CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Locus of control

Locus of control in social psychology refers to the extent to which individuals believe that they can control events that affect them. Understanding of the concept was developed by Julian B. Rotter in 1954, and has since become an important aspect of personality studies.

Individuals with a high internal locus of control believe that events result primarily from their own behavior and actions. Those with a low internal locus of control believe that powerful others, fate, or chance primarily determine events.

Those with a high internal locus of control have better control of their behavior, tend to exhibit more political behaviors, and are more likely to attempt to influence other people than those with a low external locus of control. Those with a high internal locus of control are more likely to assume that their efforts will be successful. They are more active in seeking information and knowledge concerning their situation.

One's "locus" (Latin for "place" or "location") can either be internal (meaning the person believes that they control their life) or external (meaning they believe that their environment, some higher power, or other people control their decisions and their life).
Within psychology, Locus of Control is considered to be an important aspect of personality. The concept was developed originally by Julian Rotter in the 1950s (Rotter, 1966).

Locus of Control refers to an individual's perception about the underlying main causes of events in his/her life. Or, more simply: Do you believe that your destiny is controlled by yourself or by external forces (such as fate, god, or powerful others)? The full name Rotter gave the construct was Locus of Control of Reinforcement. In giving it this name, Rotter was bridging behavioural and cognitive psychology. Rotter's view was that behaviour was largely guided by "reinforcements" (rewards and punishments) and that through contingencies such as rewards and punishments, individuals come to hold beliefs about what causes their actions. These beliefs, in turn, guide what kinds of attitudes and behaviours people adopt. This understanding of Locus of Control is consistent, for example, with Philip Zimbardo (a famous psychologist):

A locus of control orientation is a belief about whether the outcomes of our actions are contingent on what we do (internal control orientation) or on events outside our personal control (external control orientation)." (Zimbardo, 1985, p. 275)

Thus, locus of control is conceptualised as referring to a unidimensional continuum, ranging from external to internal:
**Table 1.1**

**E – I Locus of Control**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Locus of Control</th>
<th>Internal Locus of Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual believes that his/her behaviour is guided by fate, luck, or other external circumstances</td>
<td>Individual believes that his/her behaviour is guided by his/her personal decisions and efforts.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1.1.1 **Internal locus of control**

In general, it seems to be psychologically healthy to perceive that one has control over those things which one is capable of influencing.

In simplistic terms, a more internal locus of control is generally seen as desirable. Having an Internal locus of control can also be referred to as "self-agency", "personal control", "self-determination", etc. Research has found the following trends:

Males tend to be more internal than females

As people get older they tend to become more internal

People higher up in organisational structures tend to be more internal (Mamlin, Harris, & Case, 2001)

However, its important to warn people against lapsing in the overly simplistic view notion that internal is good and external is bad (two
legs good, four legs bad?). There are important subtleties and complexities to be considered. For example:

Internals can be psychologically unhealthy and unstable. An internal orientation usually needs to be matched by competence, self-efficacy and opportunity so that the person is able to successfully experience the sense of personal control and responsibility. Overly internal people who lack competence, efficacy and opportunity can become neurotic, anxious and depressed. In other words, internals need to have a realistic sense of their circle of influence in order to experience 'success'.

Externals can lead easy-going, relaxed, happy lives. Despite these cautions, psychological research has found that people with a more internal locus of control seem to be better off, e.g., they tend to be more achievement oriented and to get better paid jobs. However, thought regarding causality is needed here too. Do environmental circumstances (such as privilege and disadvantage) cause LOC beliefs or do the beliefs cause the situation?

Sometimes Locus of Control is seen as a stable, underlying personality construct, but this may be misleading, since the theory and research indicates that that locus of control is largely learned. There is evidence that, at least to some extent, LOC is a response to circumstances. Some psychological and educational interventions have been found to produce shifts towards internal locus of control.
(e.g., outdoor education programs; Hans, 2000; Hattie, Marsh, Neill & Richards, 1997).

1.1.2 **External Locus of Control**

The term locus of control was first introduced in the 1950s by psychologist Julian Rotter. It refers to a person's basic belief system about the influences that affect outcomes in their lives. There are two classifications of people in this theory: internal and external locus of control. The most successful people tend to be internal, while those with an external locus of control tend to be more negative about the world and their place in it.

People with an internal locus of control believe that they are primarily responsible for the outcomes in their lives. These people tend to be self-reliant and believe that nothing can hold them back except themselves. Studies have shown that those with an internal locus of control tend to be more successful people because they believe they can be and work toward that goal. Men tend to be more internally focused, while studies have also shown that the older a person gets the more internally focused they become.

Those with an external locus of control believe that forces outside of themselves affect their ability to succeed. They tend to stake their future on things such as fate, luck, god or society. Because they believe they have very little personal stake in their future, those with an external locus of control tend to put less effort forward on most
projects. Studies show that they are generally less successful in college and career than those with an internal locus of control. There are many simple locus of control tests available. Most will ask questions pertaining to a person’s belief in themselves. The original test was created by Rotter in 1966. It contained questions that required an "a" or "b" response. An example of a question on this test is the following: a) Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck. b) People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. Those with an internal locus of control would answer "a," while those with an external locus of control would answer "b."

Very few people are singularly internal or external. The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale places people on a scale, with one end the extreme external and at the other the extreme internal. Tests with individuals show which way they lean and if they have a sense of balance between the two extremes.

1.1.3 History of concept

Locus of control is the framework of Rotter’s (1954) social learning theory of personality. Lefcourt (1976) defined perceived locus of control as follows: "Perceived control is defined as a generalised expectancy for internal as opposed to external control of reinforcements" (Lefcourt 1976, p. 27). Early work on the topic of expectancies about control of reinforcement had, as Lefcourt explains, been performed in the 1950s by James and Phares prepared for
unpublished doctoral dissertations supervised by Rotter at The Ohio State University.[1] Attempts have been made to trace the genesis of the concept to the work of Alfred Adler, but its immediate background lies in the work of Rotter students, such as William H. James (not to be confused with William James), who studied two types of expectancy shifts:

- Typical expectancy shifts, believing that a success or failure would be followed by a similar outcome; and
- Atypical expectancy shifts, believing that a success or failure would be followed by a dissimilar outcome.

Work in this field led psychologists to suppose that people who were more likely to display typical expectancy shifts were those who more likely to attribute their outcomes to ability, whereas those who displayed atypical expectancy would be more likely to attribute their outcomes to chance. This was interpreted as saying that people could be divided into those who attribute to ability (an internal cause) versus those who attribute to luck (an external cause). However, after 1970, Bernard Weiner pointed out that attributions to ability versus luck also differ in that the former are an attribution to a stable cause, the latter an attribution to an unstable cause.

A revolutionary paper in this field was published in 1966, in the journal Psychological Monographs, by Rotter. In it, Rotter summarized over ten years of research by himself and his students, much of it previously unpublished. Early history of the concept can be found in
Lefcourt (1976), who, early in his treatise on the topic, relates the concept to learned helplessness. Rotter (1975, 1989) has discussed problems and misconceptions in others' use of the internal versus external control of reinforcement construct.

### 1.1.4 Locus of control personality orientations

Rotter (1975) cautioned that internality and externality represent two ends of a continuum, not an either/or typology. Internals tend to attribute outcomes of events to their own control. Externals attribute outcomes of events to external circumstances. For example, college students with a strong internal locus of control may believe that their grades were achieved through their own abilities and efforts, whereas those with a strong external locus of control may believe that their grades are the result of good or bad luck, or to a professor who designs bad tests or grades capriciously; hence, they are less likely to expect that their own efforts will result in success and are therefore less likely to work hard for high grades. (It should not be thought however, that internality is linked exclusively with attribution to effort and externality with attribution to luck, as Weiner's work (see below) makes clear). This has obvious implications for differences between internals and externals in terms of their achievement motivation, suggesting that internal locus is linked with higher levels of N-ach. Due to their locating control outside themselves, externals tend to feel they have less control over their fate. People with an external locus of control tend to be more stressed and prone to clinical depression.
Internals were believed by Rotter (1966) to exhibit two essential characteristics: high achievement motivation and low outer-directedness. This was the basis of the locus of control scale proposed by Rotter in 1966, although this was actually based on Rotter’s belief that locus of control is a unidimensional construct. Since 1970, Rotter’s assumption of unidimensionality has been challenged, with Levenson, for example, arguing that different dimensions of locus of control, such as belief that events in one’s life are self-determined, are organized by powerful others and are chance-based, must be separated. Weiner’s early work in the 1970s, suggested that, more-or-less orthogonal to the internality-externality dimension, we should also consider differences between those who attribute to stable causes, and those who attribute to unstable causes. This meant that attributions could be to ability (an internal stable cause), effort (an internal unstable cause), task difficulty (an external stable cause) or luck (an external, unstable cause). Such at least were how the early Weiner saw these four causes, although he has been challenged as to whether people do see luck, for example, as an external cause, whether ability is always perceived as stable and whether effort is always seen as changing. Indeed, in more recent publications (e.g. Weiner, 1980) Weiner uses different terms for these four causes—such as "objective task characteristics" in place of task
difficulty and "chance" in place of luck. It has also been notable how psychologists since Weiner have distinguished between stable effort and unstable effort—knowing that, in some circumstances, effort could be seen as a stable cause, especially given the presence of certain words such as "industrious" in the English language.

1.1.5 Scales to measure locus of control

The most famous questionnaire to measure locus of control is the 23-item forced choice items and six filler items scale of Rotter (1966), but this is not the only questionnaire—indeed, predating Rotter’s work by five years is Bialer’s (1961) 23-item scale for children. Also of relevance to locus of control scale are the Crandall Intellectual Ascription of Responsibility Scale (Crandall, 1965), and the Nowicki-Strickland Scale. One of the earliest psychometric scales to assess locus of control, using a Likert-type scale in contrast to the forced-choice alternative measure in Rotter’s scale, was that devised by W.H. James, for his unpublished doctoral dissertation, supervised by Rotter at Ohio State University, although this remained an unpublished scale.

Many measures of locus of control have appeared since Rotter’s scale, some that use a five-point scale, such as The Duttweiler Control Index (Duttweiler, 1984), and some that relate to specific areas, such as health. These scales are reviewed by Furnham and Steele (1993), and include those related to health psychology, industrial and organizational psychology, and those specifically for children, such as
the Stanford Preschool Internal-External Control Index, which is used for three- to six-year-olds. Furnham and Steele (1993) cite data that suggest that the most reliable and valid of the questionnaires for adults is the Duttweiler scale. For a review of the health questionnaires cited by these authors, see below under "Applications".

1.1.6 Attribution style: Relation with Locus of Control

Attribution Theory

It is often believed that those with an external locus of control are destined to be unhappy. There is no guarantee that those with an external locus of control are unable to be successful nor that they are unhappy. Many with this focus are able to see life as a series of fated events that they can just as easily fall on the good side of. Some are able to find freedom in this concept and live happy lives in the process.

