CHAPTER — III

POLITICAL RELATIONS

A new world much more chaotic than even before and much more prone to violence emerged at the beginning of the 1990's, with the dissolution of the old order, the world is no longer divided into two rival power blocks. The Soviet Union has disintegrated and the new states, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is in no position to serve as the countervailing power. The United States is still the most powerful country of the world, and its economy remains the world's largest economy although its share in the world economy has declined. With the end of
the cold war, the ideological confrontation between East and West has also ended. There are not many countries left in the world today which do not swear by democracy.

A large number of countries which were centrally planned economies earlier have either turned into market economics or made their own economic systems more market friendly than before consequently the world today is economically well integrated as never before. Countries of throughout the world are being forced to redefine their foreign policies against the background of these radical changes. The dramatic changes in the erstwhile Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole surviving super power from the cold war have profound implications for Indias relations with the United States.

The post-cold war is the new context for foreign policy makers of India and the United States. The basic positive feature of this new international situation is that the United States has no suspicious or distrust of the Foreign policy of India and both these countries have to evolve their bilateral relationships on the basis of authority and reciprocity which was missing during the 1950’s, to 1980’s. From the beginning of 1990’s the United State’s has developed positive perceptions about India and negative perceptions about Pakistan. But the only major negative perception against India in 1990’s is that the United State’s decision is to ease Presseler law and under
Brown amendment it has given $370 million military aid to Pakistan.¹

This change of perceptions clearly proves that Foreign policies are not based on either permanent friends or permanent foes. Foreign policies change on the basis of changes in national interests and erstwhile friends become enemies and vice-versa. This is the meaning of changing international relations and an important proof lies in the changing bilateral relationship between India and the United State's.²

Broadly speaking the following factors contributed to significant improvement in Indo-United State's relations in 1990's. Firstly, the lessening of East-West tensions leading to the with-drawl of Soviet forces from Afghanistan reduced Pakistan's strategic significance for the United States and there by removed one of the major irritants in the Indo-United State's relations. Secondly the idea of cooperative security got boost from the collapse of the Soviet Union. This compelled India to look towards the United States and enabled the latter to remove its misunderstanding about the Indo-Soviet friendship. Thirdly the United States and its western allies will remain involved in conflict situations like the gulf countries or Somalia or unstable Europe or Palestinian versus Israel issues. Peace and stability are on the agenda of
international relations during 1990's. And finally, while India's economic needs compelled it, as usual, to seek United State's cooperation, its policy of economic liberalization attracted the United States towards its vast market. 3

INDIA AT THE BEGINNING OF 1990'S:

Rajiv Gandhi lost the general election in December 1989 and by the beginning of the new year a National Front Government took the reins of Government. But it remained in office for less than one year and had no serious influence on India's Foreign policy. Due to its political instability it failed to make concrete Foreign policy. However, a major world event took place during its tenure, the gulf war which changed the face of the world. The National Front Government allowed the United States aircraft to refuel in India on their way to gulf regions. This was the first positive step taken by the Indian Government in 1990. But after continuous criticism from Political circles, and negative public opinion in India, America stopped refuelling in India. Political instability deepened with the fall of the National Front Government by the end of the year 1990 and installation of the Chandra Sekhar Government, that had more the characteristics of caretaker Government. The Foreign exchange reserves fallen sharply, which are enough only to six weeks imports.
It was only the return of the Congress Government with P.V. Narasimha Rao as Prime Minister in June 1991 that a measure of stability was established and the thread of Foreign policy taken up again. But by that time the international situation had entered a new era. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) has already disintegrated. The country had to think afresh and anew. Many of the old premises had to be replaced by a new hypothesis. The economic struggle had become more crucial than ever before, with palpable consequences for Foreign policy. New directions were needed for India's Foreign policy. Under these circumstances India tried to improve its relations with U.S.A. America also responded positively until the end of George Bush era. But some negative and positive perception about India developed during Bill Clinton's Presidency.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in late 1980's, the United State's administration turned a blind eye towards Pakistan as a front-line state in the struggle in Afghanistan. The evidence is so clear that United State's president George Bush denied to certify that Pakistan has no nuclear capability and so United State's terminated its aid to Pakistan in 1991. President George Bush and his administration in its terminal years adopted a more-even handed approach towards India and Pakistan and the later was even warned that if it continued aiding terrorist activities in India and India-held Kashmir, it could be declared a terrorist State.
With the change international Scenario, India started to change its traditional stances on crucial range of issues. In the first week of January 1992, India established diplomatic relations with Israel. In January 1992 it voted along with Westrey Powers on a UN resolution criticising Libya for refusing to cooperate in the investigations into the terrorist bombing of two airliners in 1988. India supported United State's on a vote repealing the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. These indicate radical and for reaching departures from Indias traditional foreign policy stance which has been rigidly pro-Arab. The United State's administration welcomed the decision of India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and its support for UN resolution on Zionism. India's ties with Israel gained leverage with Washington.

