CHAPTER VII

BHÂSARVÂJÑÂ AND BUDDHISM AND JAINISM

Introduction

Buddhism and Jainism came into existence at about 600 B.C. Along with the expansion of both these religions there grew up a tendency among the followers of these systems to expound their own logical systems in support of the teachings of their Lords, Buddha and Mahâvîra. As a first step towards this end they adopted the earlier Hindu logical system and the method therein in expounding the dogmas of their own religion and metaphysics. Some of the writers on Buddhism and Jainism even brought out regular treatises on logic and these were, in effect, either fragments or resumes of the logical system founded by the earlier Hindu logicians. By about 450 A.D., the Buddhist logician Dignaga and the Jaina logician Siddhasena Divâkara, laid the true foundation of a separate logical system of their own, by differentiating the principles of logic from those of religion and metaphysics. This school covered a period of nearly eight hundred years from 450 A.D. to 1200 A.D., and the growth of the philosophical system was very rapid since they were often patronised by the kings of that time
who were attracted more by their religious principles than
by the logical exercises.

In the subject matter and method this system
founded by the Buddhists and the Jaines differs markedly
from the ancient school which was essentially Brahmanic in
nature and outlook. The ancient logic dealt with sixteen
categories such as pramāṇa, prameya etc., comprising such
heterogeneous elements as doctrine of salvation and nature
of the soul and the like. The new systematic method founded
by Dignāga and Siddhasena Divākara, on the contrary, concerns
itself with one category, viz., pramāṇa which treats upon
other categories only in so far as these are necessary for
its proper elucidation. This doctrine of pramāṇa is treated
in such a way that it may be equally applied to the religious
systems of the Brāhmaṇas, Jaines and Buddhists. Inference
(anumāṇa) which was briefly noticed in the Hindu logic,
received a fuller treatment at the hands of the later
logicians. They coined numerous technical terms and intro-
duced great subtleties to the definition of terms, the
theory of syllogism etc. They also rejected prameya, the
object of knowledge, on the ground that it is useless in
works on logic to treat the soul, birth, death and the like,
which are comprised under this category.¹

¹ Satischandra Vidyabhushana, A History of Indian Logic,
pp. 157-58
Influence of Hinduism

According to some scholars the earlier and later logicians and logical systems of the Buddhists and the Jaina were very much influenced by the Hindu logical speculations. They in turn exerted their influence upon the Hindu logicians of the later period. Thus according to Dr. Jvalaprasad this period² when Jaina and Buddhist logic were evidently the result of the influence of the Hindu logic of the previous period. They in their turn, gave rise to some of the scholastic developments in the later logic and epistemology of the Hindu writers.

The positive theory of epistemology as found in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is a contrast to Nāgārjuna's denial of the means of knowledge and is certainly a fresh departure in Buddhist philosophy. Hindu and Buddhistic influence on each other is evident from the affinity of the doctrines found between Praśatapāda and Dignāga. "Similarly such factors as the introduction of epistemological discussions into the Mīmāṁsā system by Prabhākara and Kumārila, or into the Vedānta by Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja or again the development of a more theoretical and exclusive treatment of logical and epistemological subjects in the

² Termed by Jvalaprasad as "scholastic period" in which the philosophical systems fully developed both in philosophical speculations and in the method of treating the subjects.
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, which ultimately led to the creation of the new school of logic (Navya-nyāya) were all the result of the existence of strong schools of the Buddhist and Jaina logic during this period."

Buddhist influence on Brahmanic writers

Due to the influence of the Buddhist and Jaina logicians such as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Māṇikyanandin, Vādidevasūri, Siddhasena Divakara etc., the later Hindu writers on logic departed from their usual custom of treating both the pramāṇas and the prameyas in their treatises. Thus the theory of knowledge came to be regarded as a distinct subject. But they never held the view that the theory of knowledge could be discussed without assuming the objects of knowledge.

