaikāntika. Some Jaina logicians even take their illustrations of anaikāntika from Nyāyasāra and this is a clear evidence for the support which Bhāsarvajña received from the later logicians, even from some of the rival schools.

**Sub-divisions of Anadhyavasita**

Anadhyavasita or Inconsistent fallacious reason is accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas and rejected by the Naiyāyikas. Here one gets the clue to Bhāsarvajña's silence in respect to the dispute of the number of anaikāntika-hetvābhāsa, between Praśastapāda and the Buddhists. Praśastapāda accepted anadhyavasita as a variety of hetvābhāsa and included asādhāraṇa and viruddhāvyabhicārī under it. Bhāsarvajña incorporates these varieties of Praśastapāda under his divisions of anadhyavasita and thus he accepts the Vaiśeṣika standpoint. He defines it as that in which the reason abides only in the minor term and which is incapable of proving a thesis. This definition distinguishes it from the purely negative reason (kevalavyatirekī), for, a purely negative reason is also present only in the minor term and nowhere else. But unlike the anadhyavasita it is perfectly valid since it proves a required conclusion.
The other Naiyāyikas include this type of fallacious reason under ānikāntika. The earlier Naiyāyikas divided ānikāntika into sādharāṇa, asādharāṇa and anupasamhāri and Bhāsarvajña included the first under ānikāntika and the other two under anadhyavasita. Bhāsarvajña attempts a sixfold division of anadhyavasita. Here also Bhāsarvajña tries to accept a middle path which is acceptable to all the philosophical systems. But one cannot see any reference to such a fallacious reason in the Jaina works or other logical systems except that of the Vaiśeṣikas.

Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa and its varieties

The fifth fallacious reason accepted by Bhāsarvajña is kālātyayāpadiṣṭa or the mistimed. It can be defined as that in which the opposite of the major term is known to be present in the subject by means of other and more authoritative and trustworthy means of knowledge if we accept Vātsyāyana’s definition. But Bhāsarvajña defines kālātyayāpadiṣṭa as that in which the reason is present in the minor term which is contradicted by means of another proof. This fallacious reason is termed as kālātiṣṭa or bādhita by the other logicians. According to some schools it is unnecessary to recognise this as a separate variety, for it may be included in savyabhicāra in cases where the middle term is known to be present in the minor term which is known to be devoid
of any major term. Where the minor term is known to be
bereft of the middle term it may be included under asiddha,
hold such logicians. But other logicians reject this
argument for it is not possible to bring this type either
under 'savyabhicāra' or 'asiddha', since it is impossible
to bring 'bādha' to these two types. Six varieties of
this type of fallacious reason is given by Bhāsarvajña
viz. pratyakṣaviruddha, anumāṇaviruddha, āgamaviruddha,
pratyakṣaikadesaviruddha, anumāṇaikadesaviruddha and
āgamaikadesaviruddha. Among these the first three varieties
are mentioned by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Siddhasena Divākara
e tc., under the portion dealing with the fallacies of the
minor term. The Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastaapāda also
mentions fallacies of the minor term. Bhāsarvajña keeping
in mind these varieties of paksābhāsa of the Buddhists,
the Jainas and the Vaiśeṣikas, divides kālātyayāpadista
incorporating those varieties of paksābhāsa in this
fallacious reason. The later Jaina logicians have accepted
the theory of fallacious minor term and they were treated
as paksābhāsa in the later Jaina texts. The later Nyāya
tradition (that is, the neo-logical tradition) seems to
have cherished the influence of these divisions when
one examines their classification of 'bādhitā' hetvābhāsa.

Prakāraṇasama

The last variety of fallacious reason
mentioned by Bhāsarvajña is prakaraṇasama or the counter-balanced. It is a reason for which another middle term is available which proves the contrary of the major term with regard to the proposition. Bhāsarvajña defines it as the fallacious reason which establishes a conclusion as well as a counter conclusion complying with the first three conditions of a valid reason. The Nāyika-naiyāyikas call it satpratipakṣa since it raises the question - as to what is intended to prove by the speaker? Thus according to Gaṅgeśa upādhyāya, Satpratipakṣa is explained thus: If at the time of the consideration of a reason which seeks to establish the existence of the prabandum or a major term, there occurs the consideration of another reason which seeks to establish the non-existence of that term, the first reason is a counter-balanced one -, in fact both the reasons are counter-balanced.

Bhāsarvajña treats the view of some logicians who hold that the counter-balanced is a contrary but non-discrepant (viruddhāvyabhicāri) which occurs in one and the same subject with the presence of two homogeneous and mutually contradictory reasons. But Bhāsarvajña observes that this is a fallacy like anyatāsiddha, which depends upon the peculiar character of the person addressed. That is, this will be viruddhāvyabhicāri to such person who accepts it but to others it will be kālātysyāpadīśa.
of the anumānaviruddha type.

In all his definitions and illustrations of the fallacious reasons, Bhāsarvajña shows his keenness in defining them and classifying them in a most systematic and scientific manner. Till the time of Bhāsarvajña one cannot come across such a scientific and systematic classification of hetvābhāsa which is at the same time devoid of all the puzzling technicalities and intricacies of technical terms. His definitions are so simple that they are easily apprehended and the examples cited by him are very familiar and this helps to arrive at a clear understanding of the subject. He also tries to incorporate in the system the views of the Jainas, the Buddhists and such other schools and gives his definitions and examples keeping in mind the views of the rival schools as well. He advances his doctrines very carefully so that it never goes against the accepted theories of neither of these schools and that of his own. He also gives examples which are familiar to the Buddhists and the Jainas, borrowing them from their renowned logical texts. Perhaps these qualities of give and take may be the reason for the popularity of Bhāsarvajña among the Buddhists and the Jainas as they held him in high esteem.
Udāharana explained

Udāharana is the third member of a syllogism and Bhāsarvajña while explaining the members of syllogism defines it as the statement of a clear and complete illustration. This definition is almost similar to that given the Naiyāyikas. Before the time of Dignāga, an example served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the listener to understand the object or statement clearly but Dignāga converted it into a universal proposition expressing the universal concomitance of the middle term and the major term. The Jainas and the Buddhist logicians, who came after Dignāga deals with the definition of an example as it is a part and parcel of inference as it is essential for the exposition of the reason. But they say that inference is essential only for an unintelligent while intelligent persons do not require a hetusamarthana because they follow the inference as soon as the reason is merely stated.

In later times the definition and illustration of Udāharana were very much developed by the later logicians. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya defines udāharana as a word.

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30 Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, History of Indian Logic, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1978, p.295
which while producing knowledge of connection of the form that the locus of the middle term is constantly occupied by the major term, causes another knowledge which proceeds from the sentence expressive of a consideration.

The definition of udāharaṇa by the earlier Naiyāyikas is too wide that it applies to the dealings of a general type. The definition of the neo-logicians are also endowed with highly complex technicalities. But the one offered of Bhāsarvajña is too precise and simple that it can accommodate the views of the Jainas, Buddhists and even the Naiyāyikas devoid of its sāmānyavyavahāra defect. Bhāsarvajña was the first logician to give a right definition of udāharaṇa, devoid of all defects. This definition of udāharaṇa should have served as a source for the later logicians to formulate their definition of an example in their subtle and technical style which were characteristic of them, at the same time helping them to be devoid of all the defects of the definition of the earlier logicians.

All the logical traditions of India accept a twofold division of udāharaṇa and Bhāsarvajña too is not an exception. According to him an affirmative or homogeneous (sādharmya) example is the statement of an illustration in the positive order while a negative or
heterogeneous (vaidharmya) example is the statement of the illustration in a negative order. In defining this two types of udāharanās Bhāsarvajña seems to have followed the Buddhist and the Jaina tradition instead of that of the Śūtrakāra since Bhāsarvajña's definition shows close resemblance to the Buddha-Jaina definitions.