Responding to Indian ties with Israel, the United States denied Islamabad military and economic aid for the third successive year and put freeze on economic assistance worth $500 million which was in the pipe line. India has allowed the United States naval ships for exercises over its territorial waters, a fact which was unknown during 1950's and 80's. The joint exercise by the Indian and the United States navy are an indication of the beginning of a healthy trend in Indo-United States relations, where sector wise collaboration becomes possible.
Relations were very considerably looking up, but the advent of Clinton administration in January 1993 radically changed the picture. Firstly on 19 May, 1993 the United States principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Malott made some adversary comments on Kashmir. In the same year the new Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian affairs made some more adversary comments on Kashmir. She questioned the status of Jammu and Kashmir. This greatly annoyed the Indian leaders.

For a long time India has been insisting for permanent membership in UN Security Council. But United States denied to support India for permanent membership. Instead it wished to support the case of Germany or Japan. This clearly indicates that the United States is not much interested to take the cause of India in international affairs. United States also asked India to cap its missile programme.

RAO’s United States VISIT:

After the end of the cold-war, the first high level meeting with United States leaders was the visit of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to Washington in May 1994. With the changed world scenario, the visit is very important in Indo-United States relations. As the American Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Strobe remarked the visit would mark the turning over of a new leaf “in bilateral relations. Mr. Rao is the fifth Prime Minister to visit the United States.
The Prime Minister has been given the rare honour to address both houses of the United States' congress. In his address Mr. Rao while hinted about the strained Indo-United States relations in the cold war period nevertheless reiterated Indian's stand that past should not be allowed to stand in the way of future. He also reiterated India's commitment to a nuclear free world and suggested that a no-first attack treaty should be signed by all as a first step towards this objective. Mr. Rao repeatedly harped upon the share value system of India and the United States with regard to democracy, political plurotism, basic human dignity and international peace.

The major issues which came up during his talks with president Clinton include a broad overview of the post cold war era including the role of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) development in Russia, U.N. Peace keeping force, global economic trends, nuclear non-proliferation and human rights. From the Indian side, however the Primary emphasis was on United State's objections to India's missile programme, recurrent United States threats of trade sanction against India, the United States sale of F-16 aircraft's to Pakistan and United States stand on Kashmir and Punjab.

India also took up in a bigway the issue of increasing the value of trade and investment. Mr. Rao invited United States businessmen to invest in India.
Another positive outcome of the visit was that India and the U.S. broadly agreed to continue their bilateral nuclear dialogue, despite the share divergence between the two on non-proliferation matters. But his visit was more an economic trip than a political one. The key differences between India and the United States on thorny issues like NPT, America's pro-Pakistan stance etc. remained unresolved.

The first lady of the United States of America, Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton made a four day goodwill visit to India on March 27, 1995. This being an unofficial visit, no official agreements were made and only general discussions were held when she met various dignitaries including the President and the Prime Minister. Discussions were held regarding the status of women in the two countries, ways and means of empowering them, the need to expand women's access to education, health care and other developmental sectors. The first lady also announced that India would be the first country to benefit from the 10 years $100 million United States aid for women's educational initiative that she announced at the Copenhagen social summit.

The United States decision to ease Presseler amendment to aid Pakistan is a surprise to Indian leaders. President Clinton's letter to the head of the Kashmir Council has also caused worry to India. President Clinton's
another letter to United States congressman Garry Condit about Punjab in January 1994, made Indian Government to react quickly. Our Ambassador to the United State's expressed our concern on this matter to the United States authorities and conveyed our objections to such views. This was strange to India, that President Clinton made allegations about Punjab, when there is peace in the Sikh state, where people elected Government by democratic means.

AMERICAN STAND ON KASHMIR AND INDIAS REACTIONS:

Since independence the Kashmir issue has remained a burning topic in Indo-United States relations. In the cold-war era the United States supported Pakistan's resolution on Kashmir issue. It also supported Pakistan's resolution on Kashmir questions in UN Security Council. As long as the cold war continued in the world, Indo-United States relations mainly strained on account of United States support to Pakistan on Kashmir.

