CHAPTER V

THE TEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

A Introduction

The teleological argument for the existence of God is a member of the classic triad of arguments with the ontological and cosmological arguments being the other two. The argument is commonly called the teleological arguments. (The Greek word telos means 'end' or 'goal'.) This argument points out that the world appears to be ordered toward goals and ends. In the Oxford English Dictionary, 'teleology' is defined as 'the doctrine or study of ends or final causes'. This definition contains a technical term 'final causes', but this is not used now-a-days. A more familiar word would be 'purposes'. Kant calls this argument as "the physico-theological proof." Usually this argument is known as the argument from design. St. Thomas Aquinas's Fifth way is a version of this argument.

The teleological argument is an attempt to reason from the presence of order, design and purpose in this world to the existence of a supreme 'orderer', designer, and 'purposer' - that is, to God. We can find that there is order and design in the universe in such a way that the diverse ele-
ments and contrary activities are all so adjusted and adapted to make one harmonious universe. We are all impressed by the vastness, the grandeur, the beauty and the admirable order of the universe. And once we grant that the universe is a work of design, it immediately implies a designer, or it presupposes an orderer. But this supposed designer or order is neither mere chance nor the latent forces of matter. Consequently, we can say that, it must be the result of an intelligent being which is different from matter. Such a being, according to this argument, is called God, and therefore we can say that God exists.

B. The world exhibits a teleological order

This argument proceeds explicitly from orderliness of the universe which would be considered as one whole. St. Thomas Aquinas writes: "... in the Universe we find that things of diverse natures come together under one order, and this not rarely or by chance, but always or for the most part. There must therefore be some being by whose providence the world is governed. This we call God."

We know that this world exhibits a teleological order, viz., in form of design and adaptation. To understand this argument, we should first understand what teleological order is. In this world we can observe that some group of elements
are ordered in a certain way. They are interrelated so as to form a definite pattern. When the elements form a pattern we take intrinsic delight, then we can speak of an aesthetic order. When there are clear regularities, certain elements occur in a spatio-temporal proximity, we can speak of causal order. The distinctive thing about teleological order is that it introduces the motion of process and structures being fitted to bring about a certain result. Usually we can give illustrations for teleological order from the living organism. It is common observation that the anatomical structure and instinctive activities of animals are often well suited to the fulfillment of their needs.

If we are going to distinguish teleological order from causal order, we shall have to see whether the structure or process is having a 'value'. If it has a 'value', then it is a case of teleological order. Otherwise, any cause-effect relationship would be a case of teleological order. For example, wind is the reason of moving dirt into the air and the mechanism of the eye is to produce sight. Here, the latter would be counted as an example of 'design', whereas the former would not. We regard sight as having a
worth, while the movement of dirt through the air is not generally of any value. So, we can have 'value' as a criterion for the distinction between the teleological and causal orders.

Again, we can say that the teleological explanation and causal explanation are not mutually exclusive. And neither can perform the function of the other. The principle of teleological explanation is that which guides us in determining and explaining things which come from design and intent. This teleological explanation permits us to infer not only that there are purposes, but also specifically what these purposes are. Thus, teleology implies causality in the sense that teleology is dependent upon causality. But we have to see also that, causality is an asymmetrical or one-way relationship between two events. But teleology is a symmetrical relationship. It is described as a means-end relationship. And it is to be admitted that if there were no cause-effect relationships there could be no means-end relationships.

2 Designed World

Thus St. Thomas Aquinas's Fifth way ultimately depends upon an appeal to the observed natural regularities: things "always or most usually work in the same way." His contention
is that the very regularities of nature themselves prove
the existence of "an intelligent personal being by whom
everything in nature is ordered ..." Leibniz also believes
that God has designed the world according to the best possible
plan. He writes: "God has chosen that world which is the
most perfect, that is to say, which is at the same time the
simplest in its hypotheses and the richest in phenomena."

It is important to note that how the term 'design'
is used in this argument. By mere definition, it does not
imply a designer. We will have to know that the phenomena
are the work of designer before we could call them as the
cases of design. We must define 'design' in such a way as
to leave open the question of its source. We have 'design'
in the sense of that which is ordered to perform a valuable
function. We might put this by saying that things are in
order as if some conscious being had designed them. But in
saying this we are not committing ourselves to the proposi-
tion that a finite mind has designed them. Hence we can
say that the terms 'adaptation' and 'teleological order' are
not so liable to mislead.