The first Hindu logician who dealt with the theory of knowledge as a subject by itself in his work was Bhāsarvajña. The other notable logician was Gāṅgesea Upādhyaśya, the founder of the Navya-nyāya school. The main tendency of the Hindu logicians of this period was to make such modifications in their theories in so far as they are necessary in the light of the criticisms levelled by the philosophers of other schools and as could be made consistently with the

3 Jwalaprasad, History of Indian Epistemology, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1978,
essential tenets of their own; and to refute such doctrines of their opponents as they are contrary to their Brahmanical system and is impossible to agree with such theories. Bhāsarvajña made both kinds of changes in his work. He in fact modified the definitions of certain philosophical terms and made variations in the classification of certain topics. Similarly he opposed the rival theories whenever it was necessary to oppose such theories since they were antagonistic to the accepted doctrines of the Hindu logic.

This deviation of Bhāsarvajña from the earlier Hindu logical method is no doubt, due to the influence of the Buddhist and Jaina systems which flourished freely in India through the liberal support and patronage of kings for about 800 years. Perhaps, this assimilation was necessary for the revival of the Hindu logical system. During the period of the Buddhist and Jaina influence the Hindu logic became almost extinct and logicians like Siddhasena Divākara among the Jaina and Dignāga among the Buddhists travelled throughout the length and breadth of the country entering into debates with the Hindu logicians, defeating them and forcing them to join their own order by virtue of their superior dogmas. Afterwards with the help of some of the Hindu kings, the Brāhmans somehow managed to revive the Hinduism and it became necessary for them to write fresh treatises on logic which accepted some of the popular views of other schools which were not against their approved tenets.
Further, it was necessary to refute the opponent views which were against their fundamental doctrines. Bhāsarvajñā's work shows such a tendency and the growth of Śaivism in Kashmir helped him in moulding his theories on the ground of Hindu logic which assimilated in it all the other theories of opponents in as much as they are not against the fundamental doctrines of the Hindus.

**Bhāsarvajña's synthesis**

The first and perhaps the only Hindu logician who imbibed the influence of the Buddhist and Jaina logicians was Bhāsarvajña. Following the Buddhist and Jaina logicians he treated only one topic, that is, pramāṇa in his treatise and incorporated all other categories under it. In this connection it may be noted that the Nyāyasāra definition of pramāṇa as "samyaganubhavasādhanam pramāṇam" betrays the influence of Umāsvāti and Dharmakīrti both of whom have used the words "samyag anubhava" in their definitions. This was clearly due to the influence of the Buddhist and Jaina influence since at the time of Bhāsarvajña the two religious systems were flourishing very strongly in India, especially in the North enjoying even the patronage of the local rulers. Hence in order to bring their logical system on a line with

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4 Dr R.C. Dwivedi, Contribution of Jainism to Indian Culture, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1975, p.188
the others, the Brahmanic writers began to compose logical treatises which had its outward form from the Buddhist and Jaina logic while in the content they were Brahmanic in nature. Some of the logicians even went forward with some deviations in the old Hindu logical system since it was not possible for them to get rid of the influence of the Jaina and Buddhist systems of logic. This perhaps helped the Hindu logicians to effect a renaissance in their system and to persuade those who had accepted the rival religious orders to come back to their original position. Bhāsarvajña was the first logician among the Brāhmaṇas to inherit the influence of the Buddhist and Jaina logic even at the cost of deviating from the old system at certain points.

Apart from treating only the pramāṇa, he recognised only three pramāṇas viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama and in this he is with the Sāmkhyas. This is contrary to the Nyāyasūtra in which upamāṇa is enumerated as the fourth pramāṇa. Bhāsarvajña does not accept this and he is inclined to include upamāṇa under verbal testimony or āgama. He even goes to the extent of arguing that Śūtrakāra has accepted only these three pramāṇas enumerated by him.5