**Fallacious example**

One can see that the nature of hetvābhāsa has been discussed from very old times since the Kanāda-sūtras and Nyāyasūtras contain a detailed account of them. But the nature of fallacious example has not been discussed by these logicians either and one gets an account of the drṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacious example), paksābhāsa (fallacies of minor term) etc., in the later logical texts, especially that of the Buddhists and the Jainas. But it cannot be said with certainty as to whether the Hindu logicians or the Buddhist or the Jainas started discussion on the topic of the fallacious examples.

The Buddhist logician Dignāga in his Nyāya-praveśa mentions ten types of fallacious examples, five belonging to the homogeneous type (sādharmyodāhāranābhāsāḥ) and another five belonging to the heterogeneous type (vaidharmyodāhāranābhāsāḥ). One of such varieties-ubhaya-
siddha is again divided into two and thus we get twelve varieties altogether. Praśastapāda also gives an account of these very same varieties. Māthara in his vṛttti accepts ten varieties only. Jayantabhaṭṭa also accepted the very same twelve varieties of udāhanaḥbhāsa mentioned by Dignāga and Praśastapāda. Among the Jainas, Siddhasena Divākara is the first person to give an account of this. In his Nyāyāvatāra, he accepts six varieties each of this fallacious example. In the commentary Nyāyasāravivṛti, the commentator cites three more varieties of fallacious example, and thus we get eighteen varieties altogether nine belonging to each group. Dharmakīrti also accepted eighteen varieties of fallacious example. Māṇikyanandin, the Jaina logician reduced all the varieties of fallacious example mentioned by the earlier tradition and mentioned only eight varieties, four belonging to each group, that is homogeneous and heterogeneous. Thus one can notice that in later days the question of fallacious example was very alive among the logicians, especially Buddhists and Jainas and this influenced Bhāsarvajña who deals with the problem in a very elaborate manner.

Bhāsarvajña defines udāhanaḥbhāsa as that which appears to be an example even if it is devoid of the essential characteristics of an example. Any one
of the earlier logicians does not seem to give any formal
eexample of udāharaṇabhāsa and Bhāsarvajña was perhaps the
first logician, to give a formal and scientific definition
of fallacious example. This definition never goes against
the illustration given by the Jainas and the Buddhists.

In Nyāyasāra, the author accepts those very
twelve types of udāharaṇabhāsas, six belonging to each
group, which was enumerated by Praśastapāda in his Bāṣya.
Apart from these, he gives an account of another eight
types of fallacious examples - four where similarity is
in doubt and four where dissimilarity is in doubt. This
division of fallacious example based on a doubtful major
term etc., seems to be later in origin. In the Nyāya-
vatāravivrti one can see three varieties - sandighasādhya
sandigdhasādhana, sandigdbhohaya and there counterpart
(heterogeneous type) mentioned. Later on, one notices that
Dharmakirti’s eighteenfold division of fallacious examples
accommodating all these varieties mentioned by Bhāsarvajña.
In the classification, illustration etc., of the fallacious
example, Bhāsarvajña has, no doubt, closely followed
Dharmakirti even though he has tried to keep his identity
while explaining those varieties, from that of the Buddhist
and Jaina logicians. It may also be noted that various
views developed gradually among logicians with regard to
the number and treatment of fallacious examples. In
later times these views and Bhāsarvajñā's own must have influenced the logicians, notably the Jainas.

**Upanaya defined**

Bhāsarvajñā defines upanaya (application) and divides it into two kinds viz. the affirmative or homogeneous and the negative or heterogeneous. His definition and classification corresponds to that of the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. He defines upanaya as the reaffirmation, by means of comparison with the example, of the presence of the middle term in the minor term. On the other hand the definition of Gautama is not so rigid since it is of a general nature in which it is defined as the winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be proved as being "so" or "not so". Corresponding to the two divisions of example and reason Bhāsarvajñā also like other Naiyāyikas divides it into sādharmya and Vaidharmya.

**Nigamana defined**

Nigamana or conclusion is also defined by Bhāsarvajñā, in accordance with the Nyāyasūtra, which defines it as the statement of the proposition (pratijñā) soon after the narration of the application (upanaya), just as in the proposition, containing a statement of the middle term.
Necessity of upanaya and nigamana examined

In connection with the definition of nigamana Bhāsarvajña examines some opposite views which reject the necessity of upanaya and nigamana in a syllogism. It will be seen that both upanaya and nigamana are repetitions of hetu and pratiṣṭhā, for the upanaya is no other than a particular application of the hetu while nigamana is the same as pratiṣṭhā. Hence the Mīmāṃsakas recognised pratiṣṭhā, hetu and udāharana as the members of a syllogism, while another school accepted hetu, udāharana and upanaya. The Vedāntins also accepted three premises only, either the first three or the last three. The general opinion of the other schools of Hindu logicians except the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika is that there is the necessity of either of the three. But Bhāsarvajña's argument, as the commentator points out, is that since the process of inference is complete with the statement of the reason and the invariable concomitance of it, the restatement of the conclusion is with a view to show the absence of a counter-conclusion in the subject. Bhāsarvajña says that even though the process of inference is complete only with the statement of the reason and the invariable concomitance

31 Nyāyasāra with Com: Nyāyasārapadapaṇcikā, op.cit., p.41
of it with the major term, it is essential to have a conclusion in a syllogistic expression without which a conclusion cannot be reached, since it helps to point out the absence of a counter-conclusion in the major term (sādhya). In support of his argument he quotes the definition of 'nirnaya' (ascertainment) as given in Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra. He thus concludes that a nigamana serves the purpose of a counter-argument (bādhakapramāṇopanyāsārtham) which serves to arrive at a conclusion which is favourable to a proposition (sādhakapramāṇopanyāsa) and laughs at those who do not accept these two as the necessary parts of a syllogism.

What is a debate

Bhāsarvajña defines a kathā (debate) as the upholding of a thesis and an anti-thesis by the disputants and his opponents. It is twofold (1) the debate which is free from passion which is conducted with a desire to know the truth (vītarāgakathā) and (2) the debate which is conducted with a desire to gain victory (vijigīsukathā). These two types are designated in the Gautamasūtra by the name vāda and jalpa-vitaṇḍā. Here Bhāsarvajña gives the corresponding definitions of these terms in the Nyāyasūtra. A passionate debate (vijigīsukathā) is consisted of four requirements or components viz.
(1) Vādī (disputant) (2) prativādī (the opponent), (3) sābhāpati (the president) and the (4) prāshnikas (judges).

A dispassionate seeker of Truth (vitarāga) may join in such a debate with a view to find out the Truth and it will help in the outcome of true knowledge whereas a passionate person will always try after victory and fame never attempting at the outcome of the issue. The vijigīśukathā along with its two varieties, jalpa and vītaṇḍā will keep up the zest for Truth in the minds of those who are desirous of realizing the fact.

Some other categories

Bhāsarvajña treats some other categories like 'cchala' (quibble), 'jāti' (futile rejoinder) and 'nigraha-sthāna' (point of defeat) in his work in connection with anumāna, which were discussed by the Śūtrakāra and elaborated by Vātsyāyana. He gives the very same definitions and classification of these categories, even though the examples cited by him are different and perhaps independent. In classifying jāti he mentions only sixteen varieties out of the twentyfour mentioned by Śūtrakāra. But in his commentary, Bhāsarvajña mentions not only these twentyfour but also three more varieties, viz., ananyasama,
sampratipattisama and vyavasthāsama, commenting that the number may even be increased. 32 Thus in defining the Nyāyasūtra and in elaborating them, also. Bhāsarvajña has taken freedom so that he never sticks to one school or one person and this may be found in all his treatment of the subject.