3 Governed by Purposes

In other words, this argument takes its premise that
things appear to be governed by purposes. While writes,
"confronted with nature's indubitable purposiveness at all its levels, man cannot believe that it is all 'spots and jumps', an unmeaning chaos. Is the whole process of organic evolution explicable to our human minds saved on the hypothesis that such purposiveness implies not only Mind, but Creative Mind, beyond all that is, yet working out its purposes within all that is?" The idea of purpose meets us in all the ordinary theological accounts of the relation of God to the world of finite things. And it is held that the purposive activity is the central feature of our human experience.

We can see, now, in what sense the idea of 'purpose' is used in this argument. The idea of purpose, as we meet it in experience, appears to imply (i) a non-existent state of affairs, (ii) the conception of a plan for bringing the desired state of affairs into existence by selection of appropriate means, and (iii) the act of will proper which realizes or carries out this plan. The final stage of the process may seem to involve the adaptation of means to an end. Purpose in this sense is thus essentially a feature of a life in time. It would seem that the characteristic of a finite individual in an orderly universe where connection of means and end can be ascertained and relied upon. Thus we can hold that reason seems to operate characteristically
under the form of end. Also, we can observe that some features of finite purpose are falling away and when they are dropped there still remains a fundamental attitude of will.

4 An Explanation in Terms of Ends

Aristotle thinks that everything is tending to its own appropriate natural end. For him, one universal sort of explanation becomes an explanation in terms of ends for all and according to him, these ends are the final causes of things. All things have an inherent natural tendency to develop towards their ends. Hence to this development we have to explain it in terms of an Aristotelian fundamental law. But St. Thomas Aquinas is moving beyond and even against Aristotle in maintaining that "those things which do not have knowledge do not tend to an end, except under the direction of someone who knows and understands."

5 Immanent Teleology and Transcendental Teleology

According to Aristotle, there are four main types of 'cause': (i) material, (ii) formal (iii) efficient and (iv) final. It is clear that the final cause of an artefact is its intended function. But Aristotle is of the view that final causes operate in nature too. The final cause of a natural movement is closely connected with its formal cause.
Thus, the most distinctive feature of Aristotelian teleology is that it is *immanent* in nature. This means that the source of a thing’s end or its directed movement is to be found within nature itself and not in any external agency. But for Leibniz, the functions or movements are conferred upon things by an agent who is outside nature. That is, this kind of teleology derived from an external source.

So, we can make a distinction between (1) **immanent teleology** (ii) transcendent teleology. In the former, the end is internal to the process. Aristotle’s teleology is clearly immanent. Teleology is transcendent when the end is external to the process. For example, the Calvinist says that the end of man is to glorify God and not to actualize the fullness of the form of man. When considering transcendent teleology of the whole, we can make a further distinction. That is, between (a) an external agent which uses the world as means to the realization of its ends, (e.g.) St. Augustine said that God created the world in order to repopulate heaven, and (b) the world process as striving to an end which transcends the process itself (e.g.) Tennyson’s "one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves."

5.1 **Purposive Teleology and Non-purposive Teleology**

There is yet another distinction we can make between (i) purposive teleology and (ii) non-purposive teleology.
Teleology is purposive when the end is consciously chosen by a mind. For example, a man reads a book in order to learn about a certain subject. Again, we have the division of teleology of the whole and of parts. A teleological explanation of the universe as a whole is permissible and at the same time it cannot be shown that it is required. We can also give teleological explanation to the things in this world. So, with these distinctions, we can make eight theoretically possible types of teleology: (1) Whole, immanent, purposive, (2) Whole, immanent, non-purposive, (3) Whole, transcendent, purposive, (4) Whole, transcendent, non-purposive, (5) Parts, immanent, purposive, (6) Parts, immanent, non-purposive, (7) Parts, transcendent, purposive, and (8) Parts, transcendent, non-purposive.

6 **On the Basis of Values**

It is also possible to state that there is still another way of presenting this argument. And this way is purely on the basis of values; hence, it bases its attention mainly on man. This argument assumes that there is a difference between "higher" and "lower" beings, e.g., the life of a man is more valuable than the life of a worm. It is held that the world-process is a preparatio anthropologica, whether designed by or not, and man is the culmination. We cannot
explain man in terms of physical nature even though nature may be explained in terms of man. Hence, he is called "the threshold of the spirit." 

