CHAPTER IV

NYĀYASĀRA - AN ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I : PERCEPTION

Benediction and the aim

Saluting Śiva, the Supreme Lord of the Universe and the knower of the highest Truth by nature, the author begins a discourse on the means of valid knowledge, their varieties and other similar topics, for the easy understanding of youngsters.

Pramāṇa defined

A proof (pramāṇa) may be defined as the means or instrument of valid cognition. The necessity of the word 'correct' (samyag) in the definition is to exclude Doubt (samsāya) and Error (viparyśya).

Samsāya and its varieties

Doubt (samsāya) is non-determinative knowledge. This doubt is five-based on their common properties to many objects, different properties to one object, conflicting testimony, conjecture as well as non-perception. (1) By way of common properties to many objects, the doubt
arises as to whether this is a post or a man. (2) By means of different properties to an object, the doubt arises whether sound is eternal or non-eternal since it is the sole attribute of ether. (3) By way of conflicting testimony some say that the sense organs are eternal while others hold that they are non-eternal. (4) By way of conjuncture it is conjectured whether the matter that has become available was previously existent or not; and (5) By way of non-preception it is doubted whether the gobline which really exist are not apprehended or they do not exist at all because of their non-apprehension.

Una and anadhyavasāya are not different from samsāya

Due to non-determination and non-particularity, there is no difference between conjecture (Una) and non-apprehension (anadhyavasāya) from that of doubt. Conjuncture is as follows: "That must be a man who is standing in that road". Non-apprehensive knowledge is as to: "What will be the name of this tree?"

Viparyaya defined

Error (viparyaya) is defined as a false determination. That is, it is like the cognition or experience of two moons or the perception of an elephant in a dream. The necessity of the word 'cognition' (anubhava) is to
exclude recollective knowledge (smaranañajñāna). In order to distinguish between the subject and the object of knowledge and to determine their difference from the effect, the word 'means or instrument' (sādhana) is used in the definition.

Pramā, pramātā and prameya

True knowledge (pramā) is defined as correct perception. The substratum of correct perception is defined as the knower (pramātā). An object of correct knowledge (prameya) is an accurate conception.

Pramānatrovidhyam - pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama

Valid cognition is of three kinds - perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and valid verbal testimony (āgama).

Pratyakṣa : Yogipratyakṣa and avogipratyakṣa

Perception is the instrument of correct and direct cognition. It is of two kinds - non-transcendental (ayogī) and transcendental (yogī).

(a) avogipratyakṣa - how it is originated

Non-transcendental cognition (ayogipratyakṣa)
is that which is apprehended by the peculiar contact of
the sense organs with their objects with the aid of the
factors like light, place, time, quality and the like.
It is like the knowledge of jar etc., by the conjunction
of the eye and skin etc., with the object. The knowledge
of its jariness, number, measure etc., are got by their
inheritance in the object. The knowledge of colour is
apprehended by means of the eye. The knowledge of taste
is through the tongue. The knowledge of smell is derived
by means of nose. With the aid of skin the knowledge of
touch is attained. The knowledge of sound is by means
of the ear and the knowledge of pleasure and the like are
grasped with the aid of mind. The knowledge of universality
regarding the aforesaid remains in their respective organs.
It is derived through the inheritance in the inherent object
which is in conjunction with their respective organs. The
apprehension of sound is generated through its inheritance
in the ear. The apprehension of generality with regard to
the sound is derived through its inheritance in the inherent
object.

These five kinds of relations, on account of their
properties like the qualification and the qualified produces
the knowledge of non-existence and inheritance. That is like
'This earth is devoid of jar' that is, there is no jar on
the surface. Thus it can be explained wherever necessary. Perception of inherence is noticed only in some instances. It is like 'this jar is inherent with colour'. In other words, there is the inherence of colour in the jar.

(b) Yogapratyaksā and its varieties

Transcendental perception (yogapratyaksā) is the apprehension of objects which are remote in respect of place, time and nature. It is twofold - in a state of abstract meditation (yuktayogi) and in a state of non-abstract meditation (ayuktayogi). (1) In a state of abstract meditation (yuktāvasthā) comprehension of Truth in its entirety is derived by the very contact of the soul and mind together with the aid of merit etc. (2) In a state of non-abstract meditation (ayuktāvasthā) the comprehension of Truth is derived by the contact of four, three or two of the sense organs with their respective objects. And this may be applied in respective instances.

Āṛṣajñāna is included in yogapratyaksā

The cognition of seers also is included in this category since it is not different from the high merits acquired by them.

Pratyakṣa is again twofold

This perception is again twofold - determinate
and non-determinate, i.e., Savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka. (1) The knowledge of an object along with their name etc., is determinative knowledge (savikalpaka). Thus the notion, 'this is Devadatta', 'this man is possessed of a staff' etc., are determinative knowledge. (2) Non-determinative knowledge (nirvikalpaka) is the knowledge dawned at the very first moment of the contact of the sense organ with the object, as well as the knowledge of seers in deep contemplation.

CHAPTER II : INFERENCE

Anumāna defined

Inference (anumāna) is the means (instrument) of indirect cognition of an object, by way of its infallible and invariable concomitance with another object.

Avinābhāva and its varieties

Invariable concomitance (avīnābhāva) is the pervasion by nature of the middle term (reason) in the major term (object). It is of two kinds - the Affirmative and the Negative. The Affirmative is the pervasion of the Universal middle term in the Universal major term. The Negative is the pervasion of the absence of the Universal middle term in the absence of the Universal major term.


Sādhana and its varieties

Reason or middle term (sādhana) is that which helps to arrive at a conclusion. It is twofold - the directly perceived and recognized by universality. The directly perceived is the cause of that inferential cognition of an object which leads to the direct perception of the object, as smoke in the case of fire. The one recognized by universality is the cause of that inferential cognition of an object that is naturally remote from the sense organs, as the knowledge of colour, form etc., by the eye and the like.

It (anumāna) can again be divided into two - pertaining to one's self and pertaining to others. That which is not in need of instructing others is svārtham (pertaining to one's self). That which is meant for instructing others is parārtham (pertaining to the need of instructing others).

Parārthānumāna: Pañcāvayavavākya

An instruction pertaining to others is a statement consisting of five factors. They are - proposition (pratijñā), reasoning (hetu), exemplification (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana).
Pratijñā defined

Proposition (Pratijñā) is the statement of a thesis with a view to treating it. For eg. 'sound is non-external'.

Hetu defined and its varieties

Reasoning (hetu) is the statement of the middle term which is capable of pointing to the reason. For eg. the characteristics of intensity and the like in the case of sound.

Hetu is of three kinds - Affirmative-Negative (anvayavyatirekī), purely affirmative (kevalānvayī), and purely Negative (kevalavyatirekī).

Anvayavyatirekīhetu and its varieties

There are five varieties of Affirmative - Negative reasoning (ānvyasyatirekī). They are the presence of the characteristics of a reason in the minor term (pakṣadharmatvam), its presence in a similar instance (sapakṣe sattvam), absence from an opposite instance (vipakṣāt vyārṣṭītvam), non-subjection of the statement in the minor term (abādhitaviṣayattvam) and absence of genuine antagonistic instances (asatpratipakṣattvam).
The minor term (pakṣa) is the object qualified by the characteristics of the major term. The state of the characteristics of the reason or middle term in the minor term is its pervasion in the minor term (or the presence of the characteristics in the minor term). A similar instance is an object possessing the characteristics comparable to those of the major term. The presence of the middle term in the similar instance either partially or wholly is its presence in it. An opposite instance (vipakṣa) is an object from which there is the absence of the characteristics of the major term. The absence from the opposite instance is the non-existence of the cause in every contrary instance. The non-subjection (of the statement in the minor term) is the existence of the middle term in a thesis which is not opposed to the valid means of knowledge. The absence of genuine antagonistic instance is the absence of the three-fold forms of the cause in the major term and its opposites.

This type of anvayavyatirekā is of two-kinds wholly existent in the homologue (sapakṣaḥ) and partially existent in the homologue. 'That sound is non-external because it is a product' is an example for that which is existent in the homologue as a whole. 'That sound is non-eternal because even though possessing universality it is apprehended by external sense organs of people like us' is the example to
that of partially existent in the homologue.

**Kevalānvayīhetu and its varieties**

Purely affirmative (kevalānvayī) is that reason which abides in the minor term of which there are homologues but having no heterologues. Like the former it is also twofold - wholly existent in the homologue and partially existent in the homologue. Thus unseen (adrśta) and the like which is a subject of dispute are perceptible to some persons since they are objects of cognition to them as the palm of the hand and the like - is an example for the affirmative reason which is wholly existent in the homologue. This very same statement that 'unseen (adrśta) and the like, which is a subject of dispute are perceptible to some since they are not cognisable to Mīmāṁsakas like our pleasure, pain etc., can be explained as an example for the affirmative reason partially existent in the homologue.

**Kevalavyatirekhihetu**

Purely Negative is that reason which abides in the minor term of which there are no homologues and which is distinct from its heterologues. As in the example "All that which has as its agent the omnicient one, are products because they are produced occasionally. Those that are not produced by the omnicient agent are not occasional as
the sky." As a matter of contingency - 'this living organism is not without soul because of the uncertainty of occurrence of animal functions (living functions, vital breath etc.) as in the case with a log and the like. By these it can be understood that the fallacious reasons will not be constituted for valid reasons.

