CHAPTER – II

INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND PAKISTAN FROM HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
International boundary in dispute

Boundary claimed by China

Line of actual control

Boundary claimed by India

Disputed areas
Any discussion or conjecture about the future begins with an analysis of the present, which in turn must emerge from a correct understanding of the past of the historical factors and forces, which constitute the foundations of the present. The past, present and future are thus linked in a dynamic relationship, which has a thread of continuity running through. It is evident that there is a great deal of the India-China and India and Pakistan past that is firmly in the present and continues to shape our attitudes and perceptions. It is important to realize that the past plays a very significant role in the process of visualizing the future because in many instances, all that are past, is not necessarily in the past or safely lodged in history as it were. Furthermore, human beings use history in a variety of ways. When we examine states with long histories, such as India and China and considerable length of history such as India and Pakistan the question obviously is, what aspect of this history would prove to be of the greatest consequence in shaping the future of the relationships. Quoting Regis Debray approvingly, Bhattacharya has argued that “the most difficult thing is to be truly contemporaneous with our history.” More crucially it could be “a dangerous guide if part of the historical picture is ignored or the manner in which contemporary India and China and India and Pakistan view history and its legacies is neglected.”
India and China historical linkages

Period of peaceful co-existence

Howsoever carefully studied and applied history can be a trickily affair. The political leadership on both sides of the Himalayan divide unfailingly reminds us that friendship between India and China is dictated by the logic of history, but history cannot be the logic of our prejudices, for nothing could be more illogical.

There is an ancient history of civilization encounters. When Buddhism traveled from India and China along with a rich consignment of ideas, records and values. There is another history of these two economically powerful and prosperous empires during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, coexisting in peace, dominating world trade with flourishing and dynamic trade routes criss-crossing their frontier regions and constituting the hub as it were of oriental glory. There is yet another history since the eighteenth century when these two ancient civilizations and proud empires were humbled, controlled and bled white by western imperialist dominance. Then there was 20th century history that began with their respective independence and liberation from the colonial yoke; their "awakening to life and freedom". This was the period when they both played a leading role in the Asian resurgence during the 1950s and constituted two different role models for the Asian countries, as they faced up to demanding and challenging tasks of development and modernization. This was also the period
when both countries attempted to formulate a new strategic perspective within the framework of Panchasheel, the five principles of Peaceful Coexistence in an agreement signed between them on April 29th 1954. Finally there has been the history, which began in 1962 – to some extent, mutual perceptions are still being shaped by the long shadows cast by that brief but decisive conflict that ended in China’s favour - and in many ways, this still appears to be one of the major strands in the multi hued historical fabric of India – China relations in the present.

India – China Relations through the Ages

India and China are neighbours. The land mass of India and China had already formed in the beginning of Tertiary period except that the Himalayas had not yet emerged from the sea. However as soon as Himalayas were formed in the Miocene era, some twenty million years back, vegetation began to flourish in the area which made it possible to thrive at the southern and northern feet of mountains. It is no exaggeration to say that the human as well as other forms of life in both India and China have been greatly conditioned by the Himalayas. Thus India and China both belong to a single Trans – Himalayan region. The heavy human concentration in the southern and Northern flanks of the Himalayas resulted into the development of two politico-socio-cultural entities which have now assumed the identity of two new emerging countries.
History has also identified India and China as Trans Himalaya twins. During the centuries before and after Christ, Mauryan India and Han China were the twins of imperial glory. Throughout the first millennium, India and China were the centers of spiritual and religious activities. Buddhism in India, Confucianism and Buddhism in China prove the point. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries the two countries were colonial twins or co-sufferers of western colonialism.

India and China: Early Contacts

Kautilya, near to third centuries B.C. in his book "Arthashastra" described about the word "Maha Cheena" and "Cheen Amshuk" (Silk). This leads us to speculation about the Mauryans and the people of China had trade links in which silk was major commodity. Sufficient evidences have proved the contact between India and China during the regime of Han dynasty in China. The time period was 1st and 2nd century B.C and afterwards.

An envoy of Han emperor Wu Chang Ch’ien had spent his emissaries to India. Han King Wu sent a mission to Bactria and India through Central Asia in B.C. However, it failed to reach either destination. Another Han mission on its way to India through Yunnan was stopped by the King of later country. In 105 B.C. the emperor sent yet another abortive mission to India and Bactria through Yunnan and Burma.
During the ancient time, Han Emperor Zhang Qian sent his emissaries to various countries including India. The attempt was foiled because Chinese envoys were captured and killed by Kummnin Tribe. The next attempt was made in 109 B.C. but again foiled owning to the same reason. Thereafter first official contact was established in 2nd century B.C. with Jibin (Kashmir). Chinese sent Zhao-De as their representative to North and South India. Wyanshies in North western Punjab and Kanchipuram were the places to set official contacts with China. Chinese scholar Ban Gu talks about a visit by a Chinese envoy Huang Zi to Kanjivaram.

During the first century A.D China established relations with upper Burma and Assam. But the Han Emperor always gave an impression that the areas of Kashmir, Assam and Upper Burma were subordinate regions of China and they formed a part of Chinese Celestial Empire. Again at the close of the 4th century during the regime of Gupta dynasty that India–China official relations were revived. Gupta rulers sent Indian envoys from Kapilavastu to China.

In 428 A.D. embassies were exchanged between the two countries. Again in 502-503 A.D. Gupta king sent a mission to the court of Liang King Wu. The Indian Envoy gave his Chinese hosts a detailed account of his countries geography and natural resources of
the five rivers and the Ganga, and the rock salt deposits in the riverbed of Ganga.\textsuperscript{12}

During the Harsha period in 641 A.D. one Indian Emissary was sent to China as the relations were much cordial at that time. The Tang emperor reciprocated King Harsha's gesture by dispatching a military man, Genera Liang Huai Ching as the head of an Embassy to India. The Embassy arrived in King Harsha's capital probably in 643 A.D. Impressed by the hospitality and friendship of Harsha Emperor Tai-Tsung sent second Embassy headed by Li-Yi-Piao to King Harsha. The arrival of second mission probably in 645-646 A.D in Harsha's capital city of Maghadha, further strengthened friendship between the people of India and China.