Nature and Scope of Verbal testimony

Śabda or verbal testimony is considered as a separate means of valid knowledge by most of the Indian philosophical systems except the Cārvākas, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas. It is the right knowledge which is derived from the utterances of an infallible and absolutely trustworthy person. In the Nyāyasūtra verbal testimony is defined as the instructive assertion of a reliable person. The Jainas, the Buddhists and the Sāmkhyas define it in the same way and all of them include the scriptures or Vedas as an authority of verbal testimony. The Vedāntins and the Mīmāṃsakas also accept a similar definition. The Jaina sage Māṇikyanandin was the first among the logicians to give a new definition of it as the knowledge of objects derived from the words of a reliable person or scriptures in virtue of their natural fitness or suggestiveness. 33

33 Parīkṣāmakaśūtra 3.99

aptavacanadinibandhavamarthajñānamāgamaḥ
Bhāsarvajña is the first person to give a correct definition of verbal testimony which can very well accommodate the definition of other schools as well. He accepts the term "aparokṣa" (indirect) of the Jainas and the power of convention of words (samayabala) and also the authority of the Vedas. Thus his definition of śabda runs as follows:— "Verbal testimony is the means of indirect and right apprehension of an object through the force of convention."\textsuperscript{34} 

The word samaya in the definition means the knowledge or remembrance of convention. It is held that each word has a significance which is the convention made by God that such and such meaning should be understood from such and such word. It is knowledge of this convention or its remembrance which is the proximate cause of verbal knowledge. In inference it is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the middle term and major term which leads to inferential judgement, and this connection of middle term and major term is a natural relation and hence cannot be altered by man. But the relation of a word and the object signified by it is not of a natural character and hence can be altered by man signifying a different object, setting aside the old convention. This "invariable concomitance" or "avinābhāva" in an inferential

\textsuperscript{34} Nyāyasāra, op.cit., p.29
cognition differ from the 'power of convention' or 'samaya' in a verbal testimony and this is how sabda is distinguished from inference. The word samaya or force of convention is similar to the word "śakti" which was given by the later logicians. A word is that which has 'significative potency' and according to the Naiyāyikas it consists in the will of God to the effect that a particular word should convey a particular meaning. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that 'primary significative potency' of a word is the eternal significative relation between a word and its sense. The grammarians regard it was residing exclusively in words while Śāṅkhya and Vedāntins maintain that it resides in objects also. The Naiyāyikas argue that we come to know the meaning of words by means of grammar, popular usage and from dictionaries whereas there are logicians who hold that we know the meaning of words through gestures as well.

Import of words

With regard to the import of words and on the question whether words denote individual or mere forms or genus or all these three, there are various theories among the logicians. The Naiyāyikas maintain that a word conveys the sense of all the three. The Jainas hold that the word only denotes the universal. According to them
a word, the primary meaning of which is a universal, still refers to a particular indirectly, through its generic form. The Advaitins hold the view that the primary meaning of the word, which is a symbol, is the universal alone. They argue that it is in virtue of the knowledge of the universal that we can apply the word to the particular or individual. A knowledge of the particular meaning of the word is always subsumed under the knowledge of the universal meaning of the word. In experience there is no question of a priority either of the particular or of the universal. Our perception reveals the individual as possessed of the universal characteristic. So the primary meaning of the word is universal also, is the argument of the Vedāntins. The Mīmāṃsakas argue that all words have natural denotative powers by which they themselves, out of their own nature, refer to certain objects irrespective of their comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the word in question is expressive of such and such meaning, but the word is all along competent to denote that meaning and it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact which helps him to understand the meaning of a word. The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit the power of convention to a word and words are powerful of denoting the sense by themselves, they
say. It is only about proper names that convention is admitted to be denotative. They also accept the eternality of words but some manifesting cause is required to the expression of word and it is the effort of the man who utters the word. The Sāṅkhyaśas also accept the power of convention of words.35

Words and sentences

Among the two types of sounds, namely articulate and inarticulate (vamātmaka and dhvanyātmaka) the articulates is understood by those who have learned it. If it is arranged in a certain order, it is the source of knowledge. The different order of the alphabetical sounds convey different meanings and the idea of different objects if words are joined together to convey a certain sense and thus get sentences indicating affirmation, negation, etc.

A sentence is a collection of words as are dependent upon one another and are endowed with the power of being construed together in close juxtaposition to one another. Some add the intention of the speaker also in determining the meaning of a sentence. Thus the meaning

35 See K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1977, for a discussion.
of a sentence depends upon (1) the mutual dependance of words (ākāṅkṣā), (2) the capacity to accord with the sense of the sentence (yogyatā), (3) juxtaposition (sannidhi) and (4) a knowledge of the intention of the speaker (tātparyajñāna). When a sentence of this kind is uttered by a trustworthy person it becomes an instrument to right cognition. The result of this instrument is the knowledge of what is meant by a sentence and this is known as śabdapramāṇa. Different views are expressed by logicians with regard to the production of knowledge at the utterance of a sound and the way by which the sense of obligation is produced in the mind of the hearer, including the theory of spaṭa by the grammarians and Bhāsarvajñā examines all the important theories of these logicians and establishes the Nyāya theory of denotation through convention.

Āptavākya - the reliable source

All the different schools of logicians agree in the fact that the statement of a trustworthy person (āpta) is a reliable source of verbal testimony. Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bāṣya defines an āpta as one (either a sage or ārya or mleccha) who as an expert in a certain matter is competent to communicate his experience. Vācaspāti miśra says that an āpta should necessarily be completely
free from defects such as ignorance, love, hatred, etc. Udayana divides āpta into two - omnicient and non-omnicient and says that the reliability of an omnicient person is proved by the very fact that they are free from all sensual defects. With regard to a non-omnicient person his assertion can bear testimony to his reliability by reason of his being possessed of due knowledge about the thing spoken of with a desire to reveal true information, love for humanity, etc., and one can be sure of this only after repeated observation. This personal testimony is called by the Jainas as 'Laukikaśabda'. The other schools also accept a similar definition of an apta or trustworthy person and Bhāsarvajña also is not an exception in this matter since he simply follows the theory of earlier logicians in respect to the definition of an āpta.

Two varieties of verbal testimony

Verbal testimony is divided into two kinds - verbal testimony the meaning of which is perceptible (dṛṣṭārtha) and verbal testimony the meaning of which is not perceptible (adṛṣṭārtha). Vedic assertions and injunctions etc., signify what is imperceptible while common usage of words denote perceptible meanings. Bhāsarvajña stated that the validity of sentences that
signify perceptible things is reached by means of their power to incite men into action and the validity of sentences that signify non-perceptible objects is reached by reliable assertion of a trustworthy person. Thus while one can understand the validity of the words of common man by means of the facts that is to take place whereas the Vedic assertions are found to be authoritative. Since it is found that a desired result has occurred when the individual has observed his duties in accordance with the Vedic injunctions. From this one can understand that the person (Rsi) or seer who spoke those words is thoroughly reliable since he can prophecy things unseen. Therefore in the absence of any reason to oppose this view, all words uttered by such a person are reliable. Thus the authority of a word which signifies an imperceptible object is realized through inference. In this explanation one can notice Bhāsarvajña accepting the scriptures as well as common man's speech as authority and his theory with regard to the reliability of both is very logical and reasonable.