Hetvābhāsa and its varieties

That which is devoid of the requisite conditions of a true reason and that which possess the appearance of a reason is a fallacious reason (Hetvābhāsa). They are the unproved (asiddha), the contradictory (viruddha), the uncertain (anaikāntika), the inconsistent (anadhyayasita), the mistimed (kālātyayāpadiṣṭa) and the counter-balanced (prakaraṇasama). Since it is difficult to explain every one of these varieties the author proceeds to enumerate some of them depending on their generic attributes.

Asiddha and its varieties

Unproved is the reason whose existence in the minor term has not been ascertained with certainty. There are twelve varieties of the unproved reason. They are:

(1) Unproved in respect of its nature (avarūpā-siddhaḥ) eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible'.

(2) Unproved on account its (reason's) existence in a different substratum (vyadhirakaraṇāsiddhaḥ). For eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because a cloth is a product'.

(3) Unproved in respect of the substantive (viśeṣānāsiddhaḥ). For eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible even though possessing universality'.

(4) Unproved in respect of the adjective (viṣeṣaṅāsiddhaḥ). For eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it possesses universality which it is visible'.

(5) Unproved in respect to a part (of the minor term) (bhāgāsiddhaḥ) eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced by effort'.

(6) Unproved in respect of the substratum (āśrayāsiddhaḥ). eg. 'there is a primordial matter, because it evolves into the universe (it is the cause of transformation of the universe).

(7) Unproved in respect of a part of the substratum (āśrayaikadeśāsiddhaḥ). eg. 'The
primordial matter, soul and god are eternal because they are not products'.

(8) Unproved on account of the substantive being futile (vyarthaviṣeṣyāsiddhaḥ). eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it possesses universality 'even though it is a product'.

(9) Unproved on account of the adjective being futile (vyarthaviṣeṣaṃaśiddhaḥ). eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product even though it is possessed of universality'.

(10) Unproved on account of the reason being doubtful (sandigdhāsiddhaḥ). eg. 'A person without ascertaining whether there is smoke or mist observes: 'this place is fiery because it is smoky'.

(11) Unproved on account of the substantive being doubtful (sandigdhaṃ viṣeṣyāsiddhaḥ). eg. 'Even now Kapila is possessed of passions and the like, because true knowledge has not yet dawned in him even though he is a person.

(12) Unproved on account of the adjective being doubtful (sandigdhaviṣeṣaṃaśiddhaḥ). eg. 'Kapila is even now possessed of passions
and the like because he is a person even though devoid of true knowledge.

If these varieties of the unproved are accepted as unreal by both the parties then these will be called unproved to both the disputants. If again it is acceptable as unreal to one of the disputants then they will be called unproved to one of the disputants.

Viruddha and its varieties

Contradictory (viruddha) is that reason which abides in the minor term as well as in its opposite. If there are homologues to the minor term this contradictory fallacious reason may be of four kinds as follows:

(1) Contradictory fallacious reason which abides in the minor term as well as in its heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is eternal because it is a product'.

(2) Contradictory fallacious reason which abides in the minor term as well as in a part of its heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is eternal, because it is an object possessing universality and is cognised by the external sense organs of people like us'.

(3) Contradictory fallacious reason which abides in
a part of the minor term as well as in a part of its heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is eternal, because it is produced by effort'.

(4) Contradictory fallacious reason which abides in a part of the minor term and in the whole of its heterologue. For eg. 'The Earth is eternal because it is a product'.

While there are no homologues, this contradictory fallacious reason may be of four kinds, as follows:

(1) Contradictory fallacious reason which abides in the minor term as well as in its heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is the particular attribute of sky, because it is knowable'.

(2) Contradictory fallacious reason which abides in a part of the minor term as well as in a part of its heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is the particular attribute of sky, because it is produced by effort'.

(3) Contradictory fallacious reason which abides in the minor term and in a part of its heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is the particular attribute of sky, because it is cognisable by the external sense-organs'.

(4) Contradictory fallacious reason which abides in
a part of the minor term but in the whole of its heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is the particular attribute of sky, because it does not originate from words.

Is it proper to argue that there are only four varieties of contradictions and no more since they are endowed with the characteristics of the definition of the unproved? No, this is not an objection because those possessed of the characteristics of the unproved may be mentioned under both, that is, - the unproved and contradictory since they are possessed of the characteristics of the definitions of both as in the case of a balance which becomes a subject and an object of knowledge when treated as such.

Anaikántika and its varieties

Uncertain (anaikántika) is that fallacious reason which abides in the minor term, its homologues and heterologues. The subdivisions of the uncertain are as follows:

(1) That uncertain fallacious reason which abides in the minor term, its homologue and heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is non-eternal because it is an object of knowledge'.
(2) That uncertain fallacious reason which abides in the minor term and in a part of its homologue as well as in a part of its heterologue. For eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible.'

(3) That uncertain fallacious reason which abides in the minor term, and its homologue but in a part of its heterologue. For eg. 'This is a cow, because it has horns'.

(4) That uncertain fallacious reason which abides in the minor term and its heterologue but in a part of its homologue. For eg. 'This is not a cow, because it has horns'.

(5) That uncertain fallacious reason which abides in a part of the minor term, in a part of its homologue as well as in a part of its heterologue. For eg. 'The Earth is non-eternal, because it is perceptible'.

(6) That uncertain fallacious reason which abides in a part of the minor term and in a part of its homologue, but in the whole of its heterologue. For eg. 'Space, time and mind are substances, because they are non-corporeal'.

(7) That uncertain fallacious reason which abides in a part of the minor term and in a part of its
heterologue, but in the whole of its homologue. For eg. 'Space, time and mind are not substances, because they are non-corporeal'.

(8) That uncertain fallacious reason which abides in the homologue and in its heterologue, but in a part of the minor term. For eg. 'The sky, time, space, soul and mind are not substances, because they are devoid of the special quality of momentariness'.

Anadhyavasita and its varieties

The inconsistent (anadhyavasita) fallacious reason is that which abides only in the minor term and is incapable of proving a thesis.

(1) That inconsistent fallacious reason which abides in the minor term of which there are neither homologues nor heterologues. For eg. 'All are non-eternal, because they are existent'.

(2) That inconsistent fallacious reason which abides in a part of the minor term of which there are neither homologues nor heterologues. For eg. 'All are non-eternal, because they are products'.

(3) That inconsistent fallacious reason which abides in the minor term of which there are both homo-
alogues and heterologues. For eg. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is the special attribute of sky'.

(4) That inconsistent fallacious reason which abides in a part of the minor term of which there are both homologues and heterologues, For eg. 'All substances are non-eternal, because they are possessed of activity'.

(5) That inconsistent fallacious reason which abides in the minor term of which there are homologues but having no heterologues. For eg. 'All products are eternal, because they are possessed of the quality origination (originated).

(6) That inconsistent fallacious reason which abides in a part of the minor term of which there are homologues but having no heterologues. For eg. 'All products are eternal, because they are composed of limbs (parts)'.

Kālātyayaḥpadaśṭa and its varieties

The mistimed (Kālātyayaḥpadaśṭa) is that fallacious reason which is present in the minor term that is contradicted by means of another proof. It has different varieties as follows:
(1) Mistimed fallacious reason opposed by perception. Eg. 'This fire is hotless, because it is a product'.

(2) Mistimed fallacious reason opposed by inference. Eg. 'The atoms are non-eternal, because they are corporeal'.

(3) Mistimed fallacious reason opposed by valid verbal testimony or scriptures. Eg. 'Wine and the like should be consumed by Brahmins, because it is a liquid substance like the milk'.

(4) Mistimed fallacious reason opposed with respect to a part of perception. Eg. 'All fires are hotless, because they have forms'.

(5) Mistimed fallacious reason opposed with respect to a part of inference. Eg. 'Fluidity, colour, taste, smell and touch which abide in eternal substances are eternal, because they abide in atoms and pervades in different substratums producing homogeneous attributes as the quality (of similarity) 'oneness' is inherent in them.

(6) Mistimed fallacious reason opposed in respect of a part of valid verbal testimony or scriptures. Eg. 'The bodies of all celestial sages are earthly, because they have bodies like that of ours' and the like.
The counterbalanced (Prakaranasama) is that fallacious reason which establishes a conclusion as well as a counter-conclusion (one's own side as well as the opposite side) complying with the first three conditions of a valid reason. The example of counterbalanced is: 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is different from the minor term and its homologue.

Some say that there is a fallacious reason called non-erroneous contradiction which occurs when there is an advancement of two contradictory reasons of similar characters in one and the same object (thesis). For example 'The sky is eternal, because it is an incorporeal substance like the soul'. This is the argument of the disputant. For this the opponent answers 'The sky is non-eternal because it is the abode of the particular attribute (quality) 'cognition' (cognisability) by our external sense organs, like a jar and the like'.