Fist Small War

Overwhelmed by Indian response, Chinese Emperor Tai Tsung sent third mission to India. Unfortunately King Harsha was dead by the time. The mission led by Wang Hsuan-tse which left China in 648 A.D. the mission was not liked by the successor of Harsha and he ordered an attack over the mission which fled to Nepal and captured all the valuable gifts from the mission. Wang Hsuan-tse recruited seven thousand strong cavalry from Nepal in addition to thousand men from Tibet, then he returned to Magadha to settle the score. The Chinese won the battle. This was the only small battle fought between India and China in their two thousand years of close contacts until 1962.\textsuperscript{13}
Thereafter rulers of Kashmir, Vellore and Southern Indian states became Wangs in 720 A.D. At the same time ancient India's marvelous products and splendid cultural achievements had travelled to China on the great carrier i.e. Mahayana Buddhism and generated great administration for India in ancient China. During the Ta'ng Dynasty (618-907 AD), this admiration reached its zenith, as the literature of that time amply testifies it. 14 One eminent scholar of Sung Dynasty (960 –1279 AD), Ou-Yang Hsiu (1007-1072 AD) who was the chief compiler of Hsiu-t'ang-shu (the new annals of T'ang Dynasty), approved many eulogistic references to India and the Indian people in a special chapter on India.

Relations were there during Yuan Dynasty (1278-1368 AD), China established contacts with Quilon in 1278 AD. In 1281 AD Malabar also established official contacts, with China. However, Muhammad-bin-Tughlaq spurned China's offer to have relations with it. From 1325 to 1351 AD, India had no diplomatic relations with China. With India opening up for the western power, the sea route to India was captured and therefore no relations were existing with China for a long time. During the era of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 AD) detailed mention of Indian ports has been made popular by writings of Chinese scholars. From the beginning of Qing dynasty and Muslim period, both china and India were facing the interventions by the European colonial powers. Sakyamuni was contemporary of Confusious around the 5th century
B.C. Some of China's Buddhist Text even describes both Confucius and Lao Zi as Buddhissattvas i.e disciples or emissaries of Lord Buddha. China under the deep influence of Buddhism, inspired the devotees to visit India and see the places of Buddhism during the ancient time. Tao Nan was the first Chinese pilgrim who came to India in 316 A.D. Likewise many Indian Buddhist monks paid visit to China.15

Thereafter Fa-hsien in 399 A.D. and Huen – tsang (Xuang-Zhang) in 645 A.D. also visited India. It sing also visited India in the year 761 A.D. Another Chinese monk Chih – Fa – ling who had been sent by his mentor Hui-Yuan from Lu – Shuan in 392 A.D. to the Buddhist kingdom in the west to collect the Sanskrit scriptures.16 Another monk Chih- Meng, had gathered a group of fifteen persons reached to India Fa-Yung another monk sailed off towards India with five companions in the year 420 A.D. Among these only five could returned to China. The pilgrimage was done by many others but there is lack of written records about this.

Buddhidharama an Indian monk sailed in to China and reached the Gateway of Liang Empire in 526 A.D. Later on he spent nine years at Shao-lin Monastry and believed to be the founder of world famous Shao-lin temple (material Art) school.17

Amoghvajra was in China and his sojourn was from 719 A.D. to 774 A.D. He went with his Guru Vajrabodhi when he was a teenager.
He introduced the ancient Indian practices of pouring holy water on the head of the king during coronation ceremony to baptize the three T'ang emperors. This illustrates the high position which the Indian monk attained in China's socio-political hierarchy. Manjushri an Indian Buddhist monk arrived in China in year 971 A.D with some Chinese Buddhist monks who visited India. Thereafter Pu-t'o-u chih was another Indian monk who arrived in China in year 991 A.D. from Nalanda Monastery. At the same time Sung Emperor Tai-tsung received another Indian Buddhist monk Rahula. The friendship represents the noblest and purest kind of example in the international politics.

Ancient Travel Routes

Most of the travel routes traversed along by pilgrims and traders contributed to the evolution of the world famous silk Route network that marked the southern life lines of longer Eurasian regime since ancient time.

There were four famous routes. First, the oldest of all routes was the routes through Assam Burma Yunnan then merging with the main silk route leading to Central Asia. Secondly, the southern silk route which had been part of a larger road network between Asia and Europe, passing through Changan through Dunghuman to Kashgar from where its main branch bifurcated into northern and Southern Silk route. Thirdly the sea route to the Indian Subcontinent which is also
believed to be known to the Chinese since the ancient time through the Gulf of Tonkin. Finally the route through Nepal and Tibet was obvious the most difficult of all and the least used branch of the southern silk route to Central Asian Region.

Therefore, Chinese had very limited contact with India during the medieval times. Of course trade relations were there. During the British colonization, China had trade relations with India but nature of that relationship was very limited. In the beginning of twentieth century, there started a great resurgence of Asia which deeply influenced both India and China. In India in the year 1857 first movement of national independence started. In China Taiping (Peasants) uprising of 1850-1864 was to make them see their shared plight as also their shared objective and various Indian side join the Taiping fighting against the colonial invaders. In China, in the year 1911 there came the nationalist assertion.

