CHAPTER - III

ROLE OF AMERICA AND OTHER MAJOR POWERS

ROLE OF U.S.A.

Eversince the II World War had ended no sovereign state in the world had bothered much seriously for any kind of major or minor incident of International importance that occurred in any part of the Globe as much as what America had bothered. Its hegemony had worked and had been working partially on the international political arena due to its arms and economic superiority over the other nations especially on developing ones. The Persian Gulf crisis, the first post cold war crisis in the history has proved it, i.e., America was the unchecked power and the American President Bush’s policy in Gulf started certainly with super power
panache and zeal, as if America would and could impose its will on anyone.

BEGINNING OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRISIS

Practically the American involvement in the crisis began when the Iraqi President Saddam and his official media kept their war of words against Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the unresolved oil political disputes, in the last week of July 1990. Despite the Iraqi pleas to raise the oil prices, and to reduce the oil production, Kuwait and UAE had not paid any attention. Watching over all these events, then the American ambassador to Iraq Mrs. April Glaspi met Saddam just a week before invasion, and conveyed the feelings of the American Secretary of State Mr. James Baker that America had got no interest on the Arab–Arab conflicts, but urged Saddam to seek an amicable solution with UAE and Kuwait over oil prices and other disputes, and claimed that Americans wanted to have good relations with Iraq.

Saddam started amassing around 30,000 mighty Iraqi troops along its borders with Kuwait in an apparent move to take military action as threatened earlier, if Kuwait continued to produce oil beyond its OPEC oil quota. However, contrary to Glaspie’s claims Bush administration had very
seriously concerned over the Iraqi troop build-up and upon the request of UAE despatched on July 24, 1990. Air Force Aerial refueling planes to conduct a short notice emergency exercise, with already stationed six American naval armada in the region, along with the UAE fighter jets to intimidate the Iraqi leadership. Thus virtually began American involvement in the Iraq-Kuwait-UAE conflict. Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait on 2nd August to dethrone the Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah. The first words of attack reached Washington about half an hour later on August 1, at around 6.30 P.M. (E.S.T.) as the invasion was occurring swiftly reacting to the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush strongly condemned Saddam's aggression as 'bilatant act' and demanded for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces. Bush issued two executive orders freezing all Iraqi and Kuwait assets in America and its overseas banking institutions to shield them form Iraqi takeover and banned all trade with Iraq. Hence, under the same plea of protecting oil installations of Saudi Arabia and the American business interests from possible Iraqi attacks Bush sent aircraft carrier to Gulf region.
THE CRISIS AND BUSH'S DIPLOMACY

President Bush in the new post cold war crisis began his diplomatic lobbying by isolating Saddam from the rest of the world as well as from Gulf nations, by reaching out an array of Arab, western and Asian leaders through phone talks and by sending his special envoys to justify his act of sending the American aircraft carrier in defence towards Gulf region and to make others too, to censure Saddam's act of invasion as a blatant aggression and to tighten the international sanctions further, against Iraq. Thus, the vociferous international campaign led by America against Iraq began.

When Saddam made a sceptical statement on August 4, that his troops would start withdrawing from Kuwait by August 5, provided if world leaders assure him that the Emir and the Al-sabha family would not be restored in power again. But for Bush that it was meant only a partial withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and not for the restoration of legitimate government of Kuwait, hence spurned it as an unacceptable condition for him and other world leaders. Thus Bush's efforts once again had given rise to ambiguities, whether America was committed to its ideology of supporting popular governments or despotic regimes or playing double games, to serve the best interests of the Americans. On
August 5, Pentagon authorities under the supervision of Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff General Colin Powell had started preparing contingency plans to resort to carpet Bombing of Iraq's strategic defensive locations. This plan originated in the minds of military commanders who presumed that Iraqi troops might invade Saudi Arabia too, for further expansion.

But what surprised the Washington mostly was even after four days of invasion Arab leaders had not become much sensitive over the issue as much as Washington had worried. Bush had announced that Saudi interests were very important for Americans, Saudi King Fahd had not even asked Bush to stage a joint military exercise with his troops.

Bush felt unless there was whole hearted support from King Fahd, and military option might be less possible. Bush made an extensive talk over telephone with King Fahd later on Bush's behest, Defence Secretary Richard Chiney visited Saudi Arabia on August 6 along with American satellite intelligence photographs to convince king Fahd about Iraqi moves and the impending danger to the Saudi oil fields. Ultimately, Bush's telephone rhetoric and Chiney's charisma convinced King Fahd to give permission to America to land its troops on his kingdom on the plea of defence.
Perceiving the possible American threat Saddam reiterated through a personal message to Bush on August 6, via American charge de affairs James Wilson in Baghdad that his troops would not invade Saudi Arabia. But the assurance did not deter Bush from raising and spreading anti Saddam voice to all nook and corner of the world further and from tightening the economic sanctions against Iraq and from sending first contingent of American forces for Saudi Arabia and landed on August 7 at Dhahran in eastern Saudi Arabia.