Attribution style

Attributional style, or explanatory style, is a concept that was introduced by Lyn Yvonne Abramson, Martin Seligman and John D. Teasdale (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). Buchanan and Seligman (1995) have edited a book-length review of the topic. This concept goes a stage further than Weiner, saying that in addition to the concepts of internality-externality and stability a dimension of globality-specificity[clarification needed] is also needed. Abramson et al. therefore believed that how people explained successes and failures in their lives related to whether they attributed these to internal or
external factors, to factors that were short-term or long-term and to factors that affected all situations in their situations.

The topic of attribution theory, introduced to psychology by Fritz Heider, has had an influence on locus of control theory, but it is important to appreciate the differences between the history of these two models in psychology. Attribution theorists have been, largely speaking, social psychologists, concerned with the general processes characterizing how and why people in general make the attributions they do, whereas locus of control theorists have been more concerned with individual differences.

Significant to the history of both approaches were the contributions made by Bernard Weiner, in the 1970s. Prior to this time, attribution theorists and locus of control theorists had been largely concerned with divisions into external and internal loci of causality. Weiner added the dimension of stability-unstability, and somewhat later, controllability, indicating how a cause could be perceived as having been internal to a person yet still beyond the person's control. The stability dimension added to our understanding of why people succeed or fail after such outcomes. Although not part of Weiner's model, a further dimension of attribution was added by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, that of globality-specificity (see the article on explanatory style).
1.1.7 Applications of locus of control theory

Locus of control’s most famous application has probably been in the area of health psychology, largely thanks to the work of Kenneth Wallston. Scales to measure locus of control in the health domain are reviewed by Furnham and Steele (1993). The most famous of these would be the Health Locus of Control Scale and the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control Scale, or MHLC (Wallston, Wallston, & DeVellis, 1976; Wallston, Wallston, Kaplan & Maides, 1976). The latter scale is based on the idea, echoing Levenson’s earlier work, that health may be attributed to three possible outcomes: internal factors, such as self-determination of a healthy lifestyle, powerful others, such as one’s doctor, or luck.

Some of the scales reviewed by Furnham and Steele (1993) relate to health in more specific domains, such as obesity (for example, Saltzer’s (1982) Weight Locus of Control Scale or Stotland and Zuroff’s (1990) Dieting Beliefs Scale), or mental health (such as Wood and Letak’s (1982) Mental Health Locus of Control Scale or the Depression Locus of Control Scale of Whiteman, Desmond and Price, 1987) and cancer (the Cancer Locus of Control Scale of Pruyn et al., 1988). In discussing applications of the concept to health psychology, Furnham and Steele also refer to Claire Bradley’s work, linking locus of control to management of diabetes mellitus. Empirical data on health locus of control in various fields has been reviewed by Norman and Bennett (1995). These authors note that data on whether certain health-
related behaviors are related to internal health locus of control have been ambiguous. For example, they note that some studies found that internal health locus of control is linked with increased exercise, but they also cite several studies that have found only a weak or no relationship between exercise behaviors (such as jogging) and internal health locus of control. They note similar ambiguity for data on the relationship between internal health locus of control and other health-related behaviors, such as breast self-examination, weight control and preventative health behaviors. Of particular interest are the data these authors cite on the relationship between internal health locus of control and alcohol consumption.

Norman and Bennett note that some studies that compared alcoholics with non-alcoholics suggest alcoholism is linked to increased externality for health locus of control, but other studies have found alcoholism to be linked with increased internality, and similar ambiguity has been found in studies that looked at alcohol consumption in a more general, non-alcoholic population. Norman and Bennett appear a little more optimistic in reviewing the literature on the relationship between internal health locus of control and smoking cessation, although they also point out that there are grounds for supposing that powerful others health locus of control, as well as internal health locus of control, may be linked with smoking cessation.
Norman and Bennett argue that a stronger relationship is found when health locus of control is assessed for specific domains than when general measures of locus of control are taken. Overall, studies using behavior-specific health locus scales have tended to produce more positive results (Lefcourt, 1991). Moreover, these scales have been found to be more predictive of general behavior than more general scales, such as the MHLC scale (Norman & Bennett, 1995, p. 72). Norman and Bennett cite several studies that used health-related locus of control scales in specific domains, including smoking cessation (Georgio & Bradley, 1992), diabetes (Ferraro, Price, Desmond & Roberts, 1987), tablet-treated diabetes (Bradley, Lewis, Jennings & Ward, 1990), hypertension (Stanton, 1987), arthritis (Nicasio et al., 1985), cancer (Pruyn et al., 1988) and heart and lung disease (Allison, 1987).

They also argue that health locus of control is better at predicting health-related behavior if studied in conjunction with health value, i.e. the value people attach to their health, suggesting that health value is an important moderator variable in the health locus of control relationship. For example, Weiss and Larsen (1990) (cited in Norman & Bennett, 1995) found increased relationship between internal health locus of control and health when health value was assessed. Despite the importance that Norman and Bennet (1995) attach to use of specific measures of locus of control, there are still some general textbooks on personality, such as Maltby, Day and Macaskill (2007),
which continue to cite studies linking internal locus of control with improved physical health, mental health and quality of life in people undergoing conditions as diverse as HIV, migraines, diabetes, kidney disease and epilepsy (Maltby, Day & Macaskill, 2007).

In the 1970s and 1980s, Whyte correlated locus of control with academic success of students enrolled in higher education courses. Students who tended to be more internally controlled believed that hard work and focus would result oftentimes in successful academic progress and they performed better academically. Those students who were identified as more externally controlled, believing that their future depended upon luck or fate, tended to have lower academic performance levels. Cassandra B. Whyte further researched how control tendency influenced behavioral outcomes in the academic realm by examining the effects of various modes of counseling on grade improvements and the locus of control of high-risk college students.

1.1.8 Organizational psychology and religion

Other fields to which the concept has been applied include industrial and organizational psychology, sports psychology, educational psychology and the psychology of religion. Richard Kahoe has published celebrated work in the latter field, suggesting that intrinsic religious orientation correlates positively, extrinsic religious orientation correlates negatively, with internal locus (Cutrona, C.E.; Russell, D. & Jones, R.D.; 1985). Of relevance to both health
psychology and the psychology of religion is the work prepared by Holt, Clark, Kreuter and Rubio (2003), in preparing a questionnaire to assess spiritual health locus of control. These authors distinguished between an active spiritual health locus of control orientation, in which "God empowers the individual to take healthy actions" [Duttweiler, P.C. (1984).] and a more passive spiritual health locus of control orientation, where people leave everything to God in the care of their own health. In industrial and organizational psychology, it has been found that internals are more likely to take positive action to change their jobs, rather than merely to talk about occupational change, than externals (Allen, Weeks & Moffat, 2005; cited in Maltby et al., 2007).

1.1.9 Familial origins

The development of locus of control is associated with family style and resources, cultural stability and experiences with effort leading to reward. [citation needed] Many internals have grown up with families that modeled typical internal beliefs. These families emphasized effort, education, responsibility and thinking. Parents typically gave their children rewards they had promised them. In contrast, externals are typically associated with lower socioeconomic status. Societies experiencing social unrest increase the expectancy of being out-of-control, so people in such societies become more external.

The research of Schneewind (1995; cited in Schultz & Schultz, 2005) suggests that "children in large single parent families headed by
women are more likely to develop an external locus of control” (Schultz & Schultz, 2005, p. 439). Schultz and Schultz also point out that children who develop an internal locus tend to come from families where parents have been supportive and consistent in self-discipline. There has been some ambiguity about whether parental locus of control influences a child’s locus of control, although at least one study has found that children are more likely to attribute their successes and failures to unknown causes if their parents had an external locus of control.

As children grow older, they gain skills that give them more control over their environment. In support of this, psychological research has found that older children have more internal locus of control than younger children. Findings from early studies on the familial origins of locus of control were summarized by Lefcourt: "Warmth, supportiveness and parental encouragement seem to be essential for development of an internal locus". [Furnham, A. & Steele, H. (1993).]

1.1.10 Locus of control and age

It is sometimes assumed that as people age, they will become less internal and more external, but data here have been ambiguous. [Eisner, J.E. (1995)] Longitudinal data collected by Gatz and Karel (cited in Johnson et al., 2004[citation needed]) imply that internality may increase up to middle age, and thereafter decrease. Noting the ambiguity of data in this area, Aldwin and Gilmer (2004) cite Lachman’s claim that locus of control is ambiguous. Indeed, there is
evidence here that changes in locus of control in later life relate more visibly to increased externality, rather than reduced internality, if the two concepts are taken to be orthogonal. Evidence cited by Schultz and Schultz (2005), for example Heckhausen and Schulz (1995) or Ryckman and Malikosi, 1975 (cited in Schultz & Schultz, 2005), suggests that locus of control increases in internality up until middle age. These authors also note that attempts to control the environment become more pronounced between the age of eight and fourteen. For more on the relationship between locus of control and coping with the demands of later life, see the article on aging.

A study published in the journal Psychosomatic Medicine examined the health effect of childhood "locus of control". 7,500 British adults followed from birth who had shown an internal locus of control at the age of 10 were less likely to be overweight at age 30. The children who had an internal locus of control also appeared to have higher levels of self esteem. [Gong-Guy, E., & Hammen, C. (1980).]

1.1.11 Gender-based differences in locus of control

As Schultz and Schultz (2005) point out, significant differences in locus of control have not been found for adults in a U.S. population. However, these authors also note that there may be specific sex-based differences for specific categories of item to assess locus of control—for example, they cite evidence that men may have a greater internal locus for questions related to academic achievement (Strickland & Haley, 1980; cited in Schultz & Schultz, 2005).
1.1.12 Cross-cultural issues in locus of control

The question of whether people from different cultures vary in locus of control has long been of interest to social psychologists. Japanese people tend to be more external in locus of control orientation than people in the U.S., whereas differences in locus of control between different countries within Europe, and between the U.S. and Europe, tend to be small (Berry, Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 1992). As Berry et al. (1992) point out, different ethnic groups within the United States have been compared on locus of control, with blacks in the U.S. being more external than whites, even when socio-economic status is controlled (Dyal, 1984; cited in Berry et al., 1992). Berry et al. (1992) also point out how research on other ethnic minorities in the U.S., such as Hispanics, has been ambiguous. More on cross-cultural variations in locus of control can be found in Shiraev and Levy (2004). The research in this area indicates how locus of control has been a useful concept for researchers in cross-cultural psychology.

1.1.13 Self-efficacy; Relation with Locus of Control;

Self-efficacy is another related concept, introduced by Albert Bandura. Although someone may believe that how some future event turns out is under their control, they may or may not believe that they are capable of behaving in a way that will produce the desired result. For example, an athlete may believe that training eight hours a day would result in a marked improvement in ability (an internal locus of control orientation) but not believe that he or she is capable of training that
hard (a low sense of self-efficacy). Self-efficacy has been measured by means of a psychometric scale [13] and differs from locus of control in that whereas locus of control is generally a measure of cross-situational beliefs about control, self-efficacy is used as a concept to relate to more circumscribed situations and activities. Bandura has emphasized how the concept differs from self-esteem—using the example that a person may have low self-efficacy for ballroom dancing, but that if ballroom dancing is not very important to that person, this is unlikely to result in low self-esteem.