Both China and India looked with sympathy and admiration at each other’s powerful nationalist movement and sought inspiration from one another. Sunyat Sen looked upon the Non-Cooperation movement started by Mahatma Gandhi with great admiration, and pointed out as an object lesson for the Chinese Nationalist. The Indian National Congress expressed sympathy with the Chinese ‘in their struggle against at alien domination of their land’, and described the Chinese people as comrade of the Indian people in their joint struggle against
imperialism. "The Chinese Revolution", Nehru wrote subsequently in National Herald, "is not an event of local interest and importance. It is a world phenomenon of the greatest historical importance". 21

In 1926 Indian leaders voiced their protest against British intervention in China. In February 1927 at the instance of Jawahar Lal Nehru a joint declaration was issued by the Congress in the league against imperialism meeting in Brussels denouncing the use of Indian force to serve the British Imperialist interests. Nehru said in 1936 in particular reference to China, "We offer our full cooperation in their struggle against imperialism and Fascist reaction for we realize that our struggle is a common one."

At the Haripura session in February 1938 the Indian Nationalist Congress passed a resolution condemning the brutal imperialist invasion and expressing solidarity of Indian people with Chinese in the common task of combating imperialism on China. The Indian National Congress sent a medical mission to China which included Drs. Atal Kotnis and Basu to assist the anti Japanese war efforts. Dr. Kotnis died in the course of the war in 1942, and has since become a source of solidarity for the Chinese and Indians against colonialism.

Rabindranath Tagore visited China in 1924 and 1928. With gifts from Chiang-Kai shek Tagore set up Cheena Bhavan at Visva Bharathi as a monument Pandit Nehru visited China in year 1939. He saw
himself as one of the long line of scholars and statesmen bringing these two ancient civilizations closer in the modern times. Nehru dwelt upon the concept of Eastern Federation of China and India and of other eastern countries. The Indian leader was both astonished and grateful to the Chinese people who cherished a close and friendly union with the people of India.

Similar sentiments were echoed by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in the course of his visit to wartime Chungking in May 1941. The scholar statesman talked forcefully of “our civilization possessing a common cultural and spiritual background with and identity of ideals of happy life and friendship”. The Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang-Kai-Shek visited India in 1942. Following his visit to India in February 1942. Chiang- Kai-Shek pleaded with the American Government to exert pressure on the British to relax their hold on India. “The wisest and most enlightened policy for British to pursue “he wrote to President Roosevelt, “would be to restore to India her complete freedom”.

In August 1942, before launching upon his Quit India Movement, Gandhiji wrote a letter to Chiang-kai-Shek, in which he went out of his ways to tell him that his appeal to British power to withdraw from India was not meant any shape or form to weaken India’s defence against the Japanese or to embarrass them in their struggle. He further said “I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your company’s freedom".
Two days after the arrest of Gandhiji and other Indian political leaders on August 9, 1942 Chiang – Kai-Shek again pleaded with Roosevelt for intervention in the Indian situation. India and China thus had the great respect for each other. They watched each other's struggle for freedom and self-determination with sympathy and interest which gave rise to the expectation that on emergence as independent nation-states they would be following common goals and politics and would cooperate with each other in helping the other backward nations of Asia in breaking up their bonds of slavery which tied them to western powers.

Then in 1947 India got Independence from British Raj after colonization of more than 200 years. In China too, on October 1949, communist revolution took place and India immediately extended its recognition to Communist government in December 1949. Explaining India's position on the question of recognition of the new Chinese regime Jawaharlal Nehru stated in Parliament (on March 17, 1950), "it was not question of recognizing a major event in the history and appreciating and dealing with it. The new government was a stable government and there is no force likely to supplant it or push it away".22 The Chinese Reds however were contemptuous of India's independence as fake and that India was still under imperialist dominance and Pt. Nehru and other 'bourgeoisie' Indian leaders were lackeys of Western imperialists. Expressing their faith in Indian
communist leaders the Chinese hoped that a free India would one day emerge in the socialist and people's democratic family. Thus India and China began their career in the aftermath of Second World War.

Here it is not the intention of the researcher to give a history-encapsulated or otherwise—of the relationship in its magnitude and scope. In keeping with the primary focus of a study such as this. The researchers to set down the significant political milestones that have punctuated their interaction are of continuing relevance to the political processes between them. To begin with, it is necessary to refrain from imposing a typically cold war view on Nehru's perception regarding China. In the impressive compilations of independent India's first Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister, Nehru's writings and speeches, the characteristic cold war view embodying a single dimension view of a communist adversely (read China), is conspicuous by its absence. There is enough evidence regarding his reservations and more, of China's intentions and capabilities. But it is important to see that the strategic realities of Asia and the romanticism of resurgent Asian nationalism were two major elements in Nehru's politics. There is also sufficient documentation indicating that Nehru refused to be pushed into any anti-communist posture simply because of cold war compulsions. As he put it, "We have chosen our path and we propose to go along it, and so, vary it as and when we choose, and not at somebody’s dictate or pressure. Our thinking and approach do not fit in with this great
Nehru's China policy thus flowed directly from the linkage between his global view and his policy of non-alignment. For the China on the contrary, the bipolar world situation demanded that nations had necessarily to make a choice between the two camps of imperialism and socialism. There was no third road. Since India opted for a third road, the initial interactions, between independent and democratic India and liberated, socialist China could not have – and did not – begin in an amicable and smooth fashion.

India and China two civilizational landmasses joined the global community of nations in the late 1940's. Both India and China underwent some major developments in late 1940's. India got independence in 1947 after more than 200 years of British subjugation. China on the other hand became a communist country in October 1949 after a successful revolution, overthrowing the defunct Kuomintang regime.

Both the countries embarked upon their independent course of development simultaneously. The path for India was little bit easier, as its independent status was community. But the case was entirely different with China. In fact its communist status was not recognized by majority of international community. The Western Bloc led by the United States of America staunchly criticized China for embracing communism.
However China received donation from the Eastern Bloc led by Soviet Union as it got one more strong ally.  