With the fall of USSR the cold-war came to an end. There was some shift in American position on Kashmir issue. During hearings held by the sub-committee on Asia and pacific affairs of the House committee on Foreign relations in March 1991, Teresita Scheffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, stated that the UN resolutions recurring a Plebiscite in Kashmir, which the United States had strongly supported in the past, were no longer tenable and that it
now favoured bilateral negotiations to solve the problem within the frame work of the Shimla agreement of 1972.\textsuperscript{10}

However, unlike India, the United States regards, Kashmir as a disputed territory. It would like the two countries concerned to negotiate a mutually agreed solution of the problem. In the final years of President George Bush the United States threatened Pakistan, that the latter will be declared a terrorist state, if it continues to support militants in Kashmir and Punjab. This was a bright step in bilateral relations. United States also put Pakistan in the list of states sponsoring terrorism. But in 1991 a Bill was moved in the House of Representatives seeking to deny United States economic assistance to India for refusing to hold plebiscite in Kashmir and urged the United States President to use all measures to establish necessary conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{11}

In early 1993 the new administration took charge in the United States under Bill Clinton. During his period, the United States made some bitter comments on the Kashmir issue. It has changed its policy year to year on Kashmir issue. Mr. Bill Clinton sent a message to the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Shahryr Khan in Islamabad on 7 January 1993, through United States Ambassador to Pakistan. In this message Mr. Clinton warned that Pakistan could be named a terrorist sponsor, state if it fails to convincingly refute.
India's charge that it is abetting and aiding terrorist activities in India. 12

When relations are going on smooth, the statements of United States official indicated radical change on their position on Kashmir. The first indication of the change in United States policy came in a speech by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, John Malott at the India International Centre on 19 May 1993. He outlined Three Principles of United States Policy with regard to Kashmir. Firstly United States considered all of Kashmir a disputed territory. Secondly the dispute should be settled peacefully between India and Pakistan taking the views of Kashmiris, both muslims and non-muslims. Thirdly the United States was prepared to be helpful in this process, if desired by both sides. This indicated the United States interest to enter as a third party in the negotiations.

The new Assistant Secretary of State Ms. Robin Raphel, rubbed more soul in the wound caused by Malott's statement by asserting in a briefing to South Asian Correspondents in Washington on 28 October 1993, that United States did not accept the instrument of Accession of 1947 in its totality. India protested vigorously, the United States appeared to be questioning the Independence Act and thereby the very independence of India Mrs. Raphal further muddied the Indo-United States waters by maintaining subsequently that there was not enough evidence to prove Pakistan's
official involvement in giving material assistance to the militants operating in Kashmir, although there has been various state department reports to that effect. These statements injected a new element for the Kashmir conflict by saying that the people of Kashmir should be active participants in the ultimate peace negotiation for the future of Jammu and Kashmir. Raphel's statement also implied that the United States because of its superior muscle power and being the sole super power in the new world order would be able to roll back Kashmir issue back to front burner in the UN Security council and from where it (United States) could impose a peace formula on Kashmir on both India and Pakistan.  

One of the most remarkable instances of Clinton's mishandling of diplomatic niceties vis-a-vis India happened on 28 September 1993, when in the course of his address to the UN General Assembly, he mentioned Kashmir along with Angola and Caucasus as the troubled spots in Contemporary world where "bloody and ethnic, religious and civil war" are raging on. India expressed its unhappiness on President's remark. It is ironical to make such comments, when India allowed to the Kashmir valley the visits of International Commission of Jurists, the representatives of European Commission, the European Union and the International Red cross to assess the human rights situation and Pakistan outside support to the militants. When India smoothly
handled the Hazratbal siege, Washington appreciated India's nature handling of the crisis. The Indo-Pak Foreign Secretary level talks on Kashmir started in July 1990 and they continued up to January 1994. The United States welcomed these talks and asked both the countries to settle the issue bilaterally by peaceful means.

In January 1994, Bill Clinton has gone to the extent of writing a back-patting letter to Ghuloom Nabifai, a United States based Kashmir separatist. In that letter he said we share Pakistan's concerns about human rights and abuses in Kashmir. New Delhi asked the United States official to follow clear cut policy on Kashmir. New Delhi reached that President Clinton forgetting the human rights violation by militants and terrorists aided and abetted by from outside.

In January 1993 the United States Institute of Peace an organisation founded by the United States congress, organized a meeting to explore the situation in Kashmir. The conference took the view that the Shimla Agreement had been overtaken by events in the last few years. While it agreed that Pakistan was deeply involved in Secessionist activity, it felt the movement for freedom in Kashmir was genuine. It suggested that the two parts of Kashmir should be united and made into autonomous region to be defended jointly by India and Pakistan and that there should be full freedom of movement for the people of the state. India
rejected that the Idea was not practicable and it was fully capable of defending Kashmir by itself.

When India announced elections in Kashmir America welcomed the move. It was clear in Bill Clinton's letter of reply to Pakistani-American in July, 1996, in it, Mr. Clinton is said to have underlined, interalia, that the United States would encourage India's efforts to restore democratic process in Jammu and Kashmir. When the new Government under Deve Gowda took charge in New Delhi, the Pakistan Prime Minister Mrs. Bhutto asked the new Prime Minister to start talks on contentious issues, including Kashmir. The United States President welcomed the prospects of a resumption of talks between India and Pakistan stalled in January 1994. In October 1996 the United States rejected the call by the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, for an International conference. The state Department spokesman Mr. Nicholos Burns, said that the Kashmir issue should be resolved through bilateral talks between India and Pakistan and it was very important that the leaders of the two countries had regular, full and frank dialogue.