Now, teleology is also called the interpretation of beginnings by *terminus ad quem*, viz., lower stages by higher, process by product and temporal becoming in terms of realization of values. In the conception of human purpose we may distinguish the following constituent elements: (i) the pre-conceived idea of a situation to be reached, (ii) desire for that situation because of its value to the agent, (iii) means for the attainment of it and, (iv) the actualization of what was contemplated in thought and striven for.

According to this argument, the value distinctions that men make are not subjective, but are somehow characteristics of things themselves. That is, it assumes that such things as beauty, goodness and holiness are the fruits of our life.

The simplest form of the argument is that from the particular cases of design, we can argue that they could be explained only by supposing that they were produced by an intelligent being. Thus William Paley, in a classic formulation of the argument concentrated on the human eye as a
case of design. We can see that the various parts of the eye co-operate in a complex way to produce the sight. It would be impossible to attribute the formation and assembling of the actual parts into a functioning machine to the theory of 'chance'. We are obliged to postulate an intelligent mind which is responsible for the phenomenon. So, Paley argues that we can explain this adaptation of means to end only if we postulate a supernatural designer. This is the heart of the argument.

Thus, this argument claims that adaptation can be explained only in terms of a designer. It always rests on an analogy with human artifacts. Thus, Paley compares the eye to a watch. He argues that even if one does find a watch in a desert or island he would suppose that it was produced by an intelligent being. In the same way, in the adjustment of means to end, one is entitled to conclude, after the examination of the human eye, that it was produced by an intelligent being.

1 Artifacts as Our Model

If it is asked why we should take artifacts as our model, we would answer that artifacts are certainly the cases of design. For example, the structure of a watch is well suited to perform a valuable function, i.e. the function
of showing time. So, with artifacts we have some insight into what is responsible for the adjustment of means to end. We can understand it because we can see how this adjustment springs from the creative activity of maker. Also, we can know about the guiding intention of the maker to perform a valuable function. Hence, in natural cases of adaptation where the source of the adaptiveness is not obvious, we have no resources but to employ a conscious planning. And since, we do not observe any planner at work, we must postulate an invisible planner behind the scenes.

Paley begins his argument by noting that whenever we observe of something that "its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose" - a watch, for example - we conclude without hesitation that it has been devised for this purpose by some intelligent designer. William Paley states: "There can not be design without a designer; contrivance, without a contriver; order without choice; arrangement without anything capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelli-
gence and mind." Thus Paley attempted to show that the universe, like a watch, exhibits a teleological order. So, we can say that this teleological argument contains two premises. One is that nature exhibits a number of instances of means ordered to ends. The other is that the ordering of means to ends presupposes the existence of a designer.

2. **Universe is co-operating to achieve one ultimate purpose**

It is important to note that it does not say or presuppose that the whole universe is co-operating to achieve one single ultimate purpose. Also, it should be observed that the argument does not say or presuppose that the several 'ends' towards which the various means are ordered are necessarily good. Paley adds some comments that are important for his analogy between the watch and the world. First, it would not weaken our inference if we had never seen a watch before and therefore did not know from direct observations that watches are products of human intelligence. Secondly, it would not invalidate our inference from the watch to the watchmaker if we found that the mechanism did not always work perfectly. We would still be obliged to postulate a watchmaker. And third, our inference would not be undermined if there were parts of the machine whose function we are not able to discover. Again, Paley clarifies that the marks of
design do not prove that the object bearing the design, directly comes from the designer's hand. It is possible that there could be a series of intermediate causes in the process.

2.1 Productive Intelligence

Thus, Paley argues that the natural world is as manifestly designed as a watch and it implies a designer. The rotation of the planets in the solar system, the regular procession of the seasons and the complex structure and also the mental adaptation of the parts of a living organism, all suggest a design. And Paley is concerned merely to show that an intelligence of some sort must exist. According to him 'chance' is not an adequate explanation for this design; it is a mere hypothesis, for which we can offer no empirical evidence. But for the hypothesis of productive intelligence we do have some experiential warrant. Likewise, the appeal to "principles" or "laws" are all unsatisfying because they are themselves unintelligent and we could not account them for the marks of design in things. "Principles" or "laws" are merely names for patterns in what we observe. They do nothing. Laws of nature are descriptive, not prescriptive, of observed regularities. The effective causal agent operating in a 'principled' or 'lawful' way remains in need of a
specification. And also we observe an intelligent purpose in all objects. So, we may conclude that there are determinable marks of design which are sufficient evidence of the activity of a purposive, intelligent being. This we all call God.