India and China: The border and Tibet problems

India and China are divided by 2400 km long boundary which lies between the two countries. They have one natural divider – the ranges of Himalayas. Apparently this natural barrier puts some restrictions on free interaction between the people of two countries. The traditional boundary between India and China can be described as it is divided into the three sectors; The Eastern, Middle and Western.

The western sector comprises of the area of Aksaichin, an area which comes in between the triangle of India-China and Afghanistan. The Chinese Xinjiang area is north to these areas and Chinese had never claimed any part of the concerned area at any time. Official Chinese maps published in the year 1917, 1919 and 1931 showed this area as a part of Indian territory. The western boundary in Ladakh lays along the Lanak la, Niagzu stream and Demchok and Tashigong through the Emis pass. The children of Ladakhi King occupied the territory, but there was no report of Chinese annexation of these areas.

Chinese maps in the nineteenth century did not speak of province of Xinjiang extends further to the mountain range of Kuen-Lun. As we know Indian alignment was extended up to the Kuen-Lun Mountains.
The people of Ladakh collected salt from this area, which is now claimed by Chinese.

In the middle sector the area extends up to Spiti valley and Shipkila pass was included in the Indian area. In the year 1882, 1897, 1917 and 1920 survey by British official proved that this area was the part of Indian Territory. In Garhwal area, Sutlej-Ganges watershed has been the traditional boundary. Maps published by Jales Klaproth and Joseph Chavanne in 1936 show the boundary along the watershed. Shipkila has always been the part of Indian village. Namiya and the frontier area of Garhwal up to Sutlej-Ganges were subject to the Indian revenue settlement of 1825, 1842 1856, 1896 and 1920.

The line in eastern sector extends with the boundary of Sikkim, Burma etc. With Sikkim, line was drawn according to the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890. With Burma and NEFA according to Simla convention of 1913-1914. Burma was a part of British Indian Empire. Its boundary runs along the northern watershed of Irrawady and Isu-Razi pass. Chinese have great objection while accepting McMahon Line in Eastern sector which was drawn in 1914 Simla convention. They said that the China was not a party to Simla Convention, so it is not bound to accept the boundary demarcated by Simla Convention why the Chinese have accepted the Burmese section of McMahon Line without the slightest modification they have branded the India – china section 33,000 sq.km Miles south of the line. They also accused India of having
advanced the McMahon Line in certain sectors, at the expense of Tibet.25

What is Border Problem?

What China wants is that India should leave its claim in Aksai-Chin and in return China would recognize the McMahon Line. It was a contention that was unacceptable to Indian needs, as it would give exclusive right of China to deal with Pakistan and that was very dangerous from India’s Point of view. The area in Ladakh was also claimed by China as its territory. Major portion of the area was formed by the part of Chinese province of Xinjiang and remaining part of Tibetan district of Ari. China denied that these areas were ever part of India. It had not faced any protest from Indian government. China never made any formal claim on this area, because they are the part of Chinese territory.

In eastern part also China refused to recognize the Indian McMahon Line. Their contention was that McMahon Line was drawn on paper and not on ground, so the credibility of such a line was doubtful. Secondly, China was not the signatory of Simla Convention which had drawn the McMahon Line in year 1913-14. From a geopolitical perspective establishment and maintenance of Chinese authority over Tibet required and continues to require transport from the population and industrial centers of China into Tibet of substantial numbers of military and civilian personnel along with large quantities of material.
Given the extreme remoteness and ruggedness of Tibet, this has always been a difficult task for China’s government. The very few roads linking Tibet to the rest of China have thus been vital to every Chinese central government concerned about asserting its authority in Tibet.

There have been three main routes into Tibet from the rest of China; from the north via Zinjiang in Qinghai province and proceeding south over the Qinghai plateau, from the Sichuan basin in the east and proceeding westward; and from the west via Kashgar south easterly on to the Tibetan plateau crossing Aksai Chin, a cold desert, lying on the westernmost edge of the Tibetan plateau.

The Westerly route via Aksai – Chin was an old caravan route and in ways the best. It was the only route that was open year round, throughout the winter and the monsoon season and economical also as compare to other routes. However in the post 1978 era, air transport also started playing great role in Tibet. The last route is more favourable for Chinese government to have its contact with Tibet; therefore Aksai-Chin is very important for China to hold its control over Tibet.

The eastern area sector is approximately 90,000 sq km and is not a treasure house of minerals like Tibet. There are some deposits of dolomite, limestone, graphite, quartzite, kyanite, cobalt, ferrous and sulphide, iron ore, marble and copper rich timber source, coal and oil.
rich of water also, so that electricity plants can be built here. But the region is comparatively less wanted by Chinese. India always had protested the Chinese motive of territorial expansion. On November 20, 1950, speaking in Parliament Nehru had declared that McMahon Line was a non-negotiable border map or no map.

It was a map published in China in the year 1954, in which Aksai-Chin and some part of NEFA had been shown as Chinese territory. Nehru attracted the attention of the Chinese Premier during the visit to China in April 1954. In reply to Nehru, Zhou-En-Lai suggested that any difference between our two countries should be sought through consultation and solution to the problem should be arrived at through negotiations only. He said "We will never allow differences between our two countries to affect this friendship and we believe that India shares the same view." Further, he added that this map was of old Kuomintang time and it would be revised soon, which actually never happened.

In 1956 the two Prime Ministers met again, at this time Zhou-En-Lai himself brought up the question of the McMahon Line. In Nehru's account, Zhou informed him that China had accepted the McMahon Line alignment so far as it concerned the Sino-Burmese border. And that in View of the friendly relations which existed between India and China, China proposed to recognize this border with India also.
Nehru apparently concluded that he had an undertaking from Zhou-En-Lai that China would ratify the McMahon Line without the formality of negotiations. In year 1957 Peking radio announced that it had built a road connecting Tibet with Xinjiang. Two search parties were sent to the area for investigation by Indian Government one of which was even imprisoned by the Chinese authorities. When India raised the matter with Chinese government they contemplated that road building was entirely a domestic matter of China.