With the above discussion, it is evident that the United States is changing its tone from time to time. It is not following consistent policy on this sensitive issue. It appears in post cold war era that United States recognising.
the importance of both countries to have peaceful settlement on this issue, without disturbing the South Asian Peace. 15

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IN INDO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

While developments of the last few years have contributed to a change in India's perceptions of American Policy towards the region, the issue of human rights has emerged as the nucleus of new tensions. The United State's has declared that human rights are the Centre piece of its Foreign policy. The world community is now very sensitive to any serious violation of human rights. It is no longer possible for any country to ignore world opinion in the matter. International human organisation's like Amnesty international and Asia watch have focused attention on violation of human rights by Indias security forces. They want many of the laws passed by the Indian Parliament repealed as in their view, those laws entail violation of human rights.

The United States Congress too has raised the issue of violation of human rights time and again. Certain organisations of the United States sikhs and Kashmiris have successfully lobbied members of the United State's congress. Some congressmen and Senators are genuinely interested in the issue of human rights, but quite a few only find it useful in their favourite game of India-bashing. The State department has however, taken a fairly well balanced view.
India did not permit representatives of Amnesty International for 14 years to investigate cases of alleged violation of human rights. India-baiters used this fact to whip-up anti-India sentiment. In June 1990 a bill was introduced in the house of representatives calling for suspension of development aid until India allowed Amnesty International to investigate cases of violation of human rights. Stephensolarz, chairman of the sub-committee on Asia and the pacific asked for the views of administration. Janet B. Mullins, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, said that the bill seemed to assume that only non-Indian human rights organisation were capable of monitoring the human rights situation in India. She added "India is a vigorous democracy and human rights are monitored there in much the same way as they are monitored in the United States". She also underlined the fact that the Government of India had permitted foreigners, including American Congressmen and embassy officials, to visit areas in India where there were serious public order problems, talk freely with the inhabitants. There upon the Bill was put to the vote in the Rules Committee and defeated.

But that was not the end of the matter. The issue came up again on 12 June 1991 at the time of discussions of the Foreign Assistance Bill for the fiscal year 1992-93, with the efforts of Walley Herger (Republican, California) and Dan Burton (Republican-Indiana) Congressmen who are
always on the look out for an opportunity to force discussions on the question of human rights in India. Interestingly these congressmen never speak of the activities of the secessionist groups in India. However, the amendment asking for suspension of aid fell through.

Under the pressure of public opinion inside the country and abroad, the Government of India appointed National Human Rights Commission with a former justice of the Supreme Court as its head. India's human rights record was steadily increasing with an independent human rights commission. The setting up of commission has been praised by several International agencies.

President Clinton administration has giving top priority for human rights in its Foreign policy. President Clinton's strong words on human rights abuses in China signalled a new activities on behalf of human rights in other parts of the world as well. For the first time ever, the Pentagon now has an Assistant Secretary for Defense (human rights and democracy) who is responsible to keep account of human rights records of various regions. President Clinton also made a statement about human rights violation in Kashmir. 17

When the United State's Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Mallott visited India, the human rights issue was one of the the focal point in discussions we basically
conveyed our position that while India was always willing to discuss human rights issue with friendly countries, it would not like to be in a position of receiving either advice or extortions from any country. Our position is that India's Commitment to human rights is second to none. The rule of law is very well established in India. When our Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit visited America in September 1993, the human rights figured in discussions. He told the United State's administration, the steps taken by the Indian Government to alleviate the human rights situation.

Representatives of United States congress, Walley Herger and Dan Burton raised the issue of violation of human rights in India, whenever the administration comes out with a proposal to extend aid to India. They specially ask that all aid to India be suspended unless it agrees to repeal legislations like the 'Maintenance of Internal Security Act' (MISA), and 'Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act' (TADA).

Despite the fact that the state department has praised India for significant progress in the area of human rights, Republican members from Indiana Don Burton introduced a bill to cut aid to India for violation of human rights. He introduced the Bill when Foreign operation Bill came for debate in June 1996. But it was defeated by the United States congress. This marks the third straight year
that Mr. Burton will submit an amendment that singles out India for punitive treatment. This American Congressman irresponsible attempt to damage India–United State’s relations at a time when the two countries should be getting closer and not drifting apart. It is ironical to introduce such Bill when Indian Government constituted ‘National Human Rights Commission’ and taken a decision not to re-enact Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Prevention Act’ (TADA). 18

BROWN AMENDMENT :

The Brown amendment, which was initiated by a senator from Colorado, caused great irritation in Indo-American relations. It was moved to ease Presseler law (which bars military supplies and economic aid to Pakistan because of its pursuit of the nuclear weapons programme). The brown amendment has adversely affected security balance in South Asia. It was passed to supply arms to Pakistan worth of $368, for which Pakistan already paid money. 19 The first step for the passage of Brown amendment started when Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited United States in the month of April 1995. She went there with a plain image of give me my equipment or my money back so white house started efforts to supply military Hardware to Pakistan. Actually, Mr. Brown introduced the Bill for one time waiver to Presseler amendment in August, 1995, while discussions are going on defense appropriation Bill. But it
was failed, on account of lack of support. Next he proposed the same Bill in September 1995. After discussing the Bill, in detail, the Senate approved this amendment by a comfortable 55 to 44 majority on September 21, 1995.  