**Authority of words**

In his short discussion with regard to the authority and eternality etc., of verbal testimony Bhāsarvajña observes that it cannot be argued that words
are authoritative simply because they are eternal. And there is no proof to argue that words are eternal and there many grounds to prove that it is non-eternal. If words are eternal will they be ever apprehended or never apprehended. If it is admitted that words are perceptible by the sense organ, then words being eternal and hence pervasive should ever be in contact with the sense organ, ear and thus should be apprehended always. On the other hand, if it is argued that they are imperceptible to the sense organ, like the atoms, then it has to be admitted that they can never be apprehended. But our experience is that we apprehend words when they are produced or uttered by a person and the function ceases to be when he slops his utterings. If the apprehension of words is denied on the basis of the absence of a manifesting cause, such a manifesting cause cannot be admitted, says the author. He also rejects the theory of the contact of sound with the wind as the manifesting cause of sound, on the basis that if the theory is accepted we have to admit the simultaneous perception of all the sounds produced at a time, and this is not possible since ear is not capable of receiving and understanding each and every sound at one and the same time and there is no reason to believe that the manifesting cause (contact with wind) will reveal only particular sound to the
ear. Bhāsarvajña also rejects the view that sound is not produced since they are natural and hence eternal.

To uphold the eternality and authoritativeness of the Veda, the Mīmāṃsakas put forward the theory that word and its meaning as well as their relation are all natural and eternal. A word is made up of two or more letters and is a mere aggregate of the letters and not a whole (avayāvī), though the letters may occur in a particular order. A varṇa or syllable is an articulated sound, which is eternal, omni-present and integral. It is different from its sound (dhvani) if it is spoken and is different from its symbolic form if it is written. The sound and form are merely its accidental features which reveal it. A varṇa is eternal and immutable while its dhvani and rupa are momentary and changing. But since a word is an aggregate of two or more eternal varṇas it is eternal. The meaning of words denoted being universals are eternal and unchanging and the relation between a word and its meaning also, being natural, inseparable and internal, is eternal and unchanging. Language is not a creation of the human being or even the divine mind and philology is a natural science the conventional element in language being secondary (sahakārī) helping the manifestation of the words and their meanings. The Naiyāyikas,
even though they admit the authority of Veda, accept God as its creator and challenges the eternality of word. They do not admit the non-eternality of words and accept the theory of the power of convention of a word. In the above mentioned discussion Bhāsarvajña examines the aforesaid theory of the Mīmāṃsakas and rejects them supporting the views of the earlier Naiyāyikas in his familiar simple language not entering into complex technical problems.

Other sources of valid knowledge

The various independent sources of valid cognition recognised by different systems of philosophy are stated by Suresvaraśrya in his Mānasollāsa which is quoted by Varadarāja in his Türkikarakaśa. In the famous Mīmāṃsā text called Mānameyodaya there is an account of it.

36 Türkikarakaśa; Vindhyesvari Prasad Dwivedi, Benares, 1903

37 Mānameyodaya, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1975, p.9
Accordingly the number of pramāṇas recognised by each the schools of thought in India are: (1) The Cārvākas one viz. Pratyakṣa. (2) The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists two viz. Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. (3) The Sāmkhyas, Jainas and a group of Naiyāyikas three viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, and Āgama. (4) The Naiyāyikas proper four viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Āgama. (5) The Prabhākaras five by adding Arthāpatti to the above four. (6) The Bhāṭṭas and Vedāntins six who add Abhāva or Anupalabdhi to the above. (7) The Paurāṇikas eight accepting Sambhava and Aitihya to the above six. In addition to this the (8) Tāntrikas accepted gesture (Ceṣṭā) and a group of (9) Mīmāṁsakas added Pariśeṣa (elimination) to the above. Thus altogether we get nine different views of philosophers with regard to the number of pramāṇas.

Only three pramāṇas

Following the Sāmkhya and the Jaina traditions, Bhāsarvajña accepts only three pramāṇas viz.

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38 The "Nyāyaikadeśīnaḥ" mentioned by Suresvara and Varadarāja seem to be the followers of Bhāsarvajña. In the commentary of Tārtikarakṣa, Mallinātha explains the word as "bhūṣanīyāḥ"; that is, followers of Bhūṣanamata, that is Bhāsarvajña who wrote Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa the auto-commentary of Nyāyasūra. In Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgṛaha also there is a mention of these Naiyāyikas who do not accept Upamāna as a pramāṇa and these Naiyāyikas may be the followers of Bhāsarvajña.
pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama. He rejects upamāna as a separate means of valid knowledge which was accepted by all other Naiyāyikas as a separate means of valid knowledge. He also includes all the other pramāṇas under these three.

**Upamāna - is it a separate pramāṇa?**

Discussing the problem of comparison that whether it is an independent source of valid knowledge Bhāsarvajña considers three different views of logicians - one as given by the Vṛddhanaiyāyikas, one by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins and the third by the Járanaiyāyikas or senior logicians such as Uddyotakara, etc.

According to the Vṛddhanaiyāyikas a person is told by a forester who is a reliable person that a 'gavaya' is like a cow. Passing through a forest the person sees a strange animal bearing similarity with the cow remembers the words of the forester and realizes its similarity with the cow and arrives at the conclusion that this is a 'gavaya'. Here the knowledge of the similarity is the result. But Bhāsarvajña includes this knowledge under verbal testimony (śabda) because, here the words of the forester itself could give the same knowledge and hence it is futile to accept it as a separate pramāṇa, since every type of judgement due to
its peculiar character will have some kind of peculiarity and its acceptance as separate pramāṇa will lead to infinitum regress. This position taken by Bhāsarvajña, it must be admitted, is sound and logical. It is the result of his critical insight into the problems.

According to the Mīmāṁsakas the judgement arrived at the sight of a 'gavaya' is, “the cow in my house is similar to the animal now I see”. That is it is "gavayanirūpitagoviśayakam jñānam" - the knowledge derived at the sight of a 'gavaya' through the cow in the house, whereas in the judgement of Vyddhanāiyāyikas it is 'gonirūpitagavayaviśayakam jñānam", just the opposite of the former. Here the judgement of the Mīmāṁsakas is not perception since the cow is not cognised by the senses when the judgement is formulated. This is not verbal testimony too, since this judgement involves only perception of similarity, nor this is an inference for the mental process involved in this judgement is different and the similarity is not remembered. Bhāsarvajña considers this as nothing more than recollection as the perception of the cow also involves the perception of its similarity to the strange animal 'gavaya' since the similarity is inherent in the cow. This similarity is not produced in the cow when the 'gavaya' is seen, but
the already present similarity becomes more manifested at the sight of the animal. Another point of objection considered by Bhāsarvajñā in this connection is that when one sees the cow one had the knowledge of similarity in the abstract and when one goes to the forest and sees a 'gavaya' one had determinate knowledge (savikalpakajñāna) of the semblance since both the correlates are known. Here the knowledge acquired is the knowledge of the actual similarity whereas remembrance is the revival of an already received impression. Hence this knowledge is altogether knew derived through analogy and is not the revival of an old impression. Bhāsarvajñā rejects this view on the ground that this knowledge is nothing more than smṛti because we have determinate remembrance (savikalpakasmr̥ti) from an indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna).

The third view considered by Bhāsarvajñā is that of Jarannaiyāyikas such as Uddyotakara etc. The later Naiyāyikas also hold this theory, according to whom the resulting judgement is the assertion that 'the animal perceived bears the name gavaya'. But Bhāsarvajñā states that this is the result of the knowledge imparted by the forester and therefore does not require a separate means of knowledge, for, when a person is asked how he knows
that the strange animal bears that name, his reply will be that it is known to him through the words of the forester and not by analogy or by other means. And hence it may be concluded that the knowledge is derived through the words of the forester, that is by verbal testimony. In such a case, considering another opposite view, the author says, the cognition that one gets is of the form that "this is called a gavaya" while the words of the forester were in the form that "a gavaya is like a cow" so that such a cognition as mentioned above could not be derived through the words of the forester and such cognition must be considered as a separate means of knowledge known as "upamāna". Bhāsarvajña rejects this argument saying that we make the convention" this is a cow" with reference to a particular animal and when we have the cognition in the form that "this bears the name cow" we will have to regard that this cognition is not derived through the knowledge of the original convention but through some other means of knowledge. In the same way when the name "cow" is given to another animal of the same species it will require another means of knowledge, since the convention is made with reference to a particular animal of that species and this will end in infinitum regress which is not advisable. Here the knowledge of the name of the animal 'gavaya' is derived through the words of the forester by the force of con-
vention that the name applies to all the animals resembling cow and hence this is a form of verbal testimony. He also rejects the view that the connection between the word and the object signified by the word is necessary until the object is actually perceived by the individual. He holds that even if there is the absence of the perceptible knowledge of 'gavaya' when the forester tells him that a gavaya is like a cow, one can very well connect the word and the object signified by that word when one perceives the object.