Again in July 1958, publication of map in China Pictorial, showed the Aksai-Chin as a part of China. Thereafter correspondence initiated by Pt. Nehru in August 1958, asking clarification from Chinese Government on the fault of map. In this latter of December 13, 1958, Nehru took the stand that, “the Sino-Indian Agreement, which was happily concluded in 1954, had settled all outstanding problems between our two nations”. He also maintained that “Zhou had himself accepted McMahon Line as frontier in North East.” Zhou’s reply was that boundary had never been concluded between the two countries. As this was clear by the letter written on January 23 1959, Nehru proposed that “as a provisional measure the two sides temporarily maintain the status quo.”

Now an open claim was made by China on the Aksai-Chin and Ladakh areas. China had not raised the issue in 1954 because conditions were not ripe for settlement at that time. Thus they claimed
around 50,000 sq. km of Aksai-Chi Nehru rejected Zhou-En-Lai’s proposal for mutual maintenance of the status-quo proposing instead that what India held to be the status-quo should be restored. The 1954 agreement with India in which India recognized China’s sovereignty in Tibet also encoded the five principles of Peaceful Co-existence or panchasheel. Although in retrospect it seems quite naïve Nehru neglected at this stage to secure a Chinese endorsement of India’s border claim and special right in the other Himalayan states inherited from the British. In an act of supreme self delusion and wishful thinking, Nehru assumed that this concession to Chinese and the ideational propositions embodied in the Panchasheel amounted to an agreement on the border. This failure on Nehru’s part to secure a formal agreement proved extraordinarily costly later on.\textsuperscript{33}

In 1955 there were instructions in Barahoti in the middle sector. In 1958 Beijing indicated that the Aksai-Chin road in Ladakh had been built in what it claimed as its territory; and on the 1959, there were bloody clashes at Longju and the Kongka pass in the eastern and western sectors respectively. These incidents led to the increased hostility between India and China and culminated into the war of 1962.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) problems with Nehru and the bourgeois – democratic nature of the Indian leadership apart, the crux of the India-China problem was unquestionably regarding Tibet. The suspicion generated in India by the Chinese actions in Tibet in
early 1950’s and Indian reaction and criticisms and the Chinese counter criticisms persisted for quite some time. (Though they were briefly eclipsed, they resurfaced to fuel the tensions of the late 1950s. Mention may be made here of the letter from the then Home Minister Sardar Patel dated 7 November 1950, in which he described the Chinese action as “little short of perfidy” and categorically warned Nehru to take cognizance of this “new threat” posed by “communist China which has definite ambition and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us”. Nehru replied in a note circulated to Cabinet, in which he regretted that Tibet could not be “saved” but believed it “exceedingly in likely that India would now face an attack from China”. He further stated that “the idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or to put it more preciously, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards India, is rather naive”. He upheld the essential correctness of seeking an “understanding” with China since there could be no doubt that “India and China at peace with each other would make a vast difference to the whole set up and balance of the world”. It has been pointed out that, after Patel’s death in 1950, “There existed no real opposition to a policy of “understanding” with China”. Although this state of affairs lasted only till 1958, when he clearly came under pressure not only from his own party members but the opposition and the media as well. However, “Nehru’s cautions and conciliatory policy towards China seemed to be
justified by the time the Korean War came to an end when the Chinese attitude became more favourable". This was due in a large measure, to India’s mediation and diplomacy in the Korean War, which helped in breaking the impasse and established India’s image as an “honest peacebroker”. One of the principal results of this change was the *Panchasheela*, which can in fact also be seen as the first joint political contribution of the Indians and Chinese to contemporary foreign policy semantics. The concept has a pan-Asian appeal in as much as the term *sheel* is form Buddhist metaphysics and stands for a ‘Principle’. In using a Buddhist concept in a modernized context and senses, it signified a world much larger than the bilateral relations of India and China and indeed has proved to be as such.Both Nehru and Zhou Enlai appeared to project the Five principles as having universal applicability – but they in fact, became the model for the PRCs agreements / treaties with many other countries. With the signing of the Panchasheel however, India formally renounced its traditional privileges and position in Tibet, which it had inherited from the British. Thereafter began a short-lived, but extremely friendly and cordial phase of Sino-Indian relations, epitomized in the slogan Hindi-Chini Bhai- Bhai (Indians and Chinese are Brothers) Zhou Enlais 1954 visit to India indicated the contours of Chinas new strategic perspective and testified to the PRCs recognition of the alternative force constituted by the non-aligned and decolonized group of countries. In their commitment to the twin tasks of
development and modernization, they were all united. As Zhou put it, "We two countries differ in the roads to independence, but we share the same goals in maintaining independence, building nations and safeguarding world peace". In retrospect, the phase of warmth and cordiality was so brief that it is surprising that it had indeed camouflaged the contentious issues in the relationship. It was also the end of the limited, but political aspect of the relationship, which was based on the centrality of the India-China relationship in the future development of Asia and the common desire to resist imperialism in its various forms.