Indian Government strongly resisted the United States move, as it jeopardizes regional balance in South Asia. The Prime Ministers Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, has told the United States President Mr. Bill Clinton in his reply to Mr. Clinton letter on the subject that the American move for military supply to Pakistan would lead to an arms race in the South Asian region rather than promote peace and stability (as believed in Washington). The Prime Minister appears to have drawn attention to the irony that the American action should be promoting a weapons build-up, the first of its kind after the end of the cold-war. Mr. Clinton had explained, at some length, that their proposal was intended not only to improve relations between United States and Pakistan but also between India and Pakistan. The proposed transfers, Clinton seemed to imply, would be of marginal significance and would not affect the balance in the region. But Mr. Clinton's explanations are not true and relevant.  

The proposed amendment has created mixed reactions even in the United States Senate discussions. In the Senate several members took the opportunity to point out that
Pakistan broke its "Contract" with the United States in 1985 and received assistance knowing fully well that a nuclear programme was being developed, and that if the Brown amendment was accepted, it would mean allowing Islamabads nuclear weapons programme. Supporters of the amendment said that an honourable nation keep its commitment. Senator, Mr. John Glenn, said the issue was not about fairness but whether the United States was serious at all about nuclear non-proliferation. In his view Pakistan was violative, has not cooperated and that being the case it should not be rewarded.

The counter point has been that the military hardware package will set off a new arms race between India and Pakistan; and at least one senator has argued that in some ways the arms package would enhance the military capability of Iran given Islamabads close relations with a so-called terrorist nation. The administration, senator James Exon said, has taken the wrong stance; it is winking going back on laws and brown amendment was a mistake as, among other things, it would be violating the intent and principles of non-proliferation.

The Union Home Minister Mr. S.B. Chavan has said that the United State's senate's decision to approve arm sales to Pakistan following lifting of restrictions on the Presseler law would lead to tension between India and the United State's. "Indian wants to be friendly with every
country. Especially its neighbors, but the United State's move will force us to buy arms". He said A huge amount of money which could be utilised for the uplift of the poor had to be spent on defense he said. 24

The proposed amendments as was said by Mr. Brown will not repeal military aid and sales to Pakistan and that the $370 millions package had to do with contracts that were executed before 1990. His words have given a sigh to the Indians as the amendment will be applicable only for one time.

Under this Brown amendment the bilateral relations between United State's and Pakistan re-established in economic military as well as in others sectors. It also recommends cooperation in multi-lateral peace settlements, suppression of immoral traffic of drugs, suppression of terrorism, military training and release of repaired F-1 war planes etc. It includes supply of P3-C orions, equipped with Harpoon missiles, which would give Pakistan the capability to attack Indian naval vessels right up to the southern most tip of the Indian peninsula. 25

But the 26, F-16 jets have been kept out of the brown package. The amendment would allow the sale of the already paid for F-16 jets to a third party and the money will be reimbursed to Pakistan, instead those combat aircrafts. 26
By this amendment the United State's now would not have any justification, if at all there was any in the past, in telling India to go slow with its missile programme and in particular, not to undertake the serial production of Prithvi. Washington had seriously impaired its capacity to play a useful role in matters of peace and security in South Asia. It caused great strains on Indian security. It prompted India to increase its defense expenditure.

The United States followed the policy of Pakistan attitude towards Pakistan on account of number of reasons. Washington had persuaded itself that Pakistan under Bhutto could be a buffer against Islamic fundamentalism. Americans believed that Pakistan will be an ally in the struggle against fundamentalism in Iran and Central Asia. The sale of armaments to Pakistan made good business, especially when armament industry was in the doldrums and every major country was making efforts to market its arms in the third world. From the Pakistan side, it helped the Benazir Bhutto Government in power, which was facing domestic compulsions for its failure of Foreign policy.

Eventhough American assurances that they will not be used (United States supplied arms to Pakistan) against India, it is not believable to India, as we had seen in two India-Pak wars, in which Pakistan used American arms against India and America remained a spectator, without asking
Pakistan to stop usage of its arms against India. So in the long run, it causes great strains on Indian security and sovereignty.