This non-erroneous contradiction is a fallacious reason with reference to one of the parties as in the case of the unproved with reference to one party (anyatarāsiddhah). That is it becomes a good reasoning with reference to the one party as well as a fallacious reason with reference to another party.
Udāharana and its varieties

An example (udāharana) is the statement of a clear and complete illustration. It is of two kinds - Affirmative or homogeneous (sādharmya) and Negative or heterogeneous (vaidharmya). An affirmative or homogeneous example (sādharmyodāharana) is the statement of an illustration in the positive or direct order. For eg. 'Sound is non-eternal because it possesses the qualities, acuteness and the like'. All those possessing the qualities - acuteness and the like are non-eternal like pleasure and the like'. A negative or heterogeneous example (vaidharmyodāharana) is the statement of an illustration in the Negative or indirect order. For eg. 'Whatever is not non-eternal are not possessed of the qualities acuteness and the like as the sky'.

Udāharanābhāsa and its varieties

A fallacious example (udāharanābhāsa) is that which appears to be an example even if it is devoid of the essential characteristics of an example. So taking the example 'Mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal' all the fallacious examples are being explained.

Fallacious example - Affirmative or homogenous

(1) Fallacious example defective in the major term.
Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal. Whatever is corporeal are found non-eternal, as air, atom and so on'.

(2) Fallacious example defective in the middle term. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal as activity' (as an action).

(3) Fallacious example defective in both the major term and middle term. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal like the sky'.

(4) Fallacious example devoid of the substratum. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal like the horn of a hare'.

(5) Fallacious example which is non-pervasive. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal, like the jar and the like'.

(6) Fallacious example which has an inversely stated pervasion. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal. Whatever is non-eternal are found corporeal like a jar'.

These two, that is the avyāptyaabhidhāna and viparītavyāptyaabhidhāna are defective in respect to their illustration. **Fallacious example - Negative or heterogenous**

(1) Fallacious example of non-exclusive major term.
Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal because it is corporeal. Those that are not non-eternal are not corporeal like action'.

(2) Fallacious example of non-exclusive middle term. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal because it is corporeal. Those that are not non-eternal are not corporeal like an atom'.

(3) Fallacious example of both the non-exclusive major term and non-exclusive middle term. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal because it is corporeal. Those that are not non-eternal are not corporeal like a jar'.

(4) Fallacious example which is devoid of a substratum. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal because it is corporeal. Those that are not non-eternal are not corporeal like a sky flower'.

(5) Fallacious example which is non-pervasive. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal because it is corporeal. Those that are not non-eternal are not corporeal as the sky'.

(6) Fallacious example which has an inversely stated pervasion. Eg. 'Mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal. Those that are not corporeal are not non-eternal like the sky'.
Of these the last two, that is, the avyāptyabhidhāna and viparītavyāptyabhidhāna are defective with reference to their illustration.

Of these twelve varieties of fallacious examples the first six are cited for Affirmative or homogenous fallacious example and the other six are examples for Negative or heterogenous fallacious example.

According to some authorities there are only eight varieties of fallacious examples with reference to doubt. Of these the first four are of affirmative or homogeneous form and the last four are of Negative or heterogenous form.

(1) Fallacious example with a doubtful major term. 
   Eg. 'This person will exercise sovereignty, because he has sprung from the lunar dynasty, like a certain prince of that dynasty'.

(2) Fallacious example with a doubtful middle term. 
   Eg. 'This person is not omnicient, because he is possessed of passion and the like, as the man in the street'.

(3) Fallacious example with a doubtful major term as well as a doubtful middle term. Eg. 'This person will attain heaven, because he has accumulated merits like that Devadatta'.

(4) Fallacious example with a doubtful substratum. Eg. 'This person is not omnicient, because he speaks in a manifold nature (evil), like Devadatta's son who will be born'.

(5) Fallacious example with a doubtful non-exclusive major term. Eg. 'Those who do not exercise sovereignty will not be of the origin of lunar dynasty, like some other prince'.

(6) Fallacious example with a doubtful non-exclusive middle term. Eg. 'If he were omnicient he will be devoid of passion and the like, as one conversant in the scriptures'.

(7) Fallacious example with a doubtful non-exclusive major term as well as a doubtful non-exclusive middle term. Eg. 'Those who do not go to heaven, will not be the one who has accumulated merits, as a poor man'.

(8) Fallacious example with a doubtful substratum. Eg. 'If he were omnicient, he will not be a speaker in a manifold nature (of evil) as the son of Devadatta, who will be born'.

**Upanaya and its varieties**

Application or re-affirmation (upanaya) is the
assertion by means of comparison with the example of the presence of the middle term in the minor term which is well known to be invariably concomitant with the conclusion in the example. It is of two kinds - the affirmative and negative, or homogenous or heterogenous. 'So sound is possessed of the qualities acuteness and the like' is an example for Affirmative or homogenous application. 'Not so, sound is not possessed of the qualities acuteness and the like' is an example for Negative or heterogenous example.

Nigamana

The conclusion (nigamana) is the restatement of the thesis, soon after the statement of application, just like in the proposition, containing a statement of the middle term.

If it is argued that this is useless, it is not so since the process of inference is complete only with the statement of the reason and the invariable concomitance because it is powerful of establishing the means of valid knowledge which is capable of establishing the absence of the contradictory major term and without this the knowledge the presence of the major term (thesis) cannot be reached. It is stated in the Nyāyasūtra (1.1.41) that a "conclusion
is the ascertainment of the real character of a thesis after examining the views of both the disputants and the opponents." Those who understanding that the conclusion is devoid of a valid or genuine reason, if depends on a valid means of knowledge which is defective are clinging to a point of defeat, because of the presence of the defective reason in the conclusion. The illustration of a means of knowledge which is defective (in the heterologue) can be justified in a non-established (or discrepant) conclusion as the illustration of a means of knowledge which is capable of establishing discrepancy of a reason (which is capable of proving the non-established reason or middle term). So the usage of these five members (i.e., Pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana) are the highest kinds of syllogism because it is a source for debate (disputation) and since it proves the thesis to the conviction of a dissentient person.

Kathā and its varieties

Debate (kathā) is the upholding of a thesis and an anti-thesis by the disputants and his opponents. It is twofold - Debate which is free from passion (with a desire to know the truth) (vītarāgakathā) and Debate with a desire to gain victory (vijigīśukathā).
The first variety is that where a dispassionate person seeking the real nature of an object indulges in discussion with reference to reasons, with another person who also is free from passions. It is also known by the name controversy (vāda).

**Vāda defined**

The Nyāyasūtra (1.2.1) defines Vāda as 'the acceptance of the thesis and the anti-thesis in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings—neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five membered syllogism.'

In another sūtra (4.2.4a) it is stated that this dispassionate debate may be exercised even without an anti-thesis (even in the absence of an opposition) with a motive to realize the Truth just like the discussion of the student in the form of questions (doubts), with his teacher.

The second variety of the Debate with an intention to gain victory is that where a victory intending person desirous of attaining profit, honour and reputation holds discussion with another person who is also passionate, which leads him to victory or defeat. But sometimes a
dispassionate seeker of truth may hold discussion with a passionate seeker of victory with a purpose to oblige others and to safeguard the sprouting of true knowledge.

The passionate debate consists of four components - the disputant, the opponent, the president and the judges. This passionate debate is also known by the names wrangling (jalpa) and cavil (vitandā). And it is said in the Nyāyasūtra (4.2.50) that "in order to keep up the zest for Truth, wrangling and cavil may be employed just as fences of thorns are used to protect the shooting forth of seeds."

Jalpa defined

"Wrangling (jalpa) is that which is endowed with the aforesaid characteristics (i.e., it puts forward a thesis and an anti-thesis, consists in supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings, is not opposed to the main doctrine (thesis) and is carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five membered syllogism) and in which there is supporting or condemning by means of quibble, futile rejoinder and points of defeat." (Nyāyasūtra 1.2.2)

Vitandā defined

"Cavil (vitandā) is that same wrangling (jalpa)
when there is no establishing of the anti-thesis."

Cchala and its varieties

"Quibble (cchala) consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning which is an alternative (or another than the intended). It is of three kinds - verbal quibble (vēkcchala), generalising quibble (sāmānyacchala) and figurative quibble (upacāracchala).

"Verbal quibble consists in assuming a meaning other than that intended to be conveyed (by the speaker) by a word, when the meaning (intended) is not definitely specified (used ambiguously)." For example, when the proposition is put forward in the form 'Navakambaloyam māṇavakāh', the quibbler asks 'where are his nine blankets'. (Here the speaker means that "the young boy is one whose blanket is new and the quibbler assigns to the compound word a meaning other than the one intended by the speaker, i.e., the boy is one who is possessed of nine blankets). To him the point of defeat is known as one caused due to the misunderstanding or non-apprehension (of the intention of the speaker), because he has not understood the intention of the speaker that the boy is possessed of a new blanket, or because he is unable to give an answer which is correct (or unable to or does not know what proper answer to give)
or due to his wilful misapprehension of his opponent through mutual opposition.

Generalising quibble consists in the assertion of an absurd signification (the asserting of the imposibility of a thing which is possible), which is rendered possible by the connection of it with a too generic (wide) term. For example when one exclaims 'Oh! this Brahmin is well-versed in the four Vedas (is endowed with learning) the syllogist argues: "What is wonderful in it if a Brahmin happens to be well-versed in the four Vedas."

Here the quibbler says - 'No, it is not so, for there are Vṛātya Brahmins who do not know them'. (Vṛātyas are Brahmins, but devoid of learning and culture). Here also the point of defeat is the same as that of the former (vākochala), because it has not been mentioned with reference to a cause. If it is argued thus, it may be opined that the point of the speaker was that proficiency in the four Vedas along with Brahminhood is not a matter of wonder just like the exuberance of crops in a fertile field (is not a matter of wonder).