5 Nyāyasāra, op.cit., p.13

catustvābhidhānam sūtṛesu pañcatvādi nirākaraṇārtham, na trīvapratiṣedhārtham pramāṇasiddhatvādantaraṃbhāvasya. trīvābhidhānam ayuktam iti cet na. sūtrakārasyaivaṃ svabhāvatvāt.
In his rejection of upamāna as a separate pramāṇa and its inclusion under verbal testimony, it is probable that Bhāsarvajña followed the Śāmhya-Yoga systems as well as the Buddhists and Jainas. The Śāmkyyas accept only three pramāṇas and vehemently criticise those who accept upamāna as a separate pramāṇa. So also the Yoga philosophers also accept only three pramāṇas rejecting all others. The Buddhists accept only two pramāṇas and declare that all other pramāṇas are of no use. The Jainas divide the pramāṇas into two, namely pratyakṣa (direct) and parokṣa (indirect). Then they include anumāṇa and āgama under parokṣa and argue that all the other pramāṇas like smṛti, pratyabhijñā, tarka (ūha) etc., come under verbal testimony. These philosophical systems have well influenced Bhāsarvajña in shaping his logical conceptions for he has shown much deviation from the time honoured practice of treating the number of pramāṇas as four. Even then Bhāsarvajña takes pain to establish that the Sūtrakāra has accepted only these three pramāṇas and the mention of upamāna separately is to indicate the importance of that topic. One could notice that the argument put forward by Bhāsarvajña is very weak since the Sūtrakāra has actually mentioned four pramāṇas in unambiguous terms. This attempt of the author of the Nyāyasāra to bring his treatise on a par with the other popular schools of the time is characteristic of his ingenuity. In other words, he is forced by
circumstances to take such a position. He wants to present a popular view though at the same time he is reluctant to discard the tenets of the ancient school represented by the Sūtrakāra.

Influence on Bhāsarvajña

Another point of interest, which clearly exposes the Buddhist and Jaina influence upon Bhāsarvajña is his division of Anumāna. After dividing anumāna into two, viz., Drśṭa (seen) and sāmānyato drśṭa (seen generally), he again classifies it into svārtha (that for one's sake) and parārtha (that for the sake of others). This division of anumāna is entirely unknown to Gautama and Kanāda and the commentators on these systems like Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimisāra etc., who do not accept such a classification. On the other hand all the Buddhist logicians beginning from Dignāga and the Jaina logicians starting from Siddhasena Divākara accept this two-fold division of anumāna and perhaps they were the propounders of such an original classification. Bhāsarvajña was the only Hindu logician of his time to accept such a classification and this was, no doubt, due to the influence of the Jainas and Buddhist systems of logic with which he was very familiar.

Treating the subject of the fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsas) Bhāsarvajña closely following the Bhāsyakāra
gives virtually the very same definition. The Sūtrakāra has accepted five types of hetvābhāsas but has not shown any of the varieties in this regard. The commentators on the Sūtras also do not give any of the varieties of these five types of hetvābhāsas. But the Buddhist and Jaina logicians treat at length the hetvābhāsas, their number ranging from three to five. Similarly they have shown some varieties of paksābhāsas (fallacies of the minor term). The Vaiśesikas cite five types of fallacious reasons.

Bhāsarvajña on the whole accepts six types of hetvābhāsas, the five accepted by the Sūtrakāra plus anadhavasita (the void reason). He gives twelve varieties of asiddha, eight types of viruddha, eight varieties of anaikāntika, six kinds of anadhavasita, six kinds of kālātyayāpadiṣṭa and one type of prakaraṇasama.

In his treatment and classification of the fallacious reasons, there is no doubt, that Bhāsarvajña has made use of paksābhāsas and hetvābhāsas cited by Siddhasena Divākara, Māṇikyanandin, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara-gupta. A close examination of the works of these above-mentioned logicians will reveal the indebtedness of Bhāsarvajña to them. He has included the paksābhāsa of the Jainas and Buddhists under the fallacious reasons in his Nyāyasāra.6

6 Nyāyapraveśa of Dignāga, Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti and Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara contain a full-length treatment of the fallacious reasons.
Further, in his treatment of the fallacious reasons he has interchanged the varieties of reasons coming under one head to another. Thus some of the fallacious reasons cited by the Buddhists and Jainas under one head are treated under another by Bhāsarvajña. In this respect he has taken liberties in arranging these varieties systematically and scientifically. Such a long discussion of the fallacies is not found in any of the Hindu logical works and Bhāsarvajña is the first Brahmanic logician to do so and in this respect too he had cherished the influence of the Buddhist and Jain logicians. Further, he has also referred to the controversy of Dharmakīrti about the fallacy of non-erroneous contradiction in his work.  