INDO-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES ON NPT:

Since 1960's the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) remained a contentious issue in Indo-United State's relations. From time to time United States exerting great pressure on India to sign NPT. India categorically denied to sign NPT in its present form as it lacks proper balance of power and divides the world into haves and have-nots. India has also argued that three countries in its neighbourhood have nuclear weapons and that it cannot for that reason agree to give up its nuclear option unilaterally.28

United States has taken harsh measures to pressurize India to sign NPT at least in 1990's. Infact, the United States abstention on a World Bank loan to the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) in 1993 was not entirely due to environmental concerns, but its main intention is to pressure India on nuclear issue. From time to time United State's coming with new proposal to ask India to sign NPT.

In early 1990's India turned down a United States-Pak proposal for a nuke-free zone in South Asia for the scheme does not take into account the nuclear threat from
China. In 1990 the Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff proposed 5-power conference to resolve nuclear issue in South Asia. United States supported the plan. India refused to participate in this 5-power conference, as the issue is global concern and not regional concern. Next the United State's put forward the regional security conference of Pakistan, United States, Russia, China, UK, France, Germany and Japan. India did not showed any interest in to participate in conference and ultimately United States dropped the idea.

During his visit to India in May 1993, the United States Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. John Malott had wanted India to finally act on issues that caused concern to the United States. The first among these issues was the issue of non-proliferation. Later Ms. Robin Raphel, the United States Assistant Secretary of State, dealing with South Asia went to the extent of hinting that non-proliferation was infact a pre-requisite before the Prime Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao could visit the United States. But India did not succumbed to the pressures of United State's and it maintained that it will not sign NPT in its present form.

When Prime Minister Mr. Rao visited United States in May 1994, Mr. Rao reiterated the Indian position that the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation required global solutions based on the principles of equality and non-
discrimination. In 1993 talks have been held for the indefinite extension of NPT. India has not even sent observer to the main extension conference held in New York. India had refused to sign the indefinite extension of the NPT as it locked proper balance of power and responsibility and divided the world into haves and have-nots.

It is evident that India declared its past position not to sign NPT even in 1990's even though United States exerted pressure to sign the draft. Indian stand is more clear from the Prime Minister Rao's well publicised statement, in a meeting with his party MPs, that India would not sign the NPT under pressure, even if it was the only nation left in the world to do so. In future also the NPT issue will remain a burning topic in Indo-United States relations.30

INDO-UNITED STATES DIVERGENT VIEWS ON CTBT:

In 1990's one of the most contentious issue between India and the United States is the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The negotiations for the drafting of CTBT started in summer 1996 under United Nations Sponsored Conference on disarmament meeting in Geneva. It is not the first time that the International Community has come close to concluding a nuclear test ban.31 There were quite a few occasions in the past when the nuclear weapon powers were on the verge of reaching agreements on burning nuclear tests.
and each time the United State’s sabotaged the whole process for extraneous political considerations, mainly due to sudden deterioration in its relations with the soviet union. From the early 1980’s when the former president Mr. Ronald Raegan set the United States on the path of hectic programme of nuclear armament to combat the ‘evil empire’, the United States has stubbornly resisted all attempts to negotiate a test ban treaty.

The sudden change in the United State’s position in the early 1990’s in favour of the CTBT was due to the changed global strategic situation. The United States has already collected enough data by virtue of thousands of tests it had carried out, to go on improving its nuclear stockpile through computer stimulation.

It is great pity that India became an accomplice in the United States VOLTE FACE on the CTBT Purely for its own selfish purpose. In Co-sponsoring with the United States the resolution on the CTBT adopted by the General Assembly in 1993 season, India agreed to drop any reference to nuclear disarmament which had figured in all the resolutions on the this subject sponsored by India in the past and which was the central theme of the Rajiv Gandhi plan of Action. India might have done it for its own opportunistic end, but there is no doubt that in the process it gave wrong signals to the world, including the United
States and made its task of subsequently trying to regain the high moral ground on nuclear disarmament extremely difficult. With this stand of India, the United States pressured India to stand on its earlier position even in Geneva talks. But India realised its mistake and refused to sign the draft.

In 1996 Geneva talks India announced its inability to sign the treaty relating to the global ban on nuclear testing. Indian Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Arundathi Ghose told the open plenary of the Conference on disarmament on June 20th that India would not sign the CTBT in its present form. Ms Ghose declared "This was not the CTBT that India envisaged in 1954. This can not be the CTBT than Indian can be expected to accept". New Delhi proposed that the treaty be linked to a global pledge on a time bound elimination of all atomic weapons. India objecting that CTBT does not stop nuclear weapon states from continuing, refining and developing their nuclear arsenal at their test sites and in their laboratories. India also wanted to change the proposal of entry in to provision.