Figurative quibble consists in opposing the figurative denotation (secondary meaning) of a word intended by the speaker by accepting the primary denotation of that word. For eg. when one states that 'platforms are
(which is made on the basis of the secondary meaning of the term 'platforms' which here stands for the men on the platforms), the quibbler said 'people on the platforms are shouting, and not the platforms themselves, because they are inanimate'. Here also the point of defeat is the same as that of the former, because in ordinary as well as learned discourse we find that words are commonly used in both ways.

Jāti and its varieties

Futile rejoinder (jāti) is that objection by an opponent after the statement of the reason by the disputant with a view to equalizing the disputant with himself. There are many subtle varieties of this rejoinder and hence some of them may be noted here with their definitions and examples.

(1) "Balancing the similarity or dissimilarity' (sādharmyavaidharmyasamāh)" is the taking up of a counter-conclusion based on the same set of affirmative or negative examples, against a conclusion when a conclusion is reached based upon a similar or dissimilar example." As in the example 'sound is non-eternal, because it is produced like a jar', the futilist argues 'if it be argued that sound is non-eternal based upon the similarity with the jar which
is non-eternal, because of its being a product, then it may also be admitted that it (sound) is eternal, based upon its similarity with the sky, which is eternal, because the sky is incorporeal. Or again if a conclusion is arrived at that 'sound is non-eternal' by an argument based upon the dissimilarity with the sky which is eternal, because it is a product, then it may be admitted that 'sound is eternal' based upon the dissimilarity with the jar and the like which are non-eternal, because they are incorporeal and are devoid of any particularity. The answer to this argument is that this is no objection because of the presence of the cause in the universally concomitant similar or dissimilar example (with the subject), just like (the sight of) smoke and the like.

"Owing to the varying attribute of the major term (subject) and example, or owing to both standing in equal need of proof, there arises the varieties known as 'balancing the undesired', 'balancing the desired', 'balancing with that which is to be described', 'balancing with the undescribed (unproved)', 'balancing the difference' and 'balancing the thesis or proposition."

(2) 'Balancing the undesired' (utkarsasama) is the objection based upon ascribing to the thesis an undesirable attribute of the middle term (or example).
(3) 'Balancing the undesired' (apakarasasama) is the objection based upon the excluding from the thesis of a desirable attribute of the middle term. For example if it be argued that 'sound is non-eternal' because it is produced like a jar, then it may be said that it is consisted of parts even like a jar, or if it is not consisted of parts, then it cannot be non-eternal, because it is devoid of particularity. This is an example for 'Balancing the desired'. Example for 'Balancing the undesired' - if it be argued that 'sound is non-eternal' because it is produced like a jar, then it may be said that it is inaudible even like a jar; since a jar is inaudible (cannot produce sound) sound also cannot be audible, because it is devoid of particularity.

(4) 'Sound, if declared as non-eternal on the presumption that it is a product, the jar also may be declared as non-eternal on the presumption that it is a product'. This is an example of the futile rejoinder known as 'balancing with that which is to be described or delineated' (Varṇyasama).

(5) Example for 'Balancing with the undescribed or undelineated (which is not proved)' (avarṇyasama) - If due to fear of 'regress and infinitism', a jar is declared as non-eternal based upon the same presumption (that sound
is non-eternal, because it is a product like a jar), then sound also becomes that which is still to be proved since it is devoid of any particular quality.

(6) Example for 'Balancing the difference or distinction of perception' (vikalpasama) - Just as there is the possibility for difference or alteration of attributes such as corporeal or incorporeal with reference to the similarity of sound and jar on the basis that it is a product, then there will occur the alteration such as eternity or non-eternity, in the thesis and example (sound and jar) because it is devoid of any particular quality.

(7) Example for 'Balancing the thesis or proposition (petitio principii) (sūdhyasama) - If it is said that there is non-eternity of both the major term and the middle term (here, sound and jar) then it may be admitted that there is the provability of both the major term and middle term (i.e., it may be said that sound is non-eternal because it is produced like a jar, it may also be argued that jar is non-eternal because it is produced like sound or if it is not so, it cannot be so, due to the lack of any special quality). Or eternity cannot be proved (is to be proved) on the basis that a jar is produced, then the non-eternity of sound also cannot be proved, because it is devoid of any particular quality.
This is the answer to these arguments - "This is no objection because, even though a conclusion is reached based upon certain similarity of the major term and example, there is some difference between them.

Though there are similarity of the major term and example with respect to certain characteristics of them, just like the particular quality of smoke and the like, it is also tenable to have some differences between them (major term and example), with respect to their attributes. And in its rejection (refutation), it will be contradictory to the general experience in the world (or it will be against the Śastras) and the like, and there will occur the non-validity of all kinds of inference.

(8) "If the middle term is co-existent with the major term there is no difference (i.e., there is uniformity) between middle term and major term owing to their mutual presence, or if the middle term (reason) is not co-existent with the major term there will be no inference of the major term owing to their mutual absence. These are known as 'Balancing the mutually present' and 'Balancing the mutually absent' (Prāptyapraptisamānu)."

For example, if a conclusion is proved on the basis that the reason is co-existent with the major term, it will not be possible to assert which is that instrument
capable of proving the inference or which is the major term, because of the non-difference with regard to both (the major and middle terms), just like our fingers (i.e. when an action is done by our hand it cannot be inferred which of our fingers had done it.) or if a conclusion is not reached, there is nothing that can be inferred just like fuel with regard to fire.

This is being answered thus - "This is no objection because of the presence of the emergence of cause and effect in things such as jar and the like, and absence of cause and effect in oppression of persons by spells. Thus even in the non-distinction of these (cause and effect) which are mutually present or absent, the characteristics of effect and cause are peculiar to particular objects and the attributes of the major term and reason are found in them. It is impossible to refute them (i.e., the obliteration of distinction between sadhya and sadhana) since it will be contradictory to all means of valid knowledge.

(9) "Balancing the non-produced (anupattisama) is that which rises due to the absence of middle term in the major term before it is produced." For example when it is said that 'sound is non-eternal, because it is produced, the futilist's argument that since there is no reason for non-eternality (between the middle term and
major term) before the production of it (subject) and hence it may be admitted that if (the subject) is eternal, because the production of it has not taken place.

This argument is being answered thus: "This cannot be objected to because the reason is tenable if it is produced and is existent. In fact sound does not exist before it is produced. Then why do we think of the attributes such as eternality and so on (in an object before it is produced)" (i.e., it is absured).

(10) "Balancing the untenable (ahetusama) arises when there is the impossibility of the middle term at all the three times." For example the futilist asks 'If the reason proceeds the thesis (major term), how can it be a reason in the absence of a major term. Or, if the reason comes subsequent to the major term, how can it, which does not exist be the reason? Or, again, if they (i.e. the middle and major terms) exist simultaneously how will it be possible to determine which is the reason and which the major term (thesis) established by the reason, since both are found together.

This cannot be an objection because a thesis is always established by a reason and if it is maintained that there is no such a thing as reason, there will not be any activity (on the part of the people). Besides there will
be non-accomplishment of the objection based upon the impossibility at all the three times. That is, by one's own argument, the impossibility of the objection and the existence of the reason have been established.

(11) "Balancing the non-different (uniform) (aviśeṣasama) is the accomplishment of the mutual non-difference of all things with respect to the possession of certain quality (by the subject and example) on account of their having in common 'existence' (in common a property connoted by the reason). For example if a jar and sound are regarded as non-different in respect of the quality 'non-eternity' on account of both being products, then all objects will have to be considered as mutually non-different, since they are possessed of the common property existence.

This can be answered thus: If non-difference in all respects is maintained, it will be untenable since it is contradicted by perception or actual facts and so on, or if it is maintained that all things are non-different in respect of non-eternity it will be objected by inference and valid verbal testimony or scriptures or if it is maintained that they are non-different in some particulars like knowability and the like, then it will be futile since it will be the proving of the already proved.
(12) "Balancing the conclusion (upalabdhisama) is the opposition which occurs when a thesis is obtained even without the aid of the necessary middle term."

In order to establish that earth and the like are products since they are possessed of components - a reason which is cited to establish the argument, and even without the aid of such a reason it is obtained that intellect and the like are products, and hence the reason is invalid.

This is not an objection since a reason like smoke is seen to be valid even though it is present in a part of the similar instance. Then if it be asked 'How then intellect and the like can be proved to be products?' This is answered thus: "This is no objection since their attributes (or character of being a product) can be ascertained through other means as well. That is, even by other means of knowledge one can ascertain the character that it is a product. And the means of proof is used in the absence of any causes for its non-apprehension when it is not apprehended even before or after its production just like a jar and so on."

(13) Balancing the non-perception (anupalabdhisama) occurs where against an argument proving the non-existence of a thing by its non-perception, one offers an
objection trying to establish a fact from the impossibility of perceiving the non-perception of it.

If the non-perception of intellect both before and after its production proves its non-existence, then the non-apprehension of this non-perception will prove the non-existence of its non-existence (and hence it will follow that there is the non-existence of the non-existence of intellect) and hence it will follow that intellect exists both before and after its production.