However, it is necessary to dwell at some length on the longer term effects of the 1954 treaty, by which India unequivocally recognized the PRCs sovereignty over Tibet and relinquished all its extraterritorial rights there. There was uproar in the Indian Parliament and members urged the government to reconsider their attitude towards China and warned against complacency about the security of the Himalayas. There was also a tremendous outpouring of sympathy for the Tibetans. Nehru did respond to the charge and criticisms in parliament stating that he believed that while China had historically exercised some kind of "suzerainty" over Tibet, this did not amount to "Sovereignty". He expressed the hope that the matter would be resolved peacefully since he did not see how Tibet could be a threat to China. But he never accepted or incorporated the demand to take on a more threatening and tough posture vis-à-vis the Chinese and basically attempted to "Strike
balance between the trend of Indian popular feeling and the need to maintain Sino-Indian friendship. It was the Nehruvian world-view and politics, which therefore ensured that India–China relations stayed on course and may thus be assessed as the first of the major political interventions which brought the breakthrough in India-China relations. Nehru’s detractors invariably single out his stand on Tibet as responsible for depriving India of strategic leverage vis-à-vis China but it is necessary to recall that the international situation at the time did not offer many options in this regard. The realistic dimensions of Nehru’s Tibet policy merit a closer study. No major power at that time openly supported the cause of Tibetan independence—the problem was with communist China’s takeover—not about China’s claim as such. Neither did the Guomindang regime in Taiwan deny China’s rights in Tibet. India’s capabilities as well at that time were not of the order that they could challenge the PLAs “liberation” of Tibet.

The key objective was to therefore, reduce the security threat from China that was implied by the military presence in Tibet. One is somewhat struck by the fact, that, in many ways, the above quote could well define the essential contours of the India approach to the Tibet issue in the present as well. The official policy itself underwent major changes from the late forties to the signing of the Panchasheel in 1954. But since then India has maintained that Tibet is part of China and is committed to not permitting any anti China activity on its soil. But it also
granted asylum to the Dalai Lama and has allowed a Tibetan government in exile to operate from Dharamsala. Of course, there is no question of any official recognition of this body as such—it is not even registered as a political organization. In any case, the Indian policy and attitude towards Tibet is far more complex and layered by historical and cultural dimensions. Subsequently when the Dalai Lama sought and obtained political asylum in India in the wake of the uprising in 1959, India–China relations were stretched to breaking point. From Nehru’s perspective, some sort of Indian involvement in and support to the resistance in Tibet, may well have been based on impulses and objectives other than cold war ones. Studies have shown that despite the official policy of recognizing Tibet as part of China, he “also ordered the Indian Intelligence Bureau to extend “all possible help to the Tibetan national resistance, and indeed to build up that resistance. Analysts have described India’s policy towards Tibet as a “dual” one and depicted the “apparent asymmetry between India’s declaratory policy and real politik as pragmatism par excellence”.40 Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that this is a source of considerable annoyance and suspicious for the PRC and in that sense, an irritant in bilateral relations. To the extent that the policy of the government of India clearly recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China it is not an issue or a controversy at the official level; however its intangible presence results in every bilateral official document or
statement having to necessarily reaffirm the official Indian position and hence hampers the political processes between India and China.

There is a tremendous profusion of writing documentation and analysis of the events that led up to the 1962 border conflict, but even after 45 years, the general perception is still characterized by a less than sustained grasp of the crisis in its various dimensions. The full records of that crucial phase are still withheld from public scrutiny which has also prevented a genuine scholarly assessment and therefore assimilation of vital lessons into the Indian perception and management of crises. In many ways, we are still not out of the long shadows cast by the conflict, even as we have realized the necessity of putting the past behind us. Outside the specialized groups such as the security and defence sector, the external affairs bureaucracy, the political elite and scholars/historians, there is sheer ignorance. In many cases myths abound which keep alive memories of 1962 in a highly emotive fashion. The decisive account of that episode has yet to be written, but till such time we have to deal with a set of highly debated and contested versions.41

**Boarder Issue:** In any case, given the new turn in the approach to the resolution of the border, most of the assessment and stands of both at that time are of academic interest. Nonetheless, some basic facts may be set down for purposes of this account. Awareness of the disputed boundary certainly existed as early as 1950 and there was some debate
in India on the need to begin negotiation with the Chinese—but the matter was shelved for the time being. During his visit to China in 1954 Nehru, received an enthusiastic welcome from a million strong Chinese lined all along the road. It was a tremendous reception for a non-Communist head of government in a Communist state at a time when the cold war had begun a new chapter in the histories of Asia and to manipulate its geopolitics. Nehru raised the matter of incorrect borders on Chinese maps. Zhou had replied that the China needed time to complete their investigations. Subsequently the Chinese conveyed their view of the “historical illegitimacy” of the MacMahon Line (which India considered as the boundary) but that they would not violate it till such time as it was mutually resolved. But in 1957, the announcement of a road, linking Sinking and Tibet in the Aksai Chin area, (which India regarded as its own) appeared in the Chinese media. Violations however occurred intermittently, right until 1959 and beyond, alongside outward manifestations of goodwill and friendship.42

Letters and memoranda were continuously exchanged between the two governments as well as Nehru and Zhou Enlai, which revealed the differences between the Indian and Chinese stands on a range of issues, chiefly the border, but also their world views, attitudes to international laws, colonial treaties and above all the status quo, which both sides urged the other to maintain and respect, pending a solution. The differences eventually emerged as basic, irresolvable contractions.
Border clashes continued unabated, as did the written and verbal exchanges—but there was nothing that either side could produce that was acceptable to the other. A joint Communiqué signed on April 25th, 1960 during Zhou Enlai's third and last visit to India, laid the pattern for future talks, alternately in Beijing and New Delhi to exchange views on the facts of the case. Beyond this, there was no point where Indian and Chinese thinking converged, so that Nehru told Parliament on April 26th that “...this and again the actual discussion came against a rock of entirely different sets of data. If data differ, if inferences differ, arguments differ, if the basic facts are different, when there is no meeting ground at all”. Meanwhile mutual suspicions were intensifying, both on account of the border, but largely also because of Tibet. Negotiations between India and China continued throughout 1960-62, to no avail. Matters were made worse by media on both sides. The climax came in the shape of a short but decisive war in October 1962 bringing down the curtains on the fraternal friendship and understand which in any case had begun to fray in the preceding few years.