In the beginning, Bush apparently could not articulate clear and coherent objectives for his involvement in the conflict between the kingdoms. Gradually his objectives and policy began taking a shape when Iraqi troops in Kuwait on August 6 rounded up Americans and other foreign nationals starting in Kuwaiti Hotels.

On August 8, for the first time Bush openly proclaimed his four objectives which have guided his actions in the Gulf conflict.

1. Immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
2. Restoration of legitimate Government of Kuwait instead of puppet Government established by Iraqi leader.

3. His administration's commitment to security and stability of Persian Gulf region.

4. The protection of Americans abroad.

President Bush dominated the United Nations Security Council for engineering different types of resolutions imposing sanctions of various nature against Iraq. There was no surprise of Saddam Hussain having failed to do so. Keeping aside the fact of obtaining sympathy from the nations beyond the region, he could not even gain the support for his aggression on oil rich neighbour from friendly Arab leaders too. Not all Nations supported Bush wholeheartedly some for fear of losing American Aid, or some with the fear of congressional criticism of joining hands with an aggressor. Even the Russians could not spare active time towards outer world crisis by ignoring the food problem, ethnic conflicts, and growing successionism in their own country.

Bush administration had struck some costly and uneasy bargains in a bid to acquire support from some
friendly and non-friendly nations to its efforts like Egypt, Syria, Turkey, China and Rumania to hold together the anti-Iraq coalition harmoniously. Turkey although a NATO country, President Turgut Ozal had cut the oil pipe lines and blocked the roads, leading to Iraq only on the condition, after Bush administration assured him that Turkey would be compensated against its losses due to international sanctions on Iraq.

On the same line Bush also had softened his stand on sanctions that were imposed by America against China after Tiananmen-Beijing square incidents in 1989-90.

While getting these non-friendly nations support Bush thought he was manipulating the policies and time for his benefit according to the needs and circumstances but did not seem to realise its disastrous future effects on American Foreign Policy Programmes. American Flag burning, anti American Rallies had spread like smouldering not only in Arab lands but also in Hindu dominated countries like India, Nepal against massive deployment of American troops in the Persian Gulf region.

The United Nations Security Council resolution of August 6, that imposed trade embargo on Iraq, several critics felt uneasy over the role being played by America in the Gulf
since the beginning of the crisis under the mask of United Nations Resolutions and Sanctions.

When White House officials instructed the American troops in the Gulf to blockade the ship routes, United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez De Cuellar eyed the word 'blockade' unrighteous from UN point of view. Since blockade amounts to use of force to bar embargo being violated by the outsiders that the mandate was not given to America by United Nations. The Washington explanation to this carrot and stick policy was to make the economic sanctions more severe to suffocate Saddam and his troops to force them retreat from Kuwait soon, without bloodshed.

As soon as King Hussain's mission failed, Bush ordered the American Navy authorities on the same night for a total naval blockade of Iraq, giving powers to intercept any ship heading for or coming from Iraq-Kuwait.

At Bush's request China discontinued its arms supply to Baghdad Japan coordinated in oil embargo and Russia had turned back the arms shipment to Iraq.

For the first time the most hopeful offer for different talks for a diplomatic settlement of crisis came
from Iraqi's side on August 20. The offer for bilateral talks was forwarded Tariq Aziz in Amman that consisted of bilateral talks on all West Asian issues including Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, and Iraq's willingness to accept even American multinational force in Saudi Arabia, but under UN Flag, and the offer to provide guarantees against an attack on Saudi Arabia either bilaterally with the American or with Arab league. But Bush flatly rejected it.

The American designs had been more explicitly revealed when Baker proposed on September 6, before the American Congress for the creation of a 'New Security Structure' for the Middle East region on the Prototype of NATO. This statement manifested that there has come a surprising shift in the American Policy towards the new crisis. When the American military involvement began on the very first day of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, Bush administration proclaimed first that it was landing its troops to escort the Saudi Arabia, to protect its oil fields and its business interest, and its own nationals in the region but disclaimed any kind of explicit force option.

While conferring with military personnel at Pentagon on August 15, Bush made clear 'our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly nations around
the world would suffer, if control of the world's great oil reserves falls into the hands of one man, therefore, we have made our stand not simply to protect resources or business interests, but to protect the freedom of nations'. This shift had acquired the crucial importance, and came inspite of Saddam and Aziz's assurances on several occasions that Iraq had no intention to attack Saudi Arabia. Thus having declared at last that its troops had been sent in both to protect oil fields and to prevent Iraqi expansion further, and to establish a long term security and peace in the region, defence department sent additional forces in such a way that it actually increased war psychosis and spread hatred among Arab-Islamic masses throughout the world from Pakistan to Morocco on American and western leaders.

Despite the mass apathy against the massive American buildup at the region, Baker and Chiney succeeded in moulding the important world leader's commitment in the form of money and material for the American efforts especially that of Saudi and Kuwait-in-exile and obtained pledges for aid amounting eight and four billion dollars respectively, towards paying for Operation Desert Shield purposes initially. Bush had overcome minor fears about Russia's low profile commitments to back American moves, when he met his Russian counterpart Mr.Gorbachev at Helsinki summit on
September 9. The seven-hour meeting produced endorsement of a routine kind of resolution to end the crisis peacefully.