The reasoning through non-apprehension is invalid because non-apprehension is the negation of apprehension. Non-apprehension is the knowledge of negation of an object. That too, by its very nature can be understood by everyone and hence the non-apprehension of the non-apprehended is inconceivable.

(14) Balancing the eternity (nityatvasama) is the attribution of eternity to all non-eternal things on the basis that non-eternity is eternal.

If the quality of non-eternity abides in its substratum 'sound' for ever, then, since a quality does not exist without its substratum, it follows that sound is eternal, or, on the other hand if it is said that the quality of non-eternity does not reside for ever in sound,
then it may be concluded that sound is eternal due to the absence of non-eternity in the sound. By accepting non-eternity for ever present in sound, it may be contradicted by eternity (i.e. it may be admitted that sound is always non-eternal). And by accepting non-eternity not for ever present in sound then the reason will become invalid and it will be contradicted by both eternity and non-eternity because non-eternity is of the nature of non-existence.

By the exposition of these examples it is possible to refute all such futile arguments like 'the notion of otherness cannot be maintained since otherness itself is non-different from an object'. (there is no otherness of an object from an object which is distinct from it). Because even though according to varying need we apply different names to an object, it is not possible to deny the nature or character of an object.

It is not possible to illustrate all the futile rejoinders since they are numerous and even the sūtras serve as specimens only. Thus the varieties of futile rejoinders are enumerated. And now the Nigrahasthānas are being illustrated.

Nigrahasthāna and its varieties

"Point of defeat (nigrahasthāna) is a token on
failure."

These too are countless due to their numerous varieties (as diversities) arising from 'misapprehension' or 'non-apprehension', and hence delineated in a precise manner (briefly).

'Spoiling the proposition', 'shifting the proposition', 'opposing to the proposition', 'renouncing the proposition', 'shifting of the reason (middle term)', 'shifting the subject', 'meaningless', 'the unintelligible', 'the incoherent', 'the inopportune', 'the defective', 'the superfluous', 'repetition', 'non-repetition or silence', 'ignorance', 'non-ingenuity', 'evasion', 'admission of an opinion', 'overlooking the censurable', 'censuring the non-censurable', 'deviation from a tenet or doctrine' and the 'fallacious reasons' are points of defeat.

"Spoiling the proposition" (pratijñāhāni) is the admission of the characteristics of a counter example in one's subject.

For example - "If it be admitted that sound is non-eternal since it is a product, then why should it be admitted that it is eternal since it is incorporeal like other" - when asked thus by the opponent the disputant's admission is - 'be it so, why should it be incongruous'.


Here by the disputant's admission of eternality, the proposition of non-eternity (in sound) is spoiled and hence it is the point of defeat known as 'spoiling the proposition'.

"Shifting the proposition" (Pratijñāntaram) occurs when a proposition being opposed, if one tries to remove the opposition by importing new attributes to the subject or proposition." When the argument 'all are non-eternal, because they are possessed', is opposed on the basis that no similar instance could be pointed out, the disputant's attempt to introduce a new attribute in the proposition such as by 'all' he meant that "everything is a subject of discussion". This means that since his original proposition is defective he had to present it in an altered form. The word 'tadartha' in the sutra is to remove the objection on an analogy of the idiom - māṣakārthadhumah - i.e., māṣakanivrtyartha dhūmah - smoke for keeping off flies. This shifting of the subject or proposition: 'Everything that are subject of discussion are non-eternal' is a point of defeat just like the shifting of reason.

"Opposing the proposition" (pratijñāvirodha) arises when a proposition and reason urged are mutually contradicted." For example - a substance is different
from quality, because they are not found separately.

"Renouncing the proposition (pratijñāsamnyāsasam) is the total rejection of the proposition, when it is opposed." When the argument 'fire is hotless' is opposed, the disputant's argument: 'see, Oh! President and witnesses, I have not said that it is hotless and this is the admission of what is not proposed. This is his point of defeat known as 'renouncing the proposition'.

"Shifting the reason" (Hēvantaram) is the application of a particular attribute to a reason when the proposed general attribute of it is opposed." For example when the argument that 'the Vedas are eternal since its authority is unknown' is opposed on the basis that it is inconstant since the case is the same with regard to rotten wells, gardens etc., the attempt of shifting the reason by adding another adjective 'even though they have distinguishing features' is a point of defeat because the first reason cited is not capable of establishing the proposition.

"Shifting the subject" (arthāntaram), is the setting aside of the topic under discussion and the introduction of a new one which is not relevant to the context. For example 'Sound is non-eternal because it is intangible' is the reason. The word 'hetu' is derived from the root
'Hin' adding the suffix 'tun' and hence a krdanta (verbal derivative) word' - such statements of other sciences either by means of its relevance or non-relevance to the context, which really is not helpful in the context, is the point of defeat known as 'shifting the subject'.

"The meaningless" (nirarthakam) is an argument similar to that of a statement of letters in a serial order." For instance 'sound is non-eternal because the letters ka, ca, ta, ta, pa are possessed of the qualities of ga, ja, da, da, ba just like gha, jha, dha, dha, bha.

"The unintelligible" (avijñatartham) is that which although repeated three times by the disputant is not understood neither by the audience nor by the opponents. That word even though it is repeated thrice by the dis- putant is not understood either by the audience or by the opponent since the disputant use of the words out of its order, or his enunciation of it too hurriedly and so on; this is a sign that the disputant has said it 'in order to hide his ignorance and hence it is the point of defeat known as the unintelligible.

"The incoherent" (aparthakam) is that which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being used without any syntactical order. For instance the utterances like 'ten pomegranates', 'six breads', 'a
sacrificial pit', goats skin, etc.

"The inopportune" (aprāptakālam) is an utterance, the parts of which are mentioned without proper sequence. The proper order of sequence for proposition etc., which is got by constant use (or its usefulness) and the use of them in a reversed manner is a point of defeat.

"The defective" (nyūnam) is that which lacks in any one of its necessary parts since it is not possible to reach a conclusion when there is the absence of proper reason.

"The superfluous" (adhikam) is that which has more than one reason or example because the other (reason and examples) are useless since the conclusion is reached by the earlier ones.

"Repetition" (Punaruktam) is that in which except in the case of re-emphasis, the word or meaning is repeated again when it is not needed. A repetition, if it is with a purpose can be admitted. But deviating from this, if one repeats the word it is repetition (and a point of defeat). 'nityah sabdo, nityah sabdah (sound is eternal) - this is an instance of repetition of words. 'nityo dhvanih', 'avināśī sabdah' (sound is non-eternal) is an example for
repetition of meaning. "The repetition occurs when what is implied is again stated in similar words as for instance the mentioning of a dissimilar example even if a similar is already adduced." How should it be a point of defeat? Because it will never help to end a discussion. (i.e., if one goes on multiplying examples, there will be no end to the argument) and also due to the non-relevance of other examples or reason since the motive is reached by one.

Non-repetition or silence (ananubhāsaṇām) is the non-repetition of an argument of the disputant although the latter has repeated it thrice within the knowledge of the audience. This is a point of defeat of an opponent. How should it be possible to refute the disputant's view since it is impossible to know the base of his (opponent's) attack since he has not restated the argument of the dis-putant against which his (opponent's) attack is directed.

"Ignorance" (ajñānam) is the non-understanding of a proposition. That word, the meaning of which, when already stated thrice, is understood by the audience, and the opponent even repeating it has not understood it fully well, is a point of defeat of an opponent and is known by the name "Ignorance".

"Non-ingenuity" (apratibhā) is the accepting of
a challenge for disputation and yet remaining silent when
the disputation begins. This is a point of defeat for
both the disputant and the opponent.

"Evasion" (vikṣepa) is the breaking up (stopping)
of a discussion under the pretext of another urgent business.
When a debate has already been started and all the audience
has assembled, the disputant's or opponent's saying that
'since I am busy with some other urgent and useful appoint-
ment, the discussion may be started afterwards, when my
business is over'.

"The admission of an opinion" (matānujñā) is the
charging the opposite side with a defect, when such defects
are found in one's own argument. That person never trying
to remove the defect in his statement, simply trying to
find out defect in the opposite side, as in the instance,
that when charged that you are a thief, the argument that
you too are a thief, is his point of defeat, since he
himself admits the defect in his statement, even though
the opposition does not admit such a defect (with regard
to him).

"Overlooking the censurable" (paryanuyopakṣa-
śamam) is the non-defeating of a person who deserves
defeat. The censure is to be considered as a ground for
defeat. And hence overlooking it (negligence) is non-
relevant since it may end in the comment that he has reached at his point of defeat (but the disputant has overlooked it).

"Censuring the non-censurable" (miranúyojyānuyāga) is the censuring of a person who does not deserve a rebuke. For example in the argument with a view to establish that Earth etc., are products since they are possessed of parts, the opponents rejection that the reason is useless and hence fallacious known as 'aprayojaka' (having no use) is his point of defeat, since it admits one which does not really exist.

"Deviation from a tenet or doctrine" (apasiddhāntah) is the departing from one’s own accepted principles in the course of a discussion due to the diversity in the doctrine. For instance one person holding the Mīmāṃsaka view says - ‘performance of sacrificial rites (agnihotra) is capable of bestowing heaven upon that person who performs it. When questioned how should it be capable of bestowing heaven when you have already refuted the usefulness of such sacrificial rites’ the Mīmāṃsaka's reply that 'When worshipped with such rites, Lord Parameswara gratifies your desire, just as a king'. Since he (according to his school) does not accept the existence of god, his admission of a godhead is his point of defeat known as 'deviation from a tenet'.