The United States contends that the elimination of the existing pile of nuclear arms in not practical. United States first pressured India to sign the treaty. The United State's spokes man warned India that it would have to "Pay a Price" for not "falling in line" with the United State's-dominated world community. When India stand firmly, the
United States gradually changed its position towards India in pressuring India on CTBT. The United States asked India, "even if you don't sign, you don't block it." 33

Indian Government at last decided, to veto the passage of CTBT. While vetoing CTBT in its present form India said it would gladly sign the document only if five nuclear powers agree to a time-bound programme of destroying the stock pile of their nuclear arms. Any how, the United States succeeded with the help of Australia to raise the issue in U.N. General Assembly in September 1996. The Austria Sponsored a resolution in UN General Assembly to sign the CTBT. After hetic discussions, the bill was passed in UN General Assembly India tried it best in UN General Assembly to stop the passing of CTBT. But it was failed in its attempts. On 24th September it was opened for signatories. The United State's along with its allies signed the treaty. The five nuclear powers signed the treaty. India along with Libya, Bhutan, voted againsted the document in General Assembly.

DEFENSE RELATIONS IN 1990's:

Despite major differences over the nuclear issue, cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries has substantiality increased in 1990's. The defense pacts are not knew. They are continuing since 1950's. The
defense aid of United States to India in 1962 conflict with China is most remarkable one. But the military aid given to Pakistan is more than what it affording to India. Only a small quantity of military equipment is reaching from United States.

Whereas India claims that its space programme is aimed at achieving certain peaceful purposes as for example, putting satellite in outer space. The United States fears that the dual use of technology may be diverted to augment Indias military strength. United States feared that if India succeeds in developing the polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV), it would be in possession of rocket capability powerful enough for an ICBM, that could threaten the continental United States. The United States asked India to cap its missile programme, especially the launch of Prithvi and Agni missiles. Inspite United States criticism of missile programmes India successfully launched Angi and Prithvi missiles.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) of which the United States was member and India was not, is a group of countries that seeks to check a proliferation of missile. Under this MTCR. The United States imposed two years ban on Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the GlavCosmos of Russia, when these countries engaged in the transfer of Cryogenic engine technology. At last under United States pressure the Russia terminated agreement with
India. But United States was unaware of M-11 missile acquisition of Pakistan from China. It has not taken any decision to put any restrictions on these two countries. So we can understand that the United States is taking double standard, in its defense policies. 35

Despite differences on missile programmes, India has resumed its participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme run by United States. The importance of the programme is evident from the facts that four Indian Service Chiefs have attended it since 1981 some progress has been made in the transfer of dual-use technology, in December 1992 there has been a high level dialogue between the two armies, with representatives meeting with increasing frequency. The dialogue picked up when the Lieutenant General Claude Kickleigher put forward his proposals for broader cooperation between the armies of the two countries. In a note he stated that the essence of his proposal was to pursue a common policy of gradually strengthening ties towards expanding cooperation and partnership by the end of this decade through high level visits, exchanges and periodic reviews. Indo-American army staff talks, and cooperative work in selected areas of common interest.

While these proposals were being formulated, India's chief of the Army staff, General S.F. Rodrigues, paid a visit to the United States. His talks at the Pentagon
showed that new bridges were being built. The armies of the two countries had not talked to each other for forty years. The joint Naval exercise with the United States Navy was a giant step in the growing cooperation between the two countries. After the fiasco over the cryogenic rocket engine deal, the first high level contact between two governments was the visit of Foreign secretary J.N. Dixit in September 1993. During his talks Mr. Dixit expressed India's concerns on Washington's pressure on France, not to supply any fuel for the Tarapur nuclear reactor.36

United States-Defense Secretary Visit:

United States Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry visited India in January 1995. This is the first visit after the end of the cold war of a United State's defense secretary. This visit flows from our Prime Ministers visit to United States. The Government of India and the United States recognise the importance of enhancing our defense co-operation as an important part of bilateral relationship. The growth of bilateral defense relations in New areas will be evolutionary and related to convergence on global and regional issues. The enhanced defense cooperation between our two countries is designed to make a positive contribution to the security and stability of Asia.
Agreed Minute on Defense Relations between India and the United States:

After discussion the two countries signed the agreed minutes in three parts during the visit. The agreed minutes is the first document between two defense ministries of India and United States in the post-cold war period. Beginning of such cooperation were made with the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of 1984, the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in 1987 and the Kicklighter proposal of the early 1990's.

1. Civilian-to-Civilian Co-operation:

Both sides agreed that military-to-military ties should be supplemented by periodic consultations between senior civilian officials in the Indian 'Ministry of Defense' (MOD) and United States 'Department of Defense' with the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The MOD and OSD policy group meetings will include representatives, as necessary, from other Government agencies on both sides, such as 'Ministry of External Affairs' and the United States 'Department of State'. The consultation would serve to review issues of Joint concern such as post-cold war security planning and policy perspectives on both sides to provide policy guidance, the joint technical group supporting cooperation in defense research and production, to resolve policy issues such that are raised by the
service-to-service steering groups, and to promote senior level civilian exchanges as well as joint seminars between the two sides on defense and security issues.