The outcome of the extraordinary Helsinki summit was an announcement by Bush on September 12, another ancillary and new objective of 'New World Order' - a new era, free from the threat of terror, stronger into the pursuit of justice, and a more secure in the quest for peace. This was the vision Bush shared with Gorbachev at Helsinki meeting. This statement made conspicuous once again that Bush had landed his troops in the Gulf region not merely to protect Americans vital economic interests but with some other extra motive to play a wider role in the region, by creating a NATO type structure for West Asia or by something also to control oil rich nations.

BRITAIN'S ROLE

Britain's involvement in the post cold war Persian Gulf crisis had surprised no international political analyst, since historically seen, its involvement in the Middle East region was much older than that of Iraq and Kuwait Independence combined. Looking in brief into the Britain's historical experience in the region, especially towards Iraq and Kuwait concerned, no outside world power today has got as
much political experience and relations with those nations as much as Britain got.

"The rise of British power in the Middle East began in the 19th century. The constant motive of British Middle East Policy in 1833 as in 1956 was to protect British Empire in Asia". From 1900 to 1951, Britain enjoyed a remarkable success in their efforts to control sources and development of Middle Eastern oil.

Later, by 1971 British withdrawal took place from the entire region as once its imperialistic rule collapsed world wide, with the growth of nationalistic movements all round the world.

AFTER IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT

The first words of condemnation on Iraq's aggression against Kuwait came from Foreign Minister of Britain, William Waldergrave, who described Saddam's act of invasion of Kuwait as a grave threat to the peace of the region. Britain's clear stand on the new post cold war crisis came after Mrs. Margaret Thatcher's consultations with White House and joined in trade and oil embargo, and freezeed all Iraqi-
Kuwait assets after Foreign Ministers meeting was held in Rome on August 5th.

After his invasion on August 2nd, Saddam had referred or warned nothing against Britain - with any doubts on possible Britain's intervention in the Arab's affairs. But, after consulting Bush, Thatcher's decision to reinforce the three Royal Navy Frigates in the Persian Gulf region, with one of Britain's three Aircraft Carriers, was reckoned as British intervention by Iraq. Later that resulted in seizure of 35 British military advisers attached to the Kuwait's Army Units in Kuwait, by Iraqi forces on August 3, and some other unspecified number of American and British tourists staying in Kuwait were all moved to Baghdad to use them as human shields against possible attacks either by American or British.

Reacting to Baghdad's outrageous move Thatcher, on August 8, ordered British naval and air forces to the Gulf and proclaimed that this move is at the request of King Fahd.

But without clarifying its policy aims towards the new crisis situation, Thatcher administration directed on August 13, its naval forces to enforce the UN sanctions. Thus, it became the first Western European member to join the American initiated moves against Iraq.
Margaret Thatcher in her first press conference on August 21 declared Britain's old policy of sending the British troops to the Gulf was to get Iraq out of the Kuwait and to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait Emir on an old line and to preserve the security and peace of the region. Besides emphasizing the exigency of immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, she also strongly emphasised that the UN sanctions must have sharp teeth to deprive Iraq's economic and military power to keep it in the state of unpowerful nation in the region.

When Saddam held British citizens staying in Iraq and Kuwait as hostages, Thatcher accused him as a blood thirsty tyrant. But the seeds of hatred between Thatcher administration and Revolutionary Command Council have been sown even before the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, when Iraqi regime executed on March 15, the British accredited journalist Farzad Barzoft on spying charges in the vicinity of Iraqi military installation. The execution was carried out despite Thatcher's personal appeal to Saddam. Subsequently, Saddam's in attention to Thatcher's appeals resulted in increase of strains between Baghdad and London and later period led to withdrawal of British Ambassadors from Baghdad. Thatcher on August 26, a day after UN resolution for use of Naval force
blockade had been approved, ruled out any kind of talks with Saddam.

As the ending of the crisis seemed nowhere near, British Defence Secretary Tom King was sent to GCC nations on August 27, for top level talks to convince Arab leaders for preemptive military action, irrespective of UN authorisation for use of force. After Bush's announcement on August 30, of sending Baker and Nicholas Brandy on a high level delegation to Asia and Gulf region, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was also sent to Gulf states on August 31, to pursue diplomatic transactions and to make clear to them the Britain's stand on the present crisis. Saddam's goodwill gesture had not shown any liberal impact on Hurd's mission who went there to create wider gulf between GCC nations and Baghdad.

Hostage issue, economic difficulties and destructiveness of going to war had not seemed to have bothered Britain as much they had worried the other world leaders throughout the crisis period. While Russia, France and China and some other Non-aligned countries were trying to find peaceful solution to the crisis at any cost, Britain planned for possible Air strikes against Baghdad.
On September 7 at the end of a two-day debate for which the House of Commons had been recalled from its recess, Thatcher Government had won a vote of confidence over its handling of the crisis by 437 to 35 votes. Thatcher's triumph the Parliament had increased her vivacity to play a more active role in the Gulf crisis, and her aids too began wooing the world economic gaints for a more active involvement in the Gulf conflict by means of money and military contributions.