Psychiatrist and expert on trauma and dissociation, Colin A. Ross, MD, describes the inappropriate self-blame that characterizes many adult survivors of childhood trauma as "the locus of control shift." This theory is pivotal in his therapeutic sessions with near-psychotic people at the Ross Institute for Psychological Trauma.

It is important to appreciate that differences do exist between internal locus of control and self-efficacy. Smith (1989) has argued that the Rotter scale to assess locus of control cannot be taken as a measure of self-efficacy, because "only a subset of items refer directly to the subject's capabilities" (Smith, p. 229). Smith noted, in his empirical study, that coping skills training led to increases in self-efficacy, but did not affect locus of control as measured by Rotter's (1966) scale.

**1.1.14 Summary, critique and the future**

Locus of control has generated much research in a variety of areas in psychology. The construct is applicable to fields such as educational
psychology, health psychology or clinical psychology. There will probably continue to be debate about whether specific or more global measures of locus of control will prove to be more useful. Careful distinctions should also be made between locus of control (a concept linked with expectancies about the future) and attributional style (a concept linked with explanations for past outcomes), or between locus of control and concepts such as self-efficacy. The importance of locus of control as a topic in psychology is likely to remain quite central for many years.

1.2 Assertiveness

Assertiveness is a behavioral skill taught by many personal development experts and behavior therapists as well as cognitive behavior therapists. It is linked to self-esteem and considered an important communication skill[according to whom?]. It was originally explored by Joseph Wolpe in his book on treating neurosis. It is commonly employed as an intervention in behavior therapy. The belief was that a person could not be both assertive and anxious at the same time and thus being assertive would inhibit anxiety.

As a communication style and strategy, assertiveness is distinguished from aggression and passivity. How people deal with personal boundaries, their own and those of other people, helps to distinguish between these three concepts. Passive communicators do not defend their own personal boundaries and thus allow aggressive people to abuse or manipulate them through fear. Passive communicators are also typically not likely to risk trying to influence anyone else. Aggressive people do not respect the
personal boundaries of others and thus are liable to harm others while trying to influence them. A person communicates assertively by overcoming fear to speak his or her mind or trying to influence others, but doing so in a way that respects the personal boundaries of others. Assertive people are also willing to defend themselves against aggressive people.

**1.2.1 Assertive communication**

Assertive communication consists of sharing one’s wants and needs honestly in a safe context. This context presumes mutual respect for one’s boundaries. This includes the physical self, one’s possessions and one’s relationships. It also presumes a shared interest in the fulfillment of needs and wants through cooperation. Reciprocation fuels this shared pursuit of interest. If others’ actions threaten one’s boundaries, one communicates this to prevent escalation. In contrast, “aggressive communication” judges, threatens, lies, breaks confidences, stonewalls, and violates others’ boundaries.

At the opposite end of the dialectic is “passive communication”. Victims may passively permit others to violate their boundaries. At a later time, they may come back and attack with a sense of impunity or righteous indignation.

Assertive communication attempts to transcend these extremes by appealing to the shared interest of all parties. Aggressive and/or passive communication, on the other hand, may mark a relationship’s end.[4] and reduce self-respect.

Assertive people have the following characteristics:
• They feel free to express their feelings, thoughts, and desires.
• They know their rights.
• They have control over their anger. It does not mean that they repress this feeling. It means that they control it and talk about it in a reasoning manner

1.2.2 Assertiveness and Other Behaviour: Leroy Hamm (2008)

Assertiveness is not just a skill; it is a mind-set. And it can be difficult to learn because living it is more of an emotional issue than a rational one – both for the aggressive and for the passive person. It is a matter of unlearning certain misconceptions and learning another way of looking at oneself and others. In a word, it is confidence. In their book, Execution, Larry Bossidy, CEO of Honeywell, and Ram Charan call it “emotional fortitude.” “Emotional fortitude,” says Bossidy, “gives you the courage to accept points of view that are opposite of yours and deal with conflict and the confidence to encourage and accept challenges in group settings. It enables you to deal with your own weaknesses, be firm with people who aren’t performing, and to handle the ambiguity inherent in fast-moving, complex organizations.” He goes on to say, “How can your organization face reality if people don’t speak honestly and if its leaders don’t have the confidence to surface and resolve conflicts or give and take honest criticism?” The internal mind set and skill
necessary to do these things is assertiveness and managers have to have it.

Sometimes people confuse aggressiveness with assertiveness, seeing that both types of behavior involve standing up for one’s rights and expressing one’s needs. The key difference between the two styles is that individuals behaving assertively will express themselves in ways that respect the other person. They assume the best about people, respect themselves, and think “win-win” and try to compromise.

In contrast, individuals behaving aggressively will tend to employ tactics that are disrespectful, manipulative, demeaning, or abusive. They make negative assumptions about the motives of others and think in retaliatory terms, or they don’t think of the other person’s point of view at all. They win at the expense of others, and create unnecessary conflict.

Passive individuals don’t know how to adequately communicate their feelings and needs to others. They tend to fear conflict so much that they let their needs go unmet and keep their feelings secret in order to ‘keep the peace’. They let others win while they lose out; the problem with this (which I’ll go into in more detail momentarily) is that everybody involved loses, at least to an extent.

**Aggressiveness**

If people leave managers and not companies then why do people leave their managers? What is it that causes managers to lose people?
In a study by Morgan McCall & Michael Lombardo titled *Derailed Executives*, four of the ten reasons that managers derail on their way to the top had to do with aggressive management styles. They are as follows:

- An insensitivity to others, an abrasive, intimidating bullying style.
- Coldness, aloofness or arrogance.
- Over-managing, failing to delegate or to build a team.
- Inability to adapt to a boss with a different style.

All of the causes of derailment listed above can be related to assertiveness issues. For example, one assertiveness issue, aggressiveness, is a behavioral style that cares little about the needs, opinions or feelings of others and gets what he or she wants in a domineering, obtuse, and often impatient way. The language of an aggressive person can be demeaning: “You can't do anything right. You'll never make it.” Or, “You shouldn’t be in this business.” Aggressiveness inherently has character flaws. It is selfish, insensitive, and unfair. Typically, control is a big issue for aggressive people. They demand control because they fear the loss of it. Often, what we fear tends to make us angry. The aggressive person handles his anger in an unhealthy way and scatters bodies on his way to the top.

**Passivity**

On the other end of the spectrum is passivity. It is a behavioral style that places the needs, opinions, and feelings of others above one’s own. The passive person may hide his disagreements under the cloak
of being nice and agreeable and may sacrifice an honest attempt to expose the heart of an issue or hide what he really thinks in order to maintain harmony. In fairness to the passive person, the driving force behind his peacekeeping tendencies is a fear of rejection. His thinking might go like this: “I don’t want to tell you the truth or what I really think because you might get upset.” This rationale is based on a fear of disapproval or rejection. The self-talk may continue with, “If I say something that offends you, you may not like me.” This is an issue of self-confidence. If someone says something “bad” about the passive person, he may assume he has done something to deserve it and that he doesn’t have the right to be assertive. After all, assertion may bring on conflict, and conflict is bad and something to be feared. Again, this misconception is an emotional issue, not a rational one. Emotions are determined by our thoughts, and the rationale for this misconception must be challenged and disputed if the non-assertive person will ever unlock the door to his prison of passivity. For example, an effective internal argument would be: “It doesn’t make sense for me to be intimidated by him in our meetings. I will never tell the group what I really think if I continue letting my fears control me. Also, it is not fair to others or to myself to not tell them what I think. I must become more assertive in my interactions with others if I am to be true to myself.” The general belief of the passive person is that by living life in neutral, he will be safe. He cannot be criticized, then, for doing
anything harmful to anyone or making bad decisions. However, not doing bad does not mean that you are doing good.

The language of the passive person is tentative and is often deflecting. For example, “Okay. I’ll go along, but it’s your fault if this proposal of yours doesn’t work.” The passive person in this scenario doesn’t have to be responsible for the consequences. Another attempt at deflection might play out as follows:

The character flaws of the passive person are dishonest, irresponsible, and manipulative. These words may sound harsh for the peace-loving, passive individual, but they describe an often-unseen weakness on the part of managers who do not have the “emotional fortitude” or “confidence” to deal with difficult situations in an assertive way. The result is often, at best, an organization not living up to its potential and, at worst, bleeding the life out of it as a result of failing to execute.

**The Assertive Person**

The definition of assertion is getting or asking for what you want while showing respect for the other person. You can do this through your own personality. Sometimes introverts shy away from the idea of being assertive because they assume that to be assertive they must assume an “assertive” image. There is no assertive image. Assertiveness is a choice. But often the passive person has to break through certain misconceptions and give himself permission to do what needs to be done or said, even if it is initially difficult. The aggressive person will see assertion as soft peddling or sugar coating the real issue. In the
short term, the aggressive person may get what he wants, but relationships are damaged in the long run with this behavioral style. The assertive person gets to the “real issue” as well, but places the rights, feelings and opinions of others equal to his own. His language is direct but respectful. To an aggressive person, he might say, “I want to hear what you have to say, but I’m not willing to be called names.” Or, “When did you begin feeling that I don’t care about the company?” Or, “Joe, that is an aggressive statement.” The assertive person draws lines and established boundaries when necessary to insure his rights, feelings, and opinions are respected. For example, the executive assistant may say, “It would help me if you would give me a list of priorities of the items you have given me.” Often an employee must also learn to manage his manager.

The character traits of the assertive person are respectful, fair, and honest. He is never demeaning. Conversation is professional, not personal. He attacks the problem instead of the person. (i.e., “We have a problem” versus “You have a problem.”) He uses “I” language versus “you” language. (“I get frustrated because I can’t do my job when you get these weekly reports in to me late.”) He is honest and states what he wants to see happen as opposed to wasting time blaming and fault finding. He is sensitive to others while tough on decisions.

In 1988, I was in the start-up mode of a new division of our company, and my pay was tied to performance. When I asked for a raise since things weren’t moving as fast as expected, my boss said, “I’m sorry
you’re having financial problems, but I’m not able to do that and be fair to everyone else in the company.” I learned a great deal that day about emotional fortitude and assertiveness. He expressed sensitivity toward me while making a tough but fair decision.

Assertiveness is responsible. Rather than skirting or shirking the blame, the assertive person assumes and/or shares in making decisions and is there to take the consequences.

**Passive Aggressiveness**

Finally, a behavioral style that also warrants addressing is actually a blend of two that have been discussed: passive and aggressive. Passive aggressive behavior can best be described as both a cloud and/or a sniper. A “cloud” is someone who resists change, slows down workflow or otherwise damages the efforts of others or an organization without making others aware of his motive(s). He is like a cloud and hard to touch. A sniper is someone who “takes shots” at another person in a forum where the other person is not present to defend himself. This is gossip.