D The Uselessness of Inferring an Intelligent Agent

Hume asks, what could we gain by inferring a purposive or an intelligent agent? It is said that the agent plans the world in his mind somewhat in the way an architect designs a building before constructing it. If it is so, Hume, then, demands for the explanation of that minds and their contents like anything else of this world. He asks, how do the ideas in the mind of God become so ordered coherently into patterns? Shall we postulate another intelligence to account for the order of God's intelligence? We may answer this question by saying that it cannot be possible as it leads only to ad infinitum. Also, we may counter ask the critics to answer the following questions (i) do we have any experience of non-intelligent phenomena arranging themselves to form a 'purposive' pattern? and (ii) do we have any grounds to challenge Paley's principle that intelligence alone has been observed to produce the so-called marks of design?
To these questions, Hume had offered two possibilities: (1) the order in the world is the result of generative or growth processes; and (2) the order is only the chance result of material particles coming together.

1. Result of Generative Processes

We observe order developing in the course of biological growth. Seeds are planted in the ground to develop into organized vegetation. We do not observe any designer placing order in the plants. So we may conclude that order is the result of the generative processes. Likewise, the world may generate its own order just by growing and developing and so it requires no outside designer to place order in it. Thus, it appears that the observed order may be due to some inner developmental process in nature.

But we may say that even in this generative processes we find evidences of intelligence which could point to some supreme designer. Locke writes: "If the famous suggestion that all animal and vegetable life results from a single vital germ, and that all the different animals and plants now existent were developed by natural processes of evolution from that germ, were a demonstrated truth, we should still be able to point to the evidences of intelligence displayed in the measured and progressive development, in those exquisite forms."
1.1 The Theory of Natural Selection

The theory of natural selection functions to discount the need for any influence to unseen entities or intelligences at all to account for the facts. This explanation finds confirmation in the developments of biology since the time of Charles Darwin. According to this theory, the organic structure of today developed from such simpler organisms by purely natural process. This theory holds that the forms of life in the world can survive only if it is adjusted to their environment, and those which cannot adjust may die. Hence Hume argues that this explanation has been adequate in explaining the order of this world. It is held that these developments in biology are a blow to the teleological argument, for they demonstrate that there is no necessity for a designer to place order in the world. So, it seems that the basic assumption of the argument, that the world is designed, is not merely an unsupported hypothesis but also an unnecessary hypothesis.

But, we may say that if we accept Hume's criteria, then the teleological explanation of the behavior of other human beings is never warranted. Also, we can never infer from the goal-directed behavior of other people that they are anything more than mindless phenomena. If Hume's idea is accepted, it rules out not only God but all other human minds.
Then we may conclude that solipsicism is its only consequence. Again, we may say that Darwinism gives answer only to the idealistic argument from the side of evolution and it does not touch the original argument from the fact that living organism exist. Darwinian theory is not a complete explanation of the existence of teleological order in the world. It merely tells us how some cases develop from other cases. Hence, this theory alone is not an alternative to the theistic explanation.

2 Result of Inherent Forces of Matter

According to Epicurus, the reason for the natural order is that result of "the fortuitous concourse of atoms." The minute section of the cosmos that we can inspect has order. We can tell that this order could have come about by the chance collisions of particles of matter. Hume suggests that this order may be a natural outgrowth of changes inherent in the world itself. The world may go through innumerable structural changes until a stable pattern is reached. For example, on the basis of this view, we can tell that the human eye may be a result of the process of natural selection. This theory of the inherent forces of matter holds that the universe is made up of many a various element working according to the uniform and necessary laws and forces. These
elements are real and simple facts. These laws are mathematical necessities. Thus much given, order must necessarily result and there is no need of any Deus ex machina. The order existing in nature does not prove the existence of God, because we can prove that this order can exist without God. We admit that the present order of the universe is due to the laws that regulate it. But the question is to know since when and why are these very laws that make up the universe and regulate its various activities. How do we account for the first adaptations of means to their ends which we observe in this world? Also we can ask: Is this order thoroughly and ultimately self-explanatory, self-existing? Did the laws that govern the universe originate from the objects of the universe? Or rather are these laws produced by some intelligent, self-existing being? Laws are accident or accidental beings, in the philosophical sense of the term; accidents cannot exist in themselves and by themselves. For their essential characteristic is to adhere to or to exist in substances. Also the laws of nature have not originated from the objects of the universe as the laws are anterior and superior to those objects. Hence we may conclude that there must necessarily exist an intelligent being, distinct from, anterior and superior to the universe. That being is in the essence and nature of the things, and also in the inherent laws of this world.
2.1 The Chance-theory