Thatcher took a decision to send 7th Armoured Brigade also known as 'Desert Rats' to Saudi Arabia by September 14. It consisted of about 6000 men, 100 challenger Tanks known for their best expertise for desert war. In the entire crisis period Britain seemed to have done only one effort i.e., the effort of menacing Saddam and his troops.

Hurd learned Thatcher's thunders in very little time, it was evident when he warned Saddam during his Cairo visit on October 14 that, the only choice for Saddam is whether he leaves Kuwait of his own will or at the point of gun. Although Hurd came to West Asian visit after Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount) incident on the pretext of achieving a political solution what he actually had done was tried to be his best to persuade Israel to allow the entry of the UN.
The British Air Chief Marshall Sir Paddy Hine reflected on October 31 that British forces in Gulf would be fully operational within two weeks conceiving that a military attack against Iraq was increasing day by day. As a part of preparations a joint team selected from R.A.F. Army and navy began working on full time to develop plans for short noticed military strikes. Tom King on November 22, announced in Parliament the Defence Department's decision to despatch another 14,000 troops from the Armoured Brigade to Gulf, to make the total troop strength 30,000.

Unlike Thatcher, Major said "If Iraq withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally and released all hostages, then Iraq need not fear an attack from any foreign power but ruled out partial solutions, or linkages to other issues.

In the final stages after Security Council gave authoritarian for member states to use all necessary means to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, Hurd wanted to exhibit the British Gulf policy as being independent. Hurd declared independent-ly "the January 15 D-Day would not sufficiently trigger off an immediate offensive, but even after that Iraq would have no choice but to leave Kuwait". Like Bush, Major repeated before the House of Commons on January 16 "we are not
thrusting for war, though it comes ... I, believe it would be a just war”.

Hurd speaking at a special session of Foreign Office on January 16, that "though his Government had no knowledge of an Iraqi' nuclear device, but would consider a nuclear strike on Iraq if there were to be proof of it". This statement proved to what extent Britain had prepared for 16 war against Iraq irrespective of its consequences.

FRENCH ROLE

Since 1945 French Policy towards the Middle East had undergone essential changes which were the direct result of the dissolution of French colonialism. But the basic national interest which French pursued in the area from the original establishment of the colonies remained unchanged economic interests in oil and trade and military interests in the strategic protection of the Mediterranean border and access to the oil, and political interests in the maintenance of France as a major power in the world in part by retaining a capability to influence the actions of the Middle Eastern 17 nations.
In the post-cold war era's Persian Gulf crisis, it was generally believed that, while America and Britain took a hawkish stance in the entire pre-war crisis period with hegemonic motives Russia and China have taken a little indifferent stand due to myriad domestic problems vexing them within their own systems which virtually kept them aloof from the direct intervention in the crisis. But France took practically a desired stance during the pre-war crisis period. Although its policy was guided by moral considerations in the pre-war crisis period, it turned realistic when it perceived the situation had been going in the way which it had not desire. To say impartially French President Mr.Francois Mitterand had undoubtedly pursued his best to find out a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement or a peaceful political solution within the Arab framework to the crisis, but was foiled in his efforts by hawkish states.

France the second major arms supplier to the Iraq did not mince words in condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but came out specifically only after European community nations had reached an agreement for an oil import ban on Iraq-Kuwait. French premier Michel Rocard announced oil embargo on Iraq-Kuwait on August 5, despite France's strong and flourishing trade links with Iraq, and freezed all
Iraq-Kuwait assets following the Security Council's condemnation of Iraqi aggression. But the massive American involvement and belligerent stance taken by Bush administration had compelled the Paris to reassert their major power role in the world politics. Thus, its military commitment began with the announcement of reinforcement of its naval presence in the Persian Gulf region on August 6, and by August 9 the French Air Craft carrier Clemenceau was directed towards Gulf region.

With the intention to play a decisive international role in the middle Eastern crisis Mitterand began despatching on August 14, eleven special diplomatic envoys from both ruling socialistic part and opposition groups to 23 non-aligned nations in different parts of the world, to explain them that "The present French Policy towards the Gulf situation has been based on all party consensus". By sending the former French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson to hold special talks with Yasser Arafat, he hinted that France was regarding the Saddam's linkage demands on all West Asian issues for a negotiated settlement to end the crisis. In spite of its some regard for Saddam's linkage proposals and some criticism on American blockade moves, France did not want to be a moverick by continuously moving away from the other Security Council member initiatives. On August 17,
French Naval Commanders were ordered to apply the sanctions with firmness. Its stand became significantly harsh, as the Iraqi troops started taking Western nationals as hostages, and Baghdad's moves against privileges of diplomatic personnel had considerably provoked it. This resulted in the furtherance of French military commitment, towards an additional Naval Cruiser in a total of seven ships, and 3,500 men, with Heavy Transport Helicopters and Light Attack Helicopters. In continuation of it, by August 21 a decision had been taken to send French ground troops to Saudi Arabia, besides the decision to send the tanker Durance to Gulf it raised up the France warships number to eight.