The fallacious reasons also are points of defeat and these having the similar signs of fallacious reasons may be taken as points of defeat.

From these it should be inferred that words of foul abuse or a slap in the face or playing upon musical instruments, which has no use in a disputation, are points of defeat. And in a discussion with reference to texts belonging to the class of sastras, a grammatical error or other mistakes are points of defeat.

CHAPTER III: VERBAL TESTIMONY

Agaṃa defined

Verbal testimony (āgaṃa) is the means of indirect valid apprehension of an object through the force of convention.

Two varieties

It is of two types - the perceptible and the non-perceptible. The validity of sentence that signifies perceptible objects is reached by means of their power to prompt men into action. The validity of sentences that signifies non-perceptible objects is reached by reliable assertion of a trustworthy person.
How can a reliable assertion of a trustworthy person be depended to know the correctness of a sentence signifying an imperceptible object? In propositions like "those who are desirous of having children, should conduct sacrifice" - the authoritateness of such propositions is reached since it is found that it is capable of giving the desired result and from such results we know that the person who uttered these words is thoroughly dependable since he is capable of prophesying things unseen and therefore since there is no reason to distrust him and hence all words spoken by him are inferred to be authoritative.

Again it cannot be argued that words are authoritative on the basis that they are eternal since there is no means of proof to establish the eternality of words and on the other hand there are a number of inferences to prove the non-eternality of words based upon such arguments that they are possessed of the quality of ordinary human speech (and hence non-eternal). So also, if words are eternal it should be admitted that words are apprehended at all the times or are apprehended never, because there is no means of proof to establish the opposite view that is, why they should be apprehended only for the time being.

If it be argued that we do not apprehend words because of the absence of a manifesting cause of words, the answer is, it is not so, since such a manifesting
cause is not mentioned. Or if it be argued that the manifesting cause of sound is its conjunction or disjunction with the wind, it is not true, since in such a case we should have to admit that all sounds are apprehended simultaneously.

How should it be argued that sound is perceived simultaneously when it is in contact with its manifesting cause, conjunction or disjunction with wind? For instance, Ear in the perception of objects that are capable of being perceived by the same sense organ and in the same place, will not be susceptible to certain fixed impressions only since it is an organ of sense perception like the eye. Or sounds are not susceptible only to certain fixed impressions since they are in simultaneous contact with the organ of sense perception even though they are perceptible by the same organ of sense perception just like a jar.

If it be said that the same defect can be pointed out with a view holding that sound is a product, the reply is 'No', since as understood in the well-known examples of a lump of clay and a lamp, there is difference between a manifesting cause and a creative cause and hence it is not proper to have more arguments on this topic.

**Inclusion of other pramāṇas**

Thus these three (pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda)
are the only valid means of knowledge (pramāṇas) since comparison (upamāṇa), presumption (arthāpatti), possibility (sambhava), negation (abhāva), tradition (aitihya) etc., are included in them.

Here the comparison that a 'gavaya' is like a cow is included in verbal testimony. Or if it be said that it is comparison (a separate pramāṇa) based on the presumption that the cow in my house is similar to this animal, it should not be admitted since it is nothing but remembrance; for at first the perception of the cow also involves the perception of its semblance (with the animal gavaya) since the semblance is inherent in the cow.

How is this semblance comprehended? Since semblance is obtained because it is inherent in the cow, or otherwise, if it is not capable of denoting the semblance, it can never be apprehended like the unseen (merits or demerits etc.). At first the similarity is obtained by way of 'indeterminate' (abstract knowledge) perception and hence (at the sight of the familiar cow we have no semblance in the abstract) we have no cognition of apprehension (of the unknown animal). Even in the knowledge of semblance which is indeterminate (abstract), the determinate and recollective knowledge is reached even in Negation etc.
(abhāva) due to the power of correlatives and by means of the revival of impression formerly acquired.

The knowledge of the relation of name and the object signified by that name also is a case of valid verbal testimony, for, it (the knowledge of relation of name and object) is understood through question and answer (that is, when a person in the city, who says that this is a 'Gavaya' is asked how he knows that the strange animal bears that name, his reply that it is understood through the words of a forester) and also there is no mention of other means of knowledge (to refute this view).

In the cognition that 'this is known by the name gavaya it should be admitted that comparison, as a separate means of knowledge exists, since such a word (that this is known by the name gavaya) is not heard (from the forester, who on the other hand had said that 'the gavaya is like a cow'). The reply is - when a convention is made with regard to a particular animal that "this is a cow" then in a cognition that "this animal bears the name cow", one has to accept yet another means of knowledge, since the syllogism in both cases is the same and when such a convention is given to an animal of the same species, other than a specific cow, then there
arises the necessity of accepting other means of knowledge. Similarly, there is an implicit understanding between the speaker and the hearer even in the absence of a direct expression of the word, that all these animals are possessed of the name 'cow' and this cognition is got by the force of convention.

Again, if it be argued that such cognition is got by means of the force of convention (power of the word) and power to recollect, the reply is that, it is not true. Here also the case is the same (i.e., when a convention is made with regard to an animal there is an implicit understanding between the speaker and hearer that such and such words implies such and such meaning). Here also, the opinion is the same since in both cases one and the same implication is reached from the expression 'a gavaya is like the cow'. Such an apprehension is got by means of the force of convention that 'the word 'go' (cow) signifying an object similar to the cow is known by the name gavaya (Bos Gavacus). Nor it cannot be objected that there is no apprehension of connection between the name and the object denoted by that name unless the object is actually perceived; for, although unperceived the knowledge of the connection between the name śakra etc., and the object denoted by that name is obtained.
Bhāsarvajña holds that upamāna is included in śabda by the Sūtrakāra

If it be asked that the acceptance of only three pramāṇas is contrary to the sūtra (of Gautama) on the basis that 'comparison' cannot be another means of knowledge, the answer is it is not contrary to the sūtra. Because it is mentioned separately (i.e. upamāna is mentioned separately) owing to its importance and with some special motive just like the mention of Drṣṭānta (example) and Hetvābhāsa (fallacious reason) separately, even though they are included under pramāṇa (means of knowledge) and Nigrahasthāna (point of defeat) respectively.

If so the motive is to be explained. How the validity of verbal testimony can be established by the illustration of upamāna? Some say that verbal testimony is merely corroboratory of the knowledge that is derived through perception and inference. In the absence of the knowledge that is derived through perception and inference, there will not be any validity to the expression since the knowledge of the connection of the word and the object denoted by that word is not known (as the object itself is not perceived either through perception or inference as the object denoted by the word is not universally known because of the absence of any convention which at first
has to be reached either by perception or inference).

Nor there is the apprehension of relation between the word and the object signified by that word (by convention), since both are mutually dependent; that is, the knowledge of convention on a word depends upon the knowledge of the object through that word, and the knowledge of the object through word depends upon the knowledge of a convention on the word, i.e., a cause is the effect of its effect and an effect is the cause of the cause. A sentence and its meaning is not more than the knowledge of relation between the meaning of a word signifying universally known objects and in order to refute this view the Sūtrakāra has enumerated upamāna separately by way of illustration. Just as one desirous of knowing the Truth (fact) after resorting to the resemblance in signs between the unknown Gavaya and the well-known cow, comes to realize the relation between the name and the object signified by that word through a sentence known as comparison (upamāna) (or through a sentence expressing comparison). Likewise imagining some signs or shape (resorting to some signs or other) one realizes the relation between the word 'śakra' etc., and the object signified by that word. So, since the enumeration of upamāna by the Sūtrakāra is with a special motive and hence the refutation
of upamāṇa as a separate means of knowledge is not contrary to the sūtra (because the Sūtrakāra has not really treated it as a separate pramāṇa).

The inquiry of the Sūtrakāra as to the validity of upamāṇa is to include it under the valid means of knowledge and with a view to show that upamāṇa is valid like arthapatti (presumption) - and hence is not a separate pramāṇa.

Although it is well-known that the Sūtrakāra has rejected the inclusion of upamāṇa under inference, he has not objected that it is not a case of verbal testimony. The division of pramāṇas into four is to refute the view that there are five or more pramāṇas, and not to object the view that pramāṇas are three since there are enough proof to regard that upamāṇa is included in verbal testimony (by the Sūtrakāra).

If it be argued that this is not proper since the Sūtrakāra has not ascertained that there are only three pramāṇas; it cannot be argued so, since this is the way with the Sūtrakāra, that is, in some cases he has not clearly expressed his own view, even if it is a doctrine put forward by him as in the refutation of the whole on the basis that the parts cannot exist in the whole (either partially or
wholly). This refers the Gautama - Sūtra 4-2.7. Kṛṣṇaikadeśavṛttītvādavayāvāmavayāvyabhāvah" - i.e., 'there is the absence of the whole in parts due to the non-existence of a part in the whole' - this is the view of the Sūtrakāra after refuting the views of Buddhist logicians. But even refuting these, the Sūtrakāra has not put forward at least a sūtra to establish his doctrine. And the non-illustration of the doctrine even in the refutation of the whole (in the aforesaid case) is with a view to make it clear that, here, in such a case the authority (to understand it) is only to such aspirants who are comprised of such inexplicable qualities of thinking, imagination etc. So it is established clearly that upamāṇa is included in verbal testimony.