Let us see whether the order of the universe can be due to mere chance. Chance is that which has no proper reason of happening. This may be a nominal definition but such nominal definitions do not help us to understand the nature of the things. It is held that chance is that which brings about an effect without its sufficient reason. But there is a fundamental principle that everything that exists must necessarily have sufficient reason for its existence. It is, therefore, evidently wrong to say that chance brings about an effect without its sufficient cause. So, we may conclude that chance is only a name which is meant that something expected has happened.

Moreover, order, as we have seen already, is the adaptation of means to an end. It is something real and something positive; it has some real entity. Now, we may ask, how can a real entity come out of non-entity? Thus, we would say that the order of the universe is not due to the accidental or causal grouping of atoms. The chance theory would not be adequate to account for the laws and results of statistical or chemical combinations. Also, we observe in the things of the organic order a direction of the means towards an end. We find in these internal and essential finality towards which the organism tends, but chance has no finality. Hence we may
conclude that chance cannot be the cause of organism or of organic order. Robert Flint observes: "we must be informed how the universe came to be a universe, how it came to have the unity which underlies its diversity ... Did the atoms take counsel together and devise a common plan and work it out? That hypothesis is unspeakably absurd, yet it is rational in comparison with the notion that these atoms, combined by mere chance, or by chance produced such a universe as that in which we live." 32

3  **Teleological Surd**

The defense of the teleological argument rests upon the highly dubious premise that the world is perfect. But we have lot of evidences against this view. According to the objectors of the teleological argument, we have to consider the many aspects of the world before claiming that the world is perfect. We can see the droughts, floods, famines, hurricanes, earthquakes and the innumerable varieties of disease that plague the life of man. The critic may ask, why should there be evil in the world if the world was created by all-purposive intelligent being. We have seen in the previous chapter that evil causes much dismay to the claim that God is an omnipotent and benevolent God. And thus it is held that teleological argument is extremely shaky.
Edgar Brightmann has given the name 'dysteleological surd' to the view that in this world, there are many things without having any purpose. In mathematics, surd is a quantity not expressible in rational numbers. Used in a value-theory context, the term 'surd' is applied by writers to a non-value that cannot be reduced to a good. It is basic, irreducible non-value. Hence we can say that the term 'dysteleological' refers to the character of the surd which appears to be purpose-resistant. Instead of manifesting purpose, it appears to be a manifestation of the lack of this. The dysteleologists deny the existence of design or purpose in this world. There are some objects or beings which seem to be without any purpose in this world. Dysteleologists have observed that there are barren mountains, poisonous plants, dangerous animals and a great apparent waste of living germs. What is the use and purpose of all these useless and dangerous things? If the world were the work of an infinite intelligent being, would there be so many awkward things in it?

But we must confess that our present knowledge of the world is quite imperfect and limited. Nature has not yet revealed to us all her secrets. Every fresh discovery in the universe has afforded us with evidence to prove the purposefulness of nature. Besides, it is neither logical nor fair to conclude that such and such objects have no aim because we
have not yet arrived at the knowledge of their finality, even if there should be in nature many apparently useless beings, this would not give us enough reason to deny the existence of order and design in the universe. Further, Leibniz points out that God's purpose extend beyond human beings. Man is only part of a vast cosmos. Man's limited viewpoint is the reason for seeing his sufferings writ so large in the scheme of things. No one can perfectly understand the whole purposefulness of nature. And we can claim that the nature of things cooperates so perfectly and so intimately to the general plan which points to the existence of a planner or designer.