When first decision to commit naval and military forces to Gulf region was taken its objects became apparent namely disapproval of Iraq's aggression on Kuwait and to be in handy, if required to join the foreign forces in the region, to assert its identity as a major power in world affairs.

Mitterand unable to convince Bush for a negotiated settlement to the crisis, and Saddam to respect UN resolutions, gone virtually into the State of silence reticence from August last week to the day, till French diplomatic territory in Kuwait had been breached and Four French
nationals were thrashed by Iraqi troops on September 14. The raid on French diplomatic compound provoked Mitterand’s reaction in the form of expulsion of 29 Iraqi military attacks taking training courses in Paris. Following the incident Mitterand who previously objected for tightening of economic and trade sanctions against Iraq, immediately urged the UN Security Council for widening of UN territorial and sea embargo to air, against Iraq. And the subsequent decision taken at September 15 emergency meeting of inner circle of cabinet also included announcement of sending 4,000 additional troops with Helicopters, Anti-Tank Units and 30 Fighter Aircrafts under the Code name of Operation Dauguet with such retaliatory decision French commitment in the region totalled to 13,000 troops, 14 war ships and nearly 100 Helicopters.

Never before having experienced such a severe wrath from Paris, since the crisis began, Baghdad had realised soon that losing even verbal support of a western sympathiser, who favoured for a negotiated settlement of the crisis, means making the anti-Iraqi coalition stronger in favour of America. Fearing such bitter enmity, Baghdad had apologised to Mitterand on September 24 over the incident of storming of French embassy in Kuwait, with an incredible explanation, that Iraqi troops mistaken that building
belonged to a member of Kuwait ruling family. In Mitterand's UN General Assembly speech Iraqi President was strongly condemned for his unconciliatory deportment, and insisted strongly that the sovereignty of Kuwait is not negotiable.

The four-point formula advanced by Mitterand, to prevent the extension of crisis further had received no backing either from anti or pro-Iraqi sides, for lacking appropriate points required to resolve the chaotic situation, immediately. The first stage of his plan asked Iraq to state its intention to withdraw from Kuwait and release all foreign hostages.

Mitterand's second point was UN then would act to guarantee the implementation of the Iraqi military withdrawal and the restoration of Kuwait sovereignty and the expression of the democratic choice of the Kuwait.

The third stage of the plan was, international community would substitute for conflicts a policy of good neighbourliness in the Middle East region and also suggested at the end of the road the idea of an international peace conference, guarantor and catalyst of any successful negotiation.
The fourth stage of the plan envisaged, under which the whole West Asia would agree to arms reduction and cooperation from Morocco to Iran opening the way to regional stability and prosperity.

With the rejection of his September 24 peace plan by United States and Britain, Mitterand had not given up the hopes of finding a diplomatic solution to resolve the crisis. As a part of International effort Mitterand left for Gulf region on October 3, on a 36-Hour visit along with his Defence Minister Jean Pierre Chevenement and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, to hold high level talks with heads of Saudi Arabia, and UAE besides the plan to inspect the French troops deployed there.

King Fahd’s half committed talks with Mitterand had sent him back to Paris with empty hands after he visited French troops stationed at Yanbu. Even before the announcement of Mitterand’s visit to Persian Gulf region Saddam tried to lure Mitterand’s flexibility by releasing nine French hostages on October 1 and also officially offered to release about 350 French nationals trapped in Iraq, if a senior French politician visited Baghdad.
Prime Minister Michel Rocard saying in October first week to a group of French Parliamentarians that the role of the French troops sent to join the international force is limited to the enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq, but not to be a party in the conflict.

The October 8 Temple Mount incident had further indicated the possible French emphasis, on the linkage of all West Asian problems to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In his press briefing on October 9 after talks with Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti, Mitterand eyed the Temple Mount massacre as a solid proof for an international dialogue on all the Middle East issues, and warned the UN, indirectly aimed at America, that the problems might become linked as the phenomenon of violation of human rights was wide spreading in Israel.

In final stages, like China, though France was not proponent of the resolution 678 that authorised member states to use all necessary means to push Iraq out of Kuwait. France had to agree for the other member's proposals, to be in the mainstream for the basic commitment of reversing Iraq's aggression and also not to give an impression that it was alleying with an aggression.
At last, Iraq's refusal to accept 12 E.C. nation invitation for holding talks in Luxemburg on January 10, but expression of its willingness for talks with them through French mediation had encouraged once again Mitterand to send his special envoy Michel Vauzella to hold direct talks with Saddam on 5th January 1991.

Although the outcome of the talks were not fruitful, French leaders put forward the idea of extension of D-Date hoping Saddam might save his face in that period honourably. But the extension of deadline was flatly spurned by London and Washington conceiving that it might be a concession which both wanted to avoid right from the beginning of crisis. As the situation had been growing steadily worse, Mitterand had hastened his peace efforts further inspite of accusations from Washington and London hawks on his solo diplomatic initiatives.