Presumption - arthāpatti is included under inference

Presumption (arthāpatti) also is included under inference (anumāna) - since it is capable of making one realize a fact (or an object or meaning) by means of the power of invariable concomitance (āvīnābha) itself. Or if it be said that the realization of a fact (or object or meaning) is otherwise inconsistent, then it is similar to taking it for granted and this is nothing else than invariable concomitance.

If it be said that in those cases where the
relation of invariable concomitance is not to be of a
general character, as for instance, in the case of totality
of causes and (absence of) non-obstructing circumstances
etc., this presumption (arthāpatti) is to be admitted as
a separate means of knowledge, it cannot be admitted so,
since there also it is not different from the purely
Negative form of inference. Purely Negative inference
and presumption are not different except in their names.

If it be argued that this (Kevalavyatirekyanumānaḥ
or arthāpatti) is not inference because of the absence of
affirmative concomitance, it cannot be said so, as other-
wise the purely affirmative inference will also have to
be considered as a distinct means of knowledge, because
of the non-existence of purely negative concomitance in it.
And, in addition, due to some or other differences (diver-
sity, in attributes) by means of the variations in per-
ception and the like, there arises the possibility of
admitting separate means of knowledge. So presumption is
nothing more than inference since it reveals the fact (or
object or meaning) by means of the power of invariable
concomitance.

Possibility (sambhava) is included in inference

Since it is always possible to realise (or deduce)
a smaller number or quantity of objects when there is the
existence of a larger number of quantity of objects, possibility (sambhāva) does not differ from inference (anumāna).

Negation (abhāva) is included under the three pramāṇas.

Non-existence or Negation (abhāva) is included under all the three pramāṇas according to the nature of the case. That is, the knowledge of the absence of Kura's etc., is obtained by means of verbal testimony. The knowledge of the negation of colour, form etc., in soul and the like is apprehended through inference. And the knowledge of the non-existence of jar etc., on the ground and so on is understood by means of perception since such knowledge (perception) is derived as a result of the activity of the sense organ. But if it is said that, in other places (i.e., in the knowledge of ground etc., in the perception of jar) the activity of sense perception is exhausted by the mere perception of the presence of an object, it is not correct, since it is not contradictory as in the case of colour, form etc. (that activity of sense perception is to the perception of absence of objects as well as to the perception of attributes such as colour, form, size, quality and so on). If it be said that this is contrary since the absence of an object could not be an object of direct perception due to the absence of any connection (such as conjunction, inference in the conjoined - samyoga,
samyuktasamavāya etc.) between the sense organ and the absence of an object, it is not correct since it is not admissible either to the disputant (Mīmāṃsakas) or to the opponent (i.e. it is non-recognised by both the parties - ubhayāsiddhah). Just as in the disputant's view (Mīmāṃsaka view) the relation known by the name consistency takes place as in the case of colour, form etc., where non-indirect perception is inferred. Similarly in the opponent's (Naiyāyika) view also the relation of conjoined qualifying attribute (samyuktaviṣeṣaṇa) has been recognised. If it is said that the absence of a qualifying attribute and a substantive is not understood in the absence of either conjunction or inherence, it is not correct since this relation is established by means of a qualified cognition.

**Tradition (aitihya) is included under verbal testimony**

Tradition (aitihya) is an assertion which has been handed down from generation to generation having no trace or indication of its origin (of the fact that who has said so) and comes under verbal testimony, as in the example, 'a goblin resides in this banyan tree'.

**Gesture (ceṣṭā) is not distinct from verbal testimony**

Gesture (ceṣṭā) is the action of body and the limbs which is produced by means of effort. That too,
since it conveys that particular meaning of the particular intentions of a person through the force of conventions of dramaturgy and so on, is not distinct from verbal testimony, as for instance, there is the apprehension of meaning by means of alphabetical words. Thus it has been established that the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) are only three.

Prameya

Now, what are to be known by these means of valid knowledge. The answer is - 'objects of valid knowledge (Prameya) are to be known by the means of valid knowledge. What is its sign or definition or how can it be defined? A prameya (object of valid knowledge) is that the knowledge of which directly leads one to Emancipation even without the use (acquisition) of any other kinds of knowledge. And it alone is to be understood in its Reality (in its real form) and is always to be meditated upon. But the knowledge with regard to the number of small creatures etc. is not to be known and meditated since such a knowledge is not useful for the acquisition of Emancipation.

Four Divisions of Prameya

The object of knowledge is of four kinds: (1) That which is fit to be avoided (heya), that is, pain or suffering. (2) That which causes pain or sufferings
(tasya nirvartakam) i.e. ignorance, desire, merit and demerit. (3) The complete cessation of misery (ḥānāmatyanti-kam) i.e., the realization of true knowledge and (4) The means for the removal of misery (tasyopāya) i.e., the search for true knowledge. It is divided into twenty-one varieties - body, six sense organs, six objects of senses, six kinds of cognitions, pleasures and pain (objects of senses are divided into six since the sense organs are six, and hence cognitions also are divided into six, corresponding to the six senses through which they are derived).

Since body is the repository of pain, it is pain itself; the sense organs, their objects and the cognitions also are pain itself since they act as instruments of pain; pleasure, after all is closely followed by (closely in contact with) pain and hence is pain itself. Pain is distinguished especially by means of the nature of bādhana (harm from external agencies), pīḍana (injury by others either to the body or some illness) and santāpa (due to one's own defects) are misery and causes misery. (Even though these words i.e., bādhana, pīḍana and santāpa are same words denoting 'misery' it has minute differences in themselves - the causes of misery are also different even though they can be put under these general headings).

That which causes pain or suffering or its
uncommon cause (instrumental cause), is ignorance, desire, merit, demerit etc.

Ignorance (avidyā) is that knowledge which is contrary to such perceptions (cognitions) which is clearly shown by the adepts knowing the nature of the inner soul and it includes impression (samskāra) also (since at the time of dissolution there is no false knowledge, but the impressions of false knowledge exists and it becomes the source of life, after dissolution).

Desire (attachment) is an yearning for rebirth; i.e., the desire to be this or that, he or she is the cause of rebirth. In other words if I were this or that, he or she - such a prayer is attachment.

Merit and demerit (dharma dharma) are the unknown (instrumental) cause of pleasure and pain.

Cessation (hānam) is the destruction of pain or suffering and it is absolute. Hence the soul will not be in contact with pain at any time or in any way, when the cessation of pain has taken place.

The existence of soul

The mean for the removal of misery is the realization of true knowledge and it is an object of the soul
(that is, the True Knowledge is acquired by the soul). Hence it is said in the BrhadAranyakaPaniṣad (2.45) thus: "the self should really be realized (cognised), should be heard of, reflected upon and meditated upon."

In the ChāndogyaPaniṣad (7-1-3) it is said: "It should be heard of through scriptural sayings (i.e. śrutis and smṛtis), and is to be reflected upon by means of demonstrated proofs and having accomplished it is always to be meditated upon; and these are the causes for Realisation of Truth". Also there is the saying that "one who realizes the Self, overcomes pain or sufferings".

Soul is twofold

The Self is of two kinds - the superior and the inferior and hence it is said "One who is desirous of knowing Brahman should realize both. It is of two kinds: superior and inferior. There the superior Self is Lord Maheśwara (Śiva) the creator of the world and omniscient endowed with all the powers and not attached at the least by the limitations of the world. How can he be realized? He (Lord Maheśwara) can be realized by means of inference and verbal testimony. That is, a subject under consideration is a cause with regard to the realization of the instruments or reason (i.e., agent) since it has come into existence even though it has not existed before,
like a cloth. (The subject under consideration must have an intelligent agent because it was nought and has already came into being, like a piece of cloth.) It is not capable of denying since the general character proposed is a faultless one deserving no blame. Then by (a process of) elimination of the general character which has already been recognised (approved) and due to the peculiar nature of the result the existence of a particular (supreme) agent is proved, just like the apprehension of a particular agent (who has made it) in cases of particular effects such as a painting etc. And there are Agamas (scriptural sayings) like: Rudra (Iśvara or god) is only one and hence there is no place for a second and hence a second god does not exist. And he occupies the world by means of his powers, desire and the like.

The inferior self is the enjoyer of the fruits of transient life. And it is to be inferred since it is the substratum of products such as cognition and the like since an effect cannot be apprehended at the least if it is devoid of a substratum. Further, the sense organs cannot be the substratum, for, there is the absence of the recollection of a thing experienced by the sense organ, when that sense organ is destroyed, and also due to the fact that one cannot recollect an object perceived by
another. In the same way there is non-recollection since body is distinct due to its changing to childhood, boyhood and so on.

By this the argument that an object known by the prior cognition is remembered by a subsequent cognition on the basis that they are related to each other as cause and effect, is refuted because the distinctness between them cannot be avoided.

If it is argued that (the qualities of the effect are derived from the qualities of the cause) just like the crimson colour in cotton, it is not correct since the cause is not probable and does not serve to confute the Nyāya view. It is not a cause since there is neither positive nor negative concomitance, nor it is the confusion (of the opposite) since it has not considered the defects in the different views such as the 'unproved' (asiddha) etc.