4 The analogy is not a Good One

There is yet another criticism which holds that the analogy between the universe and man-made objects is not a good one; since they are not actually very similar. Further, we are able to judge what causes result in the existence of houses or watches being manufactured. We have not been present when a universe was being produced, and we cannot tell if similar causes operate in universe construction as do in human productions. We have observed causal processes other than human design. Until we actually experience the origins of worlds and have the opportunity to peruse the entire process
of development, we are not in a position to ascertain whether world-creation and development is analogous to human productions. Also, we do posit a human intelligence whenever we encounter an implement that (a) serves some conceivable purpose and (b) is evidently not altogether a product of nature. But neither of these characteristics applies to the regularities that we find in nature. On what basis, are we supposed to see an analogy? Hence we may say that it is quite beside the point to argue that "the analogy between order in nature and the order found in contrivances known to be the product of intelligent purpose is infinitely stronger than any other analogy so far suggested."

It is also suggested that if we press the analogy of the universe to a plant, instead of a machine we get a different conclusion. And why should the one analogy be regarded as worse than the other. Even if we accept the analogy were close, it would only suggest that the universe was designed by a great architect and not a creator. For if we take the analogy seriously we must notice that we do not create the materials from which we make houses, machines and so on, but only arrange the materials.
4.1 Causal Analogy is not Useful in Justifying Belief in God

Hume accepts the empiricist principle of causal analogy but did not accept of its usefulness in justifying belief in God. Also, Hume raised the question: if 'intelligent purpose' is found within the world, as one part of the world's processes, does this not at once raise the doubts about its appropriateness as the alleged cause of the world as a whole? There is a great difference between processes that may be observed to take place inside a thing and the processes that produce the thing itself. We should not argue that because intelligent design is productive of certain results within the world it should be credited with being the cause of the world.

Again, Hume challenges the analogy on which this argument is grounded. He asks, how much can we infer about the kind of causes that were needed to produce the world at the far-off time of its origin. We are much ignorant about the vastly different conditions that must have obtained when the world was being formed.

To this Paley replies that many unknown forces may be at work in the production of a phenomenon characterized by the marks of design, the regress of intermediary cause must eventually lead back to some cause adequate to account for the effect. And this ultimate cause can be no less than intelligence.
5 'Means Ordered to ends' is Ambiguous

The assertion "Nature exhibits a number of instances of means ordered to ends" is subtle and ambiguous. What nature exhibits is a high degree of law-like regularity. If this is what we mean by 'means ordered to ends', then there is nothing wrong in it. But it seems that more than this is intended. The language suggests "purposiveness" or "ordering" and thus subtly suggests in an allegedly factual premise that we should look for a "purposer" or 'orderer'. Hence we seem to have a case of syllogistic smuggling.

6 Science and the Teleological Argument

Does order in nature itself presuppose an orderer? Some people may wish to challenge the premise. It might be said that "it is not Nature that is uniform, but scientific procedure." The scientists give teleology no more consideration than an observation that it is a primitive anthropomorphism. Some have been ridiculed this teleological conception. Francis Bacon compared final causes to "vestal virgin, dedicated to God, and ... barren." And Nicolai Hartmann regarded the greatest achievement of modern thought to be the deliverance from "the nightmare of teleology."
Whitehead replies to the scientists who ridicule teleology: "Scientists animated by the purpose of providing that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study." And according to Dr S Nachakrishnan, science is "a stem of second causes which cannot describe the world adequately, much less account for it." We can also bring testimonies from the scientists in the support of this argument. Lord Kelvin writes: "Overpowering proofs of intelligent and benevolent design lie around us, showing to us through nature the influence of a free-will, and teaching us that all living beings depend upon one ever-acting Creator and Ruler."

II  AN APPRAISAL

We can say that this argument has a fascination. Here we have to consider the two important observations of Hume and Kant. Though both of them have criticised the teleological argument vigorously, nevertheless they considered it as an important argument for the existence of God. Hume speaks of it as follows: "A purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man be so hardened in absurd systems as at all times to reject it...all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a First Author." Similarly Kant, before exposing the fallaciousness of the argument, says of it: "This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. In the
oluest, the clearest and the most acorant with the common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new vigour from that source. It suggests ends and purposes, where our observation would not have detected them by itself, and extends our knowledge of nature by means of the guiding concept of a special unity, the principle of which is outside nature. This knowledge ... so strengthens the belief in a supreme Author of nature that the belief acquires the force of an irresistible conviction.” Thus it seems to be a paradox that an invalid argument should command so much respect even from those who have demonstrated its invalidity.