An example (udāharaṇa) before the time of the Buddhist logician Dignāga served as a mere familiar instance which is cited to help the understanding of the listener. But Dignāga converted it into a universal proposition expressing the universal concomitance of the middle term and the major term. Both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have treated the fallacies of example in their treatises. The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara has also dealt with the fallacies of example. The later commentators on both these philosophers enumerate exhaustively the topic on fallacious example.

7 Nyāyasāra, op. cit., p.10 ekatra tulyalakṣaṇaviruddhahetudvayopanipāto viruddhāvyabhicārityeke.
Dignāga gives five types of Dratēntēbhāsa whereas Siddhasena Divākara enumerates six types of it and in the Nyāyāvatāra-vivrti the commentator gives nine varieties. The renowned Buddhist logician Dharmaṅkirtī has cited nine varieties each of the homogeneous and heterogeneous types of fallacious examples. Bhāsarvajñā has closely followed Dharmaṅkirtī in his enumeration of this subject and he as in other cases happens to be the first Hindu logician to do so.

Another point of importance in the work is its refutation of the atheism and the theory of momentariness of the Buddhists who abandon the Vedāntic conception of the Absolute or the Sāmkhya idea of the spirit and accept only the fleeting series of mental impressions as a quasi-reality. This doctrine of the Buddhists of a fleeting series of mental expressions postulates that a previous mental state is different from a succeeding one, so that the experience one had in the previous state cannot last in the succeeding one is rejected by Bhāsarvajñā since it is contrary to one's common experience.

The followers of Buddha doubt the validity of verbal testimony (śabda) as a means of valid knowledge on the ground that it is only corroboratory of the knowledge that is derived through perception and inference and hence like memory it is not infallible. Again it cannot be
maintained that verbal testimony applies where perception and inference fail, for in the first place it is hard to conceive of an object which cannot be established by perception and inference and secondly such an object can never be established through verbal testimony, since the knowledge through verbal testimony pre-supposes the connection of words as the name and object as the thing signified by that name, which connection is hard to establish in such a case. Bhāsarvajña rejects this view of the Buddhists saying that it is possible to establish the connection between the object and the name even though the former is yet unperceived, as in the case of knowledge derived through comparison where a person establishes the connection of Gavaya as the object signified and Gavaya as the name which signifies that object, even though the former is unperceived by the person on the strength of the assertion of a reliable man. This separate mention of upamāṇa is made by the Śātrakāra, says Bhāsarvajña, to establish the validity of verbal testimony and hence he rejects the Buddhist view that verbal testimony is not a pramāṇa.

In his monumental commentary on the work, namely the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, Bhāsarvajña frequently examines the views of the Jaina and the Buddhists and quotes especially from Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta. He examines their views and quotes or rejects them wherever it is found
necessary. In dealing with hetu, udāharaṇa etc., and in treating the fallacies and also in dealing with the soul etc., he frequently examines the Buddhist views and rejects them. From the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa it is evident that Bhāsarvajña was well-versed in the Buddhist logical doctrines. All these are obvious instances of his anxiety to bring his treatment of the subject on a line with the method current in his time. He seems to have been a bold and original thinker in his chosen field.

Conclusion

It may be concluded that Bhāsarvajña has made a bold and at once successful attempt to reconstruct the Brahmanic system of logic unfettered by the orthodox lines of thinking. He felt free to borrow the outward form from both the systems of Buddhists and Jainas. But at the same time he showed particular care not to flout the basic Brahmanic tradition. His attempt was rather towards synthesising than antagonistic. Hence though he had effected significant changes in the Brahmanic logic maintaining his reliance on other systems, he was never castigated by orthodox Hindus of the later times. His

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8 D.N. Shastri, The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (Critique of Indian Realism), Bharatiya Vidya Prakashān, New Delhi, 1976, p.116
treatise was commented by scholars of almost all the religious denominations. Both Jainas and Buddhists commented on his treatise while Brahmanic writers too applauded his efforts in their commentaries. This is one of the welcome features of Bhāsarvajña's renaissance of the Hindu logical traditions.