**Gautama accepts only three pramāṇas**

After establishing that Upamāna is nothing more than verbal testimony, Bhāsarvajña attempts to establish that the Sūtrakāra accepted only three pramāṇas. It can be stated undoubtedly that the Sūtrakāra accepted four pramāṇas including Upamāna when it is stated that "perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are the four pramāṇas." But according to Bhāsarvajña Sūtrakāra has included upamāna under verbal testimony and his mention of upamāna separately is with some deeper motive, that is, the establishment of the validity of

39 Nyāyasūtra 1-1-3
pratyakṣānumānapamānasabdāh pramāṇāni
verbal testimony. The argument of Bhāsarvajña, in favour of this view is that the Śūtrakāra has mentioned separately Drstānta and hetvābhāsa even though they are included under pramāṇa and migrahamsthēna respectively owing to their importance in the śāstra. In the same way he has mentioned upamāṇa separately due to its prominence in the śāstra even though it is included under verbal testimony.

According to some verbal testimony is merely corroboratory of the knowledge derived through perception and inference and it is not infallible in itself. It cannot be said that it is of use where perception and inference fail since verbal testimony presupposes the knowledge of the connection of a word and the object of which connection cannot be established where the object itself is not known either through perception or inference. Ordinarily the knowledge of the object is the cause of convention on a word and the knowledge of this convention on a word is the cause of the knowledge of an object through that word. Here both the knowledge of the object and the knowledge of convention depend upon word which is absurd since it involves mutual dependance. A sentence cannot establish the relation of name and the object signified by that name, since it communicates the knowledge of the relation between the meaning of words signifying well known objects. To refute such a view,
Bhāsarvajña, holds that the Śūtrakāra has enumerated upamāṇa separately by way of illustration which helps the establishment of valid verbal testimony. Even if a gavaya is unknown to us, it is possible for us to shape a gavaya in our imagination through the words of the forester and thus establish the relation of the name and the object signified by that name. Therefore it cannot be said that it is hard to conceive of objects that are beyond perception and inference or that verbal testimony is meaningless if they signify objects.

As to the inquiry whether upamāṇa is valid or not, Bhāsarvajña says that it is valid like presumption and the like and is included under the already accepted three kinds of pramāṇas.

In the Nyāyasūtra, Gautama has expressed the view that upamāṇa is not valid and immediately after it is stated that this view is incorrect. But this, says Bhāsarvajña, does not mean that the Śūtrakāra regards upamāṇa as distinct from other means of valid knowledge.

\[40\] Nyāyasūtra, 2.1.42, 43

\[atyantaprāyāyikadeśasādharmyādupamāṇāsiddhiḥ...
prasiddhisādharmyādupamāṇāsiddhe yathoktadōśā-
nupapattiḥ\]
He reiterates his view saying that Gautama has defended 'presumption' as valid, rejecting the views of opponents and including it under anumāna. Similarly, Gautama has refuted the views of those who have included upamāna under inference, and established that it is distinct from anumāna. Bhāsarvajña, supporting the arguments of Sūtrakāra says that Sūtrakāra's objection was only with regard to its inclusion under Anumāna that he has never rejected its inclusion under śabda. The mention of the pramāṇas as four in number by the Sūtrakāra was because he wanted to make it clear that these are not five or more pramāṇas. Again the non-assertion of pramāṇas as three in number by the Sūtrakāra, is the view of Bhāsarvajña, due to the peculiar habit of the Sūtrakāra that in certain places he has taken care to establish his views while in certain places not and he leaves such matters to be guessed by the intelligent students and arrive at their own conclusion after careful examination of all rival views.

At any rate, this argument of Bhāsarvajña cannot be easily justified since his arguments are very weak. For, in the Nyāyasūtra it is stated that beyond doubt that there are four pramāṇas. This drawback on Bhāsarvajña's argument is due to his eagerness to bring his treatise in a line with other systems such as the
Sāmkhyas and the Jainas. If this theory of Bhāsarvajña was well conceived, he should have got a prominent place in the later logical works but do not see such a position assigned to him. It would have been better for him to reject upamāna outright rather than making a feeble and unconvincing attempt to include to reconcile with the view of Śūtrakāra thereby to ensure the sympathy of the ancient school of logicians.

Arthāpatti - a separate pramāṇa?

Among the Indian philosophical schools, it is the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta school which alone recognise arthāpatti (presumption) as an independent source of valid knowledge. According to the Mīmāṃsakas the admission of presumption is a necessity when there arises a conflict between two well known facts followed by a need for its confirmation. Accordingly the presumption is defined as the assumption of an unperceived fact apart from which the conflict between two actually perceived or known facts cannot be resolved.

Even though both the schools of Mīmāṃsakas accept presumption as a separate means of valid knowledge, they differ from each other in defining its nature and function. According to the Prābhākaraś it involves an element of doubt about the truth of two well known facts on account
of their mutual conflict whereas Kumārila Bhaṭṭa holds that presumption involves the conflict between two well known facts so that any additional element such as doubt is useless within the structure of this source of valid knowledge.

According to the Vedāntins there is only one fact which is said to be well known, namely, that something presents itself to be inexplicable or stands unexplained and so is in need of explanation. This points to the recognition of presumption as a separate pramāṇa, by the performance of which the unexplained becomes explained and this function is nothing more than the framing of an assumption (kalpanā) which provides the explanation.

Bhāsarvajña, following the other Naivēyikas include presumption under inference on the argument that in a presumptive judgement a fact is assumed by means of invariable concomitance. He says that the statement fatness (in the stock of example 'pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkte') does not arise without taking food at night is equal to the statement that "if there is eating food at night there arises the quality fatness", that is, wherever there is fatness, in the absence of eating food at daytime, there will be the eating of food at night, which is no doubt, invariable concomitance and hence it is nothing more than inference of purely negative type (kevalavyatirekī).
In the stock example Devadatta was regarded as a solitary case and the anvayavyāpti could not be enunciated, for, in such a case there will be no similar instance. Still the Nyāya view holds that even in that case the fact presumed, that is, taking food at night, to reconcile the contradiction between 'fatness' and 'not taking food at day time', could be arrived at by purely negative form of inference. In such a case it is possible to point out many dissimilar instances and hence it can be easily concluded that presumption is inference of purely negative type. It cannot also be argued that it is not inference since it lacks purely positive relation because if such an argument is approved the purely positive inference also will have to be regarded as a distinct form of pramāṇa since the purely negative relation cannot be established to exist in a purely positive type of inference. In this way Bhāsarvajña establishes that Arthāpatti is inference since it reveals the knowledge of an object through its invariable concomitance of the word and the object.

**Anupalabdhi - not a separate pramāṇa**

The admission of anupalabdhi or abhāva as an independent source of valid knowledge is primarily based on the presumption that it is a separate category, parallel
to and co-ordinate with bhāva (existence). This pramāṇa has been admitted by the Vedāntins and a group of Mimāṇsakas who define it as that which conveys the idea that just as a positive apprehension of some existent object, through any of the accredited sources such as perception, inference etc., is a way of cognising, so is the non-apprehension of some object which is likewise another way of cognising.