1 The Important Points Emerge from this Argument

We may see that several points emerge from this argument: (i) It is clear that the argument makes use of such motions as those of purpose, or of a means-end relation between things, or of action aimed at some goal or end. (ii) The argument is an argument by analogy. This is made clear in Aquinas and Paley by the use of specific analogies those of the arrow and of the watch, and in Hume and Kant by an explicit invoking of the general notion of analogy. (iii) The starting point of the argument is observation; the argument is (at least in general) in some sense supposed to be an empirical or a post-empirical one. (iv) Further, the argument can be seen as both depending upon, and leading to
the discovery of design. To the believer in God as designer, evidence of design is to be found without difficulty throughout the universe. In this sense, the argument can be said to be both from and to design. Here, we have to note that if it has been alleged that the design is 'not really there' but only is 'mind-imposed', then the force of the argument as a proof of God is surely weakened. Before we say that it would cease altogether to work as a proof, we shall consider some senses of "design".

2 Two Senses of 'Design'

Let us indicate the sense of 'design' where it is identified with 'order' in the matter of a designer, by using the term 'design-A'. Similarly let us use the term 'design-B' to mark the sense of design where 'design' is synonymous with 'purpose' or where it is used to refer the adaptations of means of ends. It has been held by Thomas McPherson that where 'design' is taken in the sense of 'design-B', then there is no necessity for making distinction between 'Argument from Design' and 'Teleological Argument'. But, if it is in the sense of 'design-A' then we can find some distinction between 'Argument from Design' and 'Teleological argument'. Further, we may make use of that distinction whenever this argument is objected to by some as it assumes what has to be proved. It is claimed that if someone says that he sees
design in the universe he is doing more than the beginning an argument for the existence of God. To choose this way of argument is already assuming God, for design implies designer. Then it is not difficult to conclude God's existence. But this type of argumentation is a put-up job. Now it is clear that as an objection to the argument from Design, this could only apply to the Teleological Argument or Argument from Design-B, and not to the Argument from Design-A. An argument constructed on the idea that the universe exhibits order (as opposed to purpose) is not open to the charge of smuggling its conclusion into its premises. Hence we may say that a teleological argument to God is a line of thought that tends to see the universe as a field of purpose actions with this we are half-way to God already. But an argument from design on the other hand, may be a line of thought that sees the universe as exhibiting order but still it requires some effort of reasoning to get this recognition to God.

3 This Argument Requires Supplementation from Other Sources

Further, we may note an observation made by Kant, that this teleological argument always requires supplementation from other sources, if God's existence is to be at issue. According to him, this supplementation is made by an appeal to the contingent character of the order in nature. The
whole frame of this nature might not have manifested this
design; it is not necessary or self-explanatory. Hence
we may claim that there must be some necessary and self
explanatory cause for the world-order as a whole. This mode
of argument is no longer the empirical-teleological way but
rather the cosmological argument. Thus the teleological
argument give way to the cosmological argument or we may
say that the cosmological argument assist this argument.

This argument is said to be also ontological. It is
ontological because it implies that the universe is responsive
to reason's demand for intelligibility, and that the demand
can be satisfied only by a purposive system. That is to say,
the point of this argument is that order, design and purpose
not only imply the existence of a necessary being but also
imply that this necessary being is intelligent and purposive.
Then it is to be held that this conclusion is already estab-
lished, if we consider the ontological argument is to be sound.
Hence it has assumed that the teleological argument is simply
another kind of evidence pointing toward the same conclusion.

4 **Difficulties in Paley's Formulation**

Now we shall have to consider about the formulation of
the argument by Paley. It is held that it does not go very
far toward proving God's existence. The most we are s
warranted in concluding is that each case of design in the natural world is due to the activity of an intelligent designer. Nothing is done to show that all cases of design are due to one and the same designer; the argument is quite compatible with polytheism or polydaemonism, in which we would have one supernatural designer for flies another for fish, and so on. Further, it is also held that even if there is one, and only one designer, nothing is done to show that this being is predominantly good rather than evil. On all these accounts, it has been held, that his argument will not bear the weight. But we may say that Paley does not propose this argument for their. He himself admits that the teleological argument is insufficient to justify literally the 'supreme' expressions familiar in théistic discourses.

However we may observe that this argument has some very strong appeals to our experience. It brings the hypothesis under consideration into direct touch with the ascertainable facts.