Gossip is passive aggressive behavior. The aggressive aspect of it is an attempt to hurt someone's reputation or damage the department or organization, and the passive side is doing it in a subtle, unnoticeable and/or indirect way.

The definition of gossip is sharing detrimental information with someone who is neither part of the problem nor part of the solution. There are two kinds of gossip: innocent and malicious. One can be
just as destructive as the other. The following are five possible reasons people gossip:

• An individual has been hurt and retaliates in anger.
• An individual is afraid to confront directly.
• He or she has a need for attention and approval from certain others to feel accepted.
• An individual has the desire to build his or her own position artificially by tearing down others.
• Habit. We get used to relating through gossip.

The only conditions under which we should talk about someone are:

• It must be the truth.
• It could be said with that person present.
• If for whatever reason it would not be appropriate to have that person present, then the person you’re sharing your comments or concerns with must be part of the solution.

If you have gossiped about a person, take a fearless moral inventory of your motives for doing so. Ask yourself, “Have I been hurt and feel the need to retaliate in an indirect way? Am I afraid to confront directly? Do I need approval and am I attempting to get acceptance from the individuals to whom I am gossiping? Am I attempting to elevate my own position formally or informally by tearing the other person down with gossip? Have I gotten used to a damaging habit?”
Someone asked me once, “What if I am just sharing my opinion?” If the motive of your sharing your opinion is to discredit someone else or build yourself or your position up, then you need to keep that opinion to yourself and assess your motive because your opinion has become gossip.

If someone begins gossiping to you, ask them, “Have you talked to (the person) about this?” Or, “I don’t see that person that way at all,” Or, “What does that have to do with what we’re talking about?” Remember, gossip is an unhealthy foundation for a relationship. Your real influence on those around you diminishes the more you gossip.

The practice of gossip in many organizations goes unchecked and unchallenged, but its damage is far reaching. I recently heard an organization’s ousted leader return to reconcile himself to the group that had ostracized him eight years earlier. He said, “If I had done half of the things I later heard I had supposedly done, I would not be worthy of standing before you.”

Another form of passive aggressive behavior is sarcasm. Sarcasm can be and is often intended to be cutting. Often the person using sarcasm says the opposite of what is meant. For example, the comment “Nice suit, Joe!” may mean, “Joe, I can’t believe you’re wearing something like that to work!” Sarcasm is negative humor. I once asked the owner of a medical clinic why his computer was not working, and he said, “Oh, that’s Sally’s (office manager) personality messing it up.” Depending upon the mutually accepted boundaries in the
relationship, that could have been humorous at best and derogatory at worst. The truth of the matter is that she was offended and chose to keep quiet instead of responding in a healthy, assertive way like, “Tom, I'm sure you didn't mean that as a cut, but that is not necessary.” With that comment, she would have assumed a positive motive on his part and at the same time would have drawn one of many lines she would most likely have to draw to teach him how it is she wants to be treated.

**Assertiveness Leads to Freedom**

Whether you have an aggressive, passive or passive-aggressive behavioral style, you can ask for what you want, say what you feel, be true to yourself and have healthier relationships if you learn to relate to others in an assertive way. From the age of five, I learned how to deal with life and others in a passive way. My mother’s advice “If you can’t say anything nice don’t say anything at all,” was most likely born out of a desire to teach her children to treat each other with respect. But she didn’t give us an assertive option, which could have given us a healthy alternative to throwing “names” at each other. It is not easy to move into a more effective way of relating because old habits are hard to break, and the issue of confidence runs so deep. But the benefits are worth it. The reward of becoming assertive can be summed up on one word: freedom.
1.2.3 Reduce Stress With Increased Assertiveness;

Elizabeth Scott, M.S., 2006

Assertiveness is the ability to express one’s feelings and assert one’s rights while respecting the feelings and rights of others. Assertive communication is appropriately direct, open and honest, and clarifies one’s needs to the other person. Assertiveness comes naturally to some, but is a skill that can be learned. People who have mastered the skill of assertiveness are able to greatly reduce the level of interpersonal conflict in their lives, thereby reducing a major source of stress.

1.3 Religiosity

Religiosity, in its broadest sense, is a comprehensive sociological term used to refer to the numerous aspects of religious activity, dedication, and belief (religious doctrine). Another term that would work equally well, though is less often used, is religiousness. In its narrowest sense, religiosity deals more with how religious a person is, and less with how a person is religious (in practicing certain rituals, retelling certain myths, revering certain symbols, or accepting certain doctrines about deities and afterlife).

1.3.1 Defining Religiosity

The search for a generally accepted theory or definition faces enormous difficulties in the case of religion (Clarke & Byrne, 1993). Scholars identify at least three historical designations of the term:

1. A supernatural power to which individuals must respond;
2. A feeling present in the individual who conceives such a power; and

3. The ritual acts carried out in respect of that power (Wulff, 1997).

Such designations have defied social scientific consensus and thus “it is hard to make any generalization [concerning religion] that is universally valid” (Peterson, 2001, p. 6). As a result, different theories and definitions of religion are often used in the literature. Among others, religion has been defined as:

“A belief in God accompanied by a commitment to follow principles believed to be set forth by God”. (McDaniel & Burnett, 1990)

“A socially shared set of beliefs, ideas and actions that relate to a reality that cannot be verified empirically yet is believed to affect the course of natural and human events”. (Terpstra & David, 1991)

“An organised system of beliefs, practices, rituals and symbols designed (a) to facilitate closeness to the sacred or transcendent (God, higher power or ultimate truth/reality), and (b) to foster an understanding of one’s relation and responsibility to others in living together in a community”. (Koenig, McCullough & Larson, 2000)

“A social arrangement designed to provide a shared, collective way of dealing with the unknown and un-knowable aspects of human life, with the mysteries of life, death and the different dilemmas that arise in the process of making moral decisions”. (Johnson, 2000)
“A cultural subsystem that refers to a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to a sacred ultimate reality or deity”. (Arnould, Price & Zikhan, 2004)

“A system of beliefs about the supernatural and spiritual world, about God, and about how humans, as God’s creatures, are supposed to behave on this earth”. (Sheth & Mittal, 2004)

According to Ferm (1963, p.647), “Religion is explained as a set of behaviors or meanings which are connected to the action of a religious person”.

Social scientists have endeavored to develop acceptable explanations of religiosity and religious belief; an exact definition is, however, lacking (Barnett, Bass & Brown, 1996). Religiosity is commonly explained in connection with cognition (religious knowledge, religious beliefs), affect, which has to do with emotional attachment or emotional feelings about religion, and/or behavior, such as church affiliation and attendance, Bible reading, and praying (Cornwall et al., 1986). King and Crowther (2004) have said that psychology literature reports that religion can be measured and studied. This in itself should be encouraging to organizational researchers who are awakening to the significance of this construct.

A scrutiny of these various definitions reveals the inconsistency underlying the understanding and perception of the concept of religion among researchers. Clarke and Byrne (1993) identified three sources of doubt about the possibility of producing a satisfactory definition of
religion. They relate to (1) conflicts and unclarities in the ordinary use of the term; (2) the confused meaning left to the term from its history; and (3) the obvious divergence in scholarly purposes and approaches to the definition of religion. Thus, because religion may be not definable in general terms, “it must be defined for each research setting” (Wilkes, Burnett & Howell, 1986).

### 1.3.2 Components

Numerous studies have explored the different components of human religiosity (Brink, 1993; Hill & Hood 1999). What most have found is that there are multiple dimensions (they often employ factor analysis). For instance, Cornwall, Albrecht, Cunningham and Pitcher (1986) identify six dimensions of religiosity based on the understanding that there are at least three components to religious behavior: knowing (cognition in the mind), feeling (affect to the spirit), and doing (behavior of the body). For each of these components of religiosity there were two cross classifications resulting in the six dimensions:

- Cognition
  - traditional orthodoxy
  - particularistic orthodoxy
- Affect
- Palpable
- Tangible
- Behavior
- religious behavior
• religious participation

Other researchers have found different dimensions, ranging generally from four to twelve components. What most measures of religiosity find is that there is at least some distinction between religious doctrine, religious practice, and spirituality.

For example, one can accept the truthfulness of the Bible (belief dimension), but never attend a church or even belong to an organized religion (practice dimension). Another example is an individual who does not hold orthodox Christian doctrines (belief dimension), but does attend a charismatic worship service (practice dimension) in order to develop his/her sense of oneness with the divine (spirituality dimension).

An individual could disavow all doctrines associated with organized religions (belief dimension), not affiliate with an organized religion or attend religious services (practice dimension), and at the same time be strongly committed to a higher power and feel that the connection with that higher power is ultimately relevant (spirituality dimension).

These are explanatory examples of the broadest dimensions of religiosity and that they may not be reflected in specific religiosity measures.

Most dimensions of religiosity are correlated, meaning people who often attend church services (practice dimension) are also likely to score highly on the belief and spirituality dimensions. But individuals
do not have to score high on all dimensions or low on all dimensions; their scores can vary by dimension.

1.3.3 Genes and environment

The contributions of genes and environment to religiosity have been quantified in twin studies (Bouchard et al.’, 1999; Kirk et al.’, 1999). Koenig et al. (2005) report that the contribution of genes to variation in religiosity (called heritability) increases from 12% to 44% and the contribution of shared (family) effects decreases from 56% to 18% between adolescence and adulthood.

1.3.4 Measuring Religiosity

Traditionally religiosity has been conceptualized as a unidimensional construct with church attendance and denomination being the primary measure (Bergan, 2001). Though this unitary measure may be simple at the cost of validity and remains a frequently used measure within the literature (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), many researchers argued that frequent use does not make such a unidimensional assessment an acceptable research practice. As Bergan (2001) very aptly pointed out, the reliance on religious attendance as a sole measure of religiosity may be insufficient and lead to incorrect conclusions. In fact, the unidimensional view of the nature of religiosity gives rise to one major concern that relates to the difficulty in equating greater attendance of worship in congregation and increased religious commitment. A person may attend prayers in congregation for several reasons, for example, to avoid social isolation,
to please their colleagues, or it can be a form of prestigious action to dominate over others. Thus we cannot say that those who are high in religious practice are high in religiosity because this practice could be a routine action more than devotional.

The recognition of the multidimensional nature of religiosity allows for a more thorough understanding of the potential importance of different dimensions or forms of religiosity. Psychometric research conducted in the area of psychology has successfully produced a plethora of scales to measure a wide variety of religious phenomena including attitudes, beliefs and values (Hill & Hood, 1999). Most research has focused upon indices of intrinsic (religion as an end), extrinsic (religion as a means) and quest (religion as a search) dimensions of religiosity. However, there is no consensus among experts as to the number of dimensions that make up the religiosity construct. Religiosity is an intricate concept and a variegated human phenomenon, and seems to cover considerable ground such as behaviors, attitudes, beliefs, feelings and experiences. Religious scholars and sociologists do not agree on whether adequate measures of individual religiosity can be developed and therefore such measures are subjectively devised by researchers to fit their research objectives. Thus, the content and number of religious dimensions vary considerably and may depend on the nature of the research, purpose and context.
Wilkes et al. (1986) contends that the use of a multi-item measurement of religiosity provides a better understanding of its true nature and “may achieve high validity at the cost of sheer impracticality for almost all consumer research”. In their study, the dimensionality of religiosity construct was assessed with four items: frequency of church attendance, confidence in religious values, importance of religious values and self-perceived religiousness.