The Prābhākāras, and the Sāṃkya-yoga schools do not accept abhāva as a separate category. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also reject it though they admit it as an ontological category. They hold that it is the perception which is the source of our knowledge of the non-existence of objects and rejects the necessity of accepting it as a separate pramāṇa. Following the Naiyāyikas, Bhāsarvajña includes abhāva under verbal testimony, inference or perception according to the merit of each case. He states that the knowledge of the absence of an object is derived through sense-perception since such knowledge is a result of the sense organ. When one perceives a jar one also perceives its colour, size, generality etc. The activity of the sense organs gives one the knowledge of the particular spot of the ground, and the attributes of the spot. Abhāva also being an attribute of the particular spot concerned, is also realised. Considering the Bhāṭṭa view that the absence of a jar could not be the object of direct
perception, since there is no connection between the sense organs and the jar, Bhāsarvajña says that the reason given viz. "the absence of any relation" is not acceptable to both the parties. Sambandhābhāva does not contradict the Nyāya view and even the Mīmāṃsakas have admitted that sambandhābhāva do not prevent the cognition of rūpas. Thus even if there is no relation between the ghaṭarūpa and the eye, it does not prevent the knowledge ghaṭarūpa, which is acquired through the sense organs. He also rejects the argument that the relation of the subject and the predicate or the qualifier and the qualified is not conceivable in the absence of either contact or inherence saying that such a relation is established through the qualified cognition (viśiṣṭapratyaya). Here, the author explains and justifies the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas and in earlier traditions also one can see the tendency to include this pramāṇa under other pramāṇas, Bhāsarvajña has clearly indicated that these are included under the three accepted by him, in consideration of the merit of each cases.

Other sources of valid knowledge

The other sources of cognition accepted by some other schools of philosophy and rejected by Bhāsarvajña are (1) Sambhava (possibility), (2) aitihya (tradition) and (3) cestā (gesture). Sambhava is regarded as the process
of knowing something, not directly and immediately but indirectly and mediately on account of its being included in something else which is already known. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāmkhya-yoga and the Mīmāṃsā schools reject this pramāṇa. Bhāsarvajña too rejects it saying that it is not different from inference since it is possible to deduce a smaller number or quantity from a greater or larger one. With regard to Aitihya it is regarded as a source of knowledge by the Paurāṇikas and is taken to mean a traditional belief or beliefs which have originated from unknown sources and have been handed down from generation to generation. But since the reliability of such statements cannot be ascertained it cannot be accepted as a pramāṇa. Bhāsarvajña, however, includes it under āgama.

Cestā is regarded as an independent pramāṇa by the Tāntrikas. They are non-verbal and consists in certain fixed bodily movements and facial expressions having fixed meanings. But Bhāsarvajña says that this does not differ verbal testimony since it is based on conventions and rules made through such texts as Nāṭyaśāstra and so on - which prescribes certain fixed movements and expressions consisting of fixed impressions.

The Concept of Prameya

In the first chapter of Nyayasara, Bhāsarvajña
has given a general definition of prameya as an "object of accurate conception". In the portion dealing with prameya he gives a more clear and specific definition of it as "the knowledge which directly leads one to Final Emancipation (mokṣa) even without the acquisition of any other kind of knowledge. By this definition the prameya is distinguished from the pramāṇas, for, the knowledge of the pramāṇas are ancillary to right knowledge leading one to final emancipation, while the knowledge of prameyas is directly capable of leading one to the attainment of release.

Bhāsarvajña reduces the twelve varieties of prameyas accepted by Aksapāda Gautama and other earlier Naiyāyikas into a fourfold division viz. (1) heyam (that which is fit to be avoided) (2) tasya nirvartakam (that which causes pain or sufferings), (3) hānam ātyantikam (complete cessation of misery) and (4) tasyopāyaḥ (the means for the removal of misery). This is clearly under the influence of yoga philosophy that Bhāsarvajña accepts these four as the prameyas. The commentator says that the twelve varieties of prameya is reduced by Bhāsarvajña into four in such a way that their knowledge leads to Mokṣa. 41 The definition of these four prameyas, as given by Bhāsarvajña

41 Nyāyasāra - padapañciṭā comm. op.cit., p.81
are almost similar to and sometimes the same as that of the yoga-sūtras. Heya constitutes twenty one types - the six senses, the six objects of sense and the knowledge derived through their contact including pleasure and pain. Since pleasure is always followed by pain it is pain itself. Body is the substratum of all the sufferings and the sense organs, their objects and the knowledge derived through their contact are instrumental causes to it. The cause of suffering (tasya dhīrvarakam) is ignorance, desire, merit and demerit. Ignorance includes impressions or samskāras, for in rebirth and after pralaya the soul again reverts to life, which is rooted in ignorance. The desire for rebirth in this world is known as desire or attachment (trṣnā). The instrumental and perhaps unknown causes of pleasure and pain are merit and demerit (dharma and adharma). The cessation of misery (bānam) should be absolute so that the soul will never come into contact with pain or suffering at any time or in any way. The means to attain the cessation of misery (tasyopāyah) which even once attained will never again cause sufferings is the realisation of true knowledge.

Bhāsarvajña lays stress on the recognised kinds of yogic practices which destroy pain and action and lead one to samādhi. He makes some slight modifications in the definition the terms in the yoga-sūtra. He says that the aids to yoga should be practised with great pārśeverance
and with supreme devotion in Maheśvara with a completely dispassionate mind which is induced by the thoughts of that Brahmaloka and other higher worlds are fraught with various kinds of miseries. By the observation of yogic practices one can attain mokṣa the attainment of which will never again cause pain.

The nature of soul

According to the Nyāya system, Ātman or Soul is of two kinds - the Supreme and the Individual. Eight qualities are attributed to the supreme soul and fourteen to the individual soul. Ātman is a real substance having the qualities, such as desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and its existence can be inferred from feelings of a person corresponding to it. It has no parts and it is eternal. There are infinite number of souls and each one is unique in each individual, since we find that the experiences on them vary. If the ātman were one the feelings of one individual soul should be experienced by every other person.

There are different theories promulgated by the philosophical systems in India, with regard to the nature of the soul. The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas maintain that

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42 M.S. Junankar, Gautama: The Nyaya Philosophy, Motilal Benarsidass, Delhi, 1978, pp.373-398
"knowledge" which is a quality belongs to the substance called the soul and that it is an object of mental perception. The Prabhakaras hold that soul is something non-intelligent which is the substratum of qualities such as knowledge, activity, experience etc. The self is not perceptible in itself but is always known as the agent of the cognitions and not as the object. It cannot be the subject or object of consciousness and it is not an object of mental perception. The Bhattas and the Prabhakaras adopt the theory of the plurality of souls to account for the various experiences. In the Sankhya-yoga system, they accept an infinite number of souls and every purusa is an unrelated, attributeless, self-luminous, eternal and omnipresent being, who is identical with consciousness. The Advaitins hold that the individual soul which appears to vary in association with mind and experiences perceptions is really identical with the unchangeable and absolute reality called Brahman. The Buddhists do not recognise a permanent soul and reduce it to momentary consciousness (ksanikavada) while the Jainas accept the soul commensurate with the body.

Following the orthodox Naiyayika view, Bhasarvajna accepts two kinds of souls - The Supreme (para) and the Individual (apara). The supreme is the highest God designated by the name Mahesvara possessed of all powers, not subject to the attachment of worldly activities and pleasures.
He is omnicient and the creator of the whole universe. The existence of this Supreme Being can be realised through inference and verbal testimony. The creation of this universe along with all the beings in it must have an intelligent cause as its agent because it was not existent and was produced. An object is produced by an agent who is capable of doing that. Likewise the world, since it is a product, must have an agent who is intelligent and capable of creating this universe and that agent is the creator the omnicient Mahaśwara. He is devoid of a body or a specific form but this does not prevent him from being the artificer of the universe because he is intelligent and powerful of creating and controlling this universe.