India - Pakistan Historical Linkages

The history of Pakistan upto 1947AD was the history of undivided India. Indo-Pakistan relations are grounded in the political, geographic, cultural and economic links between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the two largest countries of South Asia.
The two countries share much of their common geographic location, but differ starkly in religious demographics. India is a secular country with Hindu majority about 80 percent of total population and Muslims being the largest religious minority with about 13 percent of population. Pakistan, on the other hand is an Islamic country with 97 percent population being Muslim and only about 1.8 percent Hindus. Diplomatic relations between the two are defined by the history of the violent partition of British India into these two states and numerous military conflicts and territorial disputes thereafter.

Hindu-Muslim relations have historically been tense. The partition of the sub-continent and the subsequent bloodshed, violence and disorder left behind a trail of bitterness. This has promoted an enemy image of each other (India and Pakistan) which has created a mindset of hostility and antagonism both at the elite and also at the popular level. The 1940s galvanized the Muslim masses to seek a separate state in South Asia and launched the Pakistan movement changing the political map of sub-continent. Central to the politics of that period was a question of Islamic identity and assertion of Muslim nationalism. Some argue that since the people of India and Pakistan share common heritage history and a stake in economic development and an equitable social order, they are naturally inclined to prefer cooperation to confrontation and friendship to hostility. The past is too much an obsession with both countries. The ruling elites of India and Pakistan
have not forgotten their difficult past. Perceptions of national interest of both evolve out of the historical context and tend to perpetuate historical trend.45

Pakistan and India both came into being on August 1947. Muslims of subcontinent got Pakistan after long tiring efforts and great many scarifies. So, they were very happy after independence. On the other hand people of India saw that independence as an assault on their nationalism. They even today consider that Muslims of Pakistan had just divided their country which they consider as Hindustan (Land of Hindus). So the entire nation of India is just against Pakistan right from the day of independence. People of India till now have not accepted Pakistan. Due to this gap between the people of India and Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and India has not been good since 1947 upto date. All the types of relationships whether it is political or economical, whether it is cultural or social, all of them have been controversial upto date. Pakistan and India are the inheritors of two of the richest cultures and civilizations of the world. Along with other countries of South Asia, they are also among the poorest segments of mankind. Despite enjoyment of independence for more than sixty years, they remain afflicted with mass poverty and all its concomitant ills. It is a tragedy of their short history as independent states that their mutual antagonism plunged them into three wars and when not engaged fighting, has kept them close to brink. The major conflict
between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. Besides Kashmir, there are also so many other issues as discussed in the successive chapters.

**Initial Problems faced by Pakistan**\(^46\)

1. **The border problems:** The partition of India created unnatural and un-demarcated boundaries between India and Pakistan which led to numerous controversies and armed clashes. The most unfortunate happenings were over the Rann of Kutch in 1965. According to law made for the partition of the India was: “To divide up a piece of land into separate portions representing the proportionate interests of the tenants. It may also consist of dividing a property with common ownership into identifiable individual ownership”. According to which independent states of India was given the rights to be part of India or Pakistan according to their own will. But India refused that and got the controlled of Junagadh, Kashmir, Hyderabad Dakan and Munavara, which disturbed a lot the relationship between India and Pakistan.

2. **The Migratory Problem:** The partition of India was claimed by Mohammed Ali Jinnah on the basis of his two-nation theory. But there were several lakhs of non-Muslims in Pakistan and larger number of Muslims in India. The migration of such people between the two countries, the communal riots in the two since 1947, the two nation religious basis of Pakistani state and others created several complicated problems making Indo-Pakistani relations quite bitter.
3. Evacuee Property Problem: Owing to the migration of non-Muslims in Pakistan to India and the Muslims of India to Pakistan on a mass scale the problem of evacuee property also came up causing serious differences between India and Pakistan. About 79,00,000 Muslims moved from India to Pakistan. These migrants left all their movable and immovable properties in their native places. About one thousand million rupees were left in India by the Muslims in terms of immovable and movable properties. To solve the evacuee immovable property several meetings between the representatives of Indian and Pakistani Governments took place between 1947-1950 but nothing came out of it. The attempt to solve this problem by the Government of India in 1953 also failed. In 1958 a ministerial level meeting took place but it was also not fruitful. Besides moveable and immovable property of migrants, Pakistan also faced problems regarding distribution of national wealth between Pakistan and India. At the time of partition of India, national wealth was decided to be distributed among both the nations by British Government. Pakistan has to be given 750 million rupees as his share in national wealth. Also since the capital of Sub-continent was in India therefore all the capital at that time was in India. India first gave 50 million rupees to Pakistan and promised to give the remaining soon. But then India refused to give the remaining amount later. Later by the interruption of Gandhi, Pakistan was given 500 million rupees. The remaining is still to be paid by Indian Government.
4. Problems arising out of the creation of the two wings of Pakistan:

At the time of independence, the territory in which Muslims lived in majority became the part of Pakistan. As in East Bengal was Muslims dominant area, therefore it became part of Pakistan. But the problem was that geographically it was located in the east of India and it was large territory also. So it became difficult for Pakistan to manage that territory. Due to large population of East Bengal it was named as East.

Kashmir Dispute (1947 upto date)

The major cause of worst relation between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. Since the partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947, the Kashmir dispute between them has become an intractable one. They fought three wars over it in 1947, 1965, and 1999 but have not resolved it. The Indians and Pakistanis like Israelis and Palestinians make claims to the same territory.