McDaniel and Burnett (1990) initiated an alternative approach of measuring religiosity for consumer research by operationalizing religious commitment in terms of cognitive and behavioral measures of religiosity. The cognitive dimension, defined as the “degree to which an individual holds religious beliefs” (McDaniel & Burnett, 1990), was composed of three summated items designed to evaluate the importance of religion: self-ascribed religiousness and two religious-oriented questions interspersed within a list of AIO-related questions. The behavioral dimension was assessed as two separate factors: (1) frequency of church/synagogue attendance and (2) amount of monetary donations given to religious organizations.

Another approach to measure religiosity in consumer research has been the operationalization of the construct either as a means to reach self-centered ends or as an end in itself using Allport and Ross (1967) intrinsic-extrinsic Religious Orientation Scale (ROS). While the ROS has proven to have acceptable reliability and has shown some indication of applicability for marketing in general and consumer
research in particular (Delener & Schiffman, 1988; Delener, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Essoo & Dibb, 2004), one serious shortcoming of the inventory is that they were specifically designed for use with Christian or Judeo-Christian subjects. Thus, direct adaptation of the scale is not always feasible and valid to measure the degree of religiosity of other than Judeo-Christian religions, although the scale has been used in one study involving Muslim and Hindu subjects in Mauritius (Essoo & Dibb, 2004). Genia (1993), as a result of his psychometric evaluation of the ROS, recommends that the item measuring frequency of worship attendance be dropped, because it “presents theoretical as well as methodological problems” . In measuring Islamic religiosity, for instance, this item applies only to men because they are obligated to attend worship in congregation at mosque at least once a week on Friday.

The intrinsic items on the scale have also been shown to lack internal consistency and to be of questionable value for other than Christian religions (e.g. Genia, 1993). In studying the relationship between Jewish religious intensity and repeat purchase behavior, LaBarbera and Stern (1990) used two different measures of religious intensity; one for Orthodox Jews and the other for non-Orthodox Jews. Michell and Al-Mossawi (1995), in their experiment to test the mediating effect of religiosity on advertising effectiveness among British Christians and Muslims, also used two different sets of religiosity measures. Similarly, in their cross-cultural study of consumer behavior in Japan
and the U.S., Sood and Nasu (1995) developed two different measures of religiosity. The measurement was based on the responses to nine questions related to belief in the religious practice or activity, the moral consequences and experience dimension or self-rating of one's religiosity.

From the above review, some general conclusions can be drawn: religiosity is a distinct concept which can be measured from various perspectives. While there is some disagreement in the literature regarding the precise number of dimensions to employ in measuring it, most researchers agree that religiosity is multidimensional in nature. In addition, almost all the empirical studies seeking to specify dimensions of religiosity have been from a Christian perspective and developed with Christian subjects.

1.3.5 The Impact of Religiosity on Gender, Attitudes and Outcomes

Stephanie Seguino, James Lovinsky, 2009

Despite gratifying progress in some aspects of well-being, gender inequality persists globally in such key areas as income, education, economic security, and gender-related violence. The contribution of institutions to the perpetuation of gender stratification has received increased attention in recent years (Sen 1999; Morrisson and Jütting 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales 2003; Cavalcanti and Tavares 2007; Sen 2007). Two levels of institutions are implicated in this discussion:
informal institutions which embed social norms, thus shaping behavior and practices; and formal institutions whose norms, rules sanctions are inscribed in formal processes and frequently written documents (Sen 2007) There is a good deal of evidence that formal religious institutions, which shape cultural norms, social rules and behaviors, have a measurable impact on the rigidity of gender roles and attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Little research exists, however, that investigates whether there is a causal effect of those gender inequitable attitudes on unequal outcomes for women.

Economists have sought to explain gender inequalities in such areas as wages, assiduously conducting statistical analyses to account for differences in women’s and men’s productivity characteristics – education, experience, and so forth. This large body of research finds that roughly 20 - 30 percent of wage gaps cannot be accounted for by differences in women’s and men’s productivity (Weischelbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005).

**1.3.6 Religion, Religiosity, and Gender**

The role of organized religions in perpetuating norms that promote gender inequitable attitudes is complex because religious institutions themselves are not monolithic. A wide variety of voices are in evidence in religious organizations, even if dominated by hierarchical authorities. Through internal debates and struggles, religious doctrines, norms, and rules can change over time, albeit at a relatively slow pace. As hierarchical structures, however, a dominant factor in
shaping gender attitudes is the views held those at the top of the religious structure at any given point in time.

3 Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) categorization is based on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), a composite measure that includes life expectancy, educational attainment, and standard of living as measured by per capita GDP.

There are several explanations for why gender norms inculcated by religious institutions might be gender inequitable. The first relates to the role of religion as a response to economic insecurity and the second underscores the role of hierarchy in formal institutions.

With regard to the former, some theorists adhere to the modernization thesis, arguing that the intensity of religious beliefs is a response to economic insecurity and is thus inversely correlated with the stage of economic development. Adherents predict a diminished role of religion with greater and more stable material well-being. One possible explanation for this is that religion provides both a solace and explanation for harsh, difficult, and insecure lives. Norris and Inglehart (2004), for example, link economic insecurity to the stage of economic development, with low-income agrarian societies the most insecure, and industrial and post-industrial societies having relatively greater economic security.3 Economic security, however, is not necessarily correlated with economic development. As the events of recent years have shown, capitalist development is characterized by volatility. An individual’s or household’s economic security is strongly
dependent not only on own savings and assets, but also on the depth and breadth of the social safety net that can cushion volatility in household income. Welfare state spending varies widely across country, and is not strictly determined by the level of per capita income, i.e., the stage of economic development. That said, religiosity is plausibly intensified under conditions of economic insecurity, whatever the stage of development.

What are the implications for gender attitudes, and in particular, why might we expect religious institutions to advance and inculcate gender inequitable norms? Assuming the link between religion and economic security is valid, we might anticipate that individuals under stress have a need for clear, rigid rules, including behavioral norms. Further, in such circumstances, survival instincts elevate the goal of high fertility in the face of high infant mortality and death rates. In such a scenario, attitudes towards gender roles may be rigid and dichotomous in response to a struggle for economic survival.

This view is arguably reductionist. The linkage of religiosity with the stage of development is contradicted by evidence of a continued role of religious faith in social practice in countries at varying stages of economic development. As Phillips (2009) points out, religious attachment has increased, not decreased in a wide variety of countries. Further, the operation of religious beliefs in private and public spheres is not static. Evidence of an increasingly active religious role in political debate on issues such as abortion and
homosexuality is apparent in a number of countries, including the United States, a trend dubbed the “de-privatization” of religion (Casanova 1994).

The nature of religions as organizational structures, which tend to be hierarchically structured and conservative rule-based institutions, is a more plausible explanation for their inculcation of gender inequitable norms. A further impetus towards hierarchy is related to the economic role organized religions play. To varying degrees, they have access to and control over material resources, and as such, exercise power to create and maintain social norms that perpetuate structures of power that preserve their control. Elite groups tend to capture power in institutions, and thus, patriarchal dominance in the economic sphere is likely to be replicated in religious organizations.

Seen in this light, religious institutions may reflect patriarchal values in order to buttress the economic, social and political power of males to the disadvantage of women (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Kardam 2005; Sen 2007). Whatever their other roles, such as solace and even social support, if religious institutions inculcate gender norms and rules that disadvantage women, we might also expect they would hinder policy efforts aimed at closing gender gaps in important areas such as education and employment.

Where patriarchal norms dominate the social landscape, the heterosexual family and the norm that women’s primary role is to care for children and others, serving as unpaid homemaker, are
emphasized. Divorce, abortion, and homosexuality, because they contradict those social roles for women (and by implication, delineate different roles for men), tend to be viewed unfavorably. Further, sons tend to be more valued than daughters in patriarchal contexts.

If organized religions in their current state do indeed perpetuate gender inequitable attitudes, we might expect that those people who exhibit higher degrees of religiosity hold more gender inequitable attitudes. An important question is whether the incidence of gender unequal attitudes in a country translates into gender inequality of outcomes. In other words, is there evidence that gender inequality in real measures of well-being is more pronounced in countries exhibiting a greater degree of religiosity? There is mixed evidence in the literature on this question, much of it based on an assessment of the effect of specific religions such as Islam rather than religiosity per se.

It is useful to consider why religiosity and dominant religion might have an impact not only on attitudes but also on real economic outcomes. Two transmission mechanisms exist. First, at the micro level, as noted, gender unequal attitudes act as a “stealth” factor, shaping every day decisions. Employers’ choices on whom to hire and whom to lay off are affected by norms regarding who is most deserving of a job in the gender hierarchy. Families make decisions on which child to invest resources in, and which family member should undertake paid labor or unpaid caring labor. Gender norms influence
whom to elect to political office. We therefore might anticipate that insofar as religion affects norms and attitudes, there will be consequent and measurable effects at the country level on gender gaps in education, shares of the population, labor force, and income, to name a few.

The second transmission mechanism is the effect of religious attitudes on government’s distribution of resources (e.g., for education, health care) and regulation, such as enactment and enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation in employment, rules on access to loans, inheritance, property ownership, and so forth. In countries with dominant religions that are gender inequitable in their attitudes, it is possible that gender outcomes are worsened through the government channel as well.

As noted, gender attitudes and outcomes may be affected by the individual’s religious denomination, implying that some religions may be more patriarchal than others. However, whether any one organized religion is more patriarchal than any other is an empirical question on which as yet there is no consensus. Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1989) find that Muslims, Hindus, and Catholics have lower rates of female labor force participation than other religions and the non-religious. Recent studies identify Islam as significantly more patriarchal than other dominant religions on such measures as education and life expectancy (Dollar and Gatti 1999; Forsythe and Korzeniewicz 2000; Fish 2004; Balamoune-Lutz 2006), although
some recent empirical evidence challenges that view (Donno and Russett 2004; Noland 2005).

For instance, Donno and Russett (2004), in a study of the determinants of gender inequality in education, political representation, and employment in 153 countries, find that the contribution of Islamic population to gender inequality holds only for women’s share of parliamentary seats and the gender education ratio. If controls for Arab countries are introduced into the regressions, the effect of Islamic population becomes insignificant for measures of gender inequality in literacy, life expectancy, and economic activity rates. Read (2003) presents evidence that although Muslims are more patriarchal, it is the interaction of Muslim and ethnicity that matters most in shaping gender attitudes.