8 The Śiva Sādhānta Point of View

1 Inexorable nature of God's Commandments

The central idea of teleological argument is the presence of design or purpose in the world, which demands the existence of a designer who would be All-Powerful and Omniscient. Since there is purpose in creation, there should be also design and
orderliness in it. The following words of Tirumandiram reminds us of design in the world and of the existence of a designer: "Do not deny the existence of the Almighty who in His justice commanded fire to abide in the middle of the sea (to prevent its overflow on the land). He is the Lord of Gods. He showers His grace day and night." Here our attention is drawn to design or purpose and the inexorable nature of God's commandments. It might be objected by the opponents who would bring cases of dysteleology and lack of design, or of cases of the sea submerging the land and of similar calamities. But Siddhantin says to them that divine grace functions ceaselessly day and night in the world. If we can fully grasp the plan of God, the case of dysteleology and lack of design of the cases of calamities can be explained as indispensable occurrences in the plan of God. This is clear from the above verse of Tirumūlar. He also continues to say that it is natural for man to interpret everything with his reasoning (arivu). But he should realize that there is a limit to it. What is beyond human understanding need not be altogether denied, for God is even beyond our denial and forgetfulness. Such thoughts are found in the following words:

"Sellumalaivum celuttumin cintaiyai
Vallaparicāl umaiminkaį vaimaiyai"
We have further in the psalms of the Sa'iva sain a clear indication that their faith in God is nourished by their awareness of order in the physical and moral realms. Yet their faith is not undermined by calamities. The following words of Appar proves this: "Even if the earth runs into the nether world, the great sea covers up everything, the seven worlds go out of their course, the sun and moon crash (to their doom), despair not my mind! We have found one sure source of strength - the Feet of the Lord."

2 The Subjective Side of the Design of Purpose

There is also another way of presenting the teleological argument for God's existence. While the above consideration laid stress on the objective side of the design or purpose in the world, the following lays stress on the subjective side. In every man there is an instinct (craving or yearning) to know fully himself and other things. There is a purpose in this instinct, namely to find happiness. This can be illustrated by an example. At night we cannot see clearly the objects in front of us. It causes misery. Yet there is a yearning in us to have a clear vision of them. When it dawns we see the objects clearly and find happiness thereby. As long as we do not have this clear vision, we have a feeling that
something is wanting in us. Since, by knowing alone we can enjoy something, knowledge a perfect knowledge becomes the ideal of our life. From this it is clear that the purpose is found embedded in man rather than in the objective world. Hence the teleology is not objective but subjective according to Siddhāntins.

Such an interpretation, namely that knowing and enjoying is the goal of human life finds support in Folknavam:

"Lla uyīrkkum inbam enbatu
Tai asarntu varūm nēvārrākum." 56

We can find these two benefits, viz., knowing and enjoying, only in the act. For example, there may be a stone kept on our table. We may be able to ascertain its nature and purpose as paper-weight only when it is actually used for preventing the papers from being flown by wind. Hence actual function of an object, reveals its nature and purpose.

Piyag says that we should begin to act knowing all the eightfold methods.

"Vinaiye ceivyatu ceyappatuporulē
Nilanē kālar karuvi enru
Innatałku itupayanāku ennum
Annamarapin iranṭotum tokaiyi
Ayeṭṭum enpa tember mutalnileiyē". 57
That is to say, "the soul which puts forth efforts, performs deeds and experiences the consequences thereof with the help of the body wherein it resides, orana in the body which serve as instruments, time suitable for the performance of deeds, deed, order (nivati) which reallocates the fruits to their appropriate deeds, purpose and the result." Correspondingly the door also get eightfold changes which are admitted as the eightfold case conditions of the noun in Tamil language.

Hence there is a method or way or way of acting, and there is ability too in man for acting. This is explained in Tolkapiyam thus:

"Oru nariyattu anu oriyaal mutiyum
karuma nikazhthi itam ena mozhupa."

The benefit resulting from such act has two aspects.

"Itum puyakkum itan mara ennun
Tokunilai kilai payan enappattum."

Hence there must be a higher reality which actuates any object without changing its nature (ivaly) and method of its acting (nari). That is said to be a universal reality (Potumainorul) according to Tolkapiyam:

"Inbamum, itumaiyum, punarvum,
Ozhukkamum, enru itai isbudhu nari inpi
Itu aku ittinaikkku uriyapporu ennetu,
Potuvaiy nirrval porulvakai enba."