Even after the failure of De Cuellar's mission what surprised the observers was the level of Mitterand's preserverance to achieve a peaceful solution. The forcefulness of Mitterand's moral responsibilities and efforts indicated that his determination was undeterred by the war mongers or by the failures of others. His resolve was further
evinced by the last minute peace plan he submitted to UN and Iraq to avoid war. The six point peace plan submitted by him had surpassed all other peace proposals forwarded by the other world leaders, both in content and spirit. The plan called for

1. The launching of final appeal to the Iraqi leadership to comply with UN resolutions calling for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

2. Calling on Iraqi leadership to announce immediately its time table for pulling out of Kuwait and to begin immediately a rapid and massive withdrawal of its troops.

3. After this commitment is received the UN Chief would arrange for UN verification of Iraqi withdrawal with the despatch of a multinational observers force and the deployment of an Arab peace keeping force, subsequently.


5. Necessary measures, in consultation with Arab nations, to promote negotiations to consolidate the peace process.
6. And, once the Security Council resolutions have been compiled with, members of the Council will support the resolutions of other regional problems, particularly the Israel-Arab conflict over Palestinian issue by convening an appropriate international conference.

Mitterand's Plan was thwarted by British counter proposal, and also was rejected at UN by American representative Thomas Pickering stating that any effort at last minute should come from Saddam, but not from others - indirectly stating that America sought Saddam to kneel before the American supremacy.

When the plan was rejected by America and Britain, critics observed that, perhaps two points of the French Plan must have deeply embarrassed London and Washington.

1. The call for non-aggression guarantees for Iraq by coalition members.

2. For an International conference on all West-Asian conflicts, after Iraq's compliance with Security Council resolutions.
When the Consensus on its peace plan had almost turned a myth, as the zero hour for the expiry of the UN deadline was only few hours away, French Representative withdrew Mitterand’s proposal from the Council. Having failed in all his just efforts Mitterand opined in the Parliament on January 16 that use of force has now become legitimate with passing of UN deadline. Inspite of lacking strong willingness French National Assembly on the same day approved the use of force against Iraq in a special session.

ROLE OF RUSSIA

Peeping in brief into the history of Soviet experience in the Middle East region reveals, its prime aim during cold war era was expansion of communism and acquisition of military facilities in and around the Persian Gulf region. Soviet intimacy with Iraq began under the Baath Party leadership and relations culminated in the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty. Subsequently Soviet Union became the principal major arms supplier to Iraq and sold $13 billion dollars worth of arms to Iraq.

But, for some pro-American and Western analysts the recent Soviet Gulf policy had been pragmatic, flexible
and very cautious in avoiding confrontation with US whereas for anti-Americans Soviets have fallen victim to American hegemony and accused it as a dead super power, due to its non-deterrant stance against American involvement in the Gulf crisis. The domestic problems like, broiling secessionism in Baltic Republics, and the black marketing that led to food problems, ethnic unrest and ideological diversification within the party policies have all indubitably weakened Gorbachev from playing any decisive role.

Soviet President's reaction to the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not immediate by strong words unlike his American counterpart. The Kremlin in general called for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and for the restoration of sovereignty of Al-Sabha Government.

The Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze a day after invasion had taken place in an odd show issued a joint statement along with Baker calling Iraqi President to withdraw his troops from Kuwait, but he made clear that Soviet Union had not been planning for any military deployment or intervention in the region. This first Baker-Shevardnadze's amicable joint declaration on first post-cold war crisis against Iraq, was not expected as an unnatural
gesture from either side, keeping in view the non-confrontationistic Parestoika in Soviet Foreign Policy moves, for past three years.

Soviet Union a day after Iraq had annexed Kuwait moved its warships towards the Persian-Gulf and gave a call for military consultations within the framework of UN Security Council for a UN led action against Iraq. Despite American-Soviet new approaches at UN, Saddam tried to lure Soviet support by announcing linkage of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to Israeli - occupation of Palestinian territories by carefully assessing the long time Soviet support to Palestinian cause. Instead of backing the Saddam's linkage issue on traditional lines Shevardnadze in a joint statement with his Indian counterpart I.K.Gujral in Moscow called on August 14 for a political dialogue between Kuwait and Iraq for restoration of the situation prior to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait. Again on August 17 Shevardnadze after talks with German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher in Moscow revealed that Security Council could soon assume a military role which could bring a rapid solution to the crisis. Gorbachev too on the same day described Iraq's invasion as a treacherous and blatant violation of International Law. When both made these announcements, the view from the West and East became more strong that Soviet Union would no more resort to the actions
that weakens the American stand against Saddam's aggression or willing to play a role that could trigger of a superpower conflict in the region.