This debate is clearly not yet resolved. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that in addition to a person’s religiosity, religious denomination may also influence gender attitudes, although it is not clear whether denominations differ in the degree of patriarchy exhibited in the norms they inculcate. Based on this discussion, our theoretical prediction in the analysis that follows is that the greater the degree of religiosity a person exhibits, the more likely s(he) is to hold gender inequitable attitudes. The degree of religiosity, measured both in strength of beliefs and religious participation would suggest greater exposure to religious teachings, with consequent effects on attitudes. We make no theoretical predictions vis-à-vis the effect of a
person’s adherence to a particular religious denomination. We also assess the effect of religiosity on gender outcomes transmitted through religion’s influence on voting patterns and government policies.

1.3.7 Gender and Religiousness: Socialization Explanations - Alan S. Miller

It has long been assumed in sociology that gender differences in religiousness are a product of differential socialization. Yet, there is little empirical support for this assumption. To address this gap in the literature, this study draws on an extensive investigation of the relationship between differential socialization and differential religiousness. Using the American General Social Surveys and the World Values Survey, this article analyzes the relationship between traditional gender attitudes and gender differences in religious beliefs and behavior. Surprisingly, these data show no relationship between the two. Therefore, a new set of hypotheses based on an alternative model involving risk preference is proposed. Results strongly support this new approach. Women are more religious than men to the extent that being irreligious constitutes risk-taking behavior. This model is able to predict differential religiousness in a wide variety of religious and cultural settings. Implications of these findings are discussed. For at least 30 years, gender has been among the most popular topics in the social-scientific study of religion. Nevertheless, the most significant and enduring question about gender and religion has
languished: What accounts for the apparently “universal” gender difference in religious commitment?

Christianity in particular, perpetuates traditional gender roles and inequality (e.g., Richardson 1988; Stover and Hope 1984; and Dhruvarajan 1988). Nearly as much has been published about women’s roles within religious organizations, especially about gender bias vis-a`-vis leadership positions in mainline churches (e.g., Ebaugh, Lorence, and Chafetz 1996; Ammerman 1990; Carroll, Hargrove, and Lummis 1983). And feminist theological issues have received only slightly less attention (e.g., Schoenfeld and Mestrovic 1991; Neitz 1990; Rhodes 1987). But, when Walter and Davie (1998) published a review of the literature on gender and religiousness, they found it to have been a largely ignored topic. Though this literature is slim, there has been complete agreement that, whatever the dimensions of their religious differences, women are more religious than men because of differential gender socialization.

Recently, Miller and Hoffmann (1995) reconceptualized the question. They shifted from asking why women are more religious than men to asking why men are less religious than women. This led them to focus on men rather than women, and they recognized men dominate the commission of “irresponsible,” short-sighted, risk taking. They then suggested that gender differences in religiosity are related to differences in risk preferences—that to be irreligious is to risk divine
punishment. This view quickly gained considerable support (Forthun et al. 1999; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Stark 1998, 2002; Whitmeyer 1998). It is well-known that men have a greater propensity to engage in risky behavior and that this difference in risk preference has long been considered the best explanation for gender differences in crime and delinquency, as well as other “risky” behaviors such as drinking, drug use, smoking, adultery, and the like (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Gove 1985). Strong gender-based risk preferences have even been observed in financial decisions concerning business practices and investments, with males consistently willing to take greater risks (Jianakoplos, Ammon, and Bernasek 1998; Powell and Ansic 1997). In suggesting that irreligiousness be added to the list of risky behaviors, Miller and Hoffmann (1995) noted one would naturally expect males to be more irreligious than females. However, the observation that gender differences in religiousness are similar to gender differences in other forms of risky behavior does not constitute an explanation, but merely expands the phenomenon to be explained. Indeed, in their original paper, Miller and Hoffmann (1995) did not actually offer a specific explanation of why these risk preferences are different for males and females, but simply invoked the standard assumption that it is likely due to differential socialization. Unfortunately, as those familiar with the literature know, an immense amount of competent research conducted over many decades has failed to discover any important link between socialization and gender differences in either
criminality or religiousness. Partly in reaction to these failures, a growing literature suggests that gender differences in risk preference have a strong biological component (Daly and Wilson 1997; Wilson and Daly 1985; Kanazawa and Still 2000; Gove 1985). This led Stark (2002), in a recent comprehensive review of the literature on this topic, to reluctantly conclude that physiological differences related to risk preference appear to offer the only viable explanation of gender differences in religiousness. However, the case for differential socialization might have been closed too soon, leaving some very plausible research hypotheses untested. Several of these involve possible recent changes in gender socialization, which, if they have occurred, ought to diminish gender differences in irreligiousness and, indeed, in risky behavior in general. Furthermore, a major defect in all attempts to trace such things as gender differences to differential socialization may lie in the fact that virtually all such studies are limited to one society, usually the United States. This may sufficiently reduce the actual variations in socialization so that, in combination with the spillovers of the modal forms of socialization, only the crudest and most extreme socialization effects can be detected. That is, those aspects of differential socialization that produce the substantial gender differences in criminal and religious behavior may be too subtle to be adequately measured by the rather blunt research tools available to social science. Hence, until cross-cultural explorations of the socialization bases for the gender-religiousness relationship have
been exhausted, it seems premature to reject the possibility that socialization holds the explanation.

### 1.3.8 Prior attempts to explain gender differences in religiousness

Although it has very seldom been the primary focus of research, the fact that women are more religious than men is taken for granted. Virtually every quantitative study of religious behavior includes sex as a control variable—usually with little or no explanation as to why it always has an independent effect. Even when religion researchers give extended attention to gender effects, they nearly always are content to assume that readers need not be told these are caused by socialization. For example, although gender effects were so significant as to appear in the title of their fine article, “Religious Consolation among Men and Women: Do Health Problems Spur Seeking?” Ferraro and Kelley-Moore (2000, p. 232) are silent as to why “women are more likely than men to seek religious consolation.”

Even when actual mention is made as to why, essentially nothing is said. Thus, when women were found to be more likely than men to “come forward” at Billy Graham’s revivals (Colquhoun 1955) and Catholic women were found to be almost twice as likely as men to go to confession (Fichter 1952), both studies simply stated that, of course, women are raised to be more religious. Even substantial reviews of the literature say very little beyond attributing the gender differences to differential socialization (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975;
That social scientists have settled for invoking “socialization,” with little effort to say how and why these specific socialization effects occur, is not too surprising because no one doubts that a vast array of male and female behavioral differences do stem from the obvious fact that males and females are raised differently. As to religion and socialization, the traditional argument is that women are raised to be nurturing and submissive and that these qualities make religious acceptance and commitment more likely (Mol 1985; Suziedalis and Potvin 1981). This line of reasoning makes good intuitive sense and dominates the discussion of gender differences in religiousness. After all, there is little doubt that females are socialized with the above characteristics, and studies have shown that these characteristics are associated with greater levels of religiousness (McCready and McCready 1973; Thompson 1991). Similarly, the role of mother is believed to subsume religiousness since it involves such activities as teaching the children morality and caring for the physical and spiritual wellbeing of other family members (Glock, Ringer, and Babbie 1967; Walter and Davie 1998). This relationship is seen as recursive, with traditional gender roles leading to greater religiousness and religious teaching lending ideological support to traditional gender roles. Thus, while females are socialized to be submissive, passive, and nurturing, thus predisposing them to greater levels of religiousness, traditional religious institutions
are seen as contributing to the legitimacy of this type of differential socialization (Chalfant, Beckley, and Palmer 1994). This latter issue has been the focus of most feminist scholarship on this topic, with a great many studies focusing on religion’s historical contribution to the subordination of women (Verdesi 1976; Crabtree 1970).

Although there is little doubt that religious traditions have played an important role in teaching and promoting cultural definitions of gender roles, the claim that traditional gender role socialization leads to greater religiousness among females has not fared well when put to the test. For example, research has failed to find a relationship between child rearing and greater female religiousness (de Vaus and McAllister 1987; Steggarda 1993). Furthermore, substantial gender differences in religiousness have persisted even after controlling for many aspects of differential socialization (Cornwall 1988).

A variant on the socialization theme has been proposed by several researchers who argue that women are more religious than men because they do not work outside the home and, therefore, have more free time to pursue religious interests (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Iannaccone 1990; Luckmann 1967; Martin 1967). Furthermore, it has been argued that the development of a gender-based division of labor, which feminizes family duties for women and masculinizes workplace duties for men, produces higher levels of female religiousness since religion falls under the general sphere of family matters (Douglas 1977).
More generally, the above argument can be subsumed under the perspective of gender differences in social power (Turner 1991). This perspective focuses on the relative lack of social power experienced by women in society. This can be seen as influencing religiosity in several distinct ways. First, as discussed above in terms of differential socialization, a lack of social power leads to a sense of learned helplessness or submissiveness.

Second, also as discussed above, a lack of social power is associated with lower workforce participation, which has been seen as related to greater female religious participation. Finally, women’s subordinate social role could lead to greater religiosity as a means of comfort to compensate for blocked aspirations and mistreatment. Once again, though, empirical support is lacking. Studies, for example, have shown that career women are as religious as housewives, and both are far more religious than their male counterparts (Cornwall 1988; de Vaus 1984; Stark 1992). If social power were related to differential levels of religiousness, one would expect female levels of religiosity to vary based on the level of acceptance of traditional gender roles and female workforce participation. Empirical studies have failed to find either relationship.

Several more recent empirical studies have added to our understanding of gender differences in religiousness, although they leave unanswered the role socialization plays in the equation. Thompson (1991), using a femininity-masculinity scale, found a
strong relationship between religiousness and feminine personality characteristics. Respondents who scored high on the feminine side of the scale (Bem Sex Role Inventory) tended to be more religious, regardless of their sex. These results would seem to support a socialization argument, and it appears that Thompson interprets them this way, discussing gender orientation in terms of social and cultural influences. However, his study only measures personality characteristics and does not explore their origin.

Similarly, Sherkat (2002) recently found a strong relationship between gender orientation and religiousness. His study concludes that heterosexual females and homosexual males are far more religious than heterosexual males or homosexual females. Thus, results are consistent with Thompson’s earlier study, and whether or not they support a socialization argument hinges on whether or not gender orientation is the product of socialization.

Miller and Hoffmann found strong empirical support for their claims—the risk averse were more religious—and the effects held within each gender, just as in Thompson’s study. Also like Thompson, Miller and Hoffmann did not explore why women are more risk averse than men, but merely assumed the origin can be located in differential socialization.

Again, such an assumption is reasonable since a variety of studies support the view that gender-based risk differences are at least partly due to differential socialization. Past research suggests there are two
distinct ways males are socialized as risk takers and females are socialized as risk averse. First, boys have typically been encouraged to take risks—to be courageous and adventurous, while girls have been encouraged to be passive and gentle (Graney 1979; Veevers and Gee 1986). Second, occupations that involve physical risk have historically been defined as “male” occupations (Barry 1987; Blau and Ferber 1985). Thus, both socialization patterns and gender-role patterns promote risk taking among males but not among females.

Thus, to the extent that feminine personality characteristics and risk aversion are products of differential socialization, Thompson’s (1991) and Miller and Hoffmann’s (1995) studies can be seen as providing some empirical support for the role socialization plays in producing gender differences in religiosity. However, relying on these two studies to provide empirical support for the importance of socialization is not satisfying for three reasons. First, neither study directly measures or tests the effects of socialization. The authors merely assume that it is the underlying cause.