The lower self or individual soul (aparātman) is the enjoyer of the fruits of this transient life. The existence of the individual soul is to be inferred from the fact that experiences like pleasure, pain etc., require a substratum since they are products. The sense organs or the body cannot be this substratum, for, in that case when the sense organs are destroyed our experiences would have to cease. But our experience is contrary to this, since a blind man can recollect objects experienced before he became blind. The perception of an object and its remembrance must have the same substratum and hence the experience of
one sense-organ cannot be recollected by another and since we recollect experiences there should be a substratum and this is nothing else, but the Individual Self.

The fact of remembrance, again goes against the view that consciousness is a mere function of the body since the body is incessantly changing from infancy to manhood. If the body is considered as the substratum of all kinds of experiences and cognitions, a man will not be able to remember in his youth, the thing which he experienced in his boyhood.

Buddhist theory of momentariness rejected

Examining the Buddhists doctrine of momentariness, Bhāsarvajña disagrees with it on many points. The Buddhists claim that an object known by a prior cognition is remembered by a subsequent cognition since they are related as cause and effect. Bhāsarvajña states that even though they are related thus, they are distinct. Otherwise a son should have the experiences of his father. The Buddhists never accept the soul, they accept only a fleeting series of cognitions related to one another as cause and effect. But this view is contradictory to remembrance since if cognitions are momentary, the object experienced at one

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43 A.K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1970, p.462
moment cannot be remembered in the next moment. The Buddhists also argue that the qualities of the effect are derived from the qualities of the cause. A prior cognition and a subsequent cognition are related to each other by causal sequence and it is possible that experience gained in a prior cognition is transferred to a subsequent one and hence there is nothing contrary to hold that a subsequent cognition remembers what is experienced by a prior one. Bhāsarvajña rejects this argument on the basis of their illustration of crimson colour in cotton. When a cotton seed is smeared with crimson colour, it is found that the cotton from that seed also gets that colour. He says that this example is not sufficient to prove the Buddhist view, nor it is capable of rejecting the Nyāya view. There is neither positive nor negative concomitance in the Buddhist argument and they cannot point out any kind of fallacious reason in the Nyāya standpoint. The example cited by the Buddhists (kārpāsa raktata) is a kind of fallacious example known as sādhyavikala. Besides the positive and negative concomitance also cannot be shown valid as there is no invariable concomitance between a causal sequence and memory or between their negations. So also the Nyāya argument "the object experienced in the prior cognition will not be remembered by a posterior cognition due to the difference of the person experiencing it" is not shown to be unreal or fallacious by the Buddhists.
Again Bhāsarvajña says that the redness of the seed cannot be transferred to its fruit as it cannot be transferred to any other tree on the basis of the theory of "absolute destruction" accepted by the Buddhists. According to this theory, all objects last for only one moment and are immediately destroyed and that destruction is absolute. Therefore, when the cotton seed grows into a plant, the seed was absolutely destroyed along with its redness and hence the fruit of that plant could not be red. Here the law of causality also cannot be applied because on the theory of "absolute destruction" an effect comes into existence only when the cause is completely destroyed. Therefore the causal continuity between objects which are not related to each other cannot be maintained in anyway.

The doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists is contradicted by perception also. A crystal is recognised by one as the same which one has been formerly. This recognition of the crystal as the same that one has seen earlier will not be possible if one accepts the theory of momentariness for, when one has seen the crystal formerly the knowledge of it could last only for that moment and afterwards the knowledge of which is destroyed. Hence it is not possible to recognise the crystal as the one seen earlier since the feeling."this crystal is the same which I have seen formerly" is not possible; if one accepts the theory of momentariness. And if it is argued that this
recognition is erroneous like the recognition of the flame of a lamp. Bhāsparvājaṇḍa replies that even though the recognition of the lamp-flame is erroneous, it does not prove that the recognition of the crystal is erroneous since it would mean that when any one perception is proved to be erroneous, and it is not reasonable. Besides, recognition itself is not possible in the Buddhist theory of momentariness because similarity being momentary the very cause of error stands in need of proof as all recognitions rest upon similarity between two objects. In other words, if one accepts the "theory of momentariness, similarity itself being momentary it is not possible to say that one object is similar to another. So even in the example of a lamp-flame the Buddhist argument of erroneous recognition is baseless since the very cause of error, similarity, is non-existent and the acceptance of "similarity between two objects" will end in the deviation from the accepted tenet of the school and it will end in the point of defeat called siddhāntahāni.

Thus rejecting the "doctrine of momentariness" Bhāsparvājaṇḍa declares that the soul is different from the body, all-pervasive and eternal. The eternality of the soul is established by him as follows. Even though the soul is existent its origin is not traceable as in the case of Ākāśa.
One knows that ākāśa is existent but one does not know how it is originated and whether it has an end. Since it is not a product, it has no end. Similarly soul has no beginning, it is not produced by any one, and hence it has no end.

Through the example of a new born baby this Nyāya view which confirms the belief in a past birth through the fact of instinct (samskāra) can be proved. In a new born baby one can observe feelings like pleasure pain, desire, fear etc., and these clearly indicate that the child is possessed of the memory or rather the impressions of a previous birth.

Therefore, it may be said that the soul - both individual and supreme - are eternal. The body of the individual is the fruit of previous actions good or bad and the merit and demerit acquired through the actions of the individual makes him fit to be born again and again causing him to revolve in the endless chain of birth and rebirth. Merit and other qualities require conjunction with their substratum before they could be the spring of action. Yogins possessed of the eight qualities ānimā, mahimā etc., are known to occupy countless bodies at one and the same time which is inconceivable except on the all pervading character of the Self. Every object which is the source of pain or pleasure to the individual becomes so by the merit and demerit that inheres in his Self and this act upon the extraneous objects if the Self is in contact with all reality and hence it is all pervading.
Final Emancipation

Most of the Indian philosophers do not attach much importance to the attainment of earthly pleasures. They consider that under the normal conditions of human life there is preponderance of pain over pleasure, for, pleasure is always tainted with pain. In life, the sources of pain are innumerable, some are due to the very constitution of human life, some are apparently accidental to their character and some are obviously of our own creation. It is through mokṣa that we get removed from pain. There are various theories with regard to the nature of mokṣa, some say that it is the eradication of pain, to some it is the eradication of desires, others say that it is the independence of the soul and some hold that it is the enjoyment of pleasures caused by the cessation of all miseries. According to the Naiyāyikas mokṣa can be attained through the accurate knowledge of sixteen categories. Our efforts should be specially directed not to the attainment of such pleasures as are available, but to the complete and absolute extinction of all sorts of such experiences. The only way by which this end can be achieved is the acquisition of self knowledge and the elimination of false notions about the character and function of the self since only it can alleviate for ever our miseries. Therefore mokṣa consists in the absolute eradication of all sorts of miseries.
The Vaiśeṣikas hold that, in the state of salvation the soul becomes absolutely freed from all worldly connections and subsists like the sky in a state of dissolution which is devoid of any changes, either pleasurable or painful while the Naiyāyikas hold that in the state of liberation the soul is still attended by bliss and cognition.