On August 17, Gorbachev observed that since the act of aggression was committed with the help of Soviet weapons which soviets agreed to sell for Iraq only to maintain its self-defence rather than to seize foreign territories, Saddam's actions have become unacceptable for Soviet Union. When Gorbachev made this observation, it was widely assumed that the world had been moving towards New World Order absolutely free from superpower rivalry and especially Soviets might be playing a new role assuming new responsibilities for achieving amicable international relations.

On August 30, when Gorbachev observed that the massive military build up in the Gulf is very dangerous explosive and suggested for a solution that Soviet Union might move away in due course from American efforts. These fears have further enlarged again when Shevardnadze with his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen insisted on more efforts for a peaceful solution to the crisis. As a voice of peace efforts rising, Bush realised the indispensability of silent diplomacy over the gunboat and made immediately a statement that he prefers an Arab initiative towards the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
On September 7, in Tokyo Shevardnadze proposed a new formula for West Asian Peace Conference, intended to seek a rational solution to crisis as against as possible to American military venture. The formula included:

1. that every related issue to the Iraqi aggression should be discussed.

2. promoting a settlement to the conflict.

3. moving towards Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts.

By proposing such formula Shevardnadze sought to gain twin advantages.

1. To maintain good relations with all Arab nations in future irrespective of the final outcome of the crisis.

2. To restrain the American enthusiasm for preemptive military strike against Iraq without proper UN Security Council mandate and also to remember Washington about the importance of resolving all West Asian problems one by one.
FINLAND SUMMIT AND LATER DEVELOPMENTS

Turning to September 9, Finland Summit initiated
by Bush with a view to display at other world leaders and
especially to Saddam that Soviets are no more American foes.
The Summit held in Helsinki had yielded some non-permanent
results for both sides. Gorbachev explained to Bush directly
about Soviet commitment for a political solution to the
crisis and his ado about massive American troop build up in
the region which obtained assurance from Bush that American
troops won't stay in Gulf a day longer than that is required.
It also gave an opportunity for Gorbachev to slacken Bush's
obdurate stance on embargo issue, by convincing him about the
need of food shipment to Iraq-Kuwait on humanitarian grounds.
Gorbachev failed to convince Bush over the options for nego-
tiated settlement, to warn the increasing war threat in the
region. The lack of unanimity in decision making, expressing
uncertain, and contradictory opinions imbalanced approach in
searching a political solution have all contributed for
Moscow's weak position over the issue. The member of Soviet
Presidential Council Yevgeny Primakov observed that this
crisis situation as a unique laboratory to test the American
Soviet solidarity in ending the cold war and in creating a
New World Order.

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PRIMAKOV'S TRIP AND LATER DEVELOPMENTS

The first substantial efforts taken by Moscow towards finding a peaceful solution was Gorbachev's special envoy Primakov's month long diplomatic mission to West Asia, the United States, and Western Europe, that began with talks with King Hussein in Amman on October 3 followed by talks with Saddam on October 5 in Baghdad. Primakov could not win the wide backing for his mission as much Baker had won in his trips. The only worth mentioning success of his mission was his second time talks with Saddam on October 28, Primakov obtained assurances from Saddam for the release of about 1000 Soviet nationals stranded in Iraq. Without any conditions and was also able to soften Saddam's attitude temporarily towards making second thoughts for a face saving settlement.

After the failure of Primakov's mission Baker's subsequent visit to Moscow on November 9 also could not win initially the Soviet support for military action against Baghdad, because Kremlin authorities had not completely given up the hopes to save Saddam by some way or other, because Gorbachev and Shevardnadze knew perfectly that Soviet supplied military machinery cannot save Baghdad from highly sophisticated and nefarious American air power.
While America preferred January 1st as deadline for Iraqi troop pull out, Soviet Union suggested to fix it on January 15, to give fair time for complete pull out of Iraqi troops. Force Resolution was worked out by Baker with Gorbachev during his Moscow trip in November. After the Force Resolution was passed, Shevardnadz's unforeseen resignation had startled the West and White House officials Shevardnadze warned immediately after his resignation dictatorship is coming to Soviet Union.

The Palestinian-Israeli problem which had not been resolved for last 23 years inspite of repeated UN Security Council's appeals and resolutions, but now by Saddam's demand for linkage, had in fact given a good opportunity for Gorbachev to project the need for the linkage. On some occasions even his inclination for Arab initiative to resolve the crisis had not been seriously emphasised and exigency of Arab factor had also not been put forward from proper perspective.

Gorbachev's foremost failure in dealing the crisis was his dilemma between realistic and idealistic approaches to the International Political Turmoils. He wanted to make a balance between both and thought he has been succeeding in
doing so, but ultimately failed when he could not avert the war. Gorbachev had been sincere enough in threatening frequently Baghdad for possible use of force, if Iraq, did not go back to the position prior to the invasion of Kuwait, but he failed to convince.

CHINESE ROLE

The Chinese role in the Post-Cold War Persian Gulf crisis has been guided balanced by keeping historical experiences and contemporary changing resolutions in view. Chinese contacts with Middle East were initiated at the Asian Conference convened at Bandung in April 1955. Prior to that China had no diplomatic level relations with Middle East Nations. But by 1959 the Chinese interests in the Middle East region had substantially grown, and established itself as an influential factor in the affairs of Afro-Asian nations. By the end of sixties China’s unhesitant support to the Palestine and Arab-Gulf liberation movements had become a sensational aspect of its Middle East Policy.