Second, those studies that have focused on socialization have failed to produce convincing results. And third, there is mounting evidence based on biological studies of hormone effects (see Udry 1988, 2000; Collaer and Hines 1995; Booth and Dabbs 1993; Dabbs and Morris 1990; Julian and McKenry 1989) that testosterone levels are strongly related to impulsive, risky behavior. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate to consider these two studies, in particular the risk and
religion study, as supporting a purely socialization-based explanation of gender differences in religiousness.

At this point, it seems evident that, although the existence of a gender and religion effect is well-established and has been extended to many other societies and eras in Stark’s recent paper (2002), the actual research literature attempting to demonstrate socialization effects is very slight. If we assume that male irreligion is simply another aspect of the risk-taking behavior that includes crime, then the socialization literature is far more extensive but just as disappointing (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985). It was for this reason that Stark turned to physiology as offering a more promising explanation. But, as noted earlier in this essay, he may have done so prematurely. Perhaps the socialization explanation still can be saved.
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<th><strong>Islam</strong></th>
<th><strong>Hinduism</strong></th>
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<td>In Islam, <strong>belief in One God is the most important belief</strong>. <strong>Allah</strong> in Arabic refers to the One God. It is a known fact that every language has one or more terms that are used in reference to God and sometimes to lesser deities. This is not the case with Allah. Allah is the personal name of the One true God. Nothing else can be called Allah. The term has no plural or gender. This shows its uniqueness when compared with the word god which can be made plural, gods, or feminine, goddess. It is interesting to notice that Allah is the personal name of God in Aramaic, the language of Jesus and a sister language of Arabic. The One true God is a reflection of the unique concept that Islam associates with God. To a Muslim, Allah is the Almighty, Creator</td>
<td><strong>Common Concept of God in Hinduism:</strong> Hinduism is commonly perceived as a polytheistic religion. Indeed, most Hindus would attest to this, by professing belief in multiple Gods. While some Hindus believe in the existence of three gods, some believe in thousands of gods, and some others in thirty three crore i.e. 330 million Gods. However, learned Hindus, who are well versed in their scriptures, insist that a Hindu should believe in and worship only one God. The major difference between the Hindu and the Muslim perception of God is the</td>
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and Sustainer of the universe, Who is similar to nothing and nothing is comparable to Him. (monotheism)

- Islam exhorts man to consider himself and his surroundings as examples of Divine Creation rather than as divinity itself. Muslims therefore believe that everything is God’s i.e. the word ‘God’ with an apostrophe ‘s’. In other words the Muslims believe that everything belongs to God. The trees belong to God, the sun belongs to God, the moon belongs to God, the monkey belongs to God, the snake belongs to God, the human beings belong to God and everything in this universe belongs to God.
- Thus the major difference between the Hindu and the Muslim beliefs is the difference of the apostrophe ‘s’. The Hindu says everything is God. The Muslim says everything is God’s.

| common Hindus’ belief in the philosophy of Pantheism. Pantheism considers everything, living and non-living, to be Divine and Sacred. The common Hindu, therefore, considers everything as God. He considers the trees as God, the sun as God, the moon as God, the monkey as God, the snake as God and even human beings as manifestations of God! |
In Islam, **all humans are created equal**. For example, there is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab, or vice versa. Blacks and whites have no superiority over each other. The same holds with any other nationality or ethnicity. Islam rejects characterizing God in any human form or depicting Him as favoring certain individuals or nations on the basis of wealth, power or race. He created the human beings as equals. They may distinguish themselves and get His favor through virtue and piety only.

- Muslims eat all wholesome and good food including meat of Cow (beef), lamb, goat, and chicken.

- Cow is a sacred animal and a deity for Hindus. Cows, therefore, can not be killed or eaten in Hinduism.

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<td>• Hinduism has a <strong>caste system</strong>, with four major castes. Members of each are required by strict religious laws to follow certain hereditary occupations and to refrain from intermarriage or eating with members of the other castes. The highest, or priestly and intellectual, caste is that of the <strong>Brahmans</strong>. The remaining three in order are <strong>Kshatriya</strong> (ruling or warrior caste), <strong>Vaisya</strong> (common artisan and agricultural caste), and the <strong>Sudras</strong> (the low caste people).</td>
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• Hindus eat all wholesome and good food including meat of Cow (beef), lamb, goat, and chicken.
1.3.9 Hindu-Muslim Communal Violence in India:

**Genesis and Historical Roots**

Fifty-nine years after our independence won on the basis of ideals of secular democracy we see more and more communal violence and still minorities feel insecure and feel deprived of their right to honourable and dignified existence. In fact our leaders of freedom struggle like...
Gandhi, Nehru and Abdul Kalam Azad had expected that with the passage of time communal rancour will be forgotten and all citizens, as propounded in our Constitution, will be able to lead an honorable secure life enjoying all fundamental rights. But not only that this goal has not been realized it is receding ever further.

Religion plays a vital role in India’s way of life. Religious laws govern the people’s clothing, food, marriage and even occupations (Shah 1998). Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains and Parsis are the major religious communities of India. Religion as an element of personal belief remains the biggest force in India. There is, of course, absolutely nothing in that. The trouble arises when the personal faith is converted into communal antagonism. Religion comes into fray because it is a part of the social order in which men live. Religion cannot be disassociated from the modes of thought that characterize a society. While religion as such has not been responsible for the origin and growth of communalism, religiosity, that is deep emotional commitment to matters of religion, has been a major contributing factor and at the popular plane, imparted passion and intensity (Ghosh, 1987).

Religious tolerance in India finds expression in the definition of the nation as a secular state, within which the Government since independence has officially remained. Separate from any one religion, allowing all forms of belief equal status before the law. Although India has been committed to what is referred to as ‘unity in diversity’ there
have been frequent clashes between the different linguistic, regional and religious groups in the country. Of these conflicts, the relationship between Hindus and Muslims has been particularly salient.

**Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India: the historic perspective.**
The roots of communal disharmony and violence between the Hindus and Muslims in India go back to the history of several centuries. Historical analysis of Hindu-Muslim communal conflict, its causes and preconditions, has been highly contentious in character. Contemporary historians of India do not even agree that there were Hindu or Muslim communal identities before the 19th century and Hindu-Muslim conflicts were endemic (Brass 2003). Historians like Sirkar (1983) view that Hindu and Muslim conflicts are essentially modern phenomena as communal riots do seem to have been significantly rare till the 1880s.

Some historians who argue that there is more continuity between past and present extending backward at least to the early 18th century and in some arguments, into the earlier period of Mughal rule. In this view, inter religious strife and riots that resemble contemporary Hindu-Muslim conflict were present, even endemic, in pre-modern times (Brass2003). The victimization of one religious community by the other started as the suppression was initiated by the rulers who invaded India. In 712 AD, Mohammad Bin Al Quasim overran Sind. The Arabs, the Turks, the Afghans and the Mughals invaded India in
hordes from 1206 onwards, reducing temples to rubble putting hundreds of thousands of Hindus to the sword, and forcibly converting the survivors to Islam. Later during the Mughal period relations between Hindus and Muslims were not cordial during the regimes of Babur, Jehangir, Shahjahan, and Aurangazeb (Ghosh1987).

Among the Mughal emperors, Aurangazeb reversed the enlightened policy of Akbar and he was determined to make India a strictly Muslim empire. Thousands of temples at Prayag, Kashi, Ayodhya, Haridwar and other holy places were destroyed. When these temples were destroyed, there were disturbances at many places on account or resistance of the Hindus against the demolition of temples. There was a prolonged fight between the Hindus and Muslims around the Mosque built on the ruins of the veni, Madhava and Bindu Madhava temple at Banaras. The rioters destroyed all temples whether new or old (Mahajan 1993). From Mahajan’s analysis it can be noted that communal rioting and victimization of both the religious communities started during Aurangazeb period.

When the British established their dominance in India through the East India Company, they initially adopted the policy of patronizing Hindus, but after the First war of Independence in 1857 in which Hindus and Muslims fought shoulder to shoulder, the Britishers adopted the policy of divide and rule which resulted in fostering communal clashes deliberately for keeping intact their hegemony. The
relations between Hindus and Muslims were further strained when during the freedom struggle, power politics came into play. Thus though antagonism between Hindus and Muslims is an old issue, Hindu-Muslim communalism in India can be described as a legacy of British rule during the freedom struggle.

According to Bipan Chandra (1984), the congress from its very inception adopted a policy of “Unity from the top” in which the effort was to win over the middle class and upper class Muslims who were accepted as leaders of the Muslim community, leaving it to them to draw the Muslim masses into the movement instead of making a direct appeal to the anti-imperialist sentiments of both the Hindu and the Muslim masses. This unity from the top approach could not promote Hindu-Muslim cooperation in fighting imperialism. During the Khilafat movement launched by the Muslim League against the British interference, the congress only extended its support to this struggle. All the serious efforts between 1918 and 1922 at bringing about Hindu-Muslim unity were in the nature of negotiations among the top leaders of the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities and the congress.

Quite often the congress acted as an intermediary among the different communal leaders instead of acting as an active organizer of the forces of secular nationalism. There was thus an implicit acceptance within the early nationalist leadership that Hindus and Muslims were distinct communities which shared only the political and economic
concerns but not the religious, social and cultural practices. This is how seeds of communalism were sown in the first and second quarters of the 20th century. It was only after 1942 that the Muslim League emerged as a strong political party and claimed the right to speak for all Muslims. They described the congress as a’ Hindu’ organization, a claim that the British supported. Thus the congress could not purge its ranks of communal elements.

The slogan of Pakistan was first articulated by the Muslim League in Lahore in 1940. Different sections of the Muslim population had different perceptions of Pakistan. For the Muslim peasant, it meant freedom from the exploitation of the Hindu Zamindar; for the Muslim business class, it meant freedom from a well established Hindu business network; and for the Muslim intelligentsia, it meant better employment opportunities. Later, when the congress leaders accepted the partition in 1946, it resulted in 1947 in the displacement of millions of Hindus and Muslims amid bloodshed and carnage. Both nations became independent, yet more bloodshed followed the partition as one of the largest population transfers in history occurred as many Muslims left India to reside in Pakistan while Hindus moved to India (Shah1998). Thus communal violence was institutionalized in the state structures to weaken the unity and resistance of the people and used as a pretext to further attack them and cause divisions. This communal nature of the institutions and state structure did not
change with the transfer of power in 1947 and this transfer of power itself was done in the midst of communal carnage (Eh Din 2002).

The birth of Pakistan in 1947 did not settle Hindu-Muslim differences or end conflicts. To, the contrary, all the old problems remained. However, the problems are more complex and involve more than simply a difference in values. Violence and communal strife have defined the relationship between the Muslims and Hindus, since partition (Shah 1998). India has regularly experienced communal rioting particularly between Hindus and Muslims, but has occasionally involved other minority communities, since its independence. Even before independence, there were serious communal riots in Varanasi (1809), Lahore and Delhi (1825), Kolkata and Dhaka (1926), Bareilly (1871), Ahmadabad and Mumbai (1941), and of course, the horrendous country wide riots of 1946 and 1947 (Dhar, 2002).