2. Service-to-Service Cooperation:

The Co-operation begun in 1990 between the Indian and United States armies, navies and Airforces has been encouraging. It was agreed that the emphasis of service-to-service co-operation will be on professional contacts and functional co-operation including increased frequency and scope of high level exchanges, the presence of observers at each other's military exercises, attendance at seminars on subjects of mutual professional interest, professional technical training and joint exercise at progressively higher levels of scale and sophistication.

3. Defense Research and Production Co-operation:

Defense Research and Production Co-operation will also be an integral part of the bilateral defense relationship. Existing technical and production cooperation activities, such as Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, have been encouraging and will be continued. The scope and content of further expansion of cooperative defense research and production activities in accordance with the laws, policies and agreements of each country, will be developed by a Joint Technical Group (JTB) composed of senior officials from the two countries.
The Indo-United States defense co-operation is not directed at any third country. India also does not look for external assistance to handle any of its security problems. The growth of bilateral defense relations in new areas will be evolutionary and related to convergence on global and regional issues.

THE CRYOGENIC DEAL:

When India floated a global tender in 1990 for acquiring cryogenic engines, apart from Glavkosmos of Russia, India also had offers from the Arian of France and the General Dynamics of the United States and where was not a clue of the events to come. Since the Glavkosmos had quoted a lower price than that of its Western Counterparts, the formers offer was the one that was accepted. Much water has flown under the bridge since then and a series of events has culminated in the effective suspension of the technology-transferred.

India maintains that it needed the cryogenic engine for peaceful application in its space programme. But the United States accuses that the transfer of technology would have led to missile proliferation and would be a violation of the missile technology control Regime (MTCR) formulated in 1987. In relaxation to the agreement between India Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Glavkosmos for
the sole of cryogenic engine and technology transfer, the
United States clamped a two year ban on the sale of
sensitive space technology on 11 May 1992. Despite the fact
that many of its own experts did not subscribe to the idea,
the United States maintained that this technology could be
used for developing long range missile and was therefore a
violation of MTCR, which aims to curb the proliferation of
such medium and long range missiles, capable of carrying
nuclear war-heads. As per the ban, the United States will
neither export nor import any technology to or from these
organisations for the next two year.38

The United States found the technology transfer
proposal totally unacceptable and came down heavily on the
deal, declaring that this would enhance Indias missile
making technology, which would go against the MTCR, since it
would lead to violation of non-proliferation in the Indian
sub continent.

As an initial reaction, Russia made it clear that
it would go a head with the deal, the United States
displeasure not withstanding. Lofty declaration to that
effect were made during President Yeltsin visit to India in
January 1992. But tones changed as an economically insecure
Russia remembered amidst rising United States Pressure, the
monetary aid it needed from the west, to give a much needed
shot in the arm to Russias sagging economy. And when a team
of Russian negotiators, led by Yuri Koptev, the director of
the Russian space agency, completed its talks in Washington, it had a turned the Russian stand by 180° and decided to forget about the rocket technology transfer deal.

While due to its own compulsions Russia had to yield to the United States, which was resorted to apply tremendous pressure by threatening various implications of the non-scrapping of the deal, the fact remains that the United States as well as Russia, are finding it difficult to prove that the rocket deal violates MTCR. In the United States, a group of nuclear non-proliferators have admitted that acquiring the know-how and the licensed rights to build the cryogenic engines would not in any way enhance India's missile capability. Russian officials, too seem to have nothing to fall back upon and invoked the "force majeure" clause of the agreement to scrap the deal. The United States administration had offered to lift the ban on sale of sensitive components to ISRO, if India agreed to scrap the rocket deal. 39

No matter how hard the United States may try to paint it as a MTCR violation, the world-and-India-understands that actually the United States does not want India to acquire this technology largely for commercial reasons. This is because if allowed to be successfully completed, the launching facilities developed at Sri Hari Kota could then be used by other third world countries, thus causing decreased business to the same facilities being
offered at French Gayana and Cape Kennedy. Hence there is a concerted effort against India, pressurizing Russia to scrap the deal, since the Russian economy is in need of support and Russia needs the United State's help in various ways. Also, the United States can help the Russian Space Agency to enter a global market they were hitherto uninteractive with.

The scrapping of deal by Russia under United State's pressure was quite disturbing for India especially in view of the fact that the cryogenic engine was no use for missile technology as missile. Pre-launch time would then become days instead of hours. India's efforts to develop this technology were prompted more by its dependence and need for information of a geostationary satellite in space can provide than from any aggressively militaristic design India badly needs information on the weather and hopes to use the satellite for developing system of communication.

The United States for its self interest pressured Russia to stop transfer of technology, ignoring India's concerns for improving our knowledge about nature and its passage.
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