Dealing with the question of mokṣa, Bhāsarvajña considers the Vaiśeṣika view that mokṣa is the absolute condition of the Self like the absolute condition of ākāśa in a state of dissolution when all the specific qualities of the self are destroyed. Pleasure and pain, being invariably associated is not distinguishable from one another and abandon the latter. Intelligent persons do not endeavour to secure pleasure alone, for experience shows that efforts are directed for the removal of pain such as that caused by a thorn. To this argument of the Vaiśeṣikas, Bhāsarvajña replies that if final release is the state when the self loses all specific attributes, then it is a state that nobody will desire, for, no intelligent person will strive for such an end which is similar to the state of unconsciousness as in the swoon. That is, if mokṣa is a state of the Self where there is only the absence of experiences as in the unconscious state of mind which is devoid of enjoyment, then no reasonable person will strive for such a consummation and even the removal of pain caused by a thorn is directed
to the enjoyment of pleasure since in the presence of pain experience of pleasure is not possible.

Treating the Vaiśeṣika argument that Sukha and Ananda are to be taken in a secondary sense to mean dukhābhāva - absence of pain - Bhāsarvajña rejects it saying the literal sense of the word cannot be shown to be incompatible. One depends on the secondary sense only when the primary sense does not produce the meaning suitable to the occasion.

Pleasure and its consciousness are the attributes of the Self in a state of release. But whether they are eternal or non-eternal cannot be decided, says the Vaiśeṣikas. If it is non-eternal, a released person will return to mundane life. Therefore release itself will be non-eternal in character. If it is eternal, the feelings should be present in an unliberated self also, since the self is accepted as eternal in nature and hence there will be no difference between mokṣa and bandha. This view is rejected by Bhāsarvajña. He says that pleasure and its consciousness are eternal in character, but in the world the presence of demerit and sufferings obstruct the relation of subject and object (viṣayaviṣayabhāva) between consciousness and pleasure in the same way in which a wall obstructs the contact between the eye and the jar. That is, consciousness
and pleasure are eternal but the requisite connection between them is severed by demerit and sufferings and hence there is the absence of pleasure in this mundane universe.

The relation of the subject and the object, i.e., between conciousness and pleasure, is a relation that comes into existence in final liberation, and it is this that makes the difference between the world (samsāra) and mokṣa. But since this relation is a product it is natural to suppose that it may have an end some time or other, so that when this relation of conciousness (viṣaya) and pleasure (viṣayī) it ceases. There will be an end to the state of release and the soul will again be brought back to this life of sufferings, observes the Vaiśeṣikas. Bhāsarvajña answers to this point stating that though this relation is a product it is one which when once produced endures eternally like Pradhvamsābhāva. In other words the relation of conciousness and pleasure has a beginning in a state of mokṣa but has no end. But the Vaiśeṣikas persist in contending that the relation of subject and object being a product will perish since this relation is positive and therefore, though pradhvamsābhāva could be pointed out as an exception to the rule - "Yatra yatra kṛtakatvam tatra tatra vināśitvam" and when the rule is modified as "yatra yatra vastutve sati kṛtakatvam tatra tatra vināśitvam", then no exception can be pointed out and this invalidates the above rule. The subject-object relation between consciousness and pleasure is a vastu and comes under the above rule, and hence it is
non-eternal. Bhāsārvajña refutes this argument also because this relation (viṣayaviṣayibhāva) does not come under the six positive categories. The relation of pleasure and consciousness is an eternal relation so that when once produced it eternally abides in the soul and precludes all the possibilities of the soul's coming back to samsāra. Really the rule that every positive product is perishable holds good under all circumstances, but there is no ground to argue that this relation of pleasure and its consciousness are positive in character, since it is not a 'vastu' for it is not included under the first six categories. If, however, this relation of subject and object comes under the first six categories, then such a supposition will render impossible any relation between inherence and non-existence and their knowledge. It is an accepted doctrine of the Hindu school of logicians that all things in the world fall under seven categories, the six positive and the one negative. The first six positive categories, are knowable and hence is an object of knowledge. Hence the subject-object relation is that which resides in all the six categories, and are is arranged on the principle of ādhaṇa and ādheya. This relation does not fall under the six positive categories and hence is not a vastu or bhava. An object becomes the cause of an act (of knowing) through merit and demerit and the knowledge thus produced becomes the subject. The relation of subject and object depends upon merit and
demerit and therefore is a relation which will last only so long as this merit and demerit exists and will perish when they perish. Final release lies in the separation of the self and the body without entering another body in the absence of merit and demerit which would produce a subsequent embodiment. But in the state of release merit and demerit cease to be and consequently this relation of subject and object also cease to exist, causing the absence of consciousness of pleasure in such a state of release except the absolute cessation of pain.

The above argument is rejected by Bhāsarvajña. According to him in such a case the knowledge possessed by God, which is eternal, will have no relation with objects. If an object becomes the subject of knowledge through adṛśta, then it will not be possible that any object will have any connection with the knowledge possessed by God so that God will not have knowledge of objects. Hence he cannot be said to be omnicient. In spite of all opposite views and for want of any cause of its destruction, the relation between pleasure and its consciousness is eternal and hence mokṣa is the absolute cessation of pain.

In dealing with the nature of mokṣa, Bhāsarvajña seems to have followed the Bhāṭta school of the Mīmāṁsakas who declared mokṣa as the soul's experience of continuous and
unending flow of unsurpassable pleasure. His conception of Īśvara and that of Bhakti which he considers to be an invariable antecedent to knowledge betray the influence of yoga and Śaivism on him. The definition of God given in the Yogasūtra very much corresponds to that of Nyāyasūtra. Further this Yoga-sūtra definition itself has its origin in the Śivasūtras. So Śaiva influence upon Bhāsarvajña could not be overemphasised since Śaivism was very much prevalent in Kashmir during his period. Naturally Bhāsarvajña is the first Nyāya logician who gives such a positive position to God, than any other Hindu logician.

Conclusion

From the above factors it may be concluded that Bhāsarvajña was a logician of an independent disposition, though he often follows the Hindu logical tracts to express his ideas. He accepts and rejects the logical theories which were prevalent at that time and even explains the Nyāya doctrines of Sūtrakāra in such a way that it goes on a line with his own views. Thus his acceptance of one pramāṇa out of the sixteen incorporating all the others under it his rejection of Upamāṇa as a separate category and the arguments, advanced by him to prove that the Sūtrakāra has accepted only three pramāṇas etc., are clearly indicative of his position. His definitions of logical terms, his
explanations of fallacious examples and reasons etc., correspond to that of the Buddhists and the Jainas. He was the first logician to introduce and explain the fallacious examples in the Nyāya logical system. The division of anumāna into svārtha and parārtha also is a novelty of Bhāsarvajña, which he accepted from the other logical treatises like that of the Vaiśeṣikas the Buddhists and the Jainas. His concept of liberation also is beset with a novelty. Many of the important logical terms dealt with in the sūtra and its commentaries get only a cursory treatment at the hands of Bhāsarvajña. All this is suggestive of his anxiety to shape his treatise and make it up to date on a par with the other current systems of thought, especially those of the Buddhists and the Jainas. He never hesitated to borrow ideas and expressions from these rival systems in as much as he thought it fit to serve his philosophical purpose. But he was always careful to maintain the purity of the traditional way of thinking. Naturally he often criticised other schools vehemently in dealing with various topics.

For the first time, he harmonised the various lines of thought through his work. This was a necessity of the time. Disgusted with the orthodox line of thought thinkers were crossing over to the fold of Buddhism and Jainism. A special effort was needed on the part of Hindu
thinkers to check this brain drain. For this a dynamic perspective was necessary. Bhāsarvajña provided this much needed perspective and effectively revitalised the springs of Hindu logic. It is needless to point out that this new way of thinking culminated in the formation of the Navyanyāya system of logic. Thus it may be noted that Bhāsarvajña spearheaded a renaissance in the field of logic which in later time contributed substantially to the system.

44 See Dinesh Chandra Guha, Navya Nyāya system of Logic, Motilal Benarsidass, 2nd Edition, Delhi, 1979, for details.