Nor can crimson colour be produced in cotton when an absolute destruction of cause and effect takes place (since the existence of all things are momentary, according to the Buddhist standpoint), as in the case of any other cotton plant. By this argument itself the doctrine of momentariness (of the Buddhist logicians) is refuted. The
non-momentariness of objects is apprehended also by means of perceptions such as 'Recognition' as in the case of recognition of a crystal etc., (the recognition of the fact that this is the same crystal I have seen years before). If it be argued that this recognition is erroneous like the recognition of a lamp-flame (as the same lamp flame seen years before), it is not valid, because it is absurd to contribute erroneous experience everywhere since such an erroneous perception cannot be avoided in a single case (such as that of a lamp-flame, which changes at every moment, because its cause, the wick and flame, is changing at every moment). Besides, recognition (pratyabhijñā) also is not possible, because similarity being momentary, there is the absence of cause with regard to an erroneous cognition. Thus it is proved that the soul is distinct from this body, eternal and all pervading. If it is asked, how eternality could be attributed to the soul; it is said, because it is infinite (it is impossible to trace its origin) even though it is certain (it exists) just like the sky. Again how infinitude to Soul can be attributed? Since instincts such as joy, fear, sorrow, desire for sucking (milk) etc., are apprehended in a new-born baby, which is indicative of the fact that there is the remembrance (or impressions) of the experiences in a previous birth or births.
Soul is all-pervading

The all-pervading character of soul is established since merit and other qualities, like gravity etc., requires conjunction with their substratum, because they could not be the source of action in wind and such other objects, if they are devoid of a substratum. Also it is well-known that yogins possessed of supernormal powers (siddhi) such as anima etc., (power to transform themselves to minute etc.), occupy a countless number of bodies at one and the same time (which should not be imagined of if the soul is not all-pervading). It is also stated in the scriptures thus: "An intelligent person after attaining yogic powers takes a number of bodies. He can reach all the worlds and some of them can enjoy the objects of the world, by some he can perform the highest type of meditation and at last can withdraw all of them as the sun withdraws its beams". (Mahabhara 12, 300, 27-28)

Thus in this way, the True Knowledge of the Inferior Soul is a cause of Eternal Bliss or Emancipation since it causes the destruction of demerits and is capable of attaining the other world, since a world other than this exists, which is superior also.

Emancipation through yogic postures

The True Knowledge of the Supreme Soul (Superior
Soul) is the instrumental cause of Emancipation and it is reached by means of Yogic postures meditating upon Lord Parameśvara, he being the cause (of the True Knowledge of the Supreme Soul). And such yogic postures for meditating upon the Lord should be observed with a desire to attain Self-realization after the destruction of misery (pain) and action. Hence it is said in the Yogasūtra (2-1,2) thus:

"The yogic disciplines are Austerity (tapas), study (Svādhyāya) and Devotion to the Supreme Being (Īśvarapraṇidhānaḥ). It is used to overcome miseries (minimizing sufferings) with a purpose to attain self-realization (communion)."

The Yogic postures

Austerity (tapas) is the power to bear pain experienced by the individual soul and so on which helps overcoming infatuation, desire, etc. Study (svādhyāya) is the continuous recitation of spells signifying Īśvara (God) by means of agreeable spells. Devotion to the Supreme Being (Īśvarapraṇidhānaḥ) is the constant study and thinking about the True nature of the Supreme Being by means of books (such as Gītā, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis and other śāstras) which discusses the True nature of the
Supreme Being). In brief, Attachment (rāga), Aversion (dvesa) and Illusion (moha) are miseries since they cause obstructions in attaining trance or contemplation through attachment to the world.

Restraint (yamaḥ), observance (niyamaḥ), yogic postures (āsana), Breath regulation (prāṇāyāmaḥ), Abstraction (pratyāhāraḥ), Concentration (dhāraṇā), Meditation (dhyāna) and contemplation (samādhi) are the eight limbs of yogic discipline (Yogaśāstra 2.29).

Restraints (yamaḥ) are abstinences from injury (ahimsā) continence (brahmacarya), abstinence from stealing (asteya) and so on, and are the cause of purification and enlightenment of the individual, having no regard to place, time or condition. Observances (niyamaḥ) are peculiar acts causing the attainment of merit depending on time, place and circumstance and is of the nature of going round a deity, worship in the evening and recitation of holy words (recitation of holy books) and so on.

Yogic postures (āsana) are the control over the limbs of the body which helps overcoming miseries that are obstructed by the union (of the Individual Soul with the Universal Soul), and are padmaka (lotus posture), svastika and so on. Breath regulation (prāṇāyāmaḥ) is
the stoppage of breath and are of various kinds such as expiration, inspiration and retention (recaka, pūraka and kumbhaka) and it is to be practised step by step just like the taming of a wild elephant. Abstraction (pratyāhāraḥ) is the complete withdrawal of mind from all objects which hinder the attainment of contemplation. Concentration (dhrāna) is the steadfastness of the mind on an object of meditation. Meditation (dhyāna) is the incessant continuation of concentration on an object. That same meditation when it reflects only the object meditated (where there is the knowledge of the object meditated alone exists) and devoid of its identity (that is the feeling that meditation and the object meditated are separate has gone) is Contemplation (Saṃādhi). This itself is the Supreme kind of meditation since it focuses the mind in one and the same object (although there are disturbances from external agencies), just like the flame of a lamp remaining unmoved even in a wild storm, and this is known by the name Saṃādhi (contemplation).

Thus these aids to yoga (i.e., the union of the individual Soul with the Supreme Soul) are to be practised with great perseverance and with highest devotion in the Supreme Being which cannot be expressed in words; by those who are desirous of Emancipation (or release) from these worlds created by Brahmā, induced by the thought that
it is full of various kinds of miseries. He who practices Yoga will attain, without delay, the direct cognition of the Supreme Being possessed of a form having no comparison, suspicious and not misleading (True). Having seen him (the Supreme Being) one acquires incomparable (Eternal) Bliss. It has also been said: Just as the sky covers human beings as the skin of the body, similarly by attaining realization of the Supreme Soul, one attains the end of all miseries (Śvetāśvatārpanishad 6-20 3-8, 15) and also "He who knows the Self overcome pain" (Chāndogypanisad).

Thus Emancipation is attained by the realization of the suspicious Supreme Being. Again, what is this Emancipation? According to the views of some, Emancipation is the Absolute condition of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul at the cessation of all specific qualities of it (individual soul) just as the absolute condition of ether at the time of dissolution. If it is asked, how can there be the cessation of specific qualities since it is not possible to distinguish the absolute cessation of misery because of the fact that pleasure and pain are invariably concomitant; it is not so, since intelligent persons do not endeavour to secure pleasure and pleasure alone since it is commonly seen that efforts take place with a view to the removal miseries (pain) such as caused by a thorn etc.
Emancipation is the enjoyment of Eternal Bliss

It is not feasible to hold that an intelligent person will strive for such an end since it is only a state of unconsciousness as in a swoon. The example cited (viz. of the thorn etc.) is not a competent one because even the removal of the thorn etc., is for the enjoyment of pleasure since pleasure does not occur when there is the presence of misery.

And if it is asked how the apprehension of the enjoyment of pleasure by one who is released is reached, it is said that such an apprehension is reached through the scriptures or verbal testimony. It is also said in scriptures: "Where there is the enjoyment of eternal Bliss and where there is the perception of supersensual cognitions, know that is Emancipation or Mokṣa, which is not attained by ignorant persons," "He who knows the Bliss of Brahman, fears not at any more" and it is experienced in emancipation (Taittireya Upanisad 2-4-1). "The Bliss of Brahman is True Knowledge (Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upanisad 3-9-28).

As secondary sense is not contributive to the primary sense (of the words Sukha and Ānanda (i.e., pleasure and Bliss) (i.e. it is not to be taken as
dukkhābhāva - absence of misery) since the primary sense is not defective.

If it is said that there is no difference between the state of release (Emancipation) and mundane existence since pleasure and its enjoyment are eternal, it is not correct, since pleasure (Bliss) and its realization, even though they are eternal in character, the relation between them as the subject and object is obstructed, just like a wall obstructs the contact between a jar and the eye; there is the existence of merit and misery in this mundane world. In the destruction of such impediments in a state of Emancipation, the conjunction between pleasure and its consciousness takes place, just as the contact between the eye and the jar at the destruction of a wall and hence it is not correct to say that there is non-difference between emancipation and mundane life.

If it is argued that there is the possibility of cessation of pleasure and its realization (and hence an end to emancipation causing rebirth etc.), at one time or other since the relation (between pleasure and its enjoyment) is a product, it is not true, since it is eternal because of its being a product which has a beginning but no end (pradhvamsa). Again, if it is argued
that there is the possibility of cessation of pleasure and its consciousness at one time or another since the relation is a product having a positive entity, it cannot be so, since it cannot be proved, because it does not fall under substance, quality etc., or if it is included (the relation of subject and object comes under) in the categories such as substance quality and so on its relation with inherence etc., and its knowledge will not take place.

If it is said that an object becomes an agent of action through merit and demerit etc., and the knowledge produced thus is its subject, it is not true, since in that case there is the probability of the absence of any relation between the knowledge of the God, which is eternal, with its objects.

Thus from all these arguments it is clearly proved that in spite of its being a product, this eternal relation of pleasure and its realization is eternal, since there is the absence of any cause of its destruction.