1.3.10 Religiousness as a Cultural Adaptation of Basic Traits:

A Five-Factor Model Perspective Vassilis Saroglou(2010)

Why are some people more religious than others, some very religious and some not at all? Predictors of religiousness, conversion, or deconversion include contextual and situational factors such as religious socialization (mainly through family; Hood, Hill, & Gorsuch, 2009), negative life events (Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999; Steib, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009) and positive self-transcendent
experiences (Saroglou, Buxant, & Tilquin, 2008). However, individual differences, either alone or in interaction with situational factors, may also play a role in inter-individual variability in religiousness. Examples are the quality of attachment relationships (Granqvist, Mikulincer, & Shaver, this issue), the need to belong (Krause & Wulff, 2005), the need for uncertainty reduction (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, this issue), and the need for self-enhancement (Sedikides & Gebauer, this issue).

The argument of the present article is that basic personality traits, and more precisely the combination of two of the big five personality factors (or traits), are important candidates for explaining individual differences in religiousness. Additional personality factors explain specific forms of religiousness. From a Five-Factor Model (FFM; McCrae & Costa, 2008) perspective, religiousness—like other constructs such as social attitudes, values, and ideologies—is a cultural adaptation of basic personality traits. Within the FFM, these traits are Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience. These key personality traits associate with religiousness in a systematic way; are generalizable across contexts and domains of personality; can be considered predispositions of religiousness; are unique in their influence on religiousness in comparison to other relevant constructs; and have implications for understanding the role and functions of religion in many domains of life. The article is organized around three
parts. The first part consists of a meta-analysis of studies that have examined how religiousness relates to the five personality factors. On the basis of 71 samples from 19 countries, this meta-analysis investigates the main personality traits associated with religiousness. In addition, it investigates whether the relation between personality and religion is contingent upon (a) the religious dimensions under consideration (personal religiosity, spirituality, fundamentalism); (b) the characteristics of the sample (age, gender, and country); and (c) the personality measures used.

The second and third parts of the article discuss the robustness, nature, and implications of the relation between religion and the five personality factors by narratively reviewing an additional body of research. In particular, the second part examines the robustness and generalizability of the links between religiousness and these personality traits through personality models other than the FFM, measures alternative to self-reports, and personality domains other than self-perceptions. The third and last section discusses three additional issues: (a) causal direction (does personality have an impact on religiousness or vice versa?); (b) exact status of religiousness within personality (is religiousness a cultural adaptation or is it a basic dimension of personality?); and (c) implications of the view of religiousness as a unique combination of personality traits.

_A Meta-Analysis of Studies on Religiousness and the Five-Factor Model;_
Basic personality traits imply inter-individual differences and intra-individual consistency in behavior and across situations and time. On the basis of preliminary evidence from a meta-analytic review of 13 studies (Saroglou, 2002b; see also Piedmont, 2005), I hypothesized that religiousness is linked to each basic personality trait as follows. First, people with prosocial tendencies (Agreeableness) are likely to invest in religious beliefs, feelings, and practices that emphasize social harmony, positive qualities in human relations, and the idea of a protective and loving God. Second, people characterized by orderliness and self-control (Conscientiousness) are likely to invest in religious beliefs, feelings, and practices that emphasize the meaningfulness of life and the world, order in the universe through a sense of transcendence, and disciplined pursuit of valued goals. I assumed that these two patterns are relatively constant across contexts (gender, age, culture, religion, and religious orientation). Third, I also assumed that people's predispositions to engage actively with their social environment (Extraversion) and to respond unstably to stressful situations (Neuroticism) are not key explanations of religiousness, although these traits may relate to specific forms of religiousness (e.g., those involving strong positive or negative emotionality). Religiousness is used here as a broad term, encompassing different ways of referring to transcendence in one's own life. Hypotheses with regard to the relation between Openness to Experience (whether people tend to embrace or reject novel ideas and experiences) and
three religious dimensions: (a) personal (subjective, general) religiosity, (b) spirituality (including faith maturity), and (c) religious fundamentalism. Personal religiosity consists of beliefs and practices that refer to a transcendent being and are legitimized, to some extent, by an established tradition or group. Spirituality is partially related to religiosity. Both constructs refer to transcendence. However, spirituality, in contemporary secular societies, is distinct from religiosity through its emphasis on the individual experience and independence from established religious traditions and beliefs (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005). Faith maturity (Fowler, 1981) is classified here under spirituality since it shares with it individuation and reflectivity in faith (critical reconsideration of beliefs); this faith may or may not in connection with a specific religious tradition. By contrast, fundamentalism is characterized by authoritarian and dogmatic religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005). On the basis of preliminary evidence (Saroglou, 2002b), I hypothesized that high Openness to Experience reflects spirituality, whereas low Openness to Experience reflects fundamentalism. I expected for Agreeableness and Conscientiousness to positively correlate with all three religious dimensions (religiosity, spirituality, and fundamentalism).

The meta-analysis also examined moderators of the relation between basic personality traits and religiousness. Although these personality traits were assumed to be predispositions of religiousness across
contexts, I explored differences in the magnitude of the associations between traits and religiousness as a function of age, gender, and country. Finally, I investigated whether the type of FFM measures used (NEO Personality Inventory-Revised, NEO Five-Factor Inventory, adjective scales: Costa & McCrae, 2008; John, Nauman, & Soto, 2008) moderated the religion-personality associations.

1.3.11 Religious or cultural factors; Young-Shin Kang (2010)

According to Pedersen (1990), “culture” includes “ethnographic variables such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, and languages, as well as demographic variables such as age, gender, and place of residence, status variables such as social, economic, and educational factors, and affiliations”. In almost every culture, beliefs and practices of a religious nature are prominent in providing support and guidance that can assist in the maintenance and enrichment of the overall functioning of an individual, as in the areas of educational achievement and social competence.

In large part, specific religious beliefs are preserved through cultural transmission, since they have continuum only through being passed on to future generations, the individual members of which must, in turn, embrace those transmitted beliefs and practices as their own. This process is called internalization. According to Ryan, Rigby, and King (1993), internalization refers to ‘the process through which an
individual transforms a formerly externally prescribed regulation or value into an internal one’.

Internalization is most evident in the case of religious beliefs and practices. However, religious beliefs can be rigidly and unreflectively adopted or they can, in contrast, be flexible, leaving one open to the consideration and assimilation of new ideas.

**Socialization process;**

Research on transmission of values would naturally begin with an exact conception of what is being transmitted, which would range from religious values to common orientations about life. In the family, through a process of socialization, parents pass these down to their offspring. In order to illuminate this process that occurs in a familial context,

**Taylor, Clayton, and Rowley (2004) present a definition:**

Socialization is the process by which parents shape a child’s behaviors, attitudes, and social skills so that the child will be able to function as a member of society. According to this definition, the socialization of children into a system of values and beliefs about self and society is primarily molded by parents. In association with value transmission, Glass, Bengtson and Dunham (1986) have concluded that the socialization acquired from the parents also encompasses “successful intergenerational transmission of class, race, religious affiliation, marital status, and other prominent social statuses that structure life experience and mold social attitudes.” These studies
insinuate that these socialization processes affect a child’s formation of a world view, but more importantly, also funnel the child into broader communities which also help preserve the child’s religious beliefs and practices.

Value transmission through socialization process;

In regard to value socialization in the family, Whitbeck & Gecas (1988) found four factors or conditions to be particularly important to consider in assessing the transmission of values between parents and children:

a) The nature and kinds of values under consideration;

b) The perceptions and attributions formed by children regarding values of their parents;

c) The children’s age; and

d) The quality of interactions between parent and child. Value socialization in the bounds of parent-child relations may vary depending on these key components.

For example, Furstenberg (1974) noticed that the perception of the parents’ values by the child is a significant factor in the transmission of values. He detailed that the more clearly children comprehended educational goals, the more probability there would be for the children to share them with their parents.

Another important point to take into account in value socialization would be the child’s age, because age is associated with cognitive development. During the formation of values, cognitive development
operates both to set lower limits for expected internalization to occur and to discern which types of values can best be socialized at different development stages. Values also become more stable in the system of beliefs while the children mature. Furthermore, socialization outcomes depend on the quality of relations between the parent and child, in other words, on what takes place between parent and child. To the degree that the child identifies with the parent, the chance of internalizing the parent’s values would be increased for the child (Whitbeck & Gecas, 1988).

**Religious socialization;**

Religious socialization entails the process by which a person learns and internalizes behaviors, attitudes, and values within the framework of a religious system of beliefs and practices (Brown & Gary, 1991). Regnerus (2000) also defines that religious socialization is a process that often operates apart from particular belief systems and organizational affiliations, and constitutes a form of social assimilation that has the effect of reinforcing values particularly beneficial to educational achievement and goal-setting. In order to illuminate his definition, he tested a multilevel model of involvement in church activities as providing integration and motivation toward schooling success among U.S. public high school sophomores in urban areas. He found out that respondents’ participation in church activities is related to heightened educational expectations, and that
these more eagerly religious students score higher on standardized math and reading tests.

In this religious socialization process, research has focused on three agents: the family (Greeley & Rossi, 1966), the church, and peers (Cornwall, 1988). They found that the family, more particularly, parents are the primary agents of religious socialization or transmission, while peers and the religious associations are secondary institutions.

According to Hart’s study (1990) on the impact of religious socialization in the family, compared with other contexts in which socialization occurs, the home context was the most influential milieu that contributed to the teenager’s religious socialization among the other contexts including the peer group, school, religious organization such as church, and mass media. In the study by Hunsberger and Brown (1984) which elucidated the effects of various sources of religious influence during childhood, participants in the study reported that their “home experience” has the strongest influence on their religious development.

This study addressed the significance of the home environment, especially parental, more particularly, maternal influence, in affecting the later religious orientation (whether constructively or destructively), at least when their children become college students.

Religious socialization in the Asian American families. Little work has been done that considers whether or how different family factors that

[80]
may influence religious socialization for white Christians will also be
an important influence for nonwhite Christians and members of non-
Christian religions. For instance, Asian-American religions include
Christianity (both Protestantism and Catholicism), as well as an
assortment of other religions, including Buddhism, Hinduism, and
Islam (Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith, 2003; Lien and Carnes,
2004).

Similar to non-Asian families, Asian parents are often the first source
of religious influence. However, in a study on religious transmission in
Asian families, Park and Ecklund (2007) found that Asian parents not
only provided the means by which children received religious training
by transporting them to a religious center in the neighborhood, they
also provided a representational resource for religious commitment by
their roles as leaders in religious communities. Acting as models of
religious practice, parents became religious teachers and moral
instructors to their Asian American children. According to the study,
despite differences in the content, beliefs and practices across
religions, the participants, regardless of religion, usually described
their experiences with their parents in a similar manner.