REACTIONS TO THE IRAQ’S INVASION

Like all other neutral nations China expressed its anxiety over the Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait, and called
for an end to Iraqi military action against Kuwait. Initially, it was less enthusiastic in joining the American led trade cut off, and also did not take any abrupt decision to freeze arms sale to Baghdad. But in the wake of New International Crisis Beijing's hardline communist leaders very cautiously weighed the pros and cons in responding to the American requests for about three days after the invasion occurred.

Since for about 15 months earlier from the month August 1990, Western powers suspended high level contacts with Beijing and imposed economic sanctions on China in response to its crackdown on Pro-democratic movement and massacring demonstrators on June 4, 1989. Since then Chinese role and image in international politics have been considerably deteriorated, and its trade links with outer world declined and confined its activities almost to its own national problems. But Middle East crisis at once had given Beijing a chance to reassert its role at international level and hope to end the diplomatic chill that western nations imposed on it after Tiananman, and Beijing square incidents. Toma manipulate the adverse situation in favour of it. China the third largest arms supplier to Iraq on August 5 announced its decision to halt arms sales to Iraq. Premier Li Pang stated on August 5 that his country would prefer the mediation
efforts by Arab States and UN to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, instead of American and Western intervention in the crisis.

Throughout the crisis period Beijing leaders played a role to avoid either side’s hostility on their policy. By cooperating with Bush administration in passing economic sanctions and other resolutions in the UN Security Council. Chinese hardline communist leaders not only put the America in obligation to avoid harsh criticism against their policy towards pro-democratic demonstrators, but at the same time did not completely abandon their individualistic attitude by criticising some of the Washington moves. Speaking during a visit to Bolivia in the month of September 14, Foreign Minister Quian Quichen expressed his opposition to the presence of American led multinational forces in the Persian Gulf region, and especially massive American troop deployment in the region had been eyed as disastrous for the entire west Asian region.

China also gained some unanticipated impressive propaganda for playing adroit role in hostage issue, since Beijing authorities had not faced much difficulty in dealing with hostage issue, with Saddam’s decision to let Chinese leave Iraq-Kuwait without any preconditions. By providing
such kind of consular support, Chinese authorities secured some good impression in Western humanists view.

During the Operation Desert Shield period America although was badly in need of funds from its coalition partners and other friendly nations, Washington in a move to avoid antagonizing China turned down an offer by Tiwan to contribute about $100 millions to pay for military operations in the Gulf and suggested Tiwan to give that money to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey to ease their economic burdens. But Chinese reaction to this American move was passive, and it did not completely give up its own approach by insisting on a peaceful solution to the crisis rather than by aggravating the situation by military buildup.

As the Arab-Islamic and Non-aligned efforts seemed nowhere near to realise a peaceful settlement to escalating crisis, Quichen left Beijing on November 6 for four-nation visit to explore an amicable solution to both parties. But even before completion of his tour, Quichen faced Baker at Cairo and was strongly urged by him to back a possible attack on Iraq by American led allies. Baker's strong appeal convinced quichen about the certainty of American war on Iraq, unless Saddam withdrew his troops from Kuwait, as soon as possible. Quichen after his hopeless talks with
Jordan king observed that war could be catastrophic for Arabs and hinted that China might not participate in any resolution at UN that authorises the American allies to use force against Iraq. His talks with Saddam on November 12, also failed as a result of his hardline authorities' ambivalence between acting on their own ideological themes or according to the ongoing upheavals in different parts of the world towards international interdependence for the safeguard of economic and political stability.

Although Beijing hardliners extended their cooperation to Security Council, in the initial stages, they seemed to strongly turned against the Bush's new politico-military objectives towards the Middle Eastern States. However the public opinion in the China was clearly against the official attitudes. Ever since the beginning of the crisis majority portion of the public had shown pro-American attitudes.

Beijing authorities had decided to act rationally by striking a balance between their own ideas and public and American sentiments. At last, this skill had been exhibited in the form of Chinese abstention from the Security Council's voting for the force resolution against Iraq later when the war broke out, China practically went into hibernation.
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In the end, it can be concluded that no doubt the America and other western powers succeeded in restoring independence and sovereignty of Kuwait and it justified its military intervention on the basis of the United Nations Charter. The American intervention in the Gulf conflict led to assert her global leadership in the post-cold war international system. Since the America has got superior military power and technology in the world, she wanted to establish a New World Order. The United Nations cover for American and Western actions in Iraq demonstrated American resolve and its ability to muster enough votes in the Security Council. The Operation Desert Storm clearly showed that Washington was anxious to obtain United Nations endorsement for military action. Since countries which participated in Desert Storm were willing to work under American military leadership and to go along with Washington’s overall plan. Washington was able to maintain the multilateral character of the operation without disluting its own control with the western consensus and the United Nations support.
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