Location: Kashmir is located in the northeast of Pakistan and northwest of Pakistan. Geographically it has its utmost importance. Most of the rivers which flow through Pakistan have their origin in Kashmir. So, for Pakistan it is an integral state, resisted the pressure to join either Pakistan or India hoping to get independence or autonomy from both countries. To buy time and to accomplish this goal he signed standstill agreements with Pakistan on August 16th and tried to sign a similar agreement with India.
Pakistan claimed this territory, as 72 percent of Maharaja’s subjects were Muslim. India wanted the Muslim majority territory of Kashmir as an emblem of her secularism. The Maharaja offered a “stand still” agreement to India and Pakistan, as he wanted some more time to make up his mind. Pakistan signed agreement but India refused. As the Maharaja continued to dither, violence broke in the Jammu and Poonch region where sections of local Muslims wanted to merge with Pakistan. There was a similar revolt in the northern hill territory of Glight. In violation of the “Stand Still” agreement Pakistan stopped the passage of food and other essential commodities to Jammu and Kashmir through her territory. In September 1947, tribal raiders backed by Pakistan army invaded the valley.

**Violence in Kashmir:**

The Maharaja requested India to send in its armed forces. India made it contingent upon his signing the instrument of accession in favour of India. The ruler signed the instrument of accession and India accepted with the provision that after the restoration of normalcy, the final political status of the territory would be decided through a referendum. Indian soldiers were airlifted to Srinagar on October 27th, 1947. India and Pakistan began their first war in less than three months.

**First war in Kashmir:**

Of coming into being as independent states. 77 In January 1948 India appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations to restore
peace in Kashmir. On January 20th, 1948 the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was constituted (UNSC Resolution S/654). In April 1948, the UN adopted the first plebiscite resolution. The resolution called upon Pakistan “to withdraw all its armed personnel including the tribesmen from the territory of Jammu and Kashmir”. It asked India “to reduce its armed forces to the minimum level needed to maintain law and order” and to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan. The plebiscite administration was to be nominated by the UN Secretary General (UNSC Resolution S726, April 21st, 1948). A UN crafted ceasefire was implemented on January 1st, 1949. The plebiscite resolution was reaffirmed.47

Pakistan’s foreign policy in most of the last three decades seems to have been dominated by its security concerns against India. In Pakistan’s threat perception, India has constantly figured as the number one danger. It is perceived to have had problems coming to terms with Pakistan’s existence. The two countries have gone to war on three separate occasions: 1948, 1965 and 1971. Pakistan considers India’s superiority in terms of size, manpower, resources, weapons, economic patterns, Industrialization, defense, industry and educational and technological development a threat. India’s insistence on dominant leadership in South Asia also creates problems for Pakistan.
Tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir rose markedly. India's seizure of Goa by force on December 19, 1961 and the inability of the UN to prevent this had raised Pakistan's fears that India might have in mind the eventual forcible seizure of Pakistan-occupied portions of Kashmir. In this regard, President Ayub Khan's letter to President Kennedy dated 2 January 1962 stated that the forcible taking of Goa by India had demonstrated what they in Pakistan had never had any illusions about – that India would not hesitate to attack if it were in her interest to do so and if she had felt that the other side was too weak to resist. Ayub Khan viewed his alliance with the US primarily as an insurance against the Indian threat.

The two countries fought two wars on the Kashmir question in a span of 18 years. The Shimla Agreement of 1972 recognized that Kashmir was an unsettled issue. It recommended the negotiated settlement under the principle of bilateralism. Other than Kashmir, the most intolerable issues for Pakistan was the quest for sharing the water of the Indus Basin. Creation of Bangladesh, India's nuclear explosions, defence expenditure and so on which are discussed in detail in the successive chapters.

An Overview:

India and China the world's two oldest civilization countries, once great powers now the most populous countries and are back as claimants to preeminence in Asia and the world. These are the two
border counties in the South Asian continent with many competing interests with historical reasons which took the form of sharp differences over the border. They were most acute in the eastern and western extremities of the Himalayas, separated by over a thousand miles. The most immediate threat to any nation arises in its neighborhood and therefore the maintenance of peace stability and friendship with proximate states is a major concern of foreign policy. These two countries are heavily engaged in the global economy and possess the nuclear power with expanding military capabilities to match their growing ambitions. At the same time they also have a long history of bitter rivalry and unresolved border dispute, which resulted in the unsettled border issues sitting across the table finally resorting to the ultimate argument- the war in 1962. The divergent issues in Sino-Indian relations and the conflicts are discussed in the succeeding chapter.

India and Pakistan are the two countries which share much of their common geographical location and religious demographics yet diplomatic relations between the two are defined by numerous military conflicts and territorial disputes. The partition of British India in 1947 created two large countries India and Pakistan independent from Britain. The debris of the partition of India has clouded the Indo-Pak relations since 1947. The tragic wars, that followed thereafter, led to a climate of mutual suspicion and distrust. Over the years, their mutual suspicions have risen and fallen. The same pattern has continued over
the past decades during all regimes in India as well as Pakistan. The divergent issues and conflicting areas which strained the relations between India and Pakistan are discussed in the chapter VI of this thesis.
REFERENCES:

1) Bhattacharjea, Meera Sinha, China, the World and India, New Delhi: Sanskrit, 2001, p.128.

2) Tanchung, “Cultural Ambassadors: Ancient Buddhist Monks from India to China and from China to India”, Paper presented at the First Seminar on India and China: Working at each other, organized by The Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and Institute for Chinese Studies, New Delhi, 15-18 November, 1995.


9) Han, Chen Hua, Chinese Overseas Contracts with India and South East Asia, Hsia-Men University Journal, No.2, 1957, p.127.


14) Ibid.

15) Ibid.


17) Ibid.
18) Ibid.


21) Desai, B.K., "Sino-Indian", in "China Invades India", (ed), by V.B.Karnik, New Delhi, Allied, 1963, p.120.

22) Ibid.


32) Ibid.


